instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void stroke_purge(private_stroke_socket_t *this,
stroke_msg_t *msg, FILE *out)
{
if (msg->purge.flags & PURGE_OCSP)
{
lib->credmgr->flush_cache(lib->credmgr, CERT_X509_OCSP_RESPONSE);
}
if (msg->purge.flags & PURGE_CRLS)
{
lib->credmgr->flush_cache(lib->credmgr, CERT_X509_CRL);
}
if (msg->purge.flags & PURGE_CERTS)
{
lib->credmgr->flush_cache(lib->credmgr, CERT_X509);
}
if (msg->purge.flags & PURGE_IKE)
{
this->control->purge_ike(this->control, msg, out);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 12,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void writeFile(const File& file)
{
append(FileTag);
doWriteFile(file);
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int aesni_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
do {
/*
* We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt
* needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the
* decrypt for an encryption operation.
*/
aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&octx->ksenc.ks);
aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&octx->ksdec.ks);
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
&octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
(block128_f) aesni_encrypt,
(block128_f) aesni_decrypt,
enc ? aesni_ocb_encrypt
: aesni_ocb_decrypt))
return 0;
}
while (0);
/*
* If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
*/
if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set)
iv = octx->iv;
if (iv) {
if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen)
!= 1)
return 0;
octx->iv_set = 1;
}
octx->key_set = 1;
} else {
/* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
if (octx->key_set)
CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen);
else
memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen);
octx->iv_set = 1;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 69,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_import_name(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer,
gss_OID input_name_type,
gss_name_t *output_name)
{
OM_uint32 status;
dsyslog("Entering import_name\n");
status = gss_import_name(minor_status, input_name_buffer,
input_name_type, output_name);
dsyslog("Leaving import_name\n");
return (status);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 36,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CreateTransformWithCompositorElementId(
const CompositorElementId& compositor_element_id) {
TransformPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.compositor_element_id = compositor_element_id;
return TransformPaintPropertyNode::Create(TransformPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
std::move(state));
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SavePackage::SavePackage(WebContents* web_contents,
const FilePath& file_full_path,
const FilePath& directory_full_path)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
file_manager_(NULL),
download_manager_(NULL),
download_(NULL),
saved_main_file_path_(file_full_path),
saved_main_directory_path_(directory_full_path),
start_tick_(base::TimeTicks::Now()),
finished_(true),
mhtml_finishing_(false),
user_canceled_(false),
disk_error_occurred_(false),
save_type_(SAVE_PAGE_TYPE_UNKNOWN),
all_save_items_count_(0),
file_name_set_(&FilePath::CompareLessIgnoreCase),
wait_state_(INITIALIZE),
contents_id_(0),
unique_id_(g_save_package_id++),
wrote_to_completed_file_(false),
wrote_to_failed_file_(false) {
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL update_send_switch_surface_order(
rdpContext* context,
const SWITCH_SURFACE_ORDER* switch_surface)
{
wStream* s;
size_t bm, em, inf;
BYTE orderType;
BYTE controlFlags;
int headerLength;
rdpUpdate* update;
if (!context || !switch_surface || !context->update)
return FALSE;
update = context->update;
headerLength = 1;
orderType = ORDER_TYPE_SWITCH_SURFACE;
controlFlags = ORDER_SECONDARY | (orderType << 2);
inf = update_approximate_switch_surface_order(switch_surface);
update_check_flush(context, headerLength + inf);
s = update->us;
if (!s)
return FALSE;
bm = Stream_GetPosition(s);
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(s, headerLength))
return FALSE;
Stream_Seek(s, headerLength);
if (!update_write_switch_surface_order(s, switch_surface))
return FALSE;
em = Stream_GetPosition(s);
Stream_SetPosition(s, bm);
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, controlFlags); /* controlFlags (1 byte) */
Stream_SetPosition(s, em);
update->numberOrders++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED || st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE)
return 0;
if (!s->s3->in_read_app_data || (s->s3->total_renegotiations == 0))
return 0;
if (s->server) {
/*
* If we're a server and we haven't got as far as writing our
* ServerHello yet then we allow app data
*/
if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
|| st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO)
return 1;
} else {
/*
* If we're a client and we haven't read the ServerHello yet then we
* allow app data
*/
if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 9,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reds_mig_finished(int completed)
{
spice_info(NULL);
reds->mig_inprogress = TRUE;
if (reds->src_do_seamless_migrate && completed) {
reds_migrate_channels_seamless();
} else {
main_channel_migrate_src_complete(reds->main_channel, completed);
}
if (completed) {
reds_mig_fill_wait_disconnect();
} else {
reds_mig_cleanup();
}
reds_mig_release();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int list_entry_comparator(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
const struct list_entry *e1 = (struct list_entry *)p1;
const struct list_entry *e2 = (struct list_entry *)p2;
return bsearch_compare_mbox(e1->name, e2->name);
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs3svc_decode_renameargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_renameargs *args)
{
if (!(p = decode_fh(p, &args->ffh))
|| !(p = decode_filename(p, &args->fname, &args->flen))
|| !(p = decode_fh(p, &args->tfh))
|| !(p = decode_filename(p, &args->tname, &args->tlen)))
return 0;
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev)
{
/*
* Test if we are atomic. Since do_exit() needs to call into
* schedule() atomically, we ignore that path for now.
* Otherwise, whine if we are scheduling when we should not be.
*/
if (unlikely(in_atomic_preempt_off() && !prev->exit_state))
__schedule_bug(prev);
profile_hit(SCHED_PROFILING, __builtin_return_address(0));
schedstat_inc(this_rq(), sched_count);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: destroy_setvar_fifo(
setvar_fifo * fifo
)
{
setvar_node * sv;
if (fifo != NULL) {
do {
UNLINK_FIFO(sv, *fifo, link);
if (sv != NULL) {
free(sv->var);
free(sv->val);
free(sv);
}
} while (sv != NULL);
free(fifo);
}
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlNsPtr encode_add_ns(xmlNodePtr node, const char* ns)
{
xmlNsPtr xmlns;
if (ns == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
xmlns = xmlSearchNsByHref(node->doc, node, BAD_CAST(ns));
if (xmlns != NULL && xmlns->prefix == NULL) {
xmlns = xmlSearchNsPrefixByHref(node->doc, node, BAD_CAST(ns));
}
if (xmlns == NULL) {
xmlChar* prefix;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
if (zend_hash_find(&SOAP_GLOBAL(defEncNs), (char*)ns, strlen(ns) + 1, (void **)&prefix) == SUCCESS) {
xmlns = xmlNewNs(node->doc->children, BAD_CAST(ns), prefix);
} else {
smart_str prefix = {0};
int num = ++SOAP_GLOBAL(cur_uniq_ns);
while (1) {
smart_str_appendl(&prefix, "ns", 2);
smart_str_append_long(&prefix, num);
smart_str_0(&prefix);
if (xmlSearchNs(node->doc, node, BAD_CAST(prefix.c)) == NULL) {
break;
}
smart_str_free(&prefix);
prefix.c = NULL;
prefix.len = 0;
num = ++SOAP_GLOBAL(cur_uniq_ns);
}
xmlns = xmlNewNs(node->doc->children, BAD_CAST(ns), BAD_CAST(prefix.c));
smart_str_free(&prefix);
}
}
return xmlns;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Function::Function(const Function *func) {
m = func->m;
n = func->n;
memcpy(domain, func->domain, funcMaxInputs * 2 * sizeof(double));
memcpy(range, func->range, funcMaxOutputs * 2 * sizeof(double));
hasRange = func->hasRange;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool check_underflow(const struct arpt_entry *e)
{
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
unsigned int verdict;
if (!unconditional(&e->arp))
return false;
t = arpt_get_target_c(e);
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
return false;
verdict = ((struct xt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
verdict = -verdict - 1;
return verdict == NF_DROP || verdict == NF_ACCEPT;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smb2_readv_callback(struct mid_q_entry *mid)
{
struct cifs_readdata *rdata = mid->callback_data;
struct cifs_tcon *tcon = tlink_tcon(rdata->cfile->tlink);
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server;
struct smb2_sync_hdr *shdr =
(struct smb2_sync_hdr *)rdata->iov[0].iov_base;
struct cifs_credits credits = { .value = 0, .instance = 0 };
struct smb_rqst rqst = { .rq_iov = rdata->iov,
.rq_nvec = 2,
.rq_pages = rdata->pages,
.rq_offset = rdata->page_offset,
.rq_npages = rdata->nr_pages,
.rq_pagesz = rdata->pagesz,
.rq_tailsz = rdata->tailsz };
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: mid=%llu state=%d result=%d bytes=%u\n",
__func__, mid->mid, mid->mid_state, rdata->result,
rdata->bytes);
switch (mid->mid_state) {
case MID_RESPONSE_RECEIVED:
credits.value = le16_to_cpu(shdr->CreditRequest);
credits.instance = server->reconnect_instance;
/* result already set, check signature */
if (server->sign && !mid->decrypted) {
int rc;
rc = smb2_verify_signature(&rqst, server);
if (rc)
cifs_dbg(VFS, "SMB signature verification returned error = %d\n",
rc);
}
/* FIXME: should this be counted toward the initiating task? */
task_io_account_read(rdata->got_bytes);
cifs_stats_bytes_read(tcon, rdata->got_bytes);
break;
case MID_REQUEST_SUBMITTED:
case MID_RETRY_NEEDED:
rdata->result = -EAGAIN;
if (server->sign && rdata->got_bytes)
/* reset bytes number since we can not check a sign */
rdata->got_bytes = 0;
/* FIXME: should this be counted toward the initiating task? */
task_io_account_read(rdata->got_bytes);
cifs_stats_bytes_read(tcon, rdata->got_bytes);
break;
case MID_RESPONSE_MALFORMED:
credits.value = le16_to_cpu(shdr->CreditRequest);
credits.instance = server->reconnect_instance;
/* fall through */
default:
rdata->result = -EIO;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_SMB_DIRECT
/*
* If this rdata has a memmory registered, the MR can be freed
* MR needs to be freed as soon as I/O finishes to prevent deadlock
* because they have limited number and are used for future I/Os
*/
if (rdata->mr) {
smbd_deregister_mr(rdata->mr);
rdata->mr = NULL;
}
#endif
if (rdata->result && rdata->result != -ENODATA) {
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_READ_HE);
trace_smb3_read_err(0 /* xid */,
rdata->cfile->fid.persistent_fid,
tcon->tid, tcon->ses->Suid, rdata->offset,
rdata->bytes, rdata->result);
} else
trace_smb3_read_done(0 /* xid */,
rdata->cfile->fid.persistent_fid,
tcon->tid, tcon->ses->Suid,
rdata->offset, rdata->got_bytes);
queue_work(cifsiod_wq, &rdata->work);
DeleteMidQEntry(mid);
add_credits(server, &credits, 0);
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheHost::AssociateNoCache(const GURL& manifest_url) {
AssociateCacheHelper(NULL, manifest_url);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
{
return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bt_status_t btif_dm_start_discovery(void)
{
tBTA_DM_INQ inq_params;
tBTA_SERVICE_MASK services = 0;
tBTA_DM_BLE_PF_FILT_PARAMS adv_filt_param;
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __FUNCTION__);
#if (defined(BLE_INCLUDED) && (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE))
memset(&adv_filt_param, 0, sizeof(tBTA_DM_BLE_PF_FILT_PARAMS));
/* Cleanup anything remaining on index 0 */
BTA_DmBleScanFilterSetup(BTA_DM_BLE_SCAN_COND_DELETE, 0, &adv_filt_param, NULL,
bte_scan_filt_param_cfg_evt, 0);
/* Add an allow-all filter on index 0*/
adv_filt_param.dely_mode = IMMEDIATE_DELY_MODE;
adv_filt_param.feat_seln = ALLOW_ALL_FILTER;
adv_filt_param.filt_logic_type = BTA_DM_BLE_PF_FILT_LOGIC_OR;
adv_filt_param.list_logic_type = BTA_DM_BLE_PF_LIST_LOGIC_OR;
adv_filt_param.rssi_low_thres = LOWEST_RSSI_VALUE;
adv_filt_param.rssi_high_thres = LOWEST_RSSI_VALUE;
BTA_DmBleScanFilterSetup(BTA_DM_BLE_SCAN_COND_ADD, 0, &adv_filt_param, NULL,
bte_scan_filt_param_cfg_evt, 0);
/* TODO: Do we need to handle multiple inquiries at the same time? */
/* Set inquiry params and call API */
inq_params.mode = BTA_DM_GENERAL_INQUIRY|BTA_BLE_GENERAL_INQUIRY;
#if (defined(BTA_HOST_INTERLEAVE_SEARCH) && BTA_HOST_INTERLEAVE_SEARCH == TRUE)
inq_params.intl_duration[0]= BTIF_DM_INTERLEAVE_DURATION_BR_ONE;
inq_params.intl_duration[1]= BTIF_DM_INTERLEAVE_DURATION_LE_ONE;
inq_params.intl_duration[2]= BTIF_DM_INTERLEAVE_DURATION_BR_TWO;
inq_params.intl_duration[3]= BTIF_DM_INTERLEAVE_DURATION_LE_TWO;
#endif
#else
inq_params.mode = BTA_DM_GENERAL_INQUIRY;
#endif
inq_params.duration = BTIF_DM_DEFAULT_INQ_MAX_DURATION;
inq_params.max_resps = BTIF_DM_DEFAULT_INQ_MAX_RESULTS;
inq_params.report_dup = TRUE;
inq_params.filter_type = BTA_DM_INQ_CLR;
/* TODO: Filter device by BDA needs to be implemented here */
/* Will be enabled to TRUE once inquiry busy level has been received */
btif_dm_inquiry_in_progress = FALSE;
/* find nearby devices */
BTA_DmSearch(&inq_params, services, bte_search_devices_evt);
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ACodec::signalError(OMX_ERRORTYPE error, status_t internalError) {
sp<AMessage> notify = mNotify->dup();
notify->setInt32("what", CodecBase::kWhatError);
ALOGE("signalError(omxError %#x, internalError %d)", error, internalError);
if (internalError == UNKNOWN_ERROR) { // find better error code
const status_t omxStatus = statusFromOMXError(error);
if (omxStatus != 0) {
internalError = omxStatus;
} else {
ALOGW("Invalid OMX error %#x", error);
}
}
mFatalError = true;
notify->setInt32("err", internalError);
notify->setInt32("actionCode", ACTION_CODE_FATAL); // could translate from OMX error.
