input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
We located additional samples (see § 5), some of which were embedded in a .jar file that installs an OS-appropriate version of RCS (Windows or OSX), option- ally using an exploit. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a .jar file",
"start": 72,
"end": 83
},
{
"text": "an OS-appropriate version of RCS",
"start": 98,
"end": 130
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "installs",
"start": 89,
"en... | [] |
If embedded as an applet, and no exploit is present, Java displays a security warning and asks the user whether they authorize the installation. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We also saw instances of the 3-Stage Exploit Kit where the first stage contained a Flash exploit; in some cases, we could obtain all stages and confirm that these installed RCS. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "these",
"start": 157,
"end": 162
},
{
"text": "RCS",
"start": 173,
"end": 176
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "installed",
"start": 163,
"end": 172
}
]
}
} | [] |
Some samples were packed with the MPress packer, and some Windows samples were obfuscated to look like the PuTTY SSH client. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "some Windows samples",
"start": 53,
"end": 73
},
{
"text": "look like the PuTTY SSH client",
"start": 93,
"end": 123
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "were obfuscated",
"start": 7... | [] |
Another difference is in persistence. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
For example, the RCS sample sent to Ahmed adds a Run registry key, whereas the FinSpy samples used in Bahrain overwrite the hard disk's boot sector to modify the boot process; the spyware is loaded be- fore the OS, and injects itself into OS processes as they start. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the RCS sample sent to Ahmed",
"start": 13,
"end": 41
},
{
"text": "a Run registry key",
"start": 47,
"end": 65
},
{
"text": "the FinSpy samples used in Bahrain",
"start": 75,
... | [] |
The RCS samples we examined also had the ability to propa- gate to other devices, including into inactive VMWare virtual machines by modifying the disk image, onto USB flash drives, and onto Windows Mobile phones. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The RCS samples we examined",
"start": 0,
"end": 27
},
{
"text": "other devices",
"start": 67,
"end": 80
},
{
"text": "inactive VMWare virtual machines",
"start": 97,
"end":... | [] |
We did not observe similar capabilities in the FinSpy samples we examined. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Exploitation of captured data: When Ahmed Mansoor re- ceived the RCS document, he opened it, infecting his computer (Figure 5). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Ahmed subsequently noted several suspicious ac- cesses to his GMail account using IMAP. | {
"entities": {
"action": [
{
"text": "ac- cesses",
"start": 44,
"end": 54
}
],
"modifier": [
{
"text": "to",
"start": 55,
"end": 57
},
{
"text": "using",
"start": 76,
"end": 81
}
],
"entity... | [] |
Even after he changed his password, the accesses continued. | {
"entities": {
"modifier": [
{
"text": "Even after",
"start": 0,
"end": 10
}
],
"entity": [
{
"text": "he changed his password",
"start": 11,
"end": 34
},
{
"text": "the accesses",
"start": 36,
"end": 48... | [] |
While corresponding with Ahmed on his compromised account, an author of this pa- per discovered that the attackers had installed an application- specific password in Ahmed's GMail account, a secondary password that they apparently used to access his account even after he changed his main password. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a secondary password",
"start": 189,
"end": 209
},
{
"text": "they",
"start": 215,
"end": 219
},
{
"text": "access his account",
"start": 239,
"end": 257
},
{
... | [] |
The suspicious accesses stopped after removal of the application-specific password. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Two weeks after this correspondence with Ahmed, one of us (Author in Figure 5) received a targeted e-mail with a link to a file hosted on Google Docs containing a commercial off-the- shelf RAT, Xtreme RAT. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "one of us",
"start": 48,
"end": 57
},
{
"text": "a targeted e-mail with a link to a file hosted on Google Docs containing a commercial off-the- shelf RAT, Xtreme RAT",
"start": 88,
"end": 204
}
],
... | [] |
The e-mail was sent from the UAE's timezone (as well as of other countries) and contained the terms'' veryimportant'' and'' wikileaks'', just like in the e-mail re- ceived by Ahmed. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The instance of Xtreme RAT sent to Author used owner.no-ip.biz for its C & C, one of the domains men- tioned in a report published by Norman about a year-long cam- paign of cyberattacks on Israeli and Palestinian targets carried out by a group that Norman was unable to identify. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The instance of Xtreme RAT sent to Author",
"start": 0,
"end": 41
},
{
"text": "owner.no-ip.biz",
"start": 47,
"end": 62
},
{
"text": "its C & C",
"start": 67,
"end": 76
... | [] |
Three months after Author was targeted, Ahmed received an e-mail containing an attachment with Xtreme RAT that talked to the same C & C server (Figure 5), suggesting that the attackers who infected Ahmed with RCS may have provided a list of interest- ing e-mail addresses to another group for further targeting. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Ahmed",
"start": 40,
"end": 45
},
{
"text": "an e-mail containing an attachment",
"start": 55,
"end": 89
},
{
"text": "Xtreme RAT",
"start": 95,
"end": 105
},
{
... | [] |
Possible consequences: Shortly after he was targeted, Ahmed says he was physically assaulted twice by an attacker who appeared able to track Ahmed's location. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
