instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TabStripModel::IsContextMenuCommandEnabled(
int context_index, ContextMenuCommand command_id) const {
DCHECK(command_id > CommandFirst && command_id < CommandLast);
switch (command_id) {
case CommandNewTab:
case CommandCloseTab:
return true;
case CommandReload: {
std::vector<int> indices = GetIndicesForCommand(context_index);
for (size_t i = 0; i < indices.size(); ++i) {
WebContents* tab = GetWebContentsAt(indices[i]);
if (tab) {
CoreTabHelperDelegate* core_delegate =
CoreTabHelper::FromWebContents(tab)->delegate();
if (!core_delegate || core_delegate->CanReloadContents(tab))
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
case CommandCloseOtherTabs:
case CommandCloseTabsToRight:
return !GetIndicesClosedByCommand(context_index, command_id).empty();
case CommandDuplicate: {
std::vector<int> indices = GetIndicesForCommand(context_index);
for (size_t i = 0; i < indices.size(); ++i) {
if (delegate_->CanDuplicateContentsAt(indices[i]))
return true;
}
return false;
}
case CommandRestoreTab:
return delegate_->CanRestoreTab();
case CommandTogglePinned: {
std::vector<int> indices = GetIndicesForCommand(context_index);
for (size_t i = 0; i < indices.size(); ++i) {
if (!IsAppTab(indices[i]))
return true;
}
return false;
}
case CommandBookmarkAllTabs:
return browser_defaults::bookmarks_enabled &&
delegate_->CanBookmarkAllTabs();
case CommandSelectByDomain:
case CommandSelectByOpener:
return true;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerWebKitThread::setContents(Image* contents)
{
if (m_contents == contents) {
if (contents)
setNeedsDisplay();
return;
}
m_contents = contents;
setNeedsTexture(m_isDrawable && (this->contents() || drawsContent() || pluginView()));
if (m_contents)
setNeedsDisplay();
else
setNeedsCommit();
m_contentsResolutionIndependent = static_cast<bool>(m_contents);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] GraphicsLayer: rename notifySyncRequired to notifyFlushRequired
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111997
Patch by Alberto Garcia <agarcia@igalia.com> on 2013-03-11
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
This changed in r130439 but the old name was introduced again by
mistake in r144465.
* platform/graphics/blackberry/GraphicsLayerBlackBerry.h:
(WebCore::GraphicsLayerBlackBerry::notifyFlushRequired):
* platform/graphics/blackberry/LayerWebKitThread.cpp:
(WebCore::LayerWebKitThread::setNeedsCommit):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145363 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 119,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnMoveRangeSelectionExtent(const gfx::Point& point) {
Send(new InputHostMsg_MoveRangeSelectionExtent_ACK(
GetRenderWidget()->routing_id()));
base::AutoReset<bool> handling_select_range(&handling_select_range_, true);
frame_->moveRangeSelectionExtent(point);
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::FinishAsyncSwapBuffers(
uint64_t swap_id,
gfx::SwapResult result,
std::unique_ptr<gfx::GpuFence> gpu_fence) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("gpu", "AsyncSwapBuffers", swap_id);
DCHECK(!gpu_fence);
FinishSwapBuffers(result);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXTree::DestroyNodeAndSubtree(AXNode* node,
AXTreeUpdateState* update_state) {
AXNodeData empty_data;
empty_data.id = node->id();
UpdateReverseRelations(node, empty_data);
const auto& table_info_entry = table_info_map_.find(node->id());
if (table_info_entry != table_info_map_.end()) {
delete table_info_entry->second;
table_info_map_.erase(node->id());
}
for (AXTreeObserver& observer : observers_) {
if (!update_state || !update_state->IsChangedNode(node))
observer.OnNodeWillBeDeleted(this, node);
else
observer.OnNodeWillBeReparented(this, node);
}
id_map_.erase(node->id());
for (int i = 0; i < node->child_count(); ++i)
DestroyNodeAndSubtree(node->ChildAtIndex(i), update_state);
if (update_state) {
update_state->pending_nodes.erase(node);
update_state->removed_node_ids.insert(node->id());
}
if (update_state && update_state->IsChangedNode(node)) {
update_state->reparented_node_id_to_data.insert(
std::make_pair(node->id(), node->TakeData()));
}
node->Destroy();
}
Commit Message: Position info (item n of m) incorrect if hidden focusable items in list
Bug: 836997
Change-Id: I971fa7076f72d51829b36af8e379260d48ca25ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450235
Commit-Queue: Aaron Leventhal <aleventhal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nektarios Paisios <nektar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628890}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 130,253 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: drop_cap_bounding_set (bool drop_all)
{
if (!drop_all)
prctl_caps (requested_caps, TRUE, FALSE);
else
{
uint32_t no_caps[2] = {0, 0};
prctl_caps (no_caps, TRUE, FALSE);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't create our own temporary mount point for pivot_root
An attacker could pre-create /tmp/.bubblewrap-$UID and make it a
non-directory, non-symlink (in which case mounting our tmpfs would fail,
causing denial of service), or make it a symlink under their control
(potentially allowing bad things if the protected_symlinks sysctl is
not enabled).
Instead, temporarily mount the tmpfs on a directory that we are sure
exists and is not attacker-controlled. /tmp (the directory itself, not
a subdirectory) will do.
Fixes: #304
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=923557
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
Closes: #305
Approved by: cgwalters
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 89,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string ModifierKeyToLabel(ModifierKey modifier) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kModifierToLabels); ++i) {
if (modifier == kModifierToLabels[i].modifier) {
return kModifierToLabels[i].label;
}
}
return "";
}
Commit Message: Add missing shortcut keys to the keyboard overlay.
This CL adds the following shortcuts to the keyboard overlay.
* Alt - 1, Alt - 2, .., Alt - 8: go to the window at the specified position
* Alt - 9: go to the last window open
* Ctrl - Forward: switches focus to the next keyboard-accessible pane
* Ctrl - Back: switches focus to the previous keyboard-accessible pane
* Ctrl - Right: move the text cursor to the end of the next word
* Ctrl - Left: move the text cursor to the start of the previous word
* Ctrl - Alt - Z: enable or disable accessibility features
* Ctrl - Shift - Maximize: take a screenshot of the selected region
* Ctrl - Shift - O: open the Bookmark Manager
I also deleted a duplicated entry of "Close window".
BUG=chromium-os:17152
TEST=Manually checked on chromebook
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7489040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93906 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 99,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static vpx_codec_err_t vp8_decode(vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *ctx,
const uint8_t *data,
unsigned int data_sz,
void *user_priv,
long deadline)
{
vpx_codec_err_t res = VPX_CODEC_OK;
unsigned int resolution_change = 0;
unsigned int w, h;
if (!ctx->fragments.enabled && (data == NULL && data_sz == 0))
{
return 0;
}
/* Update the input fragment data */
if(update_fragments(ctx, data, data_sz, &res) <= 0)
return res;
/* Determine the stream parameters. Note that we rely on peek_si to
* validate that we have a buffer that does not wrap around the top
* of the heap.
