instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
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| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jpc_com_putparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jpc_com_t *com = &ms->parms.com;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_putuint16(out, com->regid)) {
return -1;
}
if (jas_stream_write(out, com->data, com->len) != JAS_CAST(int, com->len)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void clear_huge_page(struct page *page,
unsigned long addr, unsigned int pages_per_huge_page)
{
int i;
if (unlikely(pages_per_huge_page > MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES)) {
clear_gigantic_page(page, addr, pages_per_huge_page);
return;
}
might_sleep();
for (i = 0; i < pages_per_huge_page; i++) {
cond_resched();
clear_user_highpage(page + i, addr + i * PAGE_SIZE);
}
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::Form_ExecuteNamedAction(FPDF_FORMFILLINFO* param,
FPDF_BYTESTRING named_action) {
PDFiumEngine* engine = static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(param);
std::string action(named_action);
if (action == "Print") {
engine->client_->Print();
return;
}
int index = engine->last_page_mouse_down_;
/* Don't try to calculate the most visible page if we don't have a left click
before this event (this code originally copied Form_GetCurrentPage which of
course needs to do that and which doesn't have recursion). This can end up
causing infinite recursion. See http://crbug.com/240413 for more
information. Either way, it's not necessary for the spec'd list of named
actions.
if (index == -1)
index = engine->GetMostVisiblePage();
*/
if (index == -1)
return;
if (action == "NextPage") {
engine->ScrollToPage(index + 1);
} else if (action == "PrevPage") {
engine->ScrollToPage(index - 1);
} else if (action == "FirstPage") {
engine->ScrollToPage(0);
} else if (action == "LastPage") {
engine->ScrollToPage(engine->pages_.size() - 1);
}
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindFragDataLocation(GLuint program_id,
GLuint colorName,
const std::string& name) {
const char kFunctionName[] = "glBindFragDataLocationEXT";
if (!StringIsValidForGLES(name)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, kFunctionName, "invalid character");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (ProgramManager::HasBuiltInPrefix(name)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, kFunctionName, "reserved prefix");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (colorName >= group_->max_draw_buffers()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, kFunctionName,
"colorName out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
Program* program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(program_id, kFunctionName);
if (!program) {
return error::kNoError;
}
program->SetProgramOutputLocationBinding(name, colorName);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void futex_wait_queue_me(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, struct futex_q *q,
struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout)
{
/*
* The task state is guaranteed to be set before another task can
* wake it. set_current_state() is implemented using set_mb() and
* queue_me() calls spin_unlock() upon completion, both serializing
* access to the hash list and forcing another memory barrier.
*/
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
queue_me(q, hb);
/* Arm the timer */
if (timeout) {
hrtimer_start_expires(&timeout->timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
if (!hrtimer_active(&timeout->timer))
timeout->task = NULL;
}
/*
* If we have been removed from the hash list, then another task
* has tried to wake us, and we can skip the call to schedule().
*/
if (likely(!plist_node_empty(&q->list))) {
/*
* If the timer has already expired, current will already be
* flagged for rescheduling. Only call schedule if there
* is no timeout, or if it has yet to expire.
*/
if (!timeout || timeout->task)
freezable_schedule();
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
}
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 38,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool StartupBrowserCreator::LaunchBrowserForLastProfiles(
const base::CommandLine& command_line,
const base::FilePath& cur_dir,
bool process_startup,
Profile* last_used_profile,
const Profiles& last_opened_profiles) {
chrome::startup::IsProcessStartup is_process_startup = process_startup ?
chrome::startup::IS_PROCESS_STARTUP :
chrome::startup::IS_NOT_PROCESS_STARTUP;
chrome::startup::IsFirstRun is_first_run = first_run::IsChromeFirstRun() ?
chrome::startup::IS_FIRST_RUN : chrome::startup::IS_NOT_FIRST_RUN;
bool was_windows_notification_launch = false;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
was_windows_notification_launch =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNotificationLaunchId);
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
if (last_opened_profiles.empty() || was_windows_notification_launch) {
if (CanOpenProfileOnStartup(last_used_profile)) {
Profile* profile_to_open =
last_used_profile->IsGuestSession()
? last_used_profile->GetOffTheRecordProfile()
: last_used_profile;
return LaunchBrowser(command_line, profile_to_open, cur_dir,
is_process_startup, is_first_run);
}
ShowUserManagerOnStartup(command_line);
return true;
}
return ProcessLastOpenedProfiles(command_line, cur_dir, is_process_startup,
is_first_run, last_used_profile,
last_opened_profiles);
}
Commit Message: Prevent regular mode session startup pref type turning to default.
When user loses past session tabs of regular mode after
invoking a new window from the incognito mode.
This was happening because the SessionStartUpPref type was being set
to default, from last, for regular user mode. This was happening in
the RestoreIfNecessary method where the restoration was taking place
for users whose SessionStartUpPref type was set to last.
The fix was to make the protocol of changing the pref type to
default more explicit to incognito users and not regular users
of pref type last.
Bug: 481373
Change-Id: I96efb4cf196949312181c83c6dcd45986ddded13
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1774441
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rohit Agarwal <roagarwal@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691726}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 137,504
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport)
{
u64 seq;
__u32 hash[4];
struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
seq |= ((u64)keyptr->count) << (32 - HASH_BITS);
seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
return seq;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 165,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserChildProcessHostImpl::OnMojoError(
base::WeakPtr<BrowserChildProcessHostImpl> process,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner,
const std::string& error) {
if (!task_runner->BelongsToCurrentThread()) {
task_runner->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&BrowserChildProcessHostImpl::OnMojoError,
process, task_runner, error));
return;
}
if (!process)
return;
HistogramBadMessageTerminated(
static_cast<ProcessType>(process->data_.process_type));
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableKillAfterBadIPC)) {
return;
}
LOG(ERROR) << "Terminating child process for bad Mojo message: " << error;
base::debug::ScopedCrashKeyString scoped_error_key(
bad_message::GetMojoErrorCrashKey(), error);
base::debug::DumpWithoutCrashing();
process->child_process_->GetProcess().Terminate(
RESULT_CODE_KILLED_BAD_MESSAGE, false);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval *key, *data, **old_data;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(key);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&key, p, max, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_LONG && Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(data);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&data, p, max, var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
zval_dtor(data);
FREE_ZVAL(data);
return 0;
}
if (!objprops) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(key)) {
case IS_LONG:
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_index_update(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
case IS_STRING:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_symtable_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
}
} else {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(key);
zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data,
sizeof data, NULL);
}
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 1
| 164,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void init_seg(struct vmcb_seg *seg)
{
seg->selector = 0;
seg->attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_S_MASK |
SVM_SELECTOR_WRITE_MASK; /* Read/Write Data Segment */
seg->limit = 0xffff;
seg->base = 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 37,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DatabaseImpl::IDBThreadHelper::DeleteIndex(int64_t transaction_id,
int64_t object_store_id,
int64_t index_id) {
DCHECK(idb_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!connection_->IsConnected())
return;
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction =
connection_->GetTransaction(transaction_id);
if (!transaction)
return;
connection_->database()->DeleteIndex(transaction, object_store_id, index_id);
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 136,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual status_t sign(Vector<uint8_t> const &sessionId,
Vector<uint8_t> const &keyId,
Vector<uint8_t> const &message,
Vector<uint8_t> &signature) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IDrm::getInterfaceDescriptor());
writeVector(data, sessionId);
writeVector(data, keyId);
writeVector(data, message);
status_t status = remote()->transact(SIGN, data, &reply);
if (status != OK) {
return status;
}
readVector(reply, signature);
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: Fix info leak vulnerability of IDrm
bug: 26323455
Change-Id: I25bb30d3666ab38d5150496375ed2f55ecb23ba8
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct fib6_table *fib6_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id)
{
struct fib6_table *tb;
if (id == 0)
id = RT6_TABLE_MAIN;
tb = fib6_get_table(net, id);
if (tb)
return tb;
tb = fib6_alloc_table(net, id);
if (tb)
fib6_link_table(net, tb);
return tb;
}
Commit Message: net: fib: fib6_add: fix potential NULL pointer dereference
When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES, and we return
with an error in fn = fib6_add_1(), then error codes are encoded into
the return pointer e.g. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). In such an error case, we
write the error code into err and jump to out, hence enter the if(err)
condition. Now, if CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is enabled, we check for:
if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt)
...
if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO))
...
Since pn is NULL and fn is f.e. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), then pn != fn
evaluates to true and causes a NULL-pointer dereference on further
checks on pn. Fix it, by setting both NULL in error case, so that
pn != fn already evaluates to false and no further dereference
takes place.
This was first correctly implemented in 4a287eba2 ("IPv6 routing,
NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about
missing CREATE flag"), but the bug got later on introduced by
188c517a0 ("ipv6: return errno pointers consistently for fib6_add_1()").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ScrollAnchor::FindAnchorRecursive(LayoutObject* candidate) {
ExamineResult result = Examine(candidate);
if (result.viable) {
anchor_object_ = candidate;
corner_ = result.corner;
}
if (result.status == kReturn)
return true;
if (result.status == kSkip)
return false;
for (LayoutObject* child = candidate->SlowFirstChild(); child;
child = child->NextSibling()) {
if (FindAnchorRecursive(child))
return true;
}
if (auto* layouy_block = DynamicTo<LayoutBlock>(candidate)) {
if (TrackedLayoutBoxListHashSet* positioned_descendants =
layouy_block->PositionedObjects()) {
for (LayoutBox* descendant : *positioned_descendants) {
if (descendant->Parent() != candidate) {
if (FindAnchorRecursive(descendant))
return true;
}
}
}
}
if (result.status == kConstrain)
return true;
DCHECK_EQ(result.status, kContinue);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Consider scroll-padding when determining scroll anchor node
Scroll anchoring should not anchor to a node that is behind scroll
padding.
