mneb/malware-text-db · Datasets at Hugging Face

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More than half of the malware samples with Portable Executable (PE) resources that we have attributed to APT28 included Russian language settings (as opposed to neutral or English settings), suggesting that a significant portion of APT28 malware was compiled in a Russian language build environment consistently over the...	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Over 96% of the malware samples we have attributed to APT28 were compiled between Monday and Friday.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
More than 89% were compiled between 8AM and 6PM in the UTC+4 time zone, which parallels the working hours in Moscow and St. Petersburg.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
These samples had compile dates ranging from mid-2007 to September 2014.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Three themes in APT28's targeting clearly reflect areas of specific interest to an Eastern European government, most likely the Russian government.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Many of APT28's targets align generally with interests that are typical of any government.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
However, three themes in APT28's targeting clearly reflects areas of specific interest to an Eastern European government, most likely the Russian government.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
These include the Caucasus (especially the Georgian government), Eastern European governments and militaries, and specific security organizations.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
APT28 uses spearphishing emails to target its victims, a common tactic in which the threat group crafts its emails to mention specific topics (lures) relevant to recipients.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 0, "end": 5 }, { "text": "spearphishing emails", "start": 11, "end": 31 }, { "text": "target its victims", "start": 35, "end": 53 }, { "...	[]
This increases the likelihood that recipients will believe that the email is legitimate and will be interested in opening the message, opening any attached files, or clicking on a link in the body of the email.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Since spearphishing lures are tailored to the recipients whose accounts APT28 hopes to breach, the subjects of the lures provide clues as to APT28's targets and interests.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
For example, if the group's lures repeatedly refer to the Caucasus, then this most likely indicates that APT28 is trying to gain access to the accounts of individuals whose work pertains to the Caucasus.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Similarly, APT28's practice of registering domains that mimic those of legitimate news, politics, or other websites indicates topics that are relevant to APT28's targets.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We identified three themes in APT28's lures and registered domains, which together are particularly relevant to the Russian government.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In addition to these themes, we have seen APT28 target a range of political and military organizations.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We assess that the work of these organizations serves nation state governments.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The Caucasus, a region that includes Chechnya and other Russian republics and the independent states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, continues to experience political unrest.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The Georgian government's posture and ties to the West are a frequent source of Moscow's frustration, particularly after the 2008 war.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Overall, issues in the Caucasus likely serve as focal points for Russian intelligence collection efforts.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Since 2011, APT28 has used lures written in Georgian that are probably intended to target Georgian government agencies or citizens.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 12, "end": 17 }, { "text": "lures written in Georgian", "start": 27, "end": 52 } ], "action": [ { "text": "used", "start": 22, "end": 26 } ...	[]
APT28 is likely seeking information on Georgia's security and diplomatic postures.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Specifically, the group has targeted the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD).	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We also observed efforts to target a journalist working on issues in the Caucasus and a controversial Chechen news site.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
APT28 made at least two specific attempts to target the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The MIA harbors sensitive information about the inner workings of Georgia's security operations, the country's engagement in multilateral institutions, and the government's communications backbone.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
It is responsible for: APT28 made at least two specific attempts to target the MIA.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In one case, we identified an APT28 lure from mid-2013 that referenced MIA-related topics and employed malware that attempted to disguise its activity as legitimate MIA email traffic.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "malware", "start": 103, "end": 110 }, { "text": "its activity", "start": 138, "end": 150 }, { "text": "legitimate MIA email traffic", "start": 154, "end": 182 } ],...	[]
The lure consisted of a weaponized Excel file that presented a decoy document containing a list of Georgian driver's license numbers.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a weaponized Excel file", "start": 22, "end": 45 }, { "text": "a decoy document containing a list of Georgian driver's license numbers", "start": 61, "end": 132 } ], "action": [ { "...	[]
The backdoor attempted to establish a connection to a Georgian MIA mail server and communicate via MIA email addresses ending with'' @mia.ge.gov''.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "a connection to a Georgian MIA mail server", "start": 36, "end": 78 }, { "text": "MIA email addresses ending with'' @mia.ge.gov''", ...	[]