*/
w = ctx->si.w;
h = ctx->si.h;
res = vp8_peek_si_internal(ctx->fragments.ptrs[0], ctx->fragments.sizes[0],
&ctx->si, ctx->decrypt_cb, ctx->decrypt_state);
if((res == VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM) && !ctx->si.is_kf)
{
/* the peek function returns an error for non keyframes, however for
* this case, it is not an error */
res = VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
if(!ctx->decoder_init && !ctx->si.is_kf)
res = VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if ((ctx->si.h != h) || (ctx->si.w != w))
resolution_change = 1;
/* Initialize the decoder instance on the first frame*/
if (!res && !ctx->decoder_init)
{
VP8D_CONFIG oxcf;
oxcf.Width = ctx->si.w;
oxcf.Height = ctx->si.h;
oxcf.Version = 9;
oxcf.postprocess = 0;
oxcf.max_threads = ctx->cfg.threads;
oxcf.error_concealment =
(ctx->base.init_flags & VPX_CODEC_USE_ERROR_CONCEALMENT);
/* If postprocessing was enabled by the application and a
* configuration has not been provided, default it.
*/
if (!ctx->postproc_cfg_set
&& (ctx->base.init_flags & VPX_CODEC_USE_POSTPROC)) {
ctx->postproc_cfg.post_proc_flag =
VP8_DEBLOCK | VP8_DEMACROBLOCK | VP8_MFQE;
ctx->postproc_cfg.deblocking_level = 4;
ctx->postproc_cfg.noise_level = 0;
}
res = vp8_create_decoder_instances(&ctx->yv12_frame_buffers, &oxcf);
ctx->decoder_init = 1;
}
/* Set these even if already initialized. The caller may have changed the
* decrypt config between frames.
*/
if (ctx->decoder_init) {
ctx->yv12_frame_buffers.pbi[0]->decrypt_cb = ctx->decrypt_cb;
ctx->yv12_frame_buffers.pbi[0]->decrypt_state = ctx->decrypt_state;
}
if (!res)
{
VP8D_COMP *pbi = ctx->yv12_frame_buffers.pbi[0];
if (resolution_change)
{
VP8_COMMON *const pc = & pbi->common;
MACROBLOCKD *const xd = & pbi->mb;
#if CONFIG_MULTITHREAD
int i;
#endif
pc->Width = ctx->si.w;
pc->Height = ctx->si.h;
{
int prev_mb_rows = pc->mb_rows;
if (setjmp(pbi->common.error.jmp))
{
pbi->common.error.setjmp = 0;
vp8_clear_system_state();
/* same return value as used in vp8dx_receive_compressed_data */
return -1;
}
pbi->common.error.setjmp = 1;
if (pc->Width <= 0)
{
pc->Width = w;
vpx_internal_error(&pc->error, VPX_CODEC_CORRUPT_FRAME,
"Invalid frame width");
}
if (pc->Height <= 0)
{
pc->Height = h;
vpx_internal_error(&pc->error, VPX_CODEC_CORRUPT_FRAME,
"Invalid frame height");
}
if (vp8_alloc_frame_buffers(pc, pc->Width, pc->Height))
vpx_internal_error(&pc->error, VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR,
"Failed to allocate frame buffers");
xd->pre = pc->yv12_fb[pc->lst_fb_idx];
xd->dst = pc->yv12_fb[pc->new_fb_idx];
#if CONFIG_MULTITHREAD
for (i = 0; i < pbi->allocated_decoding_thread_count; i++)
{
pbi->mb_row_di[i].mbd.dst = pc->yv12_fb[pc->new_fb_idx];
vp8_build_block_doffsets(&pbi->mb_row_di[i].mbd);
}
#endif
vp8_build_block_doffsets(&pbi->mb);
/* allocate memory for last frame MODE_INFO array */
#if CONFIG_ERROR_CONCEALMENT
if (pbi->ec_enabled)
{
/* old prev_mip was released by vp8_de_alloc_frame_buffers()
* called in vp8_alloc_frame_buffers() */
pc->prev_mip = vpx_calloc(
(pc->mb_cols + 1) * (pc->mb_rows + 1),
sizeof(MODE_INFO));
if (!pc->prev_mip)
{
vp8_de_alloc_frame_buffers(pc);
vpx_internal_error(&pc->error, VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR,
"Failed to allocate"
"last frame MODE_INFO array");
}
pc->prev_mi = pc->prev_mip + pc->mode_info_stride + 1;
if (vp8_alloc_overlap_lists(pbi))
vpx_internal_error(&pc->error, VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR,
"Failed to allocate overlap lists "
"for error concealment");
}
#endif
#if CONFIG_MULTITHREAD
if (pbi->b_multithreaded_rd)
vp8mt_alloc_temp_buffers(pbi, pc->Width, prev_mb_rows);
#else
(void)prev_mb_rows;
#endif
}
pbi->common.error.setjmp = 0;
/* required to get past the first get_free_fb() call */
pbi->common.fb_idx_ref_cnt[0] = 0;
}
/* update the pbi fragment data */
pbi->fragments = ctx->fragments;
ctx->user_priv = user_priv;
if (vp8dx_receive_compressed_data(pbi, data_sz, data, deadline))
{
res = update_error_state(ctx, &pbi->common.error);
}
/* get ready for the next series of fragments */
ctx->fragments.count = 0;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: Cherry-pick 0f42d1f from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp8: fix decoder crash with invalid leading keyframes
decoding the same invalid keyframe twice would result in a crash as the
second time through the decoder would be assumed to have been
initialized as there was no resolution change. in this case the
resolution was itself invalid (0x6), but vp8_peek_si() was only failing
in the case of 0x0.
invalid-vp80-00-comprehensive-018.ivf.2kf_0x6.ivf tests this case by
duplicating the first keyframe and additionally adds a valid one to
ensure decoding can resume without error.
Bug: 30593765
Change-Id: I0de85f5a5eb5c0a5605230faf20c042b69aea507
(cherry picked from commit fc0466b695dce03e10390101844caa374848d903)
(cherry picked from commit 1114575245cb9d2f108749f916c76549524f5136)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GfxColorSpace::getNumColorSpaceModes() {
return nGfxColorSpaceModes;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int OPENSSL_init_crypto(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings)
{
if (stopped) {
if (!(opts & OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY))
CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
return 0;
}
/*
* When the caller specifies OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY, that should be the
* *only* option specified. With that option we return immediately after
* doing the requested limited initialization. Note that
* err_shelve_state() called by us via ossl_init_load_crypto_nodelete()
* re-enters OPENSSL_init_crypto() with OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY, but with
* base already initialized this is a harmless NOOP.
*
* If we remain the only caller of err_shelve_state() the recursion should
* perhaps be removed, but if in doubt, it can be left in place.
*/
if (!RUN_ONCE(&base, ossl_init_base))
return 0;
if (opts & OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY)
return 1;
/*
* Now we don't always set up exit handlers, the INIT_BASE_ONLY calls
* should not have the side-effect of setting up exit handlers, and
* therefore, this code block is below the INIT_BASE_ONLY-conditioned early
* return above.
