instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int assign_eip_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst,
const struct desc_struct *cs_desc)
{
enum x86emul_mode mode = ctxt->mode;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (ctxt->mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32 && cs_desc->l) {
u64 efer = 0;
ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
if (efer & EFER_LMA)
mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64;
}
#endif
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 || mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32)
mode = cs_desc->d ? X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32 : X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16;
return assign_eip(ctxt, dst, mode);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: SYSENTER emulation is broken
SYSENTER emulation is broken in several ways:
1. It misses the case of 16-bit code segments completely (CVE-2015-0239).
2. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS is checked in 64-bit mode incorrectly (bits 0 and 1 can
still be set without causing #GP).
3. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP and MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP are not masked in
legacy-mode.
4. There is some unneeded code.
Fix it.
Cc: stable@vger.linux.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 45,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gsicc_profile_serialize(gsicc_serialized_profile_t *profile_data,
cmm_profile_t *icc_profile)
{
if (icc_profile == NULL)
return;
memcpy(profile_data, icc_profile, GSICC_SERIALIZED_SIZE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,989
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltFreeKeyDefList(xsltKeyDefPtr keyd) {
xsltKeyDefPtr cur;
while (keyd != NULL) {
cur = keyd;
keyd = keyd->next;
xsltFreeKeyDef(cur);
}
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderFlexibleBox::computeChildMarginValue(Length margin)
{
LayoutUnit availableSize = contentLogicalWidth();
return minimumValueForLength(margin, availableSize);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(session_save_path)
{
char *name = NULL;
int name_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|s", &name, &name_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_STRING(PS(save_path), 1);
if (name) {
if (memchr(name, '\0', name_len) != NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The save_path cannot contain NULL characters");
zval_dtor(return_value);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
zend_alter_ini_entry("session.save_path", sizeof("session.save_path"), name, name_len, PHP_INI_USER, PHP_INI_STAGE_RUNTIME);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,583
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrepareDelegateForCreation(
std::unique_ptr<AudioOutputDelegate> delegate) {
ASSERT_EQ(nullptr, delegate_);
delegate_.swap(delegate);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: reverseSamples8bits (uint16 spp, uint16 bps, uint32 width,
uint8 *ibuff, uint8 *obuff)
{
int ready_bits = 0;
uint32 col;
uint32 src_byte, src_bit;
uint32 bit_offset = 0;
uint8 match_bits = 0, mask_bits = 0;
uint8 buff1 = 0, buff2 = 0;
unsigned char *src;
unsigned char *dst;
tsample_t sample;
if ((ibuff == NULL) || (obuff == NULL))
{
TIFFError("reverseSamples8bits","Invalid image or work buffer");
return (1);
}
ready_bits = 0;
mask_bits = (uint8)-1 >> ( 8 - bps);
dst = obuff;
for (col = width; col > 0; col--)
{
/* Compute src byte(s) and bits within byte(s) */
bit_offset = (col - 1) * bps * spp;
for (sample = 0; sample < spp; sample++)
{
if (sample == 0)
{
src_byte = bit_offset / 8;
src_bit = bit_offset % 8;
}
else
{
src_byte = (bit_offset + (sample * bps)) / 8;
src_bit = (bit_offset + (sample * bps)) % 8;
}
src = ibuff + src_byte;
match_bits = mask_bits << (8 - src_bit - bps);
buff1 = ((*src) & match_bits) << (src_bit);
if (ready_bits < 8)
buff2 = (buff2 | (buff1 >> ready_bits));
else /* If we have a full buffer's worth, write it out */
{
*dst++ = buff2;
buff2 = buff1;
ready_bits -= 8;
}
ready_bits += bps;
}
}
if (ready_bits > 0)
{
buff1 = (buff2 & ((unsigned int)255 << (8 - ready_bits)));
*dst++ = buff1;
}
return (0);
} /* end reverseSamples8bits */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 48,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Update(BytesConsumer* consumer) {
DCHECK(!underlying_);
if (is_cancelled_) {
return;
}
underlying_ = consumer;
if (client_) {
Client* client = client_;
client_ = nullptr;
underlying_->SetClient(client);
if (GetPublicState() != PublicState::kReadableOrWaiting)
client->OnStateChange();
}
}
Commit Message: [Fetch API] Fix redirect leak on "no-cors" requests
The spec issue is now fixed, and this CL follows the spec change[1].
1: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/commit/14858d3e9402285a7ff3b5e47a22896ff3adc95d
Bug: 791324
Change-Id: Ic3e3955f43578b38fc44a5a6b2a1b43d56a2becb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023613
Reviewed-by: Tsuyoshi Horo <horo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552964}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 154,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __net_init pfkey_init_proc(struct net *net)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *e;
e = proc_create("pfkey", 0, net->proc_net, &pfkey_proc_ops);
if (e == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int kvm_apic_id(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
{
return (kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_ID) >> 24) & 0xff;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: StateBase* writeFile(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value, StateBase* next)
{
File* file = V8File::toNative(value.As<v8::Object>());
if (!file)
return 0;
if (file->hasBeenClosed())
return handleError(DataCloneError, "A File object has been closed, and could therefore not be cloned.", next);
int blobIndex = -1;
m_blobDataHandles.add(file->uuid(), file->blobDataHandle());
if (appendFileInfo(file, &blobIndex)) {
ASSERT(blobIndex >= 0);
m_writer.writeFileIndex(blobIndex);
} else {
m_writer.writeFile(*file);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,651
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _callerid_find_job(callerid_conn_t conn, uint32_t *job_id)
{
ino_t inode;
pid_t pid;
int rc;
rc = callerid_find_inode_by_conn(conn, &inode);
if (rc != SLURM_SUCCESS) {
debug3("network_callerid inode not found");
return ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
}
debug3("network_callerid found inode %lu", (long unsigned int)inode);
rc = find_pid_by_inode(&pid, inode);
if (rc != SLURM_SUCCESS) {
debug3("network_callerid process not found");
return ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
}
debug3("network_callerid found process %d", (pid_t)pid);
rc = slurm_pid2jobid(pid, job_id);
if (rc != SLURM_SUCCESS) {
debug3("network_callerid job not found");
return ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
}
debug3("network_callerid found job %u", *job_id);
return SLURM_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 72,053
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: autofill::RegionDataLoader* PaymentRequestState::GetRegionDataLoader() {
return payment_request_delegate_->GetRegionDataLoader();
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 151,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void RemoveICCProfileFromResourceBlock(StringInfo *bim_profile)
{
register const unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*datum;
unsigned int
count,
long_sans;
unsigned short
id,
short_sans;
length=GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile);
if (length < 16)
return;
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile);
for (p=datum; (p >= datum) && (p < (datum+length-16)); )
{
register unsigned char
*q;
q=(unsigned char *) p;
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) p,"8BIM",4) != 0)
break;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&long_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&id);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&count);
if (id == 0x0000040f)
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,q+PSDQuantum(count)+12,length-
(PSDQuantum(count)+12)-(q-datum));
SetStringInfoLength(bim_profile,length-(PSDQuantum(count)+12));
break;
}
p+=count;
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
p++;
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/148
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 168,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutofillPopupItemView::CreateContent() {
AutofillPopupController* controller = popup_view_->controller();
auto* layout_manager = SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::BoxLayout>(
views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal, gfx::Insets(0, GetHorizontalMargin())));
layout_manager->set_cross_axis_alignment(
views::BoxLayout::CrossAxisAlignment::CROSS_AXIS_ALIGNMENT_STRETCH);
const gfx::ImageSkia icon =
controller->layout_model().GetIconImage(line_number_);
if (!icon.isNull() &&
(GetLayoutType() == PopupItemLayoutType::kLeadingIcon ||
GetLayoutType() == PopupItemLayoutType::kTwoLinesLeadingIcon)) {
AddIcon(icon);
AddSpacerWithSize(views::MenuConfig::instance().item_horizontal_padding,
/*resize=*/false, layout_manager);
}
views::View* lower_value_label = CreateSubtextLabel();
views::View* value_label = CreateValueLabel();
const int kStandardRowHeight =
views::MenuConfig::instance().touchable_menu_height + extra_height_;
if (!lower_value_label) {
layout_manager->set_minimum_cross_axis_size(kStandardRowHeight);
AddChildView(value_label);
} else {
layout_manager->set_minimum_cross_axis_size(
kStandardRowHeight + kAutofillPopupAdditionalDoubleRowHeight);
views::View* values_container = new views::View();
auto* vertical_layout =
values_container->SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::BoxLayout>(
views::BoxLayout::kVertical, gfx::Insets(),
kAdjacentLabelsVerticalSpacing));
vertical_layout->set_main_axis_alignment(
views::BoxLayout::MAIN_AXIS_ALIGNMENT_CENTER);
vertical_layout->set_cross_axis_alignment(
views::BoxLayout::CROSS_AXIS_ALIGNMENT_START);
values_container->AddChildView(value_label);
values_container->AddChildView(lower_value_label);
AddChildView(values_container);
}
AddSpacerWithSize(AutofillPopupBaseView::kValueLabelPadding,
/*resize=*/true, layout_manager);
views::View* description_label = CreateDescriptionLabel();
if (description_label)
AddChildView(description_label);
if (!icon.isNull() && GetLayoutType() == PopupItemLayoutType::kTrailingIcon) {
AddSpacerWithSize(views::MenuConfig::instance().item_horizontal_padding,
/*resize=*/false, layout_manager);
AddIcon(icon);
}
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 130,540
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t GetURLLoaderOptions(bool is_main_frame) {
uint32_t options = network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionNone;
options |= network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionSniffMimeType;
if (is_main_frame) {
options |= network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionSendSSLInfoWithResponse;
options |= network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionSendSSLInfoForCertificateError;
}
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService)) {
options |= network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionPauseOnResponseStarted;
}
return options;
}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,371
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(renameat2, int, olddfd, const char __user *, oldname,
int, newdfd, const char __user *, newname, unsigned int, flags)
{
struct dentry *old_dir, *new_dir;
struct dentry *old_dentry, *new_dentry;
struct dentry *trap;
struct nameidata oldnd, newnd;
struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL;
struct filename *from;
struct filename *to;
unsigned int lookup_flags = 0;
bool should_retry = false;
int error;
if (flags & ~(RENAME_NOREPLACE | RENAME_EXCHANGE))
return -EINVAL;
if ((flags & RENAME_NOREPLACE) && (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
return -EINVAL;
retry:
from = user_path_parent(olddfd, oldname, &oldnd, lookup_flags);
if (IS_ERR(from)) {
error = PTR_ERR(from);
goto exit;
}
to = user_path_parent(newdfd, newname, &newnd, lookup_flags);
if (IS_ERR(to)) {
error = PTR_ERR(to);
goto exit1;
}
error = -EXDEV;
if (oldnd.path.mnt != newnd.path.mnt)
goto exit2;
old_dir = oldnd.path.dentry;
error = -EBUSY;
if (oldnd.last_type != LAST_NORM)
goto exit2;
new_dir = newnd.path.dentry;
if (flags & RENAME_NOREPLACE)
error = -EEXIST;
if (newnd.last_type != LAST_NORM)
goto exit2;
error = mnt_want_write(oldnd.path.mnt);
if (error)
goto exit2;
oldnd.flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
newnd.flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
if (!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
newnd.flags |= LOOKUP_RENAME_TARGET;
retry_deleg:
trap = lock_rename(new_dir, old_dir);
old_dentry = lookup_hash(&oldnd);
error = PTR_ERR(old_dentry);
if (IS_ERR(old_dentry))
goto exit3;
/* source must exist */
error = -ENOENT;
if (d_is_negative(old_dentry))
goto exit4;
new_dentry = lookup_hash(&newnd);
error = PTR_ERR(new_dentry);
if (IS_ERR(new_dentry))
goto exit4;
error = -EEXIST;
if ((flags & RENAME_NOREPLACE) && d_is_positive(new_dentry))
goto exit5;
if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
error = -ENOENT;
if (d_is_negative(new_dentry))
goto exit5;
if (!d_is_dir(new_dentry)) {
error = -ENOTDIR;
if (newnd.last.name[newnd.last.len])
goto exit5;
}
}
/* unless the source is a directory trailing slashes give -ENOTDIR */
if (!d_is_dir(old_dentry)) {
