instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::IsDataSaverEnabled(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
if (!profile)
return false;
PrefService* prefs = profile->GetPrefs();
return prefs && prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kDataSaverEnabled);
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 152,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void igmpv3_clear_delrec(struct in_device *in_dev)
{
struct ip_mc_list *pmc, *nextpmc;
spin_lock_bh(&in_dev->mc_tomb_lock);
pmc = in_dev->mc_tomb;
in_dev->mc_tomb = NULL;
spin_unlock_bh(&in_dev->mc_tomb_lock);
for (; pmc; pmc = nextpmc) {
nextpmc = pmc->next;
ip_mc_clear_src(pmc);
in_dev_put(pmc->interface);
kfree(pmc);
}
/* clear dead sources, too */
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_pmc_rcu(in_dev, pmc) {
struct ip_sf_list *psf, *psf_next;
spin_lock_bh(&pmc->lock);
psf = pmc->tomb;
pmc->tomb = NULL;
spin_unlock_bh(&pmc->lock);
for (; psf; psf=psf_next) {
psf_next = psf->sf_next;
kfree(psf);
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_ForwardCommandToServer( const char *string ) {
char *cmd;
cmd = Cmd_Argv(0);
if ( cmd[0] == '-' ) {
return;
}
if ( clc.demoplaying || clc.state < CA_CONNECTED || cmd[0] == '+' ) {
Com_Printf ("Unknown command \"%s" S_COLOR_WHITE "\"\n", cmd);
return;
}
if ( Cmd_Argc() > 1 ) {
CL_AddReliableCommand(string, qfalse);
} else {
CL_AddReliableCommand(cmd, qfalse);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ccid3_hc_tx_exit(struct sock *sk)
{
struct ccid3_hc_tx_sock *hc = ccid3_hc_tx_sk(sk);
sk_stop_timer(sk, &hc->tx_no_feedback_timer);
tfrc_tx_hist_purge(&hc->tx_hist);
}
Commit Message: dccp: fix info leak via getsockopt(DCCP_SOCKOPT_CCID_TX_INFO)
The CCID3 code fails to initialize the trailing padding bytes of struct
tfrc_tx_info added for alignment on 64 bit architectures. It that for
potentially leaks four bytes kernel stack via the getsockopt() syscall.
Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the
info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FaviconSource::ShouldReplaceExistingSource() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: ntp4: show larger favicons in most visited page
extend favicon source to provide larger icons. For now, larger means at most 32x32. Also, the only icon we actually support at this resolution is the default (globe).
BUG=none
TEST=manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7300017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91517 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int instantiate_phys(struct lxc_handler *handler, struct lxc_netdev *netdev)
{
if (!netdev->link) {
ERROR("no link specified for the physical interface");
return -1;
}
netdev->ifindex = if_nametoindex(netdev->link);
if (!netdev->ifindex) {
ERROR("failed to retrieve the index for %s", netdev->link);
return -1;
}
if (netdev->upscript) {
int err;
err = run_script(handler->name, "net", netdev->upscript,
"up", "phys", netdev->link, (char*) NULL);
if (err)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendTrimInvalidEntry12() {
const int kSize = 0x3000; // 12 kB
SetMaxSize(kSize * 10);
InitCache();
std::string first("some key");
std::string second("something else");
disk_cache::Entry* entry;
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry(first, &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry(second, &entry), IsOk());
disk_cache::EntryImpl* entry_impl =
static_cast<disk_cache::EntryImpl*>(entry);
entry_impl->entry()->Data()->state = 0xbad;
entry_impl->entry()->Store();
entry->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("third", &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("fourth", &entry), IsOk());
TrimForTest(true);
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache_->GetEntryCount());
entry->Close();
DisableIntegrityCheck();
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gp_bgr8(Pixel *p, png_const_voidp pb)
{
png_const_bytep pp = voidcast(png_const_bytep, pb);
p->r = pp[2];
p->g = pp[1];
p->b = pp[0];
p->a = 255;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_free_bundle_msgs(struct ofputil_bundle_msg *bms, size_t n_bms)
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < n_bms; i++) {
switch ((int)bms[i].type) {
case OFPTYPE_FLOW_MOD:
free(CONST_CAST(struct ofpact *, bms[i].fm.ofpacts));
break;
case OFPTYPE_GROUP_MOD:
ofputil_uninit_group_mod(&bms[i].gm);
break;
case OFPTYPE_PACKET_OUT:
free(bms[i].po.ofpacts);
free(CONST_CAST(void *, bms[i].po.packet));
break;
default:
break;
}
}
free(bms);
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ConnectToExecutionServer(uint32 session_id,
base::win::ScopedHandle* pipe_out) {
string16 pipe_name;
FilePath winsta_path(base::GetNativeLibraryName(UTF8ToUTF16("winsta")));
base::ScopedNativeLibrary winsta(winsta_path);
if (winsta.is_valid()) {
PWINSTATIONQUERYINFORMATIONW win_station_query_information =
static_cast<PWINSTATIONQUERYINFORMATIONW>(
winsta.GetFunctionPointer("WinStationQueryInformationW"));
if (win_station_query_information) {
wchar_t name[MAX_PATH];
ULONG name_length;
if (win_station_query_information(0,
session_id,
kCreateProcessPipeNameClass,
name,
sizeof(name),
&name_length)) {
pipe_name.assign(name);
}
}
}
if (pipe_name.empty()) {
pipe_name = UTF8ToUTF16(
StringPrintf(kCreateProcessDefaultPipeNameFormat, session_id));
}
base::win::ScopedHandle pipe;
for (int i = 0; i < kPipeConnectMaxAttempts; ++i) {
pipe.Set(CreateFile(pipe_name.c_str(),
GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
0,
NULL,
OPEN_EXISTING,
0,
NULL));
if (pipe.IsValid()) {
break;
}
if (GetLastError() != ERROR_PIPE_BUSY) {
break;
}
if (!WaitNamedPipe(pipe_name.c_str(), kPipeBusyWaitTimeoutMs)) {
break;
}
}
if (!pipe.IsValid()) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) << "Failed to connect to '" << pipe_name << "'";
return false;
}
*pipe_out = pipe.Pass();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_wddx_pop_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name)
{
st_entry *ent1, *ent2;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
HashTable *target_hash;
zend_class_entry *pce;
zval obj;
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
if (stack->top == 0) {
return;
}
if (!strcmp((char *)name, EL_STRING) || !strcmp((char *)name, EL_NUMBER) ||
!strcmp((char *)name, EL_BOOLEAN) || !strcmp((char *)name, EL_NULL) ||
!strcmp((char *)name, EL_ARRAY) || !strcmp((char *)name, EL_STRUCT) ||
!strcmp((char *)name, EL_RECORDSET) || !strcmp((char *)name, EL_BINARY) ||
!strcmp((char *)name, EL_DATETIME)) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent1);
if (Z_TYPE(ent1->data) == IS_UNDEF) {
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
return;
}
if (!strcmp((char *)name, EL_BINARY)) {
zend_string *new_str = NULL;
if (ZSTR_EMPTY_ALLOC() != Z_STR(ent1->data)) {
new_str = php_base64_decode(
(unsigned char *)Z_STRVAL(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN(ent1->data));
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
if (new_str) {
ZVAL_STR(&ent1->data, new_str);
} else {
ZVAL_EMPTY_STRING(&ent1->data);
}
}
/* Call __wakeup() method on the object. */
if (Z_TYPE(ent1->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zval fname, retval;
ZVAL_STRING(&fname, "__wakeup");
call_user_function_ex(NULL, &ent1->data, &fname, &retval, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
zval_ptr_dtor(&fname);
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent2);
/* if non-existent field */
if (Z_ISUNDEF(ent2->data)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY || Z_TYPE(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
target_hash = HASH_OF(&ent2->data);
if (ent1->varname) {
if (!strcmp(ent1->varname, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR) &&
Z_TYPE(ent1->data) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN(ent1->data) &&
ent2->type == ST_STRUCT && Z_TYPE(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_bool incomplete_class = 0;
zend_str_tolower(Z_STRVAL(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN(ent1->data));
zend_string_forget_hash_val(Z_STR(ent1->data));
if ((pce = zend_hash_find_ptr(EG(class_table), Z_STR(ent1->data))) == NULL) {
incomplete_class = 1;
pce = PHP_IC_ENTRY;
}
if (pce != PHP_IC_ENTRY && (pce->serialize || pce->unserialize)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
ZVAL_UNDEF(&ent2->data);
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Class %s can not be unserialized", Z_STRVAL(ent1->data));
} else {
/* Initialize target object */
object_init_ex(&obj, pce);
/* Merge current hashtable with object's default properties */
zend_hash_merge(Z_OBJPROP(obj),
Z_ARRVAL(ent2->data),
zval_add_ref, 0);
if (incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(&obj, Z_STRVAL(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN(ent1->data));
}
/* Clean up old array entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
/* Set stack entry to point to the newly created object */
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&ent2->data, &obj);
}
/* Clean up class name var entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
} else if (Z_TYPE(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_class_entry *old_scope = EG(scope);
EG(scope) = Z_OBJCE(ent2->data);
add_property_zval(&ent2->data, ent1->varname, &ent1->data);
if Z_REFCOUNTED(ent1->data) Z_DELREF(ent1->data);
EG(scope) = old_scope;
} else {
zend_symtable_str_update(target_hash, ent1->varname, strlen(ent1->varname), &ent1->data);
}
efree(ent1->varname);
} else {
zend_hash_next_index_insert(target_hash, &ent1->data);
}
}
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
} else if (!strcmp((char *)name, EL_VAR) && stack->varname) {
efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = NULL;
} else if (!strcmp((char *)name, EL_FIELD)) {
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void **)&ent);
efree(ent);
stack->top--;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73831 - NULL Pointer Dereference while unserialize php object
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 168,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FileTransfer::~FileTransfer()
{
if (daemonCore && ActiveTransferTid >= 0) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "FileTransfer object destructor called during "
"active transfer. Cancelling transfer.\n");
daemonCore->Kill_Thread(ActiveTransferTid);
TransThreadTable->remove(ActiveTransferTid);
ActiveTransferTid = -1;
}
if (TransferPipe[0] >= 0) close(TransferPipe[0]);
if (TransferPipe[1] >= 0) close(TransferPipe[1]);
if (Iwd) free(Iwd);
if (ExecFile) free(ExecFile);
if (UserLogFile) free(UserLogFile);
if (X509UserProxy) free(X509UserProxy);
if (SpoolSpace) free(SpoolSpace);
if (TmpSpoolSpace) free(TmpSpoolSpace);
if (ExceptionFiles) delete ExceptionFiles;
if (InputFiles) delete InputFiles;
if (OutputFiles) delete OutputFiles;
if (EncryptInputFiles) delete EncryptInputFiles;
if (EncryptOutputFiles) delete EncryptOutputFiles;
if (DontEncryptInputFiles) delete DontEncryptInputFiles;
if (DontEncryptOutputFiles) delete DontEncryptOutputFiles;
if (OutputDestination) delete OutputDestination;
if (IntermediateFiles) delete IntermediateFiles;
if (SpooledIntermediateFiles) delete SpooledIntermediateFiles;
if (last_download_catalog) {
CatalogEntry *entry_pointer;
last_download_catalog->startIterations();
while(last_download_catalog->iterate(entry_pointer)) {
delete entry_pointer;
}
delete last_download_catalog;
}
if (TransSock) free(TransSock);
if (TransKey) {
if ( TranskeyTable ) {
MyString key(TransKey);
TranskeyTable->remove(key);
if ( TranskeyTable->getNumElements() == 0 ) {
delete TranskeyTable;
TranskeyTable = NULL;
delete TransThreadTable;
TransThreadTable = NULL;
}
}
free(TransKey);
}
#ifdef WIN32
if (perm_obj) delete perm_obj;
#endif
free(m_sec_session_id);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE0(restart_syscall)
{
struct restart_block *restart = ¤t->restart_block;
return restart->fn(restart);
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: avoid undefined behaviour in kill_something_info
When running kill(72057458746458112, 0) in userspace I hit the following
issue.
