input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
After being injected, it starts sending its Hello packet to its c & c server: All the requests sent to the c & c contains the string'' /FC001/'' followed by the bot id. | {
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},
{
"text": "its c & c server",
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},
{
"text": ... | [] |
This id consists of the infected computer name followed by a dash and the lower word of the disk serial id. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The data sent is simply encoded using base64, there is no cipher at all. | {
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],
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{
"text": "is simply encoded",
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}
... | [] |
The hello packet, once decoded, looks like the following: Our sample had 3 c & c servers configured: The following commands are implemented: Regarding the controller part, we found two different versions: The interface handling both Pitty TIGER and CT connections is very interesting. | {
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"text": "3 c & c servers",
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},
{
"text": "The following commands",
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"end": 123
}
],
... | [] |
We have been able to confirm that the author of those two families of malware is the same person, as will be seen in the next chapter about'' CT RAT''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This remote administration tool is often used by the Pitty Tiger group. | {
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],
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"text": "is often used",
"start": 32,... | [] |
We have been able to acquire both the client and the server parts. | {
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} | [] |
We found two instances of the same binary with different names–32mm.exe and mm32.exe. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This RAT seems to be an evolution of PittyTiger, since a specific server binary we found could handle both requests from CT and PittyTiger, and was indicated as compatible with PittyTiger. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Moreover, the same commands are implemented in both RATs. | {
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],
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"text": "are implemented",
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... | [] |
Unsurprisingly, when running in our sandbox, the RAT triggers the same alarms as PittyTiger: The binary drops two files in'' C: \Program Files\Internet Explorer'': The'' ieupdate.exe'' is a simple binary to inject the DLL into'' explorer.exe''. | {
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},
{
"text": "'' C: \\Program Files\\Internet Explorer''",
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"end": 162
... | [] |
Persistence is achieved via the following registry key: After injection, the RAT sends a first login packet to its c & c: The RAT communication is performed through HTTP requests. | {
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"text": "the following registry key",
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},
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},
{
... | [] |
The data is sent encrypted with RC4, and base64-encoded. | {
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},
{
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}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is sent",
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"end"... | [] |
The RC4 key is the Unicode form of the requested URL. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The Login packet contains the following string, after decoding and deciphering: It contains the computer name, the user name, the internal IP address, the OS version, the RAT internal version and the Language ID of the system. | {
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"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
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},
{
"text": "the computer name",
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"end": 109
},
{
"text": "the user name",
"start": 111,
"end": 124
},
{
"text":... | [] |
The RAT can then receive commands from its c & c. | {
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"text": "The RAT",
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},
{
"text": "commands",
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},
{
"text": "its c & c",
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}
],
"action": [
{
... | [] |
Usual RAT features are implemented: Regarding the configuration, our sample communicates with'' sop.avstore.com.tw'', and contains the string'' Nov 13 2013'', which should be a version identifier. | {
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{
"text": "'' sop.avstore.com.tw''",
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}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "communicates",
"start": 76,
"end": 88... | [] |
The c & c part is a Windows binary written in .NET | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We found 2 versions: The About form gives the name of the developer (s): The version of the controller which can handle both PittyTiger and CT shows the same author (s): As these screenshots show, the switch between PittyTiger and CT was probably in the last semester of 2013. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The text can be translated, thanks to Google Translate, as: Further discussion about this author is provided in subsequent sections. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We named this malware'' MM RAT'' at the beginning of our investigation, before we found an existing name for it,'' Troj/Goldsun-B'' according to Sophos. | {
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} | [] |
This is another remote administration tool often used by the Pitty Tiger crew. | {
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"text": "another remote administration tool",
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},
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"text": "the Pitty Tiger crew",
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}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "used",
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... | [] |
We have been able to acquire both a client and server part for it. | {
