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13,000 | On October 24, the UNSC passed Resolution 339, serving as a renewed call for all parties to adhere to the ceasefire terms established in Resolution 338. Most heavy fighting on the Egyptian front ended by October 26, but clashes along the ceasefire lines and a few airstrikes on the Third Army took place. With some Israeli advances taking place, Kissinger threatened to support a UN withdrawal resolution, but before Israel could respond, Egyptian national security advisor Hafez Ismail sent Kissinger a stunning message—Egypt was willing to enter into direct talks with Israel, provided that it agree to allow non-military supplies to reach the Third Army and to a complete ceasefire. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,001 | About noon on October 25, Kissinger appeared before the press at the State Department. He described the various stages of the crisis and the evolution of U.S. policy. He reviewed the first two weeks of the crisis and the nuclear alert, reiterated opposition to U.S. and Soviet troops in the area and more strongly opposed unilateral Soviet moves. He then reviewed the prospects for a peace agreement, which he termed "quite promising", and had conciliatory words for Israel, Egypt and even the USSR. Kissinger concluded his remarks by spelling out the principles of a new U.S. policy toward the Arab–Israeli conflict saying: | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,002 | Our position is that ... the conditions that produced this war were clearly intolerable to the Arab nations and that in the process of negotiations it will be necessary to make substantial concessions. The problem will be to relate the Arab concern for the sovereignty over the territories to the Israeli concern for secure boundaries. We believe that the process of negotiations between the parties is an essential component of this. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,003 | Quandt considers, "It was a brilliant performance, one of his most impressive." One hour later the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 340. This time the ceasefire held, and the fourth Arab–Israeli war was over. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,004 | Disengagement talks took place on October 28, 1973, at "Kilometre 101" between Israeli Major General Aharon Yariv and Egyptian Major General Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy. Ultimately, Kissinger took the proposal to Sadat, who agreed. United Nations checkpoints were brought in to replace Israeli ones, nonmilitary supplies were allowed to pass, and prisoners-of-war were to be exchanged. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,005 | A summit conference in Geneva followed in December 1973. All parties to the war—Israel, Syria, Jordan and Egypt—were invited to a joint effort by the Soviet Union and the United States to finally usher peace between the Arabs and Israelis. This conference was recognized by UN Security Council Resolution 344 and was based on the Resolution 338, calling for a "just and durable peace". Nevertheless, the conference was forced to adjourn on January 9, 1974, as Syria refused attendance. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,006 | After the failed conference Henry Kissinger started conducting shuttle diplomacy, meeting with Israel and the Arab states directly. The first concrete result of this was the initial military disengagement agreement, signed by Israel and Egypt on January 18, 1974. The agreement commonly known as Sinai I had the official name of "Sinai Separation of Forces Agreement". Under its terms, Israel agreed to pull back its forces from the areas West of Suez Canal, which it had occupied since the end of hostilities. Moreover, Israeli forces were also pulled back on the length of the whole front to create security zones for Egypt, UN and Israel, each roughly ten kilometres wide. Thus Israel gave up its advances reaching beyond the Suez canal, but it still held nearly all of Sinai. It became the first of many such "Land for Peace" agreements where Israel gave up territory in exchange for treaties. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,007 | On the Syrian front, skirmishes and artillery exchanges continued taking place. Shuttle diplomacy by Henry Kissinger eventually produced a disengagement agreement on May 31, 1974, based on exchange of prisoners-of-war, Israeli withdrawal to the Purple Line and the establishment of a UN buffer zone. The agreement ended the skirmishes and exchanges of artillery fire that had occurred frequently along the Israeli-Syrian ceasefire line. The UN Disengagement and Observer Force (UNDOF) was established as a peacekeeping force in the Golan. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,008 | The peace discussion at the end of the war was the first time that Arab and Israeli officials met for direct public discussions since the aftermath of the 1948 war. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,009 | Though the war reinforced Israel's military deterrence, it had a stunning effect on the population in Israel. Following their victory in the Six-Day War, the Israeli military had become complacent. The shock and sudden reversals that occurred at the beginning of the war inflicted a terrible psychological blow to the Israelis, who had hitherto experienced no serious military challenges. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,010 | A protest against the Israeli government started four months after the war ended. It was led by Motti Ashkenazi, commander of Budapest, the northernmost of the Bar-Lev forts and the only one during the war not to be captured by the Egyptians. Anger against the Israeli government (and Dayan in particular) was high. Shimon Agranat, President of the Israeli Supreme Court, was asked to lead an inquiry, the Agranat Commission, into the events leading up to the war and the setbacks of the first few days. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,011 | The Agranat Commission published its preliminary findings on April 2, 1974. Six people were held particularly responsible for Israel's failings: | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,012 | Rather than quieting public discontent, the report—which "had stressed that it was judging the ministers' responsibility for security failings, not their parliamentary responsibility, which fell outside its mandate"—inflamed it. Although it had absolved Meir and Dayan of all responsibility, public calls for their resignations (especially Dayan's) intensified. In the December 1973 legislative election, Meir's Alignment party lost five Knesset seats. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,013 | On April 11, 1974, Golda Meir resigned. Her cabinet followed suit, including Dayan, who had previously offered to resign twice and was turned down both times by Meir. A new government was seated in June and Yitzhak Rabin, who had spent most of the war as an advisor to Elazar in an unofficial capacity, became Prime Minister. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,014 | In 1999, the issue was revisited by the Israeli political leadership to prevent similar shortcomings from being repeated. The Israeli National Security Council was created to improve coordination between the different security and intelligence bodies, and the political branch of government. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,015 | General Shazly had angered Sadat for advocating the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Sinai to meet the Israeli incursion on the West Bank of the Canal. Six weeks after the war, he was relieved of command and forced out of the army, ultimately going into political exile for years. Upon his return to Egypt, he was placed under house arrest. Following his release, he advocated the formation of a "Supreme High Committee" modeled after Israel's Agranat Commission in order to "probe, examine and analyze" the performance of Egyptian forces and the command decisions made during the war, but his requests were completely ignored. He published a book, banned in Egypt, that described Egypt's military failings and the sharp disagreements he had with Ismail and Sadat in connection with the prosecution of the war. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,016 | The commanders of the Second and Third Armies, Generals Khalil and Wasel, were also dismissed from the army. The commander of the Egyptian Second Army at the start of the war, General Mamoun, suffered a heart attack, or, alternatively, a breakdown, after the Egyptian defeat during the October 14 Sinai tank battle, and was replaced by General Khalil. