input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
We suppose this group is opportunistic and sells its services to probable competitors of their targets in the private sector. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We have been able to leverage several attackers profiles, showing that the Pitty Tiger group is fairly small compared to other APT groups, which is probably why we saw them work on a very limited amount of targets. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
At the end of this report, we provide indicators of compromise to help people detect current Pitty Tiger attacks. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
APT attacks follow what we call the'' APT kill chain''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The kill chain describes briefly the way attackers do perform their actions. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It can be summarized by the following scheme: The reconnaissance phase commences when an attacker selects a new target and involves the acquisition of information about that target. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
There is very little information available about this phase, and there is little data about it. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The only way to collect information about this phase would be to already monitor all attackers' actions at this step, which is hardly feasible. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The longer the attackers spend time in attempting to understand their target and its online presence, the easier it will be to find efficient ways to penetrate that company's systems. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This reconnaissance phase is both about finding information to break into the targeted network successfully and about searching for data which could help to accelerate sensitive information isolation (like the name of a key employee for example). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This phase mostly relies on open sources from the Internet: social networks, press releases, white papers, corporate websites, search engines, but also on some active tools like vulnerability scanners etc. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
At this stage, the APT attackers have a solid knowledge of their target and its key employees. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The attackers have everything they need to start looking for an entry point to the company's network and establish one or several permanent backdoors into the environment. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The attackers",
"start": 0,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "one or several permanent backdoors",
"start": 115,
"end": 149
},
{
"text": "the environment",
"start": 155,
"end": 170
... | [] |
The attackers mostly rely on two techniques here to infect one or several computers, usually workstations, inside the target's network: spear phishing and drive-by downloads. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The attackers",
"start": 0,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "spear phishing and drive-by downloads",
"start": 136,
"end": 173
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "rely",
"start": 21,
... | [] |
Spear phishing can be described as targeted e-mail phishing. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Spear phishing",
"start": 0,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "targeted e-mail phishing",
"start": 35,
"end": 59
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "be described",
"start": 19,
"end":... | [] |
In a spear phishing scheme, attackers send very few e-mails to targeted people. | {
"entities": {
"modifier": [
{
"text": "In",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "to",
"start": 60,
"end": 62
}
],
"entity": [
{
"text": "a spear phishing scheme",
"start": 3,
"end": 26
},
{
... | [] |
In fact, they can even send just a single e-mail. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The trick is to target the right victim and provide it with the right content, so that they will click on a link leading to drive-by download of a malware, or open an attached file which will infect their computer. | {
"entities": {
"action": [
{
"text": "target",
"start": 16,
"end": 22
},
{
"text": "provide",
"start": 44,
"end": 51
},
{
"text": "click",
"start": 97,
"end": 102
},
{
"text": "open",
... | [] |
Some groups of attackers also use'' watering hole'' techniques to successfully compromise their targets. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Some groups of attackers",
"start": 0,
"end": 24
},
{
"text": "'' watering hole'' techniques",
"start": 33,
"end": 62
},
{
"text": "successfully compromise their targets",
"start": ... | [] |
To build a watering hole attack, attackers do compromise the website of a third party, generally a supplier of the target, which is typically visited by a specific group of professionals and very likely by the target. | {
"entities": {
"modifier": [
{
"text": "To",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
}
],
"entity": [
{
"text": "build a watering hole attack",
"start": 3,
"end": 31
},
{
"text": "attackers",
"start": 33,
"end": 42
}... | [] |
Every visitor of the compromised third party is then infected. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Every visitor of the compromised third party",
"start": 0,
"end": 44
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is then infected",
"start": 45,
"end": 61
}
]
}
} | [] |
