instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteUnselect(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.Selection().Clear();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetTemporaryZoomLevel(double level,
bool temporary_zoom_enabled) {
SendPageMessage(new PageMsg_SetZoomLevel(
MSG_ROUTING_NONE,
temporary_zoom_enabled ? PageMsg_SetZoomLevel_Command::SET_TEMPORARY
: PageMsg_SetZoomLevel_Command::CLEAR_TEMPORARY,
level));
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_END_MODULE_GLOBALS(exif)
ZEND_DECLARE_MODULE_GLOBALS(exif)
#ifdef ZTS
#define EXIF_G(v) TSRMG(exif_globals_id, zend_exif_globals *, v)
#else
#define EXIF_G(v) (exif_globals.v)
#endif
/* {{{ PHP_INI
*/
ZEND_INI_MH(OnUpdateEncode)
{
if (new_value && new_value_length) {
const zend_encoding **return_list;
size_t return_size;
if (FAILURE == zend_multibyte_parse_encoding_list(new_value, new_value_length,
&return_list, &return_size, 0 TSRMLS_CC)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Illegal encoding ignored: '%s'", new_value);
return FAILURE;
}
efree(return_list);
}
return OnUpdateString(entry, new_value, new_value_length, mh_arg1, mh_arg2, mh_arg3, stage TSRMLS_CC);
}
ZEND_INI_MH(OnUpdateDecode)
{
if (new_value) {
const zend_encoding **return_list;
size_t return_size;
if (FAILURE == zend_multibyte_parse_encoding_list(new_value, new_value_length,
&return_list, &return_size, 0 TSRMLS_CC)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Illegal encoding ignored: '%s'", new_value);
return FAILURE;
}
efree(return_list);
}
return OnUpdateString(entry, new_value, new_value_length, mh_arg1, mh_arg2, mh_arg3, stage TSRMLS_CC);
}
PHP_INI_BEGIN()
STD_PHP_INI_ENTRY("exif.encode_unicode", "ISO-8859-15", PHP_INI_ALL, OnUpdateEncode, encode_unicode, zend_exif_globals, exif_globals)
STD_PHP_INI_ENTRY("exif.decode_unicode_motorola", "UCS-2BE", PHP_INI_ALL, OnUpdateDecode, decode_unicode_be, zend_exif_globals, exif_globals)
STD_PHP_INI_ENTRY("exif.decode_unicode_intel", "UCS-2LE", PHP_INI_ALL, OnUpdateDecode, decode_unicode_le, zend_exif_globals, exif_globals)
STD_PHP_INI_ENTRY("exif.encode_jis", "", PHP_INI_ALL, OnUpdateEncode, encode_jis, zend_exif_globals, exif_globals)
STD_PHP_INI_ENTRY("exif.decode_jis_motorola", "JIS", PHP_INI_ALL, OnUpdateDecode, decode_jis_be, zend_exif_globals, exif_globals)
STD_PHP_INI_ENTRY("exif.decode_jis_intel", "JIS", PHP_INI_ALL, OnUpdateDecode, decode_jis_le, zend_exif_globals, exif_globals)
PHP_INI_END()
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fixed bug #72627: Memory Leakage In exif_process_IFD_in_TIFF
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 50,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _fb_wrunlock(void)
{
slurm_mutex_lock(&file_bcast_mutex);
fb_write_lock--;
pthread_cond_broadcast(&file_bcast_cond);
slurm_mutex_unlock(&file_bcast_mutex);
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SplitString(const std::wstring& str,
wchar_t c,
std::vector<std::wstring>* r) {
SplitStringT(str, c, true, r);
}
Commit Message: wstring: remove wstring version of SplitString
Retry of r84336.
BUG=23581
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6930047
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@84355 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,555 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::AllowBaseURI(
const KURL& url,
RedirectStatus redirect_status,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reporting_policy) const {
if (ShouldBypassContentSecurityPolicy(url, execution_context_))
return true;
bool is_allowed = true;
for (const auto& policy : policies_) {
if (!CheckHeaderTypeMatches(CheckHeaderType::kCheckAll,
policy->HeaderType()))
continue;
is_allowed &= policy->AllowBaseURI(url, redirect_status, reporting_policy);
}
return is_allowed;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HTC_SEND_FULL_ACTION ar6000_tx_queue_full(void *Context, struct htc_packet *pPacket)
{
struct ar6_softc *ar = (struct ar6_softc *)Context;
HTC_SEND_FULL_ACTION action = HTC_SEND_FULL_KEEP;
bool stopNet = false;
HTC_ENDPOINT_ID Endpoint = HTC_GET_ENDPOINT_FROM_PKT(pPacket);
do {
if (bypasswmi) {
int accessClass;
if (HTC_GET_TAG_FROM_PKT(pPacket) == AR6K_CONTROL_PKT_TAG) {
/* don't drop special control packets */
break;
}
accessClass = arEndpoint2Ac(ar,Endpoint);
/* for endpoint ping testing drop Best Effort and Background */
if ((accessClass == WMM_AC_BE) || (accessClass == WMM_AC_BK)) {
action = HTC_SEND_FULL_DROP;
stopNet = false;
} else {
/* keep but stop the netqueues */
stopNet = true;
}
break;
}
if (Endpoint == ar->arControlEp) {
/* under normal WMI if this is getting full, then something is running rampant
* the host should not be exhausting the WMI queue with too many commands
* the only exception to this is during testing using endpointping */
AR6000_SPIN_LOCK(&ar->arLock, 0);
/* set flag to handle subsequent messages */
ar->arWMIControlEpFull = true;
AR6000_SPIN_UNLOCK(&ar->arLock, 0);
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,("WMI Control Endpoint is FULL!!! \n"));
/* no need to stop the network */
stopNet = false;
break;
}
/* if we get here, we are dealing with data endpoints getting full */
if (HTC_GET_TAG_FROM_PKT(pPacket) == AR6K_CONTROL_PKT_TAG) {
/* don't drop control packets issued on ANY data endpoint */
break;
}
if (ar->arNetworkType == ADHOC_NETWORK) {
/* in adhoc mode, we cannot differentiate traffic priorities so there is no need to
* continue, however we should stop the network */
stopNet = true;
break;
}
/* the last MAX_HI_COOKIE_NUM "batch" of cookies are reserved for the highest
* active stream */
if (ar->arAcStreamPriMap[arEndpoint2Ac(ar,Endpoint)] < ar->arHiAcStreamActivePri &&
ar->arCookieCount <= MAX_HI_COOKIE_NUM) {
/* this stream's priority is less than the highest active priority, we
* give preference to the highest priority stream by directing
* HTC to drop the packet that overflowed */
action = HTC_SEND_FULL_DROP;
/* since we are dropping packets, no need to stop the network */
stopNet = false;
break;
}
} while (false);
if (stopNet) {
AR6000_SPIN_LOCK(&ar->arLock, 0);
ar->arNetQueueStopped = true;
AR6000_SPIN_UNLOCK(&ar->arLock, 0);
/* one of the data endpoints queues is getting full..need to stop network stack
* the queue will resume in ar6000_tx_complete() */
netif_stop_queue(ar->arNetDev);
}
return action;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long power_of(int cpu)
{
return cpu_rq(cpu)->cpu_power;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HasReverseStream(uint32_t procId)
{
if (procId == PREPROC_AEC) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *gfi_unpack_entry(
struct object_entry *oe,
unsigned long *sizep)
{
enum object_type type;
struct packed_git *p = all_packs[oe->pack_id];
if (p == pack_data && p->pack_size < (pack_size + 20)) {
/* The object is stored in the packfile we are writing to
* and we have modified it since the last time we scanned
* back to read a previously written object. If an old
* window covered [p->pack_size, p->pack_size + 20) its
* data is stale and is not valid. Closing all windows
* and updating the packfile length ensures we can read
* the newly written data.
*/
close_pack_windows(p);
sha1flush(pack_file);
/* We have to offer 20 bytes additional on the end of
* the packfile as the core unpacker code assumes the
* footer is present at the file end and must promise
* at least 20 bytes within any window it maps. But
* we don't actually create the footer here.
