instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool unhash_open_stateid(struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp,
struct list_head *reaplist)
{
bool unhashed;
lockdep_assert_held(&stp->st_stid.sc_client->cl_lock);
unhashed = unhash_ol_stateid(stp);
release_open_stateid_locks(stp, reaplist);
return unhashed;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int get_xps_queue(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_XPS
struct xps_dev_maps *dev_maps;
struct xps_map *map;
int queue_index = -1;
rcu_read_lock();
dev_maps = rcu_dereference(dev->xps_maps);
if (dev_maps) {
map = rcu_dereference(
dev_maps->cpu_map[raw_smp_processor_id()]);
if (map) {
if (map->len == 1)
queue_index = map->queues[0];
else {
u32 hash;
if (skb->sk && skb->sk->sk_hash)
hash = skb->sk->sk_hash;
else
hash = (__force u16) skb->protocol ^
skb->rxhash;
hash = jhash_1word(hash, hashrnd);
queue_index = map->queues[
((u64)hash * map->len) >> 32];
}
if (unlikely(queue_index >= dev->real_num_tx_queues))
queue_index = -1;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return queue_index;
#else
return -1;
#endif
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void submit_bio_wait_endio(struct bio *bio)
{
struct submit_bio_ret *ret = bio->bi_private;
ret->error = blk_status_to_errno(bio->bi_status);
complete(&ret->event);
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ap_queue_message(struct ap_device *ap_dev, struct ap_message *ap_msg)
{
unsigned long flags;
int rc;
/* For asynchronous message handling a valid receive-callback
* is required. */
BUG_ON(!ap_msg->receive);
spin_lock_bh(&ap_dev->lock);
if (!ap_dev->unregistered) {
/* Make room on the queue by polling for finished requests. */
rc = ap_poll_queue(ap_dev, &flags);
if (!rc)
rc = __ap_queue_message(ap_dev, ap_msg);
if (!rc)
wake_up(&ap_poll_wait);
if (rc == -ENODEV)
ap_dev->unregistered = 1;
} else {
ap_msg->receive(ap_dev, ap_msg, ERR_PTR(-ENODEV));
rc = -ENODEV;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&ap_dev->lock);
if (rc == -ENODEV)
device_unregister(&ap_dev->device);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlockFlow::removeFloatingObjectsBelow(FloatingObject* lastFloat, int logicalOffset)
{
if (!containsFloats())
return;
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
FloatingObject* curr = floatingObjectSet.last();
while (curr != lastFloat && (!curr->isPlaced() || logicalTopForFloat(curr) >= logicalOffset)) {
m_floatingObjects->remove(curr);
if (floatingObjectSet.isEmpty())
break;
curr = floatingObjectSet.last();
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void virtio_queue_guest_notifier_read(EventNotifier *n)
{
VirtQueue *vq = container_of(n, VirtQueue, guest_notifier);
if (event_notifier_test_and_clear(n)) {
virtio_irq(vq);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewTest::SimulatePointRightClick(const gfx::Point& point) {
WebMouseEvent mouse_event;
mouse_event.type = WebInputEvent::MouseDown;
mouse_event.button = WebMouseEvent::ButtonRight;
mouse_event.x = point.x();
mouse_event.y = point.y();
mouse_event.clickCount = 1;
RenderViewImpl* impl = static_cast<RenderViewImpl*>(view_);
impl->OnMessageReceived(
InputMsg_HandleInputEvent(0, &mouse_event, ui::LatencyInfo(), false));
mouse_event.type = WebInputEvent::MouseUp;
impl->OnMessageReceived(
InputMsg_HandleInputEvent(0, &mouse_event, ui::LatencyInfo(), false));
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fatal (char const *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
fprintf (stderr, "%s: **** ", program_name);
va_start (args, format);
vfprintf (stderr, format, args);
va_end (args);
putc ('\n', stderr);
fflush (stderr);
fatal_exit (0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 5,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Proxy::clearForClose()
{
resetIsolatedWorlds();
windowShell()->clearForClose();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int chmod_common(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
{
struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL;
struct iattr newattrs;
int error;
error = mnt_want_write(path->mnt);
if (error)
return error;
retry_deleg:
inode_lock(inode);
error = security_path_chmod(path, mode);
if (error)
goto out_unlock;
newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
error = notify_change(path->dentry, &newattrs, &delegated_inode);
out_unlock:
inode_unlock(inode);
if (delegated_inode) {
error = break_deleg_wait(&delegated_inode);
if (!error)
goto retry_deleg;
}
mnt_drop_write(path->mnt);
return error;
}
Commit Message: vfs: add vfs_select_inode() helper
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 94,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::receiveDroppedFiles(const DragData* dragData)
{
return m_inputType->receiveDroppedFiles(dragData);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rt_add_uncached_list(struct rtable *rt)
{
struct uncached_list *ul = raw_cpu_ptr(&rt_uncached_list);
rt->rt_uncached_list = ul;
spin_lock_bh(&ul->lock);
list_add_tail(&rt->rt_uncached, &ul->head);
spin_unlock_bh(&ul->lock);
}
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 91,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_statsdelta_open( struct inode *inode,
struct file *file ) {
if (file->f_mode&FMODE_WRITE) {
return proc_stats_rid_open(inode, file, RID_STATSDELTACLEAR);
}
return proc_stats_rid_open(inode, file, RID_STATSDELTA);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rds_recv_rcvbuf_delta(struct rds_sock *rs, struct sock *sk,
struct rds_cong_map *map,
int delta, __be16 port)
{
int now_congested;
if (delta == 0)
return;
rs->rs_rcv_bytes += delta;
if (delta > 0)
rds_stats_add(s_recv_bytes_added_to_socket, delta);
else
rds_stats_add(s_recv_bytes_removed_from_socket, -delta);
/* loop transport doesn't send/recv congestion updates */
if (rs->rs_transport->t_type == RDS_TRANS_LOOP)
return;
now_congested = rs->rs_rcv_bytes > rds_sk_rcvbuf(rs);
rdsdebug("rs %p (%pI6c:%u) recv bytes %d buf %d "
"now_cong %d delta %d\n",
rs, &rs->rs_bound_addr,
ntohs(rs->rs_bound_port), rs->rs_rcv_bytes,
rds_sk_rcvbuf(rs), now_congested, delta);
/* wasn't -> am congested */
if (!rs->rs_congested && now_congested) {
rs->rs_congested = 1;
rds_cong_set_bit(map, port);
rds_cong_queue_updates(map);
}
/* was -> aren't congested */
/* Require more free space before reporting uncongested to prevent
bouncing cong/uncong state too often */
else if (rs->rs_congested && (rs->rs_rcv_bytes < (rds_sk_rcvbuf(rs)/2))) {
rs->rs_congested = 0;
rds_cong_clear_bit(map, port);
rds_cong_queue_updates(map);
}
/* do nothing if no change in cong state */
}
Commit Message: net/rds: Fix info leak in rds6_inc_info_copy()
The rds6_inc_info_copy() function has a couple struct members which
are leaking stack information. The ->tos field should hold actual
information and the ->flags field needs to be zeroed out.
Fixes: 3eb450367d08 ("rds: add type of service(tos) infrastructure")
Fixes: b7ff8b1036f0 ("rds: Extend RDS API for IPv6 support")
Reported-by: 黄ID蝴蝶 <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ka-Cheong Poon <ka-cheong.poon@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 87,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlSAXParseDoc(xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax, const xmlChar *cur, int recovery) {
xmlDocPtr ret;
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
xmlSAXHandlerPtr oldsax = NULL;
if (cur == NULL) return(NULL);
ctxt = xmlCreateDocParserCtxt(cur);
if (ctxt == NULL) return(NULL);
if (sax != NULL) {
oldsax = ctxt->sax;
ctxt->sax = sax;
ctxt->userData = NULL;
}
xmlDetectSAX2(ctxt);
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if ((ctxt->wellFormed) || recovery) ret = ctxt->myDoc;
else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
if (sax != NULL)
ctxt->sax = oldsax;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void runtimeEnabledLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->runtimeEnabledLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_pause(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (ple_gap)
grow_ple_window(vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_on_spin(vcpu);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,034 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::CancelRequest(int child_id,
int request_id,
bool from_renderer) {
GlobalRequestID id(child_id, request_id);
if (from_renderer) {
if (transferred_navigations_.find(id) != transferred_navigations_.end())
return;
}
PendingRequestList::iterator i = pending_requests_.find(id);
if (i == pending_requests_.end()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Canceling a request that wasn't found";
return;
}
net::URLRequest* request = i->second;
bool started_before_cancel = request->is_pending();
if (CancelRequestInternal(request, from_renderer) &&
!started_before_cancel) {
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::CallResponseCompleted,
base::Unretained(this),
child_id,
request_id));
}
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cm_format_sidr_rep_event(struct cm_work *work)
{
struct cm_sidr_rep_msg *sidr_rep_msg;
struct ib_cm_sidr_rep_event_param *param;
sidr_rep_msg = (struct cm_sidr_rep_msg *)
work->mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.mad;
param = &work->cm_event.param.sidr_rep_rcvd;
param->status = sidr_rep_msg->status;
param->qkey = be32_to_cpu(sidr_rep_msg->qkey);
param->qpn = be32_to_cpu(cm_sidr_rep_get_qpn(sidr_rep_msg));
param->info = &sidr_rep_msg->info;
param->info_len = sidr_rep_msg->info_length;
work->cm_event.private_data = &sidr_rep_msg->private_data;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fanout_init_data(struct packet_fanout *f)
{
switch (f->type) {
case PACKET_FANOUT_LB:
atomic_set(&f->rr_cur, 0);
break;
case PACKET_FANOUT_CBPF:
case PACKET_FANOUT_EBPF:
RCU_INIT_POINTER(f->bpf_prog, NULL);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *ns_dname(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, int buflen)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_ops = dentry->d_fsdata;
return dynamic_dname(dentry, buffer, buflen, "%s:[%lu]",
ns_ops->name, inode->i_ino);
}
Commit Message: nsfs: mark dentry with DCACHE_RCUACCESS
Andrey reported a use-after-free in __ns_get_path():
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline]
lockref_get_not_dead+0x19/0x80 lib/lockref.c:179
__ns_get_path+0x197/0x860 fs/nsfs.c:66
open_related_ns+0xda/0x200 fs/nsfs.c:143
sock_ioctl+0x39d/0x440 net/socket.c:1001
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:45 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x1bf/0x1780 fs/ioctl.c:685
SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:700 [inline]
SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:691
We are under rcu read lock protection at that point:
rcu_read_lock();
d = atomic_long_read(&ns->stashed);
if (!d)
goto slow;
dentry = (struct dentry *)d;
if (!lockref_get_not_dead(&dentry->d_lockref))
goto slow;
rcu_read_unlock();
but don't use a proper RCU API on the free path, therefore a parallel
__d_free() could free it at the same time. We need to mark the stashed
dentry with DCACHE_RCUACCESS so that __d_free() will be called after all
readers leave RCU.