He also re- ports that his car was stolen, a large sum of money disappeared from his bank account, and his passport was confiscated. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
He believes these consequences are part of a government in- timidation campaign against him, but we did not uncover any direct links to his infection. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
(Interestingly, spyware subse- quently sent to others has used bait content about Ahmed. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "spyware subse- quently sent to others",
"start": 16,
"end": 53
},
{
"text": "bait content about Ahmed",
"start": 63,
"end": 87
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "used",
"start": 58... | [] |
) Further attacks: In October 2012, UAE Journalist A and Human Rights activist B (per Figure 6) forwarded us suspi- cious e-mails they had received that contained a Word docu- ment corresponding to the first stage of 3-Stage Exploit Kit (Figure 5). | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "suspi- cious e-mails",
"start": 109,
"end": 129
},
{
"text": "they",
"start": 130,
"end": 134
},
{
"text": "that contained a Word docu- ment corresponding to the first stage of 3-Stage Expl... | [] |
The attachment contained an embedded Flash file that exploited a vulnerability fixed in Adobe Flash 11.4, loading shell code to download a second stage from faddeha.com. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "an embedded Flash file that exploited a vulnerability fixed in Adobe Flash 11.4",
"start": 25,
"end": 104
},
{
"text": "shell code",
"start": 114,
"end": 124
},
{
"text": "a second stage",
... | [] |
We were unable to obtain the second stage or the ultimate pay- load, as the website was unavailable at the time of testing. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, the exploit kit appears indicative of Hacking Team involvement. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A page on faddeha.com found in Google's cache contained an embedded .jar | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
with the same applet class (WebEnhancer) as those observed in other .jar | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
files that we found to contain RCS. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We found a file that VirusTotal had downloaded from faddeha.com, which appeared to be a re- mote access toolkit known as SpyNet, available for general pur- chase for 50 Euros. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The SpyNet sample communicated with the C & C hamas.sytes.net. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The SpyNet sample",
"start": 0,
"end": 17
},
{
"text": "the C & C hamas.sytes.net",
"start": 36,
"end": 61
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "communicated",
"start": 18,
"e... | [] |
SpyNet Packing: We found another instance of the first stage of the 3-Stage Exploit Kit on VirusTotal. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The exploit downloaded a second stage, which in turn downloaded a sam- ple of SpyNet from maile-s.com. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The exploit",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "a second stage",
"start": 23,
"end": 37
},
{
"text": "a sam- ple of SpyNet",
"start": 64,
"end": 84
},
{
... | [] |
This sample of SpyNet communicated with the same C & C hamas.sytes.net. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This sample of SpyNet",
"start": 0,
"end": 21
},
{
"text": "the same C & C hamas.sytes.net",
"start": 40,
"end": 70
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "communicated",
"start": 22,
... | [] |
The sample was packed using ASProtect. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
When run, the sample unpacks a compiled Visual Basic project that loads, via the RunPE method, an executable packed with UPX. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a compiled Visual Basic project",
"start": 29,
"end": 60
},
{
"text": "the RunPE method",
"start": 77,
"end": 93
},
{
"text": "an executable packed with UPX",
"start": 95,
"... | [] |
Finally, this executable unpacks SpyNet. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
SpyNet's GUI only offers an option to pack with UPX, suggesting that the attack- ers specially added the other layers of packing. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In some cases, the Visual Basic project bears the name NoWayTech, which appears to be an underground RunPE tool, while others are named SpyVisual, which we have been unable to trace to any public underground tools, and thus also may reflect customiza- tion by the attacker. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The SpyVisual projects contain the string c: \Users\Zain\AppData\Local\Temp\OLE1EmbedStrm.wav, which we used as the fingerprint VB Packer in Figure 6. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Cedar Key attack: The same VB Packer was used in an attack on Relative of political detainee D and H.R. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
activist E in Figure 6. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These individuals received e-mails containing a link to a web page hosted on cedarkeyrv.com impersonat- ing YouTube. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "These individuals",
"start": 0,
"end": 17
},
{
"text": "e-mails containing a link to a web page hosted on cedarkeyrv.com impersonat- ing YouTube",
"start": 27,
"end": 115
}
],
"action": [
{... | [] |
Loading the page greeted the target with'' Video loading please wait. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
'' The page redirected to a YouTube video a few seconds later, but first loaded a Java exploit -a known vulnerability with no patch at the time that the e-mails were sent. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The page",
"start": 3,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "a Java exploit",
"start": 80,
"end": 94
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "loaded",