*/
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ATEXIT) != 0) {
if (!RUN_ONCE_ALT(®ister_atexit, ossl_init_no_register_atexit,
ossl_init_register_atexit))
return 0;
} else if (!RUN_ONCE(®ister_atexit, ossl_init_register_atexit)) {
return 0;
}
if (!RUN_ONCE(&load_crypto_nodelete, ossl_init_load_crypto_nodelete))
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS)
&& !RUN_ONCE_ALT(&load_crypto_strings,
ossl_init_no_load_crypto_strings,
ossl_init_load_crypto_strings))
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS)
&& !RUN_ONCE(&load_crypto_strings, ossl_init_load_crypto_strings))
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS)
&& !RUN_ONCE_ALT(&add_all_ciphers, ossl_init_no_add_all_ciphers,
ossl_init_add_all_ciphers))
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS)
&& !RUN_ONCE(&add_all_ciphers, ossl_init_add_all_ciphers))
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS)
&& !RUN_ONCE_ALT(&add_all_digests, ossl_init_no_add_all_digests,
ossl_init_add_all_digests))
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS)
&& !RUN_ONCE(&add_all_digests, ossl_init_add_all_digests))
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ATFORK)
&& !openssl_init_fork_handlers())
return 0;
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG)
&& !RUN_ONCE_ALT(&config, ossl_init_no_config, ossl_init_config))
return 0;
if (opts & OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG) {
int ret;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(init_lock);
conf_settings = settings;
ret = RUN_ONCE(&config, ossl_init_config);
conf_settings = NULL;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(init_lock);
if (ret <= 0)
return 0;
}
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ASYNC)
&& !RUN_ONCE(&async, ossl_init_async))
return 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_OPENSSL)
&& !RUN_ONCE(&engine_openssl, ossl_init_engine_openssl))
return 0;
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEVCRYPTOENG)
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CRYPTODEV)
&& !RUN_ONCE(&engine_devcrypto, ossl_init_engine_devcrypto))
return 0;
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RDRAND
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_RDRAND)
&& !RUN_ONCE(&engine_rdrand, ossl_init_engine_rdrand))
return 0;
# endif
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_DYNAMIC)
&& !RUN_ONCE(&engine_dynamic, ossl_init_engine_dynamic))
return 0;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK)
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_PADLOCK)
&& !RUN_ONCE(&engine_padlock, ossl_init_engine_padlock))
return 0;
# endif
# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG)
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CAPI)
&& !RUN_ONCE(&engine_capi, ossl_init_engine_capi))
return 0;
# endif
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_AFALGENG)
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_AFALG)
&& !RUN_ONCE(&engine_afalg, ossl_init_engine_afalg))
return 0;
# endif
# endif
if (opts & (OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN
| OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_OPENSSL
| OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_AFALG)) {
ENGINE_register_all_complete();
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ZLIB)
&& !RUN_ONCE(&zlib, ossl_init_zlib))
return 0;
#endif
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | 0 | 12,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct file *ib_uverbs_alloc_async_event_file(struct ib_uverbs_file *uverbs_file,
struct ib_device *ib_dev)
{
struct ib_uverbs_async_event_file *ev_file;
struct file *filp;
ev_file = kzalloc(sizeof(*ev_file), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ev_file)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ib_uverbs_init_event_queue(&ev_file->ev_queue);
ev_file->uverbs_file = uverbs_file;
kref_get(&ev_file->uverbs_file->ref);
kref_init(&ev_file->ref);
filp = anon_inode_getfile("[infinibandevent]", &uverbs_async_event_fops,
ev_file, O_RDONLY);
if (IS_ERR(filp))
goto err_put_refs;
mutex_lock(&uverbs_file->device->lists_mutex);
list_add_tail(&ev_file->list,
&uverbs_file->device->uverbs_events_file_list);
mutex_unlock(&uverbs_file->device->lists_mutex);
WARN_ON(uverbs_file->async_file);
uverbs_file->async_file = ev_file;
kref_get(&uverbs_file->async_file->ref);
INIT_IB_EVENT_HANDLER(&uverbs_file->event_handler,
ib_dev,
ib_uverbs_event_handler);
ib_register_event_handler(&uverbs_file->event_handler);
/* At that point async file stuff was fully set */
return filp;
err_put_refs:
kref_put(&ev_file->uverbs_file->ref, ib_uverbs_release_file);
kref_put(&ev_file->ref, ib_uverbs_release_async_event_file);
return filp;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: atol10(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
{
uint64_t l;
int digit;
l = 0;
digit = *p - '0';
while (digit >= 0 && digit < 10 && char_cnt-- > 0) {
l = (l * 10) + digit;
digit = *++p - '0';
}
return (l);
}
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_dict_put_drop(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, pdf_obj *key, pdf_obj *val)
{
fz_try(ctx)
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bgp_open_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *dat, int length)
{
struct bgp_open bgpo;
struct bgp_opt bgpopt;
const u_char *opt;
int i;
ND_TCHECK2(dat[0], BGP_OPEN_SIZE);
memcpy(&bgpo, dat, BGP_OPEN_SIZE);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Version %d, ", bgpo.bgpo_version));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "my AS %s, ",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), ntohs(bgpo.bgpo_myas))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Holdtime %us, ", ntohs(bgpo.bgpo_holdtime)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ID %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bgpo.bgpo_id)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Optional parameters, length: %u", bgpo.bgpo_optlen));
/* some little sanity checking */
if (length < bgpo.bgpo_optlen+BGP_OPEN_SIZE)
return;
/* ugly! */
opt = &((const struct bgp_open *)dat)->bgpo_optlen;
opt++;
i = 0;
while (i < bgpo.bgpo_optlen) {
ND_TCHECK2(opt[i], BGP_OPT_SIZE);
memcpy(&bgpopt, &opt[i], BGP_OPT_SIZE);
if (i + 2 + bgpopt.bgpopt_len > bgpo.bgpo_optlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Option %d, length: %u", bgpopt.bgpopt_type, bgpopt.bgpopt_len));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Option %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_opt_values,"Unknown",
bgpopt.bgpopt_type),
bgpopt.bgpopt_type,
bgpopt.bgpopt_len));
/* now let's decode the options we know*/
switch(bgpopt.bgpopt_type) {
case BGP_OPT_CAP:
bgp_capabilities_print(ndo, &opt[i+BGP_OPT_SIZE],
bgpopt.bgpopt_len);
break;
case BGP_OPT_AUTH:
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no decoder for option %u",
bgpopt.bgpopt_type));
break;
}
i += BGP_OPT_SIZE + bgpopt.bgpopt_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16300/BGP: prevent stack exhaustion
Enforce a limit on how many times bgp_attr_print() can recurse.
This fixes a stack exhaustion discovered by Include Security working
under the Mozilla SOS program in 2018 by means of code audit.
CWE ID: CWE-674 | 0 | 93,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void copy_user_huge_page(struct page *dst, struct page *src,
unsigned long addr, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned int pages_per_huge_page)
{
int i;
if (unlikely(pages_per_huge_page > MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES)) {
copy_user_gigantic_page(dst, src, addr, vma,
pages_per_huge_page);
return;
}
might_sleep();
for (i = 0; i < pages_per_huge_page; i++) {
cond_resched();
copy_user_highpage(dst + i, src + i, addr + i*PAGE_SIZE, vma);
}
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int n;
unsigned long alg_k;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p= &(d[4]);
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* Fool emacs indentation */
if (0) {}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
/* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
else
{
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
if ((pkey == NULL) ||
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
goto err;
s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
q=p;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
p+=2;
n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
#endif
if (n <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
goto err;
}
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
{
s2n(n,q);
n+=2;
}
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
/* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
krb5_data *enc_ticket;
krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
authp = NULL;
#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator;
#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
&kssl_err);
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
if (enc == NULL)
goto err;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (krb5rc)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
/* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
**
** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
**
** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
** Example:
** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
** optional authenticator omitted.
*/
/* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
p+= enc_ticket->length;
n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
/* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
if (authp && authp->length)
{
s2n(authp->length,p);
memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
p+= authp->length;
n+= authp->length + 2;
free(authp->data);
authp->data = NULL;
authp->length = 0;
}
else
{
s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */
n+=2;
}
tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
goto err;
/* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
** kssl_ctx->length);
** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
*/
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
kssl_ctx->key,iv);
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
sizeof tmp_buf);
EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
outl += padl;
if (outl > (int)sizeof epms)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
/* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
s2n(outl,p);
memcpy(p, epms, outl);
p+=outl;
n+=outl + 2;
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
else
{
/* we get them from the cert */
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
goto err;
}
/* generate a new random key */
if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
* make sure to clear it out afterwards */
n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
if (n <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
/* generate master key from the result */
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,p,n);
/* clean up */
memset(p,0,n);
/* send off the data */
n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
s2n(n,p);
BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
n+=2;
DH_free(dh_clnt);
/* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
{
const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
EC_KEY *tkey;
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
int field_size = 0;
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
/* Did we send out the client's
* ECDH share for use in premaster
* computation as part of client certificate?