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/signal.c:1462:11
negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
CPU: 226 PID: 9849 Comm: test Tainted: G B ---- ------- 3.10.0-327.53.58.70.x86_64_ubsan+ #116
Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. RH8100 V3/BC61PBIA, BIOS BLHSV028 11/11/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x50
__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow+0x109/0x14e
SYSC_kill+0x43e/0x4d0
SyS_kill+0xe/0x10
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Add code to avoid the UBSAN detection.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496670008-59084-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnVisibilityChanged() {
if (visible_compositors_.size() > 0) {
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->SetApplicationVisible(true);
BrowserGpuChannelHostFactorySetApplicationVisible(true);
SendOnForegroundedToGpuService();
low_end_background_cleanup_task_.Cancel();
} else {
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->SetApplicationVisible(false);
BrowserGpuChannelHostFactorySetApplicationVisible(false);
SendOnBackgroundedToGpuService();
EnqueueLowEndBackgroundCleanup();
}
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: verify_for_user_checksum(krb5_context context,
krb5_keyblock *key,
krb5_pa_for_user *req)
{
krb5_error_code code;
int i;
krb5_int32 name_type;
char *p;
krb5_data data;
krb5_boolean valid = FALSE;
if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum(req->cksum.checksum_type)) {
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;
}
/*
* Checksum is over name type and string components of
* client principal name and auth_package.
*/
data.length = 4;
for (i = 0; i < krb5_princ_size(context, req->user); i++) {
data.length += krb5_princ_component(context, req->user, i)->length;
}
data.length += krb5_princ_realm(context, req->user)->length;
data.length += req->auth_package.length;
p = data.data = malloc(data.length);
if (data.data == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
name_type = krb5_princ_type(context, req->user);
p[0] = (name_type >> 0 ) & 0xFF;
p[1] = (name_type >> 8 ) & 0xFF;
p[2] = (name_type >> 16) & 0xFF;
p[3] = (name_type >> 24) & 0xFF;
p += 4;
for (i = 0; i < krb5_princ_size(context, req->user); i++) {
if (krb5_princ_component(context, req->user, i)->length > 0) {
memcpy(p, krb5_princ_component(context, req->user, i)->data,
krb5_princ_component(context, req->user, i)->length);
}
p += krb5_princ_component(context, req->user, i)->length;
}
if (krb5_princ_realm(context, req->user)->length > 0) {
memcpy(p, krb5_princ_realm(context, req->user)->data,
krb5_princ_realm(context, req->user)->length);
}
p += krb5_princ_realm(context, req->user)->length;
if (req->auth_package.length > 0)
memcpy(p, req->auth_package.data, req->auth_package.length);
p += req->auth_package.length;
code = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context,
key,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM,
&data,
&req->cksum,
&valid);
if (code == 0 && valid == FALSE)
code = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
free(data.data);
return code;
}
Commit Message: Fix S4U2Self KDC crash when anon is restricted
In validate_as_request(), when enforcing restrict_anonymous_to_tgt,
use client.princ instead of request->client; the latter is NULL when
validating S4U2Self requests.
CVE-2016-3120:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause krb5kdc
to dereference a null pointer if the restrict_anonymous_to_tgt option
is set to true, by making an S4U2Self request.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8458 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 54,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int ethertype_to_npindex(int ethertype)
{
switch (ethertype) {
case ETH_P_IP:
return NP_IP;
case ETH_P_IPV6:
return NP_IPV6;
case ETH_P_IPX:
return NP_IPX;
case ETH_P_PPPTALK:
case ETH_P_ATALK:
return NP_AT;
case ETH_P_MPLS_UC:
return NP_MPLS_UC;
case ETH_P_MPLS_MC:
return NP_MPLS_MC;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 52,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_elem_info *info, int replace)
{
struct snd_card *card = file->card;
struct snd_kcontrol kctl, *_kctl;
unsigned int access;
long private_size;
struct user_element *ue;
int idx, err;
if (!replace && card->user_ctl_count >= MAX_USER_CONTROLS)
return -ENOMEM;
if (info->count < 1)
return -EINVAL;
access = info->access == 0 ? SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READWRITE :
(info->access & (SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READWRITE|
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_INACTIVE|
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READWRITE));
info->id.numid = 0;
memset(&kctl, 0, sizeof(kctl));
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
_kctl = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &info->id);
err = 0;
if (_kctl) {
if (replace)
err = snd_ctl_remove(card, _kctl);
else
err = -EBUSY;
} else {
if (replace)
err = -ENOENT;
}
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (err < 0)
return err;
memcpy(&kctl.id, &info->id, sizeof(info->id));
kctl.count = info->owner ? info->owner : 1;
access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_USER;
if (info->type == SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED)
kctl.info = snd_ctl_elem_user_enum_info;
else
kctl.info = snd_ctl_elem_user_info;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READ)
kctl.get = snd_ctl_elem_user_get;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_WRITE)
kctl.put = snd_ctl_elem_user_put;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READWRITE) {
kctl.tlv.c = snd_ctl_elem_user_tlv;
access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_CALLBACK;
}
switch (info->type) {
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_INTEGER:
private_size = sizeof(long);
if (info->count > 128)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_INTEGER64:
private_size = sizeof(long long);
if (info->count > 64)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED:
private_size = sizeof(unsigned int);
if (info->count > 128 || info->value.enumerated.items == 0)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_BYTES:
private_size = sizeof(unsigned char);
if (info->count > 512)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_IEC958:
private_size = sizeof(struct snd_aes_iec958);
if (info->count != 1)
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
private_size *= info->count;
ue = kzalloc(sizeof(struct user_element) + private_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ue == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
ue->card = card;
ue->info = *info;
ue->info.access = 0;
ue->elem_data = (char *)ue + sizeof(*ue);
ue->elem_data_size = private_size;
if (ue->info.type == SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED) {
err = snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names(ue);
if (err < 0) {
kfree(ue);
return err;
}
}
kctl.private_free = snd_ctl_elem_user_free;
_kctl = snd_ctl_new(&kctl, access);
if (_kctl == NULL) {
kfree(ue->priv_data);
kfree(ue);
return -ENOMEM;
}
_kctl->private_data = ue;
for (idx = 0; idx < _kctl->count; idx++)
_kctl->vd[idx].owner = file;
err = snd_ctl_add(card, _kctl);
if (err < 0)
return err;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
card->user_ctl_count++;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Fix replacing user controls
There are two issues with the current implementation for replacing user
controls. The first is that the code does not check if the control is actually a
user control and neither does it check if the control is owned by the process
that tries to remove it. That allows userspace applications to remove arbitrary
controls, which can cause a user after free if a for example a driver does not
expect a control to be removed from under its feed.
The second issue is that on one hand when a control is replaced the
user_ctl_count limit is not checked and on the other hand the user_ctl_count is
increased (even though the number of user controls does not change). This allows
userspace, once the user_ctl_count limit as been reached, to repeatedly replace
a control until user_ctl_count overflows. Once that happens new controls can be
added effectively bypassing the user_ctl_count limit.
Both issues can be fixed by instead of open-coding the removal of the control
that is to be replaced to use snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(). This function does
proper permission checks as well as decrements user_ctl_count after the control
has been removed.