notify->post();
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum event_type_t get_event_type(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
enum event_type_t event_type;
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->lock);
event_type = event->attr.pinned ? EVENT_PINNED : EVENT_FLEXIBLE;
if (!ctx->task)
event_type |= EVENT_CPU;
return event_type;
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix the perf_cpu_time_max_percent check
Use "proc_dointvec_minmax" instead of "proc_dointvec" to check the input
value from user-space.
If not, we can set a big value and some vars will overflow like
"sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate" which will cause a lot of unexpected
problems.
Signed-off-by: Tan Xiaojun <tanxiaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1487829879-56237-1-git-send-email-tanxiaojun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 85,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual bool RunOnDBThread(history::HistoryBackend* backend,
history::HistoryDatabase* db) {
work_->Run();
done_->Signal();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetClientInformation(ExceptionInformation* exception,
SanitizationInformation* sanitization,
ClientInformation* info) {
info->exception_information_address =
FromPointerCast<decltype(info->exception_information_address)>(exception);
info->sanitization_information_address =
FromPointerCast<decltype(info->sanitization_information_address)>(
sanitization);
}
Commit Message: Add Android SDK version to crash reports.
Bug: 911669
Change-Id: I62a97d76a0b88099a5a42b93463307f03be9b3e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1361104
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Conn <peconn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Michael van Ouwerkerk <mvanouwerkerk@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615851}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 142,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BluetoothRemoteGATTServer::BluetoothRemoteGATTServer(BluetoothDevice* device)
: m_device(device), m_connected(false) {}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 129,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int open_for_data(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi)
{
int ret;
const struct cdrom_device_ops *cdo = cdi->ops;
tracktype tracks;
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "entering open_for_data\n");
/* Check if the driver can report drive status. If it can, we
can do clever things. If it can't, well, we at least tried! */
if (cdo->drive_status != NULL) {
ret = cdo->drive_status(cdi, CDSL_CURRENT);
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "drive_status=%d\n", ret);
if (ret == CDS_TRAY_OPEN) {
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "the tray is open...\n");
/* can/may i close it? */
if (CDROM_CAN(CDC_CLOSE_TRAY) &&
cdi->options & CDO_AUTO_CLOSE) {
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "trying to close the tray\n");
ret=cdo->tray_move(cdi,0);
if (ret) {
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "bummer. tried to close the tray but failed.\n");
/* Ignore the error from the low
level driver. We don't care why it
couldn't close the tray. We only care
that there is no disc in the drive,
since that is the _REAL_ problem here.*/
ret=-ENOMEDIUM;
goto clean_up_and_return;
}
} else {
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "bummer. this drive can't close the tray.\n");
ret=-ENOMEDIUM;
goto clean_up_and_return;
}
/* Ok, the door should be closed now.. Check again */
ret = cdo->drive_status(cdi, CDSL_CURRENT);
if ((ret == CDS_NO_DISC) || (ret==CDS_TRAY_OPEN)) {
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "bummer. the tray is still not closed.\n");
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "tray might not contain a medium\n");
ret=-ENOMEDIUM;
goto clean_up_and_return;
}
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "the tray is now closed\n");
}
/* the door should be closed now, check for the disc */
ret = cdo->drive_status(cdi, CDSL_CURRENT);
if (ret!=CDS_DISC_OK) {
ret = -ENOMEDIUM;
goto clean_up_and_return;
}
}
cdrom_count_tracks(cdi, &tracks);
if (tracks.error == CDS_NO_DISC) {
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "bummer. no disc.\n");
ret=-ENOMEDIUM;
goto clean_up_and_return;
}
/* CD-Players which don't use O_NONBLOCK, workman
* for example, need bit CDO_CHECK_TYPE cleared! */
if (tracks.data==0) {
if (cdi->options & CDO_CHECK_TYPE) {
/* give people a warning shot, now that CDO_CHECK_TYPE
is the default case! */
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "bummer. wrong media type.\n");
cd_dbg(CD_WARNING, "pid %d must open device O_NONBLOCK!\n",
(unsigned int)task_pid_nr(current));
ret=-EMEDIUMTYPE;
goto clean_up_and_return;
}
else {
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "wrong media type, but CDO_CHECK_TYPE not set\n");
}
}
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "all seems well, opening the devicen");
/* all seems well, we can open the device */
ret = cdo->open(cdi, 0); /* open for data */
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "opening the device gave me %d\n", ret);
/* After all this careful checking, we shouldn't have problems
opening the device, but we don't want the device locked if
this somehow fails... */
if (ret) {
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "open device failed\n");
goto clean_up_and_return;
}
if (CDROM_CAN(CDC_LOCK) && (cdi->options & CDO_LOCK)) {
cdo->lock_door(cdi, 1);
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "door locked\n");
}
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "device opened successfully\n");
return ret;
/* Something failed. Try to unlock the drive, because some drivers
(notably ide-cd) lock the drive after every command. This produced
a nasty bug where after mount failed, the drive would remain locked!
This ensures that the drive gets unlocked after a mount fails. This
is a goto to avoid bloating the driver with redundant code. */
clean_up_and_return:
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "open failed\n");
if (CDROM_CAN(CDC_LOCK) && cdi->options & CDO_LOCK) {
cdo->lock_door(cdi, 0);
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "door unlocked\n");
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 76,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int auth_sess_init(void) {
config_rec *c = NULL;
unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
pr_event_register(&auth_module, "core.session-reinit", auth_sess_reinit_ev,
NULL);
/* Check for any MaxPasswordSize. */
c = find_config(main_server->conf, CONF_PARAM, "MaxPasswordSize", FALSE);
if (c != NULL) {
size_t len;
len = *((size_t *) c->argv[0]);
(void) pr_auth_set_max_password_len(session.pool, len);
}
/* Check for a server-specific TimeoutLogin */
c = find_config(main_server->conf, CONF_PARAM, "TimeoutLogin", FALSE);
if (c != NULL) {
TimeoutLogin = *((int *) c->argv[0]);
}
/* Start the login timer */
if (TimeoutLogin) {
pr_timer_remove(PR_TIMER_LOGIN, &auth_module);
pr_timer_add(TimeoutLogin, PR_TIMER_LOGIN, &auth_module,
auth_login_timeout_cb, "TimeoutLogin");
}
if (auth_client_connected == FALSE) {
int res = 0;
PRIVS_ROOT
res = pr_open_scoreboard(O_RDWR);
PRIVS_RELINQUISH
if (res < 0) {
switch (res) {
case PR_SCORE_ERR_BAD_MAGIC:
pr_log_debug(DEBUG0, "error opening scoreboard: bad/corrupted file");
break;
case PR_SCORE_ERR_OLDER_VERSION:
pr_log_debug(DEBUG0,
"error opening scoreboard: bad version (too old)");
break;
case PR_SCORE_ERR_NEWER_VERSION:
pr_log_debug(DEBUG0,
"error opening scoreboard: bad version (too new)");
break;
default:
pr_log_debug(DEBUG0, "error opening scoreboard: %s", strerror(errno));
break;
}
}
}
pr_event_register(&auth_module, "core.exit", auth_exit_ev, NULL);
if (auth_client_connected == FALSE) {
/* Create an entry in the scoreboard for this session, if we don't already
* have one.
*/
if (pr_scoreboard_entry_get(PR_SCORE_CLIENT_ADDR) == NULL) {
if (pr_scoreboard_entry_add() < 0) {
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_NOTICE, "notice: unable to add scoreboard entry: %s",
strerror(errno));
}
pr_scoreboard_entry_update(session.pid,
PR_SCORE_USER, "(none)",
PR_SCORE_SERVER_PORT, main_server->ServerPort,
PR_SCORE_SERVER_ADDR, session.c->local_addr, session.c->local_port,
PR_SCORE_SERVER_LABEL, main_server->ServerName,
PR_SCORE_CLIENT_ADDR, session.c->remote_addr,
PR_SCORE_CLIENT_NAME, session.c->remote_name,
PR_SCORE_CLASS, session.conn_class ? session.conn_class->cls_name : "",
PR_SCORE_PROTOCOL, "ftp",
PR_SCORE_BEGIN_SESSION, time(NULL),
NULL);
}
} else {
/* We're probably handling a HOST comand, and the server changed; just
* update the SERVER_LABEL field.