Bug: 1010002
Change-Id: Icbd89fb85ea2c97a6de635930a9896f6a87b8f07
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1887745
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nick Burris <nburris@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#711020}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 136,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decode_time3(__be32 *p, struct timespec *time)
{
time->tv_sec = ntohl(*p++);
time->tv_nsec = ntohl(*p++);
return p;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MODRET auth_pre_user(cmd_rec *cmd) {
if (saw_first_user_cmd == FALSE) {
if (pr_trace_get_level(timing_channel)) {
unsigned long elapsed_ms;
uint64_t finish_ms;
pr_gettimeofday_millis(&finish_ms);
elapsed_ms = (unsigned long) (finish_ms - session.connect_time_ms);
pr_trace_msg(timing_channel, 4, "Time before first USER: %lu ms",
elapsed_ms);
}
saw_first_user_cmd = TRUE;
}
if (logged_in) {
return PR_DECLINED(cmd);
}
/* Close the passwd and group databases, because libc won't let us see new
* entries to these files without this (only in PersistentPasswd mode).
*/
pr_auth_endpwent(cmd->tmp_pool);
pr_auth_endgrent(cmd->tmp_pool);
/* Check for a user name that exceeds PR_TUNABLE_LOGIN_MAX. */
if (strlen(cmd->arg) > PR_TUNABLE_LOGIN_MAX) {
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_NOTICE, "USER %s (Login failed): "
"maximum USER length exceeded", cmd->arg);
pr_response_add_err(R_501, _("Login incorrect."));
pr_cmd_set_errno(cmd, EPERM);
errno = EPERM;
return PR_ERROR(cmd);
}
return PR_DECLINED(cmd);
}
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 67,578
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void intf_free(struct kref *ref)
{
struct ipmi_smi *intf = container_of(ref, struct ipmi_smi, refcount);
clean_up_interface_data(intf);
kfree(intf);
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: itos(int val) {
char tmp[20];
snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%i", val);
return g_strdup(tmp);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,362
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Browser::CanGoBack() const {
return GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper()->controller().CanGoBack();
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,147
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct nfs4_createdata *nfs4_alloc_createdata(struct inode *dir,
struct qstr *name, struct iattr *sattr, u32 ftype)
{
struct nfs4_createdata *data;
data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (data != NULL) {
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
data->msg.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_CREATE];
data->msg.rpc_argp = &data->arg;
data->msg.rpc_resp = &data->res;
data->arg.dir_fh = NFS_FH(dir);
data->arg.server = server;
data->arg.name = name;
data->arg.attrs = sattr;
data->arg.ftype = ftype;
data->arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
data->res.server = server;
data->res.fh = &data->fh;
data->res.fattr = &data->fattr;
nfs_fattr_init(data->res.fattr);
}
return data;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcXvPutVideo(ClientPtr client)
{
DrawablePtr pDraw;
XvPortPtr pPort;
GCPtr pGC;
int status;
REQUEST(xvPutVideoReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvPutVideoReq);
VALIDATE_DRAWABLE_AND_GC(stuff->drawable, pDraw, DixWriteAccess);
VALIDATE_XV_PORT(stuff->port, pPort, DixReadAccess);
if (!(pPort->pAdaptor->type & XvInputMask) ||
!(pPort->pAdaptor->type & XvVideoMask)) {
client->errorValue = stuff->port;
return BadMatch;
}
status = XvdiMatchPort(pPort, pDraw);
if (status != Success) {
return status;
}
return XvdiPutVideo(client, pDraw, pPort, pGC, stuff->vid_x, stuff->vid_y,
stuff->vid_w, stuff->vid_h, stuff->drw_x, stuff->drw_y,
stuff->drw_w, stuff->drw_h);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,466
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileSystemOperation::DoMove(const StatusCallback& callback) {
FileSystemFileUtilProxy::Move(
&operation_context_,
src_util_, dest_util_,
src_path_, dest_path_,
base::Bind(&FileSystemOperation::DidFinishFileOperation,
base::Owned(this), callback));
}
Commit Message: Crash fix in fileapi::FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10008047 introduced delete-with-inflight-tasks in Write sequence but I failed to convert this callback to use WeakPtr().
BUG=128178
TEST=manual test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10408006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137635 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VerifyHostedDocumentJSONFile(const GDataFile* gdata_file,
const FilePath& file_path) {
ASSERT_TRUE(gdata_file != NULL);
std::string error;
JSONFileValueSerializer serializer(file_path);
scoped_ptr<Value> value(serializer.Deserialize(NULL, &error));
ASSERT_TRUE(value.get()) << "Parse error " << file_path.value()
<< ": " << error;
DictionaryValue* dict_value = NULL;
ASSERT_TRUE(value->GetAsDictionary(&dict_value));
std::string edit_url, resource_id;
EXPECT_TRUE(dict_value->GetString("url", &edit_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(dict_value->GetString("resource_id", &resource_id));
EXPECT_EQ(gdata_file->alternate_url().spec(), edit_url);
EXPECT_EQ(gdata_file->resource_id(), resource_id);
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void btif_av_event_free_data(btif_sm_event_t event, void* p_data) {
switch (event) {
case BTA_AV_META_MSG_EVT: {
tBTA_AV* av = (tBTA_AV*)p_data;
osi_free_and_reset((void**)&av->meta_msg.p_data);
if (av->meta_msg.p_msg) {
if (av->meta_msg.p_msg->hdr.opcode == AVRC_OP_VENDOR) {
osi_free(av->meta_msg.p_msg->vendor.p_vendor_data);
}
osi_free_and_reset((void**)&av->meta_msg.p_msg);
}
} break;
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE AVRC: Copy browse.p_browse_data in btif_av_event_deep_copy
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data is not copied, but used after the
original pointer is freed
Bug: 109699112
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1d014eb9a8911da6913173a9b11218bf1c89e16e
(cherry picked from commit 1d9a58768e6573899c7e80c2b3f52e22f2d8f58b)
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 174,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsViewsBrowserCocoa() {
return !base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kViewsBrowserWindows) &&
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kExperimentalUi);
}
Commit Message: [VK] Enable virtual keyboard UKM by default on M70.
Launch was approved.
Bug: 752657
Change-Id: I01ac04040b8b928c27512d203667dda234588153
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1184659
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Darren Shen <shend@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585282}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 131,486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::setProcessId(long processId)
{
inspectorController()->setProcessId(processId);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,234
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_x(BIGNUM *s, const char *user, const char *pass)
{
unsigned char dig[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
unsigned char *cs;
if ((s == NULL) ||
(user == NULL) ||
(pass == NULL))
return NULL;
if ((cs = OPENSSL_malloc(BN_num_bytes(s))) == NULL)
return NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctxt);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, user, strlen(user));
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, ":", 1);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, pass, strlen(pass));
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctxt, dig, NULL);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
BN_bn2bin(s,cs);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, cs, BN_num_bytes(s));
OPENSSL_free(cs);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, dig, sizeof(dig));
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctxt, dig, NULL);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctxt);
return BN_bin2bn(dig, sizeof(dig), NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: psf_fopen (SF_PRIVATE *psf, const char *pathname, int open_mode)
{ int oflag, mode ;
switch (open_mode)
{ case SFM_READ :
oflag = O_RDONLY | O_BINARY ;
mode = 0 ;
break ;
case SFM_WRITE :
oflag = O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY ;
mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP ;
break ;
case SFM_RDWR :
oflag = O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_BINARY ;
mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP ;
break ;
default :
psf->error = SFE_BAD_OPEN_MODE ;
return -1 ;
break ;
} ;
if (mode == 0)
psf->file.filedes = open (pathname, oflag) ;
else
psf->file.filedes = open (pathname, oflag, mode) ;
if (psf->file.filedes == -1)
psf_log_syserr (psf, errno) ;
return psf->file.filedes ;
} /* psf_fopen */
Commit Message: src/file_io.c : Prevent potential divide-by-zero.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/92
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 45,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jsvGetArrayItems(JsVar *arr, unsigned int itemCount, JsVar **itemPtr) {
JsvObjectIterator it;
jsvObjectIteratorNew(&it, arr);
unsigned int i = 0;
while (jsvObjectIteratorHasValue(&it)) {
if (i<itemCount)
itemPtr[i++] = jsvObjectIteratorGetValue(&it);
jsvObjectIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvObjectIteratorFree(&it);
while (i<itemCount)
itemPtr[i++] = 0; // just ensure we don't end up with bad data
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void NamedPropertySetter(
const AtomicString& name,
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value,
const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8StringResource<> property_value = v8_value;
if (!property_value.Prepare())
return;
bool result = impl->AnonymousNamedSetter(script_state, name, property_value);
if (!result)
return;
V8SetReturnValue(info, v8_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,890
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GetStartupData(HANDLE pipe, STARTUP_DATA *sud)
{
size_t size, len;
BOOL ret = FALSE;
WCHAR *data = NULL;
DWORD bytes, read;
bytes = PeekNamedPipeAsync(pipe, 1, &exit_event);
if (bytes == 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("PeekNamedPipeAsync failed"));
ReturnLastError(pipe, L"PeekNamedPipeAsync");
goto out;
}
size = bytes / sizeof(*data);
if (size == 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("malformed startup data: 1 byte received"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto out;
}
data = malloc(bytes);
if (data == NULL)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("malloc failed"));
ReturnLastError(pipe, L"malloc");
goto out;
}
read = ReadPipeAsync(pipe, data, bytes, 1, &exit_event);
if (bytes != read)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("ReadPipeAsync failed"));
ReturnLastError(pipe, L"ReadPipeAsync");
goto out;
}
if (data[size - 1] != 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("Startup data is not NULL terminated"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto out;
}
sud->directory = data;
len = wcslen(sud->directory) + 1;
size -= len;
if (size <= 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("Startup data ends at working directory"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto out;
}
sud->options = sud->directory + len;
len = wcslen(sud->options) + 1;
size -= len;
if (size <= 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("Startup data ends at command line options"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto out;
}
sud->std_input = sud->options + len;
data = NULL; /* don't free data */
ret = TRUE;
out:
free(data);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336)
Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive
service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances
from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code.
This usually only leads to a process crash (DoS by an unprivileged local
account) but since it could possibly lead to memory corruption if
happening while multiple other threads are active at the same time,
CVE-2018-9336 has been assigned to acknowledge this risk.