error = -ENOTDIR;
if (oldnd.last.name[oldnd.last.len])
goto exit5;
if (!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && newnd.last.name[newnd.last.len])
goto exit5;
}
/* source should not be ancestor of target */
error = -EINVAL;
if (old_dentry == trap)
goto exit5;
/* target should not be an ancestor of source */
if (!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
error = -ENOTEMPTY;
if (new_dentry == trap)
goto exit5;
error = security_path_rename(&oldnd.path, old_dentry,
&newnd.path, new_dentry, flags);
if (error)
goto exit5;
error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry,
&delegated_inode, flags);
exit5:
dput(new_dentry);
exit4:
dput(old_dentry);
exit3:
unlock_rename(new_dir, old_dir);
if (delegated_inode) {
error = break_deleg_wait(&delegated_inode);
if (!error)
goto retry_deleg;
}
mnt_drop_write(oldnd.path.mnt);
exit2:
if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags))
should_retry = true;
path_put(&newnd.path);
putname(to);
exit1:
path_put(&oldnd.path);
putname(from);
if (should_retry) {
should_retry = false;
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
goto retry;
}
exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 36,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int read_gab2_sub(AVFormatContext *s, AVStream *st, AVPacket *pkt)
{
if (pkt->size >= 7 &&
pkt->size < INT_MAX - AVPROBE_PADDING_SIZE &&
!strcmp(pkt->data, "GAB2") && AV_RL16(pkt->data + 5) == 2) {
uint8_t desc[256];
int score = AVPROBE_SCORE_EXTENSION, ret;
AVIStream *ast = st->priv_data;
AVInputFormat *sub_demuxer;
AVRational time_base;
int size;
AVIOContext *pb = avio_alloc_context(pkt->data + 7,
pkt->size - 7,
0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
AVProbeData pd;
unsigned int desc_len = avio_rl32(pb);
if (desc_len > pb->buf_end - pb->buf_ptr)
goto error;
ret = avio_get_str16le(pb, desc_len, desc, sizeof(desc));
avio_skip(pb, desc_len - ret);
if (*desc)
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "title", desc, 0);
avio_rl16(pb); /* flags? */
avio_rl32(pb); /* data size */
size = pb->buf_end - pb->buf_ptr;
pd = (AVProbeData) { .buf = av_mallocz(size + AVPROBE_PADDING_SIZE),
.buf_size = size };
if (!pd.buf)
goto error;
memcpy(pd.buf, pb->buf_ptr, size);
sub_demuxer = av_probe_input_format2(&pd, 1, &score);
av_freep(&pd.buf);
if (!sub_demuxer)
goto error;
if (!(ast->sub_ctx = avformat_alloc_context()))
goto error;
ast->sub_ctx->pb = pb;
if (ff_copy_whiteblacklists(ast->sub_ctx, s) < 0)
goto error;
if (!avformat_open_input(&ast->sub_ctx, "", sub_demuxer, NULL)) {
if (ast->sub_ctx->nb_streams != 1)
goto error;
ff_read_packet(ast->sub_ctx, &ast->sub_pkt);
avcodec_parameters_copy(st->codecpar, ast->sub_ctx->streams[0]->codecpar);
time_base = ast->sub_ctx->streams[0]->time_base;
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 64, time_base.num, time_base.den);
}
ast->sub_buffer = pkt->data;
memset(pkt, 0, sizeof(*pkt));
return 1;
error:
av_freep(&ast->sub_ctx);
av_freep(&pb);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/avidec: Limit formats in gab2 to srt and ass/ssa
This prevents part of one exploit leading to an information leak
Found-by: Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by: Thierry Foucu <tfoucu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 168,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: qtdemux_tag_add_blob (GNode * node, GstQTDemux * demux)
{
gint len;
guint8 *data;
GstBuffer *buf;
gchar *media_type, *style;
GstCaps *caps;
data = node->data;
len = QT_UINT32 (data);
buf = gst_buffer_new_and_alloc (len);
memcpy (GST_BUFFER_DATA (buf), data, len);
/* heuristic to determine style of tag */
if (QT_FOURCC (data + 4) == FOURCC_____ ||
(len > 8 + 12 && QT_FOURCC (data + 12) == FOURCC_data))
style = "itunes";
else if (demux->major_brand == GST_MAKE_FOURCC ('q', 't', ' ', ' '))
style = "quicktime";
/* fall back to assuming iso/3gp tag style */
else
style = "iso";
media_type = g_strdup_printf ("application/x-gst-qt-%c%c%c%c-tag",
g_ascii_tolower (data[4]), g_ascii_tolower (data[5]),
g_ascii_tolower (data[6]), g_ascii_tolower (data[7]));
caps = gst_caps_new_simple (media_type, "style", G_TYPE_STRING, style, NULL);
gst_buffer_set_caps (buf, caps);
gst_caps_unref (caps);
g_free (media_type);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "adding private tag; size %d, caps %" GST_PTR_FORMAT,
GST_BUFFER_SIZE (buf), caps);
gst_tag_list_add (demux->tag_list, GST_TAG_MERGE_APPEND,
GST_QT_DEMUX_PRIVATE_TAG, buf, NULL);
gst_buffer_unref (buf);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const AtomicString& Element::webkitRegionOverset() const
{
document()->updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, undefinedState, ("undefined", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::cssRegionsEnabled() || !renderRegion())
return undefinedState;
switch (renderRegion()->regionOversetState()) {
case RegionFit: {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, fitState, ("fit", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
return fitState;
}
case RegionEmpty: {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, emptyState, ("empty", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
return emptyState;
}
case RegionOverset: {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, overflowState, ("overset", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
return overflowState;
}
case RegionUndefined:
return undefinedState;
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return undefinedState;
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,432
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsHidden() {
return capturer_count_ == 0 && !should_normally_be_visible_;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
int err;
if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (insn->src_reg == 0) {
u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
__mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], imm);
return 0;
}
/* replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr() should have caught bad ld_imm64 */
BUG_ON(insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD);
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
regs[insn->dst_reg].map_ptr = ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(insn);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 59,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_connectx(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr __user *addrs,
int addrs_size)
{
sctp_assoc_t assoc_id = 0;
int err = 0;
err = __sctp_setsockopt_connectx(sk, addrs, addrs_size, &assoc_id);
if (err)
return err;
else
return assoc_id;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 43,568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decompileDEFINEFUNCTION(int n, SWF_ACTION *actions, int maxn, int is_type2)
{
int i,j,k,m,r;
struct SWF_ACTIONPUSHPARAM *myregs[ 256 ];
struct _stack *StackSave;
struct SWF_ACTIONDEFINEFUNCTION2 *sactv2;
struct strbufinfo origbuf;
OUT_BEGIN2(SWF_ACTIONDEFINEFUNCTION);
sactv2 = (struct SWF_ACTIONDEFINEFUNCTION2*)sact;
#ifdef DEBUG
if(n+1 < maxn)
{
println("/* function followed by OP %x */",
OpCode(actions, n+1, maxn));
}
#endif
#if USE_LIB
if (isStoreOp(n+1, actions,maxn)
|| ( *sact->FunctionName==0 && !is_type2 )
|| (*sactv2->FunctionName==0 && is_type2 ))
{
origbuf=setTempString(); /* switch to a temporary string buffer */
}
#endif
puts("function ");
if (is_type2)
{
for(j=1;j<sactv2->RegisterCount;j++)
{
myregs[j]=regs[j];
regs[j]=NULL;
}
r=1;
if (sactv2->PreloadThisFlag) regs[r++]=newVar("this");
if (sactv2->PreloadArgumentsFlag) regs[r++]=newVar("arguments");
if (sactv2->PreloadSuperFlag) regs[r++]=newVar("super");
if (sactv2->PreloadRootFlag) regs[r++]=newVar("root");
if (sactv2->PreloadParentFlag) regs[r++]=newVar("parent");
if (sactv2->PreloadGlobalFlag) regs[r++]=newVar("global");
puts(sactv2->FunctionName);
puts("(");
for(i=0,m=0;i<sactv2->NumParams;i++)
{
puts(sactv2->Params[i].ParamName);
if ( sactv2->Params[i].Register)
{
printf(" /*=R%d*/ ",sactv2->Params[i].Register);
regs[sactv2->Params[i].Register] = newVar(sactv2->Params[i].ParamName);
m++; // do not count 'void' etc
}
if( sactv2->NumParams > i+1 ) puts(",");
}
println(") {" );
if (r+m < sactv2->RegisterCount)
{
INDENT
puts(" var ");
}
for(k=r;r<sactv2->RegisterCount;r++)
{
if (!regs[r])
{
char *t=malloc(5); /* Rddd */
sprintf(t,"R%d", r );
puts (t);
if (k++ < sactv2->RegisterCount- m -1)
puts(", ");
else
println(";" );
regs[r]=newVar(t);
}
}
StackSave=Stack;
decompileActions(sactv2->numActions, sactv2->Actions,gIndent+1);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (Stack!=StackSave)
{
println("/* Stack problem in function code above */");
}
#endif
Stack=StackSave;
for(j=1;j<sactv2->RegisterCount;j++)
regs[j]=myregs[j];
}
else
{
puts(sact->FunctionName);
puts("(");
for(i=0;i<sact->NumParams;i++) {
puts(sact->Params[i]);
if( sact->NumParams > i+1 ) puts(",");
}
println(") {" );
k=0;
if (sact->Actions[0].SWF_ACTIONRECORD.ActionCode == SWFACTION_PUSH)
{
struct SWF_ACTIONPUSH *sactPush=(struct SWF_ACTIONPUSH *)sact->Actions;
for(i=0;i<sactPush->NumParam;i++)
{
if ((&(sactPush->Params[i]))->Type == PUSH_REGISTER)
k++; /* REGISTER */
}
if (k)
{
INDENT
puts(" var ");
for(i=1;i<=k;i++)
{
char *t=malloc(5); /* Rddd */
sprintf(t,"R%d", i );
puts (t);
if (i < k)
puts(", ");
else
println(";" );
regs[i]=newVar(t);
}
}
}
for(j=1;j<=k;j++)
myregs[j]=regs[j];
StackSave=Stack;
decompileActions(sact->numActions, sact->Actions,gIndent+1);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (Stack!=StackSave)
{
println("/* Stack problem in function code above */");
}
#endif
Stack=StackSave;
for(j=1;j<=k;j++)
regs[j]=myregs[j];
}
INDENT
if (isStoreOp(n+1, actions,maxn)
|| ( *sact->FunctionName==0 && !is_type2 )
|| (*sactv2->FunctionName==0 && is_type2 ))
{
puts("}");
#if USE_LIB
push (newVar(dcgetstr())); /* push func body for later assignment */
setOrigString(origbuf); /* switch back to orig buffer */
#else
push (newVar("/* see function code above */")); /* workaround only if LIB is not in use */
#endif
}
else
println("}" );
return 0;
}
Commit Message: decompileAction: Prevent heap buffer overflow and underflow with using OpCode
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 89,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lookup(XML_Parser parser, HASH_TABLE *table, KEY name, size_t createSize)
{
size_t i;
if (table->size == 0) {
size_t tsize;
if (!createSize)
return NULL;
table->power = INIT_POWER;
/* table->size is a power of 2 */
table->size = (size_t)1 << INIT_POWER;
tsize = table->size * sizeof(NAMED *);
table->v = (NAMED **)table->mem->malloc_fcn(tsize);
if (!table->v) {
table->size = 0;
return NULL;
}
memset(table->v, 0, tsize);
i = hash(parser, name) & ((unsigned long)table->size - 1);
}
else {
unsigned long h = hash(parser, name);
unsigned long mask = (unsigned long)table->size - 1;
unsigned char step = 0;
i = h & mask;
while (table->v[i]) {
if (keyeq(name, table->v[i]->name))
return table->v[i];
if (!step)
step = PROBE_STEP(h, mask, table->power);
i < step ? (i += table->size - step) : (i -= step);
}
if (!createSize)
return NULL;
/* check for overflow (table is half full) */
if (table->used >> (table->power - 1)) {
unsigned char newPower = table->power + 1;
size_t newSize = (size_t)1 << newPower;
unsigned long newMask = (unsigned long)newSize - 1;
size_t tsize = newSize * sizeof(NAMED *);
NAMED **newV = (NAMED **)table->mem->malloc_fcn(tsize);
if (!newV)
return NULL;
memset(newV, 0, tsize);
for (i = 0; i < table->size; i++)
if (table->v[i]) {
unsigned long newHash = hash(parser, table->v[i]->name);
size_t j = newHash & newMask;
step = 0;
while (newV[j]) {
if (!step)
step = PROBE_STEP(newHash, newMask, newPower);
j < step ? (j += newSize - step) : (j -= step);
}
newV[j] = table->v[i];
}
table->mem->free_fcn(table->v);
table->v = newV;
table->power = newPower;
table->size = newSize;
i = h & newMask;
step = 0;
while (table->v[i]) {
if (!step)
step = PROBE_STEP(h, newMask, newPower);
i < step ? (i += newSize - step) : (i -= step);
}
}
}
table->v[i] = (NAMED *)table->mem->malloc_fcn(createSize);
if (!table->v[i])
return NULL;
memset(table->v[i], 0, createSize);
table->v[i]->name = name;
(table->used)++;
return table->v[i];
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 92,345
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlDeregisterNodeDefault(xmlDeregisterNodeFunc func)
{
xmlDeregisterNodeFunc old = xmlDeregisterNodeDefaultValue;
__xmlRegisterCallbacks = 1;
xmlDeregisterNodeDefaultValue = func;
return(old);
}
Commit Message: Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 107,319
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport unsigned char *ImageToBlob(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,size_t *length,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const MagickInfo
*magick_info;
ImageInfo
*blob_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
unsigned char
*blob;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
*length=0;
blob=(unsigned char *) NULL;
blob_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
blob_info->adjoin=MagickFalse;
(void) SetImageInfo(blob_info,1,exception);
if (*blob_info->magick != '\0')
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,blob_info->magick,MaxTextExtent);
magick_info=GetMagickInfo(image->magick,exception);
if (magick_info == (const MagickInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateError,"NoDecodeDelegateForThisImageFormat","`%s'",
image->magick);
blob_info=DestroyImageInfo(blob_info);
return(blob);
}
(void) CopyMagickString(blob_info->magick,image->magick,MaxTextExtent);
if (GetMagickBlobSupport(magick_info) != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Native blob support for this image format.
