instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_cmd_set_sk_err(struct sctp_association *asoc, int error)
{
struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
if (!sctp_style(sk, UDP))
sk->sk_err = error;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 57,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __relocate_discard_cmd(struct discard_cmd_control *dcc,
struct discard_cmd *dc)
{
list_move_tail(&dc->list, &dcc->pend_list[plist_idx(dc->len)]);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool bio_attempt_front_merge(struct request_queue *q, struct request *req,
struct bio *bio)
{
const int ff = bio->bi_opf & REQ_FAILFAST_MASK;
if (!ll_front_merge_fn(q, req, bio))
return false;
trace_block_bio_frontmerge(q, req, bio);
if ((req->cmd_flags & REQ_FAILFAST_MASK) != ff)
blk_rq_set_mixed_merge(req);
bio->bi_next = req->bio;
req->bio = bio;
req->__sector = bio->bi_iter.bi_sector;
req->__data_len += bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
req->ioprio = ioprio_best(req->ioprio, bio_prio(bio));
blk_account_io_start(req, false);
return true;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_encode_queue_stats_request(enum ofp_version ofp_version,
const struct ofputil_queue_stats_request *oqsr)
{
struct ofpbuf *request;
switch (ofp_version) {
case OFP11_VERSION:
case OFP12_VERSION:
case OFP13_VERSION:
case OFP14_VERSION:
case OFP15_VERSION:
case OFP16_VERSION: {
struct ofp11_queue_stats_request *req;
request = ofpraw_alloc(OFPRAW_OFPST11_QUEUE_REQUEST, ofp_version, 0);
req = ofpbuf_put_zeros(request, sizeof *req);
req->port_no = ofputil_port_to_ofp11(oqsr->port_no);
req->queue_id = htonl(oqsr->queue_id);
break;
}
case OFP10_VERSION: {
struct ofp10_queue_stats_request *req;
request = ofpraw_alloc(OFPRAW_OFPST10_QUEUE_REQUEST, ofp_version, 0);
req = ofpbuf_put_zeros(request, sizeof *req);
/* OpenFlow 1.0 needs OFPP_ALL instead of OFPP_ANY */
req->port_no = htons(ofp_to_u16(oqsr->port_no == OFPP_ANY
? OFPP_ALL : oqsr->port_no));
req->queue_id = htonl(oqsr->queue_id);
break;
}
default:
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
return request;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: autofill::LocalCardMigrationBubble* BrowserView::ShowLocalCardMigrationBubble(
content::WebContents* web_contents,
autofill::LocalCardMigrationBubbleController* controller,
bool user_gesture) {
LocationBarView* location_bar = GetLocationBarView();
PageActionIconView* card_view =
location_bar->local_card_migration_icon_view();
views::View* anchor_view = location_bar;
if (!ui::MaterialDesignController::IsSecondaryUiMaterial()) {
if (card_view && card_view->visible())
anchor_view = card_view;
else
anchor_view = toolbar_button_provider()->GetAppMenuButton();
}
autofill::LocalCardMigrationBubbleViews* bubble =
new autofill::LocalCardMigrationBubbleViews(anchor_view, gfx::Point(),
web_contents, controller);
views::Widget* bubble_widget =
views::BubbleDialogDelegateView::CreateBubble(bubble);
if (card_view)
card_view->OnBubbleWidgetCreated(bubble_widget);
bubble->Show(user_gesture
? autofill::LocalCardMigrationBubbleViews::USER_GESTURE
: autofill::LocalCardMigrationBubbleViews::AUTOMATIC);
return bubble;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::readDouble(double *pArg) const
{
union {
double d;
unsigned long long ll;
} u;
u.d = 0;
status_t status;
status = readAligned(&u.ll);
*pArg = u.d;
return status;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void config_free(config_t *config) {
if (!config)
return;
list_free(config->sections);
osi_free(config);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> CreateJavaRectF(
JNIEnv* env,
const gfx::RectF& rect) {
return ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject>(
Java_ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid_createRectF(env,
rect.x(),
rect.y(),
rect.right(),
rect.bottom()));
}
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
TBR=tedchoc@chromium.org,jbudorick@chromium.org,sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns)
{
struct user_namespace *my_user_ns = current_user_ns();
struct user_namespace *owner, *p;
/* See if the owner is in the current user namespace */
owner = p = ns->ops->owner(ns);
for (;;) {
if (!p)
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
if (p == my_user_ns)
break;
p = p->parent;
}
return &get_user_ns(owner)->ns;
}
Commit Message: userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.
This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.
To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).
This is CVE-2018-18955.
Fixes: 6397fac4915a ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 76,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniform4ui(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
GLuint v0,
GLuint v1,
GLuint v2,
GLuint v3) {
if (isContextLost() || !location)
return;
if (location->Program() != current_program_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "uniform4ui",
"location not for current program");
return;
}
ContextGL()->Uniform4ui(location->Location(), v0, v1, v2, v3);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::Show() {
#if !defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
BrowserList::SetLastActive(browser());
#endif
if (frame_->IsVisible()) {
frame_->Activate();
return;
}
force_location_bar_focus_ = true;
RestoreFocus();
frame_->Show();
force_location_bar_focus_ = false;
browser()->OnWindowDidShow();
MaybeShowInvertBubbleView(this);
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fuse_copy_page(struct fuse_copy_state *cs, struct page **pagep,
unsigned offset, unsigned count, int zeroing)
{
int err;
struct page *page = *pagep;
if (page && zeroing && count < PAGE_SIZE)
clear_highpage(page);
while (count) {
if (cs->write && cs->pipebufs && page) {
return fuse_ref_page(cs, page, offset, count);
} else if (!cs->len) {
if (cs->move_pages && page &&
offset == 0 && count == PAGE_SIZE) {
err = fuse_try_move_page(cs, pagep);
if (err <= 0)
return err;
} else {
err = fuse_copy_fill(cs);
if (err)
return err;
}
}
if (page) {
void *mapaddr = kmap_atomic(page, KM_USER0);
void *buf = mapaddr + offset;
offset += fuse_copy_do(cs, &buf, &count);
kunmap_atomic(mapaddr, KM_USER0);
} else
offset += fuse_copy_do(cs, NULL, &count);
}
if (page && !cs->write)
flush_dcache_page(page);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_PUSHW( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
FT_UShort L, K;
L = (FT_UShort)( exc->opcode - 0xB8 + 1 );
if ( BOUNDS( L, exc->stackSize + 1 - exc->top ) )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( Stack_Overflow );
return;
}
exc->IP++;
for ( K = 0; K < L; K++ )
args[K] = GetShortIns( exc );
exc->step_ins = FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::SetEngagementLevel(mojom::EngagementLevel level) {
GetFrame()->GetDocument()->SetEngagementLevel(level);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_pgsql_data_info(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int entry_type)
{
zval *result, **field;
long row;
PGresult *pgsql_result;
pgsql_result_handle *pg_result;
int field_offset, pgsql_row, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
if (argc == 2) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "rZ", &result, &field) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "rlZ", &result, &row, &field) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pg_result, pgsql_result_handle *, &result, -1, "PostgreSQL result", le_result);
pgsql_result = pg_result->result;
if (argc == 2) {
if (pg_result->row < 0) {
pg_result->row = 0;
}
pgsql_row = pg_result->row;
if (pgsql_row < 0 || pgsql_row >= PQntuples(pgsql_result)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
pgsql_row = row;
if (pgsql_row < 0 || pgsql_row >= PQntuples(pgsql_result)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to jump to row %ld on PostgreSQL result index %ld",
row, Z_LVAL_P(result));
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
switch(Z_TYPE_PP(field)) {
case IS_STRING:
convert_to_string_ex(field);
field_offset = PQfnumber(pgsql_result, Z_STRVAL_PP(field));
break;
default:
convert_to_long_ex(field);
field_offset = Z_LVAL_PP(field);
break;
}
if (field_offset < 0 || field_offset >= PQnfields(pgsql_result)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Bad column offset specified");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
switch (entry_type) {
case PHP_PG_DATA_LENGTH:
Z_LVAL_P(return_value) = PQgetlength(pgsql_result, pgsql_row, field_offset);
break;
case PHP_PG_DATA_ISNULL:
Z_LVAL_P(return_value) = PQgetisnull(pgsql_result, pgsql_row, field_offset);
break;
}
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_LONG;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jpc_ms_dump(jpc_ms_t *ms, FILE *out)
{
jpc_mstabent_t *mstabent;
mstabent = jpc_mstab_lookup(ms->id);
fprintf(out, "type = 0x%04x (%s);", ms->id, mstabent->name);
if (JPC_MS_HASPARMS(ms->id)) {
fprintf(out, " len = %d;", ms->len + 2);
if (ms->ops->dumpparms) {
(*ms->ops->dumpparms)(ms, out);
} else {
fprintf(out, "\n");
}
} else {
fprintf(out, "\n");
}
}
Commit Message: Added range check on XRsiz and YRsiz fields of SIZ marker segment.