Fixes: e149ed2b805f ("take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs")
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 84,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_vn_unlink(
struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct xfs_name name;
int error;
xfs_dentry_to_name(&name, dentry);
error = xfs_remove(XFS_I(dir), &name, XFS_I(d_inode(dentry)));
if (error)
return error;
/*
* With unlink, the VFS makes the dentry "negative": no inode,
* but still hashed. This is incompatible with case-insensitive
* mode, so invalidate (unhash) the dentry in CI-mode.
*/
if (xfs_sb_version_hasasciici(&XFS_M(dir->i_sb)->m_sb))
d_invalidate(dentry);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix missing ILOCK unlock when xfs_setattr_nonsize fails due to EDQUOT
Benjamin Moody reported to Debian that XFS partially wedges when a chgrp
fails on account of being out of disk quota. I ran his reproducer
script:
# adduser dummy
# adduser dummy plugdev
# dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=100 of=test.img
# mkfs.xfs test.img
# mount -t xfs -o gquota test.img /mnt
# mkdir -p /mnt/dummy
# chown -c dummy /mnt/dummy
# xfs_quota -xc 'limit -g bsoft=100k bhard=100k plugdev' /mnt
(and then as user dummy)
$ dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1M count=50 of=/mnt/dummy/foo
$ chgrp plugdev /mnt/dummy/foo
and saw:
================================================
WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
5.3.0-rc5 #rc5 Tainted: G W
------------------------------------------------
chgrp/47006 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
1 lock held by chgrp/47006:
#0: 000000006664ea2d (&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}, at: xfs_ilock+0xd2/0x290 [xfs]
...which is clearly caused by xfs_setattr_nonsize failing to unlock the
ILOCK after the xfs_qm_vop_chown_reserve call fails. Add the missing
unlock.
Reported-by: benjamin.moody@gmail.com
Fixes: 253f4911f297 ("xfs: better xfs_trans_alloc interface")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 88,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
const char *pointer_desc,
int off, int size, bool strict)
{
struct tnum reg_off;
/* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
if (!strict || size == 1)
return 0;
reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off));
if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n",
pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 59,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dcbnl_ieee_del(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct dcbnl_rtnl_ops *ops = netdev->dcbnl_ops;
struct nlattr *ieee[DCB_ATTR_IEEE_MAX + 1];
int err;
if (!ops)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!tb[DCB_ATTR_IEEE])
return -EINVAL;
err = nla_parse_nested(ieee, DCB_ATTR_IEEE_MAX,
tb[DCB_ATTR_IEEE], dcbnl_ieee_policy);
if (err)
return err;
if (ieee[DCB_ATTR_IEEE_APP_TABLE]) {
struct nlattr *attr;
int rem;
nla_for_each_nested(attr, ieee[DCB_ATTR_IEEE_APP_TABLE], rem) {
struct dcb_app *app_data;
if (nla_type(attr) != DCB_ATTR_IEEE_APP)
continue;
app_data = nla_data(attr);
if (ops->ieee_delapp)
err = ops->ieee_delapp(netdev, app_data);
else
err = dcb_ieee_delapp(netdev, app_data);
if (err)
goto err;
}
}
err:
err = nla_put_u8(skb, DCB_ATTR_IEEE, err);
dcbnl_ieee_notify(netdev, RTM_SETDCB, DCB_CMD_IEEE_DEL, seq, 0);
return err;
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_switch_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int cpu;
if (vmx->loaded_vmcs == vmcs)
return;
cpu = get_cpu();
vmx->loaded_vmcs = vmcs;
vmx_vcpu_put(vcpu);
vmx_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
put_cpu();
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 81,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_ip_str(const struct sockaddr * sa, char * s, size_t maxlen)
{
switch(sa->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
inet_ntop(AF_INET, &(((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr),
s, maxlen);
break;
case AF_INET6:
inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_addr),
s, maxlen);
break;
default:
strncpy(s, "Unknown AF", maxlen);
return NULL;
}
return s;
}
Commit Message: Fix: remote: cl#5269 - Notify other clients of a new connection only if the handshake has completed (bsc#967388)
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 73,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void log_tracing_state(const SSL *ssl, conn_rec *c,
server_rec *s, int where, int rc)
{
/*
* create the various trace messages
*/
if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c,
"%s: Handshake: start", MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME);
}
else if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c,
"%s: Handshake: done", MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME);
}
else if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c,
"%s: Loop: %s",
MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
}
else if (where & SSL_CB_READ) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c,
"%s: Read: %s",
MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
}
else if (where & SSL_CB_WRITE) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c,
"%s: Write: %s",
MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
}
else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
char *str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write";
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c,
"%s: Alert: %s:%s:%s",
MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME, str,
SSL_alert_type_string_long(rc),
SSL_alert_desc_string_long(rc));
}
else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
if (rc == 0) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c,
"%s: Exit: failed in %s",
MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
}
else if (rc < 0) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, c,
"%s: Exit: error in %s",
MODSSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
}
}
/*
* Because SSL renegotiations can happen at any time (not only after
* SSL_accept()), the best way to log the current connection details is
* right after a finished handshake.
*/
if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, APLOGNO(02041)
"Protocol: %s, Cipher: %s (%s/%s bits)",
ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_PROTOCOL"),
ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER"),
ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE"),
ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER_ALGKEYSIZE"));
}
}
Commit Message: modssl: reset client-verify state when renegotiation is aborted
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1750779 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 52,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::forwardEvent(Event* event)
{
if (m_spinButtonElement) {
m_spinButtonElement->forwardEvent(event);
if (event->defaultHandled())
return;
}
if (m_dateTimeEditElement)
m_dateTimeEditElement->defaultEventHandler(event);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ipgre_header_parse(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned char *haddr)
{
struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) skb_mac_header(skb);
memcpy(haddr, &iph->saddr, 4);
return 4;
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InspectorStyleInvalidatorInvalidateEvent::InvalidationList(
ContainerNode& node,
const Vector<RefPtr<InvalidationSet>>& invalidation_list) {
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value =
FillCommonPart(node, kElementHasPendingInvalidationList);
value->BeginArray("invalidationList");
for (const auto& invalidation_set : invalidation_list)
invalidation_set->ToTracedValue(value.get());
value->EndArray();
return value;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void return_unused_surplus_pages(struct hstate *h,
unsigned long unused_resv_pages)
{
unsigned long nr_pages;
/* Cannot return gigantic pages currently */
if (hstate_is_gigantic(h))
goto out;
/*
* Part (or even all) of the reservation could have been backed
* by pre-allocated pages. Only free surplus pages.
*/
nr_pages = min(unused_resv_pages, h->surplus_huge_pages);
/*
* We want to release as many surplus pages as possible, spread
* evenly across all nodes with memory. Iterate across these nodes
* until we can no longer free unreserved surplus pages. This occurs
* when the nodes with surplus pages have no free pages.
* free_pool_huge_page() will balance the the freed pages across the
* on-line nodes with memory and will handle the hstate accounting.
*
* Note that we decrement resv_huge_pages as we free the pages. If
* we drop the lock, resv_huge_pages will still be sufficiently large
* to cover subsequent pages we may free.
*/
while (nr_pages--) {
h->resv_huge_pages--;
unused_resv_pages--;
if (!free_pool_huge_page(h, &node_states[N_MEMORY], 1))
goto out;
cond_resched_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
}
out:
/* Fully uncommit the reservation */
h->resv_huge_pages -= unused_resv_pages;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char const *srcName() { return src_name.c_str(); }
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
{
int ret;
ret = wait_on_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT,
intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (ret)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
ret = key_read_state(key);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
return key_validate(key);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key() destination
When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it
links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key
keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However,
there is actually no permission check.
This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search
permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining
the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING)
then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring.
Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring.
Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this
method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a
bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively
instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process
keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it
initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key().
Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in
construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used.
We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that
was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also,
request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than
a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable.
We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to
continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b59f
("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where
/sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the
original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users
who actually do that, though...)