*/
p->pack_size = pack_size + 20;
}
return unpack_entry(p, oe->idx.offset, &type, sizep);
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page(struct page *hpage)
{
struct hstate *h = page_hstate(hpage);
int nid = page_to_nid(hpage);
int ret = -EBUSY;
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (is_hugepage_on_freelist(hpage)) {
list_del(&hpage->lru);
set_page_refcounted(hpage);
h->free_huge_pages--;
h->free_huge_pages_node[nid]--;
ret = 0;
}
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dscr_set(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
return user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.dscr, 0, sizeof(u64));
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UngrabServer(ClientPtr client)
{
int i;
grabState = GrabNone;
ListenToAllClients();
mark_client_ungrab();
for (i = mskcnt; --i >= 0 && !grabWaiters[i];);
if (i >= 0) {
i <<= 5;
while (!GETBIT(grabWaiters, i))
i++;
BITCLEAR(grabWaiters, i);
AttendClient(clients[i]);
}
if (ServerGrabCallback) {
ServerGrabInfoRec grabinfo;
grabinfo.client = client;
grabinfo.grabstate = SERVER_UNGRABBED;
CallCallbacks(&ServerGrabCallback, (void *) &grabinfo);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHPAPI char *php_escape_shell_arg(char *str)
{
int x, y = 0, l = strlen(str);
char *cmd;
size_t estimate = (4 * l) + 3;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
cmd = safe_emalloc(4, l, 3); /* worst case */
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
cmd[y++] = '"';
#else
cmd[y++] = '\'';
#endif
for (x = 0; x < l; x++) {
int mb_len = php_mblen(str + x, (l - x));
/* skip non-valid multibyte characters */
if (mb_len < 0) {
continue;
} else if (mb_len > 1) {
memcpy(cmd + y, str + x, mb_len);
y += mb_len;
x += mb_len - 1;
continue;
}
switch (str[x]) {
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
case '"':
case '%':
cmd[y++] = ' ';
break;
#else
case '\'':
cmd[y++] = '\'';
cmd[y++] = '\\';
cmd[y++] = '\'';
#endif
/* fall-through */
default:
cmd[y++] = str[x];
}
}
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
cmd[y++] = '"';
#else
cmd[y++] = '\'';
return cmd;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 1 | 165,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GetExecutableVersionDetails(const std::wstring& exe_path,
std::wstring* product_name,
std::wstring* version,
std::wstring* special_build,
std::wstring* channel_name) {
assert(product_name);
assert(version);
assert(special_build);
assert(channel_name);
*product_name = L"Chrome";
*version = L"0.0.0.0-devel";
special_build->clear();
DWORD dummy = 0;
DWORD length = ::GetFileVersionInfoSize(exe_path.c_str(), &dummy);
if (length) {
std::unique_ptr<char[]> data(new char[length]);
if (::GetFileVersionInfo(exe_path.c_str(), dummy, length, data.get())) {
GetValueFromVersionResource(data.get(), L"ProductVersion", version);
std::wstring official_build;
GetValueFromVersionResource(data.get(), L"Official Build",
&official_build);
if (official_build != L"1")
version->append(L"-devel");
GetValueFromVersionResource(data.get(), L"ProductShortName",
product_name);
GetValueFromVersionResource(data.get(), L"SpecialBuild", special_build);
}
}
*channel_name = GetChromeChannelName();
}
Commit Message: Ignore switches following "--" when parsing a command line.
BUG=933004
R=wfh@chromium.org
Change-Id: I911be4cbfc38a4d41dec85d85f7fe0f50ddca392
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481210
Auto-Submit: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634604}
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 152,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPagePrivate::assignFocus(Platform::FocusDirection direction)
{
ASSERT((int) Platform::FocusDirectionNone == (int) FocusDirectionNone);
ASSERT((int) Platform::FocusDirectionForward == (int) FocusDirectionForward);
ASSERT((int) Platform::FocusDirectionBackward == (int) FocusDirectionBackward);
clearFocusNode();
switch (direction) {
case FocusDirectionForward:
case FocusDirectionBackward:
m_page->focusController()->setInitialFocus((FocusDirection) direction, 0);
break;
case FocusDirectionNone:
break;
default:
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __init static int clear_boot_tracer(void)
{
/*
* The default tracer at boot buffer is an init section.
* This function is called in lateinit. If we did not
* find the boot tracer, then clear it out, to prevent
* later registration from accessing the buffer that is
* about to be freed.
*/
if (!default_bootup_tracer)
return 0;
printk(KERN_INFO "ftrace bootup tracer '%s' not registered.\n",
default_bootup_tracer);
default_bootup_tracer = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fionbio(struct file *file, int __user *p)
{
int nonblock;
if (get_user(nonblock, p))
return -EFAULT;
spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
if (nonblock)
file->f_flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
else
file->f_flags &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline const char* hiermode_string(int val)
{
switch(val)
{
case HIER_NONE:
return "No Hier";
case HIER_P:
return "Hier-P";
case HIER_B:
return "Hier-B";
case HIER_P_HYBRID:
return "Hybrid Hier-P";
default:
return "No hier";
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void credssp_buffer_free(rdpCredssp* credssp)
{
sspi_SecBufferFree(&credssp->negoToken);
sspi_SecBufferFree(&credssp->pubKeyAuth);
sspi_SecBufferFree(&credssp->authInfo);
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 58,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Element::clientHeight()
{
document()->updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
bool inQuirksMode = document()->inQuirksMode();
if ((!inQuirksMode && document()->documentElement() == this) ||
(inQuirksMode && isHTMLElement() && document()->body() == this)) {
if (FrameView* view = document()->view()) {
if (RenderView* renderView = document()->renderView())
return adjustForAbsoluteZoom(view->layoutHeight(), renderView);
}
}
if (RenderBox* renderer = renderBox())
return adjustLayoutUnitForAbsoluteZoom(renderer->pixelSnappedClientHeight(), renderer).round();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool rt_is_expired(const struct rtable *rth)
{
return rth->rt_genid != rt_genid_ipv4(dev_net(rth->dst.dev));
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassScriptInstance ScriptController::createScriptInstanceForWidget(Widget* widget)
{
ASSERT(widget);
if (!widget->isPluginView())
return 0;
NPObject* npObject = toPluginView(widget)->scriptableObject();
if (!npObject)
return 0;
v8::Local<v8::Object> wrapper = createV8ObjectForNPObject(npObject, 0);
m_pluginObjects.set(widget, npObject);
return V8ScriptInstance::create(wrapper);
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void PerWorldBindingsRuntimeEnabledVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->perWorldBindingsRuntimeEnabledVoidMethod();
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagecrop)
{
zval *IM;
gdImagePtr im;
gdImagePtr im_crop;
gdRect rect;
zval *z_rect;
zval **tmp;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ra", &IM, &z_rect) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(z_rect), "x", sizeof("x"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
rect.x = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing x position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(z_rect), "y", sizeof("x"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
rect.y = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing y position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(z_rect), "width", sizeof("width"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
rect.width = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing width");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(z_rect), "height", sizeof("height"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
rect.height = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing height");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
im_crop = gdImageCrop(im, &rect);
if (im_crop == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, im_crop, le_gd);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #66356 (Heap Overflow Vulnerability in imagecrop())
And also fixed the bug: arguments are altered after some calls
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 166,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs_writepage_locked(struct page *page, struct writeback_control *wbc)
{
struct nfs_pageio_descriptor pgio;
int err;
NFS_PROTO(page_file_mapping(page)->host)->write_pageio_init(&pgio,
page->mapping->host,
wb_priority(wbc),
&nfs_async_write_completion_ops);
err = nfs_do_writepage(page, wbc, &pgio);
nfs_pageio_complete(&pgio);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (pgio.pg_error < 0)
return pgio.pg_error;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_xdr_enc_setclientid_confirm(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p, struct nfs_client *clp)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.nops = 3,
};
const u32 lease_bitmap[2] = { FATTR4_WORD0_LEASE_TIME, 0 };
int status;
xdr_init_encode(&xdr, &req->rq_snd_buf, p);
encode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
status = encode_setclientid_confirm(&xdr, clp);
if (!status)
status = encode_putrootfh(&xdr);
if (!status)
status = encode_fsinfo(&xdr, lease_bitmap);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::ProcessDescheduleUntilFinished() {
if (deschedule_until_finished_fences_.size() < 2)
return;
DCHECK_EQ(2u, deschedule_until_finished_fences_.size());
if (!deschedule_until_finished_fences_[0]->HasCompleted())
return;
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("cc", "GLES2DecoderImpl::DescheduleUntilFinished",
this);
deschedule_until_finished_fences_.erase(
deschedule_until_finished_fences_.begin());
client()->OnRescheduleAfterFinished();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayerTreeHostTestTreeActivationCallback()
: num_commits_(0), callback_count_(0) {}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ide_cmd_write(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val)
{
IDEBus *bus = opaque;
IDEState *s;
int i;
#ifdef DEBUG_IDE
printf("ide: write control addr=0x%x val=%02x\n", addr, val);
#endif
/* common for both drives */
if (!(bus->cmd & IDE_CMD_RESET) &&
(val & IDE_CMD_RESET)) {
/* reset low to high */
for(i = 0;i < 2; i++) {
s = &bus->ifs[i];
s->status = BUSY_STAT | SEEK_STAT;
s->error = 0x01;
}
} else if ((bus->cmd & IDE_CMD_RESET) &&
!(val & IDE_CMD_RESET)) {
/* high to low */
for(i = 0;i < 2; i++) {
s = &bus->ifs[i];
if (s->drive_kind == IDE_CD)
s->status = 0x00; /* NOTE: READY is _not_ set */
else
s->status = READY_STAT | SEEK_STAT;
ide_set_signature(s);
}
}
bus->cmd = val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ProfileSyncService::AddObserver(Observer* observer) {
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 access,
struct x86_exception *exception)
{
void *data = val;
int r = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
while (bytes) {
gpa_t gpa = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, addr, access,
exception);
unsigned offset = addr & (PAGE_SIZE-1);
unsigned toread = min(bytes, (unsigned)PAGE_SIZE - offset);
int ret;
if (gpa == UNMAPPED_GVA)
return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
ret = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page(vcpu, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, data,
offset, toread);
if (ret < 0) {
r = X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
goto out;
}
bytes -= toread;
data += toread;
addr += toread;
}
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ovl_link(struct dentry *old, struct inode *newdir,
struct dentry *new)
{
int err;
struct dentry *upper;
err = ovl_want_write(old);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ovl_copy_up(old);
if (err)
goto out_drop_write;
upper = ovl_dentry_upper(old);
err = ovl_create_or_link(new, upper->d_inode->i_mode, 0, NULL, upper);
out_drop_write:
ovl_drop_write(old);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: ovl: verify upper dentry before unlink and rename
Unlink and rename in overlayfs checked the upper dentry for staleness by
verifying upper->d_parent against upperdir. However the dentry can go
stale also by being unhashed, for example.