*/
blob_info->length=0;
blob_info->blob=AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMaxBlobExtent,
sizeof(unsigned char));
if (blob_info->blob == (void *) NULL)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
else
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image->blob->exempt=MagickTrue;
*image->filename='\0';
status=WriteImage(blob_info,image);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
*length=image->blob->length;
blob=DetachBlob(image->blob);
if (blob == (unsigned char *) NULL)
blob_info->blob=RelinquishMagickMemory(blob_info->blob);
else if (status == MagickFalse)
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
else
blob=(unsigned char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(blob,*length+1,
sizeof(*blob));
}
}
else
{
char
unique[MaxTextExtent];
int
file;
/*
Write file to disk in blob image format.
*/
file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(unique);
if (file == -1)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,BlobError,"UnableToWriteBlob",
image_info->filename);
}
else
{
blob_info->file=fdopen(file,"wb");
if (blob_info->file != (FILE *) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(image->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s:%s",
image->magick,unique);
status=WriteImage(blob_info,image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
(void) fclose(blob_info->file);
if (status == MagickFalse)
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
else
blob=FileToBlob(unique,~0UL,length,exception);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(unique);
}
}
blob_info=DestroyImageInfo(blob_info);
return(blob);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 88,524
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int refresh_total_sectors(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t hint)
{
BlockDriver *drv = bs->drv;
/* Do not attempt drv->bdrv_getlength() on scsi-generic devices */
if (bs->sg)
return 0;
/* query actual device if possible, otherwise just trust the hint */
if (drv->bdrv_getlength) {
int64_t length = drv->bdrv_getlength(bs);
if (length < 0) {
return length;
}
hint = DIV_ROUND_UP(length, BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
}
bs->total_sectors = hint;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,913
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void airspy_cleanup_queued_bufs(struct airspy *s)
{
unsigned long flags;
dev_dbg(s->dev, "\n");
spin_lock_irqsave(&s->queued_bufs_lock, flags);
while (!list_empty(&s->queued_bufs)) {
struct airspy_frame_buf *buf;
buf = list_entry(s->queued_bufs.next,
struct airspy_frame_buf, list);
list_del(&buf->list);
vb2_buffer_done(&buf->vb.vb2_buf, VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->queued_bufs_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: media: fix airspy usb probe error path
Fix a memory leak on probe error of the airspy usb device driver.
The problem is triggered when more than 64 usb devices register with
v4l2 of type VFL_TYPE_SDR or VFL_TYPE_SUBDEV.
The memory leak is caused by the probe function of the airspy driver
mishandeling errors and not freeing the corresponding control structures
when an error occours registering the device to v4l2 core.
A badusb device can emulate 64 of these devices, and then through
continual emulated connect/disconnect of the 65th device, cause the
kernel to run out of RAM and crash the kernel, thus causing a local DOS
vulnerability.
Fixes CVE-2016-5400
Signed-off-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 51,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int r;
r = vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu, vector);
if (!r)
return;
if (pi_test_and_set_pir(vector, &vmx->pi_desc))
return;
/* If a previous notification has sent the IPI, nothing to do. */
if (pi_test_and_set_on(&vmx->pi_desc))
return;
if (!kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, false))
kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 63,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean OnFocusIn(GtkWidget* widget,
GdkEventFocus* focus,
RenderWidgetHostViewGtk* host_view) {
host_view->ShowCurrentCursor();
RenderWidgetHostImpl* host =
RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(host_view->GetRenderWidgetHost());
host->GotFocus();
host->SetActive(true);
host_view->im_context_->OnFocusIn();
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
struct kvm_memory_slot old,
int user_alloc)
{
return;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,579
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext3DPrivate::blitMultisampleFramebufferAndRestoreContext() const
{
if (!m_context->m_attrs.antialias)
return;
const QOpenGLContext* currentContext = QOpenGLContext::currentContext();
QSurface* currentSurface = 0;
if (currentContext && currentContext != m_platformContext) {
currentSurface = currentContext->surface();
m_platformContext->makeCurrent(m_surface);
}
blitMultisampleFramebuffer();
if (currentContext && currentContext != m_platformContext)
const_cast<QOpenGLContext*>(currentContext)->makeCurrent(currentSurface);
}
Commit Message: [Qt] Remove an unnecessary masking from swapBgrToRgb()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103630
Reviewed by Zoltan Herczeg.
Get rid of a masking command in swapBgrToRgb() to speed up a little bit.
* platform/graphics/qt/GraphicsContext3DQt.cpp:
(WebCore::swapBgrToRgb):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@136375 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 107,377
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *binary_hickup_recv_verification_thread(void *arg) {
protocol_binary_response_no_extras *response = malloc(65*1024);
if (response != NULL) {
while (safe_recv_packet(response, 65*1024)) {
/* Just validate the packet format */
validate_response_header(response,
response->message.header.response.opcode,
response->message.header.response.status);
}
free(response);
}
hickup_thread_running = false;
allow_closed_read = false;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 94,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> GetExtensionViews(const v8::Arguments& args) {
if (args.Length() != 2)
return v8::Undefined();
if (!args[0]->IsInt32() || !args[1]->IsString())
return v8::Undefined();
int browser_window_id = args[0]->Int32Value();
std::string view_type_string = *v8::String::Utf8Value(args[1]->ToString());
StringToUpperASCII(&view_type_string);
ViewType::Type view_type = ViewType::INVALID;
if (view_type_string == ViewType::kBackgroundPage) {
view_type = ViewType::EXTENSION_BACKGROUND_PAGE;
} else if (view_type_string == ViewType::kInfobar) {
view_type = ViewType::EXTENSION_INFOBAR;
} else if (view_type_string == ViewType::kNotification) {
view_type = ViewType::NOTIFICATION;
} else if (view_type_string == ViewType::kTabContents) {
view_type = ViewType::TAB_CONTENTS;
} else if (view_type_string == ViewType::kPopup) {
view_type = ViewType::EXTENSION_POPUP;
} else if (view_type_string == ViewType::kExtensionDialog) {
view_type = ViewType::EXTENSION_DIALOG;
} else if (view_type_string != ViewType::kAll) {
return v8::Undefined();
}
ExtensionImpl* v8_extension = GetFromArguments<ExtensionImpl>(args);
const ::Extension* extension =
v8_extension->GetExtensionForCurrentContext();
if (!extension)
return v8::Undefined();
ExtensionViewAccumulator accumulator(extension->id(), browser_window_id,
view_type);
RenderView::ForEach(&accumulator);
return accumulator.views();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Extension::PermissionMessage Extension::PermissionMessage::CreateFromMessageId(
Extension::PermissionMessage::MessageId message_id) {
DCHECK_GT(PermissionMessage::ID_NONE, PermissionMessage::ID_UNKNOWN);
if (message_id <= ID_NONE)
return PermissionMessage(message_id, string16());
string16 message = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(kMessageIds[message_id]);
return PermissionMessage(message_id, message);
}
Commit Message: Prevent extensions from defining homepages with schemes other than valid web extents.
BUG=84402
TEST=ExtensionManifestTest.ParseHomepageURLs
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87722 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::WasShown() {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.WasShown();
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
for (auto* plugin : active_pepper_instances_)
plugin->PageVisibilityChanged(true);
#endif // ENABLE_PLUGINS
if (GetWebFrame()->FrameWidget()) {
GetWebFrame()->FrameWidget()->SetVisibilityState(VisibilityState());
}
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static XMP_Uns16 GetMacLang ( std::string * xmpLang )
{
if ( *xmpLang == "" ) return kNoMacLang;
size_t hyphenPos = xmpLang->find ( '-' ); // Make sure the XMP language is "generic".
if ( hyphenPos != std::string::npos ) xmpLang->erase ( hyphenPos );
for ( XMP_Uns16 i = 0; i <= 94; ++i ) { // Using std::map would be faster.
if ( *xmpLang == kMacToXMPLang_0_94[i] ) return i;
}
for ( XMP_Uns16 i = 128; i <= 151; ++i ) { // Using std::map would be faster.