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} | [] |
The binary we found is named 3200.exe, and triggers the following alarms in our sandbox: The'' release.tmp'' file is dropped on the system: The binary is also copied to the user's'' Application Data'' directory, and injects the'' release.tmp'' file in'' explorer.exe''. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The'' release.tmp'' file",
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},
{
"text": "the system",
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"end": 138
},
{
"text": "The binary",
"start": 140,
"end": 150
},
{
... | [] |
Persistence is achieved by adding the path to the binary to the Winlogon Shell key: The RAT embeds its own DNS server IP addresses to make the c & c domain names resolutions. | {
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{
"text": "Persistence",
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"text": "adding the path to the binary to the Winlogon Shell key",
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},
{
"text": "The RAT",
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"end"... | [] |
These addresses are listed below: It starts resolving its domains after injection, and immediately sends requests. | {
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},
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},
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"text": "injection",
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},
{
"text": "requests",
... | [] |
First requests are used to check for updates (GET request on /httpdocs/update/update.ini). | {
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"text": "requests",
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},
{
"text": "check for updates (GET request on /httpdocs/update/update.ini)",
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"end": 89
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "are used",
... | [] |
A Hello packet is then sent: The bot then repeatedly sends GET requests on'' /httpdocs/mm/ < botid > /ComMand.sec'' to retrieve remote commands. | {
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"text": "A Hello packet",
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},
{
"text": "GET requests",
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"end": 71
},
{
"text": "'... | [] |
The communication protocol is quite simple: GET requests are used to receive data from the c & c, and POST requests to send data. | {
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"entity": [
{
"text": "GET requests",
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},
{
"text": "receive data from the c & c",
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},
{
"text": "POST requests",
"start": 102,
"end": 115
},
... | [] |
In POST commands, the CGI name represents the command. | {
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}
],
"entity": [
{
"text": "POST commands",
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},
{
"text": "the CGI name",
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"end": 30
},
{
... | [] |
The following features are implemented: The following CGI files can be requested by the bot: The configuration is stored locally in a file called'' schmup.sys''. | {
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"text": "The following CGI files",
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}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "be requested",
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"end": 80
... | [] |
The file is ciphered using RC4, using the MD5 hash of'' rEdstArs'' as the key. | {
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},
{
"text": "the MD5 hash of'' rEdstArs'' as the key",
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}
],
... | [] |
Our sample uses'' mca.avstore.com.tw'','' star.yamn.net'' and'' bz.kimoo.com.tw'' as c & c servers. | {
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{
"text": "'' mca.avstore.com.tw'','' star.yamn.net'' and'' bz.kimoo.com.tw''",
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},
{
"text": "c & c servers",
"start": 8... | [] |
It contains the'' 1.6.0'' version number, and uses the password'' 9ol.8ik,'' to authenticate with the bots. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Unlike others c & c binaries, the c & c part of this RAT does not have a graphical interface, but can be remotely requested to manage the bots. | {
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"entity": [
{
"text": "the c & c part of this RAT",
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},
{
"text": "manage the bots",
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"end": 142
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "be remotely requested",
"start": 102... | [] |
Furthermore, no authentication is required to send commands to the c & c (but you need to know the configured password to interact with the bots). | {
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"action": [
{
"text": "send",
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],
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},
{
"text": "the c & c",
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}
],
"modi... | [] |
The management protocol is the same as the bots protocol, with different CGI files: The bots' answers to remote commands can be retrieved by requesting the'' Reply.sec'' file (e.g. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
GET /httpdocs/mm/ < botid > /Reply.sec) These network patterns might ring bells in some researcher's minds. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The network communication used by this binary are the same as those used by the Enfal malware, which has been used in the past by the Lurid group (APT attackers) and by other threat actors in China. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
An examination of the code did not reveal code similarities with the Enfal malware. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We do not currently know why this malware uses the same patterns to communicate. | {
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},
{
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}
],
"action"... | [] |
This is another remote administration tool used by the Pitty Tiger group. | {
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],
"action": [
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... | [] |
We have been able to get both a client and server part of it. | {