Fix by ensuring that sud->directory is set to NULL in GetStartUpData()
for all error cases (thus not being free()ed in FreeStartupData()).
Rewrite control flow to use explicit error label for error exit.
Discovered and reported by Jacob Baines <jbaines@tenable.com>.
CVE: 2018-9336
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 1
| 169,267
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: storage::FileSystemURL CreateNativeLocalFileSystemURL(
storage::FileSystemContext* context,
const base::FilePath local_path) {
return context->CreateCrackedFileSystemURL(
GURL(kOrigin), storage::kFileSystemTypeNativeLocal, local_path);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol"
This reverts commit 3519e867dc606437f804561f889d7ed95b95876a.
Reason for revert: crbug.com/786150. Application compatibility for Android WebView applications means we need to allow sniffing on that platform.
Original change's description:
> Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol
>
> To reduce attack surface, Chrome should not MIME-sniff to text/html for
> any document delivered via the file protocol. This change only impacts
> the file protocol (documents served via HTTP/HTTPS/etc are unaffected).
>
> Bug: 777737
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
> Change-Id: I7086454356b8d2d092be9e1bca0f5ff6dd3b62c0
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/751402
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Achuith Bhandarkar <achuith@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Asanka Herath <asanka@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514372}
TBR=achuith@chromium.org,benwells@chromium.org,mmenke@chromium.org,sdefresne@chromium.org,asanka@chromium.org,elawrence@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 777737
Change-Id: I864ae060ce3277d41ea257ae75e0b80c51f3ea98
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/790790
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519347}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHost::SetNextCommitWaitsForActivation() {
proxy_->SetNextCommitWaitsForActivation();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,012
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::useSecureKeyboardEntryWhenActive() const
{
return m_useSecureKeyboardEntryWhenActive;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,919
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __u8 *mr_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 30 && rdesc[29] == 0x05 && rdesc[30] == 0x09) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up button/consumer in HID report descriptor\n");
rdesc[30] = 0x0c;
}
return rdesc;
}
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 166,373
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WordMeasurement()
: renderer(0)
, width(0)
, startOffset(0)
, endOffset(0)
{
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,304
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~AutoFillMetricsTest() {
autofill_manager_.reset(NULL);
test_personal_data_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,923
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void *mlx5_get_send_wqe(struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp, int n)
{
return get_wqe(qp, qp->sq.offset + (n << MLX5_IB_SQ_STRIDE));
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int update_cowonly_root(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root)
{
int ret;
u64 old_root_bytenr;
u64 old_root_used;
struct btrfs_root *tree_root = root->fs_info->tree_root;
old_root_used = btrfs_root_used(&root->root_item);
btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups(trans, root);
while (1) {
old_root_bytenr = btrfs_root_bytenr(&root->root_item);
if (old_root_bytenr == root->node->start &&
old_root_used == btrfs_root_used(&root->root_item))
break;
btrfs_set_root_node(&root->root_item, root->node);
ret = btrfs_update_root(trans, tree_root,
&root->root_key,
&root->root_item);
if (ret)
return ret;
old_root_used = btrfs_root_used(&root->root_item);
ret = btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups(trans, root);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (root != root->fs_info->extent_root)
switch_commit_root(root);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hb_buffer_set_direction (hb_buffer_t *buffer,
hb_direction_t direction)
{
buffer->direction = direction;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TextTrackLoader::fileFailedToParse()
{
m_state = Failed;
if (!m_cueLoadTimer.isActive())
m_cueLoadTimer.startOneShot(0, BLINK_FROM_HERE);
cancelLoad();
}
Commit Message: Check CORS policy on redirect in TextTrackLoader
BUG=633885
TEST=new case in http/tests/security/text-track-crossorigin.html
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2367583002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421919}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 130,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestInterface::derefObject(void* object)
{
static_cast<TestInterface*>(object)->deref();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebDocumentLoader* WebLocalFrameImpl::GetDocumentLoader() const {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
return DocumentLoaderForDocLoader(GetFrame()->Loader().GetDocumentLoader());
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BaseShadow::BaseShadow() {
spool = NULL;
fsDomain = uidDomain = NULL;
jobAd = NULL;
remove_requested = false;
cluster = proc = -1;
gjid = NULL;
core_file_name = NULL;
scheddAddr = NULL;
job_updater = NULL;
ASSERT( !myshadow_ptr ); // make cetain we're only instantiated once
myshadow_ptr = this;
exception_already_logged = false;
began_execution = FALSE;
reconnect_e_factor = 0.0;
reconnect_ceiling = 300;
prev_run_bytes_sent = 0.0;
prev_run_bytes_recvd = 0.0;
m_num_cleanup_retries = 0;
m_max_cleanup_retries = 5;
m_lazy_queue_update = true;
m_cleanup_retry_tid = -1;
m_cleanup_retry_delay = 30;
m_RunAsNobody = false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnAccessibilityLocationChanges(
const std::vector<AccessibilityHostMsg_LocationChangeParams>& params) {
if (accessibility_reset_token_)
return;
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* view = static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
render_view_host_->GetWidget()->GetView());
if (view && is_active()) {
AccessibilityMode accessibility_mode = delegate_->GetAccessibilityMode();
if (accessibility_mode.has_mode(AccessibilityMode::kNativeAPIs)) {
BrowserAccessibilityManager* manager =
GetOrCreateBrowserAccessibilityManager();
if (manager)
manager->OnLocationChanges(params);
}
std::vector<AXLocationChangeNotificationDetails> details;
details.reserve(params.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < params.size(); ++i) {
const AccessibilityHostMsg_LocationChangeParams& param = params[i];
AXLocationChangeNotificationDetails detail;
detail.id = param.id;
detail.ax_tree_id = GetAXTreeID();
detail.new_location = param.new_location;
details.push_back(detail);
}
delegate_->AccessibilityLocationChangesReceived(details);
}
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct posix_acl *v9fs_get_cached_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct posix_acl *acl;
/*
* 9p Always cache the acl value when
* instantiating the inode (v9fs_inode_from_fid)
*/
acl = get_cached_acl(inode, type);
BUG_ON(is_uncached_acl(acl));
return acl;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 50,308
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ParamTraits<base::TimeDelta>::Write(Message* m, const param_type& p) {
ParamTraits<int64>::Write(m, p.ToInternalValue());
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 117,420
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __fanout_link(struct sock *sk, struct packet_sock *po)
{
struct packet_fanout *f = po->fanout;
spin_lock(&f->lock);
f->arr[f->num_members] = sk;
smp_wmb();
f->num_members++;
spin_unlock(&f->lock);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AutocompleteInput::AutocompleteInput(const string16& text,
const string16& desired_tld,
bool prevent_inline_autocomplete,
bool prefer_keyword,
bool allow_exact_keyword_match,
MatchesRequested matches_requested)
: desired_tld_(desired_tld),
prevent_inline_autocomplete_(prevent_inline_autocomplete),
prefer_keyword_(prefer_keyword),
allow_exact_keyword_match_(allow_exact_keyword_match),
matches_requested_(matches_requested) {
TrimWhitespace(text, TRIM_LEADING, &text_);
GURL canonicalized_url;
type_ = Parse(text_, desired_tld, &parts_, &scheme_, &canonicalized_url);
if (type_ == INVALID)
return;
if (((type_ == UNKNOWN) || (type_ == REQUESTED_URL) || (type_ == URL)) &&
canonicalized_url.is_valid() &&
(!canonicalized_url.IsStandard() || canonicalized_url.SchemeIsFile() ||
canonicalized_url.SchemeIsFileSystem() ||
!canonicalized_url.host().empty()))
canonicalized_url_ = canonicalized_url;
RemoveForcedQueryStringIfNecessary(type_, &text_);
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int propagate_umount(struct list_head *list)
{
struct mount *mnt;
list_for_each_entry(mnt, list, mnt_hash)
__propagate_umount(mnt);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 32,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_release_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
if (ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_DA_ALLOC_CLOSE)) {
ext4_alloc_da_blocks(inode);
ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_DA_ALLOC_CLOSE);
}
/* if we are the last writer on the inode, drop the block reservation */
if ((filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) &&
(atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) &&
!EXT4_I(inode)->i_reserved_data_blocks)
{
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
}
if (is_dx(inode) && filp->private_data)
ext4_htree_free_dir_info(filp->private_data);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,301
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::updateStyleForNodeIfNeeded(Node* node)
{
if (!hasPendingForcedStyleRecalc() && !childNeedsStyleRecalc() && !needsStyleRecalc())
return;
bool needsStyleRecalc = hasPendingForcedStyleRecalc();
for (Node* ancestor = node; ancestor && !needsStyleRecalc; ancestor = ancestor->parentOrShadowHostNode())
needsStyleRecalc = ancestor->needsStyleRecalc();
if (needsStyleRecalc)
updateStyleIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_set_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_nested;
else if (vcpu->arch.apic_base & X2APIC_ENABLE) {
if (is_long_mode(vcpu))
msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic;
else
msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic;
} else {
if (is_long_mode(vcpu))
msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode;
else
msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy;
}
vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(msr_bitmap));
}
Commit Message: kvm:vmx: more complete state update on APICv on/off
The function to update APICv on/off state (in particular, to deactivate
it when enabling Hyper-V SynIC) is incomplete: it doesn't adjust
APICv-related fields among secondary processor-based VM-execution
controls. As a result, Windows 2012 guests get stuck when SynIC-based
auto-EOI interrupt intersected with e.g. an IPI in the guest.
In addition, the MSR intercept bitmap isn't updated every time "virtualize
x2APIC mode" is toggled. This path can only be triggered by a malicious
guest, because Windows didn't use x2APIC but rather their own synthetic
APIC access MSRs; however a guest running in a SynIC-enabled VM could
switch to x2APIC and thus obtain direct access to host APIC MSRs
(CVE-2016-4440).