* If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
*/
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL))
{
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication using ECDH certificates.
* To add such support, one needs to add
* code that checks for appropriate
* conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
* For example, the cert have an ECC
* key on the same curve as the server's
* and the key should be authorized for
* key agreement.
*
* One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
* to skip sending the certificate verify
* message.
*
* if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
* (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
* EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
* ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
*/
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
{
tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
}
else
{
/* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
(srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
(srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
}
srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
{
/* Reuse key info from our certificate
* We only need our private key to perform
* the ECDH computation.
*/
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
if (priv_key == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
else
{
/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
* make sure to clear it out afterwards
*/
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
if (field_size <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
if (n <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* generate master key from the result */
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-> generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
p, n);
memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
{
/* Send empty client key exch message */
n = 0;
}
else
{
/* First check the size of encoding and
* allocate memory accordingly.
*/
encoded_pt_len =
EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len *
sizeof(unsigned char));
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) ||
(bn_ctx == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key */
n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
p += 1;
/* copy the point */
memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
/* increment n to account for length field */
n += 1;
}
/* Free allocated memory */
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
{
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
X509 *peer_cert;
size_t msglen;
unsigned int md_len;
int keytype;
unsigned char premaster_secret[32],shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
/* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
if (!peer_cert)
peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
if (!peer_cert) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
goto err;
}
pkey_ctx=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key=X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert),NULL);
/* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
* parameters match those of server certificate, use
* certificate key for key exchange
*/
/* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
/* Generate session key */
RAND_bytes(premaster_secret,32);
/* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) {
/* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
* would be used
*/
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
/* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific
* context data */
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx,-1,EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV,
8,shared_ukm)<0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
/*Encapsulate it into sequence */
*(p++)=V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
msglen=255;
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx,tmp,&msglen,premaster_secret,32)<0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
if (msglen >= 0x80)
{
*(p++)=0x81;
*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
n=msglen+3;
}
else
{
*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
n=msglen+2;
}
memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
{
/* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
{
if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL)
{
/* send off the data */
n=BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
s2n(n,p);
BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A,p);
n+=2;
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
{
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
unsigned char *t = NULL;
unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
int psk_err = 1;
n = 0;
if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
goto err;
}
psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
}
else if (psk_len == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto psk_err;
}
/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
t = psk_or_pre_ms;
memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
s2n(psk_len, t);
memset(t, 0, psk_len);
t+=psk_len;
s2n(psk_len, t);
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
n = strlen(identity);
s2n(n, p);
memcpy(p, identity, n);
n+=2;
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_err != 0)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
else
{
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
l2n3(n,d);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=n+4;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
#endif
return(-1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void muscle_load_single_acl(sc_file_t* file, int operation, unsigned short acl)
{
int key;
/* Everybody by default.... */
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, operation, SC_AC_NONE, 0);
if(acl == 0xFFFF) {
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, operation, SC_AC_NEVER, 0);
return;
}
for(key = 0; key < 16; key++) {
if(acl >> key & 1) {
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, operation, SC_AC_CHV, key);
}
}
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void writeSparseArray(uint32_t numProperties, uint32_t length)
{
append(SparseArrayTag);
doWriteUint32(numProperties);
doWriteUint32(length);
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __ims_pcu_execute_bl_command(struct ims_pcu *pcu,
u8 command, const void *data, size_t len,
u8 expected_response, int response_time)
{
int error;
pcu->cmd_buf[0] = command;
if (data)
memcpy(&pcu->cmd_buf[1], data, len);
error = __ims_pcu_execute_command(pcu,
IMS_PCU_CMD_BOOTLOADER, pcu->cmd_buf, len + 1,
expected_response ? IMS_PCU_RSP_BOOTLOADER : 0,
response_time);
if (error) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Failure when sending 0x%02x command to bootloader, error: %d\n",
pcu->cmd_buf[0], error);
return error;
}
if (expected_response && pcu->cmd_buf[2] != expected_response) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Unexpected response from bootloader: 0x%02x, wanted 0x%02x\n",
pcu->cmd_buf[2], expected_response);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-pcu - sanity check against missing interfaces
A malicious device missing interface can make the driver oops.
Add sanity checking.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::ExtensionDevToolsClientHost(
Profile* profile,
DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host,
const std::string& extension_id,
const std::string& extension_name,
const Debuggee& debuggee)
: profile_(profile),
agent_host_(agent_host),
extension_id_(extension_id),
last_request_id_(0),
infobar_(nullptr),
detach_reason_(api::debugger::DETACH_REASON_TARGET_CLOSED),
extension_registry_observer_(this) {
CopyDebuggee(&debuggee_, debuggee);
g_attached_client_hosts.Get().insert(this);
extension_registry_observer_.Add(ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_));
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_APP_TERMINATING,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
agent_host_->AttachClient(this);
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
::switches::kSilentDebuggerExtensionAPI)) {
return;
}
const Extension* extension =
ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile)->enabled_extensions().GetByID(
extension_id);
if (extension && Manifest::IsPolicyLocation(extension->location()))
return;
infobar_ = ExtensionDevToolsInfoBar::Create(
extension_id, extension_name, this,
base::Bind(&ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::InfoBarDismissed,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ptrace_put_reg(struct task_struct *task, int regno, unsigned long data)
{
if (task->thread.regs == NULL)
return -EIO;
if (regno == PT_MSR)
return set_user_msr(task, data);
if (regno == PT_TRAP)
return set_user_trap(task, data);
if (regno <= PT_MAX_PUT_REG) {
((unsigned long *)task->thread.regs)[regno] = data;
return 0;
}
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableTimerThrottlingForBackgroundTabs(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetTimerThrottlingForBackgroundTabsEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::shouldAppearChecked() const
{
return checked() && m_inputType->isCheckable();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Fseek (FILE *stream, file_offset offset, int ptrname)
{
if (file_seek (stream, offset, ptrname) != 0)
pfatal ("fseek");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 2,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _archive_write_header(struct archive *_a, struct archive_entry *entry)
{
struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
int ret, r2;
archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_DATA | ARCHIVE_STATE_HEADER, "archive_write_header");
archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
if (a->format_write_header == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&(a->archive), -1,
"Format must be set before you can write to an archive.");
a->archive.state = ARCHIVE_STATE_FATAL;
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* In particular, "retry" and "fatal" get returned immediately. */
ret = archive_write_finish_entry(&a->archive);
if (ret == ARCHIVE_FATAL) {
a->archive.state = ARCHIVE_STATE_FATAL;
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (ret < ARCHIVE_OK && ret != ARCHIVE_WARN)
return (ret);
if (a->skip_file_set &&
archive_entry_dev_is_set(entry) &&
archive_entry_ino_is_set(entry) &&
archive_entry_dev(entry) == (dev_t)a->skip_file_dev &&
archive_entry_ino64(entry) == a->skip_file_ino) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
"Can't add archive to itself");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
/* Format and write header. */
r2 = ((a->format_write_header)(a, entry));
if (r2 == ARCHIVE_FATAL) {
a->archive.state = ARCHIVE_STATE_FATAL;
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (r2 < ret)
ret = r2;
a->archive.state = ARCHIVE_STATE_DATA;
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Limit write requests to at most INT_MAX.