The method has one major drawback: it will also infect third parties who visit the website. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Attackers have developed ways to avoid this. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
If their reconnaissance phase has been done effectively, they already know all IP ranges used by the target company. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It just takes a few lines of code in the infecting script to only compromise visitors coming from the target IP ranges. | {
"entities": {
"action": [
{
"text": "compromise",
"start": 66,
"end": 76
}
],
"entity": [
{
"text": "visitors coming from the target IP ranges",
"start": 77,
"end": 118
}
]
}
} | [] |
Direct attacks against servers of the target can also be a way to penetrate the target's network. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Attackers have gained access to one or several machines inside the target's corporate network. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Attackers",
"start": 0,
"end": 9
},
{
"text": "access to one or several machines inside the target's corporate network",
"start": 22,
"end": 93
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "gained",
... | [] |
They need to install several different backdoors in order to be able to always access the network. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "They",
"start": 0,
"end": 4
},
{
"text": "several different backdoors",
"start": 21,
"end": 48
},
{
"text": "be able to always access the network",
"start": 61,
"end": 97
... | [] |
In case one backdoor falls, there will be others. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As soon as the attackers are sure they have enough access, they start looking for two things: intellectual property (or anything else they want to know or steal) in alignment with predefined mission objectives, and a means of privilege escalation to facilitate lateral movement within the compromised environment. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "they",
"start": 59,
"end": 63
},
{
"text": "intellectual property (or anything else they want to know or steal) in alignment with predefined mission objectives",
"start": 94,
"end": 209
},
{
... | [] |
It generally does not take long before the attackers gain domain administrator privileges and dump all the Active Directory content. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the attackers",
"start": 39,
"end": 52
},
{
"text": "domain administrator privileges",
"start": 58,
"end": 89
},
{
"text": "all the Active Directory content",
"start": 99,
"... | [] |
They use lateral moves between machines inside the network, and look for everything they need. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This step is very hard to detect, since they only use valid credentials and legitimate administration tools such as PsExec. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Data exfiltration is the last step before the attackers loop to the lateral moves step, in a never-ending circle of prolonged access and information theft. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Data exfiltration",
"start": 0,
"end": 17
},
{
"text": "the last step",
"start": 21,
"end": 34
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is",
"start": 18,
"end": 20
}
]
... | [] |
They generally create archive files containing the content they want to exfiltrate, which are then sent to the attackers by using a remote administration tool (RAT) or transfer protocols such as FTP and HTTP. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "They",
"start": 0,
"end": 4
},
{
"text": "archive files containing the content they want to exfiltrate",
"start": 22,
"end": 82
},
{
"text": "the attackers",
"start": 107,
"... | [] |
This phase is not the end of an APT attack. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The attackers loop to the access strengthening/lateral moves stage and generally keep stealing more information and stay inside the network for more data gathering. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The attackers",
"start": 0,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "more information",
"start": 95,
"end": 111
},
{
"text": "the network",
"start": 128,
"end": 139
},
{
... | [] |
For more information about all the APT phases, please refer to our APT Kill Chain blog post serie. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
During our regular investigations on APT cases, one particular variant of malware caught our attention, because we had not faced it before. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We decided to spend some time to investigate around this malware and found out that it was used exclusively by a single group of attackers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This malware family is known as'' PittyTiger'' by the anti-virus research community. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We discovered this malware sample in June 2014, leading to a command & control (c & c) server still in activity. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "this malware sample",
"start": 14,
"end": 33
},
{
"text": "a command & control (c & c) server still in activity",
"start": 59,
"end": 111
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "leading",
... | [] |