Fixes: 3e30148c3d52 ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.13+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-862 | 0 | 59,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void btm_sec_connect_after_reject_timeout (TIMER_LIST_ENT *p_tle)
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = btm_cb.p_collided_dev_rec;
UNUSED(p_tle);
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_connect_after_reject_timeout()");
btm_cb.sec_collision_tle.param = 0;
btm_cb.p_collided_dev_rec = 0;
if (btm_sec_dd_create_conn(p_dev_rec) != BTM_CMD_STARTED)
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING ("Security Manager: btm_sec_connect_after_reject_timeout: failed to start connection");
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE);
if (btm_cb.api.p_auth_complete_callback)
(*btm_cb.api.p_auth_complete_callback) (p_dev_rec->bd_addr, p_dev_rec->dev_class,
p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name, HCI_ERR_MEMORY_FULL);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void br_multicast_add_router(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port *port)
{
struct net_bridge_port *p;
struct hlist_node *slot = NULL;
hlist_for_each_entry(p, &br->router_list, rlist) {
if ((unsigned long) port >= (unsigned long) p)
break;
slot = &p->rlist;
}
if (slot)
hlist_add_after_rcu(slot, &port->rlist);
else
hlist_add_head_rcu(&port->rlist, &br->router_list);
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 30,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int phar_create_signature(phar_archive_data *phar, php_stream *fp, char **signature, int *signature_length, char **error TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
unsigned char buf[1024];
int sig_len;
php_stream_rewind(fp);
if (phar->signature) {
efree(phar->signature);
phar->signature = NULL;
}
switch(phar->sig_flags) {
#ifdef PHAR_HASH_OK
case PHAR_SIG_SHA512: {
unsigned char digest[64];
PHP_SHA512_CTX context;
PHP_SHA512Init(&context);
while ((sig_len = php_stream_read(fp, (char*)buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) {
PHP_SHA512Update(&context, buf, sig_len);
}
PHP_SHA512Final(digest, &context);
*signature = estrndup((char *) digest, 64);
*signature_length = 64;
break;
}
case PHAR_SIG_SHA256: {
unsigned char digest[32];
PHP_SHA256_CTX context;
PHP_SHA256Init(&context);
while ((sig_len = php_stream_read(fp, (char*)buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) {
PHP_SHA256Update(&context, buf, sig_len);
}
PHP_SHA256Final(digest, &context);
*signature = estrndup((char *) digest, 32);
*signature_length = 32;
break;
}
#else
case PHAR_SIG_SHA512:
case PHAR_SIG_SHA256:
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to write to phar \"%s\" with requested hash type", phar->fname);
}
return FAILURE;
#endif
case PHAR_SIG_OPENSSL: {
int siglen;
unsigned char *sigbuf;
#ifdef PHAR_HAVE_OPENSSL
BIO *in;
EVP_PKEY *key;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
in = BIO_new_mem_buf(PHAR_G(openssl_privatekey), PHAR_G(openssl_privatekey_len));
if (in == NULL) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to write to phar \"%s\" with requested openssl signature", phar->fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL,NULL, "");
BIO_free(in);
if (!key) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to process private key");
}
return FAILURE;
}
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(key);
sigbuf = emalloc(siglen + 1);
if (!EVP_SignInit(md_ctx, EVP_sha1())) {
efree(sigbuf);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to initialize openssl signature for phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
while ((sig_len = php_stream_read(fp, (char*)buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) {
if (!EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, buf, sig_len)) {
efree(sigbuf);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to update the openssl signature for phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (!EVP_SignFinal (md_ctx, sigbuf,(unsigned int *)&siglen, key)) {
efree(sigbuf);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to write phar \"%s\" with requested openssl signature", phar->fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
sigbuf[siglen] = '\0';
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md_ctx);
#else
sigbuf = NULL;
siglen = 0;
php_stream_seek(fp, 0, SEEK_END);
if (FAILURE == phar_call_openssl_signverify(1, fp, php_stream_tell(fp), PHAR_G(openssl_privatekey), PHAR_G(openssl_privatekey_len), (char **)&sigbuf, &siglen TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to write phar \"%s\" with requested openssl signature", phar->fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
#endif
*signature = (char *) sigbuf;
*signature_length = siglen;
}
break;
default:
phar->sig_flags = PHAR_SIG_SHA1;
case PHAR_SIG_SHA1: {
unsigned char digest[20];
PHP_SHA1_CTX context;
PHP_SHA1Init(&context);
while ((sig_len = php_stream_read(fp, (char*)buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) {
PHP_SHA1Update(&context, buf, sig_len);
}
PHP_SHA1Final(digest, &context);
*signature = estrndup((char *) digest, 20);
*signature_length = 20;
break;
}
case PHAR_SIG_MD5: {
unsigned char digest[16];
PHP_MD5_CTX context;
PHP_MD5Init(&context);
while ((sig_len = php_stream_read(fp, (char*)buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) {
PHP_MD5Update(&context, buf, sig_len);
}
PHP_MD5Final(digest, &context);
*signature = estrndup((char *) digest, 16);
*signature_length = 16;
break;
}
}
phar->sig_len = phar_hex_str((const char *)*signature, *signature_length, &phar->signature TSRMLS_CC);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: flatpak_proxy_client_get_policy (FlatpakProxyClient *client, const char *source)
{
if (source == NULL)
return FLATPAK_POLICY_TALK; /* All clients can talk to the bus itself */
if (source[0] == ':')
return GPOINTER_TO_UINT (g_hash_table_lookup (client->unique_id_policy, source));
return flatpak_proxy_get_policy (client->proxy, source);
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 84,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int thread_cpu_timer_create(struct k_itimer *timer)
{
timer->it_clock = THREAD_CLOCK;
return posix_cpu_timer_create(timer);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,703 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tsize_t t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile(T2P* t2p, TIFF* input, TIFF* output, ttile_t tile){
uint16 edge=0;
tsize_t written=0;
unsigned char* buffer=NULL;
tsize_t bufferoffset=0;
unsigned char* samplebuffer=NULL;
tsize_t samplebufferoffset=0;
tsize_t read=0;
uint16 i=0;
ttile_t tilecount=0;
/* tsize_t tilesize=0; */
ttile_t septilecount=0;
tsize_t septilesize=0;
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
unsigned char* jpt;
float* xfloatp;
uint32 xuint32=0;
#endif
/* Fail if prior error (in particular, can't trust tiff_datasize) */
if (t2p->t2p_error != T2P_ERR_OK)
return(0);
edge |= t2p_tile_is_right_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile);
edge |= t2p_tile_is_bottom_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile);
if( (t2p->pdf_transcode == T2P_TRANSCODE_RAW) && ((edge == 0)
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT) || defined(OJPEG_SUPPORT)
|| (t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_JPEG)
#endif
)
){
#ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT
if(t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_G4){
buffer= (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
TIFFReadRawTile(input, tile, (tdata_t) buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (t2p->tiff_fillorder==FILLORDER_LSB2MSB){
TIFFReverseBits(buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
#endif
#ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT
if(t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_ZIP){
buffer= (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
TIFFReadRawTile(input, tile, (tdata_t) buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (t2p->tiff_fillorder==FILLORDER_LSB2MSB){
TIFFReverseBits(buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
#endif
#ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->tiff_compression == COMPRESSION_OJPEG){
if(! t2p->pdf_ojpegdata){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"No support for OJPEG image %s with "
"bad tables",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
buffer=(unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
_TIFFmemcpy(buffer, t2p->pdf_ojpegdata, t2p->pdf_ojpegdatalength);
if(edge!=0){
if(t2p_tile_is_bottom_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile)){
buffer[7]=
(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilelength >> 8) & 0xff;
buffer[8]=
(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilelength ) & 0xff;
}
if(t2p_tile_is_right_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile)){
buffer[9]=
(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilewidth >> 8) & 0xff;
buffer[10]=
(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilewidth ) & 0xff;
}
}
bufferoffset=t2p->pdf_ojpegdatalength;
bufferoffset+=TIFFReadRawTile(input,
tile,
(tdata_t) &(((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset]),
-1);
((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset++]=0xff;
((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset++]=0xd9;
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(bufferoffset);
}
#endif
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->tiff_compression == COMPRESSION_JPEG){
unsigned char table_end[2];
uint32 count = 0;
buffer= (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate " TIFF_SIZE_FORMAT " bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(TIFF_SIZE_T) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLES, &count, &jpt) != 0) {
if (count > 0) {
_TIFFmemcpy(buffer, jpt, count);
bufferoffset += count - 2;
table_end[0] = buffer[bufferoffset-2];
table_end[1] = buffer[bufferoffset-1];
}
if (count > 0) {
xuint32 = bufferoffset;
bufferoffset += TIFFReadRawTile(
input,
tile,
(tdata_t) &(((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset-2]),
-1);
buffer[xuint32-2]=table_end[0];
buffer[xuint32-1]=table_end[1];
} else {
bufferoffset += TIFFReadRawTile(
input,
tile,
(tdata_t) &(((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset]),
-1);
}
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(bufferoffset);
}
#endif
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample==T2P_SAMPLE_NOTHING){