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 73,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: g_NP_GetMIMEDescription(void)
{
if (g_plugin_NP_GetMIMEDescription == NULL)
return NULL;
D(bugiI("NP_GetMIMEDescription\n"));
char *str = g_plugin_NP_GetMIMEDescription();
D(bugiD("NP_GetMIMEDescription return: %s\n", str ? str : "<empty>"));
return str;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,092 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nd_jump_root(struct nameidata *nd)
{
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
struct dentry *d;
nd->path = nd->root;
d = nd->path.dentry;
nd->inode = d->d_inode;
nd->seq = nd->root_seq;
if (unlikely(read_seqcount_retry(&d->d_seq, nd->seq)))
return -ECHILD;
} else {
path_put(&nd->path);
nd->path = nd->root;
path_get(&nd->path);
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
}
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 51,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::mediaEngineError(MediaError* err) {
DCHECK_GE(m_readyState, kHaveMetadata);
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaEngineError(" << (void*)this << ", "
<< static_cast<int>(err->code()) << ")";
stopPeriodicTimers();
m_loadState = WaitingForSource;
m_error = err;
scheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::error);
setNetworkState(kNetworkIdle);
setShouldDelayLoadEvent(false);
m_currentSourceNode = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Element::hasAttributeNS(const AtomicString& namespaceURI, const AtomicString& localName) const
{
if (!elementData())
return false;
QualifiedName qName(nullAtom, localName, namespaceURI);
synchronizeAttribute(qName);
return elementData()->getAttributeItem(qName);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebPageProxy* webkitWebViewBaseGetPage(WebKitWebViewBase* webkitWebViewBase)
{
return webkitWebViewBase->priv->pageProxy.get();
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void evmcs_write64(unsigned long field, u64 value)
{
u16 clean_field;
int offset = get_evmcs_offset(field, &clean_field);
if (offset < 0)
return;
*(u64 *)((char *)current_evmcs + offset) = value;
current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields &= ~clean_field;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 80,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOLEAN btif_hl_proc_dch_reconnect_cfm(tBTA_HL *p_data)
{
btif_hl_mdl_cb_t *p_dcb;
btif_hl_pending_chan_cb_t *p_pcb;
UINT8 app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx, mdep_cfg_idx;
BOOLEAN status = FALSE;
BOOLEAN close_dch = FALSE;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__);
btif_hl_find_app_idx_using_mdepId(p_data->dch_reconnect_cfm.local_mdep_id,&app_idx);
if (btif_hl_find_mcl_idx_using_app_idx(p_data->dch_reconnect_cfm.mcl_handle, app_idx, &mcl_idx ))
{
BTIF_HL_GET_APP_CB_PTR(app_idx);
BTIF_HL_GET_MCL_CB_PTR(app_idx, mcl_idx);
p_pcb = BTIF_HL_GET_PCB_PTR(app_idx, mcl_idx);
if (btif_hl_find_avail_mdl_idx(app_idx, mcl_idx, &mdl_idx))
{
p_dcb = BTIF_HL_GET_MDL_CB_PTR(app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx);
if (btif_hl_find_mdep_cfg_idx(app_idx, p_data->dch_reconnect_cfm.local_mdep_id, &mdep_cfg_idx))
{
p_dcb->in_use = TRUE;
p_dcb->mdl_handle = p_data->dch_reconnect_cfm.mdl_handle;
p_dcb->local_mdep_cfg_idx = mdep_cfg_idx;
p_dcb->local_mdep_id = p_data->dch_reconnect_cfm.local_mdep_id;
p_dcb->mdl_id = p_data->dch_reconnect_cfm.mdl_id;
p_dcb->dch_mode = p_data->dch_reconnect_cfm.dch_mode;
p_dcb->is_the_first_reliable= p_data->dch_reconnect_cfm.first_reliable;
p_dcb->mtu = p_data->dch_reconnect_cfm.mtu;
p_dcb->channel_id = p_pcb->channel_id;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("app_idx=%d mcl_idx=%d mdl_idx=%d", app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx );
btif_hl_send_setup_connecting_cb(app_idx, mcl_idx);
if (btif_hl_create_socket(app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx))
{
status = TRUE;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("app_idx=%d mcl_idx=%d mdl_idx=%d p_dcb->channel_id=0x%08x",
app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx, p_dcb->channel_id);
btif_hl_clean_pcb(p_pcb);
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("Unable to create socket");
close_dch = TRUE;
}
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("INVALID_LOCAL_MDEP_ID mdep_id=%d",p_data->dch_open_cfm.local_mdep_id);
close_dch = TRUE;
}
if (close_dch)
{
btif_hl_clean_mdl_cb(p_dcb);
BTA_HlDchClose(p_data->dch_reconnect_cfm.mdl_handle);
}
}
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void didCreateSnapshotFile(const WebKit::WebFileInfo& info)
{
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteJustifyRight(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource source,
const String&) {
return ExecuteApplyParagraphStyle(frame, source,
InputEvent::InputType::kFormatJustifyRight,
CSSPropertyTextAlign, "right");
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CopyFromOMX(const OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (!mCopyFromOmx) {
return;
}
sp<ABuffer> codec = getBuffer(header, false /* backup */, true /* limit */);
memcpy((OMX_U8 *)mMem->pointer() + header->nOffset, codec->data(), codec->size());
}
Commit Message: IOMX: allow configuration after going to loaded state
This was disallowed recently but we still use it as MediaCodcec.stop
only goes to loaded state, and does not free component.
Bug: 31450460
Change-Id: I72e092e4e55c9f23b1baee3e950d76e84a5ef28d
(cherry picked from commit e03b22839d78c841ce0a1a0a1ee1960932188b0b)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 157,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* PropStateToString(int prop_state) {
switch (static_cast<IBusPropState>(prop_state)) {
case PROP_STATE_UNCHECKED:
return "UNCHECKED";
case PROP_STATE_CHECKED:
return "CHECKED";
case PROP_STATE_INCONSISTENT:
return "INCONSISTENT";
}
return "UNKNOWN";
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ImageResourceContent* ImageResource::GetContent() {
return content_;
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GfxCalGrayColorSpace::getRGB(GfxColor *color, GfxRGB *rgb) {
double X, Y, Z;
double r, g, b;
getXYZ(color,&X,&Y,&Z);
#ifdef USE_CMS
if (XYZ2DisplayTransform != NULL && displayPixelType == PT_RGB) {
Guchar out[gfxColorMaxComps];
double in[gfxColorMaxComps];
in[0] = clip01(X);
in[1] = clip01(Y);
in[2] = clip01(Z);
XYZ2DisplayTransform->doTransform(in,out,1);
rgb->r = byteToCol(out[0]);
rgb->g = byteToCol(out[1]);
rgb->b = byteToCol(out[2]);
return;
}
#endif
X *= whiteX;
Y *= whiteY;
Z *= whiteZ;
r = xyzrgb[0][0] * X + xyzrgb[0][1] * Y + xyzrgb[0][2] * Z;
g = xyzrgb[1][0] * X + xyzrgb[1][1] * Y + xyzrgb[1][2] * Z;
b = xyzrgb[2][0] * X + xyzrgb[2][1] * Y + xyzrgb[2][2] * Z;
rgb->r = dblToCol(pow(clip01(r * kr), 0.5));
rgb->g = dblToCol(pow(clip01(g * kg), 0.5));
rgb->b = dblToCol(pow(clip01(b * kb), 0.5));
rgb->r = rgb->g = rgb->b = clip01(color->c[0]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int PDFiumEngine::Form_Response(IPDF_JSPLATFORM* param,
FPDF_WIDESTRING question,
FPDF_WIDESTRING title,
FPDF_WIDESTRING default_response,
FPDF_WIDESTRING label,
FPDF_BOOL password,
void* response,
int length) {
std::string question_str = base::UTF16ToUTF8(
reinterpret_cast<const base::char16*>(question));
std::string default_str = base::UTF16ToUTF8(
reinterpret_cast<const base::char16*>(default_response));
PDFiumEngine* engine = static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(param);
std::string rv = engine->client_->Prompt(question_str, default_str);
base::string16 rv_16 = base::UTF8ToUTF16(rv);
int rv_bytes = rv_16.size() * sizeof(base::char16);
if (response) {
int bytes_to_copy = rv_bytes < length ? rv_bytes : length;
memcpy(response, rv_16.c_str(), bytes_to_copy);
}
return rv_bytes;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BookmarkManagerView::HandleKeystroke(
views::TextField* sender,
const views::TextField::Keystroke& key) {
if (views::TextField::IsKeystrokeEnter(key)) {
PerformSearch();
search_tf_->SelectAll();
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Relands cl 16982 as it wasn't the cause of the build breakage. Here's
the description for that cl:
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/115505 for bug
http://crbug.com/4030 for tyoshino.
BUG=http://crbug.com/4030
TEST=make sure control-w dismisses bookmark manager.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/113902
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@16987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fbFetchPixel_x1r5g5b5 (const FbBits *bits, int offset, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
CARD32 pixel = READ((CARD16 *) bits + offset);
CARD32 r,g,b;
r = ((pixel & 0x7c00) | ((pixel & 0x7000) >> 5)) << 9;
g = ((pixel & 0x03e0) | ((pixel & 0x0380) >> 5)) << 6;
b = ((pixel & 0x001c) | ((pixel & 0x001f) << 5)) >> 2;
return (0xff000000 | r | g | b);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct cryptd_ahash *cryptd_alloc_ahash(const char *alg_name,
u32 type, u32 mask)
{
char cryptd_alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
if (snprintf(cryptd_alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"cryptd(%s)", alg_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(cryptd_alg_name, type, mask);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return ERR_CAST(tfm);
if (tfm->base.__crt_alg->cra_module != THIS_MODULE) {
crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
return __cryptd_ahash_cast(tfm);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reds_mig_target_client_add_pending_link(RedsMigTargetClient *client,
SpiceLinkMess *link_msg,
RedsStream *stream)
{
RedsMigPendingLink *mig_link;
spice_assert(reds);
spice_assert(client);
mig_link = spice_malloc0(sizeof(RedsMigPendingLink));
mig_link->link_msg = link_msg;
mig_link->stream = stream;
ring_add(&client->pending_links, &mig_link->ring_link);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t StringSize(const uint8_t *start, uint8_t encoding) {
//// return includes terminator; if unterminated, returns > limit
if (encoding == 0x00 || encoding == 0x03) {
return strlen((const char *)start) + 1;
}
size_t n = 0;
while (start[n] != '\0' || start[n + 1] != '\0') {
n += 2;
}
return n + 2;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: defensive parsing of mp3 album art information
several points in stagefrights mp3 album art code
used strlen() to parse user-supplied strings that may be
unterminated, resulting in reading beyond the end of a buffer.
This changes the code to use strnlen() for 8-bit encodings and
strengthens the parsing of 16-bit encodings similarly. It also
reworks how we watch for the end-of-buffer to avoid all over-reads.