The patch fixes those omissions.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Reported-by: Yang Zhang <yang.zhang.wz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 167,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void free_pmd_range(struct mmu_gather *tlb, pud_t *pud,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
unsigned long floor, unsigned long ceiling)
{
pmd_t *pmd;
unsigned long next;
unsigned long start;
start = addr;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
do {
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
continue;
free_pte_range(tlb, pmd, addr);
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
start &= PUD_MASK;
if (start < floor)
return;
if (ceiling) {
ceiling &= PUD_MASK;
if (!ceiling)
return;
}
if (end - 1 > ceiling - 1)
return;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, start);
pud_clear(pud);
pmd_free_tlb(tlb, pmd, start);
mm_dec_nr_pmds(tlb->mm);
}
Commit Message: mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 57,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: z2copy(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
int code = zcopy(i_ctx_p);
if (code >= 0)
return code;
if (!r_has_type(op, t_astruct))
return code;
return z2copy_gstate(i_ctx_p);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void perf_event_delayed_put(struct task_struct *task)
{
int ctxn;
for_each_task_context_nr(ctxn)
WARN_ON_ONCE(task->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn]);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _dbus_credentials_add_from_user (DBusCredentials *credentials,
const DBusString *username)
{
return _dbus_credentials_add_windows_sid (credentials,
_dbus_string_get_const_data(username));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,775
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int splice_from_pipe_feed(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct splice_desc *sd,
splice_actor *actor)
{
int ret;
while (pipe->nrbufs) {
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + pipe->curbuf;
sd->len = buf->len;
if (sd->len > sd->total_len)
sd->len = sd->total_len;
ret = pipe_buf_confirm(pipe, buf);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
if (ret == -ENODATA)
ret = 0;
return ret;
}
ret = actor(pipe, buf, sd);
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
buf->offset += ret;
buf->len -= ret;
sd->num_spliced += ret;
sd->len -= ret;
sd->pos += ret;
sd->total_len -= ret;
if (!buf->len) {
pipe_buf_release(pipe, buf);
pipe->curbuf = (pipe->curbuf + 1) & (pipe->buffers - 1);
pipe->nrbufs--;
if (pipe->files)
sd->need_wakeup = true;
}
if (!sd->total_len)
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,890
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void preproc_mount_mnt_dir(void) {
if (!tmpfs_mounted) {
if (arg_debug)
printf("Mounting tmpfs on %s directory\n", RUN_MNT_DIR);
if (mount("tmpfs", RUN_MNT_DIR, "tmpfs", MS_NOSUID | MS_STRICTATIME, "mode=755,gid=0") < 0)
errExit("mounting /run/firejail/mnt");
tmpfs_mounted = 1;
fs_logger2("tmpfs", RUN_MNT_DIR);
#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
if (arg_seccomp_block_secondary)
copy_file(PATH_SECCOMP_BLOCK_SECONDARY, RUN_SECCOMP_BLOCK_SECONDARY, getuid(), getgid(), 0644); // root needed
else {
copy_file(PATH_SECCOMP_32, RUN_SECCOMP_32, getuid(), getgid(), 0644); // root needed
}
if (arg_allow_debuggers)
copy_file(PATH_SECCOMP_DEFAULT_DEBUG, RUN_SECCOMP_CFG, getuid(), getgid(), 0644); // root needed
else
copy_file(PATH_SECCOMP_DEFAULT, RUN_SECCOMP_CFG, getuid(), getgid(), 0644); // root needed
if (arg_memory_deny_write_execute)
copy_file(PATH_SECCOMP_MDWX, RUN_SECCOMP_MDWX, getuid(), getgid(), 0644); // root needed
create_empty_file_as_root(RUN_SECCOMP_PROTOCOL, 0644);
if (set_perms(RUN_SECCOMP_PROTOCOL, getuid(), getgid(), 0644))
errExit("set_perms");
create_empty_file_as_root(RUN_SECCOMP_POSTEXEC, 0644);
if (set_perms(RUN_SECCOMP_POSTEXEC, getuid(), getgid(), 0644))
errExit("set_perms");
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 169,658
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FS_Dir_f( void ) {
char *path;
char *extension;
char **dirnames;
int ndirs;
int i;
if ( Cmd_Argc() < 2 || Cmd_Argc() > 3 ) {
Com_Printf( "usage: dir <directory> [extension]\n" );
return;
}
if ( Cmd_Argc() == 2 ) {
path = Cmd_Argv( 1 );
extension = "";
} else {
path = Cmd_Argv( 1 );
extension = Cmd_Argv( 2 );
}
Com_Printf( "Directory of %s %s\n", path, extension );
Com_Printf( "---------------\n" );
dirnames = FS_ListFiles( path, extension, &ndirs );
for ( i = 0; i < ndirs; i++ ) {
Com_Printf( "%s\n", dirnames[i] );
}
FS_FreeFileList( dirnames );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,768
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::StopFinding(StopFindAction action) {
bool clear_selection = action == kStopFindActionClearSelection;
if (clear_selection)
ExecuteCommand(WebString::FromUTF8("Unselect"));
if (text_finder_) {
if (!clear_selection)
text_finder_->SetFindEndstateFocusAndSelection();
text_finder_->StopFindingAndClearSelection();
}
if (action == kStopFindActionActivateSelection && IsFocused()) {
WebDocument doc = GetDocument();
if (!doc.IsNull()) {
WebElement element = doc.FocusedElement();
if (!element.IsNull())
element.SimulateClick();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,420
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int rpc_type_of_NPNVariable(int variable)
{
int type;
switch (variable) {
case NPNVjavascriptEnabledBool:
case NPNVasdEnabledBool:
case NPNVisOfflineBool:
case NPNVSupportsXEmbedBool:
case NPNVSupportsWindowless:
type = RPC_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
break;
case NPNVToolkit:
case NPNVnetscapeWindow:
type = RPC_TYPE_UINT32;
break;
case NPNVWindowNPObject:
case NPNVPluginElementNPObject:
type = RPC_TYPE_NP_OBJECT;
break;
default:
type = RPC_ERROR_GENERIC;
break;
}
return type;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 165,862
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DGAOpenFramebuffer(int index,
char **name,
unsigned char **mem, int *size, int *offset, int *flags)
{
DGAScreenPtr pScreenPriv = DGA_GET_SCREEN_PRIV(screenInfo.screens[index]);
/* We rely on the extension to check that DGA is available */
return (*pScreenPriv->funcs->OpenFramebuffer) (pScreenPriv->pScrn,
name, mem, size, offset,
flags);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,714
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int br_multicast_ipv6_rcv(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port *port,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sk_buff *skb2;
const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h;
u8 icmp6_type;
u8 nexthdr;
__be16 frag_off;
unsigned int len;
int offset;
int err;
u16 vid = 0;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*ip6h)))
return -EINVAL;
ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
/*
* We're interested in MLD messages only.
* - Version is 6
* - MLD has always Router Alert hop-by-hop option
* - But we do not support jumbrograms.
*/
if (ip6h->version != 6 ||
ip6h->nexthdr != IPPROTO_HOPOPTS ||
ip6h->payload_len == 0)
return 0;
len = ntohs(ip6h->payload_len) + sizeof(*ip6h);
if (skb->len < len)
return -EINVAL;
nexthdr = ip6h->nexthdr;
offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, sizeof(*ip6h), &nexthdr, &frag_off);
if (offset < 0 || nexthdr != IPPROTO_ICMPV6)
return 0;
/* Okay, we found ICMPv6 header */
skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb2)
return -ENOMEM;
err = -EINVAL;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb2, offset + sizeof(struct icmp6hdr)))
goto out;
len -= offset - skb_network_offset(skb2);
__skb_pull(skb2, offset);
skb_reset_transport_header(skb2);
skb_postpull_rcsum(skb2, skb_network_header(skb2),
skb_network_header_len(skb2));
icmp6_type = icmp6_hdr(skb2)->icmp6_type;
switch (icmp6_type) {
case ICMPV6_MGM_QUERY:
case ICMPV6_MGM_REPORT:
case ICMPV6_MGM_REDUCTION:
case ICMPV6_MLD2_REPORT:
break;
default:
err = 0;
goto out;
}
/* Okay, we found MLD message. Check further. */
if (skb2->len > len) {
err = pskb_trim_rcsum(skb2, len);
if (err)
goto out;
err = -EINVAL;
}
ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb2);
switch (skb2->ip_summed) {
case CHECKSUM_COMPLETE:
if (!csum_ipv6_magic(&ip6h->saddr, &ip6h->daddr, skb2->len,
IPPROTO_ICMPV6, skb2->csum))
break;
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case CHECKSUM_NONE:
skb2->csum = ~csum_unfold(csum_ipv6_magic(&ip6h->saddr,
&ip6h->daddr,
skb2->len,
IPPROTO_ICMPV6, 0));
if (__skb_checksum_complete(skb2))
goto out;
}
err = 0;
br_vlan_get_tag(skb, &vid);
BR_INPUT_SKB_CB(skb)->igmp = 1;
switch (icmp6_type) {
case ICMPV6_MGM_REPORT:
{
struct mld_msg *mld;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb2, sizeof(*mld))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
mld = (struct mld_msg *)skb_transport_header(skb2);
BR_INPUT_SKB_CB(skb)->mrouters_only = 1;
err = br_ip6_multicast_add_group(br, port, &mld->mld_mca, vid);
break;
}
case ICMPV6_MLD2_REPORT:
err = br_ip6_multicast_mld2_report(br, port, skb2);
break;
case ICMPV6_MGM_QUERY:
err = br_ip6_multicast_query(br, port, skb2);
break;
case ICMPV6_MGM_REDUCTION:
{
struct mld_msg *mld;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb2, sizeof(*mld))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
mld = (struct mld_msg *)skb_transport_header(skb2);
br_ip6_multicast_leave_group(br, port, &mld->mld_mca, vid);
}
}
out:
kfree_skb(skb2);
return err;
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 30,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::getParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, void *params, size_t /* size */) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (isProhibitedIndex_l(index)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return BAD_INDEX;
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetParameter(mHandle, index, params);
OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE extIndex = (OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)index;
if (err != OMX_ErrorNoMore) {
CLOG_IF_ERROR(getParameter, err, "%s(%#x)", asString(extIndex), index);
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: IOMX: allow configuration after going to loaded state
This was disallowed recently but we still use it as MediaCodcec.stop
only goes to loaded state, and does not free component.