*/
pr_scoreboard_entry_update(session.pid,
PR_SCORE_SERVER_LABEL, main_server->ServerName,
NULL);
}
/* Should we create the home for a user, if they don't have one? */
tmp = get_param_ptr(main_server->conf, "CreateHome", FALSE);
if (tmp != NULL &&
*tmp == TRUE) {
mkhome = TRUE;
} else {
mkhome = FALSE;
}
#ifdef PR_USE_LASTLOG
/* Use the lastlog file, if supported and requested. */
tmp = get_param_ptr(main_server->conf, "UseLastlog", FALSE);
if (tmp &&
*tmp == TRUE) {
lastlog = TRUE;
} else {
lastlog = FALSE;
}
#endif /* PR_USE_LASTLOG */
/* Scan the scoreboard now, in order to tally up certain values for
* substituting in any of the Display* file variables. This function
* also performs the MaxConnectionsPerHost enforcement.
*/
auth_scan_scoreboard();
auth_client_connected = TRUE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 67,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void reftype_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_TrackReferenceTypeBox *ptr = (GF_TrackReferenceTypeBox *)s;
if (!ptr) return;
if (ptr->trackIDs) gf_free(ptr->trackIDs);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void pdf_load_pages_kids(FILE *fp, pdf_t *pdf)
{
int i, id, dummy;
char *buf, *c;
long start, sz;
start = ftell(fp);
/* Load all kids for all xref tables (versions) */
for (i=0; i<pdf->n_xrefs; i++)
{
if (pdf->xrefs[i].version && (pdf->xrefs[i].end != 0))
{
fseek(fp, pdf->xrefs[i].start, SEEK_SET);
while (SAFE_F(fp, (fgetc(fp) != 't')))
; /* Iterate to trailer */
/* Get root catalog */
sz = pdf->xrefs[i].end - ftell(fp);
buf = malloc(sz + 1);
SAFE_E(fread(buf, 1, sz, fp), sz, "Failed to load /Root.\n");
buf[sz] = '\0';
if (!(c = strstr(buf, "/Root")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Jump to catalog (root) */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Root") + 1);
free(buf);
buf = get_object(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i], NULL, &dummy);
if (!buf || !(c = strstr(buf, "/Pages")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Start at the first Pages obj and get kids */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Pages") + 1);
load_kids(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i]);
free(buf);
}
}
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 169,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _yy_push_state(int new_state TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_stack_push(&SCNG(state_stack), (void *) &YYGETCONDITION(), sizeof(int));
YYSETCONDITION(new_state);
}
Commit Message: fix bug #64660 - yyparse can return 2, not only 1
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 30,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_do_setlk(struct nfs4_state *state, int cmd, struct file_lock *fl, int recovery_type)
{
struct nfs4_lockdata *data;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_LOCK],
.rpc_cred = state->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = NFS_CLIENT(state->inode),
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_lock_ops,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int ret;
dprintk("%s: begin!\n", __func__);
data = nfs4_alloc_lockdata(fl, nfs_file_open_context(fl->fl_file),
fl->fl_u.nfs4_fl.owner,
recovery_type == NFS_LOCK_NEW ? GFP_KERNEL : GFP_NOFS);
if (data == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (IS_SETLKW(cmd))
data->arg.block = 1;
if (recovery_type > NFS_LOCK_NEW) {
if (recovery_type == NFS_LOCK_RECLAIM)
data->arg.reclaim = NFS_LOCK_RECLAIM;
task_setup_data.callback_ops = &nfs4_recover_lock_ops;
}
msg.rpc_argp = &data->arg;
msg.rpc_resp = &data->res;
task_setup_data.callback_data = data;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
ret = nfs4_wait_for_completion_rpc_task(task);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = data->rpc_status;
if (ret)
nfs4_handle_setlk_error(data->server, data->lsp,
data->arg.new_lock_owner, ret);
} else
data->cancelled = 1;
rpc_put_task(task);
dprintk("%s: done, ret = %d!\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXARIAGridCell::~AXARIAGridCell() {}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: crm_node_created(xmlNode *xml)
{
xmlNode *cIter = NULL;
xml_private_t *p = xml->_private;
if(p && TRACKING_CHANGES(xml)) {
if(is_not_set(p->flags, xpf_created)) {
p->flags |= xpf_created;
__xml_node_dirty(xml);
}
for (cIter = __xml_first_child(xml); cIter != NULL; cIter = __xml_next(cIter)) {
crm_node_created(cIter);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::GetDownloadProtectionService() {
#if defined(ENABLE_SAFE_BROWSING)
SafeBrowsingService* sb_service = g_browser_process->safe_browsing_service();
if (sb_service && sb_service->download_protection_service() &&
profile_->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kSafeBrowsingEnabled)) {
return sb_service->download_protection_service();
}
#endif
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dev_queue_xmit_nit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct packet_type *ptype;
struct sk_buff *skb2 = NULL;
struct packet_type *pt_prev = NULL;
struct list_head *ptype_list = &ptype_all;
rcu_read_lock();
again:
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptype, ptype_list, list) {
/* Never send packets back to the socket
* they originated from - MvS (miquels@drinkel.ow.org)
*/
if (skb_loop_sk(ptype, skb))
continue;
if (pt_prev) {
deliver_skb(skb2, pt_prev, skb->dev);
pt_prev = ptype;
continue;
}
/* need to clone skb, done only once */
skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb2)
goto out_unlock;
net_timestamp_set(skb2);
/* skb->nh should be correctly
* set by sender, so that the second statement is
* just protection against buggy protocols.
*/
skb_reset_mac_header(skb2);
if (skb_network_header(skb2) < skb2->data ||
skb_network_header(skb2) > skb_tail_pointer(skb2)) {
net_crit_ratelimited("protocol %04x is buggy, dev %s\n",
ntohs(skb2->protocol),
dev->name);
skb_reset_network_header(skb2);
}
skb2->transport_header = skb2->network_header;
skb2->pkt_type = PACKET_OUTGOING;
pt_prev = ptype;
}
if (ptype_list == &ptype_all) {
ptype_list = &dev->ptype_all;
goto again;
}
out_unlock:
if (pt_prev)
pt_prev->func(skb2, skb->dev, pt_prev, skb->dev);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~MockDownloadFileFactory() {}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool UnprivilegedProcessDelegate::LaunchProcess(
IPC::Listener* delegate,
ScopedHandle* process_exit_event_out) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
std::string channel_name = GenerateIpcChannelName(this);
ScopedHandle client;
scoped_ptr<IPC::ChannelProxy> server;
if (!CreateConnectedIpcChannel(channel_name, delegate, &client, &server))
return false;
std::string pipe_handle = base::StringPrintf(
"%d", reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(client.Get()));
CommandLine command_line(binary_path_);
command_line.AppendSwitchASCII(kDaemonPipeSwitchName, pipe_handle);
command_line.CopySwitchesFrom(*CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(),
kCopiedSwitchNames,
arraysize(kCopiedSwitchNames));
ScopedHandle worker_thread;
worker_process_.Close();
if (!LaunchProcessWithToken(command_line.GetProgram(),
command_line.GetCommandLineString(),
NULL,
true,
0,
&worker_process_,
&worker_thread)) {
return false;
}
ScopedHandle process_exit_event;
if (!DuplicateHandle(GetCurrentProcess(),
worker_process_,
GetCurrentProcess(),
process_exit_event.Receive(),
SYNCHRONIZE,
FALSE,
0)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) << "Failed to duplicate a handle";
KillProcess(CONTROL_C_EXIT);
return false;
}
channel_ = server.Pass();
*process_exit_event_out = process_exit_event.Pass();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,546 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GetAutofillSuggestions(const FormData& form,
const FormFieldData& field) {
GetAutofillSuggestions(kDefaultPageID, form, field);
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::addSubresourceAttributeURLs(ListHashSet<KURL>& urls) const
{
HTMLTextFormControlElement::addSubresourceAttributeURLs(urls);
addSubresourceURL(urls, src());
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int read_channel_identities (WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackMetadata *wpmd)
{
if (!wpc->channel_identities) {
wpc->channel_identities = (unsigned char *)malloc (wpmd->byte_length + 1);
memcpy (wpc->channel_identities, wpmd->data, wpmd->byte_length);
wpc->channel_identities [wpmd->byte_length] = 0;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: issue #54: fix potential out-of-bounds heap read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 75,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long long sendSync(int fd) {
/* To start we need to send the SYNC command and return the payload.