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for "
"t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
read = TIFFReadEncodedTile(
input,
tile,
(tdata_t) &buffer[bufferoffset],
t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding tile %u of %s",
tile,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
} else {
if(t2p->pdf_sample == T2P_SAMPLE_PLANAR_SEPARATE_TO_CONTIG){
septilesize=TIFFTileSize(input);
septilecount=TIFFNumberOfTiles(input);
/* tilesize=septilesize*t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel; */
tilecount=septilecount/t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
samplebuffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(samplebuffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
samplebufferoffset=0;
for(i=0;i<t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;i++){
read =
TIFFReadEncodedTile(input,
tile + i*tilecount,
(tdata_t) &(samplebuffer[samplebufferoffset]),
septilesize);
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding tile %u of %s",
tile + i*tilecount,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
samplebufferoffset+=read;
}
t2p_sample_planar_separate_to_contig(
t2p,
&(buffer[bufferoffset]),
samplebuffer,
samplebufferoffset);
bufferoffset+=samplebufferoffset;
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
}
if(buffer==NULL){
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
read = TIFFReadEncodedTile(
input,
tile,
(tdata_t) &buffer[bufferoffset],
t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding tile %u of %s",
tile,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_RGBA_TO_RGB){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_rgba_to_rgb(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilewidth
*t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_RGBAA_TO_RGB){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_rgbaa_to_rgb(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilewidth
*t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_YCBCR_TO_RGB){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"No support for YCbCr to RGB in tile for %s",
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_LAB_SIGNED_TO_UNSIGNED){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_lab_signed_to_unsigned(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilewidth
*t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
}
}
if(t2p_tile_is_right_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile) != 0){
t2p_tile_collapse_left(
buffer,
TIFFTileRowSize(input),
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilewidth,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilewidth,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
}
t2p_disable(output);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, t2p->tiff_photometric);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, t2p->tiff_bitspersample);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel);
if(t2p_tile_is_right_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile) == 0){
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilewidth);
} else {
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilewidth);
}
if(t2p_tile_is_bottom_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile) == 0){
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
} else {
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilelength);
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilelength);
}
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_FILLORDER, FILLORDER_MSB2LSB);
switch(t2p->pdf_compression){
case T2P_COMPRESS_NONE:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_NONE);
break;
#ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_G4:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4);
break;
#endif
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_JPEG:
if (t2p->tiff_photometric==PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR) {
uint16 hor = 0, ver = 0;
if (TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING, &hor, &ver)!=0) {
if (hor != 0 && ver != 0) {
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING, hor, ver);
}
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_REFERENCEBLACKWHITE, &xfloatp)!=0){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_REFERENCEBLACKWHITE, xfloatp);
}
}
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_JPEG);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLESMODE, 0); /* JPEGTABLESMODE_NONE */
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & (T2P_CS_RGB | T2P_CS_LAB)){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR);
if(t2p->tiff_photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB);
} else {
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, JPEGCOLORMODE_RAW);
}
}
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & T2P_CS_GRAY){
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & T2P_CS_CMYK){
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_JPEGQUALITY,
t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality);
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_ZIP:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_DEFLATE);
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality%100 != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR,
t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality % 100);
}
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality/100 != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_ZIPQUALITY,
(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality / 100));
}
break;
#endif
default:
break;
}
t2p_enable(output);
t2p->outputwritten = 0;
bufferoffset = TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(output, (tstrip_t) 0, buffer,
TIFFStripSize(output));
if (buffer != NULL) {
_TIFFfree(buffer);
buffer = NULL;
}
if (bufferoffset == -1) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error writing encoded tile to output PDF %s",
TIFFFileName(output));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
written = t2p->outputwritten;
return(written);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __generic_add_update_flags_rr(RAnalOp *op, int d, int r) {
__generic_add_update_flags(op, 'r', d, 'r', r);
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 82,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int udp_proc_register(struct net *net, struct udp_seq_afinfo *afinfo)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *p;
int rc = 0;
afinfo->seq_fops.open = udp_seq_open;
afinfo->seq_fops.read = seq_read;
afinfo->seq_fops.llseek = seq_lseek;
afinfo->seq_fops.release = seq_release_net;
afinfo->seq_ops.start = udp_seq_start;
afinfo->seq_ops.next = udp_seq_next;
afinfo->seq_ops.stop = udp_seq_stop;
p = proc_create_data(afinfo->name, S_IRUGO, net->proc_net,
&afinfo->seq_fops, afinfo);
if (!p)
rc = -ENOMEM;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetFullscreenPepper* RenderFrameImpl::CreatePepperFullscreenContainer(
PepperPluginInstanceImpl* plugin) {
GURL active_url;
if (render_view_->webview() && render_view_->webview()->mainFrame())
active_url = GURL(render_view_->webview()->mainFrame()->document().url());
RenderWidgetFullscreenPepper* widget = RenderWidgetFullscreenPepper::Create(
GetRenderWidget()->routing_id(), GetRenderWidget()->compositor_deps(),
plugin, active_url, GetRenderWidget()->screenInfo());
widget->show(blink::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore);
return widget;
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadItemImpl::TransitionTo(DownloadState new_state) {
if (state_ == new_state)
return;
DownloadState old_state = state_;
state_ = new_state;
switch (state_) {
case COMPLETE:
bound_net_log_.AddEvent(
net::NetLog::TYPE_DOWNLOAD_ITEM_FINISHED,
base::Bind(&download_net_logs::ItemFinishedCallback,
received_bytes_, &hash_));
break;
case INTERRUPTED:
bound_net_log_.AddEvent(
net::NetLog::TYPE_DOWNLOAD_ITEM_INTERRUPTED,
base::Bind(&download_net_logs::ItemInterruptedCallback,
last_reason_, received_bytes_, &hash_state_));
break;
case CANCELLED:
bound_net_log_.AddEvent(
net::NetLog::TYPE_DOWNLOAD_ITEM_CANCELED,
base::Bind(&download_net_logs::ItemCanceledCallback,
received_bytes_, &hash_state_));
break;
default:
break;
}
VLOG(20) << " " << __FUNCTION__ << "()" << " this = " << DebugString(true);
UpdateObservers();
bool is_done = (state_ != IN_PROGRESS);
bool was_done = (old_state != IN_PROGRESS);
if (is_done && !was_done)
bound_net_log_.EndEvent(net::NetLog::TYPE_DOWNLOAD_ITEM_ACTIVE);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int pskb_expand_head(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhead, int ntail,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
int i, osize = skb_end_offset(skb);
int size = osize + nhead + ntail;
long off;
u8 *data;
BUG_ON(nhead < 0);
if (skb_shared(skb))
BUG();
size = SKB_DATA_ALIGN(size);
if (skb_pfmemalloc(skb))
gfp_mask |= __GFP_MEMALLOC;
data = kmalloc_reserve(size + SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info)),
gfp_mask, NUMA_NO_NODE, NULL);
if (!data)
goto nodata;
size = SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(ksize(data));
/* Copy only real data... and, alas, header. This should be
* optimized for the cases when header is void.
*/
memcpy(data + nhead, skb->head, skb_tail_pointer(skb) - skb->head);
memcpy((struct skb_shared_info *)(data + size),
skb_shinfo(skb),
offsetof(struct skb_shared_info, frags[skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags]));
/*
* if shinfo is shared we must drop the old head gracefully, but if it
* is not we can just drop the old head and let the existing refcount
* be since all we did is relocate the values
*/
if (skb_cloned(skb)) {
/* copy this zero copy skb frags */
if (skb_orphan_frags(skb, gfp_mask))
goto nofrags;
for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++)
skb_frag_ref(skb, i);
if (skb_has_frag_list(skb))
skb_clone_fraglist(skb);
skb_release_data(skb);
} else {
skb_free_head(skb);
}
off = (data + nhead) - skb->head;
skb->head = data;
skb->head_frag = 0;
skb->data += off;
#ifdef NET_SKBUFF_DATA_USES_OFFSET
skb->end = size;
off = nhead;
#else
skb->end = skb->head + size;
#endif
skb->tail += off;
skb_headers_offset_update(skb, nhead);
skb->cloned = 0;
skb->hdr_len = 0;
skb->nohdr = 0;
atomic_set(&skb_shinfo(skb)->dataref, 1);
/* It is not generally safe to change skb->truesize.
* For the moment, we really care of rx path, or
* when skb is orphaned (not attached to a socket).