Expand the verification to actually look up the name again (under parent
lock) and check if it matches the upper dentry. This matches what the VFS
does before passing the dentry to filesytem's unlink/rename methods, which
excludes any inconsistency caused by overlayfs.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 51,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool testEscapingHelper(const wchar_t * in, const wchar_t * expectedOut,
bool spaceToPlus = false, bool normalizeBreaks = false) {
wchar_t * const buffer = new wchar_t[(normalizeBreaks ? 6 : 3)
* wcslen(in) + 1];
if (uriEscapeW(in, buffer, spaceToPlus, normalizeBreaks)
!= buffer + wcslen(expectedOut)) {
delete [] buffer;
return false;
}
const bool equal = !wcscmp(buffer, expectedOut);
delete [] buffer;
return equal;
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 75,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct page *follow_pmd_mask(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pud_t *pudp,
unsigned int flags,
struct follow_page_context *ctx)
{
pmd_t *pmd, pmdval;
spinlock_t *ptl;
struct page *page;
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
pmd = pmd_offset(pudp, address);
/*
* The READ_ONCE() will stabilize the pmdval in a register or
* on the stack so that it will stop changing under the code.
*/
pmdval = READ_ONCE(*pmd);
if (pmd_none(pmdval))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
if (pmd_huge(pmdval) && vma->vm_flags & VM_HUGETLB) {
page = follow_huge_pmd(mm, address, pmd, flags);
if (page)
return page;
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
if (is_hugepd(__hugepd(pmd_val(pmdval)))) {
page = follow_huge_pd(vma, address,
__hugepd(pmd_val(pmdval)), flags,
PMD_SHIFT);
if (page)
return page;
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
retry:
if (!pmd_present(pmdval)) {
if (likely(!(flags & FOLL_MIGRATION)))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
VM_BUG_ON(thp_migration_supported() &&
!is_pmd_migration_entry(pmdval));
if (is_pmd_migration_entry(pmdval))
pmd_migration_entry_wait(mm, pmd);
pmdval = READ_ONCE(*pmd);
/*
* MADV_DONTNEED may convert the pmd to null because
* mmap_sem is held in read mode
*/
if (pmd_none(pmdval))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
goto retry;
}
if (pmd_devmap(pmdval)) {
ptl = pmd_lock(mm, pmd);
page = follow_devmap_pmd(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (page)
return page;
}
if (likely(!pmd_trans_huge(pmdval)))
return follow_page_pte(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pmd_protnone(pmdval))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
retry_locked:
ptl = pmd_lock(mm, pmd);
if (unlikely(pmd_none(*pmd))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
if (unlikely(!pmd_present(*pmd))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (likely(!(flags & FOLL_MIGRATION)))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
pmd_migration_entry_wait(mm, pmd);
goto retry_locked;
}
if (unlikely(!pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
return follow_page_pte(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
}
if (flags & FOLL_SPLIT) {
int ret;
page = pmd_page(*pmd);
if (is_huge_zero_page(page)) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
ret = 0;
split_huge_pmd(vma, pmd, address);
if (pmd_trans_unstable(pmd))
ret = -EBUSY;
} else {
get_page(page);
spin_unlock(ptl);
lock_page(page);
ret = split_huge_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
if (pmd_none(*pmd))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) :
follow_page_pte(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
}
page = follow_trans_huge_pmd(vma, address, pmd, flags);
spin_unlock(ptl);
ctx->page_mask = HPAGE_PMD_NR - 1;
return page;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 170,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::RenderViewCreated(
content::RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
ReloadIfTerminated(render_view_host);
ExtensionWebContentsObserver::RenderViewCreated(render_view_host);
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 171,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_imagepolygon(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int filled)
{
zval *IM, *POINTS;
long NPOINTS, COL;
zval **var = NULL;
gdImagePtr im;
gdPointPtr points;
int npoints, col, nelem, i;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rall", &IM, &POINTS, &NPOINTS, &COL) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
npoints = NPOINTS;
col = COL;
nelem = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(POINTS));
if (nelem < 6) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must have at least 3 points in your array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (npoints <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must give a positive number of points");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (nelem < npoints * 2) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Trying to use %d points in array with only %d points", npoints, nelem/2);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
points = (gdPointPtr) safe_emalloc(npoints, sizeof(gdPoint), 0);
for (i = 0; i < npoints; i++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(POINTS), (i * 2), (void **) &var) == SUCCESS) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL((var));
convert_to_long(*var);
points[i].x = Z_LVAL_PP(var);
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(POINTS), (i * 2) + 1, (void **) &var) == SUCCESS) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL(var);
convert_to_long(*var);
points[i].y = Z_LVAL_PP(var);
}
}
if (filled) {
gdImageFilledPolygon(im, points, npoints, col);
} else {
gdImagePolygon(im, points, npoints, col);
}
efree(points);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #66356 (Heap Overflow Vulnerability in imagecrop())
And also fixed the bug: arguments are altered after some calls
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 166,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *, lsa, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int hlimit = -1;
int tclass = -1;
int dontfrag = -1;
int transhdrlen = 4; /* zero session-id */
int ulen = len + transhdrlen;
int err;
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX)
return -EMSGSIZE;
/* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (lsa) {
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (lsa->l2tp_family && lsa->l2tp_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
daddr = &lsa->l2tp_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = lsa->l2tp_flowinfo & IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
lsa->l2tp_scope_id &&
ipv6_addr_type(daddr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
fl6.flowi6_oif = lsa->l2tp_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
}
if (fl6.flowi6_oif == 0)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions);
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, opt,
&hlimit, &tclass, &dontfrag);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
}
if (opt == NULL)
opt = np->opt;
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr))
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
goto out;
}
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_sk_dst_hoplimit(np, &fl6, dst);
if (tclass < 0)
tclass = np->tclass;
if (dontfrag < 0)
dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
lock_sock(sk);
err = ip6_append_data(sk, ip_generic_getfrag, msg,
ulen, transhdrlen, hlimit, tclass, opt,
&fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
if (err)
ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
err = l2tp_ip6_push_pending_frames(sk);
release_sock(sk);
done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto done;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 167,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void smb1cli_req_writev_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
{
struct tevent_req *req =
tevent_req_callback_data(subreq,
struct tevent_req);
struct smbXcli_req_state *state =
tevent_req_data(req,
struct smbXcli_req_state);
ssize_t nwritten;
int err;
state->write_req = NULL;
nwritten = writev_recv(subreq, &err);
TALLOC_FREE(subreq);
if (nwritten == -1) {
/* here, we need to notify all pending requests */
NTSTATUS status = map_nt_error_from_unix_common(err);
smbXcli_conn_disconnect(state->conn, status);
return;
}
if (state->one_way) {
state->inbuf = NULL;
tevent_req_done(req);
return;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~InputMethodStatusConnection() {
}
bool IBusConnectionsAreAlive() {
return ibus_ && ibus_bus_is_connected(ibus_) && ibus_config_;
}
void MaybeRestoreConnections() {
if (IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
return;
}
MaybeCreateIBus();
MaybeRestoreIBusConfig();
if (IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
ConnectPanelServiceSignals();
if (connection_change_handler_) {
LOG(INFO) << "Notifying Chrome that IBus is ready.";
connection_change_handler_(language_library_, true);
}
}
}
void MaybeCreateIBus() {
if (ibus_) {
return;
}
ibus_init();
ibus_ = ibus_bus_new();
if (!ibus_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ibus_bus_new() failed";
return;
}
ConnectIBusSignals();
ibus_bus_set_watch_dbus_signal(ibus_, TRUE);
ibus_bus_set_watch_ibus_signal(ibus_, TRUE);
if (ibus_bus_is_connected(ibus_)) {
LOG(INFO) << "IBus connection is ready.";
}
}
void MaybeRestoreIBusConfig() {
if (!ibus_) {
return;
}
MaybeDestroyIBusConfig();
if (!ibus_config_) {
GDBusConnection* ibus_connection = ibus_bus_get_connection(ibus_);
if (!ibus_connection) {
LOG(INFO) << "Couldn't create an ibus config object since "
<< "IBus connection is not ready.";
return;
}
const gboolean disconnected
= g_dbus_connection_is_closed(ibus_connection);
if (disconnected) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't create an ibus config object since "
<< "IBus connection is closed.";
return;
}
ibus_config_ = ibus_config_new(ibus_connection,
NULL /* do not cancel the operation */,
NULL /* do not get error information */);
if (!ibus_config_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ibus_config_new() failed. ibus-memconf is not ready?";
return;
}
g_object_ref(ibus_config_);
LOG(INFO) << "ibus_config_ is ready.";
}
}
void MaybeDestroyIBusConfig() {
if (!ibus_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "MaybeDestroyIBusConfig: ibus_ is NULL";
return;
}
if (ibus_config_ && !ibus_bus_is_connected(ibus_)) {
g_object_unref(ibus_config_);
ibus_config_ = NULL;
}
}
void FocusIn(const char* input_context_path) {
if (!input_context_path) {
LOG(ERROR) << "NULL context passed";
} else {
DLOG(INFO) << "FocusIn: " << input_context_path;
}
input_context_path_ = Or(input_context_path, "");
}
void RegisterProperties(IBusPropList* ibus_prop_list) {
DLOG(INFO) << "RegisterProperties" << (ibus_prop_list ? "" : " (clear)");
ImePropertyList prop_list; // our representation.