Once connected to the mail server, APT28's backdoor sent an email message using a subject line related to driver's licenses (in Georgian), and attached a file containing system reconnaissance information.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28's backdoor", "start": 35, "end": 51 }, { "text": "an email message using a subject line related to driver's licenses (in Georgian)", "start": 57, "end": 137 }, { "text": "a file conta...	[]
This tactic could allow APT28 to obtain data from the MIA's network through a less-monitored route, limiting the MIA network security department's abilities to detect the traffic.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 24, "end": 29 }, { "text": "data", "start": 40, "end": 44 }, { "text": "the MIA's network", "start": 50, "end": 67 }, { "text": "a less-...	[]
In the second example of MIA targeting, an APT28 lure used an information technology-themed decoy document that included references to the Windows domain'' MIA Users\Ortachala…'' (Figure 1).	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "an APT28 lure", "start": 40, "end": 53 }, { "text": "an information technology-themed decoy document that included references to the Windows domain'' MIA Users\\Ortachala…'' (Figure 1)", "start": 59, "end": 18...	[]
This probably referred to the MIA facility in the Ortachala district of Tbilisi, Georgia's capital city.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The decoy document also contains metadata listing'' MIA'' as the company name and'' Beka Nozadze'' as an author, a possible reference to a system administrator in Tbilisi.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The decoy document", "start": 0, "end": 18 }, { "text": "metadata listing'' MIA'' as the company name and'' Beka Nozadze'' as an author", "start": 33, "end": 111 } ], "action": [ { ...	[]
The text of the document purports to provide domain and user group setup information for internal Windows XP and Windows 7 systems.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The text of the document", "start": 0, "end": 24 }, { "text": "provide domain and user group setup information for internal Windows XP and Windows 7 systems", "start": 37, "end": 130 } ], "action...	[]
APT28 possibly crafted this document to appear legitimate to all MIA system users and intended to breach the MIA network specifically using the embedded malware.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 0, "end": 5 }, { "text": "this document", "start": 23, "end": 36 }, { "text": "appear legitimate to all MIA system users", "start": 40, "end": 81 } ...	[]
APT28 also appeared to target Georgia's MOD along with a U.S. defense contractor that was training the Georgian military.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
APT28 used a lure document that installed a SOURFACE downloader (further discussed in the Malware section) and contained a listing of birthdays for members of a working group between the Georgian MOD and the U.S. defense contractor.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 0, "end": 5 }, { "text": "a lure document", "start": 11, "end": 26 }, { "text": "a SOURFACE downloader", "start": 42, "end": 63 }, { "te...	[]
The U.S. contractor was involved in a working group to advise the MOD and Georgian Armed Forces, assess Georgia's military capabilities, and develop a military training program for the country.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We believe that APT28's targeting of the MOD aligns with Russian threat perceptions.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The growing U.S.-Georgian military relationship has been a source of angst for Russia.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Georgia and Russia severed diplomatic relations following the Russia-Georgia War in 2008, and Georgia has since sought to align itself more closely with western security organizations.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Additionally, in June 2014, despite Russia's vocal objections, Georgia, along with Ukraine and Moldova, signed association accords with the EU.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
This move placed all three countries more firmly in the EU's political, economic, and security spheres of influence.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Georgian military security issues, particularly with regard to U.S. cooperation and NATO, provide a strong incentive for Russian state-sponsored threat actors to steal information that sheds light on these topics.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Targeting journalists could provide APT28 and its sponsors with a way to monitor public opinion, identify dissidents, spread disinformation, or facilitate further targeting.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Another one of APT28's lures appeared to target a specific journalist covering issues in the Caucasus region.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Another one of APT28's lures", "start": 0, "end": 28 }, { "text": "a specific journalist covering issues in the Caucasus region", "start": 48, "end": 108 } ], "action": [ { "text": ...	[]
In late 2013, APT28 used a lure that contained a letter addressing a journalist by his first name and claiming to originate from a'' Chief Coordinator'' in Reason Magazine's'' Caucasian Issues Department''-a division that does not appear to exist.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 14, "end": 19 }, { "text": "a lure that contained a letter addressing a journalist by his first name and claiming to originate from a'' Chief Coordinator'' in Reason Magazine's'' Caucasian Issues Department''...	[]
(Reason Magazine is a US-based magazine) The letter welcomed the individual as a contributor and requested topic ideas and identification information in order to establish him at the magazine.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In the background, the decoy document installed a SOURFACE backdoor on the victim's system.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the decoy document", "start": 19, "end": 37 }, { "text": "a SOURFACE backdoor", "start": 48, "end": 67 }, { "text": "the victim's system", "start": 71, "end": 90 } ...	[]