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,017 | In Syria, Colonel Rafik Halawi, the Druze commander of an infantry brigade that had collapsed during the Israeli breakthrough, was executed before the war even ended. He was given a quick hearing and sentenced to death; his execution was immediate. Military historian Zeev Schiff referred to him as Syria's "sacrificial lamb". The Syrians however offered vehement denials that Halawi was executed and expended great efforts trying to debunk the allegation. They claimed he was killed in battle with Israel and threatened severe punishment to anyone repeating the allegation of execution. Their concern stemmed from a desire to maintain Syrian Druze loyalty to Assad's regime and prevent Syrian Druze from siding with their co-religionists in Israel. On July 7, 1974, Halawi's remains were removed from a Syrian military hospital and he was interred in Damascus at the "Cemetery of the Martyrs of the October War" in the presence of many Syrian dignitaries. One analyst noted that the presence of so many high-level officials was unusual and attributed it to Syrian efforts to quell any suggestion of execution. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,018 | In response to U.S. support of Israel, the Arab members of OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, decided to reduce oil production by 5% per month on October 17. On October 19, President Nixon authorized a major allocation of arms supplies and $2.2 billion in appropriations for Israel. In response, Saudi Arabia declared an embargo against the United States, later joined by other oil exporters and extended against the Netherlands and other states, causing the 1973 energy crisis. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,019 | Another Egyptian–Israeli disengagement agreement, the "Sinai Interim Agreement", was signed in Geneva on September 4, 1975, and was commonly known as Sinai II. This agreement led Israel to withdraw from another 20–40 km with UN forces buffering the vacated area. After the agreement, Israel still held more than two-thirds of Sinai, which would prove to be a valuable bargaining chip in the coming negotiations. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,020 | The Yom Kippur War upset the status quo in the Middle East, and the war served as a direct antecedent of the 1978 Camp David Accords. The impetus for the talks came when United States President Jimmy Carter invited both Sadat and Begin to a summit at Camp David to negotiate a final peace. The talks took place from September 5–17, 1978. Ultimately, the talks succeeded, and Israel and Egypt signed the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty in 1979. Israel subsequently withdrew its troops and settlers from the Sinai, in exchange for normal relations with Egypt and a lasting peace, with last Israeli troops exiting on April 26, 1982. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,021 | The Accords resulted in the Egypt–Israel peace treaty, the first ever between Israel and an Arab state. According to George Friedman, the war gave the Israelis increased respect for the Egyptian military and decreased their confidence in their own, and caused the Israelis to be uncertain whether they could defeat Egypt in the event of another war. At the same time, the Egyptians recognized that despite their improvements, they were defeated in the end, and became doubtful that they could ever defeat Israel militarily. Therefore, a negotiated settlement made sense to both sides. Many in the Arab world were outraged at Egypt's peace with Israel. Sadat, in particular, became deeply unpopular both in the Arab world and in his own country. Egypt was suspended from the Arab League until 1989. Until then, Egypt had been "at the helm of the Arab world". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,022 | U.S. military studies of the Yom Kippur War played a major role in shaping U.S. military doctrine in subsequent decades, particularly because the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was established only three months before the onset of the war. U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Creighton Abrams, TRADOC Commander Gen. William E. DePuy, and other Army leaders saw Israel's strategic and doctrinal conditions between 1967 and 1973 as similar to NATO's position in Europe, and thus they undertook a deep study of Israel's warfighting in 1973 to derive insights for war against the Soviet Union. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,023 | Soon after the war, U.S. Army civilian analysts and senior officers such as Gen. Donn A. Starry visited the IDF and compiled "lessons" for the Army to learn after the war. These lessons covered the improved lethality and accuracy of anti-tank and anti-air missiles, the importance of superior training for tank crews, the necessity of cover and concealment during movement, and the importance of combined arms warfare. In 1976, TRADOC revised the Army's FM 100–5 "Operations" field manual and promoted an operational concept of "Active Defense", with a strong emphasis on tactical proficiency tied to the performance of advanced weapons systems like those observed in the Yom Kippur War fighting. Gen. DePuy also visited Israel in 1976, where he toured Yom Kippur War battlefields and observed Israeli field training; he used these insights to encourage reforms of U.S. Army training to ease the Army's transition to a more professional force after the end of the military draft in 1973. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,024 | In May 1977, Gen. Starry (soon to succeed DePuy as TRADOC commander) returned to Israel and toured Yom Kippur War sites on the Golan Heights, guided by Raful Eitan and Moshe Peled. Starry used his observations to address problems left unaddressed by the Active Defense doctrine, such as how best to fight follow-on echelons after the first battle. TRADOC's 1982 revision of FM 100–5 replaced Active Defense with an offense-oriented operational doctrine known as AirLand Battle, which formed the basis of the American plan for Operation Desert Storm in 1991. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=34276 |
13,025 | Chernobyl is a 2019 historical tragedy television miniseries that revolves around the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 and the cleanup efforts that followed. The series was created and written by Craig Mazin and directed by Johan Renck. It features an ensemble cast led by Jared Harris, Stellan Skarsgård, Emily Watson and Paul Ritter. The series was produced by HBO in the United States and Sky UK in the United Kingdom. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,026 | The five-part series premiered simultaneously in the United States on May 6, 2019, and in the United Kingdom on May 7. It was acclaimed by critics, who lauded the performances, cinematography, historical accuracies, atmosphere, direction, screenplay, musical score and tone. At the 71st Primetime Emmy Awards, it received nineteen nominations and won for Outstanding Limited Series, Outstanding Directing, and Outstanding Writing, while Harris, Skarsgård, and Watson received acting nominations. At the 77th Golden Globe Awards, the series won for Best Miniseries or Television Film and Skarsgård won for Best Supporting Actor in a Series, Miniseries or Television Film. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,027 | While the series was exhaustively researched, some liberties were taken for dramatic purposes. The release of each episode was accompanied by a podcast in which Mazin and NPR host Peter Sagal discuss these changes and the reasoning behind them. While critics, experts and witnesses have noted historical and factual discrepancies in the miniseries, the creators' attention to detail has been widely praised. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,028 | "Chernobyl" dramatizes the story of the April 1986 nuclear plant disaster which occurred in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Soviet Union, telling the stories of the people who were involved in the disaster and those who responded to it. The series depicts some of the lesser-known stories of the disaster, including the efforts of the firefighters who were the first responders on the scene, volunteers, and teams of miners who dug a critical tunnel under Reactor 4. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,029 | The miniseries is based in large part on the recollections of Pripyat locals, as told by Belarusian Nobel laureate Svetlana Alexievich in her book "Voices from Chernobyl". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,030 | Writer Craig Mazin began researching for the project in 2014, by reading books and government reports from inside and outside the Soviet Union. Mazin also interviewed nuclear scientists to learn how a reactor works, and former Soviet citizens to gain a better idea of the culture in 1986. Mazin also read several first-person accounts in order to bring additional authenticity to the story. He explained, "When you're reading the personal stories of people who were there—people who lived near the plant, people who worked at the plant, people who were sent to Chernobyl as part of the effort to clean it up—in those individual accounts, that's really where the story came alive". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,031 | Mazin's interest in creating the series originated when he decided to write something that addressed "how we're struggling with the global war on the truth right now". Another inspiration is that he knew Chernobyl exploded, but he did not know "why". He explained, "I didn't know why, and I thought there was this inexplicable gap in my knowledge ... So, I began reading about it, just out of this very dry, intellectual curiosity, and what I discovered was that, while the story of the explosion is fascinating, and we make it really clear exactly why and how it happened, what really grabbed me and held me were the incredible stories of the human beings who lived through it, and who suffered and sacrificed to save the people that they loved, to save their countrymen and to save a continent, and continued to do so, against odds that were startling and kept getting worse. I was so moved by it. It was like I had discovered a war that people just hadn't really depicted, and I became obsessed". Mazin said that "The lesson of "Chernobyl" isn't that modern nuclear power is dangerous. The lesson is that lying, arrogance, and suppression of criticism are dangerous". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,032 | In preparation for the miniseries, Mazin visited the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. Mazin made the decision in the early stages not to use Russian or Ukrainian accents, and instead, have the actors use their natural accents. Mazin explained, "We had an initial thought that we didn't want to do the 'Boris and Natasha' clichéd accent because the Russian accent can turn comic very easily. At first, we thought that maybe we would have people do these sort of vaguely Eastern European accents—not really strong but noticeable. What we found very quickly is that actors will act accents. They will not act, they will act accents and we were losing everything about these people that we loved. Honestly, I think after maybe one or two auditions we said 'Ok, new rule. We're not doing that anymore'". Mazin also did not cast any American actors, as that could potentially pull the audience out of the story. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,033 | On July 26, 2017, it was announced that HBO and Sky had given a series order to "Chernobyl". It was HBO's first co-production with Sky UK. The five-episode miniseries was written by Craig Mazin and directed by Johan Renck. Mazin also served as an executive producer alongside Carolyn Strauss and Jane Featherstone, with Chris Fry and Renck acting as co-executive producers. On March 11, 2019, it was announced that the miniseries would premiere on May 6, 2019. On June 4, 2019, Craig Mazin made the original scripts of all episodes available for downloading as PDFs (see External links below). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,034 | A companion podcast for the miniseries had new episodes published as each TV episode aired on HBO. The podcast featured conversations between Mazin and host Peter Sagal including discussions of where the show was as true as possible to historical events and where events were consolidated or modified as part of artistic license. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,035 | Simultaneously with the initial series announcement, it was confirmed that Jared Harris would star in the series. On March 19, 2018, it was announced that Stellan Skarsgård and Emily Watson had joined the main cast, marking their second collaboration after "Breaking the Waves." In May 2018, it was announced that Paul Ritter, Jessie Buckley, Adrian Rawlins, and Con O'Neill also had joined the cast. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,036 | Principal photography began in April 2018 in Lithuania. Initial filming started on May 13, 2018, in Fabijoniškės, a residential district in Vilnius, Lithuania, which was used to portray the Ukrainian city of Pripyat, since the district maintained an authentic Soviet atmosphere. An area of densely built panel housing apartments served as a location for the evacuation scenes. Director Johan Renck heavily criticised the amount of diverse and eye-catching modern windows in the houses, but was not concerned about removing them in post-production. At the end of March, production moved to Visaginas, Lithuania, to shoot both the exterior and interior of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, a decommissioned nuclear power station that is sometimes referred to as "Chernobyl's sister" due to its visual resemblance and the nuclear reactor design used at both Chernobyl and Ignalina (RBMK nuclear power reactor). In early June 2018, production moved to Ukraine to shoot minor final scenes. The filming of "Chernobyl" took 16 weeks. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,037 | The musical score was composed by Icelandic composer Hildur Guðnadóttir. In August 2018, she began recording the score with Chris Watson at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, where the series being preliminarily shot. She used the recordings from the power plant, deciding not to depend on instruments and pre-recorded material to create the score, as she wanted to experience from a listener's perspective on what it is like to actually be inside of a power plant. The original score album was released by the record labels Deutsche Grammophon and WaterTower Music on May 31, 2019, with a vinyl edition released by Decca on September 6, 2019. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,038 | The series was exhaustively researched, but some liberties were taken for dramatic purposes, such as Legasov being present at the trial. The first episode depicts Legasov timing his suicide down to the second (1:23:45) to coincide with the second anniversary of the Chernobyl explosion. In reality, Legasov committed suicide a day later. The epilogue acknowledges that the character of Ulana Khomyuk is fictional, a composite of multiple Soviet scientists. Chernobyl expert Adam Higginbotham points out in an interview that there was no need for scientists to "uncover the truth"; that "many nuclear scientists knew all along that there were problems with this reactor—the problems that led ultimately to an explosion and disaster". Artistic license was also used in the depiction of the "Bridge of Death," from which spectators in Pripyat watched the immediate aftermath of the explosion; the miniseries asserts that all of the spectators subsequently died, a claim which is now generally held to be an urban legend. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,039 | The series also discusses a potential third steam explosion, due to the risk of corium melting through to the water reservoirs below the reactor building, as being in the range of 2 to 4 megatons. This would have been physically impossible under the circumstances, as the only known means of producing such a powerful explosion is a thermonuclear bomb, a highly contrived mechanism involving far more highly enriched fissile material than the reactor fuel present at Chernobyl. In reality, the potential third explosion would likely have been closer in size to the previous two explosions that had destroyed the core. According to series author Craig Mazin, the claim was based on one made by Belarusian nuclear physicist Vassili Nesterenko about a potential 3–5 Mt third explosion, even though physicists hired for the show were unable to confirm its plausibility. It is not clear where Nesterenko's estimate originated; it may have originally referred not to the energy of the possible third explosion itself, but rather to the resulting radioactive fallout as being comparable to the fallout of a 3–5 Mt hydrogen bomb. This would have been somewhat more plausible under the circumstances, especially in a worst-case scenario involving a major steam explosion ejecting most of reactor 4's remaining fuel into the atmosphere as a fine dust, in addition to destroying reactors 1, 2 and 3. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,040 | The series' production design, such as the choice of sets, props, and costumes, has received high praise for its accuracy. Several sources have commended the attention to even minor setting details, such as the usage of actual Kyiv-region license plate numbers, and a "New Yorker" review states that "the material culture of the Soviet Union is reproduced with an accuracy that has never before been seen" from either Western or Russian filmmakers. Oleksiy Breus, a Chernobyl engineer, commends the portrayal of the symptoms of radiation poisoning; however, Robert Gale, a doctor who treated Chernobyl victims, states that the miniseries overstated the symptoms by suggesting that the patients were actively radioactive. In a more critical judgment, a review from the "Moscow Times" highlights some small design errors: for instance, Soviet soldiers are inaccurately shown as holding their weapons in Western style, and Legasov's apartment was too "dingy" for a scientist of his status. During an interview to BBC Russian, the real Lyudmilla Ignatenko described how she suffered harassment and criticism when the series was aired. She claimed reporters hounded her at home and even jammed their foot in her door as they tried to interview her, and that she suffered criticism for exposing her unborn daughter to Vasily, despite the fact she hadn't known anything about radiation then, and that risk to a fetus from such an exposure is infinitesimally small. She said she never gave HBO and Sky Atlantic permission to tell her story, saying there had been a single phone call offering money after filming had been completed. She thought the call was a hoax because it came from a Moscow number, and hung up. HBO Sky rejects this, saying they had multiple exchanges with Lyudmilla before, during, and after filming with the opportunity to participate and provide feedback, and at no time did she express a wish for her story to not be included. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,041 | The portrayal of Soviet officials, including both plant management and central government figures, received criticism. Breus, the Chernobyl engineer, argues that the characters of Viktor Bryukhanov, Nikolai Fomin, and Anatoly Dyatlov were "distorted and misrepresented, as if they were villains." Similarly, multiple reviews criticize the series for creating a stark moral dichotomy, in which the scientists are depicted as overly heroic while the government and plant officials are uniformly villainous. The occasional threats of violence and execution from government officials were also seen by some as anachronistic: Masha Gessen of the "New Yorker" argues that the threats depicted "were not a feature of Soviet life after the nineteen-thirties." Higginbotham takes a more positive view of the portrayal of the authorities, arguing that the unconcerned attitude of the central government was accurately depicted. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,042 | "Chernobyl" received widespread critical acclaim. On review aggregator Rotten Tomatoes, the series has an approval rating of 95% based on 104 reviews, with an average rating of 8.9/10. The website's critics consensus reads: ""Chernobyl" rivets with a creeping dread that never dissipates, dramatizing a national tragedy with sterling craft and an intelligent dissection of institutional rot." On Metacritic, it has a weighted average score of 82 out of 100, based on 27 critics, indicating "universal acclaim". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,043 | Reviewers from "The Atlantic", "The Washington Post", and BBC observed parallels to contemporary society by focusing on the power of information and how dishonest leaders can make mistakes beyond their comprehension. Sophie Gilbert of "The Atlantic" hailed the series as a "grim disquisition on the toll of devaluing the truth"; Hank Stuever of "The Washington Post" praised it for showcasing "what happens when lying is standard and authority is abused". Meera Syal praised "Chernobyl" as a "fiercely intelligent exposition of the human cost of state censorship. Would love to see similar exposé of the Bhopal disaster". David Morrison was "struck by the attention to accuracy" and says the "series does an outstanding job of presenting the technical and human issues of the accident." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,044 | Jennifer K. Crosby, writing for "The Objective Standard", says that the miniseries "explores the reasons for this monumental catastrophe and illustrates how it was magnified by the evasion and denial of those in charge," adding that "although the true toll of the disaster on millions of lives will never be known, "Chernobyl" goes a long way toward helping us understand [its] real causes and effects." Aaron Giovannone writes critically of the series in the socialist publication "Jacobin", stating that "even as we worry about the ongoing ecological crisis caused by capitalism, "Chernobyl" revels in the failure of the historical alternative to capitalism," which reinforces the status quo, offering us "no way out" of the crisis. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,045 | The miniseries was well-received by some critics and audiences in Russia. Vladimir Medinsky, Russian culture minister, whose father was one of the Chernobyl liquidators, called the series "masterfully made" and "filmed with great respect for ordinary people". It was reported that Russian NTV television channel has been producing its own version of the Chernobyl story in which the CIA plays a key role in the disaster. However, the series in question had been in production since before HBO's miniseries and was not created in response to it. An apparent trailer for the series was uploaded to YouTube but was later deleted following negative reaction. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,046 | The Communists of Russia party called for a libel lawsuit against "Chernobyl"s writer, director and producers, describing the show as "disgusting". In a statement, party member Sergey Malinkovich spoke of the party's intentions to lobby TV regulator Roskomnadzor to request that it block local access to the series. Marianna Prysiazhniuk of "Vice Media" notes that multiple Russian media outlets describe the miniseries as one-sided, incomplete, or anti-Russian propaganda. "Argumenty i Fakty" dismissed the show as "a caricature and not the truth" and "The only things missing are the bears and accordions!" quipped Stanislav Natanzon, lead anchor of Russia-24, one of the country's main news channels. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,047 | In Ukraine, Anna Korolevska, deputy director at the Ukrainian National Chernobyl Museum in Kyiv, said "Today young people coming to power in Ukraine know nothing about that disaster in 1986. It was a necessary film to make and HBO have obviously tried their best; as for us, we are going to create a special tour about Chernobyl's historic truth, inspired by the HBO series." Bermet Talant, a Ukrainian journalist, noted that "In Russia, a state that still takes pride in the Soviet legacy, the series has faced criticism from the official media. Meanwhile, many in Ukraine appreciated the series for humanizing a tragic chapter in the country's history. […] Ukrainian viewers also appreciated HBO's "Chernobyl" for praising the heroism and self-sacrifice of ordinary people." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,048 | Belarusian Nobel laureate Svetlana Alexievich, whose book inspired the series, said "We are now witnessing a new phenomenon that Belarusians, who suffered greatly and thought they knew a lot about the tragedy, have completely changed their perception about Chernobyl and are interpreting this tragedy in a whole new way. The authors accomplished this, even though they are from a completely different world – not from Belarus, not from our region." She also noted its popularity with young Belarusians. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,049 | At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in China, Chinese netizens drew parallels between the Soviet response to the Chernobyl disaster and the initial handling of the coronavirus outbreak by the Chinese government. As a response, the page for "Chernobyl" on Douban, which by that point had amassed more than 200,000 ratings with an average of 9.6 out of 10, was taken down. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=55876266 |