Our researches around this particular malware family revealed the'' Pitty Tiger'' group has been active since 2011, yet we found other publications which could probably be attributed to the same group of attacker back in 2010. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This group uses other malware and tools during their APT operations, in addition to the PittyTiger RAT. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A variant of the infamous Gh0st RAT dubbed'' Paladin'' has been used repeatedly by the PT group, together with other RATs which seem to be developed exclusively for the PT group:'' MM RAT'' (aka Troj/Goldsun-B), and'' CT RAT''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Another variant of Gh0st RAT named'' Leo'' has been found inactive on a c & c server. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We also found another malware, named'' Troj/ReRol.A''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This one is also used by the group to infect workstations, collect system information, and install more malware on the infected computer. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This one",
"start": 0,
"end": 8
},
{
"text": "workstations",
"start": 45,
"end": 57
},
{
"text": "system information",
"start": 67,
"end": 85
},
{
"text"... | [] |
It acts as a first stage downloader and system data collector often used in the initial compromise of the Pitty Tiger campaigns, generally embedded in Microsoft Office documents. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "a first stage downloader",
"start": 11,
"end": 35
},
{
"text": "system data collector",
"start": 40,
"end": 61
},
{
... | [] |
Thanks to server's misconfigurations, we managed to get information from three c & c servers used by this group of attackers, which provided us with insight from the end of 2013 to the beginning of July 2014. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "three c & c servers",
"start": 73,
"end": 92
},
{
"text": "this group of attackers",
"start": 101,
"end": 124
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "used",
"start": 93,
"end": ... | [] |
Our investigation has been focused on the data we could get from these c & c servers but also on the Pitty Tiger environment. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This whitepaper aims to expose the view we have on the group, especially on their infrastructure and capabilities. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We hope this publication will bring further counter analysis from the research community to enrich the global common threat knowledge. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Pitty Tiger, like most other APT groups, use spear phishing e-mails extensively in order to gain an initial foothold within the targeted environment. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Pitty Tiger",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "spear phishing e-mails",
"start": 45,
"end": 67
},
{
"text": "extensively",
"start": 68,
"end": 79
},
{
... | [] |
We have been able to find a spear phishing e-mail crafted by the attackers. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a spear phishing e-mail",
"start": 26,
"end": 49
},
{
"text": "the attackers",
"start": 61,
"end": 74
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "crafted",
"start": 50,
"end": 57
... | [] |
This e-mail spoofed the identity of an employee of a targeted company: The attached file is a Microsoft Office Word document triggering CVE-2014-1761 to infect the computer it is sent to: While this example looks very'' amateur'' for a spear phishing attempt, we suppose the group has conducted more advanced spear phish... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This e-mail",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "the identity of an employee of a targeted company",
"start": 20,
"end": 69
},
{
"text": "a Microsoft Office Word document",
"start"... | [] |
These documents were infecting the system with Troj/ReRol.A malware, which we will detail later in this report. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "These documents",
"start": 0,
"end": 15
},
{
"text": "the system",
"start": 31,
"end": 41
},
{
"text": "Troj/ReRol.A malware",
"start": 47,
"end": 67
}
],
"act... | [] |
This could mean that the Pitty Tiger group is using stolen material as spear phishing content either to target other persons in the compromised company, or to target other persons in a competitor's company, or more generally to compromise another target. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the Pitty Tiger group",
"start": 21,
"end": 42
},
{
"text": "stolen material",
"start": 52,
"end": 67
},
{
"text": "spear phishing content",
"start": 71,
"end": 93
}
... | [] |
Pitty Tiger also seem to use fake Microsoft Office Excel content, yet we could only find empty content delivering once again the Troj/ReRol.A malware. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Pitty Tiger",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "fake Microsoft Office Excel content",
"start": 29,
"end": 64
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "use",
"start": 25,
"end": ... | [] |
Although we have not been able to find evidences of any attack aimed at exploiting vulnerabilities on the group's targets servers, we have been able to record several vulnerability scanning launched from one c & c server straight to the targets. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "vulnerability scanning",
"start": 167,
"end": 189
},
{
"text": "one c & c server",
"start": 204,
"end": 220
},
{
"text": "the targets",
"start": 233,
"end": 244
}
... | [] |
The attackers have been using different vulnerability scanners aimed at their targets. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The attackers",
"start": 0,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "different vulnerability scanners aimed at their targets",
"start": 30,
"end": 85
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "been using",
... | [] |