if (ibus_prop_list) {
if (!FlattenPropertyList(ibus_prop_list, &prop_list)) {
RegisterProperties(NULL);
return;
}
}
register_ime_properties_(language_library_, prop_list);
}
void UpdateProperty(IBusProperty* ibus_prop) {
DLOG(INFO) << "UpdateProperty";
DCHECK(ibus_prop);
ImePropertyList prop_list; // our representation.
if (!FlattenProperty(ibus_prop, &prop_list)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Malformed properties are detected";
return;
}
if (!prop_list.empty()) {
update_ime_property_(language_library_, prop_list);
}
}
void UpdateUI(const char* current_global_engine_id) {
DCHECK(current_global_engine_id);
const IBusEngineInfo* engine_info = NULL;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kIBusEngines); ++i) {
if (kIBusEngines[i].name == std::string(current_global_engine_id)) {
engine_info = &kIBusEngines[i];
break;
}
}
if (!engine_info) {
LOG(ERROR) << current_global_engine_id
<< " is not found in the input method white-list.";
return;
}
InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method =
CreateInputMethodDescriptor(engine_info->name,
engine_info->longname,
engine_info->layout,
engine_info->language);
DLOG(INFO) << "Updating the UI. ID:" << current_input_method.id
<< ", keyboard_layout:" << current_input_method.keyboard_layout;
current_input_method_changed_(language_library_, current_input_method);
}
void ConnectIBusSignals() {
if (!ibus_) {
return;
}
g_signal_connect_after(ibus_,
"connected",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusConnectedCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_,
"disconnected",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusDisconnectedCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_,
"global-engine-changed",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusGlobalEngineChangedCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_,
"name-owner-changed",
G_CALLBACK(IBusBusNameOwnerChangedCallback),
this);
}
void ConnectPanelServiceSignals() {
if (!ibus_) {
return;
}
IBusPanelService* ibus_panel_service = IBUS_PANEL_SERVICE(
g_object_get_data(G_OBJECT(ibus_), kPanelObjectKey));
if (!ibus_panel_service) {
LOG(ERROR) << "IBusPanelService is NOT available.";
return;
}
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"focus-in",
G_CALLBACK(FocusInCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"register-properties",
G_CALLBACK(RegisterPropertiesCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"update-property",
G_CALLBACK(UpdatePropertyCallback),
this);
}
static void IBusBusConnectedCallback(IBusBus* bus, gpointer user_data) {
LOG(WARNING) << "IBus connection is recovered.";
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->MaybeRestoreConnections();
}
static void IBusBusDisconnectedCallback(IBusBus* bus, gpointer user_data) {
LOG(WARNING) << "IBus connection is terminated.";
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->MaybeDestroyIBusConfig();
if (self->connection_change_handler_) {
LOG(INFO) << "Notifying Chrome that IBus is terminated.";
self->connection_change_handler_(self->language_library_, false);
}
}
static void IBusBusGlobalEngineChangedCallback(
IBusBus* bus, const gchar* engine_name, gpointer user_data) {
DCHECK(engine_name);
DLOG(INFO) << "Global engine is changed to " << engine_name;
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->UpdateUI(engine_name);
}
static void IBusBusNameOwnerChangedCallback(
IBusBus* bus,
const gchar* name, const gchar* old_name, const gchar* new_name,
gpointer user_data) {
DCHECK(name);
DCHECK(old_name);
DCHECK(new_name);
DLOG(INFO) << "Name owner is changed: name=" << name
<< ", old_name=" << old_name << ", new_name=" << new_name;
if (name != std::string("org.freedesktop.IBus.Config")) {
return;
}
const std::string empty_string;
if (old_name != empty_string || new_name == empty_string) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Unexpected name owner change: name=" << name
<< ", old_name=" << old_name << ", new_name=" << new_name;
return;
}
LOG(INFO) << "IBus config daemon is started. Recovering ibus_config_";
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->MaybeRestoreConnections();
}
static void FocusInCallback(IBusPanelService* panel,
const gchar* path,
gpointer user_data) {
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->FocusIn(path);
}
static void RegisterPropertiesCallback(IBusPanelService* panel,
IBusPropList* prop_list,
gpointer user_data) {
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->RegisterProperties(prop_list);
}
static void UpdatePropertyCallback(IBusPanelService* panel,
IBusProperty* ibus_prop,
gpointer user_data) {
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->UpdateProperty(ibus_prop);
}
static void SetImeConfigCallback(GObject* source_object,
GAsyncResult* res,
gpointer user_data) {
IBusConfig* config = IBUS_CONFIG(user_data);
g_return_if_fail(config);
GError* error = NULL;
const gboolean result =
ibus_config_set_value_async_finish(config, res, &error);
if (!result) {
std::string message = "(unknown error)";
if (error && error->message) {
message = error->message;
}
LOG(ERROR) << "ibus_config_set_value_async failed: " << message;
}
if (error) {
g_error_free(error);
}
g_object_unref(config);
}
LanguageCurrentInputMethodMonitorFunction current_input_method_changed_;
LanguageRegisterImePropertiesFunction register_ime_properties_;
LanguageUpdateImePropertyFunction update_ime_property_;
LanguageConnectionChangeMonitorFunction connection_change_handler_;
void* language_library_;
IBusBus* ibus_;
IBusConfig* ibus_config_;
std::string input_context_path_;
};
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int ablkcipher_next_fast(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
struct ablkcipher_walk *walk)
{
walk->src.page = scatterwalk_page(&walk->in);
walk->src.offset = offset_in_page(walk->in.offset);
walk->dst.page = scatterwalk_page(&walk->out);
walk->dst.offset = offset_in_page(walk->out.offset);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, isFileFormat)
{
long type;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &type) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
switch (type) {
case PHAR_FORMAT_TAR:
RETURN_BOOL(phar_obj->arc.archive->is_tar);
case PHAR_FORMAT_ZIP:
RETURN_BOOL(phar_obj->arc.archive->is_zip);
case PHAR_FORMAT_PHAR:
RETURN_BOOL(!phar_obj->arc.archive->is_tar && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_zip);
default:
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unknown file format specified");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ssl_set_bio( ssl_context *ssl,
int (*f_recv)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_recv,
int (*f_send)(void *, const unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_send )
{
ssl->f_recv = f_recv;
ssl->f_send = f_send;
ssl->p_recv = p_recv;
ssl->p_send = p_send;
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf14_disable_device(gx_device * dev)
{
gx_device_forward * pdev = (gx_device_forward *)dev;
if_debug0m('v', dev->memory, "[v]pdf14_disable_device\n");
dev->color_info = pdev->target->color_info;
pdf14_forward_device_procs(dev);
set_dev_proc(dev, create_compositor, pdf14_forward_create_compositor);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 2,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofproto_port_clear_cfm(struct ofproto *ofproto, ofp_port_t ofp_port)
{
struct ofport *ofport = ofproto_get_port(ofproto, ofp_port);
if (ofport && ofproto->ofproto_class->set_cfm) {
ofproto->ofproto_class->set_cfm(ofport, NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: media::VideoCaptureBufferType>::ToMojom(media::VideoCaptureBufferType
input) {
switch (input) {
case media::VideoCaptureBufferType::kSharedMemory:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureBufferType::kSharedMemory;
case media::VideoCaptureBufferType::kSharedMemoryViaRawFileDescriptor:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureBufferType::
kSharedMemoryViaRawFileDescriptor;
case media::VideoCaptureBufferType::kMailboxHolder:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureBufferType::kMailboxHolder;
}
NOTREACHED();
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureBufferType::kSharedMemory;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Enable camera blob stream when needed"
This reverts commit 10f4b93635e12f9fa0cba1641a10938ca38ed448.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 601492 as the
culprit for failures in the build cycles as shown on:
https://findit-for-me.appspot.com/waterfall/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyRAsSDVdmU3VzcGVjdGVkQ0wiMWNocm9taXVtLzEwZjRiOTM2MzVlMTJmOWZhMGNiYTE2NDFhMTA5MzhjYTM4ZWQ0NDgM
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.memory/Linux%20ChromiumOS%20MSan%20Tests/9190
Sample Failed Step: capture_unittests
Original change's description:
> Enable camera blob stream when needed
>
> Since blob stream needs higher resolution, it causes higher cpu loading
> to require higher resolution and resize to smaller resolution.