"start": 73,
"end": 79
}
]
}
... | [] |
Oracle released a patch 12 hours after activists began receiving these links. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The cedarkeyrv.com domain is associated with an RV park in Cedar Key, Florida. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The website's hosting company told us that the site had apparently suffered a compromise, but did not have further details. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The exploit used in the attack appears to have been origi- nally posted by a Kuwaiti user, njq8, on an Arabic-language exploit sharing site. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We contacted njq8, who told us that he had obtained the exploit elsewhere and modified it prior to posting. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The attack downloaded an instance of SpyNet from isteeler.com (which from our inspection did not appear to have any legitimate content), which used the C & C storge.myftp.org. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The attack",
"start": 0,
"end": 10
},
{
"text": "an instance of SpyNet",
"start": 22,
"end": 43
},
{
"text": "isteeler.com",
"start": 49,
"end": 61
},
{
... | [] |
This same C & C occurred in an- other attack (Figure 6) targeting Relative of political detainee D; in that case, the payload was a freely-available RAT known as njRAT, written by the same njq8 as the exploit-poster dis- cussed above. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, we did not find any other evidence suggesting njq8's involvement in either attack. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
More SpyNet attacks: The domain hamas.sytes.net, which we previously saw used by two SpyNet sam- ples, resolved to 67.205.79.177. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Historically, dreems.no-ip.ca also resolved to this address. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
An unidentified dropper using this C & C targeted Journalist F; a SpyNet attack on Relative of political detainee D also used this C & C. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "An unidentified dropper",
"start": 0,
"end": 23
},
{
"text": "this C & C",
"start": 30,
"end": 40
},
{
"text": "a SpyNet attack on Relative of political detainee D",
"start": 64,
... | [] |
In that latter case, the sample arrived via e-mail in a .rar attachment that contained an .scr file disguised as a Word document. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the sample",
"start": 21,
"end": 31
},
{
"text": "e-mail",
"start": 44,
"end": 50
},
{
"text": "a .rar attachment",
"start": 54,
"end": 71
},
{
"text": "... | [] |
The .scr file was a self-extracting archive that decompressed and ran both the bait document and the payload. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The .scr file",
"start": 0,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "both the bait document and the payload",
"start": 70,
"end": 108
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "ran",
"start": 66,
"... | [] |
The SMTP source of the e-mail was webmail.upload.bz. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Appin: In early 2013 UAE H.R. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
activist E forwarded nu- merous documents that included a particular CVE-2012-0158 exploit for Microsoft Word. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In all, these totaled 17 distinct hashes of documents, and 10 distinct hashes of payloads (some documents that differed in their hash downloaded the same pay- load). | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "some documents that differed in their hash",
"start": 91,
"end": 133
},
{
"text": "the same pay- load",
"start": 145,
"end": 163
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "downloaded",
"st... | [] |
The exploits primarily downloaded instances of SpyNet from upload.bz, which for the most part communicated with C & C at sn.all-google.com. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The exploits",
"start": 0,
"end": 12
},
{
"text": "instances of SpyNet",
"start": 34,
"end": 53
},
{
"text": "upload.bz",
"start": 59,
"end": 68
},
{
"te... | [] |
This domain was also used for C & C in other attacks, including that on Journalist C. Two of the other CVE-2012-0158 exploits down- loaded DarkComet from www.getmedia.us and www.technopenta.com after posting system infor- mation to random123.site11.com. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This domain",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "C & C in other attacks",
"start": 30,
"end": 52
},
{
"text": "Two of the other CVE-2012-0158 exploits",
"start": 86,
"end":... | [] |
All three domains match those used by an Indian cybermercenary group said to be linked to Appin Security Group. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The former two domains hosted content other than spyware (i.e., they may have been compromised). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We alerted the owner of www.getmedia.us, who removed the payloads. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The samples we received afforded us an opportunity to em- pirically characterize the use of FinFisher and Hacking Team around the world, enabling us to assess their prevalence, and identify other country cases that may warrant future investiga- tion. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We analyzed the samples and the behavior of their C & C servers to develop indicators (fingerprints) for how the servers respond to certain types of requests. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We then scanned the full Internet IPv4 address space ('' /0'') for these, along with prob- ing results found by past scans. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In many cases we do not release the full details of our fingerprints to avoid compromising what may be legitimate investigations. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Identifying and linking servers: We developed a number of fingerprints for identifying FinSpy servers using HTTP- based probing as well as FinSpy's custom TLV-based proto- col. We leveraged quirks such as specific non-compliance with RFC 2616, responses to certain types of invalid data, and the presence of signatures s... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