While some targets have been scanned with'' generic'' vulnerability scanning tools like HScan or Fluxay and port scanners like Nmap, some other targets have been scanned for very specific vulnerabilities, like a ZyWALL vulnerability or a FORTINET product. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "some targets",
"start": 6,
"end": 18
},
{
"text": "'' generic'' vulnerability scanning tools like HScan or Fluxay and port scanners like Nmap",
"start": 41,
"end": 131
},
{
"text": "some ot... | [] |
We have also been able to testify that the Pitty Tiger group has successfully collected information on some of their targets by exploiting the HeartBleed bug. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the Pitty Tiger group",
"start": 39,
"end": 60
},
{
"text": "information on some of their targets",
"start": 88,
"end": 124
},
{
"text": "exploiting the HeartBleed bug",
"start": 12... | [] |
This vulnerability which exists on some old versions of OpenSSL allows attackers to collect data from chunks of memory from the targeted machine. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "attackers",
"start": 71,
"end": 80
},
{
"text": "data",
"start": 92,
"end": 96
},
{
"text": "chunks of memory from the targeted machine",
"start": 102,
"end": 144
}
... | [] |
It allowed the Pitty Tiger group to get admin credentials from at least one target, for example. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the Pitty Tiger group",
"start": 11,
"end": 32
},
{
"text": "admin credentials",
"start": 40,
"end": 57
},
{
"text": "at least one target",
"start": 63,
"end": 82
}
... | [] |
Running automated vulnerability scanners on whole ranges of IP addresses used by the targets or on several domains is a very noisy way to collect information and find server vulnerabilities. | {
"entities": {
"action": [
{
"text": "Running",
"start": 0,
"end": 7
},
{
"text": "collect",
"start": 138,
"end": 145
},
{
"text": "find",
"start": 162,
"end": 166
}
],
"entity": [
{
... | [] |
We would advocate that this method is unwise when you want to stay furtive, and doing it from a c & c server is very surprising, to say the least. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
While the Pitty Tiger group is experienced on some aspects on its running APT campaigns, it definitely lacks some maturity here. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
One of the favorite methods used by the Pitty Tiger group to infect users is to use a Microsoft Office Word document which exploits a specific vulnerability. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the Pitty Tiger group",
"start": 36,
"end": 57
},
{
"text": "infect users",
"start": 61,
"end": 73
},
{
"text": "a Microsoft Office Word document which exploits a specific vulnerability",
... | [] |
The payload infecting the system is malware known as'' Troj/ReRol.A''. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The payload",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "the system",
"start": 22,
"end": 32
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "infecting",
"start": 12,
"end": 21
}
]
... | [] |
It is generally the first step of the initial compromise for Pitty Tiger campaigns. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We have been able to find one such document used by that group of attacker, exploiting CVE- 2012-0158, an old critical vulnerability impacting Microsoft Office and corrected by Microsoft's MS12-027 fix in April 2012. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "one such document used by that group of attacker",
"start": 26,
"end": 74
},
{
"text": "CVE- 2012-0158, an old critical vulnerability impacting Microsoft Office and corrected by Microsoft's MS12-027 fix in April 2012",
... | [] |
This vulnerability affects Microsoft Office versions up to Office 2010. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We also found one RTF document embedding CVE-2014-1761, which is a more recent exploit. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "one RTF document",
"start": 14,
"end": 30
},
{
"text": "CVE-2014-1761",
"start": 41,
"end": 54
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "embedding",
"start": 31,
"end": 40
}... | [] |
We discovered several different documents spreading this malware by triggering CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability, yet we could not share them in this report, since these documents contain information about victims of the Pitty Tiger group. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "several different documents",
"start": 14,
"end": 41
},
{
"text": "this malware",
"start": 52,
"end": 64
},
{
"text": "triggering CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability",
"start": 68,
... | [] |
The discovery of this'' old'' vulnerability exploitation in June 2014 could mean that the Pitty Tiger group has no direct access to 0day exploits, or not enough budgets to buy some. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It could also mean they use their low range exploit by default because it is working on their targets and is sufficient to compromise their workstations. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The Word document we initially found was probably a'' test'' document used by the group. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
When opened, it shows a single line written in Chinese language, which can be translated as'' Hello!'' When successfully triggered, the exploit infects the host by dropping and executing a file named'' svohost.exe'' in the temporary folder of the currently logged-in user: This binary is'' Troj/ReRol.A'' according to So... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the exploit",
"start": 132,
"end": 143
},
{
"text": "the host",
"start": 152,
"end": 160
},
{