Bug: 31450460
Change-Id: I72e092e4e55c9f23b1baee3e950d76e84a5ef28d
(cherry picked from commit e03b22839d78c841ce0a1a0a1ee1960932188b0b)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 157,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: t1_load_keyword( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader,
const T1_Field field )
{
FT_Error error;
void* dummy_object;
void** objects;
FT_UInt max_objects;
PS_Blend blend = face->blend;
if ( blend && blend->num_designs == 0 )
blend = NULL;
/* if the keyword has a dedicated callback, call it */
if ( field->type == T1_FIELD_TYPE_CALLBACK )
{
field->reader( (FT_Face)face, loader );
error = loader->parser.root.error;
goto Exit;
}
/* now, the keyword is either a simple field, or a table of fields; */
/* we are now going to take care of it */
switch ( field->location )
{
case T1_FIELD_LOCATION_FONT_INFO:
dummy_object = &face->type1.font_info;
objects = &dummy_object;
max_objects = 0;
if ( blend )
{
objects = (void**)blend->font_infos;
max_objects = blend->num_designs;
}
break;
case T1_FIELD_LOCATION_FONT_EXTRA:
dummy_object = &face->type1.font_extra;
objects = &dummy_object;
max_objects = 0;
break;
case T1_FIELD_LOCATION_PRIVATE:
dummy_object = &face->type1.private_dict;
objects = &dummy_object;
max_objects = 0;
if ( blend )
{
objects = (void**)blend->privates;
max_objects = blend->num_designs;
}
break;
case T1_FIELD_LOCATION_BBOX:
dummy_object = &face->type1.font_bbox;
objects = &dummy_object;
max_objects = 0;
if ( blend )
{
objects = (void**)blend->bboxes;
max_objects = blend->num_designs;
}
break;
case T1_FIELD_LOCATION_LOADER:
dummy_object = loader;
objects = &dummy_object;
max_objects = 0;
break;
case T1_FIELD_LOCATION_FACE:
dummy_object = face;
objects = &dummy_object;
max_objects = 0;
break;
#ifndef T1_CONFIG_OPTION_NO_MM_SUPPORT
case T1_FIELD_LOCATION_BLEND:
dummy_object = face->blend;
objects = &dummy_object;
max_objects = 0;
break;
#endif
default:
dummy_object = &face->type1;
objects = &dummy_object;
max_objects = 0;
}
if ( *objects )
{
if ( field->type == T1_FIELD_TYPE_INTEGER_ARRAY ||
field->type == T1_FIELD_TYPE_FIXED_ARRAY )
error = T1_Load_Field_Table( &loader->parser, field,
objects, max_objects, 0 );
else
error = T1_Load_Field( &loader->parser, field,
objects, max_objects, 0 );
}
else
{
FT_TRACE1(( "t1_load_keyword: ignoring keyword `%s'"
" which is not valid at this point\n"
" (probably due to missing keywords)\n",
field->ident ));
error = FT_Err_Ok;
}
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static jboolean android_net_wifi_start_logging_ring_buffer(JNIEnv *env, jclass cls, jint iface,
jint verbose_level,jint flags, jint max_interval,jint min_data_size, jstring ring_name) {
JNIHelper helper(env);
wifi_interface_handle handle = getIfaceHandle(helper, cls, iface);
ALOGD("android_net_wifi_start_logging_ring_buffer = %p", handle);
if (handle == 0) {
return false;
}
ScopedUtfChars chars(env, ring_name);
const char* ring_name_const_char = chars.c_str();
int ret = hal_fn.wifi_start_logging(handle, verbose_level,
flags, max_interval, min_data_size, const_cast<char *>(ring_name_const_char));
if (ret != WIFI_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Fail to start logging for ring %s", ring_name_const_char);
} else {
ALOGD("start logging for ring %s", ring_name_const_char);
}
return ret == WIFI_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: getHTTPResponse(int s, int * size)
{
char buf[2048];
int n;
int endofheaders = 0;
int chunked = 0;
int content_length = -1;
unsigned int chunksize = 0;
unsigned int bytestocopy = 0;
/* buffers : */
char * header_buf;
unsigned int header_buf_len = 2048;
unsigned int header_buf_used = 0;
char * content_buf;
unsigned int content_buf_len = 2048;
unsigned int content_buf_used = 0;
char chunksize_buf[32];
unsigned int chunksize_buf_index;
header_buf = malloc(header_buf_len);
content_buf = malloc(content_buf_len);
chunksize_buf[0] = '\0';
chunksize_buf_index = 0;
while((n = receivedata(s, buf, 2048, 5000, NULL)) > 0)
{
if(endofheaders == 0)
{
int i;
int linestart=0;
int colon=0;
int valuestart=0;
if(header_buf_used + n > header_buf_len) {
header_buf = realloc(header_buf, header_buf_used + n);
header_buf_len = header_buf_used + n;
}
memcpy(header_buf + header_buf_used, buf, n);
header_buf_used += n;
/* search for CR LF CR LF (end of headers)
* recognize also LF LF */
i = 0;
while(i < ((int)header_buf_used-1) && (endofheaders == 0)) {
if(header_buf[i] == '\r') {
i++;
if(header_buf[i] == '\n') {
i++;
if(i < (int)header_buf_used && header_buf[i] == '\r') {
i++;
if(i < (int)header_buf_used && header_buf[i] == '\n') {
endofheaders = i+1;
}
}
}
} else if(header_buf[i] == '\n') {
i++;
if(header_buf[i] == '\n') {
endofheaders = i+1;
}
}
i++;
}
if(endofheaders == 0)
continue;
/* parse header lines */
for(i = 0; i < endofheaders - 1; i++) {
if(colon <= linestart && header_buf[i]==':')
{
colon = i;
while(i < (endofheaders-1)
&& (header_buf[i+1] == ' ' || header_buf[i+1] == '\t'))
i++;
valuestart = i + 1;
}
/* detecting end of line */
else if(header_buf[i]=='\r' || header_buf[i]=='\n')
{
if(colon > linestart && valuestart > colon)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("header='%.*s', value='%.*s'\n",
colon-linestart, header_buf+linestart,
i-valuestart, header_buf+valuestart);
#endif
if(0==strncasecmp(header_buf+linestart, "content-length", colon-linestart))
{
content_length = atoi(header_buf+valuestart);
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Content-Length: %d\n", content_length);
#endif
}
else if(0==strncasecmp(header_buf+linestart, "transfer-encoding", colon-linestart)
&& 0==strncasecmp(header_buf+valuestart, "chunked", 7))
{
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("chunked transfer-encoding!\n");
#endif
chunked = 1;
}
}
while(header_buf[i]=='\r' || header_buf[i] == '\n')
i++;
linestart = i;
colon = linestart;
valuestart = 0;
}
}
/* copy the remaining of the received data back to buf */
n = header_buf_used - endofheaders;
memcpy(buf, header_buf + endofheaders, n);
/* if(headers) */
}
if(endofheaders)
{
/* content */
if(chunked)
{
int i = 0;
while(i < n)
{
if(chunksize == 0)
{
/* reading chunk size */
if(chunksize_buf_index == 0) {
/* skipping any leading CR LF */
if(i<n && buf[i] == '\r') i++;
if(i<n && buf[i] == '\n') i++;
}
while(i<n && isxdigit(buf[i])
&& chunksize_buf_index < (sizeof(chunksize_buf)-1))
{
chunksize_buf[chunksize_buf_index++] = buf[i];
chunksize_buf[chunksize_buf_index] = '\0';
i++;
}
while(i<n && buf[i] != '\r' && buf[i] != '\n')
i++; /* discarding chunk-extension */
if(i<n && buf[i] == '\r') i++;
if(i<n && buf[i] == '\n') {
unsigned int j;
for(j = 0; j < chunksize_buf_index; j++) {
if(chunksize_buf[j] >= '0'
&& chunksize_buf[j] <= '9')
chunksize = (chunksize << 4) + (chunksize_buf[j] - '0');
else
chunksize = (chunksize << 4) + ((chunksize_buf[j] | 32) - 'a' + 10);
}
chunksize_buf[0] = '\0';
chunksize_buf_index = 0;
i++;
} else {
/* not finished to get chunksize */
continue;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("chunksize = %u (%x)\n", chunksize, chunksize);
#endif
if(chunksize == 0)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("end of HTTP content - %d %d\n", i, n);
/*printf("'%.*s'\n", n-i, buf+i);*/
#endif
goto end_of_stream;
}
}
bytestocopy = ((int)chunksize < (n - i))?chunksize:(unsigned int)(n - i);
if((content_buf_used + bytestocopy) > content_buf_len)
{
if(content_length >= (int)(content_buf_used + bytestocopy)) {
content_buf_len = content_length;
} else {
content_buf_len = content_buf_used + bytestocopy;
}
content_buf = (char *)realloc((void *)content_buf,
content_buf_len);
}
memcpy(content_buf + content_buf_used, buf + i, bytestocopy);
content_buf_used += bytestocopy;
i += bytestocopy;
chunksize -= bytestocopy;
}
}
else
{
/* not chunked */
if(content_length > 0
&& (int)(content_buf_used + n) > content_length) {
/* skipping additional bytes */
n = content_length - content_buf_used;
}
if(content_buf_used + n > content_buf_len)
{
if(content_length >= (int)(content_buf_used + n)) {
content_buf_len = content_length;
} else {
content_buf_len = content_buf_used + n;
}
content_buf = (char *)realloc((void *)content_buf,
content_buf_len);
}
memcpy(content_buf + content_buf_used, buf, n);
content_buf_used += n;
}
}
/* use the Content-Length header value if available */
if(content_length > 0 && (int)content_buf_used >= content_length)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("End of HTTP content\n");
#endif
break;
}
}
end_of_stream:
free(header_buf); header_buf = NULL;
*size = content_buf_used;
if(content_buf_used == 0)
{
free(content_buf);
content_buf = NULL;
}
return content_buf;
}
Commit Message: miniwget.c: fixed potential buffer overrun
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 166,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit algif_hash_exit(void)
{
int err = af_alg_unregister_type(&algif_type_hash);
BUG_ON(err);
}
Commit Message: crypto: algif - suppress sending source address information in recvmsg
The current code does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local sockaddr_storage variable to userland
-- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.38
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,834
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: content::RenderFrameHost* GetChildFrame() {
return GetWebContents()->GetAllFrames()[1];
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _TIFFfree(void* p)
{
free(p);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 86,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const ChildProcessData& BrowserChildProcessHostImpl::GetData() const {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
return data_;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: retr_rate (wgint bytes, double secs)
{
static char res[20];
static const char *rate_names[] = {"B/s", "KB/s", "MB/s", "GB/s" };
static const char *rate_names_bits[] = {"b/s", "Kb/s", "Mb/s", "Gb/s" };
int units;
double dlrate = calc_rate (bytes, secs, &units);
/* Use more digits for smaller numbers (regardless of unit used),
e.g. "1022", "247", "12.5", "2.38". */
snprintf (res, sizeof(res), "%.*f %s",
dlrate >= 99.95 ? 0 : dlrate >= 9.995 ? 1 : 2,
dlrate, !opt.report_bps ? rate_names[units]: rate_names_bits[units]);
return res;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ati_remote2_get_mode_mask(char *buffer,
const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
pr_debug("%s()\n", __func__);
return sprintf(buffer, "0x%02x", *(unsigned int *)kp->arg);
}
Commit Message: Input: ati_remote2 - fix crashes on detecting device with invalid descriptor
The ati_remote2 driver expects at least two interfaces with one
endpoint each. If given malicious descriptor that specify one
interface or no endpoints, it will crash in the probe function.