The body of the letter suggests that APT28 actors are able to read at least two languages–Russian and English.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The grammar of the letter also indicates that English is not the author's first language, despite it purportedly originating from a US-based magazine.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
This implies that Russian may be the APT28 author's preferred language.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Targeting journalists could provide APT28 and its sponsors with a way to monitor public opinion, identify dissidents, spread disinformation, or facilitate further targeting.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Several other nation states are suspected of targeting journalists and dissidents to monitor their activity, including China and Iran., Journalists in the Caucasus working on Caucasus independence issues would be a prime target for intelligence collection for Moscow.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Journalists critical of the Kremlin have long been targets of surveillance and harassment, and a number of governments and human rights organizations have publicly criticized the government for its treatment of journalists and its increasing consolidation of control over the media.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We have seen APT28 register at least two domains mimicking the domains of legitimate organizations in the Caucasus, as shown in the table below.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 13, "end": 18 }, { "text": "at least two domains mimicking the domains of legitimate organizations in the Caucasus", "start": 28, "end": 114 } ], "action": [ { "tex...	[]
One APT28 domain imitated a key Chechen-focused news website, while the other appeared to target members of the Armenian military by hosting a fake login page.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "One APT28 domain", "start": 0, "end": 16 }, { "text": "a key Chechen-focused news website", "start": 26, "end": 60 }, { "text": "the other", "start": 68, "end": 77 }, ...	[]
Of particular note, the Kavkaz Center is a Chechen-run website designed to present an alternative view to the long-running conflict between Russia and Chechen separatists.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In 2004 and 2013, Russia's Foreign Minister voiced his displeasure that a Swedish company continues to host the Kavkaz Center website.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Eastern European countries' political and military postures are traditionally core Russian government interests.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The Kremlin has long regarded the former Soviet Republics and satellite states as in its sphere of economic, political, and military interest.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Over the past two decades, as many of these states joined NATO and the EU, Russia has attempted to regain its influence in the region.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Many of APT28's targets parallel this continued focus on Eastern European governments and militaries.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We have evidence that APT28 made at least two attempts to compromise Eastern European government organizations: • In a late 2013 incident, a FireEye device deployed at an Eastern European Ministry of Foreign Affairs detected APT28 malware in the client's network.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
• More recently, in August 2014 APT28 used a lure (Figure 3) about hostilities surrounding a Malaysia Airlines flight downed in Ukraine in a probable attempt to compromise the Polish government.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 32, "end": 37 }, { "text": "a lure (Figure 3) about hostilities surrounding a Malaysia Airlines flight downed in Ukraine", "start": 43, "end": 135 }, { "text": "a probable ...	[]
A SOURFACE sample employed in the same Malaysia Airlines lure was referenced by a Polish computer security company in a blog post.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "A SOURFACE sample", "start": 0, "end": 17 }, { "text": "the same Malaysia Airlines lure", "start": 30, "end": 61 } ], "action": [ { "text": "employed", "start": 18, ...	[]
The Polish security company indicated that the sample was'' sent to the government,'' presumably the Polish government, given the company's location and visibility.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We have evidence that APT28 made at least two attempts to compromise Eastern European government organizations.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
APT28 has registered domains similar to those of legitimate Eastern European news sites and governments, listed in Table 2.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 0, "end": 5 }, { "text": "domains similar to those of legitimate Eastern European news sites and governments", "start": 21, "end": 103 } ], "action": [ { "text": "r...	[]
These domain registrations not only suggest that APT28 is interested in Eastern European political affairs, but also that the group targets Eastern European governments directly.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In addition, APT28 used one domain for command and control sessions (baltichost [.] org) that was themed after the Baltic Host exercises.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 13, "end": 18 }, { "text": "one domain for command and control sessions (baltichost [.] org) that was themed after the Baltic Host exercises", "start": 24, "end": 136 } ], "actio...	[]
Baltic Host is a multinational logistics planning exercise, hosted annually since 2009 by one of the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all three of which are on Russia's border) on a rotational basis.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In June 2014, this event was integrated with a larger U.S. Army training event, and focused on exercises to improve interoperability with regional allies and partners., This domain registration suggests that APT28 sought to target individuals either participating in the exercises or interested in Baltic military and se...	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Such targets would potentially provide APT28 with sensitive tactical and strategic intelligence concerning regional military capabilities and relationships.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