This prevents a certain common programming error (passing -1 to write)
from leading to other problems deeper in the library.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 34,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void v9fs_path_copy(V9fsPath *lhs, V9fsPath *rhs)
{
v9fs_path_free(lhs);
lhs->data = g_malloc(rhs->size);
memcpy(lhs->data, rhs->data, rhs->size);
lhs->size = rhs->size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void close_complete_upcall(struct iwch_ep *ep)
{
struct iw_cm_event event;
PDBG("%s ep %p\n", __func__, ep);
memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event));
event.event = IW_CM_EVENT_CLOSE;
if (ep->com.cm_id) {
PDBG("close complete delivered ep %p cm_id %p tid %d\n",
ep, ep->com.cm_id, ep->hwtid);
ep->com.cm_id->event_handler(ep->com.cm_id, &event);
ep->com.cm_id->rem_ref(ep->com.cm_id);
ep->com.cm_id = NULL;
ep->com.qp = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Window::setTimeoutMethodCustom(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args)
{
ExceptionState es(args.GetIsolate());
WindowSetTimeoutImpl(args, true, es);
es.throwIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rename_process(const char name[8]) {
assert(name);
/* This is a like a poor man's setproctitle(). It changes the
* comm field, argv[0], and also the glibc's internally used
* name of the process. For the first one a limit of 16 chars
* applies, to the second one usually one of 10 (i.e. length
* of "/sbin/init"), to the third one one of 7 (i.e. length of
* "systemd"). If you pass a longer string it will be
* truncated */
prctl(PR_SET_NAME, name);
if (program_invocation_name)
strncpy(program_invocation_name, name, strlen(program_invocation_name));
if (saved_argc > 0) {
int i;
if (saved_argv[0])
strncpy(saved_argv[0], name, strlen(saved_argv[0]));
for (i = 1; i < saved_argc; i++) {
if (!saved_argv[i])
break;
memset(saved_argv[i], 0, strlen(saved_argv[i]));
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fst_process_rx_status(int rx_status, char *name)
{
switch (rx_status) {
case NET_RX_SUCCESS:
{
/*
* Nothing to do here
*/
break;
}
case NET_RX_DROP:
{
dbg(DBG_ASS, "%s: Received packet dropped\n", name);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 39,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterFITSImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("FITS");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadFITSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteFITSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsFITS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Flexible Image Transport System");
entry->module=ConstantString("FITS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("FTS");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadFITSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteFITSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsFITS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Flexible Image Transport System");
entry->module=ConstantString("FTS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tpm_continue_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
u8 data[] = {
0, 193, /* TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND */
0, 0, 0, 10, /* length */
0, 0, 0, 83, /* TPM_ORD_GetCapability */
};
tpm_transmit(chip, data, sizeof(data));
}
Commit Message: char/tpm: Fix unitialized usage of data buffer
This patch fixes information leakage to the userspace by initializing
the data buffer to zero.
Reported-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Selhorst <m.selhorst@sirrix.com>
[ Also removed the silly "* sizeof(u8)". If that isn't 1, we have way
deeper problems than a simple multiplication can fix. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 27,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void phar_copy_cached_phar(phar_archive_data **pphar TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
phar_archive_data *phar;
HashTable newmanifest;
char *fname;
phar_archive_object **objphar;
phar = (phar_archive_data *) emalloc(sizeof(phar_archive_data));
*phar = **pphar;
phar->is_persistent = 0;
fname = phar->fname;
phar->fname = estrndup(phar->fname, phar->fname_len);
phar->ext = phar->fname + (phar->ext - fname);
if (phar->alias) {
phar->alias = estrndup(phar->alias, phar->alias_len);
}
if (phar->signature) {
phar->signature = estrdup(phar->signature);
}
if (phar->metadata) {
/* assume success, we would have failed before */
if (phar->metadata_len) {
char *buf = estrndup((char *) phar->metadata, phar->metadata_len);
phar_parse_metadata(&buf, &phar->metadata, phar->metadata_len TSRMLS_CC);
efree(buf);
} else {
zval *t;
t = phar->metadata;
ALLOC_ZVAL(phar->metadata);
*phar->metadata = *t;
zval_copy_ctor(phar->metadata);
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(phar->metadata, 1);
}
}
zend_hash_init(&newmanifest, sizeof(phar_entry_info),
zend_get_hash_value, destroy_phar_manifest_entry, 0);
zend_hash_copy(&newmanifest, &(*pphar)->manifest, NULL, NULL, sizeof(phar_entry_info));
zend_hash_apply_with_argument(&newmanifest, (apply_func_arg_t) phar_update_cached_entry, (void *)phar TSRMLS_CC);
phar->manifest = newmanifest;
zend_hash_init(&phar->mounted_dirs, sizeof(char *),
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, 0);
zend_hash_init(&phar->virtual_dirs, sizeof(char *),
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, 0);
zend_hash_copy(&phar->virtual_dirs, &(*pphar)->virtual_dirs, NULL, NULL, sizeof(void *));
*pphar = phar;
/* now, scan the list of persistent Phar objects referencing this phar and update the pointers */
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(&PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_persist_map);
SUCCESS == zend_hash_get_current_data(&PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_persist_map, (void **) &objphar);
zend_hash_move_forward(&PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_persist_map)) {
if (objphar[0]->arc.archive->fname_len == phar->fname_len && !memcmp(objphar[0]->arc.archive->fname, phar->fname, phar->fname_len)) {
objphar[0]->arc.archive = phar;
}
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::AsValueWithFrameInto(
FrameData* frame,
base::trace_event::TracedValue* state) const {
if (this->pending_tree_) {
state->BeginDictionary("activation_state");
ActivationStateAsValueInto(state);
state->EndDictionary();
}
MathUtil::AddToTracedValue("device_viewport_size", device_viewport_size_,
state);
std::vector<PrioritizedTile> prioritized_tiles;
active_tree_->GetAllPrioritizedTilesForTracing(&prioritized_tiles);
if (pending_tree_)
pending_tree_->GetAllPrioritizedTilesForTracing(&prioritized_tiles);
state->BeginArray("active_tiles");
for (const auto& prioritized_tile : prioritized_tiles) {
state->BeginDictionary();
prioritized_tile.AsValueInto(state);
state->EndDictionary();
}
state->EndArray();
state->BeginDictionary("tile_manager_basic_state");
tile_manager_.BasicStateAsValueInto(state);
state->EndDictionary();
state->BeginDictionary("active_tree");
active_tree_->AsValueInto(state);
state->EndDictionary();
if (pending_tree_) {
state->BeginDictionary("pending_tree");
pending_tree_->AsValueInto(state);
state->EndDictionary();
}
if (frame) {
state->BeginDictionary("frame");
frame->AsValueInto(state);
state->EndDictionary();
}
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void OverloadedMethodH2Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
TestInterfaceEmpty* test_interface_empty_arg;
test_interface_empty_arg = V8TestInterfaceEmpty::ToImplWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[0]);
if (!test_interface_empty_arg) {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("overloadedMethodH", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::ArgumentNotOfType(0, "TestInterfaceEmpty")));
return;
}
impl->overloadedMethodH(test_interface_empty_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pcf_seek_to_table_type( FT_Stream stream,
PCF_Table tables,
FT_ULong ntables, /* same as PCF_Toc->count */
FT_ULong type,
FT_ULong *aformat,
FT_ULong *asize )
{
FT_Error error = FT_ERR( Invalid_File_Format );
FT_ULong i;
for ( i = 0; i < ntables; i++ )
if ( tables[i].type == type )
{
if ( stream->pos > tables[i].offset )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Stream_Skip );
goto Fail;
}
if ( FT_STREAM_SKIP( tables[i].offset - stream->pos ) )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Stream_Skip );
goto Fail;
}
*asize = tables[i].size;
*aformat = tables[i].format;
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
Fail:
*asize = 0;
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 6,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParamTraits<IPC::ChannelHandle>::Log(const param_type& p,
std::string* l) {
l->append(StringPrintf("ChannelHandle(%s", p.name.c_str()));
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
l->append(", ");
ParamTraits<base::FileDescriptor>::Log(p.socket, l);
#endif
l->append(")");
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sort_camera_metadata(camera_metadata_t *dst) {
if (dst == NULL) return ERROR;
if (dst->flags & FLAG_SORTED) return OK;
qsort(get_entries(dst), dst->entry_count,
sizeof(camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t),
compare_entry_tags);
dst->flags |= FLAG_SORTED;
assert(validate_camera_metadata_structure(dst, NULL) == OK);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Prevent data size overflow
Add a function to check overflow when calculating metadata
data size.
