text stringlengths 1 81 | start float64 0 10.1k | duration float64 0 24.9 |
|---|---|---|
as was the origin of this code system. | 1,485.44 | 2.49 |
So that includes A
through Z, 0 through 9, | 1,487.93 | 2.58 |
and the punctuation
I alluded to earlier. | 1,490.51 | 2.19 |
But websites and apps
nowadays should also | 1,492.7 | 2.31 |
support Unicode, including things like
emoji and other accented characters | 1,495.01 | 5.25 |
or symbols that you might have
in languages beyond English. | 1,500.26 | 3.54 |
Unfortunately, this is not really
common practice, I dare say. | 1,503.8 | 3.69 |
Just yesterday, I created an account
on a new website for the first time, | 1,507.49 | 3.93 |
and it made me jump through
hoops, so to speak, figuring out | 1,511.42 | 3.06 |
the right number of uppercase letters,
lowercase letters, punctuation, | 1,514.48 | 3.63 |
and even then it told me I can
only use certain punctuation. | 1,518.11 | 3.46 |
So I had to think about now
which symbols I'm using. | 1,521.57 | 2.48 |
That is a lot of friction that
is not good for usability. | 1,524.05 | 3.338 |
And it's of questionable value
for the security of the system | 1,527.388 | 2.542 |
if I can't even remember
the thing afterward. | 1,529.93 | 2.25 |
So keep this in mind, in general,
that your password should not only | 1,532.18 | 3.75 |
be eight characters,
minimally, but most apps | 1,535.93 | 3.27 |
and websites you maybe
yourself develop moving forward | 1,539.2 | 3.06 |
should allow much longer
passwords as well. | 1,542.26 | 2.74 |
And you as the human
can use longer passwords | 1,545 | 2.45 |
if systems allow them as well. | 1,547.45 | 1.93 |
Now, here's another set of
recommendations from NIST. | 1,549.38 | 2.84 |
"Verifiers--" the website or
the apps that we're using-- | 1,552.22 | 3.27 |
"shall compare the
prospective secrets--" | 1,555.49 | 2.31 |
the passwords you're choosing--
"against a list that contains | 1,557.8 | 2.94 |
values known to be commonly
used, expected, or compromised." | 1,560.74 | 4.353 |
So that is to say when
you type in a password, | 1,565.093 | 1.917 |
if it's already been a
commonly used password, | 1,567.01 | 2.4 |
if it's very easily guessable,
the website or app should probably | 1,569.41 | 2.94 |
say, uh, pick a better
password than that | 1,572.35 | 2.61 |
just to decrease the
probability that an adversary is | 1,574.96 | 2.668 |
going to get into that account. | 1,577.628 | 1.292 |
Specifically, NIST
recommends that "passwords | 1,578.92 | 2.73 |
obtained from previous
breached corpuses--" | 1,581.65 | 2.67 |
which is a fancy way of saying if some
website, some database has been hacked, | 1,584.32 | 4.65 |
and that database contains
usernames and passwords, | 1,588.97 | 3.09 |
and those passwords
have now been uploaded | 1,592.06 | 2.04 |
to the internet for adversaries
or anyone to download and browse, | 1,594.1 | 4.68 |
well, then you should not be allowed
to pick a password from that list | 1,598.78 | 3.21 |
because it's essentially
an alternative dictionary. | 1,601.99 | 2.55 |
It essentially is a list of passwords
that a smart adversary should just | 1,604.54 | 4.2 |
start with before they even bother
resorting to brute force, which | 1,608.74 | 3.69 |
we've seen would take much more time. | 1,612.43 | 2.01 |
Two, dictionary words. | 1,614.44 | 1.78 |
So this we've already
stipulated would be a good thing | 1,616.22 | 2.29 |
to avoid because there's just
much too easy for an adversary | 1,618.51 | 2.5 |
to go through a big list of English
words or some other language | 1,621.01 | 2.79 |
and try those first. | 1,623.8 | 1.29 |
Three, repetitive or
sequential characters, aaaaaa | 1,625.09 | 5.34 |
or a slightly more creatively
but not good enough, 1235abcd. | 1,630.43 | 5.67 |