Note that by using snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl() the check which returns -EBUSY at
beginning of the function if the control already exists is removed. This is not
a problem though since the check is quite useless, because the lock that is
protecting the control list is released between the check and before adding the
new control to the list, which means that it is possible that a different
control with the same settings is added to the list after the check. Luckily
there is another check that is done while holding the lock in snd_ctl_add(), so
we'll rely on that to make sure that the same control is not added twice.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 166,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
{
/* should be the case, see cirrus_bitblt_start */
assert(s->cirrus_blt_width > 0);
assert(s->cirrus_blt_height > 0);
if (s->cirrus_blt_width > CIRRUS_BLTBUFSIZE) {
return true;
}
if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
return true;
}
if (dst_only) {
return false;
}
if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 16,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_pdiscard(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_IN_PKT_DISCARDS);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_DISCARD_PACKET, SCTP_NULL());
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 31,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vhost_net_disable_vq(struct vhost_net *n,
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
{
struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq =
container_of(vq, struct vhost_net_virtqueue, vq);
struct vhost_poll *poll = n->poll + (nvq - n->vqs);
if (!vq->private_data)
return;
vhost_poll_stop(poll);
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 30,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tracing_set_tracer(struct trace_array *tr, const char *buf)
{
struct tracer *t;
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE
bool had_max_tr;
#endif
int ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&trace_types_lock);
if (!ring_buffer_expanded) {
ret = __tracing_resize_ring_buffer(tr, trace_buf_size,
RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = 0;
}
for (t = trace_types; t; t = t->next) {
if (strcmp(t->name, buf) == 0)
break;
}
if (!t) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (t == tr->current_trace)
goto out;
/* Some tracers won't work on kernel command line */
if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING && t->noboot) {
pr_warn("Tracer '%s' is not allowed on command line, ignored\n",
t->name);
goto out;
}
/* Some tracers are only allowed for the top level buffer */
if (!trace_ok_for_array(t, tr)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* If trace pipe files are being read, we can't change the tracer */
if (tr->current_trace->ref) {
ret = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
trace_branch_disable();
tr->current_trace->enabled--;
if (tr->current_trace->reset)
tr->current_trace->reset(tr);
/* Current trace needs to be nop_trace before synchronize_sched */
tr->current_trace = &nop_trace;
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE
had_max_tr = tr->allocated_snapshot;
if (had_max_tr && !t->use_max_tr) {
/*
* We need to make sure that the update_max_tr sees that
* current_trace changed to nop_trace to keep it from
* swapping the buffers after we resize it.
* The update_max_tr is called from interrupts disabled
* so a synchronized_sched() is sufficient.
*/
synchronize_sched();
free_snapshot(tr);
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE
if (t->use_max_tr && !had_max_tr) {
ret = tracing_alloc_snapshot_instance(tr);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
}
#endif
if (t->init) {
ret = tracer_init(t, tr);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
tr->current_trace = t;
tr->current_trace->enabled++;
trace_branch_enable(tr);
out:
mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static noinline int submit_compressed_extents(struct inode *inode,
struct async_cow *async_cow)
{
struct async_extent *async_extent;
u64 alloc_hint = 0;
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
struct btrfs_key ins;
struct extent_map *em;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct extent_map_tree *em_tree = &BTRFS_I(inode)->extent_tree;
struct extent_io_tree *io_tree;
int ret = 0;
if (list_empty(&async_cow->extents))
return 0;
while (!list_empty(&async_cow->extents)) {
async_extent = list_entry(async_cow->extents.next,
struct async_extent, list);
list_del(&async_extent->list);
io_tree = &BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree;
retry:
/* did the compression code fall back to uncompressed IO? */
if (!async_extent->pages) {
int page_started = 0;
unsigned long nr_written = 0;
lock_extent(io_tree, async_extent->start,
async_extent->start +
async_extent->ram_size - 1);
/* allocate blocks */
ret = cow_file_range(inode, async_cow->locked_page,
async_extent->start,
async_extent->start +
async_extent->ram_size - 1,
&page_started, &nr_written, 0);
/* JDM XXX */
/*
* if page_started, cow_file_range inserted an
* inline extent and took care of all the unlocking
* and IO for us. Otherwise, we need to submit
* all those pages down to the drive.
*/
if (!page_started && !ret)
extent_write_locked_range(io_tree,
inode, async_extent->start,
async_extent->start +
async_extent->ram_size - 1,
btrfs_get_extent,
WB_SYNC_ALL);
kfree(async_extent);
cond_resched();
continue;
}
lock_extent(io_tree, async_extent->start,
async_extent->start + async_extent->ram_size - 1);
trans = btrfs_join_transaction(root);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
} else {
trans->block_rsv = &root->fs_info->delalloc_block_rsv;
ret = btrfs_reserve_extent(trans, root,
async_extent->compressed_size,
async_extent->compressed_size,
0, alloc_hint, &ins, 1);
if (ret && ret != -ENOSPC)
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
}
if (ret) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < async_extent->nr_pages; i++) {
WARN_ON(async_extent->pages[i]->mapping);
page_cache_release(async_extent->pages[i]);
}
kfree(async_extent->pages);
async_extent->nr_pages = 0;
async_extent->pages = NULL;
unlock_extent(io_tree, async_extent->start,
async_extent->start +
async_extent->ram_size - 1);
if (ret == -ENOSPC)
goto retry;
goto out_free; /* JDM: Requeue? */
}
/*
* here we're doing allocation and writeback of the
* compressed pages
*/
btrfs_drop_extent_cache(inode, async_extent->start,
async_extent->start +
async_extent->ram_size - 1, 0);
em = alloc_extent_map();
BUG_ON(!em); /* -ENOMEM */
em->start = async_extent->start;
em->len = async_extent->ram_size;
em->orig_start = em->start;
em->block_start = ins.objectid;
em->block_len = ins.offset;
em->orig_block_len = ins.offset;
em->bdev = root->fs_info->fs_devices->latest_bdev;
em->compress_type = async_extent->compress_type;
set_bit(EXTENT_FLAG_PINNED, &em->flags);
set_bit(EXTENT_FLAG_COMPRESSED, &em->flags);
em->generation = -1;
while (1) {
write_lock(&em_tree->lock);
ret = add_extent_mapping(em_tree, em);
if (!ret)
list_move(&em->list,
&em_tree->modified_extents);
write_unlock(&em_tree->lock);
if (ret != -EEXIST) {
free_extent_map(em);
break;
}
btrfs_drop_extent_cache(inode, async_extent->start,
async_extent->start +
async_extent->ram_size - 1, 0);
}
ret = btrfs_add_ordered_extent_compress(inode,
async_extent->start,
ins.objectid,
async_extent->ram_size,
ins.offset,
BTRFS_ORDERED_COMPRESSED,
async_extent->compress_type);
BUG_ON(ret); /* -ENOMEM */
/*
* clear dirty, set writeback and unlock the pages.
*/
extent_clear_unlock_delalloc(inode,
&BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree,
async_extent->start,
async_extent->start +
async_extent->ram_size - 1,
NULL, EXTENT_CLEAR_UNLOCK_PAGE |
EXTENT_CLEAR_UNLOCK |
EXTENT_CLEAR_DELALLOC |
EXTENT_CLEAR_DIRTY | EXTENT_SET_WRITEBACK);
ret = btrfs_submit_compressed_write(inode,
async_extent->start,
async_extent->ram_size,
ins.objectid,
ins.offset, async_extent->pages,
async_extent->nr_pages);
BUG_ON(ret); /* -ENOMEM */
alloc_hint = ins.objectid + ins.offset;
kfree(async_extent);
cond_resched();
}
ret = 0;
out:
return ret;
out_free:
kfree(async_extent);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fuse_retrieve_end(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_req *req)
{
release_pages(req->pages, req->num_pages, 0);
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static WebCore::FrameLoaderClientEfl* _ewk_frame_loader_efl_get(const WebCore::Frame* frame)
{
return static_cast<WebCore::FrameLoaderClientEfl*>(frame->loader()->client());
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void TagToFilterModuleName(const char *tag,char *name)
{
assert(tag != (char *) NULL);
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",tag);
assert(name != (char *) NULL);
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_LTDL_DELEGATE)
(void) FormatLocaleString(name,MaxTextExtent,"%s.dll",tag);
#else
(void) FormatLocaleString(name,MaxTextExtent,"%s.la",tag);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 71,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pair_decode(char *str, float8 *x, float8 *y, char **s)
{
int has_delim;
char *cp;
if (!PointerIsValid(str))
return FALSE;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *str))
str++;
if ((has_delim = (*str == LDELIM)))
str++;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *str))
str++;
*x = strtod(str, &cp);
if (cp <= str)
return FALSE;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *cp))
cp++;
if (*cp++ != DELIM)
return FALSE;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *cp))
cp++;
*y = strtod(cp, &str);
if (str <= cp)
return FALSE;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *str))
str++;
if (has_delim)
{
if (*str != RDELIM)
return FALSE;
str++;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *str))
str++;
}
if (s != NULL)
*s = str;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t get_static_nip_by_mac(struct static_lease *st_lease, void *mac)
{
while (st_lease) {
if (memcmp(st_lease->mac, mac, 6) == 0)
return st_lease->nip;
st_lease = st_lease->next;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int get_process_comm(pid_t pid, char **name) {
int r;
assert(name);
if (pid == 0)
r = read_one_line_file("/proc/self/comm", name);
else {
char *p;
if (asprintf(&p, "/proc/%lu/comm", (unsigned long) pid) < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
r = read_one_line_file(p, name);
free(p);
}
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void findBigKeys(void) {
unsigned long long biggest[TYPE_COUNT] = {0}, counts[TYPE_COUNT] = {0}, totalsize[TYPE_COUNT] = {0};
unsigned long long sampled = 0, total_keys, totlen=0, *sizes=NULL, it=0;
sds maxkeys[TYPE_COUNT] = {0};
char *typename[] = {"string","list","set","hash","zset","stream","none"};
char *typeunit[] = {"bytes","items","members","fields","members","entries",""};
redisReply *reply, *keys;
unsigned int arrsize=0, i;
int type, *types=NULL;
double pct;
/* Total keys pre scanning */
total_keys = getDbSize();
/* Status message */
printf("\n# Scanning the entire keyspace to find biggest keys as well as\n");
printf("# average sizes per key type. You can use -i 0.1 to sleep 0.1 sec\n");
printf("# per 100 SCAN commands (not usually needed).\n\n");
/* New up sds strings to keep track of overall biggest per type */
for(i=0;i<TYPE_NONE; i++) {
maxkeys[i] = sdsempty();
if(!maxkeys[i]) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate memory for largest key names!\n");
exit(1);
}
}
/* SCAN loop */
do {
/* Calculate approximate percentage completion */
pct = 100 * (double)sampled/total_keys;
/* Grab some keys and point to the keys array */
reply = sendScan(&it);
keys = reply->element[1];
/* Reallocate our type and size array if we need to */
if(keys->elements > arrsize) {
types = zrealloc(types, sizeof(int)*keys->elements);
sizes = zrealloc(sizes, sizeof(unsigned long long)*keys->elements);
if(!types || !sizes) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate storage for keys!\n");
exit(1);
}
arrsize = keys->elements;
}
/* Retreive types and then sizes */