Bug: 30741779
Change-Id: I6405fe608567a4f4113674050f826f305ecae030
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int x86_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct pmu *tmp;
int err;
switch (event->attr.type) {
case PERF_TYPE_RAW:
case PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE:
case PERF_TYPE_HW_CACHE:
break;
default:
return -ENOENT;
}
err = __x86_pmu_event_init(event);
if (!err) {
/*
* we temporarily connect event to its pmu
* such that validate_group() can classify
* it as an x86 event using is_x86_event()
*/
tmp = event->pmu;
event->pmu = &pmu;
if (event->group_leader != event)
err = validate_group(event);
else
err = validate_event(event);
event->pmu = tmp;
}
if (err) {
if (event->destroy)
event->destroy(event);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *dex_class_super_name(RBinDexObj *bin, RBinDexClass *c) {
int cid, tid;
if (!bin || !c || !bin->types) {
return NULL;
}
cid = c->super_class;
if (cid < 0 || cid >= bin->header.types_size) {
return NULL;
}
tid = bin->types[cid].descriptor_id;
return getstr (bin, tid);
}
Commit Message: fix #6872
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 68,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabletModeWindowManager::WindowStateDestroyed(aura::Window* window) {
DCHECK(!window->HasObserver(this));
auto it = window_state_map_.find(window);
if (it != window_state_map_.end())
window_state_map_.erase(it);
}
Commit Message: Fix the crash after clamshell -> tablet transition in overview mode.
This CL just reverted some changes that were made in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1658955. In
that CL, we changed the clamshell <-> tablet transition when clamshell
split view mode is enabled, however, we should keep the old behavior
unchanged if the feature is not enabled, i.e., overview should be ended
if it's active before the transition. Otherwise, it will cause a nullptr
dereference crash since |split_view_drag_indicators_| is not created in
clamshell overview and will be used in tablet overview.
Bug: 982507
Change-Id: I238fe9472648a446cff4ab992150658c228714dd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1705474
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima (Slow - on/off site) <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679306}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CommitMessageOrderReverser(
WebContents* web_contents,
const GURL& deferred_url,
DidStartDeferringCommitCallback deferred_url_triggered_action)
: DidCommitProvisionalLoadInterceptor(web_contents),
deferred_url_(deferred_url),
deferred_url_triggered_action_(
std::move(deferred_url_triggered_action)) {}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 143,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void munlock_vma_pages_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
vma->vm_flags &= VM_LOCKED_CLEAR_MASK;
while (start < end) {
struct page *page;
unsigned int page_mask = 0;
unsigned long page_increm;
struct pagevec pvec;
struct zone *zone;
int zoneid;
pagevec_init(&pvec, 0);
/*
* Although FOLL_DUMP is intended for get_dump_page(),
* it just so happens that its special treatment of the
* ZERO_PAGE (returning an error instead of doing get_page)
* suits munlock very well (and if somehow an abnormal page
* has sneaked into the range, we won't oops here: great).
*/
page = follow_page(vma, start, FOLL_GET | FOLL_DUMP);
if (page && !IS_ERR(page)) {
if (PageTransTail(page)) {
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageMlocked(page), page);
put_page(page); /* follow_page_mask() */
} else if (PageTransHuge(page)) {
lock_page(page);
/*
* Any THP page found by follow_page_mask() may
* have gotten split before reaching
* munlock_vma_page(), so we need to compute
* the page_mask here instead.
*/
page_mask = munlock_vma_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page); /* follow_page_mask() */
} else {
/*
* Non-huge pages are handled in batches via
* pagevec. The pin from follow_page_mask()
* prevents them from collapsing by THP.
*/
pagevec_add(&pvec, page);
zone = page_zone(page);
zoneid = page_zone_id(page);
/*
* Try to fill the rest of pagevec using fast
* pte walk. This will also update start to
* the next page to process. Then munlock the
* pagevec.
*/
start = __munlock_pagevec_fill(&pvec, vma,
zoneid, start, end);
__munlock_pagevec(&pvec, zone);
goto next;
}
}
page_increm = 1 + page_mask;
start += page_increm * PAGE_SIZE;
next:
cond_resched();
}
}
Commit Message: mlock: fix mlock count can not decrease in race condition
Kefeng reported that when running the follow test, the mlock count in
meminfo will increase permanently:
[1] testcase
linux:~ # cat test_mlockal
grep Mlocked /proc/meminfo
for j in `seq 0 10`
do
for i in `seq 4 15`
do
./p_mlockall >> log &
done
sleep 0.2
done
# wait some time to let mlock counter decrease and 5s may not enough
sleep 5
grep Mlocked /proc/meminfo
linux:~ # cat p_mlockall.c
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#define SPACE_LEN 4096
int main(int argc, char ** argv)
{
int ret;
void *adr = malloc(SPACE_LEN);
if (!adr)
return -1;
ret = mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE);
printf("mlcokall ret = %d\n", ret);
ret = munlockall();
printf("munlcokall ret = %d\n", ret);
free(adr);
return 0;
}
In __munlock_pagevec() we should decrement NR_MLOCK for each page where
we clear the PageMlocked flag. Commit 1ebb7cc6a583 ("mm: munlock: batch
NR_MLOCK zone state updates") has introduced a bug where we don't
decrement NR_MLOCK for pages where we clear the flag, but fail to
isolate them from the lru list (e.g. when the pages are on some other
cpu's percpu pagevec). Since PageMlocked stays cleared, the NR_MLOCK
accounting gets permanently disrupted by this.