Ensure there is at least two interfaces and one endpoint for each
interface before using it.
The full disclosure: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/90
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 55,212
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_aix_arch( struct utsname *buf )
{
char *ret = "UNK";
char d[3];
int model;
/* The model number is encoded in the last two non zero digits of the
model code. */
d[0] = buf->machine[ strlen( buf->machine ) - 4 ];
d[1] = buf->machine[ strlen( buf->machine ) - 3 ];
d[2] = '\0';
model = strtol(d, NULL, 16);
/* ok, group the model numbers into processor families: */
switch(model)
{
case 0x10:
/* Model 530/730 */
break;
case 0x11:
case 0x14:
/* Model 540 */
break;
case 0x18:
/* Model 530H */
break;
case 0x1C:
/* Model 550 */
break;
case 0x20:
/* Model 930 */
break;
case 0x2E:
/* Model 950/950E */
break;
case 0x30:
/* Model 520 or 740/741 */
break;
case 0x31:
/* Model 320 */
break;
case 0x34:
/* Model 520H */
break;
case 0x35:
/* Model 32H/320E */
break;
case 0x37:
/* Model 340/34H */
break;
case 0x38:
/* Model 350 */
break;
case 0x41:
/* Model 220/22W/22G/230 */
break;
case 0x42:
/* Model 41T/41W */
break;
case 0x43:
/* Model M20 */
break;
case 0x45:
/* Model 220/M20/230/23W */
break;
case 0x46:
case 0x49:
/* Model 250 */
break;
case 0x47:
/* Model 230 */
break;
case 0x48:
/* Model C10 */
break;
case 0x4C:
/* PowerPC 603/604 model, and later */
ret = strdup("PWR3II");
break;
case 0x4D:
/* Model 40P */
break;
case 0x57:
/* Model 390/3AT/3BT */
break;
case 0x58:
/* Model 380/3AT/3BT */
break;
case 0x59:
/* Model 39H/3CT */
break;
case 0x5C:
/* Model 560 */
break;
case 0x63:
/* Model 970/97B */
break;
case 0x64:
/* Model 980/98B */
break;
case 0x66:
/* Model 580/58F */
break;
case 0x67:
/* Model 570/770/R10 */
break;
case 0x70:
/* Model 590 */
break;
case 0x71:
/* Model 58H */
break;
case 0x72:
/* Model 59H/58H/R12/R20 */
break;
case 0x75:
/* Model 370/375/37T */
break;
case 0x76:
/* Model 360/365/36T */
break;
case 0x77:
/* Model 315/350/355/510/550H/550L */
break;
case 0x79:
/* Model 591 */
break;
case 0x80:
/* Model 990 */
break;
case 0x81:
/* Model R24 */
break;
case 0x82:
/* Model R00/R24 */
break;
case 0x89:
/* Model 595 */
break;
case 0x90:
/* Model C20 */
break;
case 0x91:
/* Model 42T */
break;
case 0x94:
/* Model 397 */
break;
case 0xA0:
/* Model J30 */
break;
case 0xA1:
/* Model J40 */
break;
case 0xA3:
/* Model R30 */
break;
case 0xA4:
/* Model R40 */
break;
case 0xA6:
/* Model G30 */
break;
case 0xA7:
/* Model G40 */
break;
case 0xC4:
/* Model F30 */
break;
default:
/* unknown model, use default value of ret */
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int trace_vprintk(unsigned long ip, const char *fmt, va_list args)
{
return trace_array_vprintk(&global_trace, ip, fmt, args);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int unicode_cp_is_allowed(unsigned uni_cp, int document_type)
{
/* XML 1.0 HTML 4.01 HTML 5
* 0x09..0x0A 0x09..0x0A 0x09..0x0A
* 0x0D 0x0D 0x0C..0x0D
* 0x0020..0xD7FF 0x20..0x7E 0x20..0x7E
* 0x00A0..0xD7FF 0x00A0..0xD7FF
* 0xE000..0xFFFD 0xE000..0x10FFFF 0xE000..0xFDCF
* 0x010000..0x10FFFF 0xFDF0..0x10FFFF (*)
*
* (*) exclude code points where ((code & 0xFFFF) >= 0xFFFE)
*
* References:
* XML 1.0: <http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml/#charsets>
* HTML 4.01: <http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/PR-html40-19990824/sgml/sgmldecl.html>
* HTML 5: <http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#preprocessing-the-input-stream>
*
* Not sure this is the relevant part for HTML 5, though. I opted to
* disallow the characters that would result in a parse error when
* preprocessing of the input stream. See also section 8.1.3.
*
* It's unclear if XHTML 1.0 allows C1 characters. I'll opt to apply to
* XHTML 1.0 the same rules as for XML 1.0.
* See <http://cmsmcq.com/2007/C1.xml>.
*/
switch (document_type) {
case ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML401:
return (uni_cp >= 0x20 && uni_cp <= 0x7E) ||
(uni_cp == 0x0A || uni_cp == 0x09 || uni_cp == 0x0D) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xA0 && uni_cp <= 0xD7FF) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xE000 && uni_cp <= 0x10FFFF);
case ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML5:
return (uni_cp >= 0x20 && uni_cp <= 0x7E) ||
(uni_cp >= 0x09 && uni_cp <= 0x0D && uni_cp != 0x0B) || /* form feed U+0C allowed */
(uni_cp >= 0xA0 && uni_cp <= 0xD7FF) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xE000 && uni_cp <= 0x10FFFF &&
((uni_cp & 0xFFFF) < 0xFFFE) && /* last two of each plane (nonchars) disallowed */
(uni_cp < 0xFDD0 || uni_cp > 0xFDEF)); /* U+FDD0-U+FDEF (nonchars) disallowed */
case ENT_HTML_DOC_XHTML:
case ENT_HTML_DOC_XML1:
return (uni_cp >= 0x20 && uni_cp <= 0xD7FF) ||
(uni_cp == 0x0A || uni_cp == 0x09 || uni_cp == 0x0D) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xE000 && uni_cp <= 0x10FFFF && uni_cp != 0xFFFE && uni_cp != 0xFFFF);
default:
return 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 167,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_output_read_group(struct perf_output_handle *handle,
struct perf_event *event,
u64 enabled, u64 running)
{
struct perf_event *leader = event->group_leader, *sub;
u64 read_format = event->attr.read_format;
u64 values[5];
int n = 0;
values[n++] = 1 + leader->nr_siblings;
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_ENABLED)
values[n++] = enabled;
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_RUNNING)
values[n++] = running;
if (leader != event)
leader->pmu->read(leader);
values[n++] = perf_event_count(leader);
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_ID)
values[n++] = primary_event_id(leader);
__output_copy(handle, values, n * sizeof(u64));
list_for_each_entry(sub, &leader->sibling_list, group_entry) {
n = 0;
if (sub != event)
sub->pmu->read(sub);
values[n++] = perf_event_count(sub);
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_ID)
values[n++] = primary_event_id(sub);
__output_copy(handle, values, n * sizeof(u64));
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LoginPromptBrowserTestObserver::RemoveHandler(LoginHandler* handler) {
std::list<LoginHandler*>::iterator i = std::find(handlers_.begin(),
handlers_.end(),
handler);
EXPECT_TRUE(i != handlers_.end());
if (i != handlers_.end())
handlers_.erase(i);
}
Commit Message: Revert cross-origin auth prompt blocking.
BUG=174129
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12183030
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181113 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SessionStore::WriteBatch::Commit(std::unique_ptr<WriteBatch> batch) {
DCHECK(batch);
std::move(batch->commit_cb_)
.Run(std::move(batch->batch_),
base::BindOnce(&ForwardError, std::move(batch->error_handler_)));
}
Commit Message: Add trace event to sync_sessions::OnReadAllMetadata()
It is likely a cause of janks on UI thread on Android.
Add a trace event to get metrics about the duration.