These exercises are a particular point of interest in Moscow: pro- Kremlin press cited Russia's interpretation of these military exercises and NATO's involvement as a'' sign of aggression,'' and Russia's Foreign Minister publicly stated that the exercise was'' a demonstration of hostile intention.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
'' APT28's lures and domain registrations also demonstrate their interest in NATO and other European security organizations.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
NATO remains a chief Russian adversary, or in the words of Russia's 2010 military doctrine, a'' main external military danger'' particularly as it moves'' closer to the borders of the Russian Federation.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
'' As the traditional western counterweight to the Soviet Union, Russia regards NATO, particularly NATO's eastward expansion, as a threat to Russia's strategic stability.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
APT28 also registered a domain name imitating the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an intergovernmental organization that has cited widespread fraud in numerous Russian state elections.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Insider information about NATO, the OSCE and other security organizations would inform Russian political and military policy.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Several of the domains APT28 registered imitated NATO domain names, including those of NATO Special Operations Headquarters and the NATO Future Forces Exhibition.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Several of the domains APT28 registered", "start": 0, "end": 39 }, { "text": "NATO domain names", "start": 49, "end": 66 } ], "action": [ { "text": "imitated", "start": 40, ...	[]
We also observed a user that we suspect works for NATO HQ submit an APT28 sample to VirusTotal, probably as a result of receiving a suspicious email.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
APT28 also demonstrated an interest in defense attaches working in European countries.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We identified an APT28 lure containing a decoy document with a list of British officers and U.S. and Canadian military attachés in London.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "an APT28 lure", "start": 14, "end": 27 }, { "text": "a decoy document with a list of British officers and U.S. and Canadian military attachés in London", "start": 39, "end": 137 } ], "action": [ ...	[]
Finally, APT28 used a lure that contained an apparent non-public listing of contact information for defense attachés in the'' Ankara Military Attaché Corps (AMAC),'' which appears to be a professional organization of defense attachés in Turkey.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 9, "end": 14 }, { "text": "a lure that contained an apparent non-public listing of contact information for defense attachés in the'' Ankara Military Attaché Corps (AMAC),''", "start": 20, "end...	[]
In addition to targeting European security organizations and governments, it appears that APT28 is targeting attendees of European defense exhibitions.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Some of the APT28- registered domains imitated those of defense events held in Europe, such as the Farnborough Airshow 2014, EuroNaval 2014, EUROSATORY 2014, and the Counter Terror Expo.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Some of the APT28- registered domains", "start": 0, "end": 37 }, { "text": "those of defense events held in Europe", "start": 47, "end": 85 } ], "action": [ { "text": "imitated", ...	[]
In September 2014, APT28 registered a domain (smigroup- online.co [.] uk) that appeared to mimic that for the SMi Group, a company that plans events for the'' Defence, Security, Energy, Utilities, Finance and Pharmaceutical sectors.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 19, "end": 24 }, { "text": "a domain (smigroup- online.co [.] uk) that appeared to mimic that for the SMi Group", "start": 36, "end": 119 } ], "action": [ { "text":...	[]
'' Among other events, the SMi Group is currently planning a military satellite communications event for November 2014.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Targeting organizations and professionals involved in these defense events would likely provide APT28 with an opportunity to procure intelligence pertaining to new defense technologies, as well as the victim organizations' operations, communications, and future plans.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
APT28 has targeted a variety of organizations that fall outside of the three themes we highlighted above.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
However, we are not profiling all of APT28's targets with the same detail because they are not particularly indicative of a specific sponsor's interests.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
They do indicate parallel areas of interest to many governments and do not run counter to Russian state interests.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Other probable APT28 targets that we have identified: Our analysis of some of the group's more commonly used tools indicates that APT28 has been systematically updating their malware since 2007.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
APT28's tools are suggestive of the group's skills, ambitions, and identity.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Our analysis of some of the group's more commonly used tools indicates that APT28 has been systematically updating their tools since 2007.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
APT28 is most likely supported by a group of developers creating tools intended for long-term use and versatility, who make an effort to obfuscate their activity.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
This suggests that APT28 receives direct ongoing financial and other resources from a well-established organization, most likely a nation state government.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
APT28's malware settings suggest that the developers have done the majority of their work in a Russian language build environment during Russian business hours, which suggests that the Russian government is APT28's sponsor.	{ "entities": {} }	[]