> In hangout app, we don't need blob stream. Enabling blob stream when
> needed can save a lot of cpu usage.
>
> BUG=b:114676133
> TEST=manually test in apprtc and CCA. make sure picture taking still
> works in CCA.
>
> Change-Id: I9144461bc76627903d0b3b359ce9cf962ff3628c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1261242
> Commit-Queue: Heng-ruey Hsu <henryhsu@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601492}
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
BUG=b:114676133
Change-Id: If173ffe9259f7eca849b184806bd56e2a9fbaac4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1292256
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601538}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 140,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct packet_type *pt, struct net_device *orig_dev)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct packet_sock *po;
struct sockaddr_ll *sll;
union tpacket_uhdr h;
u8 *skb_head = skb->data;
int skb_len = skb->len;
unsigned int snaplen, res;
unsigned long status = TP_STATUS_USER;
unsigned short macoff, netoff, hdrlen;
struct sk_buff *copy_skb = NULL;
struct timespec ts;
__u32 ts_status;
bool is_drop_n_account = false;
/* struct tpacket{2,3}_hdr is aligned to a multiple of TPACKET_ALIGNMENT.
* We may add members to them until current aligned size without forcing
* userspace to call getsockopt(..., PACKET_HDRLEN, ...).
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(TPACKET_ALIGN(sizeof(*h.h2)) != 32);
BUILD_BUG_ON(TPACKET_ALIGN(sizeof(*h.h3)) != 48);
if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_LOOPBACK)
goto drop;
sk = pt->af_packet_priv;
po = pkt_sk(sk);
if (!net_eq(dev_net(dev), sock_net(sk)))
goto drop;
if (dev->header_ops) {
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_DGRAM)
skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb_mac_header(skb));
else if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_OUTGOING) {
/* Special case: outgoing packets have ll header at head */
skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(skb));
}
}
snaplen = skb->len;
res = run_filter(skb, sk, snaplen);
if (!res)
goto drop_n_restore;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
status |= TP_STATUS_CSUMNOTREADY;
else if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_OUTGOING &&
(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE ||
skb_csum_unnecessary(skb)))
status |= TP_STATUS_CSUM_VALID;
if (snaplen > res)
snaplen = res;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
macoff = netoff = TPACKET_ALIGN(po->tp_hdrlen) + 16 +
po->tp_reserve;
} else {
unsigned int maclen = skb_network_offset(skb);
netoff = TPACKET_ALIGN(po->tp_hdrlen +
(maclen < 16 ? 16 : maclen)) +
po->tp_reserve;
if (po->has_vnet_hdr)
netoff += sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
macoff = netoff - maclen;
}
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
if (macoff + snaplen > po->rx_ring.frame_size) {
if (po->copy_thresh &&
atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) < sk->sk_rcvbuf) {
if (skb_shared(skb)) {
copy_skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
} else {
copy_skb = skb_get(skb);
skb_head = skb->data;
}
if (copy_skb)
skb_set_owner_r(copy_skb, sk);
}
snaplen = po->rx_ring.frame_size - macoff;
if ((int)snaplen < 0)
snaplen = 0;
}
} else if (unlikely(macoff + snaplen >
GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len)) {
u32 nval;
nval = GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len - macoff;
pr_err_once("tpacket_rcv: packet too big, clamped from %u to %u. macoff=%u\n",
snaplen, nval, macoff);
snaplen = nval;
if (unlikely((int)snaplen < 0)) {
snaplen = 0;
macoff = GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len;
}
}
spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
h.raw = packet_current_rx_frame(po, skb,
TP_STATUS_KERNEL, (macoff+snaplen));
if (!h.raw)
goto drop_n_account;
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
packet_increment_rx_head(po, &po->rx_ring);
/*
* LOSING will be reported till you read the stats,
* because it's COR - Clear On Read.
* Anyways, moving it for V1/V2 only as V3 doesn't need this
* at packet level.
*/
if (po->stats.stats1.tp_drops)
status |= TP_STATUS_LOSING;
}
po->stats.stats1.tp_packets++;
if (copy_skb) {
status |= TP_STATUS_COPY;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, copy_skb);
}
spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
if (virtio_net_hdr_from_skb(skb, h.raw + macoff -
sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr),
vio_le(), true)) {
spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
goto drop_n_account;
}
}
skb_copy_bits(skb, 0, h.raw + macoff, snaplen);
if (!(ts_status = tpacket_get_timestamp(skb, &ts, po->tp_tstamp)))
getnstimeofday(&ts);
status |= ts_status;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V1:
h.h1->tp_len = skb->len;
h.h1->tp_snaplen = snaplen;
h.h1->tp_mac = macoff;
h.h1->tp_net = netoff;
h.h1->tp_sec = ts.tv_sec;
h.h1->tp_usec = ts.tv_nsec / NSEC_PER_USEC;
hdrlen = sizeof(*h.h1);
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
h.h2->tp_len = skb->len;
h.h2->tp_snaplen = snaplen;
h.h2->tp_mac = macoff;
h.h2->tp_net = netoff;
h.h2->tp_sec = ts.tv_sec;
h.h2->tp_nsec = ts.tv_nsec;
if (skb_vlan_tag_present(skb)) {
h.h2->tp_vlan_tci = skb_vlan_tag_get(skb);
h.h2->tp_vlan_tpid = ntohs(skb->vlan_proto);
status |= TP_STATUS_VLAN_VALID | TP_STATUS_VLAN_TPID_VALID;
} else {
h.h2->tp_vlan_tci = 0;
h.h2->tp_vlan_tpid = 0;
}
memset(h.h2->tp_padding, 0, sizeof(h.h2->tp_padding));
hdrlen = sizeof(*h.h2);
break;
case TPACKET_V3:
/* tp_nxt_offset,vlan are already populated above.
* So DONT clear those fields here
*/
h.h3->tp_status |= status;
h.h3->tp_len = skb->len;
h.h3->tp_snaplen = snaplen;
h.h3->tp_mac = macoff;
h.h3->tp_net = netoff;
h.h3->tp_sec = ts.tv_sec;
h.h3->tp_nsec = ts.tv_nsec;
memset(h.h3->tp_padding, 0, sizeof(h.h3->tp_padding));
hdrlen = sizeof(*h.h3);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
sll = h.raw + TPACKET_ALIGN(hdrlen);
sll->sll_halen = dev_parse_header(skb, sll->sll_addr);
sll->sll_family = AF_PACKET;
sll->sll_hatype = dev->type;
sll->sll_protocol = skb->protocol;
sll->sll_pkttype = skb->pkt_type;
if (unlikely(po->origdev))
sll->sll_ifindex = orig_dev->ifindex;
else
sll->sll_ifindex = dev->ifindex;
smp_mb();
#if ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE == 1
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
u8 *start, *end;
end = (u8 *) PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long) h.raw +
macoff + snaplen);
for (start = h.raw; start < end; start += PAGE_SIZE)
flush_dcache_page(pgv_to_page(start));
}
smp_wmb();
#endif
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
__packet_set_status(po, h.raw, status);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
} else {
prb_clear_blk_fill_status(&po->rx_ring);
}
drop_n_restore:
if (skb_head != skb->data && skb_shared(skb)) {
skb->data = skb_head;
skb->len = skb_len;
}
drop:
if (!is_drop_n_account)
consume_skb(skb);
else
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
drop_n_account:
is_drop_n_account = true;
po->stats.stats1.tp_drops++;
spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
kfree_skb(copy_skb);
goto drop_n_restore;
}
Commit Message: packet: Don't write vnet header beyond end of buffer
... which may happen with certain values of tp_reserve and maclen.