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} | [] |
The binary we found was dropped by a malicious Word document. | {
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}
],
"action": [
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"... | [] |
The following alarms are triggered in the sandbox: The shellcode contained in the Word file drops the following file, and executes it: This one drops in turn the following file: This tmp file is then copied to'' C: \Windows\system32\Nwsapagentex.dll'' and registered as a service called'' Nwsapagent''. | {
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},
{
"text": "the following file",
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},
{
"text": "it",
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"end": 133
... | [] |
This malware is a variant of the infamous Gh0st RAT. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Our specific sample uses'' ssss0'' instead of the usual'' Gh0st'' header for network communications. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The commands ID used in the communication protocol have also changed, but the features are quite the same. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The configuration is directly embedded in the binary, and deciphered at runtime. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Up to 5 c & c servers can be configured, but our sample only had one:'' ey.avstore.com.tw:53''. | {
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}
],
"action": [
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"text": "be configured",
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}
]
}
} | [] |
'' EY'' could stand for'' Ernst & Young''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It would not be very surprising, since a lot of different attack groups do use anti-virus vendors or other big company's names to try to look more legitimate. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Pitty Tiger is no exception, as detailed later in this report. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We also found two c & c binaries, claiming to be versions 2.1 and 2.2 of the Paladin RAT controller. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Version 2.1 answers to the'' ssss0'' header, while version 2.2 uses the classical'' Gh0st'' header. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Additionally to the Paladin RAT, we found another variant of Gh0st RAT, named'' Leo''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Although we have found it on a c & c server of the group, there is no evidence that is has been used by the group, in opposition to Paladin which is used often by Pitty Tiger. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Moreover, the built malware we found in the same folder was configured to connect to a local IP address, probably for testing purposes. | {
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{
"text": "the built malware we found in the same folder",
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},
{
"text": "a local IP address",
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}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "connect",
"star... | [] |
Our investigation has focused on three particular c & c servers used by the group. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These c & c servers, unlike the other c & cs used by the group, have been misconfigured. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Once parsed and dumped, it provided us with more insight. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We found several domains used by the Pitty Tiger group, the most interesting ones being detailed in this chapter. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Pitty Tiger, like other APT attackers, often use anti-virus'' familiar names'' when registering domains or creating subdomains. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Some examples can be avstore.com.tw, sophos.skypetm.com.tw, symantecs.com.tw, trendmicro.org.tw etc. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The registration information for this domain has been the same since 2013-06-04: This information has been used to register another domain, skypetm.com.tw, which has also been used by the Pitty Tiger group. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Our research also led us to the discovery of four different malware families connected to subdomains of avstore.com.tw: This domain has shown two different WHOIS entries through time: The most recent registration information is also used for avstore.com.tw. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Six malware families have been identified as communicating with subdomains of skypetm.com.tw: Avstore.com.tw and skypetm.com.tw have 4 malware families in common, communicating to subdomains of both domains: Some domains registered by the group are very old. | {
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},
{
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... | [] |
There is an increase in the registrations from 2010 on. | {
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} | [] |
All the e-mail addresses used are connected to the Pitty Tiger group. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Mapping the victims of such a targeted campaign is not an easy task. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We have found the Pitty Tiger group to be very active against one particular private company from the defense industry and one academic network of a government,, yet we think it was done to be used as a proxy for some of the group's operations. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We have also found some connections from other companies to the c & c servers, yet we did not find evidence that they were real victims. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These alleged victims do work in different sectors and are located mostly in European countries. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It might be surprising to see a company specialized in web development here, yet it has built websites for interesting potential targets. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We suspect Pitty Tiger to use this compromise to spear phish other companies which are in commercial relation with this web development company. | {
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},
{
"text": "other companies which are in commercial relation with this web development company",
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}