BUG=902203
Change-Id: I4c4e9c2a20790264b982007ea7ee88ddfa7b972c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1319369
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <mastiz@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: ssid <ssid@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606104}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int asf_read_marker(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t size)
{
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int i, count, name_len, ret;
char name[1024];
avio_rl64(pb); // reserved 16 bytes
avio_rl64(pb); // ...
count = avio_rl32(pb); // markers count
avio_rl16(pb); // reserved 2 bytes
name_len = avio_rl16(pb); // name length
avio_skip(pb, name_len);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
int64_t pres_time;
int name_len;
if (avio_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_rl64(pb); // offset, 8 bytes
pres_time = avio_rl64(pb); // presentation time
pres_time -= asf->hdr.preroll * 10000;
avio_rl16(pb); // entry length
avio_rl32(pb); // send time
avio_rl32(pb); // flags
name_len = avio_rl32(pb); // name length
if ((ret = avio_get_str16le(pb, name_len * 2, name,
sizeof(name))) < name_len)
avio_skip(pb, name_len - ret);
avpriv_new_chapter(s, i, (AVRational) { 1, 10000000 }, pres_time,
AV_NOPTS_VALUE, name);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 61,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderViewImpl::enumerateChosenDirectory(
const WebString& path,
WebFileChooserCompletion* chooser_completion) {
int id = enumeration_completion_id_++;
enumeration_completions_[id] = chooser_completion;
return Send(new ViewHostMsg_EnumerateDirectory(
routing_id_,
id,
webkit_base::WebStringToFilePath(path)));
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: file_to_archive(struct cpio *cpio, const char *srcpath)
{
const char *destpath;
struct archive_entry *entry, *spare;
size_t len;
int r;
/*
* Create an archive_entry describing the source file.
*
*/
entry = archive_entry_new();
if (entry == NULL)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Couldn't allocate entry");
archive_entry_copy_sourcepath(entry, srcpath);
r = archive_read_disk_entry_from_file(cpio->archive_read_disk,
entry, -1, NULL);
if (r < ARCHIVE_FAILED)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "%s",
archive_error_string(cpio->archive_read_disk));
if (r < ARCHIVE_OK)
lafe_warnc(0, "%s",
archive_error_string(cpio->archive_read_disk));
if (r <= ARCHIVE_FAILED) {
cpio->return_value = 1;
return (r);
}
if (cpio->uid_override >= 0) {
archive_entry_set_uid(entry, cpio->uid_override);
archive_entry_set_uname(entry, cpio->uname_override);
}
if (cpio->gid_override >= 0) {
archive_entry_set_gid(entry, cpio->gid_override);
archive_entry_set_gname(entry, cpio->gname_override);
}
/*
* Generate a destination path for this entry.
* "destination path" is the name to which it will be copied in
* pass mode or the name that will go into the archive in
* output mode.
*/
destpath = srcpath;
if (cpio->destdir) {
len = strlen(cpio->destdir) + strlen(srcpath) + 8;
if (len >= cpio->pass_destpath_alloc) {
while (len >= cpio->pass_destpath_alloc) {
cpio->pass_destpath_alloc += 512;
cpio->pass_destpath_alloc *= 2;
}
free(cpio->pass_destpath);
cpio->pass_destpath = malloc(cpio->pass_destpath_alloc);
if (cpio->pass_destpath == NULL)
lafe_errc(1, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate path buffer");
}
strcpy(cpio->pass_destpath, cpio->destdir);
strcat(cpio->pass_destpath, remove_leading_slash(srcpath));
destpath = cpio->pass_destpath;
}
if (cpio->option_rename)
destpath = cpio_rename(destpath);
if (destpath == NULL)
return (0);
archive_entry_copy_pathname(entry, destpath);
/*
* If we're trying to preserve hardlinks, match them here.
*/
spare = NULL;
if (cpio->linkresolver != NULL
&& archive_entry_filetype(entry) != AE_IFDIR) {
archive_entry_linkify(cpio->linkresolver, &entry, &spare);
}
if (entry != NULL) {
r = entry_to_archive(cpio, entry);
archive_entry_free(entry);
if (spare != NULL) {
if (r == 0)
r = entry_to_archive(cpio, spare);
archive_entry_free(spare);
}
}
return (r);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 43,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AudioOutputDevice::Play() {
message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&AudioOutputDevice::PlayOnIOThread, this));
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 103,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pcd_completion(struct pcd_unit *cd, char *buf, char *fun)
{
int r, d, p, n, k, j;
r = -1;
k = 0;
j = 0;
if (!pcd_wait(cd, IDE_BUSY, IDE_DRQ | IDE_READY | IDE_ERR,
fun, "completion")) {
r = 0;
while (read_reg(cd, 7) & IDE_DRQ) {
d = read_reg(cd, 4) + 256 * read_reg(cd, 5);
n = (d + 3) & 0xfffc;
p = read_reg(cd, 2) & 3;
if ((p == 2) && (n > 0) && (j == 0)) {
pi_read_block(cd->pi, buf, n);
if (verbose > 1)
printk("%s: %s: Read %d bytes\n",
cd->name, fun, n);
r = 0;
j++;
} else {
if (verbose > 1)
printk
("%s: %s: Unexpected phase %d, d=%d, k=%d\n",
cd->name, fun, p, d, k);
if (verbose < 2)
printk_once(
"%s: WARNING: ATAPI phase errors\n",
cd->name);
mdelay(1);
}
if (k++ > PCD_TMO) {
printk("%s: Stuck DRQ\n", cd->name);
break;
}
if (pcd_wait
(cd, IDE_BUSY, IDE_DRQ | IDE_READY | IDE_ERR, fun,
"completion")) {
r = -1;
break;
}
}
}
pi_disconnect(cd->pi);
return r;
}
Commit Message: paride/pcd: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference and mem leak
Syzkaller report this:
pcd: pcd version 1.07, major 46, nice 0
pcd0: Autoprobe failed
pcd: No CD-ROM drive found
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 4525 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pcd_init+0x95c/0x1000 [pcd]
Code: c4 ab f7 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 56 a3 da f7 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 39 a3 da f7 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 cc b2
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e84df880 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc155a088 RCX: ffffffffc1508935
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffc900014f0000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee658b8 R09: ffffed103ee658b8
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee658b7 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc155a778 R14: ffffffffc155a4a8 R15: 0000000000000003
FS: 00007fe71bee3700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055a7334441a8 CR3: 00000001e9674003 CR4: 00000000007606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1508000
? 0xffffffffc1508000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe71bee2c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fe71bee2c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe71bee36bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pcd(+) paride solos_pci atm ts_fsm rtc_mt6397 mac80211 nhc_mobility nhc_udp nhc_ipv6 nhc_hop nhc_dest nhc_fragment nhc_routing 6lowpan rtc_cros_ec memconsole intel_xhci_usb_role_switch roles rtc_wm8350 usbcore industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio asc7621 dm_era dm_persistent_data dm_bufio dm_mod tpm gnss_ubx gnss_serial serdev gnss max2165 cpufreq_dt hid_penmount hid menf21bmc_wdt rc_core n_tracesink ide_gd_mod cdns_csi2tx v4l2_fwnode videodev media pinctrl_lewisburg pinctrl_intel iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun joydev mousedev ppdev kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd
ide_pci_generic piix input_leds cryptd glue_helper psmouse ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt ata_generic i2c_piix4 agpgart pata_acpi parport_pc parport floppy rtc_cmos sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: bmc150_magn]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace d873691c3cd69f56 ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pcd_init_units, cd->disk will be
NULL, however in pcd_detect and pcd_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 81b74ac68c28 ("paride/pcd: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 87,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ib_ucm_cleanup_events(struct ib_ucm_context *ctx)
{
struct ib_ucm_event *uevent;
mutex_lock(&ctx->file->file_mutex);
list_del(&ctx->file_list);
while (!list_empty(&ctx->events)) {
uevent = list_entry(ctx->events.next,
struct ib_ucm_event, ctx_list);
list_del(&uevent->file_list);
list_del(&uevent->ctx_list);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->file->file_mutex);
/* clear incoming connections. */
if (ib_ucm_new_cm_id(uevent->resp.event))
ib_destroy_cm_id(uevent->cm_id);
kfree(uevent);
mutex_lock(&ctx->file->file_mutex);
}
mutex_unlock(&ctx->file->file_mutex);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterTTFImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("TTF");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("TTC");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("OTF");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("PFA");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("PFB");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("PFA");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("DFONT");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SkCodec::Result SkIcoCodec::onGetPixels(const SkImageInfo& dstInfo,
void* dst, size_t dstRowBytes,
const Options& opts,
int* rowsDecoded) {
if (opts.fSubset) {
return kUnimplemented;
}
int index = 0;
SkCodec::Result result = kInvalidScale;
while (true) {
index = this->chooseCodec(dstInfo.dimensions(), index);
if (index < 0) {
break;
}
SkCodec* embeddedCodec = fEmbeddedCodecs->operator[](index).get();
result = embeddedCodec->getPixels(dstInfo, dst, dstRowBytes, &opts);
switch (result) {
case kSuccess:
case kIncompleteInput:
*rowsDecoded = dstInfo.height();
return result;
default:
break;
}
index++;
}
SkCodecPrintf("Error: No matching candidate image in ico.\n");
return result;
}
Commit Message: RESTRICT AUTOMERGE: Cherry-pick "begin cleanup of malloc porting layer"
Bug: 78354855
Test: Not feasible
Original description:
========================================================================
1. Merge some of the allocators into sk_malloc_flags by redefining a flag to mean zero-init
2. Add more private helpers to simplify our call-sites (and handle some overflow mul checks)
3. The 2-param helpers rely on the saturating SkSafeMath::Mul to pass max_size_t as the request,
which should always fail.
chromium: 508641
Reviewed-on: https://skia-review.googlesource.com/90940
Commit-Queue: Mike Reed <reed@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Robert Phillips <robertphillips@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Altmueller <stephana@google.com>
========================================================================
Conflicts:
- include/private/SkMalloc.h
Simply removed the old definitions of SK_MALLOC_TEMP and SK_MALLOC_THROW.
- public.bzl
Copied SK_SUPPORT_LEGACY_MALLOC_PORTING_LAYER into the old defines.
- src/codec/SkIcoCodec.cpp
Drop a change where we were not using malloc yet.
- src/codec/SkBmpBaseCodec.cpp
- src/core/SkBitmapCache.cpp
These files weren't yet using malloc (and SkBmpBaseCodec hadn't been
factored out).
- src/core/SkMallocPixelRef.cpp
These were still using New rather than Make (return raw pointer). Leave
them unchanged, as sk_malloc_flags is still valid.
- src/lazy/SkDiscardableMemoryPool.cpp
Leave this unchanged; sk_malloc_flags is still valid
In addition, pull in SkSafeMath.h, which was originally introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/c/skia/+/33721. This is required
for the new sk_malloc calls.