Fixes: 58d19b19cd99 ("packet: vnet_hdr support for tpacket_rcv")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ReadUserLogStateAccess::isInitialized( void ) const
{
return m_state->isInitialized( );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnReplace(const base::string16& text) {
if (!frame_->hasSelection())
frame_->selectWordAroundCaret();
frame_->replaceSelection(text);
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __inet_check_established(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct sock *sk, __u16 lport,
struct inet_timewait_sock **twp)
{
struct inet_hashinfo *hinfo = death_row->hashinfo;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
__be32 daddr = inet->inet_rcv_saddr;
__be32 saddr = inet->inet_daddr;
int dif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
INET_ADDR_COOKIE(acookie, saddr, daddr)
const __portpair ports = INET_COMBINED_PORTS(inet->inet_dport, lport);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
unsigned int hash = inet_ehashfn(net, daddr, lport,
saddr, inet->inet_dport);
struct inet_ehash_bucket *head = inet_ehash_bucket(hinfo, hash);
spinlock_t *lock = inet_ehash_lockp(hinfo, hash);
struct sock *sk2;
const struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
struct inet_timewait_sock *tw;
int twrefcnt = 0;
spin_lock(lock);
/* Check TIME-WAIT sockets first. */
sk_nulls_for_each(sk2, node, &head->twchain) {
tw = inet_twsk(sk2);
if (INET_TW_MATCH(sk2, net, hash, acookie,
saddr, daddr, ports, dif)) {
if (twsk_unique(sk, sk2, twp))
goto unique;
else
goto not_unique;
}
}
tw = NULL;
/* And established part... */
sk_nulls_for_each(sk2, node, &head->chain) {
if (INET_MATCH(sk2, net, hash, acookie,
saddr, daddr, ports, dif))
goto not_unique;
}
unique:
/* Must record num and sport now. Otherwise we will see
* in hash table socket with a funny identity. */
inet->inet_num = lport;
inet->inet_sport = htons(lport);
sk->sk_hash = hash;
WARN_ON(!sk_unhashed(sk));
__sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(sk, &head->chain);
if (tw) {
twrefcnt = inet_twsk_unhash(tw);
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_TIMEWAITRECYCLED);
}
spin_unlock(lock);
if (twrefcnt)
inet_twsk_put(tw);
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, 1);
if (twp) {
*twp = tw;
} else if (tw) {
/* Silly. Should hash-dance instead... */
inet_twsk_deschedule(tw, death_row);
inet_twsk_put(tw);
}
return 0;
not_unique:
spin_unlock(lock);
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuChannelHost::Connect(
const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle,
base::ProcessHandle client_process_for_gpu) {
DCHECK(factory_->IsMainThread());
scoped_refptr<base::MessageLoopProxy> io_loop = factory_->GetIOLoopProxy();
channel_.reset(new IPC::SyncChannel(
channel_handle, IPC::Channel::MODE_CLIENT, NULL,
io_loop, true,
factory_->GetShutDownEvent()));
sync_filter_ = new IPC::SyncMessageFilter(
factory_->GetShutDownEvent());
channel_->AddFilter(sync_filter_.get());
channel_filter_ = new MessageFilter(this);
channel_->AddFilter(channel_filter_.get());
state_ = kConnected;
Send(new GpuChannelMsg_Initialize(client_process_for_gpu));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 170,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(sendmsg, int, fd, struct msghdr __user *, msg, unsigned int, flags)
{
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
return __sys_sendmsg(fd, msg, flags);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void dm_init_normal_md_queue(struct mapped_device *md)
{
md->use_blk_mq = false;
dm_init_md_queue(md);
/*
* Initialize aspects of queue that aren't relevant for blk-mq
*/
md->queue->backing_dev_info->congested_fn = dm_any_congested;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int PVGetLayerID(VideoDecControls *decCtrl)
{
VideoDecData *video = (VideoDecData *)decCtrl->videoDecoderData;
return video->currLayer;
}
Commit Message: Fix NPDs in h263 decoder
Bug: 35269635
Test: decoded PoC with and without patch
Change-Id: I636a14360c7801cc5bca63c9cb44d1d235df8fd8
(cherry picked from commit 2ad2a92318a3b9daf78ebcdc597085adbf32600d)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnReadAsciiText(
ui::Clipboard::Buffer buffer, std::string* result) {
GetClipboard()->ReadAsciiText(buffer, result);
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 98,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanRedirectToURL(const GURL& url) {
if (!url.is_valid())
return false; // Can't redirect to invalid URLs.
const std::string& scheme = url.scheme();
if (scheme == kChromeErrorScheme)
return false;
if (IsPseudoScheme(scheme)) {
return url.IsAboutBlank();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID: | 0 | 143,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UploadProgress MockNetworkTransaction::GetUploadProgress() const {
return UploadProgress();
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 119,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: snd_pcm_sframes_t snd_pcm_lib_writev(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
void __user **bufs,
snd_pcm_uframes_t frames)
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
int nonblock;
int err;
err = pcm_sanity_check(substream);
if (err < 0)
return err;
runtime = substream->runtime;
nonblock = !!(substream->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
if (runtime->access != SNDRV_PCM_ACCESS_RW_NONINTERLEAVED)
return -EINVAL;
return snd_pcm_lib_write1(substream, (unsigned long)bufs, frames,
nonblock, snd_pcm_lib_writev_transfer);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 47,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LayoutBlockFlow::isSelfCollapsingBlock() const
{
m_hasOnlySelfCollapsingChildren = LayoutBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock();
return m_hasOnlySelfCollapsingChildren;
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 123,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NotifyRouteChangesOnIO(
base::Callback<void(ResourceDispatcherHostImpl*,
const GlobalFrameRoutingId&)> frame_callback,
std::unique_ptr<std::set<GlobalFrameRoutingId>> routing_ids) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
ResourceDispatcherHostImpl* rdh = ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get();
if (!rdh)
return;
for (const auto& routing_id : *routing_ids)
frame_callback.Run(rdh, routing_id);
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtio_gpu_resource_detach_backing(VirtIOGPU *g,
struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
{
struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res;
struct virtio_gpu_resource_detach_backing detach;
VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(detach);
trace_virtio_gpu_cmd_res_back_detach(detach.resource_id);
res = virtio_gpu_find_resource(g, detach.resource_id);
if (!res || !res->iov) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: illegal resource specified %d\n",
__func__, detach.resource_id);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_RESOURCE_ID;
return;
}
virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping(res);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 6,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntRect RenderBox::clipRect(const IntPoint& location)
{
IntRect clipRect(location, size());
if (!style()->clipLeft().isAuto()) {
int c = style()->clipLeft().calcValue(width());
clipRect.move(c, 0);
clipRect.contract(c, 0);
}
if (!style()->clipRight().isAuto())
clipRect.contract(width() - style()->clipRight().calcValue(width()), 0);
if (!style()->clipTop().isAuto()) {
int c = style()->clipTop().calcValue(height());
clipRect.move(0, c);
clipRect.contract(0, c);
}
if (!style()->clipBottom().isAuto())
clipRect.contract(0, height() - style()->clipBottom().calcValue(height()));
return clipRect;
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::TextInputStateChanged(
const ViewHostMsg_TextInputState_Params& params) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebPreferences ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetWebkitPrefs(Profile* profile,
bool is_web_ui) {
return RenderViewHostDelegateHelper::GetWebkitPrefs(profile, is_web_ui);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static sector_t udf_bmap(struct address_space *mapping, sector_t block)
{
return generic_block_bmap(mapping, block, udf_get_block);
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs
We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.
Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 36,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AXLayoutObject::supportsARIAOwns() const {
if (!m_layoutObject)
return false;
const AtomicString& ariaOwns = getAttribute(aria_ownsAttr);
return !ariaOwns.isEmpty();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_uuid(const char *uuid)
{
const char *p;
for (p = uuid; p[0]; p++)
if ((!isalnum(*p)) && (*p != '-')) return EINA_FALSE;
return EINA_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void InsertComplexDoubleRow(Image *image,double *p,int y,double MinVal,
double MaxVal,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
double f;
int x;
register Quantum *q;
if (MinVal >= 0)
MinVal = -1;
if (MaxVal <= 0)
MaxVal = 1;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
return;
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (*p > 0)
{
f=(*p/MaxVal)*(Quantum) (QuantumRange-GetPixelRed(image,q));
if ((f+GetPixelRed(image,q)) >= QuantumRange)
SetPixelRed(image,QuantumRange,q);
else
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(image,q)+ClampToQuantum(f),q);
f=GetPixelGreen(image,q)-f/2.0;
if (f <= 0.0)
{
SetPixelGreen(image,0,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,0,q);
}
else
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(f),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(f),q);
}
}
if (*p < 0)
{
f=(*p/MinVal)*(Quantum) (QuantumRange-GetPixelBlue(image,q));
if ((f+GetPixelBlue(image,q)) >= QuantumRange)
SetPixelBlue(image,QuantumRange,q);
else
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(image,q)+ClampToQuantum(f),q);
f=GetPixelGreen(image,q)-f/2.0;
if (f <= 0.0)
{
SetPixelRed(image,0,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,0,q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(f),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(f),q);
}
}
p++;
q++;
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
return;
return;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1554
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void prpl_xfer_canceled(struct file_transfer *ft, char *reason)
{
struct prpl_xfer_data *px = ft->data;
if (px->xfer) {
if (!purple_xfer_is_completed(px->xfer) && !purple_xfer_is_canceled(px->xfer)) {
purple_xfer_cancel_local(px->xfer);
}
px->xfer->ui_data = NULL;
purple_xfer_unref(px->xfer);
px->xfer = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: purple: Fix crash on ft requests from unknown contacts
Followup to 701ab81 (included in 3.5) which was a partial fix which only
improved things for non-libpurple file transfers (that is, just jabber)
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 68,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataFile::SetFileNameFromTitle() {
if (is_hosted_document_) {
file_name_ = EscapeUtf8FileName(title_ + document_extension_);
} else {
GDataEntry::SetFileNameFromTitle();
}
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: KURL HTMLInputElement::src() const
{
return document().completeURL(fastGetAttribute(srcAttr));
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 114,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void update_pmu_context(struct pmu *pmu, struct pmu *old_pmu)
{
int cpu;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
cpuctx = per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, cpu);
if (cpuctx->unique_pmu == old_pmu)
cpuctx->unique_pmu = pmu;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::childTypeAllowed(NodeType type) const
{
switch (type) {
case ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
case CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
case DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE:
case DOCUMENT_NODE:
case ENTITY_NODE:
case ENTITY_REFERENCE_NODE:
case NOTATION_NODE:
case TEXT_NODE:
case XPATH_NAMESPACE_NODE:
return false;
case COMMENT_NODE:
case PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION_NODE:
return true;
case DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:
case ELEMENT_NODE:
for (Node* c = firstChild(); c; c = c->nextSibling())
if (c->nodeType() == type)
return false;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btrfs_del_items(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, struct btrfs_root *root,
struct btrfs_path *path, int slot, int nr)
{
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
struct btrfs_item *item;
int last_off;
int dsize = 0;
int ret = 0;
int wret;
int i;
u32 nritems;
struct btrfs_map_token token;
btrfs_init_map_token(&token);
leaf = path->nodes[0];
last_off = btrfs_item_offset_nr(leaf, slot + nr - 1);
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++)
dsize += btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot + i);
nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(leaf);
if (slot + nr != nritems) {
int data_end = leaf_data_end(root, leaf);
memmove_extent_buffer(leaf, btrfs_leaf_data(leaf) +
data_end + dsize,
btrfs_leaf_data(leaf) + data_end,
last_off - data_end);
for (i = slot + nr; i < nritems; i++) {
u32 ioff;
item = btrfs_item_nr(i);
ioff = btrfs_token_item_offset(leaf, item, &token);
btrfs_set_token_item_offset(leaf, item,
ioff + dsize, &token);
}
memmove_extent_buffer(leaf, btrfs_item_nr_offset(slot),
btrfs_item_nr_offset(slot + nr),
sizeof(struct btrfs_item) *
(nritems - slot - nr));
}
btrfs_set_header_nritems(leaf, nritems - nr);
nritems -= nr;
/* delete the leaf if we've emptied it */
if (nritems == 0) {
if (leaf == root->node) {
btrfs_set_header_level(leaf, 0);
} else {
btrfs_set_path_blocking(path);
clean_tree_block(trans, root, leaf);
btrfs_del_leaf(trans, root, path, leaf);
}
} else {
int used = leaf_space_used(leaf, 0, nritems);
if (slot == 0) {
struct btrfs_disk_key disk_key;
btrfs_item_key(leaf, &disk_key, 0);
fixup_low_keys(root, path, &disk_key, 1);
}
/* delete the leaf if it is mostly empty */
if (used < BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(root) / 3) {
/* push_leaf_left fixes the path.
* make sure the path still points to our leaf
* for possible call to del_ptr below
*/
slot = path->slots[1];
extent_buffer_get(leaf);
btrfs_set_path_blocking(path);
wret = push_leaf_left(trans, root, path, 1, 1,
1, (u32)-1);
if (wret < 0 && wret != -ENOSPC)
ret = wret;
if (path->nodes[0] == leaf &&
btrfs_header_nritems(leaf)) {
wret = push_leaf_right(trans, root, path, 1,
1, 1, 0);
if (wret < 0 && wret != -ENOSPC)
ret = wret;
}
if (btrfs_header_nritems(leaf) == 0) {
path->slots[1] = slot;
btrfs_del_leaf(trans, root, path, leaf);
free_extent_buffer(leaf);
ret = 0;
} else {
/* if we're still in the path, make sure
* we're dirty. Otherwise, one of the
* push_leaf functions must have already
* dirtied this buffer
*/
if (path->nodes[0] == leaf)
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(leaf);
free_extent_buffer(leaf);
}
} else {
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(leaf);
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 45,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DeleteRenderbuffersHelper(
GLsizei n, const GLuint* client_ids) {
bool supports_seperate_framebuffer_binds =
feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_framebuffer_multisample;
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
RenderbufferManager::RenderbufferInfo* renderbuffer =
GetRenderbufferInfo(client_ids[ii]);
if (renderbuffer && !renderbuffer->IsDeleted()) {
if (bound_renderbuffer_ == renderbuffer) {
bound_renderbuffer_ = NULL;
}
if (supports_seperate_framebuffer_binds) {
if (bound_read_framebuffer_) {
bound_read_framebuffer_->UnbindRenderbuffer(
GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER, renderbuffer);
}
if (bound_draw_framebuffer_) {
bound_draw_framebuffer_->UnbindRenderbuffer(
GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER, renderbuffer);
}
} else {
if (bound_draw_framebuffer_) {
bound_draw_framebuffer_->UnbindRenderbuffer(
GL_FRAMEBUFFER, renderbuffer);
}
}
state_dirty_ = true;
RemoveRenderbufferInfo(client_ids[ii]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> InspectorLayoutEvent::BeginData(
LocalFrameView* frame_view) {
bool is_partial;
unsigned needs_layout_objects;
unsigned total_objects;
LocalFrame& frame = frame_view->GetFrame();
frame.View()->CountObjectsNeedingLayout(needs_layout_objects, total_objects,
is_partial);
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value = TracedValue::Create();
value->SetInteger("dirtyObjects", needs_layout_objects);
value->SetInteger("totalObjects", total_objects);
value->SetBoolean("partialLayout", is_partial);
value->SetString("frame", ToHexString(&frame));
SetCallStack(value.get());
return value;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void usb_release_interface(struct device *dev)
{
struct usb_interface *intf = to_usb_interface(dev);
struct usb_interface_cache *intfc =
altsetting_to_usb_interface_cache(intf->altsetting);
kref_put(&intfc->ref, usb_release_interface_cache);
usb_put_dev(interface_to_usbdev(intf));
kfree(intf);
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int read_emulate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
void *val, int bytes)
{
return !kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, gpa, val, bytes);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pkcs7_encode_rinfo(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri,
unsigned char *key, int keylen)
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
unsigned char *ek = NULL;
int ret = 0;
size_t eklen;
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(ri->cert);
if (!pkey)
return 0;
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
if (!pctx)
return 0;
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCODE_RINFO, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen, key, keylen) <= 0)
goto err;
ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen);
if (ek == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCODE_RINFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen, key, keylen) <= 0)
goto err;
ASN1_STRING_set0(ri->enc_key, ek, eklen);
ek = NULL;
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
OPENSSL_free(ek);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: PKCS#7: Fix NULL dereference with missing EncryptedContent.