if ( *xmpLang == kMacToXMPLang_128_151[i-128] ) return i;
}
return kNoMacLang;
} // GetMacLang
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 15,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs3svc_decode_readdirplusargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_readdirargs *args)
{
int len;
u32 max_blocksize = svc_max_payload(rqstp);
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &args->cookie);
args->verf = p; p += 2;
args->dircount = ntohl(*p++);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
len = args->count = min(args->count, max_blocksize);
while (len > 0) {
struct page *p = *(rqstp->rq_next_page++);
if (!args->buffer)
args->buffer = page_address(p);
len -= PAGE_SIZE;
}
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 1
| 168,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderView::RendererAccessibilityNotification::ShouldIncludeChildren() {
typedef ViewHostMsg_AccessibilityNotification_Params params;
if (type == WebKit::WebAccessibilityNotificationChildrenChanged ||
type == WebKit::WebAccessibilityNotificationLoadComplete) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOL VCAPITYPE VirtualChannelEntryEx(PCHANNEL_ENTRY_POINTS_EX pEntryPoints, PVOID pInitHandle)
{
UINT rc;
drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc;
DrdynvcClientContext* context = NULL;
CHANNEL_ENTRY_POINTS_FREERDP_EX* pEntryPointsEx;
drdynvc = (drdynvcPlugin*) calloc(1, sizeof(drdynvcPlugin));
if (!drdynvc)
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "calloc failed!");
return FALSE;
}
drdynvc->channelDef.options =
CHANNEL_OPTION_INITIALIZED |
CHANNEL_OPTION_ENCRYPT_RDP |
CHANNEL_OPTION_COMPRESS_RDP;
sprintf_s(drdynvc->channelDef.name, ARRAYSIZE(drdynvc->channelDef.name), "drdynvc");
drdynvc->state = DRDYNVC_STATE_INITIAL;
pEntryPointsEx = (CHANNEL_ENTRY_POINTS_FREERDP_EX*) pEntryPoints;
if ((pEntryPointsEx->cbSize >= sizeof(CHANNEL_ENTRY_POINTS_FREERDP_EX)) &&
(pEntryPointsEx->MagicNumber == FREERDP_CHANNEL_MAGIC_NUMBER))
{
context = (DrdynvcClientContext*) calloc(1, sizeof(DrdynvcClientContext));
if (!context)
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "calloc failed!");
free(drdynvc);
return FALSE;
}
context->handle = (void*) drdynvc;
context->custom = NULL;
drdynvc->context = context;
context->GetVersion = drdynvc_get_version;
drdynvc->rdpcontext = pEntryPointsEx->context;
}
drdynvc->log = WLog_Get(TAG);
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG, "VirtualChannelEntryEx");
CopyMemory(&(drdynvc->channelEntryPoints), pEntryPoints, sizeof(CHANNEL_ENTRY_POINTS_FREERDP_EX));
drdynvc->InitHandle = pInitHandle;
rc = drdynvc->channelEntryPoints.pVirtualChannelInitEx(drdynvc, context, pInitHandle,
&drdynvc->channelDef, 1, VIRTUAL_CHANNEL_VERSION_WIN2000, drdynvc_virtual_channel_init_event_ex);
if (CHANNEL_RC_OK != rc)
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "pVirtualChannelInit failed with %s [%08"PRIX32"]",
WTSErrorToString(rc), rc);
free(drdynvc->context);
free(drdynvc);
return FALSE;
}
drdynvc->channelEntryPoints.pInterface = context;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID:
| 0
| 74,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FakeBluetoothAgentManagerClient::GetAgentServiceProvider() {
return service_provider_;
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cc::EffectTree& PropertyTreeManager::GetEffectTree() {
return property_trees_.effect_tree;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,610
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int codeTriggerProgram(
Parse *pParse, /* The parser context */
TriggerStep *pStepList, /* List of statements inside the trigger body */
int orconf /* Conflict algorithm. (OE_Abort, etc) */
){
TriggerStep *pStep;
Vdbe *v = pParse->pVdbe;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
assert( pParse->pTriggerTab && pParse->pToplevel );
assert( pStepList );
assert( v!=0 );
for(pStep=pStepList; pStep; pStep=pStep->pNext){
/* Figure out the ON CONFLICT policy that will be used for this step
** of the trigger program. If the statement that caused this trigger
** to fire had an explicit ON CONFLICT, then use it. Otherwise, use
** the ON CONFLICT policy that was specified as part of the trigger
** step statement. Example:
**
** CREATE TRIGGER AFTER INSERT ON t1 BEGIN;
** INSERT OR REPLACE INTO t2 VALUES(new.a, new.b);
** END;
**
** INSERT INTO t1 ... ; -- insert into t2 uses REPLACE policy
** INSERT OR IGNORE INTO t1 ... ; -- insert into t2 uses IGNORE policy
*/
pParse->eOrconf = (orconf==OE_Default)?pStep->orconf:(u8)orconf;
assert( pParse->okConstFactor==0 );
switch( pStep->op ){
case TK_UPDATE: {
sqlite3Update(pParse,
targetSrcList(pParse, pStep),
sqlite3ExprListDup(db, pStep->pExprList, 0),
sqlite3ExprDup(db, pStep->pWhere, 0),
pParse->eOrconf
);
break;
}
case TK_INSERT: {
sqlite3Insert(pParse,
targetSrcList(pParse, pStep),
sqlite3SelectDup(db, pStep->pSelect, 0),
sqlite3IdListDup(db, pStep->pIdList),
pParse->eOrconf
);
break;
}
case TK_DELETE: {
sqlite3DeleteFrom(pParse,
targetSrcList(pParse, pStep),
sqlite3ExprDup(db, pStep->pWhere, 0)
);
break;
}
default: assert( pStep->op==TK_SELECT ); {
SelectDest sDest;
Select *pSelect = sqlite3SelectDup(db, pStep->pSelect, 0);
sqlite3SelectDestInit(&sDest, SRT_Discard, 0);
sqlite3Select(pParse, pSelect, &sDest);
sqlite3SelectDelete(db, pSelect);
break;
}
}
if( pStep->op!=TK_SELECT ){
sqlite3VdbeAddOp0(v, OP_ResetCount);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: archive_read_format_zip_seekable_read_header(struct archive_read *a,
struct archive_entry *entry)
{
struct zip *zip = (struct zip *)a->format->data;
struct zip_entry *rsrc;
int64_t offset;
int r, ret = ARCHIVE_OK;
/*
* It should be sufficient to call archive_read_next_header() for
* a reader to determine if an entry is encrypted or not. If the
* encryption of an entry is only detectable when calling
* archive_read_data(), so be it. We'll do the same check there
* as well.
*/
if (zip->has_encrypted_entries ==
ARCHIVE_READ_FORMAT_ENCRYPTION_DONT_KNOW)
zip->has_encrypted_entries = 0;
a->archive.archive_format = ARCHIVE_FORMAT_ZIP;
if (a->archive.archive_format_name == NULL)
a->archive.archive_format_name = "ZIP";
if (zip->zip_entries == NULL) {
r = slurp_central_directory(a, zip);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return r;
/* Get first entry whose local header offset is lower than
* other entries in the archive file. */
zip->entry =
(struct zip_entry *)ARCHIVE_RB_TREE_MIN(&zip->tree);
} else if (zip->entry != NULL) {
/* Get next entry in local header offset order. */
zip->entry = (struct zip_entry *)__archive_rb_tree_iterate(
&zip->tree, &zip->entry->node, ARCHIVE_RB_DIR_RIGHT);
}
if (zip->entry == NULL)
return ARCHIVE_EOF;
if (zip->entry->rsrcname.s)
rsrc = (struct zip_entry *)__archive_rb_tree_find_node(
&zip->tree_rsrc, zip->entry->rsrcname.s);
else
rsrc = NULL;
if (zip->cctx_valid)
archive_decrypto_aes_ctr_release(&zip->cctx);
if (zip->hctx_valid)
archive_hmac_sha1_cleanup(&zip->hctx);
zip->tctx_valid = zip->cctx_valid = zip->hctx_valid = 0;
__archive_read_reset_passphrase(a);
/* File entries are sorted by the header offset, we should mostly
* use __archive_read_consume to advance a read point to avoid redundant
* data reading. */
offset = archive_filter_bytes(&a->archive, 0);
if (offset < zip->entry->local_header_offset)
__archive_read_consume(a,
zip->entry->local_header_offset - offset);
else if (offset != zip->entry->local_header_offset) {
__archive_read_seek(a, zip->entry->local_header_offset,
SEEK_SET);
}
zip->unconsumed = 0;
r = zip_read_local_file_header(a, entry, zip);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return r;
if (rsrc) {
int ret2 = zip_read_mac_metadata(a, entry, rsrc);
if (ret2 < ret)
ret = ret2;
}
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Issue #656: Fix CVE-2016-1541, VU#862384
When reading OS X metadata entries in Zip archives that were stored
without compression, libarchive would use the uncompressed entry size
to allocate a buffer but would use the compressed entry size to limit
the amount of data copied into that buffer. Since the compressed
and uncompressed sizes are provided by data in the archive itself,
an attacker could manipulate these values to write data beyond
the end of the allocated buffer.
This fix provides three new checks to guard against such
manipulation and to make libarchive generally more robust when
handling this type of entry:
1. If an OS X metadata entry is stored without compression,
abort the entire archive if the compressed and uncompressed
data sizes do not match.
2. When sanity-checking the size of an OS X metadata entry,
abort this entry if either the compressed or uncompressed
size is larger than 4MB.
3. When copying data into the allocated buffer, check the copy
size against both the compressed entry size and uncompressed
entry size.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 55,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void net_tx_pkt_sendv(struct NetTxPkt *pkt,
NetClientState *nc, const struct iovec *iov, int iov_cnt)
{
if (pkt->is_loopback) {
nc->info->receive_iov(nc, iov, iov_cnt);
} else {
qemu_sendv_packet(nc, iov, iov_cnt);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 8,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_read_stsz(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
MOVStreamContext *sc;
unsigned int i, entries, sample_size, field_size, num_bytes;
GetBitContext gb;
unsigned char* buf;
int ret;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
sc = st->priv_data;
avio_r8(pb); /* version */
avio_rb24(pb); /* flags */
if (atom.type == MKTAG('s','t','s','z')) {
sample_size = avio_rb32(pb);
if (!sc->sample_size) /* do not overwrite value computed in stsd */
sc->sample_size = sample_size;
sc->stsz_sample_size = sample_size;
field_size = 32;
} else {
sample_size = 0;
avio_rb24(pb); /* reserved */
field_size = avio_r8(pb);
}
entries = avio_rb32(pb);
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_TRACE, "sample_size = %u sample_count = %u\n", sc->sample_size, entries);
sc->sample_count = entries;
if (sample_size)
return 0;
if (field_size != 4 && field_size != 8 && field_size != 16 && field_size != 32) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid sample field size %u\n", field_size);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (!entries)
return 0;
if (entries >= (UINT_MAX - 4) / field_size)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (sc->sample_sizes)
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Duplicated STSZ atom\n");
av_free(sc->sample_sizes);
sc->sample_count = 0;
sc->sample_sizes = av_malloc_array(entries, sizeof(*sc->sample_sizes));
if (!sc->sample_sizes)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
num_bytes = (entries*field_size+4)>>3;
buf = av_malloc(num_bytes+AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if (!buf) {
av_freep(&sc->sample_sizes);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
ret = ffio_read_size(pb, buf, num_bytes);
if (ret < 0) {
av_freep(&sc->sample_sizes);
av_free(buf);
return ret;
}
init_get_bits(&gb, buf, 8*num_bytes);
for (i = 0; i < entries && !pb->eof_reached; i++) {
sc->sample_sizes[i] = get_bits_long(&gb, field_size);
sc->data_size += sc->sample_sizes[i];
}
sc->sample_count = i;
av_free(buf);
if (pb->eof_reached)
return AVERROR_EOF;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,466
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zisofs_free(struct archive_write *a)
{
(void)a; /* UNUSED */
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 50,910
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
{
int al, i, j, ret;
unsigned int n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
return (-1);
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
&& (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
&& (type !=
SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
{
unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
unsigned char *dst = buf;
unsigned int k;
/* peek == 0 */
n = 0;
while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
*dst++ = *src++;
len--;
s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
n++;
}
/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
return n;
}
/*
* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
*/
if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
}
start:
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
/*-
* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
*/
rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
/* get new packet if necessary */
if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
if (ret <= 0)
return (ret);
}
/*
* Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
* record that isn't an alert.
*/
if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0)
s->cert->alert_count = 0;
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
* reset by ssl3_get_finished */
&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
* 'peek' mode)
*/
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
rr->length = 0;
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
return (0);
}
if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
/*
* make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
* doing a handshake for the first time
*/
if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
goto f_err;
}
if (len <= 0)
return (len);
if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
n = rr->length;
else
n = (unsigned int)len;
memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
if (!peek) {
rr->length -= n;
rr->off += n;
if (rr->length == 0) {
s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
rr->off = 0;
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
}
}
return (n);
}
/*
* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
* then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
*/
/*
* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
* that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
*/
{
unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
unsigned char *dest = NULL;
unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->s3->handshake_fragment);
dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
} else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->s3->alert_fragment);
dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
i = tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
if (i < 0)
return i;
rr->length = 0;
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)
goto start;
/* Exit and notify application to read again */
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
return (-1);
}
#endif
if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
if (rr->length < n)
n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
/* now move 'n' bytes: */
while (n-- > 0) {
dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
rr->length--;
}
if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
goto start; /* fragment was too small */
}
}
/*-
* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
* s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
*/
/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
if ((!s->server) &&
(s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
(s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
(s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
(s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
!s->s3->renegotiate) {
ssl3_renegotiate(s);
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
BIO *bio;
/*
* In the case where we try to read application data,
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return (-1);
}
}
}
}
/*
* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
* again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
*/
goto start;
}
/*
* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
* allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
*/
if (s->server
&& SSL_is_init_finished(s)
&& !s->s3->send_connection_binding
&& s->version > SSL3_VERSION
&& s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
&& s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
&& s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0) {
s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
rr->length = 0;
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
goto start;
}
if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL) {
j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
}
if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
s->cert->alert_count++;
if (s->cert->alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
goto f_err;
}
if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
return (0);
}
/*
* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
* renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
* alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
* presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
* future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
* the peer refused it where we carry on.