*/
if (!skb->sk || skb->destructor == sock_edemux)
skb->truesize += size - osize;
return 0;
nofrags:
kfree(data);
nodata:
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 67,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(libxml)
{
zend_class_entry ce;
php_libxml_initialize();
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_VERSION", LIBXML_VERSION, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DOTTED_VERSION", LIBXML_DOTTED_VERSION, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("LIBXML_LOADED_VERSION", (char *)xmlParserVersion, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* For use with loading xml */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOENT", XML_PARSE_NOENT, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DTDLOAD", XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DTDATTR", XML_PARSE_DTDATTR, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DTDVALID", XML_PARSE_DTDVALID, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOERROR", XML_PARSE_NOERROR, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOWARNING", XML_PARSE_NOWARNING, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOBLANKS", XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_XINCLUDE", XML_PARSE_XINCLUDE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NSCLEAN", XML_PARSE_NSCLEAN, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOCDATA", XML_PARSE_NOCDATA, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NONET", XML_PARSE_NONET, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_PEDANTIC", XML_PARSE_PEDANTIC, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20621
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_COMPACT", XML_PARSE_COMPACT, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOXMLDECL", XML_SAVE_NO_DECL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20703
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_PARSEHUGE", XML_PARSE_HUGE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOEMPTYTAG", LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* Schema validation options */
#if defined(LIBXML_SCHEMAS_ENABLED) && LIBXML_VERSION >= 20614
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_SCHEMA_CREATE", XML_SCHEMA_VAL_VC_I_CREATE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
/* Additional constants for use with loading html */
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20707
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_HTML_NOIMPLIED", HTML_PARSE_NOIMPLIED, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20708
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_HTML_NODEFDTD", HTML_PARSE_NODEFDTD, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
/* Error levels */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_NONE", XML_ERR_NONE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_WARNING", XML_ERR_WARNING, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_ERROR", XML_ERR_ERROR, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_FATAL", XML_ERR_FATAL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
INIT_CLASS_ENTRY(ce, "LibXMLError", NULL);
libxmlerror_class_entry = zend_register_internal_class(&ce TSRMLS_CC);
if (sapi_module.name) {
static const char * const supported_sapis[] = {
"cgi-fcgi",
"fpm-fcgi",
"litespeed",
NULL
};
const char * const *sapi_name;
for (sapi_name = supported_sapis; *sapi_name; sapi_name++) {
if (strcmp(sapi_module.name, *sapi_name) == 0) {
_php_libxml_per_request_initialization = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (!_php_libxml_per_request_initialization) {
/* report errors via handler rather than stderr */
xmlSetGenericErrorFunc(NULL, php_libxml_error_handler);
xmlParserInputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_input_buffer_create_filename);
xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_output_buffer_create_filename);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetTranslatedShaderSourceANGLE(
uint32 immediate_data_size,
const gles2::GetTranslatedShaderSourceANGLE& c) {
GLuint shader = c.shader;
uint32 bucket_id = static_cast<uint32>(c.bucket_id);
Bucket* bucket = CreateBucket(bucket_id);
ShaderManager::ShaderInfo* info = GetShaderInfoNotProgram(
shader, "glTranslatedGetShaderSourceANGLE");
if (!info) {
bucket->SetSize(0);
return error::kNoError;
}
ForceCompileShaderIfPending(info);
bucket->SetFromString(info->translated_source() ?
info->translated_source()->c_str() : NULL);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct nfs4_opendata *nfs4_open_recoverdata_alloc(struct nfs_open_context *ctx,
struct nfs4_state *state, enum open_claim_type4 claim)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *opendata;
opendata = nfs4_opendata_alloc(ctx->dentry, state->owner, 0, 0,
NULL, NULL, claim, GFP_NOFS);
if (opendata == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
opendata->state = state;
atomic_inc(&state->count);
return opendata;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void intel_pmu_nhm_workaround(void)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
static const unsigned long nhm_magic[4] = {
0x4300B5,
0x4300D2,
0x4300B1,
0x4300B1
};
struct perf_event *event;
int i;
/*
* The Errata requires below steps:
* 1) Clear MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE and MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
* 2) Configure 4 PERFEVTSELx with the magic events and clear
* the corresponding PMCx;
* 3) set bit0~bit3 of MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
* 4) Clear MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
* 5) Clear 4 pairs of ERFEVTSELx and PMCx;
*/
/*
* The real steps we choose are a little different from above.
* A) To reduce MSR operations, we don't run step 1) as they
* are already cleared before this function is called;
* B) Call x86_perf_event_update to save PMCx before configuring
* PERFEVTSELx with magic number;
* C) With step 5), we do clear only when the PERFEVTSELx is
* not used currently.
* D) Call x86_perf_event_set_period to restore PMCx;
*/
/* We always operate 4 pairs of PERF Counters */
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
event = cpuc->events[i];
if (event)
x86_perf_event_update(event);
}
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
wrmsrl(MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + i, nhm_magic[i]);
wrmsrl(MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 + i, 0x0);
}
wrmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, 0xf);
wrmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, 0x0);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
event = cpuc->events[i];
if (event) {
x86_perf_event_set_period(event);
__x86_pmu_enable_event(&event->hw,
ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_ENABLE);
} else
wrmsrl(MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + i, 0x0);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,822 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static DetectTransaction GetTx(const uint8_t ipproto, const AppProto alproto,
void *alstate, const uint64_t tx_id, const int tx_end_state,
const uint8_t flow_flags)
{
void *tx_ptr = AppLayerParserGetTx(ipproto, alproto, alstate, tx_id);
if (tx_ptr == NULL) {
DetectTransaction no_tx = { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, };
return no_tx;
}
const uint64_t detect_flags = AppLayerParserGetTxDetectFlags(ipproto, alproto, tx_ptr, flow_flags);
if (detect_flags & APP_LAYER_TX_INSPECTED_FLAG) {
SCLogDebug("%"PRIu64" tx already fully inspected for %s. Flags %016"PRIx64,
tx_id, flow_flags & STREAM_TOSERVER ? "toserver" : "toclient",
detect_flags);
DetectTransaction no_tx = { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, };
return no_tx;
}
const int tx_progress = AppLayerParserGetStateProgress(ipproto, alproto, tx_ptr, flow_flags);
const int dir_int = (flow_flags & STREAM_TOSERVER) ? 0 : 1;
DetectEngineState *tx_de_state = AppLayerParserGetTxDetectState(ipproto, alproto, tx_ptr);
DetectEngineStateDirection *tx_dir_state = tx_de_state ? &tx_de_state->dir_state[dir_int] : NULL;
uint64_t prefilter_flags = detect_flags & APP_LAYER_TX_PREFILTER_MASK;
DetectTransaction tx = {
.tx_ptr = tx_ptr,
.tx_id = tx_id,
.de_state = tx_dir_state,
.detect_flags = detect_flags,
.prefilter_flags = prefilter_flags,
.prefilter_flags_orig = prefilter_flags,
.tx_progress = tx_progress,
.tx_end_state = tx_end_state,
};
return tx;
}
Commit Message: stream: still inspect packets dropped by stream
The detect engine would bypass packets that are set as dropped. This
seems sane, as these packets are going to be dropped anyway.
However, it lead to the following corner case: stream events that
triggered the drop could not be matched on the rules. The packet
with the event wouldn't make it to the detect engine due to the bypass.
This patch changes the logic to not bypass DROP packets anymore.
Packets that are dropped by the stream engine will set the no payload
inspection flag, so avoid needless cost.
CWE ID: CWE-693 | 0 | 84,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *PktSrcToString(enum PktSrcEnum pkt_src)
{
const char *pkt_src_str = "<unknown>";
switch (pkt_src) {
case PKT_SRC_WIRE:
pkt_src_str = "wire/pcap";
break;
case PKT_SRC_DECODER_GRE:
pkt_src_str = "gre tunnel";
break;
case PKT_SRC_DECODER_IPV4:
pkt_src_str = "ipv4 tunnel";
break;
case PKT_SRC_DECODER_IPV6:
pkt_src_str = "ipv6 tunnel";
break;
case PKT_SRC_DECODER_TEREDO:
pkt_src_str = "teredo tunnel";
break;
case PKT_SRC_DEFRAG:
pkt_src_str = "defrag";
break;
case PKT_SRC_STREAM_TCP_STREAM_END_PSEUDO:
pkt_src_str = "stream";
break;
case PKT_SRC_STREAM_TCP_DETECTLOG_FLUSH:
pkt_src_str = "stream (detect/log)";
break;
case PKT_SRC_FFR:
pkt_src_str = "stream (flow timeout)";
break;
}
return pkt_src_str;
}
Commit Message: teredo: be stricter on what to consider valid teredo
Invalid Teredo can lead to valid DNS traffic (or other UDP traffic)
being misdetected as Teredo. This leads to false negatives in the
UDP payload inspection.
Make the teredo code only consider a packet teredo if the encapsulated
data was decoded without any 'invalid' events being set.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 87,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VP8XChunk::VP8XChunk(Container* parent, WEBP_MetaHandler* handler)
: Chunk(parent, handler)
{
this->size = 10;
this->needsRewrite = true;
parent->vp8x = this;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
PACKET session_id;
size_t session_id_len;
const unsigned char *cipherchars;
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
unsigned int compression;
unsigned int sversion;
int protverr;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
if (protverr != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
goto f_err;
}
/* load the server hello data */
/* load the server random */
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 0;
/* Get the session-id. */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
|| session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
* EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
* Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
* Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
* works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
* layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
* servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
* is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
* we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
* server wants to resume.
*/
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
s->session->tlsext_tick) {
const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length,
NULL, &pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
session_id_len) == 0) {
if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
/* actually a client application bug */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 1;
} else {
/*
* If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
* didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
* In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
* so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
* overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
*/
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
goto f_err;
}
}
s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
/* session_id_len could be 0 */
memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
session_id_len);
}
/* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
if (c == NULL) {
/* unknown cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
* version.
*/
s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
/*
* If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
* or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
*/
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
if (i < 0) {
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
* and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
* set and use it for comparison.