* The hiredis client lib does not understand this part of the protocol
* and we don't want to mess with its buffers, so everything is performed
* using direct low-level I/O. */
char buf[4096], *p;
ssize_t nread;
/* Send the SYNC command. */
if (write(fd,"SYNC\r\n",6) != 6) {
fprintf(stderr,"Error writing to master\n");
exit(1);
}
/* Read $<payload>\r\n, making sure to read just up to "\n" */
p = buf;
while(1) {
nread = read(fd,p,1);
if (nread <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr,"Error reading bulk length while SYNCing\n");
exit(1);
}
if (*p == '\n' && p != buf) break;
if (*p != '\n') p++;
}
*p = '\0';
if (buf[0] == '-') {
printf("SYNC with master failed: %s\n", buf);
exit(1);
}
return strtoull(buf+1,NULL,10);
}
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 81,986 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::RegisterMojoInterfaces() {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&InstalledAppProviderImplDefault::Create));
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
PermissionManager* permission_manager =
GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext()->GetPermissionManager();
if (delegate_) {
auto* geolocation_context = delegate_->GetGeolocationContext();
if (geolocation_context && permission_manager) {
geolocation_service_.reset(new GeolocationServiceImpl(
geolocation_context, permission_manager, this));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&GeolocationServiceImpl::Bind,
base::Unretained(geolocation_service_.get())));
}
}
registry_->AddInterface<device::mojom::WakeLock>(base::Bind(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindWakeLockRequest, base::Unretained(this)));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebNfc)) {
registry_->AddInterface<device::mojom::NFC>(base::Bind(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindNFCRequest, base::Unretained(this)));
}
#endif
if (!permission_service_context_)
permission_service_context_.reset(new PermissionServiceContext(this));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&PermissionServiceContext::CreateService,
base::Unretained(permission_service_context_.get())));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindPresentationServiceRequest,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&MediaSessionServiceImpl::Create, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(
base::IgnoreResult(&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateWebBluetoothService),
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateUsbDeviceManager, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateUsbChooserService, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface<media::mojom::InterfaceFactory>(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindMediaInterfaceFactoryRequest,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateWebSocket, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&SharedWorkerConnectorImpl::Create,
process_->GetID(), routing_id_));
registry_->AddInterface<device::mojom::VRService>(base::Bind(
&WebvrServiceProvider::BindWebvrService, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateAudioInputStreamFactory,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateAudioOutputStreamFactory,
base::Unretained(this)));
if (resource_coordinator::IsResourceCoordinatorEnabled()) {
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&CreateFrameResourceCoordinator, base::Unretained(this)));
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
if (BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()) {
MediaStreamManager* media_stream_manager =
BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()->media_stream_manager();
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&MediaDevicesDispatcherHost::Create, GetProcess()->GetID(),
GetRoutingID(),
base::Unretained(media_stream_manager)),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateMediaStreamDispatcherHost,
base::Unretained(this), base::Unretained(media_stream_manager)),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO));
}
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MEDIA_REMOTING)
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&RemoterFactoryImpl::Bind,
GetProcess()->GetID(), GetRoutingID()));
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MEDIA_REMOTING)
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&KeyboardLockServiceImpl::CreateMojoService, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&ImageCaptureImpl::Create));
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebAuth)) {
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindAuthenticatorRequest,
base::Unretained(this)));
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableWebAuthTestingAPI)) {
auto* environment_singleton =
ScopedVirtualAuthenticatorEnvironment::GetInstance();
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&ScopedVirtualAuthenticatorEnvironment::AddBinding,
base::Unretained(environment_singleton)));
}
}
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (permission_manager) {
sensor_provider_proxy_.reset(
new SensorProviderProxyImpl(permission_manager, this));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&SensorProviderProxyImpl::Bind,
base::Unretained(sensor_provider_proxy_.get())));
}
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&media::MediaMetricsProvider::Create,
GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord()
? nullptr
: GetSiteInstance()
->GetBrowserContext()
->GetVideoDecodePerfHistory()));
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
cc::switches::kEnableGpuBenchmarking)) {
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&InputInjectorImpl::Create, weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(GetRestrictedCookieManager, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&QuotaDispatcherHost::CreateForFrame, GetProcess(), routing_id_));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService)) {
StoragePartitionImpl* storage_partition =
static_cast<StoragePartitionImpl*>(BrowserContext::GetStoragePartition(
GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext(), GetSiteInstance()));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(
&PrefetchURLLoaderService::ConnectToService,
base::RetainedRef(storage_partition->GetPrefetchURLLoaderService()),
frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id()),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO));
}
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestLoadTimingNotReusedWithPac(const net::LoadTimingInfo& load_timing_info,
int connect_timing_flags) {
EXPECT_FALSE(load_timing_info.socket_reused);
EXPECT_NE(net::NetLog::Source::kInvalidId, load_timing_info.socket_log_id);
EXPECT_FALSE(load_timing_info.proxy_resolve_start.is_null());
EXPECT_LE(load_timing_info.proxy_resolve_start,
load_timing_info.proxy_resolve_end);
EXPECT_LE(load_timing_info.proxy_resolve_end,
load_timing_info.connect_timing.connect_start);
net::ExpectConnectTimingHasTimes(load_timing_info.connect_timing,
connect_timing_flags);
EXPECT_LE(load_timing_info.connect_timing.connect_end,
load_timing_info.send_start);
EXPECT_LE(load_timing_info.send_start, load_timing_info.send_end);
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.request_start_time.is_null());
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.request_start.is_null());
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.receive_headers_end.is_null());
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcRenderCreatePicture(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xRenderCreatePictureReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderCreatePictureReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->pid);
swapl(&stuff->drawable);
swapl(&stuff->format);
swapl(&stuff->mask);
SwapRestL(stuff);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SkColor AutofillPopupBaseView::GetSeparatorColor() {
return GetNativeTheme()->GetSystemColor(
ui::NativeTheme::kColorId_MenuSeparatorColor);
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XFixesCreateRegionFromGC (Display *dpy, GC gc)
{
XFixesExtDisplayInfo *info = XFixesFindDisplay (dpy);
xXFixesCreateRegionFromGCReq *req;
XserverRegion region;
XFixesCheckExtension (dpy, info, 0);
LockDisplay (dpy);
GetReq (XFixesCreateRegionFromGC, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->xfixesReqType = X_XFixesCreateRegionFromGC;
region = req->region = XAllocID (dpy);
req->gc = gc->gid;
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle();
return region;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 8,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: writeBufferToSeparateStrips (TIFF* out, uint8* buf,
uint32 length, uint32 width, uint16 spp,
struct dump_opts *dump)
{
uint8 *src;
uint16 bps;
uint32 row, nrows, rowsize, rowsperstrip;
uint32 bytes_per_sample;
tsample_t s;
tstrip_t strip = 0;
tsize_t stripsize = TIFFStripSize(out);
tsize_t rowstripsize, scanlinesize = TIFFScanlineSize(out);
tsize_t total_bytes = 0;
tdata_t obuf;
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(out, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rowsperstrip);
(void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps);
bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
if( width == 0 ||
(uint32)bps * (uint32)spp > TIFF_UINT32_MAX / width ||
bps * spp * width > TIFF_UINT32_MAX - 7U )
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, uint32 overflow when computing (bps * spp * width) + 7");
return 1;
}
rowsize = ((bps * spp * width) + 7U) / 8; /* source has interleaved samples */
if( bytes_per_sample == 0 ||
rowsperstrip > TIFF_UINT32_MAX / bytes_per_sample ||
rowsperstrip * bytes_per_sample > TIFF_UINT32_MAX / (width + 1) )
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, uint32 overflow when computing rowsperstrip * "
"bytes_per_sample * (width + 1)");
return 1;
}
rowstripsize = rowsperstrip * bytes_per_sample * (width + 1);
obuf = _TIFFmalloc (rowstripsize);
if (obuf == NULL)
return 1;
for (s = 0; s < spp; s++)
{
for (row = 0; row < length; row += rowsperstrip)
{
nrows = (row + rowsperstrip > length) ? length - row : rowsperstrip;
stripsize = TIFFVStripSize(out, nrows);
src = buf + (row * rowsize);
total_bytes += stripsize;
memset (obuf, '\0', rowstripsize);
if (extractContigSamplesToBuffer(obuf, src, nrows, width, s, spp, bps, dump))
{
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 1;
}
if ((dump->outfile != NULL) && (dump->level == 1))
{
dump_info(dump->outfile, dump->format,"",
"Sample %2d, Strip: %2d, bytes: %4d, Row %4d, bytes: %4d, Input offset: %6d",
s + 1, strip + 1, stripsize, row + 1, scanlinesize, src - buf);
dump_buffer(dump->outfile, dump->format, nrows, scanlinesize, row, obuf);
}
if (TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(out, strip++, obuf, stripsize) < 0)
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out), "Error, can't write strip %u", strip - 1);
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 1;
}
}
}
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix readContigStripsIntoBuffer() in -i (ignore) mode so
that the output buffer is correctly incremented to avoid write outside bounds.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2620
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void zend_fcall_info_args_clear(zend_fcall_info *fci, int free_mem) /* {{{ */
{
if (fci->params) {
if (free_mem) {
efree(fci->params);
fci->params = NULL;
}
}
fci->param_count = 0;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cbcmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct shash_instance *inst;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
int err;
err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH);
if (err)
return err;
alg = crypto_get_attr_alg(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
if (IS_ERR(alg))
return PTR_ERR(alg);
inst = shash_alloc_instance("cbcmac", alg);
err = PTR_ERR(inst);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto out_put_alg;
err = crypto_init_spawn(shash_instance_ctx(inst), alg,
shash_crypto_instance(inst),
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
if (err)
goto out_free_inst;
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = 1;
inst->alg.digestsize = alg->cra_blocksize;
inst->alg.descsize = ALIGN(sizeof(struct cbcmac_desc_ctx),
alg->cra_alignmask + 1) +
alg->cra_blocksize;
inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx);
inst->alg.base.cra_init = cbcmac_init_tfm;
inst->alg.base.cra_exit = cbcmac_exit_tfm;
inst->alg.init = crypto_cbcmac_digest_init;
inst->alg.update = crypto_cbcmac_digest_update;
inst->alg.final = crypto_cbcmac_digest_final;
inst->alg.setkey = crypto_cbcmac_digest_setkey;
err = shash_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
out_free_inst:
if (err)
shash_free_instance(shash_crypto_instance(inst));
out_put_alg:
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: ccm - move cbcmac input off the stack
Commit f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
refactored the CCM driver to allow separate implementations of the
underlying MAC to be provided by a platform. However, in doing so, it
moved some data from the linear region to the stack, which violates the
SG constraints when the stack is virtually mapped.
So move idata/odata back to the request ctx struct, of which we can
reasonably expect that it has been allocated using kmalloc() et al.
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Fixes: f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmd_urlfetch(char *tag)
{
struct mboxkey *mboxkey_db;
int c, r, doclose;
static struct buf arg, param;
struct imapurl url;
struct index_state *state;
uint32_t msgno;
mbentry_t *mbentry = NULL;
time_t now = time(NULL);
unsigned extended, params;
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* URLFETCH");
do {
char *intname = NULL;
extended = params = 0;
/* See if its an extended URLFETCH */
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c == '(') extended = 1;
else prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg);
(void)prot_putc(' ', imapd_out);
prot_printstring(imapd_out, arg.s);
if (extended) {
while (c == ' ') {
c = getword(imapd_in, ¶m);
ucase(param.s);
if (!strcmp(param.s, "BODY")) {
if (params & (URLFETCH_BODY | URLFETCH_BINARY)) goto badext;
params |= URLFETCH_BODY;
} else if (!strcmp(param.s, "BINARY")) {
if (params & (URLFETCH_BODY | URLFETCH_BINARY)) goto badext;
params |= URLFETCH_BINARY;
} else if (!strcmp(param.s, "BODYPARTSTRUCTURE")) {
if (params & URLFETCH_BODYPARTSTRUCTURE) goto badext;
params |= URLFETCH_BODYPARTSTRUCTURE;
} else {
goto badext;
}
}
if (c != ')') goto badext;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
}
doclose = 0;
r = imapurl_fromURL(&url, arg.s);
/* validate the URL */
if (r || !url.user || !url.server || !url.mailbox || !url.uid ||
(url.section && !*url.section) ||
(url.urlauth.access && !(url.urlauth.mech && url.urlauth.token))) {
/* missing info */
r = IMAP_BADURL;
} else if (strcmp(url.server, config_servername)) {
/* wrong server */
r = IMAP_BADURL;
} else if (url.urlauth.expire &&
url.urlauth.expire < mktime(gmtime(&now))) {
/* expired */
r = IMAP_BADURL;
} else if (url.urlauth.access) {
/* check mechanism & authorization */
int authorized = 0;
if (!strcasecmp(url.urlauth.mech, "INTERNAL")) {
if (!strncasecmp(url.urlauth.access, "submit+", 7) &&
global_authisa(imapd_authstate, IMAPOPT_SUBMITSERVERS)) {
/* authorized submit server */
authorized = 1;
} else if (!strncasecmp(url.urlauth.access, "user+", 5) &&
!strcmp(url.urlauth.access+5, imapd_userid)) {
/* currently authorized user */
authorized = 1;
} else if (!strcasecmp(url.urlauth.access, "authuser") &&
strcmp(imapd_userid, "anonymous")) {
/* any non-anonymous authorized user */
authorized = 1;
} else if (!strcasecmp(url.urlauth.access, "anonymous")) {
/* anyone */
authorized = 1;
}
}
if (!authorized) r = IMAP_BADURL;
}
if (r) goto err;
intname = mboxname_from_external(url.mailbox, &imapd_namespace, url.user);
r = mlookup(NULL, NULL, intname, &mbentry);
if (r) goto err;
if ((mbentry->mbtype & MBTYPE_REMOTE)) {
/* remote mailbox */
struct backend *be;
be = proxy_findserver(mbentry->server, &imap_protocol,
proxy_userid, &backend_cached,
&backend_current, &backend_inbox, imapd_in);
if (!be) {
r = IMAP_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE;
} else {
/* XXX proxy command to backend */
}
free(url.freeme);
mboxlist_entry_free(&mbentry);
free(intname);
continue;
}
mboxlist_entry_free(&mbentry);
/* local mailbox */
if (url.urlauth.token) {
/* validate the URLAUTH token */
/* yes, this is evil, in-place conversion from hex
* to binary */
if (hex_to_bin(url.urlauth.token, 0,
(unsigned char *) url.urlauth.token) < 1) {
r = IMAP_BADURL;
break;
}
/* first byte is the algorithm used to create token */
switch (url.urlauth.token[0]) {
case URLAUTH_ALG_HMAC_SHA1: {
const char *key;
size_t keylen;
unsigned char vtoken[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int vtoken_len;
r = mboxkey_open(url.user, 0, &mboxkey_db);
if (r) break;
r = mboxkey_read(mboxkey_db, intname, &key, &keylen);
if (r) break;
HMAC(EVP_sha1(), key, keylen, (unsigned char *) arg.s,
url.urlauth.rump_len, vtoken, &vtoken_len);
mboxkey_close(mboxkey_db);
if (memcmp(vtoken, url.urlauth.token+1, vtoken_len)) {
r = IMAP_BADURL;
}
break;
}
default:
r = IMAP_BADURL;
break;
}
}
if (r) goto err;
if (!strcmp(index_mboxname(imapd_index), intname)) {
state = imapd_index;
}
else {
/* not the currently selected mailbox, so try to open it */
r = index_open(intname, NULL, &state);
if (!r)
doclose = 1;
if (!r && !url.urlauth.access &&
!(state->myrights & ACL_READ)) {
r = (imapd_userisadmin ||
(state->myrights & ACL_LOOKUP)) ?