getKeyTypes(keys, types);
getKeySizes(keys, types, sizes);
/* Now update our stats */
for(i=0;i<keys->elements;i++) {
if((type = types[i]) == TYPE_NONE)
continue;
totalsize[type] += sizes[i];
counts[type]++;
totlen += keys->element[i]->len;
sampled++;
if(biggest[type]<sizes[i]) {
printf(
"[%05.2f%%] Biggest %-6s found so far '%s' with %llu %s\n",
pct, typename[type], keys->element[i]->str, sizes[i],
typeunit[type]);
/* Keep track of biggest key name for this type */
maxkeys[type] = sdscpy(maxkeys[type], keys->element[i]->str);
if(!maxkeys[type]) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate memory for key!\n");
exit(1);
}
/* Keep track of the biggest size for this type */
biggest[type] = sizes[i];
}
/* Update overall progress */
if(sampled % 1000000 == 0) {
printf("[%05.2f%%] Sampled %llu keys so far\n", pct, sampled);
}
}
/* Sleep if we've been directed to do so */
if(sampled && (sampled %100) == 0 && config.interval) {
usleep(config.interval);
}
freeReplyObject(reply);
} while(it != 0);
if(types) zfree(types);
if(sizes) zfree(sizes);
/* We're done */
printf("\n-------- summary -------\n\n");
printf("Sampled %llu keys in the keyspace!\n", sampled);
printf("Total key length in bytes is %llu (avg len %.2f)\n\n",
totlen, totlen ? (double)totlen/sampled : 0);
/* Output the biggest keys we found, for types we did find */
for(i=0;i<TYPE_NONE;i++) {
if(sdslen(maxkeys[i])>0) {
printf("Biggest %6s found '%s' has %llu %s\n", typename[i], maxkeys[i],
biggest[i], typeunit[i]);
}
}
printf("\n");
for(i=0;i<TYPE_NONE;i++) {
printf("%llu %ss with %llu %s (%05.2f%% of keys, avg size %.2f)\n",
counts[i], typename[i], totalsize[i], typeunit[i],
sampled ? 100 * (double)counts[i]/sampled : 0,
counts[i] ? (double)totalsize[i]/counts[i] : 0);
}
/* Free sds strings containing max keys */
for(i=0;i<TYPE_NONE;i++) {
sdsfree(maxkeys[i]);
}
/* Success! */
exit(0);
}
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 81,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::vector<PageHandler*> PageHandler::EnabledForWebContents(
WebContentsImpl* contents) {
if (!DevToolsAgentHost::HasFor(contents))
return std::vector<PageHandler*>();
std::vector<PageHandler*> result;
for (auto* handler :
PageHandler::ForAgentHost(static_cast<DevToolsAgentHostImpl*>(
DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(contents).get()))) {
if (handler->enabled_)
result.push_back(handler);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CairoOutputDev::endMarkedContent(GfxState *state)
{
if (text)
actualText->endMC(state);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
{
return !!v->arch.irq_lines || kvm_vgic_vcpu_pending_irq(v);
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ia64_patch_gate (void)
{
# define START(name) ((unsigned long) __start_gate_##name##_patchlist)
# define END(name) ((unsigned long)__end_gate_##name##_patchlist)
patch_fsyscall_table(START(fsyscall), END(fsyscall));
patch_brl_fsys_bubble_down(START(brl_fsys_bubble_down), END(brl_fsys_bubble_down));
ia64_patch_vtop(START(vtop), END(vtop));
ia64_patch_mckinley_e9(START(mckinley_e9), END(mckinley_e9));
}
Commit Message: [IA64] Workaround for RSE issue
Problem: An application violating the architectural rules regarding
operation dependencies and having specific Register Stack Engine (RSE)
state at the time of the violation, may result in an illegal operation
fault and invalid RSE state. Such faults may initiate a cascade of
repeated illegal operation faults within OS interruption handlers.
The specific behavior is OS dependent.
Implication: An application causing an illegal operation fault with
specific RSE state may result in a series of illegal operation faults
and an eventual OS stack overflow condition.
Workaround: OS interruption handlers that switch to kernel backing
store implement a check for invalid RSE state to avoid the series
of illegal operation faults.
The core of the workaround is the RSE_WORKAROUND code sequence
inserted into each invocation of the SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER and
SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER_R19 macros. This sequence includes hard-coded
constants that depend on the number of stacked physical registers
being 96. The rest of this patch consists of code to disable this
workaround should this not be the case (with the presumption that
if a future Itanium processor increases the number of registers, it
would also remove the need for this patch).
Move the start of the RBS up to a mod32 boundary to avoid some
corner cases.
The dispatch_illegal_op_fault code outgrew the spot it was
squatting in when built with this patch and CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y
Move it out to the end of the ivt.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 74,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AutocompleteResult& AutocompleteEditModel::result() const {
return autocomplete_controller_->result();
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
((void) p);
((void) end);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
((void) p);
((void) end);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server
* doesn't use a psk_identity_hint
*/
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE )
{
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
/* Current message is probably either
* CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
goto exit;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key exchange message must "
"not be skipped" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
} /* FALLTROUGH */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
; /* nothing more to do */
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
p, end - p );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
size_t sig_len, hashlen;
unsigned char hash[64];
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
size_t params_len = p - params;
/*
* Handle the digitally-signed structure
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
if( ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( ssl, &p, end,
&md_alg, &pk_alg ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
if( pk_alg != mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info );
/* Default hash for ECDSA is SHA-1 */
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else
#endif
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/*
* Read signature
*/
if( p > end - 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
p += 2;
if( end != p + sig_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "signature", p, sig_len );
/*
* Compute the hash that has been signed
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
hashlen = 36;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, params,
params_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
/* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
hashlen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, params,
params_len, md_alg );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen != 0 ? hashlen :
(unsigned int) ( mbedtls_md_get_size( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) ) );
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* Verify signature
*/
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
exit:
ssl->state++;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server key exchange" ) );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Prevent arithmetic overflow on bounds check
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void atl2_read_pci_cfg(struct atl2_hw *hw, u32 reg, u16 *value)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = hw->back;
pci_read_config_word(adapter->pdev, reg, value);
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 55,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void didStopLoading()
{
m_stopLoadingCount++;
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Layer::SetParent(Layer* layer) {
DCHECK(!layer || !layer->HasAncestor(this));
if (parent_should_know_need_push_properties()) {
if (parent_)
parent_->RemoveDependentNeedsPushProperties();
if (layer)
layer->AddDependentNeedsPushProperties();
}
parent_ = layer;
SetLayerTreeHost(parent_ ? parent_->layer_tree_host() : NULL);
if (!layer_tree_host_)
return;
const LayerTreeSettings& settings = layer_tree_host_->settings();
if (!settings.layer_transforms_should_scale_layer_contents)
return;
reset_raster_scale_to_unknown();
if (mask_layer_.get())
mask_layer_->reset_raster_scale_to_unknown();
if (replica_layer_.get() && replica_layer_->mask_layer_.get())
replica_layer_->mask_layer_->reset_raster_scale_to_unknown();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnGetWindowState(
std::unique_ptr<browser::GetWindowBoundsResult> result) {
HeadlessBrowser::Options::Builder builder;
const HeadlessBrowser::Options kDefaultOptions = builder.Build();
CheckWindowBounds(gfx::Rect(kDefaultOptions.window_size), state_,
std::move(result));
FinishAsynchronousTest();
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetTooltipsEnabled(bool enable) {
if (enable) {
tooltip_disabler_.reset();
} else {
tooltip_disabler_.reset(
new aura::client::ScopedTooltipDisabler(window_->GetRootWindow()));
}
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseAudioContext::HandlePostRenderTasks(const AudioBus* destination_bus) {
DCHECK(IsAudioThread());
if (TryLock()) {
GetDeferredTaskHandler().BreakConnections();
GetDeferredTaskHandler().HandleDeferredTasks();
GetDeferredTaskHandler().RequestToDeleteHandlersOnMainThread();
unlock();
}
if (HasRealtimeConstraint()) {
bool is_audible = IsAudible(destination_bus);
if (is_audible) {
++total_audible_renders_;
}
if (currentTime() <= kStopRecordingAudibilityTime) {
if (was_audible_ != is_audible) {
was_audible_ = is_audible;
if (is_audible) {
PostCrossThreadTask(
*task_runner_, FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(&BaseAudioContext::NotifyAudibleAudioStarted,
WrapCrossThreadPersistent(this)));
} else {
PostCrossThreadTask(
*task_runner_, FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(&BaseAudioContext::NotifyAudibleAudioStopped,
WrapCrossThreadPersistent(this)));
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterAAIImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("AAI");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: float DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::maximumWidth(const Font& font)
{
float maximumWidth = font.width(visibleEmptyValue());
for (unsigned index = 0; index < m_symbols.size(); ++index)
maximumWidth = std::max(maximumWidth, font.width(m_symbols[index]));
return maximumWidth + DateTimeFieldElement::maximumWidth(font);
}
Commit Message: INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 103,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BluetoothAdapter::CanPower() const {
return IsPresent();
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document& Document::AXObjectCacheOwner() const {
Document* doc = const_cast<Document*>(this);
if (doc->GetFrame() && doc->GetFrame()->PagePopupOwner()) {
DCHECK(!doc->ax_object_cache_);
return doc->GetFrame()
->PagePopupOwner()
->GetDocument()
.AXObjectCacheOwner();
}
return *doc;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::OnDidStopLoading() {
for (const auto& pair : proxy_hosts_) {
pair.second->Send(new FrameMsg_DidStopLoading(pair.second->GetRoutingID()));
}
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_restart(struct sem_array *sma, struct sem_queue *q)
{
struct sem *curr;
struct sem_queue *h;
/* if the operation didn't modify the array, then no restart */
if (q->alter == 0)
return 0;
/* pending complex operations are too difficult to analyse */
if (sma->complex_count)
return 1;
/* we were a sleeping complex operation. Too difficult */
if (q->nsops > 1)
return 1;
curr = sma->sem_base + q->sops[0].sem_num;
/* No-one waits on this queue */
if (list_empty(&curr->sem_pending))
return 0;
/* the new semaphore value */
if (curr->semval) {
/* It is impossible that someone waits for the new value:
* - q is a previously sleeping simple operation that
* altered the array. It must be a decrement, because
* simple increments never sleep.