*/
if (s->session->cipher)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
/* lets get the compression algorithm */
/* COMPRESSION */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (compression != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#else
if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
if (compression == 0)
comp = NULL;
else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
goto f_err;
} else {
comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
}
if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
} else {
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
}
#endif
/* TLS extensions */
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
/* wrong packet length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey),
labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
goto err;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
#endif
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fix missing NULL checks in CKE processing
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 69,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::DidNavigate(
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
bool is_same_document_navigation) {
frame_tree_node_->SetCurrentURL(params.url);
SetLastCommittedOrigin(params.origin);
if (!params.url_is_unreachable)
last_successful_url_ = params.url;
if (!is_same_document_navigation) {
ResetFeaturePolicy();
active_sandbox_flags_ = frame_tree_node()->active_sandbox_flags();
}
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_map_one_to_many(fz_context *ctx, pdf_cmap *cmap, unsigned int low, int *values, int len)
{
if (len == 1)
{
add_range(ctx, cmap, low, low, values[0], 1, 0);
return;
}
/* Decode unicode surrogate pairs. */
/* Only the *-UCS2 CMaps use one-to-many mappings, so assuming unicode should be safe. */
if (len == 2 &&
values[0] >= 0xD800 && values[0] <= 0xDBFF &&
values[1] >= 0xDC00 && values[1] <= 0xDFFF)
{
int rune = ((values[0] - 0xD800) << 10) + (values[1] - 0xDC00) + 0x10000;
add_range(ctx, cmap, low, low, rune, 1, 0);
return;
}
if (len > PDF_MRANGE_CAP)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "ignoring one to many mapping in cmap %s", cmap->cmap_name);
return;
}
add_mrange(ctx, cmap, low, values, len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoMultiDrawBeginCHROMIUM(
GLsizei drawcount) {
if (!multi_draw_manager_->Begin(drawcount)) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ipmi_unregister_smi(struct ipmi_smi *intf)
{
struct ipmi_smi_watcher *w;
int intf_num = intf->intf_num, index;
mutex_lock(&ipmi_interfaces_mutex);
intf->intf_num = -1;
intf->in_shutdown = true;
list_del_rcu(&intf->link);
mutex_unlock(&ipmi_interfaces_mutex);
synchronize_srcu(&ipmi_interfaces_srcu);
/* At this point no users can be added to the interface. */
/*
* Call all the watcher interfaces to tell them that
* an interface is going away.
*/
mutex_lock(&smi_watchers_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(w, &smi_watchers, link)
w->smi_gone(intf_num);
mutex_unlock(&smi_watchers_mutex);
index = srcu_read_lock(&intf->users_srcu);
while (!list_empty(&intf->users)) {
struct ipmi_user *user =
container_of(list_next_rcu(&intf->users),
struct ipmi_user, link);
_ipmi_destroy_user(user);
}
srcu_read_unlock(&intf->users_srcu, index);
if (intf->handlers->shutdown)
intf->handlers->shutdown(intf->send_info);
cleanup_smi_msgs(intf);
ipmi_bmc_unregister(intf);
cleanup_srcu_struct(&intf->users_srcu);
kref_put(&intf->refcount, intf_free);
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String LocalDOMWindow::prompt(ScriptState* script_state,
const String& message,
const String& default_value) {
if (!GetFrame())
return String();
if (document()->IsSandboxed(kSandboxModals)) {
UseCounter::Count(document(), WebFeature::kDialogInSandboxedContext);
GetFrameConsole()->AddMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kSecurityMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel,
"Ignored call to 'prompt()'. The document is sandboxed, and the "
"'allow-modals' keyword is not set."));
return String();
}
switch (document()->GetEngagementLevel()) {
case mojom::blink::EngagementLevel::NONE:
UseCounter::Count(document(), WebFeature::kPromptEngagementNone);
break;
case mojom::blink::EngagementLevel::MINIMAL:
UseCounter::Count(document(), WebFeature::kPromptEngagementMinimal);
break;
case mojom::blink::EngagementLevel::LOW:
UseCounter::Count(document(), WebFeature::kPromptEngagementLow);
break;
case mojom::blink::EngagementLevel::MEDIUM:
UseCounter::Count(document(), WebFeature::kPromptEngagementMedium);
break;
case mojom::blink::EngagementLevel::HIGH:
UseCounter::Count(document(), WebFeature::kPromptEngagementHigh);
break;
case mojom::blink::EngagementLevel::MAX:
UseCounter::Count(document(), WebFeature::kPromptEngagementMax);
break;
}
if (v8::MicrotasksScope::IsRunningMicrotasks(script_state->GetIsolate())) {
UseCounter::Count(document(), WebFeature::kDuring_Microtask_Prompt);
}
document()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutTree();
Page* page = GetFrame()->GetPage();
if (!page)
return String();
String return_value;
if (page->GetChromeClient().OpenJavaScriptPrompt(GetFrame(), message,
default_value, return_value))
return return_value;
UseCounter::CountCrossOriginIframe(*document(),
WebFeature::kCrossOriginWindowPrompt);
return String();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestMediaController* media_controller() const {
return media_controller_.get();
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mmu_need_write_protect(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn,
bool can_unsync)
{
struct kvm_mmu_page *s;
bool need_unsync = false;
for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(vcpu->kvm, s, gfn) {
if (!can_unsync)
return 1;
if (s->role.level != PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL)
return 1;
if (!s->unsync)
need_unsync = true;
}
if (need_unsync)
kvm_unsync_pages(vcpu, gfn);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DWORD GetNextChunkSize(size_t current_pos, size_t max_size) {
return static_cast<DWORD>(((max_size - current_pos) <= UINT_MAX) ?
(max_size - current_pos) : UINT_MAX);
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 110,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnSelectionChanged(const string16& text,
size_t offset,
const ui::Range& range) {
if (view_)
view_->SelectionChanged(text, offset, range);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int js_isarrayindex(js_State *J, const char *str, int *idx)
{
char buf[32];
*idx = jsV_numbertointeger(jsV_stringtonumber(J, str));
sprintf(buf, "%u", *idx);
return !strcmp(buf, str);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebstoreBindings::OnInlineWebstoreInstallResponse(
int install_id,
bool success,
const std::string& error,
webstore_install::Result result) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = context()->isolate();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context()->v8_context());
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = {
v8::Integer::New(isolate, install_id),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, success),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, error.c_str()),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate, api::webstore::kInstallResultCodes[static_cast<int>(result)])
};
context()->module_system()->CallModuleMethod(
"webstore", "onInstallResponse", arraysize(argv), argv);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool V8TestCustomNamedGetter::HasInstance(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value)
{
return GetRawTemplate()->HasInstance(value);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pch_repl_lines (void)
{
return p_repl_lines;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 2,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: compat_do_ipt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
{
int ret;
if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
case IPT_SO_GET_INFO:
ret = get_info(sock_net(sk), user, len, 1);
break;
case IPT_SO_GET_ENTRIES:
ret = compat_get_entries(sock_net(sk), user, len);
break;
default:
ret = do_ipt_get_ctl(sk, cmd, user, len);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned lodepng_convert(unsigned char* out, const unsigned char* in,
LodePNGColorMode* mode_out, const LodePNGColorMode* mode_in,
unsigned w, unsigned h)
{
size_t i;
ColorTree tree;
size_t numpixels = w * h;
if(lodepng_color_mode_equal(mode_out, mode_in))
{
size_t numbytes = lodepng_get_raw_size(w, h, mode_in);
for(i = 0; i < numbytes; i++) out[i] = in[i];
return 0;
}
if(mode_out->colortype == LCT_PALETTE)
{
size_t palsize = 1u << mode_out->bitdepth;
if(mode_out->palettesize < palsize) palsize = mode_out->palettesize;
color_tree_init(&tree);
for(i = 0; i < palsize; i++)
{
unsigned char* p = &mode_out->palette[i * 4];
color_tree_add(&tree, p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3], i);
}
}
if(mode_in->bitdepth == 16 && mode_out->bitdepth == 16)
{
for(i = 0; i < numpixels; i++)
{
unsigned short r = 0, g = 0, b = 0, a = 0;
getPixelColorRGBA16(&r, &g, &b, &a, in, i, mode_in);
rgba16ToPixel(out, i, mode_out, r, g, b, a);
}
}
else if(mode_out->bitdepth == 8 && mode_out->colortype == LCT_RGBA)
{
getPixelColorsRGBA8(out, numpixels, 1, in, mode_in);
}
else if(mode_out->bitdepth == 8 && mode_out->colortype == LCT_RGB)
{
getPixelColorsRGBA8(out, numpixels, 0, in, mode_in);
}
else
{
unsigned char r = 0, g = 0, b = 0, a = 0;
for(i = 0; i < numpixels; i++)
{
getPixelColorRGBA8(&r, &g, &b, &a, in, i, mode_in);
rgba8ToPixel(out, i, mode_out, &tree, r, g, b, a);
}
}
if(mode_out->colortype == LCT_PALETTE)
{
color_tree_cleanup(&tree);
}
return 0; /*no error (this function currently never has one, but maybe OOM detection added later.)*/
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InvokeTaskHelper(scoped_ptr<WebTask> task) : task_(task.Pass()) {}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::metafile() const {
return metafile_.get();
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _PUBLIC_ size_t strlen_m_ext_term(const char *s, const charset_t src_charset,
const charset_t dst_charset)
{
if (!s) {
return 0;
}
return strlen_m_ext(s, src_charset, dst_charset) + 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int phar_zip_process_extra(php_stream *fp, phar_entry_info *entry, php_uint16 len) /* {{{ */
{
union {
phar_zip_extra_field_header header;
phar_zip_unix3 unix3;
} h;
int read;
do {
if (sizeof(h.header) != php_stream_read(fp, (char *) &h.header, sizeof(h.header))) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (h.header.tag[0] != 'n' || h.header.tag[1] != 'u') {
/* skip to next header */
php_stream_seek(fp, PHAR_GET_16(h.header.size), SEEK_CUR);
len -= PHAR_GET_16(h.header.size) + 4;
continue;
}
/* unix3 header found */
read = php_stream_read(fp, (char *) &(h.unix3.crc32), sizeof(h.unix3) - sizeof(h.header));
len -= read + 4;
if (sizeof(h.unix3) - sizeof(h.header) != read) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (PHAR_GET_16(h.unix3.size) > sizeof(h.unix3) - 4) {
/* skip symlink filename - we may add this support in later */
php_stream_seek(fp, PHAR_GET_16(h.unix3.size) - sizeof(h.unix3.size), SEEK_CUR);
}
/* set permissions */
entry->flags &= PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK;
if (entry->is_dir) {
entry->flags |= PHAR_GET_16(h.unix3.perms) & PHAR_ENT_PERM_MASK;
} else {
entry->flags |= PHAR_GET_16(h.unix3.perms) & PHAR_ENT_PERM_MASK;
}
} while (len);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72928 - Out of bound when verify signature of zip phar in phar_parse_zipfile
(cherry picked from commit 19484ab77466f99c78fc0e677f7e03da0584d6a2)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int generic_file_readonly_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE))
return -EINVAL;
return generic_file_mmap(file, vma);
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 58,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: generateReference(const char *custom1, const char *custom2)
{
static uint ref_counter = 0;
const char *local_cust1 = custom1;
const char *local_cust2 = custom2;
int reference_len = 4;
char *since_epoch = NULL;
reference_len += 20; /* too big */
reference_len += 40; /* too big */
if (local_cust1 == NULL) {
local_cust1 = "_empty_";
}
reference_len += strlen(local_cust1);
if (local_cust2 == NULL) {
local_cust2 = "_empty_";
}
reference_len += strlen(local_cust2);
since_epoch = calloc(1, reference_len);
if (since_epoch != NULL) {
sprintf(since_epoch, "%s-%s-%lu-%u",
local_cust1, local_cust2, (unsigned long)time(NULL), ref_counter++);
}
return since_epoch;
}
Commit Message: High: libcrmcommon: fix CVE-2016-7035 (improper IPC guarding)
It was discovered that at some not so uncommon circumstances, some
pacemaker daemons could be talked to, via libqb-facilitated IPC, by
unprivileged clients due to flawed authorization decision. Depending
on the capabilities of affected daemons, this might equip unauthorized
user with local privilege escalation or up to cluster-wide remote
execution of possibly arbitrary commands when such user happens to
reside at standard or remote/guest cluster node, respectively.