Bug: 32377688
Test: crafted mp3's w/ good/bad cover art. See what showed in play music
Change-Id: Ia9f526d71b21ef6a61acacf616b573753cd21df6
(cherry picked from commit fa0806b594e98f1aed3ebcfc6a801b4c0056f9eb)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 174,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int forced_push(struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
return after(tp->write_seq, tp->pushed_seq + (tp->max_window >> 1));
}
Commit Message: net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: id_fnmx(struct sh_fpu_soft_struct *fregs, struct pt_regs *regs, u16 code)
{
int n = (code >> 8) & 0xf, m = (code >> 4) & 0xf, x = code & 0xf;
return (fnmx[x])(fregs, regs, m, n);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentThreadableLoader::handleError(const ResourceError& error)
{
ResourceError copiedError = error;
ThreadableLoaderClient* client = m_client;
clear();
client->didFail(copiedError);
}
Commit Message: DocumentThreadableLoader: Add guards for sync notifyFinished() in setResource()
In loadRequest(), setResource() can call clear() synchronously:
DocumentThreadableLoader::clear()
DocumentThreadableLoader::handleError()
Resource::didAddClient()
RawResource::didAddClient()
and thus |m_client| can be null while resource() isn't null after setResource(),
causing crashes (Issue 595964).
This CL checks whether |*this| is destructed and
whether |m_client| is null after setResource().
BUG=595964
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1902683002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391001}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 119,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UsbCloseDeviceFunction::UsbCloseDeviceFunction() {
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jpc_ft_invlift_colgrp(jpc_fix_t *a, int numrows, int stride, int parity)
{
jpc_fix_t *lptr;
jpc_fix_t *hptr;
register jpc_fix_t *lptr2;
register jpc_fix_t *hptr2;
register int n;
register int i;
int llen;
llen = (numrows + 1 - parity) >> 1;
if (numrows > 1) {
/* Apply the first lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (!parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
lptr2[0] -= jpc_fix_asr(hptr2[0] + 1, 1);
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
lptr += stride;
}
n = llen - (!parity) - (parity != (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
lptr2[0] -= jpc_fix_asr(hptr2[0] + hptr2[stride] + 2, 2);
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
lptr += stride;
hptr += stride;
}
if (parity != (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
lptr2[0] -= jpc_fix_asr(hptr2[0] + 1, 1);
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
}
/* Apply the second lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
hptr2[0] += lptr2[0];
++hptr2;
++lptr2;
}
hptr += stride;
}
n = numrows - llen - parity - (parity == (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
hptr2[0] += jpc_fix_asr(lptr2[0] + lptr2[stride], 1);
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
hptr += stride;
lptr += stride;
}
if (parity == (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
hptr2[0] += lptr2[0];
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
}
} else {
if (parity) {
lptr2 = &a[0];
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
lptr2[0] = jpc_fix_asr(lptr2[0], 1);
++lptr2;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fuse_reply_entry(struct fuse* fuse, __u64 unique,
struct node* parent, const char* name, const char* actual_name,
const char* path)
{
struct node* node;
struct fuse_entry_out out;
struct stat s;
if (lstat(path, &s) < 0) {
return -errno;
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&fuse->global->lock);
node = acquire_or_create_child_locked(fuse, parent, name, actual_name);
if (!node) {
pthread_mutex_unlock(&fuse->global->lock);
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset(&out, 0, sizeof(out));
attr_from_stat(fuse, &out.attr, &s, node);
out.attr_valid = 10;
out.entry_valid = 10;
out.nodeid = node->nid;
out.generation = node->gen;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&fuse->global->lock);
fuse_reply(fuse, unique, &out, sizeof(out));
return NO_STATUS;
}
Commit Message: Fix overflow in path building
An incorrect size was causing an unsigned value
to wrap, causing it to write past the end of
the buffer.
Bug: 28085658
Change-Id: Ie9625c729cca024d514ba2880ff97209d435a165
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 160,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: terminate_cib(const char *caller, gboolean fast)
{
if (remote_fd > 0) {
close(remote_fd);
remote_fd = 0;
}
if (remote_tls_fd > 0) {
close(remote_tls_fd);
remote_tls_fd = 0;
}
if(!fast) {
crm_info("%s: Disconnecting from cluster infrastructure", caller);
crm_cluster_disconnect(&crm_cluster);
}
uninitializeCib();
crm_info("%s: Exiting%s...", caller, fast?" fast":mainloop?" from mainloop":"");
if(fast == FALSE && mainloop != NULL && g_main_is_running(mainloop)) {
g_main_quit(mainloop);
} else {
qb_ipcs_destroy(ipcs_ro);
qb_ipcs_destroy(ipcs_rw);
qb_ipcs_destroy(ipcs_shm);
if (fast) {
crm_exit(EX_USAGE);
} else {
crm_exit(EX_OK);
}
}
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetRenderWidgetHostWithPageFocus() {
WebContentsImpl* focused_web_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (focused_web_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
focused_web_contents->interstitial_page_->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
if (!GuestMode::IsCrossProcessFrameGuest(focused_web_contents) &&
focused_web_contents->browser_plugin_guest_) {
return focused_web_contents->GetOuterWebContents()
->GetMainFrame()
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
return focused_web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 144,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct task_struct *task_rcu_dereference(struct task_struct **ptask)
{
struct sighand_struct *sighand;
struct task_struct *task;
/*
* We need to verify that release_task() was not called and thus
* delayed_put_task_struct() can't run and drop the last reference
* before rcu_read_unlock(). We check task->sighand != NULL,
* but we can read the already freed and reused memory.
*/
retry:
task = rcu_dereference(*ptask);
if (!task)
return NULL;
probe_kernel_address(&task->sighand, sighand);
/*
* Pairs with atomic_dec_and_test() in put_task_struct(). If this task
* was already freed we can not miss the preceding update of this
* pointer.
*/
smp_rmb();
if (unlikely(task != READ_ONCE(*ptask)))
goto retry;
/*
* We've re-checked that "task == *ptask", now we have two different
* cases:
*
* 1. This is actually the same task/task_struct. In this case
* sighand != NULL tells us it is still alive.
*
* 2. This is another task which got the same memory for task_struct.
* We can't know this of course, and we can not trust
* sighand != NULL.
*
* In this case we actually return a random value, but this is
* correct.
*
* If we return NULL - we can pretend that we actually noticed that
* *ptask was updated when the previous task has exited. Or pretend
* that probe_slab_address(&sighand) reads NULL.
*
* If we return the new task (because sighand is not NULL for any
* reason) - this is fine too. This (new) task can't go away before
* another gp pass.
*
* And note: We could even eliminate the false positive if re-read
* task->sighand once again to avoid the falsely NULL. But this case
* is very unlikely so we don't care.
*/
if (!sighand)
return NULL;
return task;
}
Commit Message: fix infoleak in waitid(2)
kernel_waitid() can return a PID, an error or 0. rusage is filled in the first
case and waitid(2) rusage should've been copied out exactly in that case, *not*
whenever kernel_waitid() has not returned an error. Compat variant shares that
braino; none of kernel_wait4() callers do, so the below ought to fix it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Fixes: ce72a16fa705 ("wait4(2)/waitid(2): separate copying rusage to userland")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 60,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: handle_is_ok(int i, int type)
{
return i >= 0 && (u_int)i < num_handles && handles[i].use == type;
}
Commit Message: disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 60,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t n_tty_write(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file *file,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t nr)
{
const unsigned char *b = buf;
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
int c;
ssize_t retval = 0;
/* Job control check -- must be done at start (POSIX.1 7.1.1.4). */
if (L_TOSTOP(tty) && file->f_op->write != redirected_tty_write) {
retval = tty_check_change(tty);
if (retval)
return retval;
}
down_read(&tty->termios_rwsem);
/* Write out any echoed characters that are still pending */
process_echoes(tty);
add_wait_queue(&tty->write_wait, &wait);
while (1) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
if (tty_hung_up_p(file) || (tty->link && !tty->link->count)) {
retval = -EIO;
break;
}
if (O_OPOST(tty)) {
while (nr > 0) {
ssize_t num = process_output_block(tty, b, nr);
if (num < 0) {
if (num == -EAGAIN)
break;
retval = num;
goto break_out;
}
b += num;
nr -= num;
if (nr == 0)
break;
c = *b;
if (process_output(c, tty) < 0)
break;
b++; nr--;
}
if (tty->ops->flush_chars)
tty->ops->flush_chars(tty);
} else {
while (nr > 0) {
c = tty->ops->write(tty, b, nr);
if (c < 0) {
retval = c;
goto break_out;
}
if (!c)
break;
b += c;
nr -= c;
}
}
if (!nr)
break;
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
retval = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
up_read(&tty->termios_rwsem);
schedule();
down_read(&tty->termios_rwsem);
}
break_out:
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(&tty->write_wait, &wait);
if (b - buf != nr && tty->fasync)
set_bit(TTY_DO_WRITE_WAKEUP, &tty->flags);
up_read(&tty->termios_rwsem);
return (b - buf) ? b - buf : retval;
}
Commit Message: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 166,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebInputElement ConvertToWebInput(const WebFormControlElement& element) {
if (element.IsNull())
return WebInputElement();
const WebInputElement* input = ToWebInputElement(&element);
return input ? *input : WebInputElement();
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 137,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __btrfs_end_transaction(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root, int throttle)
{
struct btrfs_transaction *cur_trans = trans->transaction;
struct btrfs_fs_info *info = root->fs_info;
int count = 0;
int lock = (trans->type != TRANS_JOIN_NOLOCK);
int err = 0;
if (--trans->use_count) {
trans->block_rsv = trans->orig_rsv;
return 0;
}
/*
* do the qgroup accounting as early as possible
*/
err = btrfs_delayed_refs_qgroup_accounting(trans, info);
btrfs_trans_release_metadata(trans, root);
trans->block_rsv = NULL;
/*
* the same root has to be passed to start_transaction and
* end_transaction. Subvolume quota depends on this.
*/
WARN_ON(trans->root != root);
if (trans->qgroup_reserved) {
btrfs_qgroup_free(root, trans->qgroup_reserved);
trans->qgroup_reserved = 0;
}
if (!list_empty(&trans->new_bgs))
btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(trans, root);
while (count < 2) {
unsigned long cur = trans->delayed_ref_updates;
trans->delayed_ref_updates = 0;
if (cur &&
trans->transaction->delayed_refs.num_heads_ready > 64) {
trans->delayed_ref_updates = 0;
btrfs_run_delayed_refs(trans, root, cur);
} else {
break;
}
count++;
}
btrfs_trans_release_metadata(trans, root);
trans->block_rsv = NULL;
if (!list_empty(&trans->new_bgs))
btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(trans, root);
if (lock && !atomic_read(&root->fs_info->open_ioctl_trans) &&
should_end_transaction(trans, root)) {
trans->transaction->blocked = 1;
smp_wmb();
}
if (lock && cur_trans->blocked && !cur_trans->in_commit) {
if (throttle) {
/*
* We may race with somebody else here so end up having
* to call end_transaction on ourselves again, so inc
* our use_count.