IMAP_PERMISSION_DENIED : IMAP_MAILBOX_NONEXISTENT;
}
}
if (r) goto err;
if (url.uidvalidity &&
(state->mailbox->i.uidvalidity != url.uidvalidity)) {
r = IMAP_BADURL;
} else if (!url.uid || !(msgno = index_finduid(state, url.uid)) ||
(index_getuid(state, msgno) != url.uid)) {
r = IMAP_BADURL;
} else {
r = index_urlfetch(state, msgno, params, url.section,
url.start_octet, url.octet_count,
imapd_out, NULL);
}
if (doclose)
index_close(&state);
err:
free(url.freeme);
if (r) prot_printf(imapd_out, " NIL");
free(intname);
} while (c == ' ');
prot_printf(imapd_out, "\r\n");
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Unexpected extra arguments to URLFETCH\r\n", tag);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
}
else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED));
}
return;
badext:
prot_printf(imapd_out, " NIL\r\n");
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Invalid extended URLFETCH parameters\r\n", tag);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String8 InputDispatcher::getApplicationWindowLabelLocked(
const sp<InputApplicationHandle>& applicationHandle,
const sp<InputWindowHandle>& windowHandle) {
if (applicationHandle != NULL) {
if (windowHandle != NULL) {
String8 label(applicationHandle->getName());
label.append(" - ");
label.append(windowHandle->getName());
return label;
} else {
return applicationHandle->getName();
}
} else if (windowHandle != NULL) {
return windowHandle->getName();
} else {
return String8("<unknown application or window>");
}
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 163,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lrw_aesni_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct aesni_lrw_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
int err;
err = aes_set_key_common(tfm, ctx->raw_aes_ctx, key,
keylen - AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (err)
return err;
return lrw_init_table(&ctx->lrw_table, key + keylen - AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlock::addFocusRingRects(Vector<IntRect>& rects, const LayoutPoint& additionalOffset, const RenderLayerModelObject* paintContainer)
{
if (inlineElementContinuation()) {
bool nextInlineHasLineBox = inlineElementContinuation()->firstLineBox();
bool prevInlineHasLineBox = toRenderInline(inlineElementContinuation()->node()->renderer())->firstLineBox();
LayoutUnit topMargin = prevInlineHasLineBox ? collapsedMarginBefore() : LayoutUnit();
LayoutUnit bottomMargin = nextInlineHasLineBox ? collapsedMarginAfter() : LayoutUnit();
LayoutRect rect(additionalOffset.x(), additionalOffset.y() - topMargin, width(), height() + topMargin + bottomMargin);
if (!rect.isEmpty())
rects.append(pixelSnappedIntRect(rect));
} else if (width() && height())
rects.append(pixelSnappedIntRect(additionalOffset, size()));
if (!hasOverflowClip() && !hasControlClip()) {
for (RootInlineBox* curr = firstRootBox(); curr; curr = curr->nextRootBox()) {
LayoutUnit top = max<LayoutUnit>(curr->lineTop(), curr->top());
LayoutUnit bottom = min<LayoutUnit>(curr->lineBottom(), curr->top() + curr->height());
LayoutRect rect(additionalOffset.x() + curr->x(), additionalOffset.y() + top, curr->width(), bottom - top);
if (!rect.isEmpty())
rects.append(pixelSnappedIntRect(rect));
}
for (RenderObject* curr = firstChild(); curr; curr = curr->nextSibling()) {
if (!curr->isText() && !curr->isListMarker() && curr->isBox()) {
RenderBox* box = toRenderBox(curr);
FloatPoint pos;
if (box->layer())
pos = curr->localToContainerPoint(FloatPoint(), paintContainer);
else
pos = FloatPoint((additionalOffset.x() + box->x()).toFloat(), (additionalOffset.y() + box->y()).toFloat()); // FIXME: Snap offsets? crbug.com/350474
box->addFocusRingRects(rects, flooredLayoutPoint(pos), paintContainer);
}
}
}
if (inlineElementContinuation())
inlineElementContinuation()->addFocusRingRects(rects, flooredLayoutPoint(additionalOffset + inlineElementContinuation()->containingBlock()->location() - location()), paintContainer);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
int success = 0, first_error = 0, total_failed = 0;
int buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER;
#endif
/*
* Check for valid input
*/
if( chain == NULL || buf == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/*
* Determine buffer content. Buffer contains either one DER certificate or
* one or more PEM certificates.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
if( buflen != 0 && buf[buflen - 1] == '\0' &&
strstr( (const char *) buf, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" ) != NULL )
{
buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM;
}
if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER )
return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen );
#else
return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_pem_context pem;
/* 1 rather than 0 since the terminating NULL byte is counted in */
while( buflen > 1 )
{
size_t use_len;
mbedtls_pem_init( &pem );
/* If we get there, we know the string is null-terminated */
ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem,
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----",
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
buf, NULL, 0, &use_len );
if( ret == 0 )
{
/*
* Was PEM encoded
*/
buflen -= use_len;
buf += use_len;
}
else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA )
{
return( ret );
}
else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT )
{
mbedtls_pem_free( &pem );
/*
* PEM header and footer were found
*/
buflen -= use_len;
buf += use_len;
if( first_error == 0 )
first_error = ret;
total_failed++;
continue;
}
else
break;
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, pem.buf, pem.buflen );
mbedtls_pem_free( &pem );
if( ret != 0 )
{
/*
* Quit parsing on a memory error
*/
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED )
return( ret );
if( first_error == 0 )
first_error = ret;
total_failed++;
continue;
}
success = 1;
}
}
if( success )
return( total_failed );
else if( first_error )
return( first_error );
else
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
}
Commit Message: Improve behaviour on fatal errors
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 61,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pgp_finish(sc_card_t *card)
{
if (card != NULL) {
struct pgp_priv_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
if (priv != NULL) {
/* delete fake file hierarchy */
pgp_iterate_blobs(priv->mf, 99, pgp_free_blob);
/* delete private data */
free(priv);
}
card->drv_data = NULL;
}
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned ucvector_reserve(ucvector* p, size_t allocsize)
{
if(allocsize > p->allocsize)
{
size_t newsize = (allocsize > p->allocsize * 2) ? allocsize : (allocsize * 3 / 2);
void* data = realloc(p->data, newsize);
if(data)
{
p->allocsize = newsize;
p->data = (unsigned char*)data;
}
else
{
ucvector_cleanup(p);
return 0; /*error: not enough memory*/
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int read_image_tga( gdIOCtx *ctx, oTga *tga )
{
int pixel_block_size = (tga->bits / 8);
int image_block_size = (tga->width * tga->height) * pixel_block_size;
uint8_t* decompression_buffer = NULL;
unsigned char* conversion_buffer = NULL;
int buffer_caret = 0;
int bitmap_caret = 0;
int i = 0;
int j = 0;
uint8_t encoded_pixels;
if(overflow2(tga->width, tga->height)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(tga->width * tga->height, pixel_block_size)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(image_block_size, sizeof(int))) {
return -1;
}
/*! \todo Add more image type support.
*/
if (tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB && tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE)
return -1;
/*! \brief Allocate memmory for image block
* Allocate a chunk of memory for the image block to be passed into.
*/
tga->bitmap = (int *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (tga->bitmap == NULL)
return -1;
switch (tga->imagetype) {
case TGA_TYPE_RGB:
/*! \brief Read in uncompressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an uncompressed RGB type TGA.
*/
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
return -1;
}
while (buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
tga->bitmap[buffer_caret] = (int) conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
break;
case TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE:
/*! \brief Read in RLE compressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an RLE compressed RGB type TGA.