*/
else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
return (0);
#endif
} else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
char tmp[16];
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
return (0);
} else {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto f_err;
}
goto start;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
* shutdown */
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
rr->length = 0;
return (0);
}
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/*
* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
* what the record payload has to look like
*/
if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
(rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
goto f_err;
}
/* Check we have a cipher to change to */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
rr->length = 0;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
goto err;
else
goto start;
}
/*
* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
*/
if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
* are not as expected (and because this is
* not really needed for clients except for
* detecting protocol violations): */
s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server)
? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
#else
s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
#endif
s->renegotiate = 1;
s->new_session = 1;
}
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
BIO *bio;
/*
* In the case where we try to read application data, but we
* trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
* option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
* problems in the blocking world
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return (-1);
}
}
goto start;
}
switch (rr->type) {
default:
/*
* TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
* TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
* TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
* no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
* record types, using up resources processing them.
*/
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
/*
* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
* happen when type != rr->type
*/
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
/*
* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
* application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
* (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
* application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
* started), we will indulge it.
*/
if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
(((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
(s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
(s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
(s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
(s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
)
)) {
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
return (-1);
} else {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* not reached */
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
return (-1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 165,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_pic_coding_ext(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T) IV_SUCCESS;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
/* extension code identifier */
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
ps_dec->au2_f_code[0][0] = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
ps_dec->au2_f_code[0][1] = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
ps_dec->au2_f_code[1][0] = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
ps_dec->au2_f_code[1][1] = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,2);
ps_dec->u2_picture_structure = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,2);
if (ps_dec->u2_picture_structure < TOP_FIELD ||
ps_dec->u2_picture_structure > FRAME_PICTURE)
{
return IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_DECODE_ERR;
}
ps_dec->u2_top_field_first = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_frame_pred_frame_dct = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_concealment_motion_vectors = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_intra_vlc_format = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_alternate_scan = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_repeat_first_field = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
/* Flush chroma_420_type */
impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_progressive_frame = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
if (impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream))
{
/* Flush v_axis, field_sequence, burst_amplitude, sub_carrier_phase */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,20);
}
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
if(VERTICAL_SCAN == ps_dec->u2_alternate_scan)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_vertical;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag;
}
return e_error;
}
Commit Message: Adding check for min_width and min_height
Add check for min_wd and min_ht. Stride is updated if header
decode is done.
Bug: 74078669
Change-Id: Ided95395e1138335dbb4b05131a8551f6f7bbfcd
(cherry picked from commit 84eba4863dd50083951db83ea3cc81e015bf51da)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 162,940
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExpectFilledTestForm() {
ExpectFieldValue("firstname", "Milton");
ExpectFieldValue("lastname", "Waddams");
ExpectFieldValue("address1", "4120 Freidrich Lane");
ExpectFieldValue("address2", "Basement");
ExpectFieldValue("city", "Austin");
ExpectFieldValue("state", "TX");
ExpectFieldValue("zip", "78744");
ExpectFieldValue("country", "US");
ExpectFieldValue("phone", "5125551234");
}
Commit Message: Disable AutofillInteractiveTest.OnChangeAfterAutofill test.
Failing due to http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=revision&revision=170278.
BUG=353691
TBR=isherman@chromium.org, dbeam@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/216853002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260106 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PluginService::PurgePluginListCache(BrowserContext* browser_context,
bool reload_pages) {
for (RenderProcessHost::iterator it = RenderProcessHost::AllHostsIterator();
!it.IsAtEnd(); it.Advance()) {
RenderProcessHost* host = it.GetCurrentValue();
if (!browser_context || host->GetBrowserContext() == browser_context)
host->Send(new ViewMsg_PurgePluginListCache(reload_pages));
}
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_attr_rmtval_get(
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_bmbt_irec map[ATTR_RMTVALUE_MAPSIZE];
struct xfs_mount *mp = args->dp->i_mount;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
xfs_dablk_t lblkno = args->rmtblkno;
__uint8_t *dst = args->value;
int valuelen = args->valuelen;
int nmap;
int error;
int blkcnt = args->rmtblkcnt;
int i;
int offset = 0;
trace_xfs_attr_rmtval_get(args);
ASSERT(!(args->flags & ATTR_KERNOVAL));
while (valuelen > 0) {
nmap = ATTR_RMTVALUE_MAPSIZE;
error = xfs_bmapi_read(args->dp, (xfs_fileoff_t)lblkno,
blkcnt, map, &nmap,
XFS_BMAPI_ATTRFORK);
if (error)
return error;
ASSERT(nmap >= 1);
for (i = 0; (i < nmap) && (valuelen > 0); i++) {
xfs_daddr_t dblkno;
int dblkcnt;
ASSERT((map[i].br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) &&
(map[i].br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK));
dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map[i].br_startblock);
dblkcnt = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, map[i].br_blockcount);
error = xfs_trans_read_buf(mp, NULL, mp->m_ddev_targp,
dblkno, dblkcnt, 0, &bp,
&xfs_attr3_rmt_buf_ops);
if (error)
return error;
error = xfs_attr_rmtval_copyout(mp, bp, args->dp->i_ino,
&offset, &valuelen,
&dst);
xfs_buf_relse(bp);
if (error)
return error;
/* roll attribute extent map forwards */
lblkno += map[i].br_blockcount;
blkcnt -= map[i].br_blockcount;
}
}
ASSERT(valuelen == 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 1
| 166,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void iucv_process_message(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct iucv_path *path,
struct iucv_message *msg)
{
int rc;
unsigned int len;
len = iucv_msg_length(msg);
/* store msg target class in the second 4 bytes of skb ctrl buffer */
/* Note: the first 4 bytes are reserved for msg tag */
memcpy(CB_TRGCLS(skb), &msg->class, CB_TRGCLS_LEN);
/* check for special IPRM messages (e.g. iucv_sock_shutdown) */
if ((msg->flags & IUCV_IPRMDATA) && len > 7) {
if (memcmp(msg->rmmsg, iprm_shutdown, 8) == 0) {
skb->data = NULL;
skb->len = 0;
}
} else {
rc = pr_iucv->message_receive(path, msg,
msg->flags & IUCV_IPRMDATA,
skb->data, len, NULL);
if (rc) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return;
}
/* we need to fragment iucv messages for SOCK_STREAM only;
* for SOCK_SEQPACKET, it is only relevant if we support
* record segmentation using MSG_EOR (see also recvmsg()) */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM &&
skb->truesize >= sk->sk_rcvbuf / 4) {
rc = iucv_fragment_skb(sk, skb, len);
kfree_skb(skb);
skb = NULL;
if (rc) {
pr_iucv->path_sever(path, NULL);
return;
}
skb = skb_dequeue(&iucv_sk(sk)->backlog_skb_q);
} else {
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
skb->len = len;
}
}
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb))
skb_queue_head(&iucv_sk(sk)->backlog_skb_q, skb);
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,604
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vol_effect_process(effect_handle_t self,
audio_buffer_t *in_buffer,
audio_buffer_t *out_buffer)
{
int status = 0;
ALOGV("%s Called ", __func__);
vol_listener_context_t *context = (vol_listener_context_t *)self;
pthread_mutex_lock(&vol_listner_init_lock);
if (context->state != VOL_LISTENER_STATE_ACTIVE) {
ALOGE("%s: state is not active .. return error", __func__);
status = -EINVAL;
goto exit;
}
if (in_buffer->raw != out_buffer->raw) {
memcpy(out_buffer->raw, in_buffer->raw, out_buffer->frameCount * 2 * sizeof(int16_t));
} else {
ALOGW("%s: something wrong, didn't handle in_buffer and out_buffer same address case",
__func__);
}
exit:
pthread_mutex_unlock(&vol_listner_init_lock);
return status;
}
Commit Message: post proc : volume listener : fix effect release crash
Fix access to deleted effect context in vol_prc_lib_release()
Bug: 25753245.
Change-Id: I64ca99e4d5d09667be4c8c605f66700b9ae67949
(cherry picked from commit 93ab6fdda7b7557ccb34372670c30fa6178f8426)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 161,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::FindResponseIdsForCacheHelper(
int64_t cache_id,
std::vector<int64_t>* ids_vector,
std::set<int64_t>* ids_set) {
DCHECK(ids_vector || ids_set);
DCHECK(!(ids_vector && ids_set));
if (!LazyOpen(kDontCreate))
return false;
static const char kSql[] =
"SELECT response_id FROM Entries WHERE cache_id = ?";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, cache_id);
while (statement.Step()) {
int64_t id = statement.ColumnInt64(0);
if (ids_set)
ids_set->insert(id);
else
ids_vector->push_back(id);
}
return statement.Succeeded();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,285
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Np_toFixed(js_State *J)
{
js_Object *self = js_toobject(J, 0);
int width = js_tointeger(J, 1);
char buf[32];
double x;
if (self->type != JS_CNUMBER) js_typeerror(J, "not a number");
if (width < 0) js_rangeerror(J, "precision %d out of range", width);
if (width > 20) js_rangeerror(J, "precision %d out of range", width);
x = self->u.number;
if (isnan(x) || isinf(x) || x <= -1e21 || x >= 1e21)
js_pushstring(J, jsV_numbertostring(J, buf, x));
else
numtostr(J, "%.*f", width, x);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700938: Fix stack overflow in numtostr as used by Number#toFixed().
32 is not enough to fit sprintf("%.20f", 1e20).
We need at least 43 bytes to fit that format.
Bump the static buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 90,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ib_uverbs_detach_umcast(struct ib_qp *qp,
struct ib_uqp_object *uobj)
{
struct ib_uverbs_mcast_entry *mcast, *tmp;
list_for_each_entry_safe(mcast, tmp, &uobj->mcast_list, list) {
ib_detach_mcast(qp, &mcast->gid, mcast->lid);
list_del(&mcast->list);
kfree(mcast);
}
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: views::View* AutofillPopupSuggestionView::CreateSubtextLabel() {
if (GetLayoutType() != PopupItemLayoutType::kTwoLinesLeadingIcon)
return AutofillPopupItemView::CreateSubtextLabel();
base::string16 label_text =
popup_view_->controller()->GetSuggestionAt(line_number_).additional_label;
if (label_text.empty())
return nullptr;
views::Label* label = CreateLabelWithStyleAndContext(
label_text, ChromeTextContext::CONTEXT_BODY_TEXT_SMALL,
ChromeTextStyle::STYLE_SECONDARY);
return label;
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 130,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cassignforin(JF, js_Ast *stm)
{
js_Ast *lhs = stm->a;
if (stm->type == STM_FOR_IN_VAR) {
if (lhs->b)
jsC_error(J, lhs->b, "more than one loop variable in for-in statement");
emitlocal(J, F, OP_SETLOCAL, OP_SETVAR, lhs->a->a); /* list(var-init(ident)) */
emit(J, F, OP_POP);
return;
}
switch (lhs->type) {
case EXP_IDENTIFIER:
emitlocal(J, F, OP_SETLOCAL, OP_SETVAR, lhs);
emit(J, F, OP_POP);
break;
case EXP_INDEX:
cexp(J, F, lhs->a);
cexp(J, F, lhs->b);
emit(J, F, OP_ROT3);
emit(J, F, OP_SETPROP);
emit(J, F, OP_POP);
break;
case EXP_MEMBER:
cexp(J, F, lhs->a);
emit(J, F, OP_ROT2);
emitstring(J, F, OP_SETPROP_S, lhs->b->string);
emit(J, F, OP_POP);
break;
default:
jsC_error(J, lhs, "invalid l-value in for-in loop assignment");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 7,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,
unsigned int fault)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
int code = BUS_ADRERR;
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die: */
if (!(error_code & PF_USER)) {
no_context(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
/* User-space => ok to do another page fault: */
if (is_prefetch(regs, error_code, address))
return;
tsk->thread.cr2 = address;
tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
tsk->thread.trap_no = 14;
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
if (fault & (VM_FAULT_HWPOISON|VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE)) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"MCE: Killing %s:%d due to hardware memory corruption fault at %lx\n",
tsk->comm, tsk->pid, address);
code = BUS_MCEERR_AR;
}
#endif
force_sig_info_fault(SIGBUS, code, address, tsk, fault);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,932
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void EnterNamespaceSandbox(LinuxSandbox* linux_sandbox,
base::Closure* post_fork_parent_callback) {
linux_sandbox->EngageNamespaceSandbox();
if (getpid() == 1) {
base::Closure drop_all_caps_callback =
base::Bind(&DropAllCapabilities, linux_sandbox->proc_fd());
base::Closure callback = base::Bind(
&RunTwoClosures, &drop_all_caps_callback, post_fork_parent_callback);
CHECK(CreateInitProcessReaper(&callback));
}
}
Commit Message: Serialize struct tm in a safe way.