More than half of the malware samples with Portable Executable (PE) resources that we have attributed to APT28 included Russian language settings (as opposed to neutral or English settings), suggesting that a significant portion of APT28 malware was compiled in a Russian language build environment consistently over the...

{ "entities": {} }

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Over 96% of the malware samples we have attributed to APT28 were compiled between Monday and Friday.

{ "entities": {} }

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More than 89% were compiled between 8AM and 6PM in the UTC+4 time zone, which parallels the working hours in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

These samples had compile dates ranging from mid-2007 to September 2014.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Three themes in APT28's targeting clearly reflect areas of specific interest to an Eastern European government, most likely the Russian government.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Many of APT28's targets align generally with interests that are typical of any government.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

However, three themes in APT28's targeting clearly reflects areas of specific interest to an Eastern European government, most likely the Russian government.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

These include the Caucasus (especially the Georgian government), Eastern European governments and militaries, and specific security organizations.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

APT28 uses spearphishing emails to target its victims, a common tactic in which the threat group crafts its emails to mention specific topics (lures) relevant to recipients.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 0, "end": 5 }, { "text": "spearphishing emails", "start": 11, "end": 31 }, { "text": "target its victims", "start": 35, "end": 53 }, { "...

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This increases the likelihood that recipients will believe that the email is legitimate and will be interested in opening the message, opening any attached files, or clicking on a link in the body of the email.

{ "entities": {} }

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Since spearphishing lures are tailored to the recipients whose accounts APT28 hopes to breach, the subjects of the lures provide clues as to APT28's targets and interests.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

For example, if the group's lures repeatedly refer to the Caucasus, then this most likely indicates that APT28 is trying to gain access to the accounts of individuals whose work pertains to the Caucasus.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Similarly, APT28's practice of registering domains that mimic those of legitimate news, politics, or other websites indicates topics that are relevant to APT28's targets.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

We identified three themes in APT28's lures and registered domains, which together are particularly relevant to the Russian government.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

In addition to these themes, we have seen APT28 target a range of political and military organizations.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

We assess that the work of these organizations serves nation state governments.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The Caucasus, a region that includes Chechnya and other Russian republics and the independent states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, continues to experience political unrest.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The Georgian government's posture and ties to the West are a frequent source of Moscow's frustration, particularly after the 2008 war.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Overall, issues in the Caucasus likely serve as focal points for Russian intelligence collection efforts.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Since 2011, APT28 has used lures written in Georgian that are probably intended to target Georgian government agencies or citizens.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 12, "end": 17 }, { "text": "lures written in Georgian", "start": 27, "end": 52 } ], "action": [ { "text": "used", "start": 22, "end": 26 } ...

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APT28 is likely seeking information on Georgia's security and diplomatic postures.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Specifically, the group has targeted the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD).

{ "entities": {} }

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We also observed efforts to target a journalist working on issues in the Caucasus and a controversial Chechen news site.

{ "entities": {} }

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APT28 made at least two specific attempts to target the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The MIA harbors sensitive information about the inner workings of Georgia's security operations, the country's engagement in multilateral institutions, and the government's communications backbone.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

It is responsible for: APT28 made at least two specific attempts to target the MIA.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

In one case, we identified an APT28 lure from mid-2013 that referenced MIA-related topics and employed malware that attempted to disguise its activity as legitimate MIA email traffic.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "malware", "start": 103, "end": 110 }, { "text": "its activity", "start": 138, "end": 150 }, { "text": "legitimate MIA email traffic", "start": 154, "end": 182 } ],...

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The lure consisted of a weaponized Excel file that presented a decoy document containing a list of Georgian driver's license numbers.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a weaponized Excel file", "start": 22, "end": 45 }, { "text": "a decoy document containing a list of Georgian driver's license numbers", "start": 61, "end": 132 } ], "action": [ { "...

[]

The backdoor attempted to establish a connection to a Georgian MIA mail server and communicate via MIA email addresses ending with'' @mia.ge.gov''.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "a connection to a Georgian MIA mail server", "start": 36, "end": 78 }, { "text": "MIA email addresses ending with'' @mia.ge.gov''", ...

[]

Once connected to the mail server, APT28's backdoor sent an email message using a subject line related to driver's licenses (in Georgian), and attached a file containing system reconnaissance information.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28's backdoor", "start": 35, "end": 51 }, { "text": "an email message using a subject line related to driver's licenses (in Georgian)", "start": 57, "end": 137 }, { "text": "a file conta...

[]

This tactic could allow APT28 to obtain data from the MIA's network through a less-monitored route, limiting the MIA network security department's abilities to detect the traffic.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 24, "end": 29 }, { "text": "data", "start": 40, "end": 44 }, { "text": "the MIA's network", "start": 50, "end": 67 }, { "text": "a less-...

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In the second example of MIA targeting, an APT28 lure used an information technology-themed decoy document that included references to the Windows domain'' MIA Users\Ortachala…'' (Figure 1).

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "an APT28 lure", "start": 40, "end": 53 }, { "text": "an information technology-themed decoy document that included references to the Windows domain'' MIA Users\\Ortachala…'' (Figure 1)", "start": 59, "end": 18...