See Appendix A for details. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We then exhaus- tively scanned the Internet looking for matches to these finger- prints. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Gamma documentation advertises that an operator of FinSpy can obscure the location of the C & C server (called the mas- ter) by setting up a proxy known as a relay. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "an operator of FinSpy",
"start": 36,
"end": 57
},
{
"text": "the location of the C & C server (called the mas- ter)",
"start": 70,
"end": 124
},
{
"text": "setting up a proxy known as a rel... | [] |
In Spring 2013 we noticed FinSpy servers now issuing 302 Redirects to google.com. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, we noticed anomalies: for ex- ample, servers in India were redirecting to the Latvian ver- sion of Google google.lv. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We suspect that the server in India was a relay forwarding to a master in Latvia. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Be- cause the master served as a proxy for Google, we could uncover its IP address using a Google feature that prints a user's IP address for the query'' IP address. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
'' We created an additional fingerprint based on the proxying behavior and is- sued GET /search? q=ip+address & nord=1 requests to servers We note some interesting master locations in Table 4. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Server locations: In all, our fingerprints matched 92 dis- tinct IP addresses in 35 different countries. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Probing these on 8/8/13 revealed 22 distinct addresses still responding, sited in: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Ethiopia, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Macedonia, Mex- ico, Romania, Serbia, Turkmenistan, and the United States. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We found servers responding to a number of our fingerprints, sug- gesting either that some servers lag in their updates, or a con- certed effort to vary the behavior of FinSpy servers to make detection harder. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We found: (1) 3 IP addresses in ranges registered to Gamma. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
(2) Servers in 3 IP ranges explicitly registered to govern- ment agencies: Turkmenistan's Ministry of Communications, Qatar's State Security Bureau, and the Bulgarian Council of Ministers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
(3) 3 additional IP addresses in Bahrain, all in Batelco. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
(4) Servers in 7 countries with governments classified as'' authoritarian regimes'' by The Economist: Bahrain, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Qatar, Turkmenistan, UAE, Vietnam. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Additional FinSpy samples: In parallel to our scanning, we obtained 9 samples of FinSpy by writing YARA rules for the'' malware hunting'' feature of VirusTotal Intelligence. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This feature sends us all newly-submitted samples that match our signatures. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We located a version of FinSpy that does not use the normal FinSpy handshake, but instead uses a protocol based on HTTP POST requests for communication with the C & C server. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a version of FinSpy",
"start": 11,
"end": 30
},
{
"text": "a protocol based on HTTP POST requests",
"start": 95,
"end": 133
},
{
"text": "communication with the C & C server",
"star... | [] |
This did not appear to be an older or newer ver- sion of the protocol, suggesting that our scan results may not reveal the full scope of FinSpy C & C servers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Perhaps, the HTTP POST protocol was only delivered to a specific Gamma customer to meet a requirement. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We began by analyzing the UAE RCS sample from Ahmed and 6 samples obtained from VirusTotal by searching for AV re- sults containing the strings'' DaVinci'' and'' RCS. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
'' At the time, several AV vendors had added detection for RCS based on a sample analyzed by Dr. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Web and the UAE RCS sample sent to Ahmed. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We also similarly obtained and analyzed sam- ples of FSBSpy, a piece of malware that can report system information, upload screenshots, and drop and execute more malware. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a piece of malware",
"start": 61,
"end": 79
},
{
"text": "system information",
"start": 96,
"end": 114
},
{
"text": "screenshots",
"start": 123,
"end": 134
},
{
... | [] |
Based on these samples, we devised YARA signa- tures that yielded 23 additional samples of structurally similar malware. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Fingerprints: We probed the C & C servers of the RCS and FSBSpy samples, and found that they responded in a distinc- tive way to HTTP requests, and returned distinctive SSL cer- tificates. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We searched sources including Shodan, 5 Internet Census service probes, and Critical.IO scanning data for the observed distinctive HTTP behavior. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
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