BUG=765512
Change-Id: If235b8677eb527be2ac0fe621fc210e4116a7566
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/679441
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 150,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void read_fsinfo(DOS_FS * fs, struct boot_sector *b, int lss)
{
struct info_sector i;
if (!b->info_sector) {
printf("No FSINFO sector\n");
if (interactive)
printf("1) Create one\n2) Do without FSINFO\n");
else
printf(" Not automatically creating it.\n");
if (interactive && get_key("12", "?") == '1') {
/* search for a free reserved sector (not boot sector and not
* backup boot sector) */
uint32_t s;
for (s = 1; s < le16toh(b->reserved); ++s)
if (s != le16toh(b->backup_boot))
break;
if (s > 0 && s < le16toh(b->reserved)) {
init_fsinfo(&i);
fs_write((off_t)s * lss, sizeof(i), &i);
b->info_sector = htole16(s);
fs_write(offsetof(struct boot_sector, info_sector),
sizeof(b->info_sector), &b->info_sector);
if (fs->backupboot_start)
fs_write(fs->backupboot_start +
offsetof(struct boot_sector, info_sector),
sizeof(b->info_sector), &b->info_sector);
} else {
printf("No free reserved sector found -- "
"no space for FSINFO sector!\n");
return;
}
} else
return;
}
fs->fsinfo_start = le16toh(b->info_sector) * lss;
fs_read(fs->fsinfo_start, sizeof(i), &i);
if (i.magic != htole32(0x41615252) ||
i.signature != htole32(0x61417272) || i.boot_sign != htole16(0xaa55)) {
printf("FSINFO sector has bad magic number(s):\n");
if (i.magic != htole32(0x41615252))
printf(" Offset %llu: 0x%08x != expected 0x%08x\n",
(unsigned long long)offsetof(struct info_sector, magic),
le32toh(i.magic), 0x41615252);
if (i.signature != htole32(0x61417272))
printf(" Offset %llu: 0x%08x != expected 0x%08x\n",
(unsigned long long)offsetof(struct info_sector, signature),
le32toh(i.signature), 0x61417272);
if (i.boot_sign != htole16(0xaa55))
printf(" Offset %llu: 0x%04x != expected 0x%04x\n",
(unsigned long long)offsetof(struct info_sector, boot_sign),
le16toh(i.boot_sign), 0xaa55);
if (interactive)
printf("1) Correct\n2) Don't correct (FSINFO invalid then)\n");
else
printf(" Auto-correcting it.\n");
if (!interactive || get_key("12", "?") == '1') {
init_fsinfo(&i);
fs_write(fs->fsinfo_start, sizeof(i), &i);
} else
fs->fsinfo_start = 0;
}
if (fs->fsinfo_start)
fs->free_clusters = le32toh(i.free_clusters);
}
Commit Message: read_boot(): Handle excessive FAT size specifications
The variable used for storing the FAT size (in bytes) was an unsigned
int. Since the size in sectors read from the BPB was not sufficiently
checked, this could end up being zero after multiplying it with the
sector size while some offsets still stayed excessive. Ultimately it
would cause segfaults when accessing FAT entries for which no memory
was allocated.
Make it more robust by changing the types used to store FAT size to
off_t and abort if there is no room for data clusters. Additionally
check that FAT size is not specified as zero.
Fixes #25 and fixes #26.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <aeb@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 52,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CameraSourceListener::postDataTimestamp(
nsecs_t timestamp, int32_t msgType, const sp<IMemory>& dataPtr) {
sp<CameraSource> source = mSource.promote();
if (source.get() != NULL) {
source->dataCallbackTimestamp(timestamp/1000, msgType, dataPtr);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,350
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static NodeInfo *GetNodeInfo(CubeInfo *cube_info,const size_t id,
const size_t level,NodeInfo *parent)
{
NodeInfo
*node_info;
if (cube_info->free_nodes == 0)
{
Nodes
*nodes;
/*
Allocate a new queue of nodes.
*/
nodes=(Nodes *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*nodes));
if (nodes == (Nodes *) NULL)
return((NodeInfo *) NULL);
nodes->nodes=(NodeInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory(NodesInAList,
sizeof(*nodes->nodes));
if (nodes->nodes == (NodeInfo *) NULL)
return((NodeInfo *) NULL);
nodes->next=cube_info->node_queue;
cube_info->node_queue=nodes;
cube_info->next_node=nodes->nodes;
cube_info->free_nodes=NodesInAList;
}
cube_info->nodes++;
cube_info->free_nodes--;
node_info=cube_info->next_node++;
(void) ResetMagickMemory(node_info,0,sizeof(*node_info));
node_info->parent=parent;
node_info->id=id;
node_info->level=level;
return(node_info);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/574
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 62,710
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InspectorStyleRecalcInvalidationTrackingEvent::Data(
Node* node,
const StyleChangeReasonForTracing& reason) {
DCHECK(node);
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value = TracedValue::Create();
value->SetString("frame", ToHexString(node->GetDocument().GetFrame()));
SetNodeInfo(value.get(), node, "nodeId", "nodeName");
value->SetString("reason", reason.ReasonString());
value->SetString("extraData", reason.GetExtraData());
SourceLocation::Capture()->ToTracedValue(value.get(), "stackTrace");
return value;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Status IndexedDBDatabase::GetOperation(
int64_t object_store_id,
int64_t index_id,
std::unique_ptr<IndexedDBKeyRange> key_range,
indexed_db::CursorType cursor_type,
scoped_refptr<IndexedDBCallbacks> callbacks,
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction) {
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBDatabase::GetOperation", "txn.id", transaction->id());
DCHECK(metadata_.object_stores.find(object_store_id) !=
metadata_.object_stores.end());
const IndexedDBObjectStoreMetadata& object_store_metadata =
metadata_.object_stores[object_store_id];
const IndexedDBKey* key;
Status s = Status::OK();
std::unique_ptr<IndexedDBBackingStore::Cursor> backing_store_cursor;
if (key_range->IsOnlyKey()) {
key = &key_range->lower();
} else {
if (index_id == IndexedDBIndexMetadata::kInvalidId) {
if (cursor_type == indexed_db::CURSOR_KEY_ONLY) {
backing_store_cursor = backing_store_->OpenObjectStoreKeyCursor(
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(), id(), object_store_id,
*key_range, blink::kWebIDBCursorDirectionNext, &s);
} else {
backing_store_cursor = backing_store_->OpenObjectStoreCursor(
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(), id(), object_store_id,
*key_range, blink::kWebIDBCursorDirectionNext, &s);
}
} else if (cursor_type == indexed_db::CURSOR_KEY_ONLY) {
backing_store_cursor = backing_store_->OpenIndexKeyCursor(
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(), id(), object_store_id,
index_id, *key_range, blink::kWebIDBCursorDirectionNext, &s);
} else {
backing_store_cursor = backing_store_->OpenIndexCursor(
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(), id(), object_store_id,
index_id, *key_range, blink::kWebIDBCursorDirectionNext, &s);
}
if (!s.ok())
return s;
if (!backing_store_cursor) {
callbacks->OnSuccess();
return s;
}
key = &backing_store_cursor->key();
}
std::unique_ptr<IndexedDBKey> primary_key;
if (index_id == IndexedDBIndexMetadata::kInvalidId) {
IndexedDBReturnValue value;
s = backing_store_->GetRecord(transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(),
id(),
object_store_id,
*key,
&value);
if (!s.ok())
return s;
if (value.empty()) {
callbacks->OnSuccess();
return s;
}
if (cursor_type == indexed_db::CURSOR_KEY_ONLY) {
callbacks->OnSuccess(*key);
return s;
}
if (object_store_metadata.auto_increment &&
!object_store_metadata.key_path.IsNull()) {
value.primary_key = *key;
value.key_path = object_store_metadata.key_path;
}
callbacks->OnSuccess(&value);
return s;
}
s = backing_store_->GetPrimaryKeyViaIndex(
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(),
id(),
object_store_id,
index_id,
*key,
&primary_key);
if (!s.ok())
return s;
if (!primary_key) {
callbacks->OnSuccess();
return s;
}
if (cursor_type == indexed_db::CURSOR_KEY_ONLY) {
callbacks->OnSuccess(*primary_key);
return s;
}
IndexedDBReturnValue value;
s = backing_store_->GetRecord(transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(),
id(),
object_store_id,
*primary_key,
&value);
if (!s.ok())
return s;
if (value.empty()) {
callbacks->OnSuccess();
return s;
}
if (object_store_metadata.auto_increment &&
!object_store_metadata.key_path.IsNull()) {
value.primary_key = *primary_key;
value.key_path = object_store_metadata.key_path;
}
callbacks->OnSuccess(&value);
return s;
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 155,449
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decode_OFPAT_RAW_SET_NW_SRC(ovs_be32 ipv4,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
ofpact_put_SET_IPV4_SRC(out)->ipv4 = ipv4;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void reset_stats() { num_invocations_ = 0; }
Commit Message: ash: Make UserActivityDetector ignore synthetic mouse events
This may have been preventing us from suspending (e.g.
mouse event is synthesized in response to lock window being
shown so Chrome tells powerd that the user is active).
BUG=133419
TEST=added
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10574044
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143437 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 103,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct mm_struct * mm_init(struct mm_struct * mm, struct task_struct *p)
{
atomic_set(&mm->mm_users, 1);
atomic_set(&mm->mm_count, 1);
init_rwsem(&mm->mmap_sem);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mm->mmlist);
mm->flags = (current->mm) ?