*/
decompression_buffer = (uint8_t*) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(uint8_t));
if (decompression_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
gdFree(decompression_buffer);
return -1;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] = (int)conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( bitmap_caret < image_block_size ) {
if ((decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] & TGA_RLE_FLAG) == TGA_RLE_FLAG) {
encoded_pixels = ( ( decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] & 127 ) + 1 );
buffer_caret++;
for (i = 0; i < encoded_pixels; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < pixel_block_size; j++, bitmap_caret++) {
tga->bitmap[ bitmap_caret ] = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret + j ];
}
}
buffer_caret += pixel_block_size;
} else {
encoded_pixels = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] + 1;
buffer_caret++;
for (i = 0; i < encoded_pixels; i++) {
for( j = 0; j < pixel_block_size; j++, bitmap_caret++ ) {
tga->bitmap[ bitmap_caret ] = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret + j ];
}
buffer_caret += pixel_block_size;
}
}
}
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
break;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: bug #248, fix Out-Of-Bounds Read in read_image_tga
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 169,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaPlayerService::AudioOutput::setAudioStreamType(audio_stream_type_t streamType)
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
if (mAttributes == NULL) {
mStreamType = streamType;
}
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err pasp_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_PixelAspectRatioBox *ptr = (GF_PixelAspectRatioBox *)s;
GF_Err e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->hSpacing);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->vSpacing);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct inode *ext2_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext2_inode_info *ei;
ei = kmem_cache_alloc(ext2_inode_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ei)
return NULL;
ei->i_block_alloc_info = NULL;
ei->vfs_inode.i_version = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
memset(&ei->i_dquot, 0, sizeof(ei->i_dquot));
#endif
return &ei->vfs_inode;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 94,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftVPX::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE || mEOSStatus == OUTPUT_FRAMES_FLUSHED) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
bool EOSseen = false;
vpx_codec_err_t err;
bool portWillReset = false;
while ((mEOSStatus == INPUT_EOS_SEEN || !inQueue.empty())
&& !outQueue.empty()) {
if (mEOSStatus == INPUT_EOS_SEEN || mImg != NULL) {
if (!outputBuffers(
mEOSStatus == INPUT_EOS_SEEN, true /* display */,
mEOSStatus == INPUT_EOS_SEEN, &portWillReset)) {
ALOGE("on2 decoder failed to output frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
if (portWillReset || mEOSStatus == OUTPUT_FRAMES_FLUSHED ||
mEOSStatus == INPUT_EOS_SEEN) {
return;
}
}
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
mTimeStamps[mTimeStampIdx] = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mEOSStatus = INPUT_EOS_SEEN;
EOSseen = true;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > 0 &&
vpx_codec_decode((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx,
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset,
inHeader->nFilledLen,
&mTimeStamps[mTimeStampIdx], 0)) {
ALOGE("on2 decoder failed to decode frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
mTimeStampIdx = (mTimeStampIdx + 1) % kNumBuffers;
if (!outputBuffers(
EOSseen /* flushDecoder */, true /* display */, EOSseen, &portWillReset)) {
ALOGE("on2 decoder failed to output frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
if (portWillReset) {
return;
}
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 160,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageFilledPolygon (gdImagePtr im, gdPointPtr p, int n, int c)
{
int i;
int j;
int index;
int y;
int miny, maxy, pmaxy;
int x1, y1;
int x2, y2;
int ind1, ind2;
int ints;
int fill_color;
if (n <= 0) {
return;
}
if (c == gdAntiAliased) {
fill_color = im->AA_color;
} else {
fill_color = c;
}
if (!im->polyAllocated) {
if (overflow2(sizeof (int), n)) {
return;
}
im->polyInts = (int *) gdMalloc (sizeof (int) * n);
if (!im->polyInts) {
return;
}
im->polyAllocated = n;
}
if (im->polyAllocated < n) {
while (im->polyAllocated < n) {
im->polyAllocated *= 2;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof (int), im->polyAllocated)) {
return;
}
im->polyInts = (int *) gdReallocEx (im->polyInts,
sizeof (int) * im->polyAllocated);
if (!im->polyInts) {
return;
}
}
miny = p[0].y;
maxy = p[0].y;
for (i = 1; (i < n); i++) {
if (p[i].y < miny) {
miny = p[i].y;
}
if (p[i].y > maxy) {
maxy = p[i].y;
}
}
/* necessary special case: horizontal line */
if (n > 1 && miny == maxy) {
x1 = x2 = p[0].x;
for (i = 1; (i < n); i++) {
if (p[i].x < x1) {
x1 = p[i].x;
} else if (p[i].x > x2) {
x2 = p[i].x;
}
}
gdImageLine(im, x1, miny, x2, miny, c);
return;
}
pmaxy = maxy;
/* 2.0.16: Optimization by Ilia Chipitsine -- don't waste time offscreen */
/* 2.0.26: clipping rectangle is even better */
if (miny < im->cy1) {
miny = im->cy1;
}
if (maxy > im->cy2) {
maxy = im->cy2;
}
/* Fix in 1.3: count a vertex only once */
for (y = miny; (y <= maxy); y++) {
ints = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < n); i++) {
if (!i) {
ind1 = n - 1;
ind2 = 0;
} else {
ind1 = i - 1;
ind2 = i;
}
y1 = p[ind1].y;
y2 = p[ind2].y;
if (y1 < y2) {
x1 = p[ind1].x;
x2 = p[ind2].x;
} else if (y1 > y2) {
y2 = p[ind1].y;
y1 = p[ind2].y;
x2 = p[ind1].x;
x1 = p[ind2].x;
} else {
continue;
}
/* Do the following math as float intermediately, and round to ensure
* that Polygon and FilledPolygon for the same set of points have the
* same footprint. */
if ((y >= y1) && (y < y2)) {
im->polyInts[ints++] = (int) ((float) ((y - y1) * (x2 - x1)) /
(float) (y2 - y1) + 0.5 + x1);
} else if ((y == pmaxy) && (y == y2)) {
im->polyInts[ints++] = x2;
}
}
/*
2.0.26: polygons pretty much always have less than 100 points,
and most of the time they have considerably less. For such trivial
cases, insertion sort is a good choice. Also a good choice for
future implementations that may wish to indirect through a table.
*/
for (i = 1; (i < ints); i++) {
index = im->polyInts[i];
j = i;
while ((j > 0) && (im->polyInts[j - 1] > index)) {
im->polyInts[j] = im->polyInts[j - 1];
j--;
}
im->polyInts[j] = index;
}
for (i = 0; (i < (ints-1)); i += 2) {
/* 2.0.29: back to gdImageLine to prevent segfaults when
performing a pattern fill */
gdImageLine (im, im->polyInts[i], y, im->polyInts[i + 1], y,
fill_color);
}
}
/* If we are drawing this AA, then redraw the border with AA lines. */
/* This doesn't work as well as I'd like, but it doesn't clash either. */
if (c == gdAntiAliased) {
gdImagePolygon (im, p, n, c);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_private_encrypt)
{
zval **key, *crypted;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int cryptedlen;
unsigned char *cryptedbuf = NULL;
int successful = 0;
long keyresource = -1;
char * data;
int data_len;
long padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "szZ|l", &data, &data_len, &crypted, &key, &padding) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
pkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(key, 0, "", 0, &keyresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "key param is not a valid private key");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
cryptedlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
cryptedbuf = emalloc(cryptedlen + 1);
switch (pkey->type) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
case EVP_PKEY_RSA2:
successful = (RSA_private_encrypt(data_len,
(unsigned char *)data,
cryptedbuf,
pkey->pkey.rsa,
padding) == cryptedlen);
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "key type not supported in this PHP build!");
}
if (successful) {
zval_dtor(crypted);
cryptedbuf[cryptedlen] = '\0';
ZVAL_STRINGL(crypted, (char *)cryptedbuf, cryptedlen, 0);
cryptedbuf = NULL;
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
if (cryptedbuf) {
efree(cryptedbuf);
}
if (keyresource == -1) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: KURL getSubResourceURLFromElement(Element* element)
{
ASSERT(element);
const QualifiedName& attributeName = element->subResourceAttributeName();
if (attributeName == QualifiedName::null())
return KURL();
String value = element->getAttribute(attributeName);
if (value.isEmpty() || value.stripWhiteSpace().startsWith("javascript:", TextCaseInsensitive))
return KURL();
return element->document().completeURL(value);
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 125,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Editor::applyParagraphStyleToSelection(StylePropertySet* style,
InputEvent::InputType inputType) {
if (!style || style->isEmpty() || !canEditRichly())
return;
applyParagraphStyle(style, inputType);
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::AdjustFloatRectForScrollAndAbsoluteZoom(
FloatRect& rect,
LayoutObject& layout_object) {
if (!View())
return;
LayoutRect visible_content_rect(View()->VisibleContentRect());
rect.Move(-FloatSize(visible_content_rect.X().ToFloat(),
visible_content_rect.Y().ToFloat()));
AdjustFloatRectForAbsoluteZoom(rect, layout_object);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFlexibleBox::childPreferredMainAxisContentExtentRequiresLayout(RenderBox* child, bool hasInfiniteLineLength) const
{
return preferredMainAxisExtentDependsOnLayout(flexBasisForChild(child), hasInfiniteLineLength) && hasOrthogonalFlow(child);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool JSTestCustomNamedGetterPrototype::getOwnPropertyDescriptor(JSObject* object, ExecState* exec, const Identifier& propertyName, PropertyDescriptor& descriptor)
{
JSTestCustomNamedGetterPrototype* thisObject = jsCast<JSTestCustomNamedGetterPrototype*>(object);
return getStaticFunctionDescriptor<JSObject>(exec, &JSTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeTable, thisObject, propertyName, descriptor);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoVertexAttribI4ui(GLuint indx,
GLuint x,
GLuint y,
GLuint z,
GLuint w) {
api()->glVertexAttribI4uiFn(indx, x, y, z, w);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void testClearRect()
{
m_testSurface->initializeCurrentFrame();
m_testSurface->getPicture();
SkPaint clearPaint;
clearPaint.setXfermodeMode(SkXfermode::kClear_Mode);
m_imageBuffer->canvas()->drawRect(SkRect::MakeWH(m_testSurface->size().width(), m_testSurface->size().height()), clearPaint);
m_fakeImageBufferClient->fakeDraw();
EXPECT_EQ(1, m_fakeImageBufferClient->frameCount());
m_testSurface->getPicture();
EXPECT_EQ(2, m_fakeImageBufferClient->frameCount());
expectDisplayListEnabled(true);
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 132,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlock::paintColumnRules(PaintInfo& paintInfo, const LayoutPoint& paintOffset)
{
if (paintInfo.context->paintingDisabled())
return;
const Color& ruleColor = resolveColor(CSSPropertyWebkitColumnRuleColor);
bool ruleTransparent = style()->columnRuleIsTransparent();
EBorderStyle ruleStyle = style()->columnRuleStyle();
LayoutUnit ruleThickness = style()->columnRuleWidth();
LayoutUnit colGap = columnGap();
bool renderRule = ruleStyle > BHIDDEN && !ruleTransparent;
if (!renderRule)
return;
ColumnInfo* colInfo = columnInfo();
unsigned colCount = columnCount(colInfo);
bool antialias = shouldAntialiasLines(paintInfo.context);
if (colInfo->progressionAxis() == ColumnInfo::InlineAxis) {
bool leftToRight = style()->isLeftToRightDirection();
LayoutUnit currLogicalLeftOffset = leftToRight ? LayoutUnit() : contentLogicalWidth();
LayoutUnit ruleAdd = logicalLeftOffsetForContent();
LayoutUnit ruleLogicalLeft = leftToRight ? LayoutUnit() : contentLogicalWidth();
LayoutUnit inlineDirectionSize = colInfo->desiredColumnWidth();
BoxSide boxSide = isHorizontalWritingMode()
? leftToRight ? BSLeft : BSRight
: leftToRight ? BSTop : BSBottom;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < colCount; i++) {
if (leftToRight) {
ruleLogicalLeft += inlineDirectionSize + colGap / 2;
currLogicalLeftOffset += inlineDirectionSize + colGap;
} else {
ruleLogicalLeft -= (inlineDirectionSize + colGap / 2);
currLogicalLeftOffset -= (inlineDirectionSize + colGap);
}
if (i < colCount - 1) {
LayoutUnit ruleLeft = isHorizontalWritingMode() ? paintOffset.x() + ruleLogicalLeft - ruleThickness / 2 + ruleAdd : paintOffset.x() + borderLeft() + paddingLeft();
LayoutUnit ruleRight = isHorizontalWritingMode() ? ruleLeft + ruleThickness : ruleLeft + contentWidth();
LayoutUnit ruleTop = isHorizontalWritingMode() ? paintOffset.y() + borderTop() + paddingTop() : paintOffset.y() + ruleLogicalLeft - ruleThickness / 2 + ruleAdd;
LayoutUnit ruleBottom = isHorizontalWritingMode() ? ruleTop + contentHeight() : ruleTop + ruleThickness;
IntRect pixelSnappedRuleRect = pixelSnappedIntRectFromEdges(ruleLeft, ruleTop, ruleRight, ruleBottom);
drawLineForBoxSide(paintInfo.context, pixelSnappedRuleRect.x(), pixelSnappedRuleRect.y(), pixelSnappedRuleRect.maxX(), pixelSnappedRuleRect.maxY(), boxSide, ruleColor, ruleStyle, 0, 0, antialias);
}
ruleLogicalLeft = currLogicalLeftOffset;
}
} else {
bool topToBottom = !style()->isFlippedBlocksWritingMode();
LayoutUnit ruleLeft = isHorizontalWritingMode()
? borderLeft() + paddingLeft()
: colGap / 2 - colGap - ruleThickness / 2 + borderBefore() + paddingBefore();
LayoutUnit ruleWidth = isHorizontalWritingMode() ? contentWidth() : ruleThickness;
LayoutUnit ruleTop = isHorizontalWritingMode()
? colGap / 2 - colGap - ruleThickness / 2 + borderBefore() + paddingBefore()
: borderStart() + paddingStart();
LayoutUnit ruleHeight = isHorizontalWritingMode() ? ruleThickness : contentHeight();
LayoutRect ruleRect(ruleLeft, ruleTop, ruleWidth, ruleHeight);
if (!topToBottom) {
if (isHorizontalWritingMode())
ruleRect.setY(height() - ruleRect.maxY());
else
ruleRect.setX(width() - ruleRect.maxX());
}
ruleRect.moveBy(paintOffset);
BoxSide boxSide = isHorizontalWritingMode()
? topToBottom ? BSTop : BSBottom
: topToBottom ? BSLeft : BSRight;
LayoutSize step(0, topToBottom ? colInfo->columnHeight() + colGap : -(colInfo->columnHeight() + colGap));
if (!isHorizontalWritingMode())
step = step.transposedSize();
for (unsigned i = 1; i < colCount; i++) {
ruleRect.move(step);
IntRect pixelSnappedRuleRect = pixelSnappedIntRect(ruleRect);
drawLineForBoxSide(paintInfo.context, pixelSnappedRuleRect.x(), pixelSnappedRuleRect.y(), pixelSnappedRuleRect.maxX(), pixelSnappedRuleRect.maxY(), boxSide, ruleColor, ruleStyle, 0, 0, antialias);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_debugregs *dbgregs)
{
unsigned long val;
memcpy(dbgregs->db, vcpu->arch.db, sizeof(vcpu->arch.db));
kvm_get_dr(vcpu, 6, &val);
dbgregs->dr6 = val;
dbgregs->dr7 = vcpu->arch.dr7;
dbgregs->flags = 0;
memset(&dbgregs->reserved, 0, sizeof(dbgregs->reserved));
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::DidChangeForm() {
TextControlElement::DidChangeForm();
if (input_type_)
AddToRadioButtonGroup();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int x86_pmu_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct perf_event *event;
int idx, handled = 0;
u64 val;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
/*
* Some chipsets need to unmask the LVTPC in a particular spot
* inside the nmi handler. As a result, the unmasking was pushed
* into all the nmi handlers.