* - The value is not 0, thus wait-for-zero won't proceed.
* - If there are older (higher priority) decrements
* in the queue, then they have observed the original
* semval value and couldn't proceed. The operation
* decremented to value - thus they won't proceed either.
*/
BUG_ON(q->sops[0].sem_op >= 0);
return 0;
}
/*
* semval is 0. Check if there are wait-for-zero semops.
* They must be the first entries in the per-semaphore queue
*/
h = list_first_entry(&curr->sem_pending, struct sem_queue, list);
BUG_ON(h->nsops != 1);
BUG_ON(h->sops[0].sem_num != q->sops[0].sem_num);
/* Yes, there is a wait-for-zero semop. Restart */
if (h->sops[0].sem_op == 0)
return 1;
/* Again - no-one is waiting for the new value. */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _bdf_list_shift( _bdf_list_t* list,
unsigned long n )
{
unsigned long i, u;
if ( list == 0 || list->used == 0 || n == 0 )
return;
if ( n >= list->used )
{
list->used = 0;
return;
}
for ( u = n, i = 0; u < list->used; i++, u++ )
list->field[i] = list->field[u];
list->used -= n;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_process_child_read (struct t_hook *hook_process, int fd,
int index_buffer, struct t_hook **hook_fd)
{
char buffer[4096];
int num_read;
if (hook_process->deleted)
return;
num_read = read (fd, buffer, sizeof (buffer) - 1);
if (num_read > 0)
{
hook_process_add_to_buffer (hook_process, index_buffer,
buffer, num_read);
}
else if (num_read == 0)
{
unhook (*hook_fd);
*hook_fd = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DataPipeConsumerDispatcher::EndSerialize(
void* destination,
ports::PortName* ports,
PlatformHandle* platform_handles) {
SerializedState* state = static_cast<SerializedState*>(destination);
memcpy(&state->options, &options_, sizeof(MojoCreateDataPipeOptions));
memset(state->padding, 0, sizeof(state->padding));
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
DCHECK(in_transit_);
state->pipe_id = pipe_id_;
state->read_offset = read_offset_;
state->bytes_available = bytes_available_;
state->flags = peer_closed_ ? kFlagPeerClosed : 0;
auto region_handle =
base::UnsafeSharedMemoryRegion::TakeHandleForSerialization(
std::move(shared_ring_buffer_));
const base::UnguessableToken& guid = region_handle.GetGUID();
state->buffer_guid_high = guid.GetHighForSerialization();
state->buffer_guid_low = guid.GetLowForSerialization();
ports[0] = control_port_.name();
PlatformHandle handle;
PlatformHandle ignored_handle;
ExtractPlatformHandlesFromSharedMemoryRegionHandle(
region_handle.PassPlatformHandle(), &handle, &ignored_handle);
if (!handle.is_valid() || ignored_handle.is_valid())
return false;
platform_handles[0] = std::move(handle);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 154,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem)
{
int r;
gfn_t base_gfn;
unsigned long npages;
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
struct kvm_memory_slot old, new;
struct kvm_memslots *slots = NULL, *old_memslots;
int as_id, id;
enum kvm_mr_change change;
r = check_memory_region_flags(mem);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
as_id = mem->slot >> 16;
id = (u16)mem->slot;
/* General sanity checks */
if (mem->memory_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
/* We can read the guest memory with __xxx_user() later on. */
if ((id < KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS) &&
((mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) ||
!access_ok((void __user *)(unsigned long)mem->userspace_addr,
mem->memory_size)))
goto out;
if (as_id >= KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM || id >= KVM_MEM_SLOTS_NUM)
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr + mem->memory_size < mem->guest_phys_addr)
goto out;
slot = id_to_memslot(__kvm_memslots(kvm, as_id), id);
base_gfn = mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (npages > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES)
goto out;
new = old = *slot;
new.id = id;
new.base_gfn = base_gfn;
new.npages = npages;
new.flags = mem->flags;
if (npages) {
if (!old.npages)
change = KVM_MR_CREATE;
else { /* Modify an existing slot. */
if ((mem->userspace_addr != old.userspace_addr) ||
(npages != old.npages) ||
((new.flags ^ old.flags) & KVM_MEM_READONLY))
goto out;
if (base_gfn != old.base_gfn)
change = KVM_MR_MOVE;
else if (new.flags != old.flags)
change = KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY;
else { /* Nothing to change. */
r = 0;
goto out;
}
}
} else {
if (!old.npages)
goto out;
change = KVM_MR_DELETE;
new.base_gfn = 0;
new.flags = 0;
}
if ((change == KVM_MR_CREATE) || (change == KVM_MR_MOVE)) {
/* Check for overlaps */
r = -EEXIST;
kvm_for_each_memslot(slot, __kvm_memslots(kvm, as_id)) {
if (slot->id == id)
continue;
if (!((base_gfn + npages <= slot->base_gfn) ||
(base_gfn >= slot->base_gfn + slot->npages)))
goto out;
}
}
/* Free page dirty bitmap if unneeded */
if (!(new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
r = -ENOMEM;
if (change == KVM_MR_CREATE) {
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
if (kvm_arch_create_memslot(kvm, &new, npages))
goto out_free;
}
/* Allocate page dirty bitmap if needed */
if ((new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES) && !new.dirty_bitmap) {
if (kvm_create_dirty_bitmap(&new) < 0)
goto out_free;
}
slots = kvzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_memslots), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
memcpy(slots, __kvm_memslots(kvm, as_id), sizeof(struct kvm_memslots));
if ((change == KVM_MR_DELETE) || (change == KVM_MR_MOVE)) {
slot = id_to_memslot(slots, id);
slot->flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID;
old_memslots = install_new_memslots(kvm, as_id, slots);
/* From this point no new shadow pages pointing to a deleted,
* or moved, memslot will be created.
*
* validation of sp->gfn happens in:
* - gfn_to_hva (kvm_read_guest, gfn_to_pfn)
* - kvm_is_visible_gfn (mmu_check_roots)
*/
kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(kvm, slot);
/*
* We can re-use the old_memslots from above, the only difference
* from the currently installed memslots is the invalid flag. This
* will get overwritten by update_memslots anyway.
*/
slots = old_memslots;
}
r = kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(kvm, &new, mem, change);
if (r)
goto out_slots;
/* actual memory is freed via old in kvm_free_memslot below */
if (change == KVM_MR_DELETE) {
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
memset(&new.arch, 0, sizeof(new.arch));
}
update_memslots(slots, &new, change);
old_memslots = install_new_memslots(kvm, as_id, slots);
kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(kvm, mem, &old, &new, change);
kvm_free_memslot(kvm, &old, &new);
kvfree(old_memslots);
return 0;
out_slots:
kvfree(slots);
out_free:
kvm_free_memslot(kvm, &new, &old);
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 91,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int read_io_status(modbus_t *ctx, int function,
int addr, int nb, uint8_t *dest)
{
int rc;
int req_length;
uint8_t req[_MIN_REQ_LENGTH];
uint8_t rsp[MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH];
req_length = ctx->backend->build_request_basis(ctx, function, addr, nb, req);
rc = send_msg(ctx, req, req_length);
if (rc > 0) {
int i, temp, bit;
int pos = 0;
int offset;
int offset_end;
rc = _modbus_receive_msg(ctx, rsp, MSG_CONFIRMATION);
if (rc == -1)
return -1;
rc = check_confirmation(ctx, req, rsp, rc);
if (rc == -1)
return -1;
offset = ctx->backend->header_length + 2;
offset_end = offset + rc;
for (i = offset; i < offset_end; i++) {
/* Shift reg hi_byte to temp */
temp = rsp[i];
for (bit = 0x01; (bit & 0xff) && (pos < nb);) {
dest[pos++] = (temp & bit) ? TRUE : FALSE;
bit = bit << 1;
}
}
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 88,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int septransform(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, ref *sepspace, int *usealternate, int *stage, int *stack_depth)
{
gx_device * dev = igs->device;
ref sname, proc;
int code, colorant_number;
code = array_get(imemory, sepspace, 1, &sname);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (r_has_type(&sname, t_name)) {
name_string_ref(imemory, &sname, &sname);
}
/* Check for /All and /None, never need the alternate for these */
if (r_size(&sname) == 3 &&
strncmp("All", (const char *)sname.value.bytes, r_size(&sname)) == 0) {
*usealternate = 0;
return 0;
}
if (r_size(&sname) == 4 &&
strncmp("None", (const char *)sname.value.bytes, r_size(&sname)) == 0) {
*usealternate = 0;
return 0;
}
/*
* Compare the colorant name to the device's. If the device's
* compare routine returns GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS then the
* colorant is in the SeparationNames list but not in the
* SeparationOrder list.