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This probably referred to the MIA facility in the Ortachala district of Tbilisi, Georgia's capital city.

{ "entities": {} }

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The decoy document also contains metadata listing'' MIA'' as the company name and'' Beka Nozadze'' as an author, a possible reference to a system administrator in Tbilisi.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The decoy document", "start": 0, "end": 18 }, { "text": "metadata listing'' MIA'' as the company name and'' Beka Nozadze'' as an author", "start": 33, "end": 111 } ], "action": [ { ...

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The text of the document purports to provide domain and user group setup information for internal Windows XP and Windows 7 systems.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The text of the document", "start": 0, "end": 24 }, { "text": "provide domain and user group setup information for internal Windows XP and Windows 7 systems", "start": 37, "end": 130 } ], "action...

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APT28 possibly crafted this document to appear legitimate to all MIA system users and intended to breach the MIA network specifically using the embedded malware.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 0, "end": 5 }, { "text": "this document", "start": 23, "end": 36 }, { "text": "appear legitimate to all MIA system users", "start": 40, "end": 81 } ...

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APT28 also appeared to target Georgia's MOD along with a U.S. defense contractor that was training the Georgian military.

{ "entities": {} }

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APT28 used a lure document that installed a SOURFACE downloader (further discussed in the Malware section) and contained a listing of birthdays for members of a working group between the Georgian MOD and the U.S. defense contractor.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 0, "end": 5 }, { "text": "a lure document", "start": 11, "end": 26 }, { "text": "a SOURFACE downloader", "start": 42, "end": 63 }, { "te...

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The U.S. contractor was involved in a working group to advise the MOD and Georgian Armed Forces, assess Georgia's military capabilities, and develop a military training program for the country.

{ "entities": {} }

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We believe that APT28's targeting of the MOD aligns with Russian threat perceptions.

{ "entities": {} }

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The growing U.S.-Georgian military relationship has been a source of angst for Russia.

{ "entities": {} }

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Georgia and Russia severed diplomatic relations following the Russia-Georgia War in 2008, and Georgia has since sought to align itself more closely with western security organizations.

{ "entities": {} }

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Additionally, in June 2014, despite Russia's vocal objections, Georgia, along with Ukraine and Moldova, signed association accords with the EU.

{ "entities": {} }

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This move placed all three countries more firmly in the EU's political, economic, and security spheres of influence.

{ "entities": {} }

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Georgian military security issues, particularly with regard to U.S. cooperation and NATO, provide a strong incentive for Russian state-sponsored threat actors to steal information that sheds light on these topics.

{ "entities": {} }

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Targeting journalists could provide APT28 and its sponsors with a way to monitor public opinion, identify dissidents, spread disinformation, or facilitate further targeting.

{ "entities": {} }

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Another one of APT28's lures appeared to target a specific journalist covering issues in the Caucasus region.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Another one of APT28's lures", "start": 0, "end": 28 }, { "text": "a specific journalist covering issues in the Caucasus region", "start": 48, "end": 108 } ], "action": [ { "text": ...

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In late 2013, APT28 used a lure that contained a letter addressing a journalist by his first name and claiming to originate from a'' Chief Coordinator'' in Reason Magazine's'' Caucasian Issues Department''-a division that does not appear to exist.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 14, "end": 19 }, { "text": "a lure that contained a letter addressing a journalist by his first name and claiming to originate from a'' Chief Coordinator'' in Reason Magazine's'' Caucasian Issues Department''...

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(Reason Magazine is a US-based magazine) The letter welcomed the individual as a contributor and requested topic ideas and identification information in order to establish him at the magazine.

{ "entities": {} }

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In the background, the decoy document installed a SOURFACE backdoor on the victim's system.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the decoy document", "start": 19, "end": 37 }, { "text": "a SOURFACE backdoor", "start": 48, "end": 67 }, { "text": "the victim's system", "start": 71, "end": 90 } ...

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The body of the letter suggests that APT28 actors are able to read at least two languages–Russian and English.

{ "entities": {} }

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The grammar of the letter also indicates that English is not the author's first language, despite it purportedly originating from a US-based magazine.

{ "entities": {} }

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This implies that Russian may be the APT28 author's preferred language.

{ "entities": {} }

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Targeting journalists could provide APT28 and its sponsors with a way to monitor public opinion, identify dissidents, spread disinformation, or facilitate further targeting.

{ "entities": {} }

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Several other nation states are suspected of targeting journalists and dissidents to monitor their activity, including China and Iran., Journalists in the Caucasus working on Caucasus independence issues would be a prime target for intelligence collection for Moscow.