*
* This generic handler doesn't seem to have any issues where the
* unmasking occurs so it was left at the top.
*/
apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, APIC_DM_NMI);
for (idx = 0; idx < x86_pmu.num_counters; idx++) {
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask)) {
/*
* Though we deactivated the counter some cpus
* might still deliver spurious interrupts still
* in flight. Catch them:
*/
if (__test_and_clear_bit(idx, cpuc->running))
handled++;
continue;
}
event = cpuc->events[idx];
val = x86_perf_event_update(event);
if (val & (1ULL << (x86_pmu.cntval_bits - 1)))
continue;
/*
* event overflow
*/
handled++;
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!x86_perf_event_set_period(event))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 1, &data, regs))
x86_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
if (handled)
inc_irq_stat(apic_perf_irqs);
return handled;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 165,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::MaybeCopyDisableWebRtcEncryptionSwitch(
base::CommandLine* to_command_line,
const base::CommandLine& from_command_line,
version_info::Channel channel) {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
const version_info::Channel kMaxDisableEncryptionChannel =
version_info::Channel::BETA;
#else
const version_info::Channel kMaxDisableEncryptionChannel =
version_info::Channel::DEV;
#endif
if (channel <= kMaxDisableEncryptionChannel) {
static const char* const kWebRtcDevSwitchNames[] = {
switches::kDisableWebRtcEncryption,
};
to_command_line->CopySwitchesFrom(from_command_line, kWebRtcDevSwitchNames,
base::size(kWebRtcDevSwitchNames));
}
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int tcp_xmit_size_goal(struct sock *sk, u32 mss_now,
int large_allowed)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
u32 xmit_size_goal, old_size_goal;
xmit_size_goal = mss_now;
if (large_allowed && sk_can_gso(sk)) {
xmit_size_goal = ((sk->sk_gso_max_size - 1) -
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops->net_header_len -
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len -
tp->tcp_header_len);
xmit_size_goal = tcp_bound_to_half_wnd(tp, xmit_size_goal);
/* We try hard to avoid divides here */
old_size_goal = tp->xmit_size_goal_segs * mss_now;
if (likely(old_size_goal <= xmit_size_goal &&
old_size_goal + mss_now > xmit_size_goal)) {
xmit_size_goal = old_size_goal;
} else {
tp->xmit_size_goal_segs = xmit_size_goal / mss_now;
xmit_size_goal = tp->xmit_size_goal_segs * mss_now;
}
}
return max(xmit_size_goal, mss_now);
}
Commit Message: net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
kex->done = 1;
sshbuf_reset(kex->peer);
/* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */
kex->name = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 165,483 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int reuc_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const git_index_reuc_entry *info_a = a;
const git_index_reuc_entry *info_b = b;
return strcmp(info_a->path, info_b->path);
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 normal_pmc_alternative(u64 ev, unsigned long flags)
{
u64 alt[MAX_EVENT_ALTERNATIVES];
int n;
flags &= ~(PPMU_LIMITED_PMC_OK | PPMU_LIMITED_PMC_REQD);
n = ppmu->get_alternatives(ev, flags, alt);
if (!n)
return 0;
return alt[0];
}
Commit Message: perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 22,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _gcry_mpi_ec_get_reset (mpi_ec_t ec)
{
ec->t.valid.a_is_pminus3 = 0;
ec->t.valid.two_inv_p = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: StrongWeakPair(Object* obj1, Object* obj2) : Base(obj1, obj2) {}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *rdev_get_drvdata(struct regulator_dev *rdev)
{
return rdev->reg_data;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rds_cmsg_recv(struct rds_incoming *inc, struct msghdr *msg,
struct rds_sock *rs)
{
int ret = 0;
if (inc->i_rdma_cookie) {
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RDS, RDS_CMSG_RDMA_DEST,
sizeof(inc->i_rdma_cookie), &inc->i_rdma_cookie);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if ((inc->i_rx_tstamp.tv_sec != 0) &&
sock_flag(rds_rs_to_sk(rs), SOCK_RCVTSTAMP)) {
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMP,
sizeof(struct timeval),
&inc->i_rx_tstamp);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: rds: fix an infoleak in rds_inc_info_copy
The last field "flags" of object "minfo" is not initialized.
Copying this object out may leak kernel stack data.
Assign 0 to it to avoid leak.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 52,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_attr_bitmap(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap)
{
uint32_t bmlen;
__be32 *p;
READ_BUF(4);
READ32(bmlen);
bitmap[0] = bitmap[1] = 0;
READ_BUF((bmlen << 2));
if (bmlen > 0) {
READ32(bitmap[0]);
if (bmlen > 1)
READ32(bitmap[1]);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tracing_reset_all_online_cpus(void)
{
struct trace_array *tr;
list_for_each_entry(tr, &ftrace_trace_arrays, list) {
if (!tr->clear_trace)
continue;
tr->clear_trace = false;
tracing_reset_online_cpus(&tr->trace_buffer);
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE
tracing_reset_online_cpus(&tr->max_buffer);
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldMethod", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, longArg, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldMethod(longArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T impeg2d_api_entity(iv_obj_t *ps_dechdl,
void *pv_api_ip,
void *pv_api_op)
{
iv_obj_t *ps_dec_handle;
dec_state_t *ps_dec_state;
dec_state_multi_core_t *ps_dec_state_multi_core;
impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
impeg2d_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
WORD32 bytes_remaining;
pic_buf_t *ps_disp_pic;
ps_dec_ip = (impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (impeg2d_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
memset(ps_dec_op,0,sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_size = sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_op_t);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present = 0;
bytes_remaining = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
ps_dec_handle = (iv_obj_t *)ps_dechdl;
if(ps_dechdl == NULL)
{
return(IV_FAIL);
}
ps_dec_state_multi_core = ps_dec_handle->pv_codec_handle;
ps_dec_state = ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[0];
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_frm_buf = &(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf);
if(0 == ps_dec_state->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_y_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0];
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_u_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1];
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_v_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2];
}
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic = NULL;
ps_dec_state->i4_frame_decoded = 0;
/*rest bytes consumed */
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = IV_SUCCESS;
if((ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.pv_stream_buffer == NULL)&&(ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm==0))
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if (ps_dec_state->u4_num_frames_decoded > NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = IMPEG2D_SAMPLE_VERSION_LIMIT_ERR;
return(IV_FAIL);
}
if(((0 == ps_dec_state->u2_header_done) || (ps_dec_state->u2_decode_header == 1)) && (ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm == 0))
{
impeg2d_dec_hdr(ps_dec_state,ps_dec_ip ,ps_dec_op);
bytes_remaining -= ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed;
}
if((1 != ps_dec_state->u2_decode_header) && ((bytes_remaining > 0) || ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm))
{
if(ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm)
{
if(ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[1] != NULL)
{
impeg2_disp_mgr_add(&ps_dec_state->s_disp_mgr, ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[1], ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[1]->i4_buf_id);
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[1]->i4_buf_id, BUF_MGR_REF);
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0]->i4_buf_id, BUF_MGR_REF);
ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[1] = NULL;
ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0] = NULL;
}
else if(ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0] != NULL)
{
impeg2_disp_mgr_add(&ps_dec_state->s_disp_mgr, ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0], ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0]->i4_buf_id);
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0]->i4_buf_id, BUF_MGR_REF);
ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0] = NULL;
}
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_size = sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_size = sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_op_t);
ps_disp_pic = impeg2_disp_mgr_get(&ps_dec_state->s_disp_mgr, &ps_dec_state->i4_disp_buf_id);
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic = ps_disp_pic;
if(ps_disp_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present = 0;
}
else
{
WORD32 fmt_conv;
if(0 == ps_dec_state->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_y_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0];
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_u_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1];
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_v_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2];
fmt_conv = 1;
}
else
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_y_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_y;
if(IV_YUV_420P == ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_u_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_u;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_v_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_v;
fmt_conv = 0;
}
else
{
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
pu1_buf = ps_dec_state->as_disp_buffers[ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id].pu1_bufs[1];
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_u_buf = pu1_buf;
pu1_buf = ps_dec_state->as_disp_buffers[ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id].pu1_bufs[2];
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_v_buf = pu1_buf;
fmt_conv = 1;
}
}
if(fmt_conv == 1)
{
iv_yuv_buf_t *ps_dst;
ps_dst = &(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf);
if(ps_dec_state->u4_deinterlace && (0 == ps_dec_state->u2_progressive_frame))
{
impeg2d_deinterlace(ps_dec_state,
ps_disp_pic,
ps_dst,
0,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size);
}
else
{
impeg2d_format_convert(ps_dec_state,
ps_disp_pic,
ps_dst,
0,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size);
}
}
if(ps_dec_state->u4_deinterlace)
{
if(ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic)
{
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg,
ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic->i4_buf_id,
MPEG2_BUF_MGR_DEINT);
}
ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic = ps_disp_pic;
}
if(0 == ps_dec_state->u4_share_disp_buf)
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present = 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_disp_buf_id = ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_ts = ps_disp_pic->u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_output_format = (IV_COLOR_FORMAT_T)ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_is_ref_flag = (B_PIC != ps_dec_state->e_pic_type);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_progressive_frame_flag = IV_PROGRESSIVE;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_size = sizeof(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf);
switch(ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat)
{
case IV_YUV_420SP_UV:
case IV_YUV_420SP_VU:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride;
break;
case IV_YUV_422ILE:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_ht = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_wd = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_ht = 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present)
{
if(1 == ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present)
{
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride,
ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size,
ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat,
ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size);
}
return(IV_SUCCESS);
}
else
{
ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm = 0;
return(IV_FAIL);
}
}
else if(ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm==0)
{
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_size = sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_size = sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_op_t);
if(ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes < 4)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
return(IV_FAIL);
}
if(1 == ps_dec_state->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
if(0 == impeg2_buf_mgr_check_free(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg))
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code =
(IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_output_format = (IV_COLOR_FORMAT_T)ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_is_ref_flag = (B_PIC != ps_dec_state->e_pic_type);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_progressive_frame_flag = IV_PROGRESSIVE;
if (0 == ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride)
{
ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride = (ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size);
}
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_size = sizeof(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf);
switch(ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat)
{
case IV_YUV_420SP_UV:
case IV_YUV_420SP_VU:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride;
break;
case IV_YUV_422ILE:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_ht = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_wd = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_ht = 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
if( ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm == 0)
{
ps_dec_state->u1_flushcnt = 0;
/*************************************************************************/
/* Frame Decode */
/*************************************************************************/
impeg2d_dec_frm(ps_dec_state,ps_dec_ip,ps_dec_op);
if (IVD_ERROR_NONE ==
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code)
{
if(ps_dec_state->u1_first_frame_done == 0)
{
ps_dec_state->u1_first_frame_done = 1;
}
if(ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present = 1;
switch(ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic->e_pic_type)
{
case I_PIC :
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_I_FRAME;
break;
case P_PIC:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_P_FRAME;
break;
case B_PIC:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_B_FRAME;
break;
case D_PIC:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_I_FRAME;
break;
default :
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_FRAMETYPE_DEFAULT;
break;
}
}
else
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
}
ps_dec_state->u4_num_frames_decoded++;
}
}
else
{
ps_dec_state->u1_flushcnt++;
}
}
if(ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_disp_buf_id = ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_ts = ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic->u4_ts;
if(0 == ps_dec_state->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
}
}
if(ps_dec_state->u4_deinterlace)
{
if(ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic)
{
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg,
ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic->i4_buf_id,
MPEG2_BUF_MGR_DEINT);
}
ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic = ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic;
}
if(1 == ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present)
{
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride,
ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size,
ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat,
ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size);
}
}
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_progressive_frame_flag = 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e4_fld_type = ps_dec_state->s_disp_op.e4_fld_type;
if(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code)
return IV_FAIL;
else
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix in handling header decode errors
If header decode was unsuccessful, do not try decoding a frame
Also, initialize pic_wd, pic_ht for reinitialization when
decoder is created with smaller dimensions
Bug: 28886651
Bug: 35219737
Change-Id: I8c06d9052910e47fce2e6fe25ad318d4c83d2c50
(cherry picked from commit 2b9fa9ace2dbedfbac026fc9b6ab6cdac7f68c27)
(cherry picked from commit c2395cd7cc0c286a66de674032dd2ed26500aef4)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DebuggerAttachFunction::~DebuggerAttachFunction() {
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 120,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __cfs_schedulable(struct task_group *tg, u64 period, u64 quota)
{
int ret;
struct cfs_schedulable_data data = {
.tg = tg,
.period = period,
.quota = quota,
};
if (quota != RUNTIME_INF) {
do_div(data.period, NSEC_PER_USEC);
do_div(data.quota, NSEC_PER_USEC);
}
rcu_read_lock();
ret = walk_tg_tree(tg_cfs_schedulable_down, tg_nop, &data);
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err pcrb_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i;
GF_PcrInfoBox *ptr = (GF_PcrInfoBox*) s;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->subsegment_count);
for (i=0; i<ptr->subsegment_count; i++ ) {
u32 data1 = (u32) (ptr->pcr_values[i] >> 10);
u16 data2 = (u16) (ptr->pcr_values[i] << 6);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, data1);
gf_bs_write_u16(bs, data2);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool is_mmio_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr)
{
if (vcpu->arch.mmu.direct_map || mmu_is_nested(vcpu))
return vcpu_match_mmio_gpa(vcpu, addr);
return vcpu_match_mmio_gva(vcpu, addr);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_destroy(HashTable *ht)
{
Bucket *p, *end;
IS_CONSISTENT(ht);
HT_ASSERT(GC_REFCOUNT(ht) <= 1);
if (ht->nNumUsed) {
p = ht->arData;
end = p + ht->nNumUsed;
if (ht->pDestructor) {
SET_INCONSISTENT(HT_IS_DESTROYING);
if (ht->u.flags & (HASH_FLAG_PACKED|HASH_FLAG_STATIC_KEYS)) {
if (ht->nNumUsed == ht->nNumOfElements) {
do {
ht->pDestructor(&p->val);
} while (++p != end);
} else {
do {
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE(p->val) != IS_UNDEF)) {
ht->pDestructor(&p->val);
}
} while (++p != end);
}
} else if (ht->nNumUsed == ht->nNumOfElements) {
do {
ht->pDestructor(&p->val);
if (EXPECTED(p->key)) {
zend_string_release(p->key);
}
} while (++p != end);
} else {
do {
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE(p->val) != IS_UNDEF)) {
ht->pDestructor(&p->val);
if (EXPECTED(p->key)) {
zend_string_release(p->key);
}
}
} while (++p != end);
}
SET_INCONSISTENT(HT_DESTROYED);
} else {
if (!(ht->u.flags & (HASH_FLAG_PACKED|HASH_FLAG_STATIC_KEYS))) {
do {
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE(p->val) != IS_UNDEF)) {
if (EXPECTED(p->key)) {
zend_string_release(p->key);
}
}
} while (++p != end);
}
}
zend_hash_iterators_remove(ht);
} else if (EXPECTED(!(ht->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_INITIALIZED))) {
return;
}
pefree(HT_GET_DATA_ADDR(ht), ht->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_PERSISTENT);
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 69,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void do_fd_request(struct request_queue *q)
{
if (WARN(max_buffer_sectors == 0,
"VFS: %s called on non-open device\n", __func__))
return;
if (WARN(atomic_read(&usage_count) == 0,
"warning: usage count=0, current_req=%p sect=%ld type=%x flags=%llx\n",
current_req, (long)blk_rq_pos(current_req), current_req->cmd_type,
(unsigned long long) current_req->cmd_flags))
return;
if (test_and_set_bit(0, &fdc_busy)) {
/* fdc busy, this new request will be treated when the
current one is done */
is_alive(__func__, "old request running");
return;
}
command_status = FD_COMMAND_NONE;
__reschedule_timeout(MAXTIMEOUT, "fd_request");
set_fdc(0);
process_fd_request();
is_alive(__func__, "");
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoDisableVertexAttribArray(GLuint index) {
if (state_.vertex_attrib_manager->Enable(index, false)) {
if (index != 0 || gl_version_info().BehavesLikeGLES()) {
state_.vertex_attrib_manager->SetDriverVertexAttribEnabled(index, false);
}
} else {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glDisableVertexAttribArray", "index out of range");
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init nr_proto_init(void)
{
int i;
int rc = proto_register(&nr_proto, 0);
if (rc != 0)
goto out;
if (nr_ndevs > 0x7fffffff/sizeof(struct net_device *)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "NET/ROM: nr_proto_init - nr_ndevs parameter to large\n");
return -1;
}
dev_nr = kzalloc(nr_ndevs * sizeof(struct net_device *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (dev_nr == NULL) {
printk(KERN_ERR "NET/ROM: nr_proto_init - unable to allocate device array\n");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < nr_ndevs; i++) {
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
struct net_device *dev;
sprintf(name, "nr%d", i);
dev = alloc_netdev(0, name, nr_setup);
if (!dev) {
printk(KERN_ERR "NET/ROM: nr_proto_init - unable to allocate device structure\n");
goto fail;
}
dev->base_addr = i;
if (register_netdev(dev)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "NET/ROM: nr_proto_init - unable to register network device\n");
free_netdev(dev);
goto fail;
}
nr_set_lockdep_key(dev);
dev_nr[i] = dev;
}
if (sock_register(&nr_family_ops)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "NET/ROM: nr_proto_init - unable to register socket family\n");
goto fail;
}
register_netdevice_notifier(&nr_dev_notifier);
ax25_register_pid(&nr_pid);
ax25_linkfail_register(&nr_linkfail_notifier);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
nr_register_sysctl();
#endif
nr_loopback_init();
proc_create("nr", S_IRUGO, init_net.proc_net, &nr_info_fops);
proc_create("nr_neigh", S_IRUGO, init_net.proc_net, &nr_neigh_fops);
proc_create("nr_nodes", S_IRUGO, init_net.proc_net, &nr_nodes_fops);
out:
return rc;
fail:
while (--i >= 0) {
unregister_netdev(dev_nr[i]);
free_netdev(dev_nr[i]);
}
kfree(dev_nr);
proto_unregister(&nr_proto);
rc = -1;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: netrom: fix info leak via msg_name in nr_recvmsg()
In case msg_name is set the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of
struct sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Also
the sax25_ndigis member does not get assigned, leaking four more
bytes.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoResult DataPipeProducerDispatcher::RemoveWatcherRef(
WatcherDispatcher* watcher,
uintptr_t context) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (is_closed_ || in_transit_)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return watchers_.Remove(watcher, context);
}
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 154,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QuotaManager::QuotaManager(bool is_incognito,
const FilePath& profile_path,
base::SingleThreadTaskRunner* io_thread,
base::SequencedTaskRunner* db_thread,
SpecialStoragePolicy* special_storage_policy)
: is_incognito_(is_incognito),
profile_path_(profile_path),
proxy_(new QuotaManagerProxy(
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this), io_thread)),
db_disabled_(false),
eviction_disabled_(false),
io_thread_(io_thread),
db_thread_(db_thread),
temporary_quota_initialized_(false),
temporary_quota_override_(-1),
desired_available_space_(-1),
special_storage_policy_(special_storage_policy),
weak_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
get_disk_space_fn_(&base::SysInfo::AmountOfFreeDiskSpace) {
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::NotifyObserversOfNavigationCommit(bool is_new_navigation,
bool is_same_document) {
for (auto& observer : render_view_->observers_)
observer.DidCommitProvisionalLoad(frame_, is_new_navigation);
{
SCOPED_UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMER("RenderFrameObservers.DidCommitProvisionalLoad");
for (auto& observer : observers_) {
observer.DidCommitProvisionalLoad(is_new_navigation, is_same_document);
}
}
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage void __exception do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int instr;
siginfo_t info;
void __user *pc;
pc = (void __user *)instruction_pointer(regs);
if (processor_mode(regs) == SVC_MODE) {
#ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
if (thumb_mode(regs)) {
instr = ((u16 *)pc)[0];
if (is_wide_instruction(instr)) {
instr <<= 16;
instr |= ((u16 *)pc)[1];
}
} else
#endif
instr = *(u32 *) pc;
} else if (thumb_mode(regs)) {
if (get_user(instr, (u16 __user *)pc))
goto die_sig;
if (is_wide_instruction(instr)) {
unsigned int instr2;
if (get_user(instr2, (u16 __user *)pc+1))
goto die_sig;
instr <<= 16;
instr |= instr2;
}
} else if (get_user(instr, (u32 __user *)pc)) {
goto die_sig;
}
if (call_undef_hook(regs, instr) == 0)
return;
die_sig:
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_USER
if (user_debug & UDBG_UNDEFINED) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s (%d): undefined instruction: pc=%p\n",
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), pc);
dump_instr(KERN_INFO, regs);
}
#endif
info.si_signo = SIGILL;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = ILL_ILLOPC;
info.si_addr = pc;
arm_notify_die("Oops - undefined instruction", regs, &info, 0, 6);
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 58,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: strcode(int code)
{
switch (code)
{
case LIBPNG_WARNING_CODE: return "warning";
case LIBPNG_ERROR_CODE: return "libpng";
case ZLIB_ERROR_CODE: return "zlib";
case INVALID_ERROR_CODE: return "invalid";
case READ_ERROR_CODE: return "read";
case WRITE_ERROR_CODE: return "write";
case UNEXPECTED_ERROR_CODE: return "unexpected";
default: return "INVALID";
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,149 |
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