13,050 | The was a nuclear accident in 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Ōkuma, Fukushima, Japan. The proximate cause of the disaster was the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami, which occurred on the afternoon of 11 March 2011 and remains the most powerful earthquake ever recorded in Japan. The earthquake triggered a powerful tsunami, with 13–14-meter-high waves damaging the nuclear power plant's emergency diesel generators, leading to a loss of electric power. The result was the most severe nuclear accident since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, classified as level seven on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) after initially being classified as level five, and thus joining Chernobyl as the only other accident to receive such classification. While the 1957 explosion at the Mayak facility was the second worst by radioactivity released, the INES ranks incidents by impact on population, so Chernobyl (335,000 people evacuated) and Fukushima (154,000 evacuated) rank higher than the 10,000 evacuated from the Mayak site in the rural southern Urals. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,051 | The accident was triggered by the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami, which occurred in the Pacific Ocean about east of the Japanese mainland at 14:46 JST on Friday, 11 March 2011. On detecting the earthquake, the active reactors automatically shut down their normal power-generating fission reactions. Because of these shutdowns and other electrical grid supply problems, the reactors' electricity supply failed, and their emergency diesel generators automatically started. Critically, these were required to provide electrical power to the pumps that circulated coolant through the reactors' cores. This continued circulation was vital to remove residual decay heat, which continues to be produced after fission has ceased. However, the earthquake had also generated a tsunami high that arrived shortly afterwards, swept over the plant's seawall and then flooded the lower parts of the reactor buildings at units 1–4. This flooding caused the failure of the emergency generators and loss of power to the circulating pumps. The resultant loss of reactor core cooling led to three nuclear meltdowns, three hydrogen explosions, and the release of radioactive contamination in Units 1, 2 and 3 between 12 and 15 March. The spent fuel pool of the previously shut down Reactor 4 increased in temperature on 15 March due to decay heat from newly added spent fuel rods, but did not boil down sufficiently to expose the fuel. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,052 | In the days after the accident, radiation released into the atmosphere forced the government to declare an ever-larger evacuation zone around the plant, culminating in an evacuation zone with a radius. All told, some 110,000 residents were evacuated from the communities surrounding the plant due to the rising off-site levels of ambient ionizing radiation caused by airborne radioactive contamination from the damaged reactors. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,053 | Large amounts of water contaminated with radioactive isotopes were released into the Pacific Ocean during and after the disaster. Michio Aoyama, a professor of radioisotope geoscience at the Institute of Environmental Radioactivity, has estimated that 18,000 terabecquerel (TBq) of radioactive caesium-137 were released into the Pacific during the accident, and in 2013, 30 gigabecquerel (GBq) of caesium-137 were still flowing into the ocean every day. The plant's operator has since built new walls along the coast and has created a 1.5 km long "ice wall" of frozen earth to stop the flow of contaminated water. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,054 | While there has been ongoing controversy over the health effects of the disaster, a 2014 report by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and World Health Organization projected no increase in miscarriages, stillbirths or physical and mental disorders in babies born after the accident. Evacuation and sheltering to protect the public significantly reduced potential radiation exposures by a factor of 10, according to UNSCEAR. UNSCEAR also reported that the evacuations themselves had repercussions for the people involved, including a number of evacuation-related deaths and a subsequent impact on mental and social well-being (for example, because evacuees were separated from their homes and familiar surroundings, and many lost their livelihoods). An ongoing intensive cleanup program to both decontaminate affected areas and decommission the plant will take 30 to 40 years from the disaster, plant management estimated. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,055 | On 5 July 2012, the National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) found that the causes of the accident had been foreseeable, and that the plant operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), had failed to meet basic safety requirements such as risk assessment, preparing for containing collateral damage, and developing evacuation plans. At a meeting in Vienna three months after the disaster, the International Atomic Energy Agency faulted lax oversight by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, saying the ministry faced an inherent conflict of interest as the government agency in charge of both regulating and promoting the nuclear power industry. On 12 October 2012, TEPCO admitted for the first time that it had failed to take necessary measures for fear of inviting lawsuits or protests against its nuclear plants. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,056 | The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant consisted of six General Electric (GE) light water boiling water reactors (BWRs) with a combined power of 4.7 gigawatts, making it one of the world's 25 largest nuclear power stations. It was the first GE-designed nuclear plant to be constructed and run entirely by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). Reactor 1 was a 439 MWe type (BWR-3) reactor constructed in July 1967, and commenced operation on 26 March 1971. It was designed to withstand an earthquake with a peak ground acceleration of 0.18 g () and a response spectrum based on the 1952 Kern County earthquake. Reactors 2 and 3 were both 784 MWe type BWR-4s. Reactor 2 commenced operation in July 1974, and Reactor 3 in March 1976. The earthquake design basis for all units ranged from 0.42 g () to 0.46 g (). After the 1978 Miyagi earthquake, when the ground acceleration reached 0.125 g () for 30 seconds, no damage to the critical parts of the reactor was found. Units 1–5 have a Mark-1 type (light bulb torus) containment structure; unit 6 has Mark 2-type (over/under) containment structure. In September 2010, Reactor 3 was partially fueled by mixed-oxides (MOX). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,057 | At the time of the accident, the units and central storage facility contained the following numbers of fuel assemblies: | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,058 | There was no MOX (mixed oxide) fuel in any of the cooling ponds at the time of the incident. The only MOX fuel was loaded in the Unit 3 reactor. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,059 | Nuclear reactors generate electricity by using the heat of the fission reaction to produce steam, which drives turbines that generate electricity. When the reactor stops operating, the radioactive decay of unstable isotopes in the fuel continues to generate heat (decay heat) for a time, and so requires continued cooling. This decay heat amounts to approximately 6.5% of the amount produced by fission at first, then decreases over several days before reaching shutdown levels. Afterwards, spent fuel rods typically require several years in a spent fuel pool before they can be safely transferred to dry cask storage vessels. The decay heat in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool had the capacity to boil about of water per day. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,060 | In the reactor core, high-pressure systems cycle water between the reactor pressure vessel and heat exchangers. These systems transfer heat to a secondary heat exchanger via the essential service water system, using water pumped out to sea or an onsite cooling tower. Units 2 and 3 had steam turbine-driven emergency core cooling systems that could be directly operated by steam produced by decay heat and that could inject water directly into the reactor. Some electrical power was needed to operate valves and monitoring systems. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,061 | Unit 1 had a different, entirely passive cooling system, the Isolation Condenser (IC). It consisted of a series of pipes run from the reactor core to the inside of a large tank of water. When the valves were opened, steam flowed upward to the IC, where the cool water in the tank condenses the steam back to water that runs under gravity back to the reactor core. During a 25 March 2014 presentation to the TVA, Takeyuki Inagaki explained that unit 1's IC was operated intermittently to maintain reactor vessel level and to prevent the core from cooling too quickly, which can increase reactor power. As the tsunami engulfed the station, the IC valves were closed and could not be reopened automatically due to the loss of electrical power, but could have been opened manually. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,062 | When a reactor is not producing electricity, its cooling pumps can be powered by other reactor units, the grid, diesel generators, or batteries. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,063 | The Fukushima reactors were not designed for a large tsunami, nor had the reactors been modified when concerns were raised in Japan and by the IAEA. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,064 | In accordance with GE's original specifications for the construction of the plant, each reactor's emergency diesel generators and DC batteries, crucial components in powering cooling systems after a power loss, were located in the basements of the reactor turbine buildings. Mid-level GE engineers expressed concerns, relayed to TEPCO, that this left them vulnerable to flooding. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,065 | In the late 1990s, three additional backup diesel generators for Units 2 and 4 were placed in new buildings located higher on the hillside, to comply with new regulatory requirements. All six units were given access to these diesel generators, but the switching stations that sent power from these backup generators to the reactors' cooling systems for Units 1 through 5 were still located in the poorly protected turbine buildings. Meanwhile, the switching station for Unit 6 was protected inside the only GE Mark II reactor building and continued to function. All three of the generators added in the late 1990s were fully operational after the tsunami. If the switching stations had been moved to the interior of the reactor buildings or to other flood-proof locations, power would have been provided by these generators to the reactors' cooling systems and thus the catastrophe would have been averted. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,066 | The nearby Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Plant was also struck by the tsunami. However, this power plant had incorporated design changes that improved its resistance to flooding, thereby reducing flood damage. The diesel generators and related electrical distribution equipment were located in the watertight reactor building, and therefore this equipment remained functional. By midnight, power from the electricity grid was being used to power the reactor-cooling pumps. Seawater pumps for cooling were protected from flooding, and although 3 of 4 initially failed, they were restored to operation. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,067 | Used fuel assemblies taken from reactors are initially stored for at least 18 months in the pools adjacent to their reactors. They can then be transferred to the central fuel storage pond. Fukushima I's storage area contains 6375 fuel assemblies. After further cooling, fuel can be transferred to dry cask storage, which has shown no signs of abnormalities. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,068 | Many of the internal components and fuel assembly cladding are made from zircaloy because it does not absorb neutrons. At normal operating temperatures of approximately , zircaloy is inert. However, above , zirconium metal can react exothermically with water to form free hydrogen gas. The reaction between zirconium and the coolant produces more heat, accelerating the reaction. In addition, zircaloy can react with uranium dioxide to form zirconium dioxide and uranium metal. This exothermic reaction together with the reaction of boron carbide with stainless steel can release additional heat energy, thus contributing to the overheating of a reactor. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,069 | At the time of the Tōhoku earthquake on 11 March 2011, Reactors 4, 5, and 6 were shut down. However, their spent fuel pools still required cooling. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,070 | The 9.0 M earthquake occurred at 14:46 on Friday, 11 March 2011, with the epicenter near Honshu, the largest island of Japan. It produced maximum ground g-forces of 0.56, 0.52, 0.56 at units 2, 3, and 5 respectively. This exceeded the seismic reactor design tolerances of 0.45, 0.45, and 0.46 g for continued operation, but the seismic values were within the design tolerances at units 1, 4, and 6. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,071 | When the earthquake struck, units 1, 2, and 3 were operating, but units 4, 5, and 6 had been shut down for a scheduled inspection. Immediately after the earthquake, the electricity-producing Reactors 1, 2, and 3 automatically shut down their sustained fission reactions by inserting control rods in a safety procedure referred to as a SCRAM, which ends the reactors' normal running conditions, by closing down the fission reaction in a controlled manner. As the reactors were now unable to generate power to run their own coolant pumps, emergency diesel generators came online, as designed, to power electronics and coolant systems. These operated normally until the tsunami destroyed the generators for Reactors 1–5. The two generators cooling Reactor 6 were undamaged and were sufficient to be pressed into service to cool the neighboring Reactor 5 along with their own reactor, averting the overheating issues the other reactors suffered. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,072 | The largest tsunami wave was 13–14 m (43–46 feet) high and hit approximately 50 minutes after the initial earthquake, overwhelming the plant's ground level, which was above the sea level. The moment of impact was recorded by a camera. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,073 | The waves flooded the basements of the power plant's turbine buildings and disabled the emergency diesel generators at approximately 15:41. TEPCO then notified authorities of a "first-level emergency". The switching stations that provided power from the three backup generators located higher on the hillside failed when the building that housed them flooded. All AC power was lost to units 1–4. All DC power was lost on Units 1 and 2 due to flooding, while some DC power from batteries remained available on Unit 3. Steam-driven pumps provided cooling water to reactors 2 and 3 and prevented their fuel rods from overheating, as the rods continued to generate decay heat after fission had ceased. Eventually these pumps stopped working, and the reactors began to overheat. The lack of cooling water eventually led to meltdowns in Reactors 1, 2, and 3. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,074 | Further batteries and mobile generators were dispatched to the site, but were delayed by poor road conditions; the first arrived at 21:00 11 March, almost six hours after the tsunami struck. Unsuccessful attempts were made to connect portable generating equipment to power water pumps. The failure was attributed to flooding at the connection point in the Turbine Hall basement and the absence of suitable cables. TEPCO switched its efforts to installing new lines from the grid. One generator at unit 6 resumed operation on 17 March, while external power returned to units 5 and 6 only on 20 March. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,075 | As workers struggled to supply power to the reactors' coolant systems and restore power to their control rooms, three hydrogen-air chemical explosions occurred, the first in Unit 1 on 12 March, and the last in Unit 4, on 15 March. It is estimated that the oxidation of zirconium by steam in Reactors 1–3 produced of hydrogen gas each. The pressurized gas was vented out of the reactor pressure vessel where it mixed with the ambient air, and eventually reached explosive concentration limits in Units 1 and 3. Due to piping connections between Units 3 and 4, or alternatively from the same reaction occurring in the spent fuel pool in Unit 4 itself, Unit 4 also filled with hydrogen, resulting in an explosion. In each case, the hydrogen-air explosions occurred at the top of each unit, in their upper secondary containment buildings which in a BWR, are constructed out of steel panels which are intended to be blown off in the event of a hydrogen explosion. Drone overflights on 20 March and afterwards captured clear images of the effects of each explosion on the outside structures, while the view inside was largely obscured by shadows and debris. In Reactors 1, 2, and 3, overheating caused a reaction between the water and the zircaloy, creating hydrogen gas. On 12 March, leaking hydrogen mixed with oxygen exploded in Unit 1, destroying the upper part of the building and injuring five people. On 14 March, a similar explosion occurred in the Reactor 3 building, blowing off the roof and injuring eleven people. On 15 March, there was an explosion in the Reactor 4 building due to a shared vent pipe with Reactor 3. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,076 | The amount of damage sustained by the reactor cores during the accident, and the location of molten nuclear fuel ("corium") within the containment buildings, is unknown; TEPCO has revised its estimates several times. On 16 March 2011, TEPCO estimated that 70% of the fuel in Unit 1 had melted and 33% in Unit 2, and that Unit 3's core might also be damaged. As of 2015 it can be assumed that most fuel melted through the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and is resting on the bottom of the primary containment vessel (PCV), having been stopped by the PCV concrete. In July 2017 a remotely controlled robot filmed for the first time apparently melted fuel, just below the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 3. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,077 | TEPCO released further estimates of the state and location of the fuel in a November 2011 report. The report concluded that the Unit 1 RPV was damaged during the disaster and that "significant amounts" of molten fuel had fallen into the bottom of the PCV. The erosion of the concrete of the PCV by the molten fuel after the core meltdown was estimated to stop at approx. in depth, while the thickness of the containment is thick. Gas sampling carried out before the report detected no signs of an ongoing reaction of the fuel with the concrete of the PCV and all the fuel in Unit 1 was estimated to be "well cooled down, including the fuel dropped on the bottom of the reactor". Fuel in Units 2 and 3 had melted, however less than in Unit 1, and fuel was presumed to be still in the RPV, with no significant amounts of fuel fallen to the bottom of the PCV. The report further suggested that "there is a range in the evaluation results" from "all fuel in the RPV (none fuel fallen to the PCV)" in Unit 2 and Unit 3, to "most fuel in the RPV (some fuel in PCV)". For Unit 2 and Unit 3 it was estimated that the "fuel is cooled sufficiently". According to the report, the greater damage in Unit 1 (when compared to the other two units) was due to the longer time that no cooling water was injected in Unit 1. This resulted in much more decay heat accumulating, as for about 1 day there was no water injection for Unit 1, while Unit 2 and Unit 3 had only a quarter of a day without water injection. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,078 | In November 2013, Mari Yamaguchi reported for Associated Press that there are computer simulations that suggest that "the melted fuel in Unit 1, whose core damage was the most extensive, has breached the bottom of the primary containment vessel and even partially eaten into its concrete foundation, coming within about of leaking into the ground" – a Kyoto University nuclear engineer said with regard to these estimates: "We just can't be sure until we actually see the inside of the reactors." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,079 | According to a December 2013 report, TEPCO estimated for Unit 1 that "the decay heat must have decreased enough, the molten fuel can be assumed to remain in PCV (primary containment vessel)". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,080 | In August 2014, TEPCO released a new revised estimate that Reactor 3 had a complete melt through in the initial phase of the accident. According to this new estimate within the first three days of the accident the entire core content of Reactor 3 had melted through the RPV and fallen to the bottom of the PCV. These estimates were based on a simulation, which indicated that Reactor 3's melted core penetrated through of the PCV's concrete base, and came close to of the PCV's steel wall. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,081 | In February 2015, TEPCO started the muon scanning process for Units 1, 2, and 3. With this scanning setup it will be possible to determine the approximate amount and location of the remaining nuclear fuel within the RPV, but not the amount and resting place of the corium in the PCV. In March 2015 TEPCO released the result of the muon scan for Unit 1 which showed that no fuel was visible in the RPV, which would suggest that most if not all of the molten fuel had dropped onto the bottom of the PCV – this will change the plan for the removal of the fuel from Unit 1. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,082 | In February 2017, six years after the disaster, radiation levels inside the Unit 2 containment building were crudely estimated to be about 650 Sv/h. The estimation was revised later to 80 Sv/h. These readings were the highest recorded since the disaster occurred in 2011 and the first recorded in that area of the reactor since the meltdowns. Images showed a hole in metal grating beneath the reactor pressure vessel, suggesting that melted nuclear fuel had escaped the vessel in that area. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,083 | In February 2017, TEPCO released images taken inside Reactor 2 by a remote-controlled camera that show a wide hole in the metal grating under the pressure vessel in the reactor's primary containment vessel, which could have been caused by fuel escaping the pressure vessel, indicating a meltdown/melt-through had occurred, through this layer of containment. Ionizing radiation levels of about 210 sieverts (Sv) per hour were subsequently detected inside the Unit 2 containment vessel. Undamaged spent fuel typically has values of 270 Sv/h, after ten years of cold shutdown with no shielding. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,084 | In January 2018, a remote-controlled camera confirmed that nuclear fuel debris was at the bottom of the Unit 2 PCV, showing fuel had escaped the RPV. The handle from the top of a nuclear fuel assembly was also observed, confirming that a considerable amount of the nuclear fuel had melted. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,085 | Reactor 4 was not operating when the earthquake struck. All fuel rods from Unit 4 had been transferred to the spent fuel pool on an upper floor of the reactor building prior to the tsunami. On 15 March, an explosion damaged the fourth floor rooftop area of Unit 4, creating two large holes in a wall of the outer building. It was reported that water in the spent fuel pool might be boiling. The explosion was later found to be caused by hydrogen passing to unit 4 from unit 3 through shared pipes. As a result, from the explosion, a fire broke out and caused the temperature in the fuel pool to increase to . Radiation inside the Unit 4 control room prevented workers from staying there for long periods. Visual inspection of the spent fuel pool on 30 April revealed no significant damage to the rods. A radiochemical examination of the pond water confirmed that little of the fuel had been damaged. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,086 | In October 2012, the former Japanese Ambassador to Switzerland and Senegal, Mitsuhei Murata, said that the ground under Fukushima Unit 4 was sinking, and the structure may collapse. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,087 | In November 2013, TEPCO began moving the 1533 fuel rods in the Unit 4 cooling pool to the central pool. This process was completed on 22 December 2014. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,088 | Reactors 5 and 6 were also not operating when the earthquake struck. Unlike Reactor 4, their fuel rods remained in the reactor. The reactors had been closely monitored, as cooling processes were not functioning well. Both Unit 5 and Unit 6 shared a working generator and switchgear during the emergency and achieved a successful cold shutdown nine days later on 20 March. The plant's operators had to release 1,320 tons of low levels of radioactive waste that accumulated from the sub-drain pits into the ocean to prevent equipment from being damaged. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,089 | On 21 March, temperatures in the fuel pond had risen slightly, to and water was sprayed over the pool. Power was restored to cooling systems on 24 March and by 28 March, temperatures were reported down to . | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,090 | One analysis, in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, stated that Government agencies and TEPCO were unprepared for the "cascading nuclear disaster" and the tsunami that "began the nuclear disaster could and should have been anticipated and that ambiguity about the roles of public and private institutions in such a crisis was a factor in the poor response at Fukushima". In March 2012, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said that the government shared the blame for the Fukushima disaster, saying that officials had been blinded by a false belief in the country's "technological infallibility", and were taken in by a "safety myth". Noda said "Everybody must share the pain of responsibility." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,091 | According to Naoto Kan, Japan's prime minister during the tsunami, the country was unprepared for the disaster, and nuclear power plants should not have been built so close to the ocean. Kan acknowledged flaws in authorities' handling of the crisis, including poor communication and coordination between nuclear regulators, utility officials, and the government. He said the disaster "laid bare a host of an even bigger man-made vulnerabilities in Japan's nuclear industry and regulation, from inadequate safety guidelines to crisis management, all of which he said need to be overhauled." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,092 | Physicist and environmentalist Amory Lovins said that Japan's "rigid bureaucratic structures, reluctance to send bad news upwards, need to save face, weak development of policy alternatives, eagerness to preserve nuclear power's public acceptance, and politically fragile government, along with TEPCO's very hierarchical management culture, also contributed to the way the accident unfolded. Moreover, the information Japanese people receive about nuclear energy and its alternatives has long been tightly controlled by both TEPCO and the government." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,093 | The Japanese government did not keep records of key meetings during the crisis. Data from the SPEEDI network were emailed to the prefectural government, but not shared with others. Emails from NISA to Fukushima, covering 12 March 11:54 PM to 16 March 9 AM and holding vital information for evacuation and health advisories, went unread and were deleted. The data was not used because the disaster countermeasure office regarded the data as "useless because the predicted amount of released radiation is unrealistic." On 14 March 2011 TEPCO officials were instructed not to use the phrase "core meltdown" at press conferences. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,094 | On the evening of 15 March, Prime Minister Kan called Seiki Soramoto, who used to design nuclear plants for Toshiba, to ask for his help in managing the escalating crisis. Soramoto formed an impromptu advisory group, which included his former professor at the University of Tokyo, Toshiso Kosako, a top Japanese expert on radiation measurement. Mr. Kosako, who studied the Soviet response to the Chernobyl crisis, said he was stunned at how little the leaders in the prime minister's office knew about the resources available to them. He quickly advised the chief cabinet secretary, Yukio Edano, to use SPEEDI, which used measurements of radioactive releases, as well as weather and topographical data, to predict where radioactive materials could travel after being released into the atmosphere. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,095 | The Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company's interim report stated that Japan's response was flawed by "poor communication and delays in releasing data on dangerous radiation leaks at the facility". The report blamed Japan's central government as well as TEPCO, "depicting a scene of harried officials incapable of making decisions to stem radiation leaks as the situation at the coastal plant worsened in the days and weeks following the disaster". The report said poor planning worsened the disaster response, noting that authorities had "grossly underestimated tsunami risks" that followed the magnitude 9.0 earthquake. The high tsunami that struck the plant was double the height of the highest wave predicted by officials. The erroneous assumption that the plant's cooling system would function after the tsunami worsened the disaster. "Plant workers had no clear instructions on how to respond to such a disaster, causing miscommunication, especially when the disaster destroyed backup generators." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,096 | In February 2012, the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation described how Japan's response was hindered by a loss of trust between the major actors: Prime Minister Kan, TEPCO's Tokyo headquarters and the plant manager. The report said that these conflicts "produced confused flows of sometimes contradictory information". According to the report, Kan delayed the cooling of the reactors by questioning the choice of seawater instead of fresh water, accusing him of micromanaging response efforts and appointing a small, closed, decision-making staff. The report stated that the Japanese government was slow to accept assistance from U.S. nuclear experts. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,097 | A 2012 report in "The Economist" said: "The operating company was poorly regulated and did not know what was going on. The operators made mistakes. The representatives of the safety inspectorate fled. Some of the equipment failed. The establishment repeatedly played down the risks and suppressed information about the movement of the radioactive plume, so some people were evacuated from more lightly to more heavily contaminated places." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,098 | From 17 to 19 March 2011, US military aircraft measured radiation within a radius of the site. The data recorded 125 microsieverts per hour of radiation as far as northwest of the plant. The US provided detailed maps to the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) on 18 March and to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) two days later, but officials did not act on the information. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
13,099 | The data were not forwarded to the prime minister's office or the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC), nor were they used to direct the evacuation. Because a substantial portion of radioactive materials reached ground to the northwest, residents evacuated in this direction were unnecessarily exposed to radiation. According to NSC chief Tetsuya Yamamoto, "It was very regrettable that we didn't share and utilize the information." Itaru Watanabe, an official of the Science and Technology Policy Bureau of the technology ministry, said it was appropriate for the United States, not Japan, to release the data. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=31162817 |
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