*/
trans->use_count++;
return btrfs_commit_transaction(trans, root);
} else {
wake_up_process(info->transaction_kthread);
}
}
if (trans->type < TRANS_JOIN_NOLOCK)
sb_end_intwrite(root->fs_info->sb);
WARN_ON(cur_trans != info->running_transaction);
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&cur_trans->num_writers) < 1);
atomic_dec(&cur_trans->num_writers);
smp_mb();
if (waitqueue_active(&cur_trans->writer_wait))
wake_up(&cur_trans->writer_wait);
put_transaction(cur_trans);
if (current->journal_info == trans)
current->journal_info = NULL;
if (throttle)
btrfs_run_delayed_iputs(root);
if (trans->aborted ||
root->fs_info->fs_state & BTRFS_SUPER_FLAG_ERROR) {
err = -EIO;
}
assert_qgroups_uptodate(trans);
memset(trans, 0, sizeof(*trans));
kmem_cache_free(btrfs_trans_handle_cachep, trans);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void net_disable_timestamp(void)
{
#ifdef HAVE_JUMP_LABEL
int wanted;
while (1) {
wanted = atomic_read(&netstamp_wanted);
if (wanted <= 1)
break;
if (atomic_cmpxchg(&netstamp_wanted, wanted, wanted - 1) == wanted)
return;
}
atomic_dec(&netstamp_needed_deferred);
schedule_work(&netstamp_work);
#else
static_key_slow_dec(&netstamp_needed);
#endif
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int ZEND_FASTCALL _zend_handle_numeric_str_ex(const char *key, size_t length, zend_ulong *idx)
{
register const char *tmp = key;
const char *end = key + length;
if (*tmp == '-') {
tmp++;
}
if ((*tmp == '0' && length > 1) /* numbers with leading zeros */
|| (end - tmp > MAX_LENGTH_OF_LONG - 1) /* number too long */
|| (SIZEOF_ZEND_LONG == 4 &&
end - tmp == MAX_LENGTH_OF_LONG - 1 &&
*tmp > '2')) { /* overflow */
return 0;
}
*idx = (*tmp - '0');
while (1) {
++tmp;
if (tmp == end) {
if (*key == '-') {
if (*idx-1 > ZEND_LONG_MAX) { /* overflow */
return 0;
}
*idx = 0 - *idx;
} else if (*idx > ZEND_LONG_MAX) { /* overflow */
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
if (*tmp <= '9' && *tmp >= '0') {
*idx = (*idx * 10) + (*tmp - '0');
} else {
return 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 69,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FT_Set_Renderer( FT_Library library,
FT_Renderer renderer,
FT_UInt num_params,
FT_Parameter* parameters )
{
FT_ListNode node;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
if ( !library )
return FT_Err_Invalid_Library_Handle;
if ( !renderer )
return FT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
node = FT_List_Find( &library->renderers, renderer );
if ( !node )
{
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
goto Exit;
}
FT_List_Up( &library->renderers, node );
if ( renderer->glyph_format == FT_GLYPH_FORMAT_OUTLINE )
library->cur_renderer = renderer;
if ( num_params > 0 )
{
FT_Renderer_SetModeFunc set_mode = renderer->clazz->set_mode;
for ( ; num_params > 0; num_params-- )
{
error = set_mode( renderer, parameters->tag, parameters->data );
if ( error )
break;
}
}
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ImapData *imap_conn_find(const struct Account *account, int flags)
{
struct Connection *conn = NULL;
struct Account *creds = NULL;
struct ImapData *idata = NULL;
bool new = false;
while ((conn = mutt_conn_find(conn, account)))
{
if (!creds)
creds = &conn->account;
else
memcpy(&conn->account, creds, sizeof(struct Account));
idata = conn->data;
if (flags & MUTT_IMAP_CONN_NONEW)
{
if (!idata)
{
/* This should only happen if we've come to the end of the list */
mutt_socket_free(conn);
return NULL;
}
else if (idata->state < IMAP_AUTHENTICATED)
continue;
}
if (flags & MUTT_IMAP_CONN_NOSELECT && idata && idata->state >= IMAP_SELECTED)
continue;
if (idata && idata->status == IMAP_FATAL)
continue;
break;
}
if (!conn)
return NULL; /* this happens when the initial connection fails */
if (!idata)
{
/* The current connection is a new connection */
idata = imap_new_idata();
if (!idata)
{
mutt_socket_free(conn);
return NULL;
}
conn->data = idata;
idata->conn = conn;
new = true;
}
if (idata->state == IMAP_DISCONNECTED)
imap_open_connection(idata);
if (idata->state == IMAP_CONNECTED)
{
if (imap_authenticate(idata) == IMAP_AUTH_SUCCESS)
{
idata->state = IMAP_AUTHENTICATED;
FREE(&idata->capstr);
new = true;
if (idata->conn->ssf)
mutt_debug(2, "Communication encrypted at %d bits\n", idata->conn->ssf);
}
else
mutt_account_unsetpass(&idata->conn->account);
}
if (new && idata->state == IMAP_AUTHENTICATED)
{
/* capabilities may have changed */
imap_exec(idata, "CAPABILITY", IMAP_CMD_QUEUE);
/* enable RFC6855, if the server supports that */
if (mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, ENABLE))
imap_exec(idata, "ENABLE UTF8=ACCEPT", IMAP_CMD_QUEUE);
/* get root delimiter, '/' as default */
idata->delim = '/';
imap_exec(idata, "LIST \"\" \"\"", IMAP_CMD_QUEUE);
/* we may need the root delimiter before we open a mailbox */
imap_exec(idata, NULL, IMAP_CMD_FAIL_OK);
}
return idata;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 79,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResizingVideoSource() {
SetSize(kInitialWidth, kInitialHeight);
limit_ = 60;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct in6_addr *extract_addr(struct nlattr *addr, struct nlattr *local,
struct in6_addr **peer_pfx)
{
struct in6_addr *pfx = NULL;
*peer_pfx = NULL;
if (addr)
pfx = nla_data(addr);
if (local) {
if (pfx && nla_memcmp(local, pfx, sizeof(*pfx)))
*peer_pfx = pfx;
pfx = nla_data(local);
}
return pfx;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cryptd_hash_final(struct crypto_async_request *req_async, int err)
{
struct ahash_request *req = ahash_request_cast(req_async);
struct cryptd_hash_request_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
if (unlikely(err == -EINPROGRESS))
goto out;
err = crypto_shash_final(&rctx->desc, req->result);
req->base.complete = rctx->complete;
out:
local_bh_disable();
rctx->complete(&req->base, err);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,664 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool vif_event_equals(struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif_event *event,
u8 action)
{
u8 evt_action;
spin_lock(&event->vif_event_lock);
evt_action = event->action;
spin_unlock(&event->vif_event_lock);
return evt_action == action;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::cream_ping(const char * service)
{
static const char* command = "CREAM_PING";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!service) service=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
int x = sprintf(reqline,"%s",escapeGahpString(service));
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,normal_proxy,high_prio);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
int rc = 0;
if (result->argc < 2 || result->argc > 3) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
if (strcmp(result->argv[1], NULLSTRING) == 0) {
if ( strcasecmp( result->argv[2], "true" ) ) {
rc = 0;
} else {
rc = 1;
error_string = "";
}
} else {
rc = 1;
error_string = result->argv[1];
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fanout_add(struct sock *sk, u16 id, u16 type_flags)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_fanout *f, *match;
u8 type = type_flags & 0xff;
u8 flags = type_flags >> 8;
int err;
switch (type) {
case PACKET_FANOUT_ROLLOVER:
if (type_flags & PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_ROLLOVER)
return -EINVAL;
case PACKET_FANOUT_HASH:
case PACKET_FANOUT_LB:
case PACKET_FANOUT_CPU:
case PACKET_FANOUT_RND:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!po->running)
return -EINVAL;
if (po->fanout)
return -EALREADY;
mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
match = NULL;
list_for_each_entry(f, &fanout_list, list) {
if (f->id == id &&
read_pnet(&f->net) == sock_net(sk)) {
match = f;
break;
}
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (match && match->flags != flags)
goto out;
if (!match) {
err = -ENOMEM;
match = kzalloc(sizeof(*match), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!match)
goto out;
write_pnet(&match->net, sock_net(sk));
match->id = id;
match->type = type;
match->flags = flags;
atomic_set(&match->rr_cur, 0);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&match->list);
spin_lock_init(&match->lock);
atomic_set(&match->sk_ref, 0);
match->prot_hook.type = po->prot_hook.type;
match->prot_hook.dev = po->prot_hook.dev;
match->prot_hook.func = packet_rcv_fanout;
match->prot_hook.af_packet_priv = match;
match->prot_hook.id_match = match_fanout_group;
dev_add_pack(&match->prot_hook);
list_add(&match->list, &fanout_list);
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (match->type == type &&
match->prot_hook.type == po->prot_hook.type &&
match->prot_hook.dev == po->prot_hook.dev) {
err = -ENOSPC;
if (atomic_read(&match->sk_ref) < PACKET_FANOUT_MAX) {
__dev_remove_pack(&po->prot_hook);
po->fanout = match;
atomic_inc(&match->sk_ref);
__fanout_link(sk, po);
err = 0;
}
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::SendJsonRequest(const DispatchCallback& callback,
const std::string& browser_id,
const std::string& url) {
if (!android_bridge_) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
android_bridge_->SendJsonRequest(browser_id, url,
base::Bind(&DevToolsUIBindings::JsonReceived,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
callback));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 138,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_inode_set_cowblocks_tag(
xfs_inode_t *ip)
{
trace_xfs_inode_set_cowblocks_tag(ip);
return __xfs_inode_set_blocks_tag(ip, xfs_queue_cowblocks,
trace_xfs_perag_set_cowblocks,
XFS_ICI_COWBLOCKS_TAG);
}
Commit Message: xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 79,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ospf6_print_lsaprefix(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *tptr, u_int lsa_length)
{
const struct lsa6_prefix *lsapp = (const struct lsa6_prefix *)tptr;
u_int wordlen;
struct in6_addr prefix;
if (lsa_length < sizeof (*lsapp) - IPV6_ADDR_LEN_BYTES)
goto trunc;
lsa_length -= sizeof (*lsapp) - IPV6_ADDR_LEN_BYTES;
ND_TCHECK2(*lsapp, sizeof (*lsapp) - IPV6_ADDR_LEN_BYTES);
wordlen = (lsapp->lsa_p_len + 31) / 32;
if (wordlen * 4 > sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " bogus prefixlen /%d", lsapp->lsa_p_len));
goto trunc;
}
if (lsa_length < wordlen * 4)
goto trunc;
lsa_length -= wordlen * 4;
ND_TCHECK2(lsapp->lsa_p_prefix, wordlen * 4);
memset(&prefix, 0, sizeof(prefix));
memcpy(&prefix, lsapp->lsa_p_prefix, wordlen * 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t%s/%d", ip6addr_string(ndo, &prefix),
lsapp->lsa_p_len));
if (lsapp->lsa_p_opt) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Options [%s]",
bittok2str(ospf6_lsa_prefix_option_values,
"none", lsapp->lsa_p_opt)));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", metric %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&lsapp->lsa_p_metric)));
return sizeof(*lsapp) - IPV6_ADDR_LEN_BYTES + wordlen * 4;
trunc:
return -1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13036/OSPFv3: Add a bounds check before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::wstring GetChromeInstallSubDirectory() {
std::wstring result;
AppendChromeInstallSubDirectory(InstallDetails::Get().mode(),
true /* include_suffix */, &result);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Ignore switches following "--" when parsing a command line.