Also pull in SkSafeMath::Add and SkSafeMath::Mul, introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/88581
Also add SK_MaxSizeT, which the above depends on, introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/57084
Also, modify NewFromStream to use sk_malloc_canfail, matching pi and
avoiding a build break
Change-Id: Ib320484673a865460fc1efb900f611209e088edb
(cherry picked from commit a12cc3e14ea6734c7efe76aa6a19239909830b28)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 162,932
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::DoIsEnabled(GLenum cap) {
return state_.GetEnabled(cap);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void libxsmm_sparse_csc_reader( libxsmm_generated_code* io_generated_code,
const char* i_csc_file_in,
unsigned int** o_row_idx,
unsigned int** o_column_idx,
double** o_values,
unsigned int* o_row_count,
unsigned int* o_column_count,
unsigned int* o_element_count ) {
FILE *l_csc_file_handle;
const unsigned int l_line_length = 512;
char l_line[512/*l_line_length*/+1];
unsigned int l_header_read = 0;
unsigned int* l_column_idx_id = NULL;
unsigned int l_i = 0;
l_csc_file_handle = fopen( i_csc_file_in, "r" );
if ( l_csc_file_handle == NULL ) {
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_INPUT );
return;
}
while (fgets(l_line, l_line_length, l_csc_file_handle) != NULL) {
if ( strlen(l_line) == l_line_length ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_column_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
fclose( l_csc_file_handle ); /* close mtx file */
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_READ_LEN );
return;
}
/* check if we are still reading comments header */
if ( l_line[0] == '%' ) {
continue;
} else {
/* if we are the first line after comment header, we allocate our data structures */
if ( l_header_read == 0 ) {
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %u", o_row_count, o_column_count, o_element_count) == 3 ) {
/* allocate CSC data structure matching mtx file */
*o_row_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_element_count));
*o_column_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * ((size_t)(*o_column_count) + 1));
*o_values = (double*) malloc(sizeof(double) * (*o_element_count));
l_column_idx_id = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_column_count));
/* check if mallocs were successful */
if ( ( *o_row_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_column_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_values == NULL ) ||
( l_column_idx_id == NULL ) ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_column_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
fclose(l_csc_file_handle); /* close mtx file */
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_ALLOC_DATA );
return;
}
/* set everything to zero for init */
memset(*o_row_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_element_count));
memset(*o_column_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int) * ((size_t)(*o_column_count) + 1));
memset(*o_values, 0, sizeof(double) * (*o_element_count));
memset(l_column_idx_id, 0, sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_column_count));
/* init column idx */
for (l_i = 0; l_i <= *o_column_count; ++l_i) {
(*o_column_idx)[l_i] = *o_element_count;
}
/* init */
(*o_column_idx)[0] = 0;
l_i = 0;
l_header_read = 1;
} else {
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_READ_DESC );
fclose( l_csc_file_handle ); /* close mtx file */
return;
}
/* now we read the actual content */
} else {
unsigned int l_row = 0, l_column = 0;
double l_value = 0;
/* read a line of content */
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %lf", &l_row, &l_column, &l_value) != 3 ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_column_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
fclose(l_csc_file_handle); /* close mtx file */
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_READ_ELEMS );
return;
}
/* adjust numbers to zero termination */
l_row--;
l_column--;
/* add these values to row and value structure */
(*o_row_idx)[l_i] = l_row;
(*o_values)[l_i] = l_value;
l_i++;
/* handle columns, set id to own for this column, yeah we need to handle empty columns */
l_column_idx_id[l_column] = 1;
(*o_column_idx)[l_column+1] = l_i;
}
}
}
/* close mtx file */
fclose( l_csc_file_handle );
/* check if we read a file which was consistent */
if ( l_i != (*o_element_count) ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_column_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_LEN );
return;
}
if ( l_column_idx_id != NULL ) {
/* let's handle empty columns */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_column_count); l_i++) {
if ( l_column_idx_id[l_i] == 0 ) {
(*o_column_idx)[l_i+1] = (*o_column_idx)[l_i];
}
}
/* free helper data structure */
free( l_column_idx_id );
}
}
Commit Message: Issue #287: made CSR/CSC readers more robust against invalid input (case #1).
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 168,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaControlFullscreenButtonElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* event) {
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::click) {
if (mediaElement().isFullscreen()) {
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.ExitFullscreen"));
mediaControls().exitFullscreen();
} else {
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.EnterFullscreen"));
mediaControls().enterFullscreen();
}
event->setDefaultHandled();
}
MediaControlInputElement::defaultEventHandler(event);
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 126,953
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: free_xargs(xargs_t xargs)
{
if (xargs.dn)
free (xargs.dn);
if (xargs.linkdn)
free(xargs.linkdn);
if (xargs.containerdn)
free (xargs.containerdn);
if (xargs.tktpolicydn)
free (xargs.tktpolicydn);
}
Commit Message: Support keyless principals in LDAP [CVE-2014-5354]
Operations like "kadmin -q 'addprinc -nokey foo'" or
"kadmin -q 'purgekeys -all foo'" result in principal entries with
no keys present, so krb5_encode_krbsecretkey() would just return
NULL, which then got unconditionally dereferenced in
krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod().
Apply some fixes to krb5_encode_krbsecretkey() to handle zero-key
principals better, correct the test for an allocation failure, and
slightly restructure the cleanup handler to be shorter and more
appropriate for the usage. Once it no longer short-circuits when
n_key_data is zero, it will produce an array of length two with both
entries NULL, which is treated as an empty list by the LDAP library,
the correct behavior for a keyless principal.
However, attributes with empty values are only handled by the LDAP
library for Modify operations, not Add operations (which only get
a sequence of Attribute, with no operation field). Therefore, only
add an empty krbprincipalkey to the modlist when we will be performing a
Modify, and not when we will be performing an Add, which is conditional
on the (misspelled) create_standalone_prinicipal boolean.
CVE-2014-5354:
In MIT krb5, when kadmind is configured to use LDAP for the KDC
database, an authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL
dereference by inserting into the database a principal entry which
contains no long-term keys.
In order for the LDAP KDC backend to translate a principal entry
from the database abstraction layer into the form expected by the
LDAP schema, the principal's keys are encoded into a
NULL-terminated array of length-value entries to be stored in the
LDAP database. However, the subroutine which produced this array
did not correctly handle the case where no keys were present,
returning NULL instead of an empty array, and the array was
unconditionally dereferenced while adding to the list of LDAP
operations to perform.
Versions of MIT krb5 prior to 1.12 did not expose a way for
principal entries to have no long-term key material, and
therefore are not vulnerable.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8041 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.13.1
subject: kadmind with ldap backend crashes when putting keyless entries
CWE ID:
| 0
| 36,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: spindown_inhibitor_disconnected_cb (Inhibitor *inhibitor,
Device *device)
{
device->priv->spindown_inhibitors = g_list_remove (device->priv->spindown_inhibitors, inhibitor);
g_signal_handlers_disconnect_by_func (inhibitor, spindown_inhibitor_disconnected_cb, device);
g_object_unref (inhibitor);
update_info (device);
drain_pending_changes (device, FALSE);
daemon_local_update_spindown (device->priv->daemon);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: freeBindings(XML_Parser parser, BINDING *bindings)
{
while (bindings) {
BINDING *b = bindings;
/* m_startNamespaceDeclHandler will have been called for this
* binding in addBindings(), so call the end handler now.
*/
if (parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler)
parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, b->prefix->name);
bindings = bindings->nextTagBinding;
b->nextTagBinding = parser->m_freeBindingList;
parser->m_freeBindingList = b;
b->prefix->binding = b->prevPrefixBinding;
}
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 92,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: concat_gen_fifos(
void *first,
void *second
)
{
gen_fifo *pf1;
gen_fifo *pf2;
pf1 = first;
pf2 = second;
if (NULL == pf1)
return pf2;
else if (NULL == pf2)
return pf1;
CONCAT_FIFO(*pf1, *pf2, link);
free(pf2);
return pf1;
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_PRINTER_INFO_7(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
offset = dissect_spoolss_relstr(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_printer_guid,
0, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_printer_action, NULL);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 52,023
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool testNormalizeMaskHelper(const wchar_t * uriText, unsigned int expectedMask) {
UriParserStateW state;
UriUriW uri;
state.uri = &uri;
int res = uriParseUriW(&state, uriText);
if (res != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return false;
}
const unsigned int maskBefore = uriNormalizeSyntaxMaskRequiredW(&uri);
if (maskBefore != expectedMask) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return false;
}
res = uriNormalizeSyntaxW(&uri);
if (res != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return false;
}
const unsigned int maskAfter = uriNormalizeSyntaxMaskRequiredW(&uri);
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return (maskAfter == URI_NORMALIZED);
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 75,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::clip(const String& winding_rule_string) {
ClipInternal(path_, winding_rule_string);
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::ReloadFocusedFrame(bool bypass_cache) {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->Send(new FrameMsg_Reload(
focused_frame->GetRoutingID(), bypass_cache));
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NTSTATUS UnmountAllDevices (UNMOUNT_STRUCT *unmountRequest, BOOL ignoreOpenFiles)
{
NTSTATUS status = 0;
PDEVICE_OBJECT ListDevice;
int maxUniqueId = LastUniqueVolumeId;
Dump ("Unmounting all volumes\n");
if (unmountRequest)
unmountRequest->HiddenVolumeProtectionTriggered = FALSE;
while ((ListDevice = FindVolumeWithHighestUniqueId (maxUniqueId)) != NULL)
{
PEXTENSION ListExtension = (PEXTENSION) ListDevice->DeviceExtension;
maxUniqueId = ListExtension->UniqueVolumeId - 1;
if (IsVolumeAccessibleByCurrentUser (ListExtension))
{
NTSTATUS ntStatus;
if (unmountRequest)
unmountRequest->nDosDriveNo = ListExtension->nDosDriveNo;
ntStatus = UnmountDevice (unmountRequest, ListDevice, ignoreOpenFiles);
status = ntStatus == 0 ? status : ntStatus;
if (unmountRequest && unmountRequest->HiddenVolumeProtectionTriggered)
break;
}
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 87,224
|
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