{ "entities": {} }

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Journalists critical of the Kremlin have long been targets of surveillance and harassment, and a number of governments and human rights organizations have publicly criticized the government for its treatment of journalists and its increasing consolidation of control over the media.

{ "entities": {} }

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We have seen APT28 register at least two domains mimicking the domains of legitimate organizations in the Caucasus, as shown in the table below.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 13, "end": 18 }, { "text": "at least two domains mimicking the domains of legitimate organizations in the Caucasus", "start": 28, "end": 114 } ], "action": [ { "tex...

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One APT28 domain imitated a key Chechen-focused news website, while the other appeared to target members of the Armenian military by hosting a fake login page.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "One APT28 domain", "start": 0, "end": 16 }, { "text": "a key Chechen-focused news website", "start": 26, "end": 60 }, { "text": "the other", "start": 68, "end": 77 }, ...

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Of particular note, the Kavkaz Center is a Chechen-run website designed to present an alternative view to the long-running conflict between Russia and Chechen separatists.

{ "entities": {} }

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In 2004 and 2013, Russia's Foreign Minister voiced his displeasure that a Swedish company continues to host the Kavkaz Center website.

{ "entities": {} }

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Eastern European countries' political and military postures are traditionally core Russian government interests.

{ "entities": {} }

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The Kremlin has long regarded the former Soviet Republics and satellite states as in its sphere of economic, political, and military interest.

{ "entities": {} }

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Over the past two decades, as many of these states joined NATO and the EU, Russia has attempted to regain its influence in the region.

{ "entities": {} }

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Many of APT28's targets parallel this continued focus on Eastern European governments and militaries.

{ "entities": {} }

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We have evidence that APT28 made at least two attempts to compromise Eastern European government organizations: • In a late 2013 incident, a FireEye device deployed at an Eastern European Ministry of Foreign Affairs detected APT28 malware in the client's network.

{ "entities": {} }

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• More recently, in August 2014 APT28 used a lure (Figure 3) about hostilities surrounding a Malaysia Airlines flight downed in Ukraine in a probable attempt to compromise the Polish government.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 32, "end": 37 }, { "text": "a lure (Figure 3) about hostilities surrounding a Malaysia Airlines flight downed in Ukraine", "start": 43, "end": 135 }, { "text": "a probable ...

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A SOURFACE sample employed in the same Malaysia Airlines lure was referenced by a Polish computer security company in a blog post.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "A SOURFACE sample", "start": 0, "end": 17 }, { "text": "the same Malaysia Airlines lure", "start": 30, "end": 61 } ], "action": [ { "text": "employed", "start": 18, ...

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The Polish security company indicated that the sample was'' sent to the government,'' presumably the Polish government, given the company's location and visibility.

{ "entities": {} }

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We have evidence that APT28 made at least two attempts to compromise Eastern European government organizations.

{ "entities": {} }

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APT28 has registered domains similar to those of legitimate Eastern European news sites and governments, listed in Table 2.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 0, "end": 5 }, { "text": "domains similar to those of legitimate Eastern European news sites and governments", "start": 21, "end": 103 } ], "action": [ { "text": "r...

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These domain registrations not only suggest that APT28 is interested in Eastern European political affairs, but also that the group targets Eastern European governments directly.

{ "entities": {} }

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In addition, APT28 used one domain for command and control sessions (baltichost [.] org) that was themed after the Baltic Host exercises.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 13, "end": 18 }, { "text": "one domain for command and control sessions (baltichost [.] org) that was themed after the Baltic Host exercises", "start": 24, "end": 136 } ], "actio...

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Baltic Host is a multinational logistics planning exercise, hosted annually since 2009 by one of the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all three of which are on Russia's border) on a rotational basis.

{ "entities": {} }

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In June 2014, this event was integrated with a larger U.S. Army training event, and focused on exercises to improve interoperability with regional allies and partners., This domain registration suggests that APT28 sought to target individuals either participating in the exercises or interested in Baltic military and se...

{ "entities": {} }

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Such targets would potentially provide APT28 with sensitive tactical and strategic intelligence concerning regional military capabilities and relationships.

{ "entities": {} }

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These exercises are a particular point of interest in Moscow: pro- Kremlin press cited Russia's interpretation of these military exercises and NATO's involvement as a'' sign of aggression,'' and Russia's Foreign Minister publicly stated that the exercise was'' a demonstration of hostile intention.