BUG=933004
R=wfh@chromium.org
Change-Id: I911be4cbfc38a4d41dec85d85f7fe0f50ddca392
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481210
Auto-Submit: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634604}
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 152,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long FS_ReadFileDir(const char *qpath, void *searchPath, qboolean unpure, void **buffer)
{
fileHandle_t h;
searchpath_t *search;
byte* buf;
qboolean isConfig;
long len;
if ( !fs_searchpaths ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization" );
}
if ( !qpath || !qpath[0] ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "FS_ReadFile with empty name" );
}
buf = NULL; // quiet compiler warning
if ( strstr( qpath, ".cfg" ) ) {
isConfig = qtrue;
if ( com_journal && com_journal->integer == 2 ) {
int r;
Com_DPrintf( "Loading %s from journal file.\n", qpath );
r = FS_Read( &len, sizeof( len ), com_journalDataFile );
if ( r != sizeof( len ) ) {
if ( buffer != NULL ) {
*buffer = NULL;
}
return -1;
}
if ( !len ) {
if ( buffer == NULL ) {
return 1; // hack for old journal files
}
*buffer = NULL;
return -1;
}
if ( buffer == NULL ) {
return len;
}
buf = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory( len + 1 );
*buffer = buf;
r = FS_Read( buf, len, com_journalDataFile );
if ( r != len ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Read from journalDataFile failed" );
}
fs_loadCount++;
fs_loadStack++;
buf[len] = 0;
return len;
}
} else {
isConfig = qfalse;
}
search = searchPath;
if(search == NULL)
{
len = FS_FOpenFileRead(qpath, &h, qfalse);
}
else
{
len = FS_FOpenFileReadDir(qpath, search, &h, qfalse, unpure);
}
if ( h == 0 ) {
if ( buffer ) {
*buffer = NULL;
}
if ( isConfig && com_journal && com_journal->integer == 1 ) {
Com_DPrintf( "Writing zero for %s to journal file.\n", qpath );
len = 0;
FS_Write( &len, sizeof( len ), com_journalDataFile );
FS_Flush( com_journalDataFile );
}
return -1;
}
if ( !buffer ) {
if ( isConfig && com_journal && com_journal->integer == 1 ) {
Com_DPrintf( "Writing len for %s to journal file.\n", qpath );
FS_Write( &len, sizeof( len ), com_journalDataFile );
FS_Flush( com_journalDataFile );
}
FS_FCloseFile( h );
return len;
}
fs_loadCount++;
fs_loadStack++;
buf = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory( len + 1 );
*buffer = buf;
FS_Read( buf, len, h );
buf[len] = 0;
FS_FCloseFile( h );
if ( isConfig && com_journal && com_journal->integer == 1 ) {
Com_DPrintf( "Writing %s to journal file.\n", qpath );
FS_Write( &len, sizeof( len ), com_journalDataFile );
FS_Write( buf, len, com_journalDataFile );
FS_Flush( com_journalDataFile );
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void addrconf_join_anycast(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp)
{
struct in6_addr addr;
if (ifp->prefix_len >= 127) /* RFC 6164 */
return;
ipv6_addr_prefix(&addr, &ifp->addr, ifp->prefix_len);
if (ipv6_addr_any(&addr))
return;
__ipv6_dev_ac_inc(ifp->idev, &addr);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ProfileSyncService::IsEncryptedDatatypeEnabled() const {
if (encryption_pending())
return true;
const syncable::ModelTypeSet preferred_types = GetPreferredDataTypes();
const syncable::ModelTypeSet encrypted_types = GetEncryptedDataTypes();
DCHECK(encrypted_types.Has(syncable::PASSWORDS));
return !Intersection(preferred_types, encrypted_types).Empty();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PSIR_FileWriter::ParseFileResources ( XMP_IO* fileRef, XMP_Uns32 length )
{
static const size_t kMinPSIRSize = 12; // 4+2+1+1+4
this->DeleteExistingInfo();
this->fileParsed = true;
if ( length == 0 ) return;
XMP_Int64 psirOrigin = fileRef->Offset(); // Need this to determine the resource data offsets.
XMP_Int64 fileEnd = psirOrigin + length;
char nameBuffer [260]; // The name is a PString, at 1+255+1 including length and pad.
while ( fileRef->Offset() < fileEnd ) {
if ( ! XIO::CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, kMinPSIRSize ) ) break; // Bad image resource.
XMP_Int64 thisRsrcPos = fileRef->Offset();
XMP_Uns32 type = XIO::ReadUns32_BE ( fileRef );
XMP_Uns16 id = XIO::ReadUns16_BE ( fileRef );
XMP_Uns8 nameLen = XIO::ReadUns8 ( fileRef ); // ! The length for the Pascal string.
XMP_Uns16 paddedLen = (nameLen + 2) & 0xFFFE; // ! Round up to an even total. Yes, +2!
if ( ! XIO::CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, paddedLen+4 ) ) break; // Bad image resource.
nameBuffer[0] = nameLen;
fileRef->ReadAll ( &nameBuffer[1], paddedLen-1 ); // Include the pad byte, present for zero nameLen.
XMP_Uns32 dataLen = XIO::ReadUns32_BE ( fileRef );
XMP_Uns32 dataTotal = ((dataLen + 1) & 0xFFFFFFFEUL); // Round up to an even total.
if ( ! XIO::CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, dataTotal ) ) break; // Bad image resource.
XMP_Int64 thisDataPos = fileRef->Offset();
continue;
}
InternalRsrcInfo newInfo ( id, dataLen, kIsFileBased );
InternalRsrcMap::iterator rsrcPos = this->imgRsrcs.find ( id );
if ( rsrcPos == this->imgRsrcs.end() ) {
rsrcPos = this->imgRsrcs.insert ( rsrcPos, InternalRsrcMap::value_type ( id, newInfo ) );
} else if ( (rsrcPos->second.dataLen == 0) && (newInfo.dataLen != 0) ) {
rsrcPos->second = newInfo;
} else {
fileRef->Seek ( nextRsrcPos, kXMP_SeekFromStart );
continue;
}
InternalRsrcInfo* rsrcPtr = &rsrcPos->second;
rsrcPtr->origOffset = (XMP_Uns32)thisDataPos;
if ( nameLen > 0 ) {
rsrcPtr->rsrcName = (XMP_Uns8*) malloc ( paddedLen );
if ( rsrcPtr->rsrcName == 0 ) XMP_Throw ( "Out of memory", kXMPErr_NoMemory );
memcpy ( (void*)rsrcPtr->rsrcName, nameBuffer, paddedLen ); // AUDIT: Safe, allocated enough bytes above.
}
if ( ! IsMetadataImgRsrc ( id ) ) {
fileRef->Seek ( nextRsrcPos, kXMP_SeekFromStart );
continue;
}
rsrcPtr->dataPtr = malloc ( dataTotal ); // ! Allocate after the IsMetadataImgRsrc check.