*/
colorant_number = (*dev_proc(dev, get_color_comp_index))
(dev, (const char *)sname.value.bytes, r_size(&sname), SEPARATION_NAME);
if (colorant_number >= 0) { /* If valid colorant name */
*usealternate = 0;
} else
*usealternate = 1;
if (*usealternate && *stage == 0) {
(*stage)++;
esp++;
code = array_get(imemory, sepspace, 3, &proc);
if (code < 0)
return code;
*esp = proc;
return o_push_estack;
}
*stage = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClearSchemes() {
schemes_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Apply missing kParentDirectory check
BUG=161564
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11414046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __be32 *xdr_encode_opaque(__be32 *p, const void *ptr, unsigned int nbytes)
{
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(nbytes);
return xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, ptr, nbytes);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FindBarController::Show() {
FindManager* find_manager = tab_contents_->GetFindManager();
if (!find_manager->find_ui_active()) {
MaybeSetPrepopulateText();
find_manager->set_find_ui_active(true);
find_bar_->Show(true);
}
find_bar_->SetFocusAndSelection();
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidFinishLoad() {
TRACE_EVENT1("navigation,benchmark,rail",
"RenderFrameImpl::didFinishLoad", "id", routing_id_);
if (!frame_->Parent()) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("WebCore,benchmark,rail", "LoadFinished",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_PROCESS);
}
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidFinishLoad();
WebDocumentLoader* document_loader = frame_->GetDocumentLoader();
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidFinishLoad(routing_id_, document_loader->GetUrl()));
if (!RenderThreadImpl::current())
return;
RenderThreadImpl::RendererMemoryMetrics memory_metrics;
if (!RenderThreadImpl::current()->GetRendererMemoryMetrics(&memory_metrics))
return;
RecordSuffixedRendererMemoryMetrics(memory_metrics, ".DidFinishLoad");
if (!IsMainFrame())
return;
RecordSuffixedRendererMemoryMetrics(memory_metrics,
".MainFrameDidFinishLoad");
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void netlink_forward_ring(struct netlink_ring *ring)
{
unsigned int head = ring->head, pos = head;
const struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr;
do {
hdr = __netlink_lookup_frame(ring, pos);
if (hdr->nm_status == NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED)
break;
if (hdr->nm_status != NL_MMAP_STATUS_SKIP)
break;
netlink_increment_head(ring);
} while (ring->head != head);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int muscle_set_security_env(sc_card_t *card,
const sc_security_env_t *env,
int se_num)
{
muscle_private_t* priv = MUSCLE_DATA(card);
if (env->operation != SC_SEC_OPERATION_SIGN &&
env->operation != SC_SEC_OPERATION_DECIPHER) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "Invalid crypto operation supplied.\n");
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (env->algorithm != SC_ALGORITHM_RSA) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "Invalid crypto algorithm supplied.\n");
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
/* ADJUST FOR PKCS1 padding support for decryption only */
if ((env->algorithm_flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PADS) ||
(env->algorithm_flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASHES)) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "Card supports only raw RSA.\n");
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (env->flags & SC_SEC_ENV_KEY_REF_PRESENT) {
if (env->key_ref_len != 1 ||
(env->key_ref[0] > 0x0F)) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "Invalid key reference supplied.\n");
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
priv->rsa_key_ref = env->key_ref[0];
}
if (env->flags & SC_SEC_ENV_ALG_REF_PRESENT) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "Algorithm reference not supported.\n");
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
/* if (env->flags & SC_SEC_ENV_FILE_REF_PRESENT)
if (memcmp(env->file_ref.value, "\x00\x12", 2) != 0) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "File reference is not 0012.\n");
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
} */
priv->env = *env;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void * load_bytes(RBinFile *bf, const ut8 *buf, ut64 sz, ut64 loadaddr, Sdb *sdb) {
struct Elf_(r_bin_elf_obj_t) *res;
if (!buf || !sz || sz == UT64_MAX) {
return NULL;
}
RBuffer *tbuf = r_buf_new ();
r_buf_set_bytes (tbuf, buf, sz);
res = Elf_(r_bin_elf_new_buf) (tbuf, bf->rbin->verbose);
if (res) {
sdb_ns_set (sdb, "info", res->kv);
}
r_buf_free (tbuf);
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void _WM_do_meta_lyric(struct _mdi *mdi, struct _event_data *data) {
/* placeholder function so we can record tempo in the event stream
* for conversion function _WM_Event2Midi */
#ifdef DEBUG_MIDI
uint8_t ch = data->channel;
MIDI_EVENT_SDEBUG(__FUNCTION__, ch, data->data.string);
#endif
if (!(mdi->extra_info.mixer_options & WM_MO_TEXTASLYRIC)) {
mdi->lyric = data->data.string;
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 63,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int netlink_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_puts(seq,
"sk Eth Pid Groups "
"Rmem Wmem Dump Locks Drops Inode\n");
} else {
struct sock *s = v;
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(s);
seq_printf(seq, "%pK %-3d %-6d %08x %-8d %-8d %pK %-8d %-8d %-8lu\n",
s,
s->sk_protocol,
nlk->pid,
nlk->groups ? (u32)nlk->groups[0] : 0,
sk_rmem_alloc_get(s),
sk_wmem_alloc_get(s),
nlk->cb,
atomic_read(&s->sk_refcnt),
atomic_read(&s->sk_drops),
sock_i_ino(s)
);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SkBitmap Browser::GetCurrentPageIcon() const {
TabContents* contents = GetSelectedTabContents();
return contents ? contents->GetFavIcon() : SkBitmap();
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IMediaDeathNotifier::addObitRecipient(const wp<IMediaDeathNotifier>& recipient)
{
ALOGV("addObitRecipient");
Mutex::Autolock _l(sServiceLock);
sObitRecipients.add(recipient);
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 159,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static AttrNodeList* ensureAttrNodeListForElement(Element* element)
{
if (element->hasSyntheticAttrChildNodes()) {
ASSERT(attrNodeListMap().contains(element));
return attrNodeListMap().get(element);
}
ASSERT(!attrNodeListMap().contains(element));
element->setHasSyntheticAttrChildNodes(true);
AttrNodeListMap::AddResult result = attrNodeListMap().add(element, adoptPtr(new AttrNodeList));
return result.iterator->value.get();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPagePrivate::didChangeSettings(WebSettings* webSettings)
{
Settings* coreSettings = m_page->settings();
m_page->setGroupName(webSettings->pageGroupName());
coreSettings->setXSSAuditorEnabled(webSettings->xssAuditorEnabled());
coreSettings->setLoadsImagesAutomatically(webSettings->loadsImagesAutomatically());
coreSettings->setShouldDrawBorderWhileLoadingImages(webSettings->shouldDrawBorderWhileLoadingImages());
coreSettings->setScriptEnabled(webSettings->isJavaScriptEnabled());
coreSettings->setPrivateBrowsingEnabled(webSettings->isPrivateBrowsingEnabled());
coreSettings->setDeviceSupportsMouse(webSettings->deviceSupportsMouse());
coreSettings->setDefaultFixedFontSize(webSettings->defaultFixedFontSize());
coreSettings->setDefaultFontSize(webSettings->defaultFontSize());
coreSettings->setMinimumLogicalFontSize(webSettings->minimumFontSize());
if (!webSettings->serifFontFamily().empty())
coreSettings->setSerifFontFamily(String(webSettings->serifFontFamily()));
if (!webSettings->fixedFontFamily().empty())
coreSettings->setFixedFontFamily(String(webSettings->fixedFontFamily()));
if (!webSettings->sansSerifFontFamily().empty())
coreSettings->setSansSerifFontFamily(String(webSettings->sansSerifFontFamily()));
if (!webSettings->standardFontFamily().empty())
coreSettings->setStandardFontFamily(String(webSettings->standardFontFamily()));
coreSettings->setJavaScriptCanOpenWindowsAutomatically(webSettings->canJavaScriptOpenWindowsAutomatically());
coreSettings->setAllowScriptsToCloseWindows(webSettings->canJavaScriptOpenWindowsAutomatically()); // Why are we using the same value as setJavaScriptCanOpenWindowsAutomatically()?
coreSettings->setPluginsEnabled(webSettings->arePluginsEnabled());
coreSettings->setDefaultTextEncodingName(webSettings->defaultTextEncodingName());
coreSettings->setDownloadableBinaryFontsEnabled(webSettings->downloadableBinaryFontsEnabled());
coreSettings->setSpatialNavigationEnabled(m_webSettings->isSpatialNavigationEnabled());
coreSettings->setAsynchronousSpellCheckingEnabled(m_webSettings->isAsynchronousSpellCheckingEnabled());
BlackBerry::Platform::String stylesheetURL = webSettings->userStyleSheetLocation();
if (!stylesheetURL.empty())
coreSettings->setUserStyleSheetLocation(KURL(KURL(), stylesheetURL));
coreSettings->setFirstScheduledLayoutDelay(webSettings->firstScheduledLayoutDelay());
coreSettings->setUseCache(webSettings->useWebKitCache());
coreSettings->setCookieEnabled(webSettings->areCookiesEnabled());
#if ENABLE(SQL_DATABASE)
static bool dbinit = false;
if (!dbinit && !webSettings->databasePath().empty()) {
dbinit = true;
DatabaseManager::initialize(webSettings->databasePath());
}
static bool acinit = false;
if (!acinit && !webSettings->appCachePath().empty()) {
acinit = true;
cacheStorage().setCacheDirectory(webSettings->appCachePath());
}
coreSettings->setLocalStorageDatabasePath(webSettings->localStoragePath());
Database::setIsAvailable(webSettings->isDatabasesEnabled());
DatabaseSync::setIsAvailable(webSettings->isDatabasesEnabled());
coreSettings->setLocalStorageEnabled(webSettings->isLocalStorageEnabled());
coreSettings->setOfflineWebApplicationCacheEnabled(webSettings->isAppCacheEnabled());
m_page->group().groupSettings()->setLocalStorageQuotaBytes(webSettings->localStorageQuota());
coreSettings->setSessionStorageQuota(webSettings->sessionStorageQuota());
coreSettings->setUsesPageCache(webSettings->maximumPagesInCache());
coreSettings->setFrameFlatteningEnabled(webSettings->isFrameFlatteningEnabled());
#endif
#if ENABLE(INDEXED_DATABASE)
m_page->group().groupSettings()->setIndexedDBDatabasePath(webSettings->indexedDataBasePath());
#endif
#if ENABLE(WEB_SOCKETS)
WebSocket::setIsAvailable(webSettings->areWebSocketsEnabled());
#endif
#if ENABLE(FULLSCREEN_API)
coreSettings->setFullScreenEnabled(true);
#endif
#if ENABLE(VIEWPORT_REFLOW)
coreSettings->setTextReflowEnabled(webSettings->textReflowMode() == WebSettings::TextReflowEnabled);
#endif
coreSettings->setShouldUseFirstScheduledLayoutDelay(webSettings->isEmailMode());
coreSettings->setProcessHTTPEquiv(!webSettings->isEmailMode());
coreSettings->setShouldUseCrossOriginProtocolCheck(!webSettings->allowCrossSiteRequests());
coreSettings->setWebSecurityEnabled(!webSettings->allowCrossSiteRequests());
cookieManager().setPrivateMode(webSettings->isPrivateBrowsingEnabled());
CredentialStorage::setPrivateMode(webSettings->isPrivateBrowsingEnabled());
if (m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->view()) {
Color backgroundColor(webSettings->backgroundColor());
m_mainFrame->view()->updateBackgroundRecursively(backgroundColor, backgroundColor.hasAlpha());
Platform::userInterfaceThreadMessageClient()->dispatchMessage(