],
"action": [
{
"t... | [] |
We have to mention that we only had access to three of the several attackers' servers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Therefore, we suppose the Pitty Tiger group could have more targets than what we could confirm. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We also found a lot of vulnerability scanners launched by the attackers at different targets, yet there was no sign of compromise. | {
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},
{
"text": "different targets",
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}
],
... | [] |
During the course of our investigations, we discovered a RAR archive on the attacker's server containing 5 Word documents and one small C source code. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These documents belong to the defense company which has been compromised. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
According to the name of the files and the general feel of the archive, we do think it was extracted by the attackers to'' show'' someone what kind of data they could get from the compromise of that particular target. | {
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},
{
"text": "'' show'' someone what kind of data they could get from the compromise of that particular ta... | [] |
The documents were still exhibiting comments from various users, showing it was an ongoing work and not old documents. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Interestingly enough, we saw a part of these documents appear on Virus-Total, with an additional'' gift'' from the attackers, a payload dropping a malware. | {
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{
"text": "a payload",
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}
],
"action": [
{
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"end": 144
}
]... | [] |
There are only two options we can think of here: Someone from the same company has been targeted with this document. | {
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{
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},
{
"text": "this document",
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}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "been targeted",
"start": 85,
... | [] |
Someone from another company has been targeted with this document. | {
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},
{
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}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "been targeted",
"start": 35,
"e... | [] |
This other company could be a partner or competitor. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Since we were unable to determine the intended use of this specific document, we can only suppose that it could be used to provide commercial advantages to competitors of that company, or used by a foreign state. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
During our investigation, we found out interesting information about the Pitty Tiger group itself. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
After analyzing the various collected elements, we have tried to draw a portrait of this particular threat. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We have been able to get all the RDP connections logs to one c & c server: These connections are either VPS or dynamic IP addresses, mostly from China. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A computer named CHMXY-PC connected to the c & c via RDP with IP address 58.61.40.5. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "A computer named CHMXY-PC",
"start": 0,
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},
{
"text": "the c & c",
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"end": 48
},
{
"text": "RDP",
"start": 53,
"end": 56
},
{
"text"... | [] |
The IP is in an ADSL dynamic pool in the Gangzhou area (Guangdong province): A few connections to the c & c were done by a computer named TIEWEISHIPC with IP address 27.16.139.143. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "A few connections to the c & c",
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},
{
"text": "a computer named TIEWEISHIPC with IP address 27.16.139.143",
"start": 121,
"end": 179
}
],
"action": [
{
"text... | [] |
This IP address belongs to an ADSL dynamic pool in the Wuhan area (Hubei's provincial capital). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Some connections to the c & c originated from a computer named FLY-THINK with several IP addresses, all located in Fuqing (Fujian province). | {
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{
"text": "Some connections to the c & c",
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},
{
"text": "a computer named FLY-THINK with several IP addresses, all located in Fuqing (Fujian province)",
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"end": 139
}
],
"a... | [] |
The IP addresses are in an ADSL dynamic pool: Most of the connections to the c & c server were coming from a computer named 50PZ80C- 1DFDCB8 with several IP addresses. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Most of the connections to the c & c server",
"start": 46,
"end": 89
},
{
"text": "a computer named 50PZ80C- 1DFDCB8 with several IP addresses",
"start": 107,
"end": 166
}
],
"action": [
{
... | [] |
There are 11 IP addresses from Chinese dynamic ADSL ranges: 9 from Fuqing (Fujian province), one from Fuzhou (Fujian's province capital) and one from Nanchang (Jiangxi's province capital). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The last one came from a VPS instance located in Los Angeles (California, USA) but purchased by a China based VPS provider XeVPS which belong to the AS38197 (Sun Network Hong Kong Limited). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The two computers FLY-THINK and 50PZ80C-1DFDCB8 have used distinct IP addresses to connect to the c & c, yet some of these IP addresses come from the same IP range: We mapped these RDP connections to have a graphical view: We found that a member of this group of attackers used some tools on his own system, for testing ... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The two computers FLY-THINK and 50PZ80C-1DFDCB8",
"start": 0,
"end": 47
},
{
"text": "distinct IP addresses",
"start": 58,
"end": 79
},
{
"text": "connect to the c & c",
"start": 83... | [] |
This information was still available when we got access to the c & c server. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
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