if ( rsrcPtr->dataPtr == 0 ) XMP_Throw ( "Out of memory", kXMPErr_NoMemory );
fileRef->ReadAll ( (void*)rsrcPtr->dataPtr, dataTotal );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 164,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_io_cb (engine_gpgsm_t gpgsm, iocb_data_t *iocbd, gpgme_io_cb_t handler)
{
gpgme_error_t err;
TRACE_BEG2 (DEBUG_ENGINE, "engine-gpgsm:add_io_cb", gpgsm,
"fd %d, dir %d", iocbd->fd, iocbd->dir);
err = (*gpgsm->io_cbs.add) (gpgsm->io_cbs.add_priv,
iocbd->fd, iocbd->dir,
handler, iocbd->data, &iocbd->tag);
if (err)
return TRACE_ERR (err);
if (!iocbd->dir)
/* FIXME Kludge around poll() problem. */
err = _gpgme_io_set_nonblocking (iocbd->fd);
return TRACE_ERR (err);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::NeedsLayoutTreeUpdate() const {
if (!IsActive() || !View())
return false;
if (NeedsFullLayoutTreeUpdate())
return true;
if (ChildNeedsStyleRecalc())
return true;
if (ChildNeedsStyleInvalidation())
return true;
if (ChildNeedsReattachLayoutTree()) {
DCHECK(InStyleRecalc());
return true;
}
if (GetLayoutView() && GetLayoutView()->WasNotifiedOfSubtreeChange())
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool EnabledDelete(LocalFrame& frame,
Event* event,
EditorCommandSource source) {
switch (source) {
case kCommandFromMenuOrKeyBinding:
return frame.Selection().SelectionHasFocus() &&
frame.GetEditor().CanDelete();
case kCommandFromDOM:
return EnabledInEditableText(frame, event, source);
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
{
return kvm_x86_ops->get_msr(vcpu, msr);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int shmem_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{
int error;
if ((error = shmem_mknod(dir, dentry, mode | S_IFDIR, 0)))
return error;
inc_nlink(dir);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
libettercap_init();
ef_globals_alloc();
select_text_interface();
libettercap_ui_init();
/* etterfilter copyright */
fprintf(stdout, "\n" EC_COLOR_BOLD "%s %s" EC_COLOR_END " copyright %s %s\n\n",
PROGRAM, EC_VERSION, EC_COPYRIGHT, EC_AUTHORS);
/* initialize the line number */
EF_GBL->lineno = 1;
/* getopt related parsing... */
parse_options(argc, argv);
/* set the input for source file */
if (EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file) {
yyin = fopen(EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file, "r");
if (yyin == NULL)
FATAL_ERROR("Input file not found !");
} else {
FATAL_ERROR("No source file.");
}
/* no buffering */
setbuf(yyin, NULL);
setbuf(stdout, NULL);
setbuf(stderr, NULL);
/* load the tables in etterfilter.tbl */
load_tables();
/* load the constants in etterfilter.cnt */
load_constants();
/* print the message */
fprintf(stdout, "\n Parsing source file \'%s\' ", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file);
fflush(stdout);
ef_debug(1, "\n");
/* begin the parsing */
if (yyparse() == 0)
fprintf(stdout, " done.\n\n");
else
fprintf(stdout, "\n\nThe script contains errors...\n\n");
/* write to file */
if (write_output() != E_SUCCESS)
FATAL_ERROR("Cannot write output file (%s)", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
ef_globals_free();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 168,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gx_set_pattern_procs_trans(gx_device_color *pdevc)
{
pdevc->type = &gx_dc_pattern_trans;
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 1,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ide_cmd_done(IDEState *s)
{
if (s->bus->dma->ops->cmd_done) {
s->bus->dma->ops->cmd_done(s->bus->dma);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SavePackage::CheckFinish() {
if (in_process_count() || finished_)
return;
FilePath dir = (save_type_ == SAVE_PAGE_TYPE_AS_COMPLETE_HTML &&
saved_success_items_.size() > 1) ?
saved_main_directory_path_ : FilePath();
FinalNameList final_names;
for (SavedItemMap::iterator it = saved_success_items_.begin();
it != saved_success_items_.end(); ++it)
final_names.push_back(std::make_pair(it->first,
it->second->full_path()));
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SaveFileManager::RenameAllFiles,
file_manager_,
final_names,
dir,
web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost()->GetID(),
web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetRoutingID(),
id()));
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int in_gate_area_no_mm(unsigned long addr)
{
#ifdef AT_SYSINFO_EHDR
if ((addr >= FIXADDR_USER_START) && (addr < FIXADDR_USER_END))
return 1;
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bnep_ctrl_set_mcfilter(struct bnep_session *s, u8 *data, int len)
{
int n;
if (len < 2)
return -EILSEQ;
n = get_unaligned_be16(data);
data += 2;
len -= 2;
if (len < n)
return -EILSEQ;
BT_DBG("filter len %d", n);
#ifdef CONFIG_BT_BNEP_MC_FILTER
n /= (ETH_ALEN * 2);
if (n > 0) {
int i;
s->mc_filter = 0;
/* Always send broadcast */
set_bit(bnep_mc_hash(s->dev->broadcast), (ulong *) &s->mc_filter);
/* Add address ranges to the multicast hash */
for (; n > 0; n--) {
u8 a1[6], *a2;
memcpy(a1, data, ETH_ALEN);
data += ETH_ALEN;
a2 = data;
data += ETH_ALEN;
BT_DBG("mc filter %pMR -> %pMR", a1, a2);
/* Iterate from a1 to a2 */
set_bit(bnep_mc_hash(a1), (ulong *) &s->mc_filter);
while (memcmp(a1, a2, 6) < 0 && s->mc_filter != ~0LL) {
/* Increment a1 */
i = 5;
while (i >= 0 && ++a1[i--] == 0)
;
set_bit(bnep_mc_hash(a1), (ulong *) &s->mc_filter);
}
}
}
BT_DBG("mc filter hash 0x%llx", s->mc_filter);
bnep_send_rsp(s, BNEP_FILTER_MULTI_ADDR_RSP, BNEP_SUCCESS);
#else
bnep_send_rsp(s, BNEP_FILTER_MULTI_ADDR_RSP, BNEP_FILTER_UNSUPPORTED_REQ);
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: bnep: bnep_add_connection() should verify that it's dealing with l2cap socket
same story as cmtp
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CameraSource::releaseRecordingFrame(const sp<IMemory>& frame) {
ALOGV("releaseRecordingFrame");
if (mCameraRecordingProxy != NULL) {
mCameraRecordingProxy->releaseRecordingFrame(frame);
} else if (mCamera != NULL) {
int64_t token = IPCThreadState::self()->clearCallingIdentity();
mCamera->releaseRecordingFrame(frame);
IPCThreadState::self()->restoreCallingIdentity(token);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::OpenInNewTab(const std::string& url) {
delegate_->OpenInNewTab(url);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 138,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pixHtmlViewer(const char *dirin,
const char *dirout,
const char *rootname,
l_int32 thumbwidth,
l_int32 viewwidth)
{
char *fname, *fullname, *outname;
char *mainname, *linkname, *linknameshort;
char *viewfile, *thumbfile;
char *shtml, *slink;
char charbuf[512];
char htmlstring[] = "<html>";
char framestring[] = "</frameset></html>";
l_int32 i, nfiles, index, w, d, nimages, ret;
l_float32 factor;
PIX *pix, *pixthumb, *pixview;
SARRAY *safiles, *sathumbs, *saviews, *sahtml, *salink;
PROCNAME("pixHtmlViewer");
if (!dirin)
return ERROR_INT("dirin not defined", procName, 1);
if (!dirout)
return ERROR_INT("dirout not defined", procName, 1);
if (!rootname)
return ERROR_INT("rootname not defined", procName, 1);
if (thumbwidth == 0)
thumbwidth = DEFAULT_THUMB_WIDTH;
if (thumbwidth < MIN_THUMB_WIDTH) {
L_WARNING("thumbwidth too small; using min value\n", procName);
thumbwidth = MIN_THUMB_WIDTH;
}
if (viewwidth == 0)
viewwidth = DEFAULT_VIEW_WIDTH;
if (viewwidth < MIN_VIEW_WIDTH) {
L_WARNING("viewwidth too small; using min value\n", procName);
viewwidth = MIN_VIEW_WIDTH;
}
/* Make the output directory if it doesn't already exist */
#ifndef _WIN32
snprintf(charbuf, sizeof(charbuf), "mkdir -p %s", dirout);
ret = system(charbuf);
#else
ret = CreateDirectory(dirout, NULL) ? 0 : 1;
#endif /* !_WIN32 */
if (ret) {
L_ERROR("output directory %s not made\n", procName, dirout);
return 1;
}
/* Capture the filenames in the input directory */
if ((safiles = getFilenamesInDirectory(dirin)) == NULL)
return ERROR_INT("safiles not made", procName, 1);
/* Generate output text file names */
sprintf(charbuf, "%s/%s.html", dirout, rootname);
mainname = stringNew(charbuf);
sprintf(charbuf, "%s/%s-links.html", dirout, rootname);
linkname = stringNew(charbuf);
linknameshort = stringJoin(rootname, "-links.html");
/* Generate the thumbs and views */
sathumbs = sarrayCreate(0);
saviews = sarrayCreate(0);
nfiles = sarrayGetCount(safiles);
index = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nfiles; i++) {
fname = sarrayGetString(safiles, i, L_NOCOPY);
fullname = genPathname(dirin, fname);
fprintf(stderr, "name: %s\n", fullname);
if ((pix = pixRead(fullname)) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "file %s not a readable image\n", fullname);
lept_free(fullname);
continue;
}
lept_free(fullname);
/* Make and store the thumbnail images */
pixGetDimensions(pix, &w, NULL, &d);
factor = (l_float32)thumbwidth / (l_float32)w;
pixthumb = pixScale(pix, factor, factor);
sprintf(charbuf, "%s_thumb_%03d", rootname, index);
sarrayAddString(sathumbs, charbuf, L_COPY);
outname = genPathname(dirout, charbuf);
WriteFormattedPix(outname, pixthumb);
lept_free(outname);
pixDestroy(&pixthumb);
/* Make and store the view images */
factor = (l_float32)viewwidth / (l_float32)w;
if (factor >= 1.0)
pixview = pixClone(pix); /* no upscaling */
else
pixview = pixScale(pix, factor, factor);
snprintf(charbuf, sizeof(charbuf), "%s_view_%03d", rootname, index);
sarrayAddString(saviews, charbuf, L_COPY);
outname = genPathname(dirout, charbuf);
WriteFormattedPix(outname, pixview);
lept_free(outname);
pixDestroy(&pixview);
pixDestroy(&pix);
index++;
}
/* Generate the main html file */
sahtml = sarrayCreate(0);
sarrayAddString(sahtml, htmlstring, L_COPY);
sprintf(charbuf, "<frameset cols=\"%d, *\">", thumbwidth + 30);
sarrayAddString(sahtml, charbuf, L_COPY);
sprintf(charbuf, "<frame name=\"thumbs\" src=\"%s\">", linknameshort);
sarrayAddString(sahtml, charbuf, L_COPY);
sprintf(charbuf, "<frame name=\"views\" src=\"%s\">",
sarrayGetString(saviews, 0, L_NOCOPY));
sarrayAddString(sahtml, charbuf, L_COPY);
sarrayAddString(sahtml, framestring, L_COPY);
shtml = sarrayToString(sahtml, 1);
l_binaryWrite(mainname, "w", shtml, strlen(shtml));
fprintf(stderr, "******************************************\n"
"Writing html file: %s\n"
"******************************************\n", mainname);
lept_free(shtml);
lept_free(mainname);
/* Generate the link html file */
nimages = sarrayGetCount(saviews);
fprintf(stderr, "num. images = %d\n", nimages);
salink = sarrayCreate(0);
for (i = 0; i < nimages; i++) {
viewfile = sarrayGetString(saviews, i, L_NOCOPY);
thumbfile = sarrayGetString(sathumbs, i, L_NOCOPY);
sprintf(charbuf, "<a href=\"%s\" TARGET=views><img src=\"%s\"></a>",
viewfile, thumbfile);
sarrayAddString(salink, charbuf, L_COPY);
}
slink = sarrayToString(salink, 1);
l_binaryWrite(linkname, "w", slink, strlen(slink));
lept_free(slink);
lept_free(linkname);
lept_free(linknameshort);
sarrayDestroy(&safiles);
sarrayDestroy(&sathumbs);
sarrayDestroy(&saviews);
sarrayDestroy(&sahtml);
sarrayDestroy(&salink);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: prog/htmlviewer: Catch unbound memory access (CID 1386222)
rootname can have any size, so limit the amount of copied bytes.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aspath_filter_exclude (struct aspath * source, struct aspath * exclude_list)
{
struct assegment * srcseg, * exclseg, * lastseg;
struct aspath * newpath;
newpath = aspath_new();
lastseg = NULL;
for (srcseg = source->segments; srcseg; srcseg = srcseg->next)
{
unsigned i, y, newlen = 0, done = 0, skip_as;
struct assegment * newseg;
/* Find out, how much ASns are we going to pick from this segment.