I would also add 0000 and so
forth into that category as well. | 1,636.1 | 4.56 |
It's just too easy for
the adversary to guess | 1,640.66 | 3.06 |
that maybe you're doing something
repetitive like that too. | 1,643.72 | 3.06 |
And then lastly, context-specific
words, such as the name of the service, | 1,646.78 | 4.29 |
the username, and derivatives thereof. | 1,651.07 | 2.65 |
This is to say, if you sign up for
a Gmail account for the first time, | 1,653.72 | 3.62 |
you should not be allowed by
Google to choose a password | 1,657.34 | 3.87 |
like "Gmail password," quote unquote. | 1,661.21 | 2.58 |
If you sign up for an
Amazon account, you | 1,663.79 | 1.86 |
should not be allowed by
Amazon to have your password be | 1,665.65 | 2.7 |
"Amazon password" or some such variant
thereof because smart adversaries are | 1,668.35 | 4.74 |
going to try those same heuristics. | 1,673.09 | 1.5 |
And that's the catch too. | 1,674.59 | 1.05 |
If you can think of it, even if
you think you're being clever, | 1,675.64 | 3.15 |
odds are a just-as-clever adversary
can think of that heuristic as well | 1,678.79 | 4.09 |
and prioritize those tricks
before they resort to brute force, | 1,682.88 | 4.22 |
like I did on my own laptop. | 1,687.1 | 2.43 |
A few other recommendations as well. | 1,689.53 | 1.95 |
"Memorized secret verifiers
shall not permit the subscriber | 1,691.48 | 3.99 |
to store a hint that is inaccessible
to an unauthenticated claimant. | 1,695.47 | 4.59 |
Verifiers shall now prompt subscribers
to use specific types of information, | 1,700.06 | 3.82 |
for instance, 'what was the name of
your first pet?' when choosing memorize | 1,703.88 | 4.01 |
secrets." | 1,707.89 | 0.57 |
So there are a lot of companies, a lot
of websites, a lot of applications that | 1,708.46 | 3.87 |
violate this recommendation nowadays. | 1,712.33 | 2.67 |
And in fact, I bet you can
think of one or more accounts | 1,715 | 2.37 |
that you have where you've had
to tell them, for instance, what | 1,717.37 | 3.12 |
was the name of your first pet
or your first car or your mother | 1,720.49 | 3.69 |
or father's name or the like. | 1,724.18 | 1.86 |
That's not good to collect
either, nor is a hint | 1,726.04 | 3.49 |
a good thing because
frankly, you and I are | 1,729.53 | 2.55 |
all too often in the habit of
maybe typing into that hint field, | 1,732.08 | 4.23 |
if it's available, a
question that's meant to help | 1,736.31 | 3.27 |
you remember what your password was. | 1,739.58 | 1.74 |
But if your hint is something like, my
password is the name of my first pet, | 1,741.32 | 4.53 |
well, you're now just leaking
information to the world. | 1,745.85 | 3.09 |
And anyone who can go online
and figure out that information | 1,748.94 | 3.12 |
can now get into your account as well. | 1,752.06 | 2.77 |
And so that's really the
threat, in this case. | 1,754.83 | 2.51 |
If you start using personally
identifiable information | 1,757.34 | 3.09 |
in this age of social media and
websites like LinkedIn and the like, | 1,760.43 | 4.35 |
there's just so much information out
there about us that can be discovered. | 1,764.78 | 4.24 |
You don't want to fill all of these
databases, all of these systems | 1,769.02 | 3.11 |
with each of these tidbits about
you because a smart adversary | 1,772.13 | 3.18 |
with enough time and enough
focus on you can probably | 1,775.31 | 3.27 |
figure out all of those same values. | 1,778.58 | 2.89 |
So what more? | 1,781.47 | 1.01 |
"Verifiers shall not
require memorized secrets | 1,782.48 | 3.36 |
to be changed arbitrarily,
for instance, periodically." | 1,785.84 | 3.12 |
So this one, too, is something
that a lot of companies | 1,788.96 | 2.34 |
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