The original vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to allow
unprivileged IPC clients to clean up the file system materialized
leftovers in case the server (otherwise responsible for the lifecycle
of these files) crashes. While the intended part of such behavior is
now effectively voided (along with the unintended one), a best-effort
fix to address this corner case systemically at libqb is coming along
(https://github.com/ClusterLabs/libqb/pull/231).
Affected versions: 1.1.10-rc1 (2013-04-17) - 1.1.15 (2016-06-21)
Impact: Important
CVSSv3 ranking: 8.8 : AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credits for independent findings, in chronological order:
Jan "poki" Pokorný, of Red Hat
Alain Moulle, of ATOS/BULL
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 86,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_io_bus_sort_cmp(const void *p1, const void *p2)
{
const struct kvm_io_range *r1 = p1;
const struct kvm_io_range *r2 = p2;
if (r1->addr < r2->addr)
return -1;
if (r1->addr + r1->len > r2->addr + r2->len)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hugetlbfs_parse_options(char *options, struct hugetlbfs_config *pconfig)
{
char *p, *rest;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int option;
unsigned long long size = 0;
enum { NO_SIZE, SIZE_STD, SIZE_PERCENT } setsize = NO_SIZE;
if (!options)
return 0;
while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
int token;
if (!*p)
continue;
token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
switch (token) {
case Opt_uid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
goto bad_val;
pconfig->uid = option;
break;
case Opt_gid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
goto bad_val;
pconfig->gid = option;
break;
case Opt_mode:
if (match_octal(&args[0], &option))
goto bad_val;
pconfig->mode = option & 01777U;
break;
case Opt_size: {
/* memparse() will accept a K/M/G without a digit */
if (!isdigit(*args[0].from))
goto bad_val;
size = memparse(args[0].from, &rest);
setsize = SIZE_STD;
if (*rest == '%')
setsize = SIZE_PERCENT;
break;
}
case Opt_nr_inodes:
/* memparse() will accept a K/M/G without a digit */
if (!isdigit(*args[0].from))
goto bad_val;
pconfig->nr_inodes = memparse(args[0].from, &rest);
break;
case Opt_pagesize: {
unsigned long ps;
ps = memparse(args[0].from, &rest);
pconfig->hstate = size_to_hstate(ps);
if (!pconfig->hstate) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"hugetlbfs: Unsupported page size %lu MB\n",
ps >> 20);
return -EINVAL;
}
break;
}
default:
printk(KERN_ERR "hugetlbfs: Bad mount option: \"%s\"\n",
p);
return -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
/* Do size after hstate is set up */
if (setsize > NO_SIZE) {
struct hstate *h = pconfig->hstate;
if (setsize == SIZE_PERCENT) {
size <<= huge_page_shift(h);
size *= h->max_huge_pages;
do_div(size, 100);
}
pconfig->nr_blocks = (size >> huge_page_shift(h));
}
return 0;
bad_val:
printk(KERN_ERR "hugetlbfs: Bad value '%s' for mount option '%s'\n",
args[0].from, p);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int request_count() const {
return request_count_;
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_check_chunk_name(png_structp png_ptr, png_bytep chunk_name)
{
png_debug(1, "in png_check_chunk_name");
if (isnonalpha(chunk_name[0]) || isnonalpha(chunk_name[1]) ||
isnonalpha(chunk_name[2]) || isnonalpha(chunk_name[3]))
{
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "invalid chunk type");
}
}
Commit Message: Pull follow-up tweak from upstream.
BUG=116162
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9546033
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125311 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 109,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct tty_struct *tty_pair_get_tty(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
if (tty->driver->type == TTY_DRIVER_TYPE_PTY &&
tty->driver->subtype == PTY_TYPE_MASTER)
tty = tty->link;
return tty;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *__raw_v6_lookup(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
unsigned short num, const struct in6_addr *loc_addr,
const struct in6_addr *rmt_addr, int dif)
{
bool is_multicast = ipv6_addr_is_multicast(loc_addr);
sk_for_each_from(sk)
if (inet_sk(sk)->inet_num == num) {
if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), net))
continue;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(&sk->sk_v6_daddr) &&
!ipv6_addr_equal(&sk->sk_v6_daddr, rmt_addr))
continue;
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && sk->sk_bound_dev_if != dif)
continue;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr)) {
if (ipv6_addr_equal(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr, loc_addr))
goto found;
if (is_multicast &&
inet6_mc_check(sk, loc_addr, rmt_addr))
goto found;
continue;
}
goto found;
}
sk = NULL;
found:
return sk;
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 40,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage void sys_exit_group(int error_code)
{
do_group_exit((error_code & 0xff) << 8);
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nextY(int d)
{
HmarkerList *hl = Currentbuf->hmarklist;
Anchor *an, *pan;
int i, x, y, n = searchKeyNum();
int hseq;
if (Currentbuf->firstLine == NULL)
return;
if (!hl || hl->nmark == 0)
return;
an = retrieveCurrentAnchor(Currentbuf);
if (an == NULL)
an = retrieveCurrentForm(Currentbuf);
x = Currentbuf->pos;
y = Currentbuf->currentLine->linenumber + d;
pan = NULL;
hseq = -1;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (an)
hseq = abs(an->hseq);
an = NULL;
for (; y >= 0 && y <= Currentbuf->lastLine->linenumber; y += d) {
an = retrieveAnchor(Currentbuf->href, y, x);
if (!an)
an = retrieveAnchor(Currentbuf->formitem, y, x);
if (an && hseq != abs(an->hseq)) {
pan = an;
break;
}
}
if (!an)
break;
}
if (pan == NULL)
return;
gotoLine(Currentbuf, pan->start.line);
arrangeLine(Currentbuf);
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_NORMAL);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 84,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::SetTreeActivationCallback(
const base::Closure& callback) {
DCHECK(task_runner_provider_->IsImplThread());
tree_activation_callback_ = callback;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void netlink_frame_flush_dcache(const struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr)
{
#if ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE == 1
struct page *p_start, *p_end;
/* First page is flushed through netlink_{get,set}_status */
p_start = pgvec_to_page(hdr + PAGE_SIZE);
p_end = pgvec_to_page((void *)hdr + NL_MMAP_HDRLEN + hdr->nm_len - 1);
while (p_start <= p_end) {
flush_dcache_page(p_start);
p_start++;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SafeSock::CloneStream()
{
return new SafeSock(*this);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SyncAuthenticPixelCacheNexus(Image *image,
NexusInfo *restrict nexus_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
/*
Transfer pixels to the cache.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->cache == (Cache) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(CacheError,"PixelCacheIsNotOpen",image->filename);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (cache_info->type == UndefinedCache)
return(MagickFalse);
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) &&
(image->clip_mask != (Image *) NULL) &&
(ClipPixelCacheNexus(image,nexus_info,exception) == MagickFalse))
return(MagickFalse);
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) &&
(image->mask != (Image *) NULL) &&
(MaskPixelCacheNexus(image,nexus_info,exception) == MagickFalse))
return(MagickFalse);
if (nexus_info->authentic_pixel_cache != MagickFalse)
{
image->taint=MagickTrue;
return(MagickTrue);
}
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
status=WritePixelCachePixels(cache_info,nexus_info,exception);
if ((cache_info->active_index_channel != MagickFalse) &&
(WritePixelCacheIndexes(cache_info,nexus_info,exception) == MagickFalse))
return(MagickFalse);
if (status != MagickFalse)
image->taint=MagickTrue;
return(status);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 73,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_time(int fd, int mode, const char *name,
time_t atime, long atime_nsec,
time_t mtime, long mtime_nsec)
{
/* Select the best implementation for this platform. */
#if defined(HAVE_UTIMENSAT) && defined(HAVE_FUTIMENS)
/*
* utimensat() and futimens() are defined in
* POSIX.1-2008. They support ns resolution and setting times
* on fds and symlinks.