Fix it by counting the number of page whose PageMlock flag is cleared.
Fixes: 1ebb7cc6a583 (" mm: munlock: batch NR_MLOCK zone state updates")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1495678405-54569-1-git-send-email-xieyisheng1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@logfs.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Cc: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 85,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _warc_cleanup(struct archive_read *a)
{
struct warc_s *w = a->format->data;
if (w->pool.len > 0U) {
free(w->pool.str);
}
archive_string_free(&w->sver);
free(w);
a->format->data = NULL;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: warc: consume data once read
The warc decoder only used read ahead, it wouldn't actually consume
data that had previously been printed. This means that if you specify
an invalid content length, it will just reprint the same data over
and over and over again until it hits the desired length.
This means that a WARC resource with e.g.
Content-Length: 666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666665
but only a few hundred bytes of data, causes a quasi-infinite loop.
Consume data in subsequent calls to _warc_read.
Found with an AFL + afl-rb + qsym setup.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 74,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int midi_setup_cuepoint(struct _mdi *mdi, char * text) {
MIDI_EVENT_SDEBUG(__FUNCTION__,0, text);
strip_text(text);
_WM_CheckEventMemoryPool(mdi);
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].do_event = *_WM_do_meta_cuepoint;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].event_data.channel = 0;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].event_data.data.string = text;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].samples_to_next = 0;
mdi->event_count++;
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 63,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_Init( void ) {
Com_Printf( "----- Client Initialization -----\n" );
Con_Init();
if(!com_fullyInitialized)
{
CL_ClearState();
clc.state = CA_DISCONNECTED; // no longer CA_UNINITIALIZED
cl_oldGameSet = qfalse;
}
cls.realtime = 0;
CL_InitInput();
cl_noprint = Cvar_Get( "cl_noprint", "0", 0 );
#ifdef UPDATE_SERVER_NAME
cl_motd = Cvar_Get( "cl_motd", "1", 0 );
#endif
cl_autoupdate = Cvar_Get( "cl_autoupdate", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_timeout = Cvar_Get( "cl_timeout", "200", 0 );
cl_wavefilerecord = Cvar_Get( "cl_wavefilerecord", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_timeNudge = Cvar_Get( "cl_timeNudge", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_shownet = Cvar_Get( "cl_shownet", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_shownuments = Cvar_Get( "cl_shownuments", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_visibleClients = Cvar_Get( "cl_visibleClients", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_showServerCommands = Cvar_Get( "cl_showServerCommands", "0", 0 );
cl_showSend = Cvar_Get( "cl_showSend", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_showTimeDelta = Cvar_Get( "cl_showTimeDelta", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_freezeDemo = Cvar_Get( "cl_freezeDemo", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
rcon_client_password = Cvar_Get( "rconPassword", "", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_activeAction = Cvar_Get( "activeAction", "", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_timedemo = Cvar_Get( "timedemo", "0", 0 );
cl_timedemoLog = Cvar_Get ("cl_timedemoLog", "", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_autoRecordDemo = Cvar_Get ("cl_autoRecordDemo", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_aviFrameRate = Cvar_Get ("cl_aviFrameRate", "25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_aviMotionJpeg = Cvar_Get ("cl_aviMotionJpeg", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_avidemo = Cvar_Get( "cl_avidemo", "0", 0 );
cl_forceavidemo = Cvar_Get( "cl_forceavidemo", "0", 0 );
rconAddress = Cvar_Get( "rconAddress", "", 0 );
cl_yawspeed = Cvar_Get( "cl_yawspeed", "140", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_pitchspeed = Cvar_Get( "cl_pitchspeed", "140", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_anglespeedkey = Cvar_Get( "cl_anglespeedkey", "1.5", 0 );
cl_maxpackets = Cvar_Get( "cl_maxpackets", "38", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_packetdup = Cvar_Get( "cl_packetdup", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_showPing = Cvar_Get( "cl_showPing", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_run = Cvar_Get( "cl_run", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_sensitivity = Cvar_Get( "sensitivity", "5", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_mouseAccel = Cvar_Get( "cl_mouseAccel", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_freelook = Cvar_Get( "cl_freelook", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_mouseAccelStyle = Cvar_Get( "cl_mouseAccelStyle", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_mouseAccelOffset = Cvar_Get( "cl_mouseAccelOffset", "5", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_CheckRange(cl_mouseAccelOffset, 0.001f, 50000.0f, qfalse);
cl_showMouseRate = Cvar_Get( "cl_showmouserate", "0", 0 );
cl_allowDownload = Cvar_Get( "cl_allowDownload", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
#ifdef USE_CURL_DLOPEN
cl_cURLLib = Cvar_Get("cl_cURLLib", DEFAULT_CURL_LIB, CVAR_ARCHIVE);
#endif
Cvar_Get( "cg_autoswitch", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_wolfparticles", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_conXOffset = Cvar_Get( "cl_conXOffset", "0", 0 );
cl_inGameVideo = Cvar_Get( "r_inGameVideo", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_serverStatusResendTime = Cvar_Get( "cl_serverStatusResendTime", "750", 0 );
cl_recoilPitch = Cvar_Get( "cg_recoilPitch", "0", CVAR_ROM );
cl_bypassMouseInput = Cvar_Get( "cl_bypassMouseInput", "0", 0 ); //CVAR_ROM ); // NERVE - SMF
m_pitch = Cvar_Get( "m_pitch", "0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_yaw = Cvar_Get( "m_yaw", "0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_forward = Cvar_Get( "m_forward", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_side = Cvar_Get( "m_side", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_filter = Cvar_Get( "m_filter", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
j_pitch = Cvar_Get ("j_pitch", "0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_yaw = Cvar_Get ("j_yaw", "-0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_forward = Cvar_Get ("j_forward", "-0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_side = Cvar_Get ("j_side", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_up = Cvar_Get ("j_up", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_pitch_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_pitch_axis", "3", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_yaw_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_yaw_axis", "2", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_forward_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_forward_axis", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_side_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_side_axis", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_up_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_up_axis", "4", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_pitch_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_yaw_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_forward_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_side_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_up_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
cl_motdString = Cvar_Get( "cl_motdString", "", CVAR_ROM );
Cvar_Get( "cl_maxPing", "800", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_lanForcePackets = Cvar_Get ("cl_lanForcePackets", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_guid = Cvar_Get( "cl_guid", "unknown", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ROM );
cl_guidServerUniq = Cvar_Get ("cl_guidServerUniq", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_consoleKeys = Cvar_Get( "cl_consoleKeys", "~ ` 0x7e 0x60", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
Cvar_Get( "cg_drawCompass", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_drawNotifyText", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_quickMessageAlt", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_popupLimboMenu", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_descriptiveText", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_drawTeamOverlay", "2", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_uselessNostalgia", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE ); // JPW NERVE
Cvar_Get( "cg_drawGun", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_cursorHints", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_voiceSpriteTime", "6000", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_teamChatsOnly", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_noVoiceChats", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_noVoiceText", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_crosshairSize", "48", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_drawCrosshair", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_zoomDefaultSniper", "20", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_zoomstepsniper", "2", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "mp_playerType", "0", 0 );