createMethodCallMessage(&WebPagePrivate::setCompositorBackgroundColor, this, backgroundColor));
}
if (m_backingStore) {
m_backingStore->d->setWebPageBackgroundColor(m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->view()
? m_mainFrame->view()->documentBackgroundColor()
: webSettings->backgroundColor());
}
m_page->setDeviceScaleFactor(webSettings->devicePixelRatio());
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::CommitNavigationInternal(
const network::ResourceResponseHead& head,
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
const CommitNavigationParams& commit_params,
network::mojom::URLLoaderClientEndpointsPtr url_loader_client_endpoints,
std::unique_ptr<blink::URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo>
subresource_loader_factories,
base::Optional<std::vector<mojom::TransferrableURLLoaderPtr>>
subresource_overrides,
blink::mojom::ControllerServiceWorkerInfoPtr controller_service_worker_info,
blink::mojom::ServiceWorkerProviderInfoForWindowPtr provider_info,
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtr prefetch_loader_factory,
const base::UnguessableToken& devtools_navigation_token,
mojom::FrameNavigationControl::CommitNavigationCallback callback,
mojom::NavigationClient::CommitNavigationCallback
per_navigation_mojo_interface_callback) {
DCHECK(!IsRendererDebugURL(common_params.url));
DCHECK(
!FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::IsSameDocument(common_params.navigation_type));
if (ShouldIgnoreCommitNavigation(commit_params)) {
browser_side_navigation_pending_url_ = GURL();
AbortCommitNavigation(std::move(callback),
blink::mojom::CommitResult::Aborted);
return;
}
bool was_initiated_in_this_frame = false;
if (IsPerNavigationMojoInterfaceEnabled()) {
was_initiated_in_this_frame =
navigation_client_impl_ &&
navigation_client_impl_->was_initiated_in_this_frame();
} else {
was_initiated_in_this_frame =
browser_side_navigation_pending_ &&
browser_side_navigation_pending_url_ == commit_params.original_url &&
commit_params.nav_entry_id == 0;
}
DCHECK(common_params.url.SchemeIs(url::kJavaScriptScheme) ||
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService) ||
subresource_loader_factories);
const network::ResourceResponseHead* response_head = nullptr;
if (!frame_->Parent() && !frame_->IsViewSourceModeEnabled())
response_head = &head;
int request_id = ResourceDispatcher::MakeRequestID();
std::unique_ptr<DocumentState> document_state = BuildDocumentStateFromParams(
common_params, commit_params, base::TimeTicks::Now(), std::move(callback),
std::move(per_navigation_mojo_interface_callback), response_head,
std::move(navigation_client_impl_), request_id,
was_initiated_in_this_frame);
bool is_client_redirect =
!!(common_params.transition & ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_CLIENT_REDIRECT);
auto navigation_params =
std::make_unique<WebNavigationParams>(devtools_navigation_token);
navigation_params->is_client_redirect = is_client_redirect;
FillMiscNavigationParams(common_params, commit_params,
navigation_params.get());
auto commit_with_params = base::BindOnce(
&RenderFrameImpl::CommitNavigationWithParams, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
common_params, commit_params, std::move(subresource_loader_factories),
std::move(subresource_overrides),
std::move(controller_service_worker_info), std::move(provider_info),
std::move(prefetch_loader_factory), std::move(document_state));
bool should_load_data_url = !common_params.base_url_for_data_url.is_empty();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
should_load_data_url |= !commit_params.data_url_as_string.empty();
#endif
if (is_main_frame_ && should_load_data_url) {
std::string mime_type, charset, data;
GURL base_url;
DecodeDataURL(common_params, commit_params, &mime_type, &charset, &data,
&base_url);
navigation_params->url = base_url;
WebNavigationParams::FillStaticResponse(navigation_params.get(),
WebString::FromUTF8(mime_type),
WebString::FromUTF8(charset), data);
navigation_params->unreachable_url = common_params.history_url_for_data_url;
std::move(commit_with_params).Run(std::move(navigation_params));
return;
}
FillNavigationParamsRequest(common_params, commit_params,
navigation_params.get());
if (!url_loader_client_endpoints &&
common_params.url.SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme)) {
std::string mime_type, charset, data;
if (!net::DataURL::Parse(common_params.url, &mime_type, &charset, &data)) {
CHECK(false) << "Invalid URL passed: "
<< common_params.url.possibly_invalid_spec();
return;
}
WebNavigationParams::FillStaticResponse(navigation_params.get(),
WebString::FromUTF8(mime_type),
WebString::FromUTF8(charset), data);
} else {
NavigationBodyLoader::FillNavigationParamsResponseAndBodyLoader(
common_params, commit_params, request_id, head,
std::move(url_loader_client_endpoints),
GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kInternalLoading), GetRoutingID(),
!frame_->Parent(), navigation_params.get());
}
bool is_mhtml_archive =
base::LowerCaseEqualsASCII(head.mime_type, "multipart/related") ||
base::LowerCaseEqualsASCII(head.mime_type, "message/rfc822");
if (is_mhtml_archive && navigation_params->body_loader) {
mhtml_body_loader_client_ =
std::make_unique<RenderFrameImpl::MHTMLBodyLoaderClient>(
std::move(navigation_params), std::move(commit_with_params));
return;
}
std::move(commit_with_params).Run(std::move(navigation_params));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionApiTest::RunPlatformAppTestWithFlags(
const std::string& extension_name, int flags) {
return RunExtensionTestImpl(
extension_name, std::string(), NULL, flags | kFlagLaunchPlatformApp);
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void __bd_forget(struct inode *inode)
{
list_del_init(&inode->i_devices);
inode->i_bdev = NULL;
inode->i_mapping = &inode->i_data;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_mkdir(void *opaque)
{
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
size_t offset = 7;
int32_t fid;
struct stat stbuf;
V9fsQID qid;
V9fsString name;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
gid_t gid;
int mode;
int err = 0;
v9fs_string_init(&name);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dsdd", &fid, &name, &mode, &gid);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_mkdir(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, name.data, mode, gid);
if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
if (!strcmp(".", name.data) || !strcmp("..", name.data)) {
err = -EEXIST;
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
err = v9fs_co_mkdir(pdu, fidp, &name, mode, fidp->uid, gid, &stbuf);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
stat_to_qid(&stbuf, &qid);
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "Q", &qid);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
err += offset;
trace_v9fs_mkdir_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id,
qid.type, qid.version, qid.path, err);
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&name);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InjectRawKeyEvent(WebContents* web_contents,
blink::WebInputEvent::Type type,
ui::DomKey key,
ui::DomCode code,
ui::KeyboardCode key_code,
int modifiers) {
NativeWebKeyboardEvent event(type, modifiers, base::TimeTicks::Now());
BuildSimpleWebKeyEvent(type, key, code, key_code, &event);
WebContentsImpl* web_contents_impl =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(web_contents);
RenderWidgetHostImpl* main_frame_rwh =
web_contents_impl->GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost();
web_contents_impl->GetFocusedRenderWidgetHost(main_frame_rwh)
->ForwardKeyboardEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void closePendingFds(unixFile *pFile){
unixInodeInfo *pInode = pFile->pInode;
UnixUnusedFd *p;
UnixUnusedFd *pNext;
for(p=pInode->pUnused; p; p=pNext){
pNext = p->pNext;
robust_close(pFile, p->fd, __LINE__);
sqlite3_free(p);
}
pInode->pUnused = 0;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,399 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline static int php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(char *filename)
{
if (php_check_open_basedir(filename)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int maybe_init_creds(struct scm_cookie *scm,
struct socket *socket,
const struct sock *other)
{
int err;
struct msghdr msg = { .msg_controllen = 0 };
err = scm_send(socket, &msg, scm, false);
if (err)
return err;
if (unix_passcred_enabled(socket, other)) {
scm->pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
current_uid_gid(&scm->creds.uid, &scm->creds.gid);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 54,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteOTBImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
#define SetBit(a,i,set) \
a=(unsigned char) ((set) ? (a) | (1L << (i)) : (a) & ~(1L << (i)))
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
bit,
byte,
info;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
/*
Convert image to a bi-level image.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
info=0;
if ((image->columns >= 256) || (image->rows >= 256))
SetBit(info,4,1);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,info);
if ((image->columns >= 256) || (image->rows >= 256))
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->rows);
}
else
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) image->rows);
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,1); /* depth */
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p) < (QuantumRange/2.0))
byte|=0x1 << (7-bit);
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p++;
}
if (bit != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void btif_hh_disconnect(bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr)
{
btif_hh_device_t *p_dev;
p_dev = btif_hh_find_connected_dev_by_bda(bd_addr);
if (p_dev != NULL)
{
BTA_HhClose(p_dev->dev_handle);
}
else
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s-- Error: device not connected:",__FUNCTION__);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: is_needy (NautilusFile *file,
FileCheck check_missing,
RequestType request_type_wanted)
{
NautilusDirectory *directory;
GList *node;
ReadyCallback *callback;
Monitor *monitor;
if (!(*check_missing)(file))
{
return FALSE;
}
directory = file->details->directory;
if (directory->details->call_when_ready_counters[request_type_wanted] > 0)
{
for (node = directory->details->call_when_ready_list;
node != NULL; node = node->next)
{
callback = node->data;
if (callback->active &&
REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (callback->request, request_type_wanted))
{
if (callback->file == file)
{
return TRUE;
}
if (callback->file == NULL
&& file != directory->details->as_file)
{
return TRUE;
}
}
}
}
if (directory->details->monitor_counters[request_type_wanted] > 0)
{
for (node = directory->details->monitor_list;
node != NULL; node = node->next)
{
monitor = node->data;
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (monitor->request, request_type_wanted))
{
if (monitor_includes_file (monitor, file))
{
return TRUE;
}
}
}
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string PPAPINaClTest::BuildQuery(const std::string& base,
const std::string& test_case) {
return StringPrintf("%smode=nacl&testcase=%s", base.c_str(),
test_case.c_str());
}
Commit Message: Disable OutOfProcessPPAPITest.VarDeprecated on Mac due to timeouts.