"text": "a file named'' svohost.exe''",
"start": 187,
"end": 215
},
... | [] |
It immediately triggers alarms on our sandbox: The binary drops a copy of itself in the Application Data folder of the currently logged-in user: The malware initiates a communication to time.windows.com to check for connectivity, and then communicates with the c & c server at mac.avstore.com.tw. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The binary",
"start": 47,
"end": 57
},
{
"text": "a copy of itself",
"start": 64,
"end": 80
},
{
"text": "the Application Data folder of the currently logged-in user",
"start": 84,
... | [] |
Very few variants of Troj/ReRol.A are public. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The variants we have seen did use that same User- Agent: The persistence mechanism used by the malware is the creation of a registry key named'' Shell'' containing the path to the malware on the infected system: The payload of this malware is used to collect information on the newly infected host, and send it back to t... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The persistence mechanism",
"start": 57,
"end": 82
},
{
"text": "the malware",
"start": 91,
"end": 102
},
{
"text": "the creation of a registry key named'' Shell'' containing the path to th... | [] |
It can also download and execute binaries. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "binaries",
"start": 33,
"end": 41
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "download",
"start": 12,
"end": 20
},
{
"tex... | [] |
The data sent in the POST request has a 0x11 bytes header consisting of a fixed-value byte (0xc3) followed by a 0x10 bytes encryption key. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The data",
"start": 0,
"end": 8
},
{
"text": "the POST request",
"start": 17,
"end": 33
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "sent",
"start": 9,
"end": 13
}
],
"... | [] |
The data following the header is encrypted using RC4 with the previous key. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The data following the header",
"start": 0,
"end": 29
},
{
"text": "RC4",
"start": 49,
"end": 52
},
{
"text": "the previous key",
"start": 58,
"end": 74
}
],
"... | [] |
Once the data is deciphered, the last byte of the clear text should also be 0xc3. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We have been able to decrypt the communications and confirmed what is transmitted to the c & c server. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Here is an anonymized sample of communication showing information collected by the malware: This information is very useful for an attacker: it shows all software installed on the system, and running services. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "information",
"start": 54,
"end": 65
},
{
"text": "the malware",
"start": 79,
"end": 90
},
{
"text": "it",
"start": 141,
"end": 143
},
{
"text": "all sof... | [] |
Once this data has been transferred to the c & c server, it responds by sending additional malware to execute on the machine. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "this data",
"start": 5,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "the c & c server",
"start": 39,
"end": 55
},
{
"text": "it",
"start": 57,
"end": 59
},
{
"text": "additio... | [] |
The c & c part consists of two files: The dr.asp registers the following keywords: These two binaries were no longer available on the server. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, we found various files which could have been used as'' 32.exe'' in the past: The 322.exe file is a legitimate, Chinese, calc.exe tool. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It might have been used by the attackers to perform tests. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The 3 others binaries are RATs, which will be detailed in the next parts. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This RAT is the origin of the attackers' group name. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
'' PittyTiger'' is a mutex used by the malware. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
'' Pitty Tiger'' is also a string transmitted in the network communications of the RAT, as you will see in this chapter. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The malware, when running in our sandbox, triggers the following alarms: The binary drops two files in'' C: \Windows\System32'': The'' qmgrxp.exe'' binary is a simple copy of the original binary. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The binary",
"start": 73,
"end": 83
},
{
"text": "two files",
"start": 90,
"end": 99
},
{
"text": "'' C: \\Windows\\System32''",
"start": 102,
"end": 127
},
{
... | [] |
It drops the'' packet64.dll'', and injects it in'' explorer.exe''. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "the'' packet64.dll''",
"start": 9,
"end": 29
},
{
"text": "it",
"start": 43,
"end": 45
},
{
"text": "'' explorer.... | [] |
When executed, a mutex called'' PittyTiger'' is created. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a mutex called'' PittyTiger''",
"start": 15,
"end": 44
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is created",
"start": 45,
"end": 55
}
]
}
} | [] |
Persistence is achieved by adding the path to the binary to the WinlogonUserInit key: The'' packet64.dll'' is the main payload of the RAT. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Persistence",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "adding the path to the binary to the WinlogonUserInit key",
"start": 27,
"end": 84
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is achieved",
... | [] |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.