*/
struct timespec ts[2];
(void)mode; /* UNUSED */
ts[0].tv_sec = atime;
ts[0].tv_nsec = atime_nsec;
ts[1].tv_sec = mtime;
ts[1].tv_nsec = mtime_nsec;
if (fd >= 0)
return futimens(fd, ts);
return utimensat(AT_FDCWD, name, ts, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
#elif HAVE_UTIMES
/*
* The utimes()-family functions support µs-resolution and
* setting times fds and symlinks. utimes() is documented as
* LEGACY by POSIX, futimes() and lutimes() are not described
* in POSIX.
*/
struct timeval times[2];
times[0].tv_sec = atime;
times[0].tv_usec = atime_nsec / 1000;
times[1].tv_sec = mtime;
times[1].tv_usec = mtime_nsec / 1000;
#ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES
if (fd >= 0)
return (futimes(fd, times));
#else
(void)fd; /* UNUSED */
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LUTIMES
(void)mode; /* UNUSED */
return (lutimes(name, times));
#else
if (S_ISLNK(mode))
return (0);
return (utimes(name, times));
#endif
#elif defined(HAVE_UTIME)
/*
* utime() is POSIX-standard but only supports 1s resolution and
* does not support fds or symlinks.
*/
struct utimbuf times;
(void)fd; /* UNUSED */
(void)name; /* UNUSED */
(void)atime_nsec; /* UNUSED */
(void)mtime_nsec; /* UNUSED */
times.actime = atime;
times.modtime = mtime;
if (S_ISLNK(mode))
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
return (utime(name, ×));
#else
/*
* We don't know how to set the time on this platform.
*/
(void)fd; /* UNUSED */
(void)mode; /* UNUSED */
(void)name; /* UNUSED */
(void)atime_nsec; /* UNUSED */
(void)mtime_nsec; /* UNUSED */
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 43,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void __x86_pmu_enable_event(struct hw_perf_event *hwc,
u64 enable_mask)
{
if (hwc->extra_reg)
wrmsrl(hwc->extra_reg, hwc->extra_config);
wrmsrl(hwc->config_base, hwc->config | enable_mask);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: init_ctx_reselect(OM_uint32 *minor_status, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc,
OM_uint32 acc_negState, gss_OID supportedMech,
gss_buffer_t *responseToken, gss_buffer_t *mechListMIC,
OM_uint32 *negState, send_token_flag *tokflag)
{
OM_uint32 tmpmin;
size_t i;
generic_gss_release_oid(&tmpmin, &sc->internal_mech);
gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin, &sc->ctx_handle,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
/* Find supportedMech in sc->mech_set. */
for (i = 0; i < sc->mech_set->count; i++) {
if (g_OID_equal(supportedMech, &sc->mech_set->elements[i]))
break;
}
if (i == sc->mech_set->count)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
sc->internal_mech = &sc->mech_set->elements[i];
/*
* Windows 2003 and earlier don't correctly send a
* negState of request-mic when counter-proposing a
* mechanism. They probably don't handle mechListMICs
* properly either.
*/
if (acc_negState != REQUEST_MIC)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
sc->mech_complete = 0;
sc->mic_reqd = 1;
*negState = REQUEST_MIC;
*tokflag = CONT_TOKEN_SEND;
return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free in SPNEGO [CVE-2014-4343]
In commit cd7d6b08 ("Verify acceptor's mech in SPNEGO initiator") the
pointer sc->internal_mech became an alias into sc->mech_set->elements,
which should be considered constant for the duration of the SPNEGO
context. So don't free it.
CVE-2014-4343:
In MIT krb5 releases 1.10 and newer, an unauthenticated remote
attacker with the ability to spoof packets appearing to be from a
GSSAPI acceptor can cause a double-free condition in GSSAPI initiators
(clients) which are using the SPNEGO mechanism, by returning a
different underlying mechanism than was proposed by the initiator. At
this stage of the negotiation, the acceptor is unauthenticated, and
the acceptor's response could be spoofed by an attacker with the
ability to inject traffic to the initiator.
Historically, some double-free vulnerabilities can be translated into
remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be tailored
to the individual application and are usually quite
complicated. Double-frees can also be exploited to cause an
application crash, for a denial of service. However, most GSSAPI
client applications are not vulnerable, as the SPNEGO mechanism is not
used by default (when GSS_C_NO_OID is passed as the mech_type argument
to gss_init_sec_context()). The most common use of SPNEGO is for
HTTP-Negotiate, used in web browsers and other web clients. Most such
clients are believed to not offer HTTP-Negotiate by default, instead
requiring a whitelist of sites for which it may be used to be
configured. If the whitelist is configured to only allow
HTTP-Negotiate over TLS connections ("https://"), a successful
attacker must also spoof the web server's SSL certificate, due to the
way the WWW-Authenticate header is sent in a 401 (Unauthorized)
response message. Unfortunately, many instructions for enabling
HTTP-Negotiate in common web browsers do not include a TLS
requirement.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary and CVSSv2 vector]
ticket: 7969 (new)
target_version: 1.12.2
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 1 | 166,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::viewport(GLint x,
GLint y,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
ContextGL()->Viewport(x, y, width, height);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response CreateContextErrorResponse() {
return Response::Error("Could not connect to the context");
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingAccessPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_activityLoggingAccessPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
V8PerContextData* context_data = script_state->PerContextData();
if (context_data && context_data->ActivityLogger()) {
context_data->ActivityLogger()->LogSetter("TestObject.activityLoggingAccessPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute", v8_value);
}
test_object_v8_internal::ActivityLoggingAccessPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static event_gui_data_t *new_event_gui_data_t(void)
{
return xzalloc(sizeof(event_gui_data_t));
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(stream_set_read_buffer)
{
zval *arg1;
int ret;
long arg2;
size_t buff;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl", &arg1, &arg2) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_from_zval(stream, &arg1);
buff = arg2;
/* if buff is 0 then set to non-buffered */
if (buff == 0) {
ret = php_stream_set_option(stream, PHP_STREAM_OPTION_READ_BUFFER, PHP_STREAM_BUFFER_NONE, NULL);
} else {
ret = php_stream_set_option(stream, PHP_STREAM_OPTION_READ_BUFFER, PHP_STREAM_BUFFER_FULL, &buff);
}
RETURN_LONG(ret == 0 ? 0 : EOF);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sctp_register_af(struct sctp_af *af)
{
switch (af->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
if (sctp_af_v4_specific)
return 0;
sctp_af_v4_specific = af;
break;
case AF_INET6:
if (sctp_af_v6_specific)
return 0;
sctp_af_v6_specific = af;
break;
default:
return 0;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&af->list);
list_add_tail(&af->list, &sctp_address_families);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 42,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int snd_pcm_update_hw_ptr(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
return snd_pcm_update_hw_ptr0(substream, 0);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 47,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ehci_trace_qtd(EHCIQueue *q, hwaddr addr, EHCIqtd *qtd)
{
/* need three here due to argument count limits */
trace_usb_ehci_qtd_ptrs(q, addr, qtd->next, qtd->altnext);
trace_usb_ehci_qtd_fields(addr,
get_field(qtd->token, QTD_TOKEN_TBYTES),
get_field(qtd->token, QTD_TOKEN_CPAGE),
get_field(qtd->token, QTD_TOKEN_CERR),
get_field(qtd->token, QTD_TOKEN_PID));
trace_usb_ehci_qtd_bits(addr,
(bool)(qtd->token & QTD_TOKEN_IOC),
(bool)(qtd->token & QTD_TOKEN_ACTIVE),
(bool)(qtd->token & QTD_TOKEN_HALT),
(bool)(qtd->token & QTD_TOKEN_BABBLE),
(bool)(qtd->token & QTD_TOKEN_XACTERR));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 5,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_NXAST_RAW_RESUBMIT_TABLE(const struct nx_action_resubmit *nar,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
struct ofpact_resubmit *resubmit;
if (nar->pad[0] || nar->pad[1] || nar->pad[2]) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
resubmit = ofpact_put_RESUBMIT(out);
resubmit->ofpact.raw = NXAST_RAW_RESUBMIT_TABLE;
resubmit->in_port = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(nar->in_port));
resubmit->table_id = nar->table;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableForceTallerSelectPopup(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetForceTallerSelectPopupEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void* dvcman_get_rdp_settings(IDRDYNVC_ENTRY_POINTS* pEntryPoints)
{
return (void*)((DVCMAN_ENTRY_POINTS*) pEntryPoints)->settings;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID: | 0 | 74,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int _zend_ts_hash_quick_add_or_update(TsHashTable *ht, char *arKey, uint nKeyLength, ulong h, void *pData, uint nDataSize, void **pDest, int flag ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
int retval;
begin_write(ht);
retval = _zend_hash_quick_add_or_update(TS_HASH(ht), arKey, nKeyLength, h, pData, nDataSize, pDest, flag ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
end_write(ht);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,438 |
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