* We can't perform filtering right inline, because the size of
* the new segment isn't known at the moment yet.
*/
for (i = 0; i < srcseg->length; i++)
{
skip_as = 0;
for (exclseg = exclude_list->segments; exclseg && !skip_as; exclseg = exclseg->next)
for (y = 0; y < exclseg->length; y++)
if (srcseg->as[i] == exclseg->as[y])
{
skip_as = 1;
break;
}
if (!skip_as)
newlen++;
}
/* newlen is now the number of ASns to copy */
if (!newlen)
continue;
/* Actual copying. Allocate memory and iterate once more, performing filtering. */
newseg = assegment_new (srcseg->type, newlen);
for (i = 0; i < srcseg->length; i++)
{
skip_as = 0;
for (exclseg = exclude_list->segments; exclseg && !skip_as; exclseg = exclseg->next)
for (y = 0; y < exclseg->length; y++)
if (srcseg->as[i] == exclseg->as[y])
{
skip_as = 1;
break;
}
if (skip_as)
continue;
newseg->as[done++] = srcseg->as[i];
}
/* At his point newlen must be equal to done, and both must be positive. Append
* the filtered segment to the gross result. */
if (!lastseg)
newpath->segments = newseg;
else
lastseg->next = newseg;
lastseg = newseg;
}
aspath_str_update (newpath);
/* We are happy returning even an empty AS_PATH, because the administrator
* might expect this very behaviour. There's a mean to avoid this, if necessary,
* by having a match rule against certain AS_PATH regexps in the route-map index.
*/
aspath_free (source);
return newpath;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_exponent (void *arg, gcry_mpi_t a)
{
gcry_mpi_t e = arg;
gcry_mpi_t tmp;
int result;
mpi_sub_ui (a, a, 1);
tmp = _gcry_mpi_alloc_like (a);
result = !mpi_gcd(tmp, e, a); /* GCD is not 1. */
_gcry_mpi_release (tmp);
mpi_add_ui (a, a, 1);
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 17,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void resume (lua_State *L, void *ud) {
StkId firstArg = cast(StkId, ud);
CallInfo *ci = L->ci;
if (L->status == 0) { /* start coroutine? */
lua_assert(ci == L->base_ci && firstArg > L->base);
if (luaD_precall(L, firstArg - 1, LUA_MULTRET) != PCRLUA)
return;
}
else { /* resuming from previous yield */
lua_assert(L->status == LUA_YIELD);
L->status = 0;
if (!f_isLua(ci)) { /* `common' yield? */
/* finish interrupted execution of `OP_CALL' */
lua_assert(GET_OPCODE(*((ci-1)->savedpc - 1)) == OP_CALL ||
GET_OPCODE(*((ci-1)->savedpc - 1)) == OP_TAILCALL);
if (luaD_poscall(L, firstArg)) /* complete it... */
L->top = L->ci->top; /* and correct top if not multiple results */
}
else /* yielded inside a hook: just continue its execution */
L->base = L->ci->base;
}
luaV_execute(L, cast_int(L->ci - L->base_ci));
}
Commit Message: disable loading lua bytecode
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 43,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(curl_exec)
{
CURLcode error;
zval *zid;
php_curl *ch;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r", &zid) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((ch = (php_curl*)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(zid), le_curl_name, le_curl)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
_php_curl_verify_handlers(ch, 1);
_php_curl_cleanup_handle(ch);
error = curl_easy_perform(ch->cp);
SAVE_CURL_ERROR(ch, error);
/* CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE is returned by HEAD requests */
if (error != CURLE_OK && error != CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE) {
smart_str_free(&ch->handlers->write->buf);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!Z_ISUNDEF(ch->handlers->std_err)) {
php_stream *stream;
stream = (php_stream*)zend_fetch_resource2_ex(&ch->handlers->std_err, NULL, php_file_le_stream(), php_file_le_pstream());
if (stream) {
php_stream_flush(stream);
}
}
if (ch->handlers->write->method == PHP_CURL_RETURN && ch->handlers->write->buf.s) {
smart_str_0(&ch->handlers->write->buf);
RETURN_STR_COPY(ch->handlers->write->buf.s);
}
/* flush the file handle, so any remaining data is synched to disk */
if (ch->handlers->write->method == PHP_CURL_FILE && ch->handlers->write->fp) {
fflush(ch->handlers->write->fp);
}
if (ch->handlers->write_header->method == PHP_CURL_FILE && ch->handlers->write_header->fp) {
fflush(ch->handlers->write_header->fp);
}
if (ch->handlers->write->method == PHP_CURL_RETURN) {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
} else {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72674 - check both curl_escape and curl_unescape
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_get_mmx_flagmask (int flag_select, int *compilerID)
{
/* Obsolete, to be removed from libpng-1.4.0 */
PNG_UNUSED(flag_select)
*compilerID = -1; /* unknown (i.e., no asm/MMX code compiled) */
return 0L;
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ll_find_deltas(struct object_entry **list, unsigned list_size,
int window, int depth, unsigned *processed)
{
struct thread_params *p;
int i, ret, active_threads = 0;
init_threaded_search();
if (delta_search_threads <= 1) {
find_deltas(list, &list_size, window, depth, processed);
cleanup_threaded_search();
return;
}
if (progress > pack_to_stdout)
fprintf(stderr, "Delta compression using up to %d threads.\n",
delta_search_threads);
p = xcalloc(delta_search_threads, sizeof(*p));
/* Partition the work amongst work threads. */
for (i = 0; i < delta_search_threads; i++) {
unsigned sub_size = list_size / (delta_search_threads - i);
/* don't use too small segments or no deltas will be found */
if (sub_size < 2*window && i+1 < delta_search_threads)
sub_size = 0;
p[i].window = window;
p[i].depth = depth;
p[i].processed = processed;
p[i].working = 1;
p[i].data_ready = 0;
/* try to split chunks on "path" boundaries */
while (sub_size && sub_size < list_size &&
list[sub_size]->hash &&
list[sub_size]->hash == list[sub_size-1]->hash)
sub_size++;
p[i].list = list;
p[i].list_size = sub_size;
p[i].remaining = sub_size;
list += sub_size;
list_size -= sub_size;
}
/* Start work threads. */
for (i = 0; i < delta_search_threads; i++) {
if (!p[i].list_size)
continue;
pthread_mutex_init(&p[i].mutex, NULL);
pthread_cond_init(&p[i].cond, NULL);
ret = pthread_create(&p[i].thread, NULL,
threaded_find_deltas, &p[i]);
if (ret)
die("unable to create thread: %s", strerror(ret));
active_threads++;
}
/*
* Now let's wait for work completion. Each time a thread is done
* with its work, we steal half of the remaining work from the
* thread with the largest number of unprocessed objects and give
* it to that newly idle thread. This ensure good load balancing
* until the remaining object list segments are simply too short
* to be worth splitting anymore.
*/
while (active_threads) {
struct thread_params *target = NULL;
struct thread_params *victim = NULL;
unsigned sub_size = 0;
progress_lock();
for (;;) {
for (i = 0; !target && i < delta_search_threads; i++)
if (!p[i].working)
target = &p[i];
if (target)
break;
pthread_cond_wait(&progress_cond, &progress_mutex);
}
for (i = 0; i < delta_search_threads; i++)
if (p[i].remaining > 2*window &&
(!victim || victim->remaining < p[i].remaining))
victim = &p[i];
if (victim) {
sub_size = victim->remaining / 2;
list = victim->list + victim->list_size - sub_size;
while (sub_size && list[0]->hash &&
list[0]->hash == list[-1]->hash) {
list++;
sub_size--;
}
if (!sub_size) {
/*
* It is possible for some "paths" to have
* so many objects that no hash boundary
* might be found. Let's just steal the
* exact half in that case.
*/
sub_size = victim->remaining / 2;
list -= sub_size;
}
target->list = list;
victim->list_size -= sub_size;
victim->remaining -= sub_size;
}
target->list_size = sub_size;
target->remaining = sub_size;
target->working = 1;
progress_unlock();
pthread_mutex_lock(&target->mutex);
target->data_ready = 1;
pthread_cond_signal(&target->cond);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&target->mutex);
if (!sub_size) {
pthread_join(target->thread, NULL);
pthread_cond_destroy(&target->cond);
pthread_mutex_destroy(&target->mutex);
active_threads--;
}
}
cleanup_threaded_search();
free(p);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int numa_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return do_maps_open(inode, file, &proc_pid_numa_maps_op);
}
Commit Message: proc: fix oops on invalid /proc/<pid>/maps access
When m_start returns an error, the seq_file logic will still call m_stop
with that error entry, so we'd better make sure that we check it before
using it as a vma.