(current->mm->flags & MMF_INIT_MASK) : default_dump_filter;
mm->core_state = NULL;
mm->nr_ptes = 0;
memset(&mm->rss_stat, 0, sizeof(mm->rss_stat));
spin_lock_init(&mm->page_table_lock);
mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
mm_init_aio(mm);
mm_init_owner(mm, p);
atomic_set(&mm->oom_disable_count, 0);
if (likely(!mm_alloc_pgd(mm))) {
mm->def_flags = 0;
mmu_notifier_mm_init(mm);
return mm;
}
free_mm(mm);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,273
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: helpFile(char *base)
{
return expandPath(Strnew_m_charp(w3m_help_dir(), "/", base, NULL)->ptr);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 84,559
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ber_parse_header(STREAM s, int tagval, int *length)
{
int tag, len;
if (tagval > 0xff)
{
in_uint16_be(s, tag);
}
else
{
in_uint8(s, tag);
}
if (tag != tagval)
{
logger(Core, Error, "ber_parse_header(), expected tag %d, got %d", tagval, tag);
return False;
}
in_uint8(s, len);
if (len & 0x80)
{
len &= ~0x80;
*length = 0;
while (len--)
next_be(s, *length);
}
else
*length = len;
return s_check(s);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 169,794
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void test_global_rules()
{
assert_true_rule(
"global private rule global_rule { \
condition: \
true \
} \
rule test { \
condition: true \
}",
NULL);
assert_false_rule(
"global private rule global_rule { \
condition: \
false \
} \
rule test { \
condition: true \
}",
NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix heap overflow (reported by Jurriaan Bremer)
When setting a new array item with yr_object_array_set_item() the array size is doubled if the index for the new item is larger than the already allocated ones. No further checks were made to ensure that the index fits into the array after doubling its capacity. If the array capacity was for example 64, and a new object is assigned to an index larger than 128 the overflow occurs. As yr_object_array_set_item() is usually invoked with indexes that increase monotonically by one, this bug never triggered before. But the new "dotnet" module has the potential to allow the exploitation of this bug by scanning a specially crafted .NET binary.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameHostImpl::GetNavigationClientFromInterfaceProvider() {
mojom::NavigationClientAssociatedPtr navigation_client_ptr;
GetRemoteAssociatedInterfaces()->GetInterface(&navigation_client_ptr);
return navigation_client_ptr;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void ftrace_exports_enable(void)
{
static_branch_enable(&ftrace_exports_enabled);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::clearBufferfv(
GLenum buffer,
GLint drawbuffer,
MaybeShared<DOMFloat32Array> value,
GLuint src_offset) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateClearBuffer("clearBufferfv", buffer, value.View()->length(),
src_offset))
return;
ScopedRGBEmulationColorMask emulation_color_mask(this, color_mask_,
drawing_buffer_.get());
ContextGL()->ClearBufferfv(buffer, drawbuffer,
value.View()->DataMaybeShared() + src_offset);
MarkContextChanged(kCanvasChanged);
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 146,629
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int get_nohz_timer_target(void)
{
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
int i;
struct sched_domain *sd;
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_domain(cpu, sd) {
for_each_cpu(i, sched_domain_span(sd)) {
if (!idle_cpu(i)) {
cpu = i;
goto unlock;
}
}
}
unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return cpu;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit NavigationHandleWatcher(WebContents* web_contents)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents) {}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 143,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int update_open_stateid(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *open_stateid, nfs4_stateid *delegation, fmode_t fmode)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(state->inode);
struct nfs_delegation *deleg_cur;
int ret = 0;
fmode &= (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE);
rcu_read_lock();
deleg_cur = rcu_dereference(nfsi->delegation);
if (deleg_cur == NULL)
goto no_delegation;
spin_lock(&deleg_cur->lock);
if (rcu_dereference(nfsi->delegation) != deleg_cur ||
test_bit(NFS_DELEGATION_RETURNING, &deleg_cur->flags) ||
(deleg_cur->type & fmode) != fmode)
goto no_delegation_unlock;
if (delegation == NULL)
delegation = &deleg_cur->stateid;
else if (!nfs4_stateid_match(&deleg_cur->stateid, delegation))
goto no_delegation_unlock;
nfs_mark_delegation_referenced(deleg_cur);
__update_open_stateid(state, open_stateid, &deleg_cur->stateid, fmode);
ret = 1;
no_delegation_unlock:
spin_unlock(&deleg_cur->lock);
no_delegation:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!ret && open_stateid != NULL) {
__update_open_stateid(state, open_stateid, NULL, fmode);
ret = 1;
}
if (test_bit(NFS_STATE_RECLAIM_NOGRACE, &state->flags))
nfs4_schedule_state_manager(state->owner->so_server->nfs_client);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,278
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void btif_hh_close_poll_thread(btif_hh_device_t *p_dev)
{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__);
p_dev->hh_keep_polling = 0;
if(p_dev->hh_poll_thread_id > 0)
pthread_join(p_dev->hh_poll_thread_id,NULL);
return;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::Destroy() {
pending_transaction_.reset();
surface_list_.clear();
root_surface_.reset();
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 130,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_canonicalize)
{
get_icu_value_src_php( LOC_CANONICALIZE_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 52,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arch_init(void *opaque)
{
int r;
struct kvm_x86_ops *ops = (struct kvm_x86_ops *)opaque;
if (kvm_x86_ops) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: already loaded the other module\n");
r = -EEXIST;
goto out;
}
if (!ops->cpu_has_kvm_support()) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: no hardware support\n");
r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
if (ops->disabled_by_bios()) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: disabled by bios\n");
r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
r = -ENOMEM;
shared_msrs = alloc_percpu(struct kvm_shared_msrs);
if (!shared_msrs) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: failed to allocate percpu kvm_shared_msrs\n");
goto out;
}
r = kvm_mmu_module_init();
if (r)
goto out_free_percpu;
kvm_set_mmio_spte_mask();
kvm_init_msr_list();
kvm_x86_ops = ops;
kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(PT_USER_MASK, PT_ACCESSED_MASK,
PT_DIRTY_MASK, PT64_NX_MASK, 0);
kvm_timer_init();
perf_register_guest_info_callbacks(&kvm_guest_cbs);
if (cpu_has_xsave)
host_xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
kvm_lapic_init();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
pvclock_gtod_register_notifier(&pvclock_gtod_notifier);
#endif
return 0;
out_free_percpu:
free_percpu(shared_msrs);
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,276
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltXPathVariableLookup(void *ctxt, const xmlChar *name,
const xmlChar *ns_uri) {
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt;
xmlXPathObjectPtr valueObj = NULL;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (name == NULL))
return(NULL);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_VARIABLE
XSLT_TRACE(((xsltTransformContextPtr)ctxt),XSLT_TRACE_VARIABLES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Lookup variable '%s'\n", name));
#endif
tctxt = (xsltTransformContextPtr) ctxt;
/*
* Local variables/params ---------------------------------------------
*
* Do the lookup from the top of the stack, but
* don't use params being computed in a call-param
* First lookup expects the variable name and URI to
* come from the disctionnary and hence pointer comparison.
*/
if (tctxt->varsNr != 0) {
int i;
xsltStackElemPtr variable = NULL, cur;
for (i = tctxt->varsNr; i > tctxt->varsBase; i--) {
cur = tctxt->varsTab[i-1];
if ((cur->name == name) && (cur->nameURI == ns_uri)) {
#if 0
stack_addr++;
#endif
variable = cur;
goto local_variable_found;
}
cur = cur->next;
}
/*
* Redo the lookup with interned strings to avoid string comparison.
*
* OPTIMIZE TODO: The problem here is, that if we request a
* global variable, then this will be also executed.
*/
{
const xmlChar *tmpName = name, *tmpNsName = ns_uri;
name = xmlDictLookup(tctxt->dict, name, -1);
if (ns_uri)
ns_uri = xmlDictLookup(tctxt->dict, ns_uri, -1);
if ((tmpName != name) || (tmpNsName != ns_uri)) {
for (i = tctxt->varsNr; i > tctxt->varsBase; i--) {
cur = tctxt->varsTab[i-1];
if ((cur->name == name) && (cur->nameURI == ns_uri)) {
#if 0
stack_cmp++;
#endif
variable = cur;
goto local_variable_found;
}
}
}
}
local_variable_found:
if (variable) {
if (variable->computed == 0) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_VARIABLE
XSLT_TRACE(tctxt,XSLT_TRACE_VARIABLES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"uncomputed variable '%s'\n", name));
#endif
variable->value = xsltEvalVariable(tctxt, variable, NULL);
variable->computed = 1;
}
if (variable->value != NULL) {
valueObj = xmlXPathObjectCopy(variable->value);
}
return(valueObj);
}
}
/*
* Global variables/params --------------------------------------------
*/
if (tctxt->globalVars) {
valueObj = xsltGlobalVariableLookup(tctxt, name, ns_uri);
}
if (valueObj == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_VARIABLE
XSLT_TRACE(tctxt,XSLT_TRACE_VARIABLES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"variable not found '%s'\n", name));
#endif
if (ns_uri) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"Variable '{%s}%s' has not been declared.\n", ns_uri, name);
} else {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"Variable '%s' has not been declared.\n", name);
}
} else {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_VARIABLE
XSLT_TRACE(tctxt,XSLT_TRACE_VARIABLES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"found variable '%s'\n", name));
#endif
}
return(valueObj);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void TrimTrailingSpaces ( TIFF_Manager::TagInfo * info )
{
info->dataLen = (XMP_Uns32) TrimTrailingSpaces ( (char*)info->dataPtr, (size_t)info->dataLen );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 15,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DBusHelperProxy::setHelperResponder(QObject *o)
{
responder = o;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_write_prft_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVMuxContext *mov, int tracks)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb), pts_us, ntp_ts;
MOVTrack *first_track;
/* PRFT should be associated with at most one track. So, choosing only the
* first track. */
if (tracks > 0)
return 0;
first_track = &(mov->tracks[0]);
if (!first_track->entry) {
av_log(mov->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Unable to write PRFT, no entries in the track\n");
return 0;
}
if (first_track->cluster[0].pts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
av_log(mov->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Unable to write PRFT, first PTS is invalid\n");
return 0;
}
if (mov->write_prft == MOV_PRFT_SRC_WALLCLOCK) {
ntp_ts = ff_get_formatted_ntp_time(ff_ntp_time());
} else if (mov->write_prft == MOV_PRFT_SRC_PTS) {
pts_us = av_rescale_q(first_track->cluster[0].pts,
first_track->st->time_base, AV_TIME_BASE_Q);
ntp_ts = ff_get_formatted_ntp_time(pts_us + NTP_OFFSET_US);
} else {
av_log(mov->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Unsupported PRFT box configuration: %d\n",
mov->write_prft);
return 0;
}
avio_wb32(pb, 0); // Size place holder
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "prft"); // Type
avio_w8(pb, 1); // Version
avio_wb24(pb, 0); // Flags
avio_wb32(pb, first_track->track_id); // reference track ID
avio_wb64(pb, ntp_ts); // NTP time stamp
avio_wb64(pb, first_track->cluster[0].pts); //media time
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 79,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: handle_child_line(const char *line, void *data)
{
UNUSED(data);
const char *val;
char buf[1024];
if (str_startswith(line, "Class:"))
{
val = line + sizeof("Class:");
/* Skip whitespace and second Class: occurrence */
val += strspn(val, " \t") + sizeof("Class");
current_device.klass = strtol(val, NULL, 16);
}
else if (str_startswith(line, "Vendor:"))
{
val = line + sizeof("Vendor:");
current_device.vendor = strtol(val, NULL, 16);
}
else if (str_startswith(line, "Device:"))
{
val = line + sizeof("Device:");
/* Sigh, there are *two* lines tagged as Device:. We
are not interested in the domain/bus/slot/func */
if (!strchr(val, ':'))
current_device.device = strtol(val, NULL, 16);
}
else if (str_startswith(line, "SVendor:"))
{
val = line + sizeof("SVendor:");
current_device.subvendor = strtol(val, NULL, 16);
}
else if (str_startswith(line, "SDevice:"))
{
val = line + sizeof("SDevice:");
current_device.subdevice = strtol(val, NULL, 16);
}
else if (str_startswith(line, "Rev:"))
{
val = line + sizeof("Rev:");
current_device.revision = strtol(val, NULL, 16);
}
else if (str_startswith(line, "ProgIf:"))
{
val = line + sizeof("ProgIf:");
current_device.progif = strtol(val, NULL, 16);
}
else if (strspn(line, " \t") == strlen(line))
{
/* Blank line. Send collected information over channel */
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%04x,%04x,%04x,%04x,%04x,%02x,%02x\n",
current_device.klass, current_device.vendor,
current_device.device, current_device.subvendor,
current_device.subdevice, current_device.revision, current_device.progif);
lspci_send(buf);
memset(¤t_device, 0, sizeof(current_device));
}
else
{
logger(Core, Warning, "handle_child_line(), Unrecognized lspci line '%s'", line);
}
return True;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,938
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void AppLayerProtoDetectPrintProbingParsers(AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParser *pp)
{
SCEnter();
AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParserPort *pp_port = NULL;
AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParserElement *pp_pe = NULL;
printf("\nProtocol Detection Configuration\n");
for ( ; pp != NULL; pp = pp->next) {
/* print ip protocol */
if (pp->ipproto == IPPROTO_TCP)
printf("IPProto: TCP\n");
else if (pp->ipproto == IPPROTO_UDP)
printf("IPProto: UDP\n");
else
printf("IPProto: %"PRIu8"\n", pp->ipproto);
pp_port = pp->port;
for ( ; pp_port != NULL; pp_port = pp_port->next) {
if (pp_port->dp != NULL) {
printf(" Port: %"PRIu16 "\n", pp_port->port);
printf(" Destination port: (max-depth: %"PRIu16 ", "
"mask - %"PRIu32")\n",
pp_port->dp_max_depth,
pp_port->alproto_mask);
pp_pe = pp_port->dp;
for ( ; pp_pe != NULL; pp_pe = pp_pe->next) {
if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_HTTP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_HTTP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_FTP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_FTP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_FTPDATA)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_FTPDATA\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_SMTP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_SMTP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_TLS)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_TLS\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_SSH)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_SSH\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_IMAP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_IMAP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_MSN)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_MSN\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_JABBER)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_JABBER\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_SMB)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_SMB\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_SMB2)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_SMB2\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_DCERPC)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_DCERPC\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_IRC)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_IRC\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_DNS)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_DNS\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_MODBUS)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_MODBUS\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_ENIP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_ENIP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_NFS)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_NFS\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_NTP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_NTP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_TFTP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_TFTP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_IKEV2)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_IKEV2\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_KRB5)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_KRB5\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_DHCP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_DHCP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_TEMPLATE_RUST)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_TEMPLATE_RUST\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_TEMPLATE)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_TEMPLATE\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_DNP3)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_DNP3\n");
else
printf("impossible\n");
printf(" port: %"PRIu16 "\n", pp_pe->port);
printf(" mask: %"PRIu32 "\n", pp_pe->alproto_mask);
printf(" min_depth: %"PRIu32 "\n", pp_pe->min_depth);
printf(" max_depth: %"PRIu32 "\n", pp_pe->max_depth);
printf("\n");
}
}
if (pp_port->sp == NULL) {
continue;
}
printf(" Source port: (max-depth: %"PRIu16 ", "
"mask - %"PRIu32")\n",
pp_port->sp_max_depth,
pp_port->alproto_mask);
pp_pe = pp_port->sp;
for ( ; pp_pe != NULL; pp_pe = pp_pe->next) {
if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_HTTP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_HTTP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_FTP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_FTP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_FTPDATA)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_FTPDATA\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_SMTP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_SMTP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_TLS)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_TLS\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_SSH)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_SSH\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_IMAP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_IMAP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_MSN)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_MSN\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_JABBER)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_JABBER\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_SMB)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_SMB\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_SMB2)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_SMB2\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_DCERPC)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_DCERPC\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_IRC)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_IRC\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_DNS)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_DNS\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_MODBUS)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_MODBUS\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_ENIP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_ENIP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_NFS)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_NFS\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_NTP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_NTP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_TFTP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_TFTP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_IKEV2)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_IKEV2\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_KRB5)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_KRB5\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_DHCP)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_DHCP\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_TEMPLATE_RUST)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_TEMPLATE_RUST\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_TEMPLATE)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_TEMPLATE\n");
else if (pp_pe->alproto == ALPROTO_DNP3)
printf(" alproto: ALPROTO_DNP3\n");
else
printf("impossible\n");
printf(" port: %"PRIu16 "\n", pp_pe->port);
printf(" mask: %"PRIu32 "\n", pp_pe->alproto_mask);
printf(" min_depth: %"PRIu32 "\n", pp_pe->min_depth);
printf(" max_depth: %"PRIu32 "\n", pp_pe->max_depth);
printf("\n");
}
}
}
SCReturn;
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 96,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sg_emulated_host(struct request_queue *q, int __user *p)
{
return put_user(1, p);
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 94,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool vmacache_valid(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct task_struct *curr;
if (!vmacache_valid_mm(mm))
return false;
curr = current;
if (mm->vmacache_seqnum != curr->vmacache.seqnum) {
/*
* First attempt will always be invalid, initialize
* the new cache for this task here.