{ "entities": {} }

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'' APT28's lures and domain registrations also demonstrate their interest in NATO and other European security organizations.

{ "entities": {} }

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NATO remains a chief Russian adversary, or in the words of Russia's 2010 military doctrine, a'' main external military danger'' particularly as it moves'' closer to the borders of the Russian Federation.

{ "entities": {} }

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'' As the traditional western counterweight to the Soviet Union, Russia regards NATO, particularly NATO's eastward expansion, as a threat to Russia's strategic stability.

{ "entities": {} }

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APT28 also registered a domain name imitating the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an intergovernmental organization that has cited widespread fraud in numerous Russian state elections.

{ "entities": {} }

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Insider information about NATO, the OSCE and other security organizations would inform Russian political and military policy.

{ "entities": {} }

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Several of the domains APT28 registered imitated NATO domain names, including those of NATO Special Operations Headquarters and the NATO Future Forces Exhibition.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Several of the domains APT28 registered", "start": 0, "end": 39 }, { "text": "NATO domain names", "start": 49, "end": 66 } ], "action": [ { "text": "imitated", "start": 40, ...

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We also observed a user that we suspect works for NATO HQ submit an APT28 sample to VirusTotal, probably as a result of receiving a suspicious email.

{ "entities": {} }

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APT28 also demonstrated an interest in defense attaches working in European countries.

{ "entities": {} }

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We identified an APT28 lure containing a decoy document with a list of British officers and U.S. and Canadian military attachés in London.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "an APT28 lure", "start": 14, "end": 27 }, { "text": "a decoy document with a list of British officers and U.S. and Canadian military attachés in London", "start": 39, "end": 137 } ], "action": [ ...

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Finally, APT28 used a lure that contained an apparent non-public listing of contact information for defense attachés in the'' Ankara Military Attaché Corps (AMAC),'' which appears to be a professional organization of defense attachés in Turkey.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 9, "end": 14 }, { "text": "a lure that contained an apparent non-public listing of contact information for defense attachés in the'' Ankara Military Attaché Corps (AMAC),''", "start": 20, "end...

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In addition to targeting European security organizations and governments, it appears that APT28 is targeting attendees of European defense exhibitions.

{ "entities": {} }

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Some of the APT28- registered domains imitated those of defense events held in Europe, such as the Farnborough Airshow 2014, EuroNaval 2014, EUROSATORY 2014, and the Counter Terror Expo.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Some of the APT28- registered domains", "start": 0, "end": 37 }, { "text": "those of defense events held in Europe", "start": 47, "end": 85 } ], "action": [ { "text": "imitated", ...

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In September 2014, APT28 registered a domain (smigroup- online.co [.] uk) that appeared to mimic that for the SMi Group, a company that plans events for the'' Defence, Security, Energy, Utilities, Finance and Pharmaceutical sectors.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "APT28", "start": 19, "end": 24 }, { "text": "a domain (smigroup- online.co [.] uk) that appeared to mimic that for the SMi Group", "start": 36, "end": 119 } ], "action": [ { "text":...

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'' Among other events, the SMi Group is currently planning a military satellite communications event for November 2014.

{ "entities": {} }

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Targeting organizations and professionals involved in these defense events would likely provide APT28 with an opportunity to procure intelligence pertaining to new defense technologies, as well as the victim organizations' operations, communications, and future plans.

{ "entities": {} }

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APT28 has targeted a variety of organizations that fall outside of the three themes we highlighted above.

{ "entities": {} }

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However, we are not profiling all of APT28's targets with the same detail because they are not particularly indicative of a specific sponsor's interests.

{ "entities": {} }

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They do indicate parallel areas of interest to many governments and do not run counter to Russian state interests.

{ "entities": {} }

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Other probable APT28 targets that we have identified: Our analysis of some of the group's more commonly used tools indicates that APT28 has been systematically updating their malware since 2007.

{ "entities": {} }

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APT28's tools are suggestive of the group's skills, ambitions, and identity.

{ "entities": {} }

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Our analysis of some of the group's more commonly used tools indicates that APT28 has been systematically updating their tools since 2007.

{ "entities": {} }

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APT28 is most likely supported by a group of developers creating tools intended for long-term use and versatility, who make an effort to obfuscate their activity.

{ "entities": {} }

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This suggests that APT28 receives direct ongoing financial and other resources from a well-established organization, most likely a nation state government.

{ "entities": {} }

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APT28's malware settings suggest that the developers have done the majority of their work in a Russian language build environment during Russian business hours, which suggests that the Russian government is APT28's sponsor.

{ "entities": {} }

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