Introduced by commit ec6fd8a4355c ("report errors in /proc/*/*map*
sanely"), which replaced NULL with various ERR_PTR() cases.
(On ia64, you happen to get a unaligned fault instead of a page fault,
since the address used is generally some random error code like -EPERM)
Reported-by: Anca Emanuel <anca.emanuel@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Américo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int conn_si_send_proxy(struct connection *conn, unsigned int flag)
{
/* we might have been called just after an asynchronous shutw */
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH)
goto out_error;
if (!conn_ctrl_ready(conn))
goto out_error;
if (!fd_send_ready(conn->t.sock.fd))
goto out_wait;
/* If we have a PROXY line to send, we'll use this to validate the
* connection, in which case the connection is validated only once
* we've sent the whole proxy line. Otherwise we use connect().
*/
while (conn->send_proxy_ofs) {
int ret;
/* The target server expects a PROXY line to be sent first.
* If the send_proxy_ofs is negative, it corresponds to the
* offset to start sending from then end of the proxy string
* (which is recomputed every time since it's constant). If
* it is positive, it means we have to send from the start.
* We can only send a "normal" PROXY line when the connection
* is attached to a stream interface. Otherwise we can only
* send a LOCAL line (eg: for use with health checks).
*/
if (conn->data == &si_conn_cb) {
struct stream_interface *si = conn->owner;
struct connection *remote = objt_conn(si->ob->prod->end);
ret = make_proxy_line(trash.str, trash.size, objt_server(conn->target), remote);
}
else {
/* The target server expects a LOCAL line to be sent first. Retrieving
* local or remote addresses may fail until the connection is established.
*/
conn_get_from_addr(conn);
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_ADDR_FROM_SET))
goto out_wait;
conn_get_to_addr(conn);
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_ADDR_TO_SET))
goto out_wait;
ret = make_proxy_line(trash.str, trash.size, objt_server(conn->target), conn);
}
if (!ret)
goto out_error;
if (conn->send_proxy_ofs > 0)
conn->send_proxy_ofs = -ret; /* first call */
/* we have to send trash from (ret+sp for -sp bytes). If the
* data layer has a pending write, we'll also set MSG_MORE.
*/
ret = send(conn->t.sock.fd, trash.str + ret + conn->send_proxy_ofs, -conn->send_proxy_ofs,
(conn->flags & CO_FL_DATA_WR_ENA) ? MSG_MORE : 0);
if (ret == 0)
goto out_wait;
if (ret < 0) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == ENOTCONN)
goto out_wait;
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH | CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH;
goto out_error;
}
conn->send_proxy_ofs += ret; /* becomes zero once complete */
if (conn->send_proxy_ofs != 0)
goto out_wait;
/* OK we've sent the whole line, we're connected */
break;
}
/* The connection is ready now, simply return and let the connection
* handler notify upper layers if needed.
*/
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN)
conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN;
conn->flags &= ~flag;
return 1;
out_error:
/* Write error on the file descriptor */
conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
return 0;
out_wait:
__conn_sock_stop_recv(conn);
fd_cant_send(conn->t.sock.fd);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool OmniboxViewViews::SelectionAtBeginning() const {
const gfx::Range sel = GetSelectedRange();
return sel.GetMax() == 0;
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 142,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nsPluginInstance::nsPluginInstance(nsPluginCreateData* data)
:
nsPluginInstanceBase(),
_instance(data->instance),
_window(0),
_width(0),
_height(0),
_streamfd(-1),
_childpid(0),
_filefd(-1),
_name(),
_scriptObject(0)
{
for (size_t i=0, n=data->argc; i<n; ++i) {
std::string name, val;
gnash::StringNoCaseEqual noCaseCompare;
if (data->argn[i]) {
name = data->argn[i];
}
if (data->argv[i]) {
val = data->argv[i];
}
if (noCaseCompare(name, "name")) {
_name = val;
}
_params[name] = val;
}
if (HasScripting()) {
_scriptObject = (GnashPluginScriptObject*) NPN_CreateObject( _instance,
GnashPluginScriptObject::marshalGetNPClass());
}
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 13,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: request_reissue(struct request *req) {
const struct nameserver *const last_ns = req->ns;
ASSERT_LOCKED(req->base);
ASSERT_VALID_REQUEST(req);
/* the last nameserver should have been marked as failing */
/* by the caller of this function, therefore pick will try */
/* not to return it */
request_swap_ns(req, nameserver_pick(req->base));
if (req->ns == last_ns) {
/* ... but pick did return it */
/* not a lot of point in trying again with the */
/* same server */
return 1;
}
req->reissue_count++;
req->tx_count = 0;
req->transmit_me = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NORET_TYPE void ATTRIB_NORET nmi_exception_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
bust_spinlocks(1);
printk("NMI taken!!!!\n");
die("NMI", regs);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool Read8bitTables(cmsContext ContextID, cmsIOHANDLER* io, cmsPipeline* lut, int nChannels)
{
cmsUInt8Number* Temp = NULL;
int i, j;
cmsToneCurve* Tables[cmsMAXCHANNELS];
if (nChannels > cmsMAXCHANNELS) return FALSE;
if (nChannels <= 0) return FALSE;
memset(Tables, 0, sizeof(Tables));
Temp = (cmsUInt8Number*) _cmsMalloc(ContextID, 256);
if (Temp == NULL) return FALSE;
for (i=0; i < nChannels; i++) {
Tables[i] = cmsBuildTabulatedToneCurve16(ContextID, 256, NULL);
if (Tables[i] == NULL) goto Error;
}
for (i=0; i < nChannels; i++) {
if (io ->Read(io, Temp, 256, 1) != 1) goto Error;
for (j=0; j < 256; j++)
Tables[i]->Table16[j] = (cmsUInt16Number) FROM_8_TO_16(Temp[j]);
}
_cmsFree(ContextID, Temp);
Temp = NULL;
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(lut, cmsAT_END, cmsStageAllocToneCurves(ContextID, nChannels, Tables)))
goto Error;
for (i=0; i < nChannels; i++)
cmsFreeToneCurve(Tables[i]);
return TRUE;
Error:
for (i=0; i < nChannels; i++) {
if (Tables[i]) cmsFreeToneCurve(Tables[i]);
}
if (Temp) _cmsFree(ContextID, Temp);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::readBlob(size_t len, ReadableBlob* outBlob) const
{
int32_t useAshmem;
status_t status = readInt32(&useAshmem);
if (status) return status;
if (!useAshmem) {
ALOGV("readBlob: read in place");
const void* ptr = readInplace(len);
if (!ptr) return BAD_VALUE;
outBlob->init(false /*mapped*/, const_cast<void*>(ptr), len);
return NO_ERROR;
}
ALOGV("readBlob: read from ashmem");
int fd = readFileDescriptor();
if (fd == int(BAD_TYPE)) return BAD_VALUE;
void* ptr = ::mmap(NULL, len, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) return NO_MEMORY;
outBlob->init(true /*mapped*/, ptr, len);
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints(struct dwc3 *dwc)
{
struct dwc3_ep *dep;
u8 epnum;
for (epnum = 0; epnum < DWC3_ENDPOINTS_NUM; epnum++) {
dep = dwc->eps[epnum];
if (!dep)
continue;
/*
* Physical endpoints 0 and 1 are special; they form the
* bi-directional USB endpoint 0.
*
* For those two physical endpoints, we don't allocate a TRB
* pool nor do we add them the endpoints list. Due to that, we
* shouldn't do these two operations otherwise we would end up
* with all sorts of bugs when removing dwc3.ko.
*/
if (epnum != 0 && epnum != 1) {
dwc3_free_trb_pool(dep);
list_del(&dep->endpoint.ep_list);
}
kfree(dep);
}
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 88,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Smb4KGlobal::removeMountedShare(Smb4KShare *share)
{
Q_ASSERT(share);
bool removed = false;
if (share)
{
mutex.lock();
QMutableListIterator<Smb4KShare *> it(p->mountedSharesList);
while (it.hasNext())
{
Smb4KShare *s = it.next();
if (QString::compare(s->path(), share->path(), Qt::CaseInsensitive) == 0 ||
QString::compare(s->canonicalPath(), share->canonicalPath(), Qt::CaseInsensitive) == 0)
{
it.remove();
removed = true;
break;
}
else
{
}
}
for (Smb4KShare *s : p->mountedSharesList)
{
if (!s->isForeign())
{
p->onlyForeignShares = false;
break;
}
else
{
}
}
delete share;
mutex.unlock();
}
else
{
}
return removed;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi) {
switch (pi->poc.prg) {
case OPJ_LRCP:
return opj_pi_next_lrcp(pi);
case OPJ_RLCP:
return opj_pi_next_rlcp(pi);
case OPJ_RPCL:
return opj_pi_next_rpcl(pi);
case OPJ_PCRL:
return opj_pi_next_pcrl(pi);
case OPJ_CPRL:
return opj_pi_next_cprl(pi);
case OPJ_PROG_UNKNOWN:
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Fix an integer overflow issue (#809)
Prevent an integer overflow issue in function opj_pi_create_decode of
pi.c.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 50,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void address_to_pubkeyhash(unsigned char *pkh, const char *addr)
{
unsigned char b58bin[25];
memset(b58bin, 0, 25);
b58tobin(b58bin, addr);
pkh[0] = 0x76;
pkh[1] = 0xa9;
pkh[2] = 0x14;
memcpy(&pkh[3], &b58bin[1], 20);
pkh[23] = 0x88;
pkh[24] = 0xac;
}
Commit Message: Do some random sanity checking for stratum message parsing
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 36,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::invalidateAccessKeyMap()
{
m_accessKeyMapValid = false;
m_elementsByAccessKey.clear();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 AuthenticatorBlePowerOnManualSheetModel::GetStepDescription()
const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_WEBAUTHN_BLUETOOTH_POWER_ON_MANUAL_DESCRIPTION);
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,878 |
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