BUG=121107
TBR=polina@chromium.org,ddorwin@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9950017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@129857 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 107,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetAvailableDraftPageCount() {
int page_data_map_size = page_data_map_.size();
if (page_data_map_.find(printing::COMPLETE_PREVIEW_DOCUMENT_INDEX) !=
page_data_map_.end()) {
page_data_map_size--;
}
return page_data_map_size;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 170,819 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::i18n::TextDirection Textfield::GetTextDirection() const {
return GetRenderText()->GetDisplayTextDirection();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::RenderFrameDeleted(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
is_notifying_observers_ = true;
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.RenderFrameDeleted(render_frame_host);
is_notifying_observers_ = false;
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
pepper_playback_observer_->RenderFrameDeleted(render_frame_host);
#endif
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int netbk_check_gop(struct xenvif *vif, int nr_meta_slots,
struct netrx_pending_operations *npo)
{
struct gnttab_copy *copy_op;
int status = XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_meta_slots; i++) {
copy_op = npo->copy + npo->copy_cons++;
if (copy_op->status != GNTST_okay) {
netdev_dbg(vif->dev,
"Bad status %d from copy to DOM%d.\n",
copy_op->status, vif->domid);
status = XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR;
}
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_v6_cmp_addr(const union sctp_addr *addr1,
const union sctp_addr *addr2)
{
if (addr1->sa.sa_family != addr2->sa.sa_family) {
if (addr1->sa.sa_family == AF_INET &&
addr2->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 &&
ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr2->v6.sin6_addr)) {
if (addr2->v6.sin6_port == addr1->v4.sin_port &&
addr2->v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] ==
addr1->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)
return 1;
}
if (addr2->sa.sa_family == AF_INET &&
addr1->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 &&
ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr1->v6.sin6_addr)) {
if (addr1->v6.sin6_port == addr2->v4.sin_port &&
addr1->v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] ==
addr2->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
if (addr1->v6.sin6_port != addr2->v6.sin6_port)
return 0;
if (!ipv6_addr_equal(&addr1->v6.sin6_addr, &addr2->v6.sin6_addr))
return 0;
/* If this is a linklocal address, compare the scope_id. */
if (ipv6_addr_type(&addr1->v6.sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
if (addr1->v6.sin6_scope_id && addr2->v6.sin6_scope_id &&
(addr1->v6.sin6_scope_id != addr2->v6.sin6_scope_id)) {
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not inherit ipv6_{mc|ac|fl}_list from parent
SCTP needs fixes similar to 83eaddab4378 ("ipv6/dccp: do not inherit
ipv6_mc_list from parent"), otherwise bad things can happen.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 65,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *AcquireBZIPMemory(void *context,int items,int size)
{
(void) context;
return((void *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) items,(size_t) size));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double InputType::ValueAsDouble() const {
return std::numeric_limits<double>::quiet_NaN();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::SetMaxRestoredPageID(int32 max_id) {
max_restored_page_id_ = max_id;
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,566 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool is_size_safe_to_change(struct cifsInodeInfo *cifsInode, __u64 end_of_file)
{
if (!cifsInode)
return true;
if (is_inode_writable(cifsInode)) {
/* This inode is open for write at least once */
struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb;
cifs_sb = CIFS_SB(cifsInode->vfs_inode.i_sb);
if (cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_DIRECT_IO) {
/* since no page cache to corrupt on directio
we can change size safely */
return true;
}
if (i_size_read(&cifsInode->vfs_inode) < end_of_file)
return true;
return false;
} else
return true;
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 40,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hns_nic_maybe_stop_tso(
struct sk_buff **out_skb, int *bnum, struct hnae_ring *ring)
{
int i;
int size;
int buf_num;
int frag_num;
struct sk_buff *skb = *out_skb;
struct sk_buff *new_skb = NULL;
struct skb_frag_struct *frag;
size = skb_headlen(skb);
buf_num = (size + BD_MAX_SEND_SIZE - 1) / BD_MAX_SEND_SIZE;
frag_num = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
for (i = 0; i < frag_num; i++) {
frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
size = skb_frag_size(frag);
buf_num += (size + BD_MAX_SEND_SIZE - 1) / BD_MAX_SEND_SIZE;
}
if (unlikely(buf_num > ring->max_desc_num_per_pkt)) {
buf_num = (skb->len + BD_MAX_SEND_SIZE - 1) / BD_MAX_SEND_SIZE;
if (ring_space(ring) < buf_num)
return -EBUSY;
/* manual split the send packet */
new_skb = skb_copy(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!new_skb)
return -ENOMEM;
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
*out_skb = new_skb;
} else if (ring_space(ring) < buf_num) {
return -EBUSY;
}
*bnum = buf_num;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 85,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Handle<FixedArrayBase> ConvertElementsWithCapacity(
Handle<JSObject> object, Handle<FixedArrayBase> old_elements,
ElementsKind from_kind, uint32_t capacity) {
return ConvertElementsWithCapacity(
object, old_elements, from_kind, capacity, 0, 0,
ElementsAccessor::kCopyToEndAndInitializeToHole);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void typedArrayAttrAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::typedArrayAttrAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigateToSamePage(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
NavigationHandleImpl* handle) {
NavigationEntryImpl* existing_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
CHECK_EQ(existing_entry->site_instance(), rfh->GetSiteInstance());
DCHECK_EQ(pending_entry_->GetUniqueID(), params.nav_entry_id);
existing_entry->set_unique_id(pending_entry_->GetUniqueID());
existing_entry->set_page_type(params.url_is_unreachable ? PAGE_TYPE_ERROR
: PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
if (existing_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url())
UpdateVirtualURLToURL(existing_entry, params.url);
existing_entry->SetURL(params.url);
existing_entry->GetSSL() = SSLStatus(handle->GetSSLInfo());
if (existing_entry->GetURL().SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme) &&
!rfh->GetParent() && handle->GetNetErrorCode() == net::OK) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Navigation.SecureSchemeHasSSLStatus.SamePage",
!!existing_entry->GetSSL().certificate);
}
existing_entry->set_extra_headers(pending_entry_->extra_headers());
existing_entry->AddOrUpdateFrameEntry(
rfh->frame_tree_node(), params.item_sequence_number,
params.document_sequence_number, rfh->GetSiteInstance(), nullptr,
params.url, params.referrer, params.redirects, params.page_state,
params.method, params.post_id, nullptr /* blob_url_loader_factory */);
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
}
Commit Message: Preserve renderer-initiated bit when reloading in a new process.
BUG=847718
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Change-Id: I6c3461793fbb23f1a4d731dc27b4e77312f29227
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1080235
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563312}
CWE ID: | 0 | 153,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sys_error (const char *format, ...)
#else
sys_error (format, va_alist)
const char *format;
va_dcl
#endif
{
int e;
va_list args;
e = errno;
error_prolog (0);
SH_VA_START (args, format);
vfprintf (stderr, format, args);
fprintf (stderr, ": %s\n", strerror (e));
va_end (args);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: box_ht(BOX *box)
{
return box->high.y - box->low.y;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kernel_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
mm_segment_t oldfs = get_fs();
int err;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sock->ops->ioctl(sock, cmd, arg);
set_fs(oldfs);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OmniboxEditModel::State::~State() {
}
Commit Message: [OriginChip] Re-enable the chip as necessary when switching tabs.
BUG=369500
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/292493003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@271161 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EventTarget* Document::errorEventTarget()
{
return domWindow();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void yr_re_print(
RE_AST* re_ast)
{
_yr_re_print_node(re_ast->root_node);
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer overrun (issue #678). Add assert for detecting this kind of issues earlier.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 64,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *server_hostname_port(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dummy, const char *arg)
{
const char *err = ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, NOT_IN_DIR_LOC_FILE);
const char *portstr, *part;
char *scheme;
int port;
if (err != NULL) {
return err;
}
if (apr_fnmatch_test(arg))
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->temp_pool, "Invalid ServerName \"", arg,
"\" use ServerAlias to set multiple server names.", NULL);
part = ap_strstr_c(arg, "://");
if (part) {
scheme = apr_pstrndup(cmd->pool, arg, part - arg);
ap_str_tolower(scheme);
cmd->server->server_scheme = (const char *)scheme;
part += 3;
} else {
part = arg;
}
portstr = ap_strchr_c(part, ':');
if (portstr) {
cmd->server->server_hostname = apr_pstrndup(cmd->pool, part,
portstr - part);
portstr++;
port = atoi(portstr);
if (port <= 0 || port >= 65536) { /* 65536 == 1<<16 */
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->temp_pool, "The port number \"", arg,
"\" is outside the appropriate range "
"(i.e., 1..65535).", NULL);
}
}
else {
cmd->server->server_hostname = apr_pstrdup(cmd->pool, part);
port = 0;
}
cmd->server->port = port;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CameraClient::recordingEnabled() {
LOG1("recordingEnabled (pid %d)", getCallingPid());
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
if (checkPidAndHardware() != NO_ERROR) return false;
return mHardware->recordingEnabled();
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputHandler::spellCheckingRequestProcessed(int32_t transactionId, spannable_string_t* spannableString)
{
SpellingLog(LogLevelWarn, "InputHandler::spellCheckingRequestProcessed Expected transaction id %d, received %d. %s"
, transactionId
, m_processingTransactionId
, transactionId == m_processingTransactionId ? "" : "We are out of sync with input service.");
if (!spannableString || !isActiveTextEdit()) {
SpellingLog(LogLevelWarn, "InputHandler::spellCheckingRequestProcessed Cancelling request with transactionId %d.", transactionId);
m_request->didCancel();
m_processingTransactionId = -1;
return;
}
Vector<TextCheckingResult> results;
WTF::String replacement;
TextCheckingResult textCheckingResult;
textCheckingResult.type = TextCheckingTypeSpelling;
textCheckingResult.replacement = replacement;
textCheckingResult.location = 0;
textCheckingResult.length = 0;
span_t* span = spannableString->spans;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < spannableString->spans_count; i++) {
if (!span)
break;
if (span->end < span->start) {
m_request->didCancel();
return;
}
if (span->attributes_mask & MISSPELLED_WORD_ATTRIB) {
textCheckingResult.location = span->start;
textCheckingResult.length = span->end - span->start + 1;
results.append(textCheckingResult);
}
span++;
}
free(spannableString->spans);
free(spannableString);
m_request->didSucceed(results);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,581 |
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