CVE-2015-1790
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 44,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagecolorallocate)
{
zval *IM;
long red, green, blue;
gdImagePtr im;
int ct = (-1);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rlll", &IM, &red, &green, &blue) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
ct = gdImageColorAllocate(im, red, green, blue);
if (ct < 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_LONG(ct);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xt_register_matches(struct xt_match *match, unsigned int n)
{
unsigned int i;
int err = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
err = xt_register_match(&match[i]);
if (err)
goto err;
}
return err;
err:
if (i > 0)
xt_unregister_matches(match, i);
return err;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: swabHorAcc16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
TIFFSwabArrayOfShort(wp, wc);
return horAcc16(tif, cp0, cc);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predic.c: fix memory leaks in error code paths added in
previous commit (fix for MSVR 35105)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vcard_response_set_status(VCardResponse *response, vcard_7816_status_t status)
{
unsigned char sw1, sw2;
response->b_status = status; /* make sure the status and swX representations
* are consistent */
sw1 = (status >> 8) & 0xff;
sw2 = status & 0xff;
response->b_sw1 = sw1;
response->b_sw2 = sw2;
response->b_data[response->b_len] = sw1;
response->b_data[response->b_len+1] = sw2;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tt_check_single_notdef( FT_Face ttface )
{
FT_Bool result = FALSE;
TT_Face face = (TT_Face)ttface;
FT_UInt asize;
FT_ULong i;
FT_ULong glyph_index = 0;
FT_UInt count = 0;
for( i = 0; i < face->num_locations; i++ )
{
tt_face_get_location( face, i, &asize );
if ( asize > 0 )
{
count += 1;
if ( count > 1 )
break;
glyph_index = i;
}
}
/* Only have a single outline. */
if ( count == 1 )
{
if ( glyph_index == 0 )
result = TRUE;
else
{
/* FIXME: Need to test glyphname == .notdef ? */
FT_Error error;
char buf[8];
error = FT_Get_Glyph_Name( ttface, glyph_index, buf, 8 );
if ( !error &&
buf[0] == '.' && !ft_strncmp( buf, ".notdef", 8 ) )
result = TRUE;
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 7,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool cfs_rq_is_decayed(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq)
{
if (cfs_rq->load.weight)
return false;
if (cfs_rq->avg.load_sum)
return false;
if (cfs_rq->avg.util_sum)
return false;
if (cfs_rq->avg.runnable_load_sum)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 1 | 169,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::removeHandle(EffectHandle *handle)
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
size_t size = mHandles.size();
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
if (mHandles[i] == handle) {
break;
}
}
if (i == size) {
return size;
}
ALOGV("removeHandle() %p removed handle %p in position %zu", this, handle, i);
mHandles.removeAt(i);
if (i == 0) {
EffectHandle *h = controlHandle_l();
if (h != NULL) {
h->setControl(true /*hasControl*/, true /*signal*/ , handle->enabled() /*enabled*/);
}
}
if (mHandles.size() == 0 && !mPinned) {
mState = DESTROYED;
}
return mHandles.size();
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 157,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseAudioContext::PerformCleanupOnMainThread() {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
GraphAutoLocker locker(this);
if (is_resolving_resume_promises_) {
for (auto& resolver : resume_resolvers_) {
if (context_state_ == kClosed) {
resolver->Reject(DOMException::Create(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Cannot resume a context that has been closed"));
} else {
SetContextState(kRunning);
resolver->Resolve();
}
}
resume_resolvers_.clear();
is_resolving_resume_promises_ = false;
}
if (active_source_nodes_.size()) {
for (AudioNode* node : active_source_nodes_) {
if (node->Handler().GetNodeType() ==
AudioHandler::kNodeTypeAudioBufferSource) {
AudioBufferSourceNode* source_node =
static_cast<AudioBufferSourceNode*>(node);
source_node->GetAudioBufferSourceHandler().HandleStoppableSourceNode();
}
}
Vector<AudioHandler*> finished_handlers;
{
MutexLocker lock(finished_source_handlers_mutex_);
finished_source_handlers_.swap(finished_handlers);
}
unsigned remove_count = 0;
Vector<bool> removables;
removables.resize(active_source_nodes_.size());
for (AudioHandler* handler : finished_handlers) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < active_source_nodes_.size(); ++i) {
if (handler == &active_source_nodes_[i]->Handler()) {
handler->BreakConnectionWithLock();
removables[i] = true;
remove_count++;
break;
}
}
}
if (remove_count > 0) {
HeapVector<Member<AudioNode>> actives;
DCHECK_GE(active_source_nodes_.size(), remove_count);
size_t initial_capacity =
std::min(active_source_nodes_.size() - remove_count,
active_source_nodes_.size());
actives.ReserveInitialCapacity(initial_capacity);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < removables.size(); ++i) {
if (!removables[i])
actives.push_back(active_source_nodes_[i]);
}
active_source_nodes_.swap(actives);
}
}
has_posted_cleanup_task_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::OnAuthCancelled() {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentCancelled,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
auth_fetcher_.reset();
registrar_.reset();
g_browser_process->browser_policy_connector()->DeviceStopAutoRetry();
get_screen_observer()->OnExit(
ScreenObserver::ENTERPRISE_ENROLLMENT_CANCELLED);
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::FullscreenStateChanged(bool is_fullscreen) {
GetFrameHost()->FullscreenStateChanged(is_fullscreen);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void padb_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_PaddingBitsBox *ptr = (GF_PaddingBitsBox *) s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
if (ptr->padbits) gf_free(ptr->padbits);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IGDstartelt(void * d, const char * name, int l)
{
struct IGDdatas * datas = (struct IGDdatas *)d;
memcpy( datas->cureltname, name, l);
datas->cureltname[l] = '\0';
datas->level++;
if( (l==7) && !memcmp(name, "service", l) ) {
datas->tmp.controlurl[0] = '\0';
datas->tmp.eventsuburl[0] = '\0';
datas->tmp.scpdurl[0] = '\0';
datas->tmp.servicetype[0] = '\0';
}
}
Commit Message: igd_desc_parse.c: fix buffer overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 166,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __be32 nfs4_preprocess_confirmed_seqid_op(struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, u32 seqid,
stateid_t *stateid, struct nfs4_ol_stateid **stpp, struct nfsd_net *nn)
{
__be32 status;
struct nfs4_openowner *oo;
struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp;
status = nfs4_preprocess_seqid_op(cstate, seqid, stateid,
NFS4_OPEN_STID, &stp, nn);
if (status)
return status;
oo = openowner(stp->st_stateowner);
if (!(oo->oo_flags & NFS4_OO_CONFIRMED)) {
mutex_unlock(&stp->st_mutex);
nfs4_put_stid(&stp->st_stid);
return nfserr_bad_stateid;
}
*stpp = stp;
return nfs_ok;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SimulateTouchPressAt(WebContents* web_contents, const gfx::Point& point) {
ui::TouchEvent touch(
ui::ET_TOUCH_PRESSED, point, base::TimeTicks(),
ui::PointerDetails(ui::EventPointerType::POINTER_TYPE_TOUCH, 0));
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewAura*>(
web_contents->GetRenderWidgetHostView())
->OnTouchEvent(&touch);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long hi3660_stub_clk_recalc_rate(struct clk_hw *hw,
unsigned long parent_rate)
{
struct hi3660_stub_clk *stub_clk = to_stub_clk(hw);
/*
* LPM3 writes back the CPU frequency in shared SRAM so read
* back the frequency.
*/
stub_clk->rate = readl(freq_reg + (stub_clk->id << 2)) * MHZ;
return stub_clk->rate;
}
Commit Message: clk: hisilicon: hi3660：Fix potential NULL dereference in hi3660_stub_clk_probe()
platform_get_resource() may return NULL, add proper check to
avoid potential NULL dereferencing.
This is detected by Coccinelle semantic patch.
@@
expression pdev, res, n, t, e, e1, e2;
@@
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, t, n);
+ if (!res)
+ return -EINVAL;
... when != res == NULL
e = devm_ioremap(e1, res->start, e2);
Fixes: 4f16f7ff3bc0 ("clk: hisilicon: Add support for Hi3660 stub clocks")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 83,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void conn_shrink(conn *c) {
assert(c != NULL);
if (IS_UDP(c->transport))
return;
if (c->rsize > READ_BUFFER_HIGHWAT && c->rbytes < DATA_BUFFER_SIZE) {
char *newbuf;
if (c->rcurr != c->rbuf)
memmove(c->rbuf, c->rcurr, (size_t)c->rbytes);
newbuf = (char *)realloc((void *)c->rbuf, DATA_BUFFER_SIZE);
if (newbuf) {
c->rbuf = newbuf;
c->rsize = DATA_BUFFER_SIZE;
}
/* TODO check other branch... */
c->rcurr = c->rbuf;
}
if (c->isize > ITEM_LIST_HIGHWAT) {
item **newbuf = (item**) realloc((void *)c->ilist, ITEM_LIST_INITIAL * sizeof(c->ilist[0]));
if (newbuf) {
c->ilist = newbuf;
c->isize = ITEM_LIST_INITIAL;
}
/* TODO check error condition? */
}
if (c->msgsize > MSG_LIST_HIGHWAT) {
struct msghdr *newbuf = (struct msghdr *) realloc((void *)c->msglist, MSG_LIST_INITIAL * sizeof(c->msglist[0]));
if (newbuf) {
c->msglist = newbuf;
c->msgsize = MSG_LIST_INITIAL;
}
/* TODO check error condition? */
}
if (c->iovsize > IOV_LIST_HIGHWAT) {
struct iovec *newbuf = (struct iovec *) realloc((void *)c->iov, IOV_LIST_INITIAL * sizeof(c->iov[0]));
if (newbuf) {
c->iov = newbuf;
c->iovsize = IOV_LIST_INITIAL;
}
/* TODO check return value */
}
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebRTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::localDescription()
{
return m_localDescription;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SyncImage(Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
MagickBooleanType
range_exception,
status,
taint;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
return(MagickFalse);
range_exception=MagickFalse;
status=MagickTrue;
taint=image->taint;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(range_exception,status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
Quantum
index;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=PushColormapIndex(image,GetPixelIndex(image,q),&range_exception);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
image->taint=taint;
if ((image->ping == MagickFalse) && (range_exception != MagickFalse))
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageWarning,"InvalidColormapIndex","`%s'",image->filename);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_states(struct verifier_env *env)
{
struct verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
int i;
if (!env->explored_states)
return;
for (i = 0; i < env->prog->len; i++) {
sl = env->explored_states[i];
if (sl)
while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
sln = sl->next;
kfree(sl);
sl = sln;
}
}
kfree(env->explored_states);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLFrameOwnerElement::~HTMLFrameOwnerElement() {
DCHECK(!content_frame_);
}
Commit Message: Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 150,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct skcipher_request *init_skcipher_req(const u8 *key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
struct skcipher_request *req;
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
int ret;
tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(blkcipher_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to load %s transform (%ld)\n",
blkcipher_alg, PTR_ERR(tfm));
return ERR_CAST(tfm);
}
ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to setkey (%d)\n", ret);
crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to allocate request for %s\n",
blkcipher_alg);
crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
return req;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,219 |
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