*/
curr->vmacache.seqnum = mm->vmacache_seqnum;
vmacache_flush(curr);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: mm: get rid of vmacache_flush_all() entirely
Jann Horn points out that the vmacache_flush_all() function is not only
potentially expensive, it's buggy too. It also happens to be entirely
unnecessary, because the sequence number overflow case can be avoided by
simply making the sequence number be 64-bit. That doesn't even grow the
data structures in question, because the other adjacent fields are
already 64-bit.
So simplify the whole thing by just making the sequence number overflow
case go away entirely, which gets rid of all the complications and makes
the code faster too. Win-win.
[ Oleg Nesterov points out that the VMACACHE_FULL_FLUSHES statistics
also just goes away entirely with this ]
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 77,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OggSource::start(MetaData * /* params */) {
if (mStarted) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
mStarted = true;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix memory leak in OggExtractor
Test: added a temporal log and run poc
Bug: 63581671
Change-Id: I436a08e54d5e831f9fbdb33c26d15397ce1fbeba
(cherry picked from commit 63079e7c8e12cda4eb124fbe565213d30b9ea34c)
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 162,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ~UserCloudPolicyManagerFactoryChromeOS() {}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 110,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OmniboxViewWin::ExecuteCommand(int command_id) {
ScopedFreeze freeze(this, GetTextObjectModel());
if (command_id == IDS_PASTE_AND_GO) {
model_->PasteAndGo();
return;
}
OnBeforePossibleChange();
switch (command_id) {
case IDS_UNDO:
Undo();
break;
case IDC_CUT:
Cut();
break;
case IDC_COPY:
Copy();
break;
case IDC_PASTE:
Paste();
break;
case IDS_SELECT_ALL:
SelectAll(false);
break;
case IDS_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES:
command_updater_->ExecuteCommand(IDC_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
OnAfterPossibleChange();
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::OnWindowActivated() {
WebContents* contents = chrome::GetActiveWebContents(this);
if (contents && ShouldReloadCrashedTab(contents))
chrome::Reload(this, CURRENT_TAB);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int skcipher_encrypt_ablkcipher(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_skcipher_tfm(skcipher);
struct ablkcipher_alg *alg = &tfm->__crt_alg->cra_ablkcipher;
return skcipher_crypt_ablkcipher(req, alg->encrypt);
}
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PlainTextRange InputMethodController::CreateSelectionRangeForSetComposition(
int selection_start,
int selection_end,
size_t text_length) const {
const int selection_offsets_start =
static_cast<int>(GetSelectionOffsets().Start());
const int start = selection_offsets_start + selection_start;
const int end = selection_offsets_start + selection_end;
return CreateRangeForSelection(start, end, text_length);
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool venc_dev::venc_enable_initial_qp(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_INITIALQP* initqp)
{
int rc;
struct v4l2_control control;
struct v4l2_ext_control ctrl[4];
struct v4l2_ext_controls controls;
ctrl[0].id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_I_FRAME_QP;
ctrl[0].value = initqp->nQpI;
ctrl[1].id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_P_FRAME_QP;
ctrl[1].value = initqp->nQpP;
ctrl[2].id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_B_FRAME_QP;
ctrl[2].value = initqp->nQpB;
ctrl[3].id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_ENABLE_INITIAL_QP;
ctrl[3].value = initqp->bEnableInitQp;
controls.count = 4;
controls.ctrl_class = V4L2_CTRL_CLASS_MPEG;
controls.controls = ctrl;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Calling IOCTL set control for id=%x val=%d, id=%x val=%d, id=%x val=%d, id=%x val=%d",
controls.controls[0].id, controls.controls[0].value,
controls.controls[1].id, controls.controls[1].value,
controls.controls[2].id, controls.controls[2].value,
controls.controls[3].id, controls.controls[3].value);
rc = ioctl(m_nDriver_fd, VIDIOC_S_EXT_CTRLS, &controls);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set session_qp %d", rc);
return false;
}
init_qp.iframeqp = initqp->nQpI;
init_qp.pframeqp = initqp->nQpP;
init_qp.bframeqp = initqp->nQpB;
init_qp.enableinitqp = initqp->bEnableInitQp;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Success IOCTL set control for id=%x val=%d, id=%x val=%d, id=%x val=%d, id=%x val=%d",
controls.controls[0].id, controls.controls[0].value,
controls.controls[1].id, controls.controls[1].value,
controls.controls[2].id, controls.controls[2].value,
controls.controls[3].id, controls.controls[3].value);
return true;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FillDriveEntryPropertiesValue(const drive::ResourceEntry& entry_proto,
bool shared_with_me,
DriveEntryProperties* properties) {
properties->shared_with_me.reset(new bool(shared_with_me));
properties->shared.reset(new bool(entry_proto.shared()));
const drive::PlatformFileInfoProto& file_info = entry_proto.file_info();
properties->file_size.reset(new double(file_info.size()));
properties->last_modified_time.reset(new double(
base::Time::FromInternalValue(file_info.last_modified()).ToJsTime()));
if (!entry_proto.has_file_specific_info())
return;
const drive::FileSpecificInfo& file_specific_info =
entry_proto.file_specific_info();
if (!entry_proto.resource_id().empty()) {
properties->thumbnail_url.reset(
new std::string("https://www.googledrive.com/thumb/" +
entry_proto.resource_id() + "?width=500&height=500"));
}
if (file_specific_info.has_image_width()) {
properties->image_width.reset(
new int(file_specific_info.image_width()));
}
if (file_specific_info.has_image_height()) {
properties->image_height.reset(
new int(file_specific_info.image_height()));
}
if (file_specific_info.has_image_rotation()) {
properties->image_rotation.reset(
new int(file_specific_info.image_rotation()));
}
properties->is_hosted.reset(
new bool(file_specific_info.is_hosted_document()));
properties->content_mime_type.reset(
new std::string(file_specific_info.content_mime_type()));
properties->is_pinned.reset(
new bool(file_specific_info.cache_state().is_pinned()));
properties->is_present.reset(
new bool(file_specific_info.cache_state().is_present()));
}
Commit Message: Reland r286968: The CL borrows ShareDialog from Files.app and add it to Gallery.
Previous Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/431293002
BUG=374667
TEST=manually
R=yoshiki@chromium.org, mtomasz@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/433733004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286975 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
{
struct task_struct *me = current;
unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)];
long error;
error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
if (error != -ENOSYS)
return error;
error = 0;
switch (option) {
case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG:
if (!valid_signal(arg2)) {
error = -EINVAL;
break;
}
me->pdeath_signal = arg2;
break;
case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG:
error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2);
break;
case PR_GET_DUMPABLE:
error = get_dumpable(me->mm);
break;
case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
if (arg2 < 0 || arg2 > 1) {
error = -EINVAL;
break;
}
set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2);
break;
case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
break;
case PR_GET_UNALIGN:
error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
break;
case PR_SET_FPEMU:
error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
break;
case PR_GET_FPEMU:
error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
break;
case PR_SET_FPEXC:
error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
break;
case PR_GET_FPEXC:
error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
break;
case PR_GET_TIMING:
error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL;
break;
case PR_SET_TIMING:
if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL)
error = -EINVAL;
break;
case PR_SET_NAME:
comm[sizeof(me->comm)-1] = 0;
if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2,
sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0)
return -EFAULT;
set_task_comm(me, comm);
proc_comm_connector(me);
break;
case PR_GET_NAME:
get_task_comm(comm, me);
if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm,
sizeof(comm)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
case PR_GET_ENDIAN:
error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
break;
case PR_SET_ENDIAN:
error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
break;
case PR_GET_SECCOMP:
error = prctl_get_seccomp();
break;
case PR_SET_SECCOMP:
error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3);
break;
case PR_GET_TSC:
error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
break;
case PR_SET_TSC:
error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
break;
case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE:
error = perf_event_task_disable();
break;
case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE:
error = perf_event_task_enable();
break;
case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK:
error = current->timer_slack_ns;
break;
case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK:
if (arg2 <= 0)
current->timer_slack_ns =
current->default_timer_slack_ns;
else
current->timer_slack_ns = arg2;
break;
case PR_MCE_KILL:
if (arg4 | arg5)
return -EINVAL;
switch (arg2) {
case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR:
if (arg3 != 0)
return -EINVAL;
current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS;
break;
case PR_MCE_KILL_SET:
current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS;
if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY)
current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY;
else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE)
current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY;
else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT)
current->flags &=
~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS);
else
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
break;
case PR_MCE_KILL_GET:
if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5)
return -EINVAL;
if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS)
error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ?
PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE;
else
error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT;
break;
case PR_SET_MM:
error = prctl_set_mm(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
break;
case PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS:
error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, (int __user **)arg2);
break;
case PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER:
me->signal->is_child_subreaper = !!arg2;
break;
case PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER:
error = put_user(me->signal->is_child_subreaper,
(int __user *) arg2);
break;
case PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS:
if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
return -EINVAL;
current->no_new_privs = 1;
break;
case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS:
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
return -EINVAL;
return current->no_new_privs ? 1 : 0;
default:
error = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-16
| 0
| 21,539
|
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