Cvar_Get( "mp_currentPlayerType", "0", 0 );
Cvar_Get( "mp_weapon", "0", 0 );
Cvar_Get( "mp_team", "0", 0 );
Cvar_Get( "mp_currentTeam", "0", 0 );
Cvar_Get( "name", "WolfPlayer", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_rate = Cvar_Get( "rate", "25000", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE ); // NERVE - SMF - changed from 3000
Cvar_Get( "snaps", "20", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "model", "multi", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "head", "default", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "color", "4", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "handicap", "100", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "sex", "male", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cl_anonymous", "0", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "password", "", CVAR_USERINFO );
Cvar_Get( "cg_predictItems", "1", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
#ifdef USE_MUMBLE
cl_useMumble = Cvar_Get ("cl_useMumble", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE | CVAR_LATCH);
cl_mumbleScale = Cvar_Get ("cl_mumbleScale", "0.0254", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
#endif
#ifdef USE_VOIP
cl_voipSend = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipSend", "0", 0);
cl_voipSendTarget = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipSendTarget", "spatial", 0);
cl_voipGainDuringCapture = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipGainDuringCapture", "0.2", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipCaptureMult = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipCaptureMult", "2.0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipUseVAD = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipUseVAD", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipVADThreshold = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipVADThreshold", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipShowMeter = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipShowMeter", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voip = Cvar_Get ("cl_voip", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
Cvar_CheckRange( cl_voip, 0, 1, qtrue );
cl_voipProtocol = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipProtocol", cl_voip->integer ? "opus" : "", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ROM);
#endif
Cvar_Get( "cg_autoactivate", "1", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_viewsize", "100", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get ("cg_stereoSeparation", "0", CVAR_ROM);
Cvar_Get( "cg_autoReload", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE | CVAR_USERINFO );
cl_missionStats = Cvar_Get( "g_missionStats", "0", CVAR_ROM );
cl_waitForFire = Cvar_Get( "cl_waitForFire", "0", CVAR_ROM );
cl_language = Cvar_Get( "cl_language", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_debugTranslation = Cvar_Get( "cl_debugTranslation", "0", 0 );
cl_updateavailable = Cvar_Get( "cl_updateavailable", "0", CVAR_ROM );
cl_updatefiles = Cvar_Get( "cl_updatefiles", "", CVAR_ROM );
Q_strncpyz( cls.autoupdateServerNames[0], AUTOUPDATE_SERVER1_NAME, MAX_QPATH );
Q_strncpyz( cls.autoupdateServerNames[1], AUTOUPDATE_SERVER2_NAME, MAX_QPATH );
Q_strncpyz( cls.autoupdateServerNames[2], AUTOUPDATE_SERVER3_NAME, MAX_QPATH );
Q_strncpyz( cls.autoupdateServerNames[3], AUTOUPDATE_SERVER4_NAME, MAX_QPATH );
Q_strncpyz( cls.autoupdateServerNames[4], AUTOUPDATE_SERVER5_NAME, MAX_QPATH );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cmd", CL_ForwardToServer_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "configstrings", CL_Configstrings_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "clientinfo", CL_Clientinfo_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "snd_restart", CL_Snd_Restart_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "vid_restart", CL_Vid_Restart_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "ui_restart", CL_UI_Restart_f ); // NERVE - SMF
Cmd_AddCommand( "disconnect", CL_Disconnect_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "record", CL_Record_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "demo", CL_PlayDemo_f );
Cmd_SetCommandCompletionFunc( "demo", CL_CompleteDemoName );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cinematic", CL_PlayCinematic_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "stoprecord", CL_StopRecord_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "connect", CL_Connect_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "reconnect", CL_Reconnect_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "localservers", CL_LocalServers_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "globalservers", CL_GlobalServers_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "rcon", CL_Rcon_f );
Cmd_SetCommandCompletionFunc( "rcon", CL_CompleteRcon );
Cmd_AddCommand( "ping", CL_Ping_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "serverstatus", CL_ServerStatus_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "showip", CL_ShowIP_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "fs_openedList", CL_OpenedPK3List_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "fs_referencedList", CL_ReferencedPK3List_f );
Cmd_AddCommand ("video", CL_Video_f );
Cmd_AddCommand ("stopvideo", CL_StopVideo_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_startgather", CL_Cache_StartGather_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_usedfile", CL_Cache_UsedFile_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_setindex", CL_Cache_SetIndex_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_mapchange", CL_Cache_MapChange_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_endgather", CL_Cache_EndGather_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "updatehunkusage", CL_UpdateLevelHunkUsage );
Cmd_AddCommand( "updatescreen", SCR_UpdateScreen );
Cmd_AddCommand( "SaveTranslations", CL_SaveTranslations_f ); // NERVE - SMF - localization
Cmd_AddCommand( "SaveNewTranslations", CL_SaveNewTranslations_f ); // NERVE - SMF - localization
Cmd_AddCommand( "LoadTranslations", CL_LoadTranslations_f ); // NERVE - SMF - localization
Cmd_AddCommand( "startSingleplayer", CL_startSingleplayer_f ); // NERVE - SMF
Cmd_AddCommand( "setRecommended", CL_SetRecommended_f );
CL_InitRef();
SCR_Init();
Cvar_Set( "cl_running", "1" );
autoupdateChecked = qfalse;
autoupdateStarted = qfalse;
CL_InitTranslation(); // NERVE - SMF - localization
CL_GenerateQKey();
CL_UpdateGUID( NULL, 0 );
Com_Printf( "----- Client Initialization Complete -----\n" );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 1 | 170,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int apply_mailbox_pattern(annotate_state_t *state,
const char *pattern,
int (*proc)(annotate_state_t *, void *),
void *data)
{
struct apply_rock arock;
int r = 0;
memset(&arock, 0, sizeof(arock));
arock.state = state;
arock.proc = proc;
arock.data = data;
r = mboxlist_findall(&imapd_namespace,
pattern,
imapd_userisadmin || imapd_userisproxyadmin,
imapd_userid,
imapd_authstate,
apply_cb, &arock);
if (!r && !arock.nseen)
r = IMAP_MAILBOX_NONEXISTENT;
return r;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int snd_seq_queue_timer_close(int queueid)
{
struct snd_seq_queue *queue;
int result = 0;
queue = queueptr(queueid);
if (queue == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
snd_seq_timer_close(queue);
queuefree(queue);
return result;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close
ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client. This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.
This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 54,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::ValidateCompressedTexSubDimensions(
const char* function_name,
GLenum target, GLint level, GLint xoffset, GLint yoffset, GLint zoffset,
GLsizei width, GLsizei height, GLsizei depth, GLenum format,
Texture* texture) {
const char* error_message = "";
if (!::gpu::gles2::ValidateCompressedTexSubDimensions(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, width, height, depth,
format, texture, &error_message)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name, error_message);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void mnt_add_count(struct mount *mnt, int n)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
this_cpu_add(mnt->mnt_pcp->mnt_count, n);
#else
preempt_disable();
mnt->mnt_count += n;
preempt_enable();
#endif
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PrintPreviewMessageHandler::PrintPreviewMessageHandler(
WebContents* web_contents)
: content::WebContentsObserver(web_contents) {
DCHECK(web_contents);
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 1 | 171,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void stsc_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_SampleToChunkBox *ptr = (GF_SampleToChunkBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
if (ptr->entries) gf_free(ptr->entries);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameImpl::UniqueNameFrameAdapter::CollectAncestorNames(
BeginPoint begin_point,
bool (*should_stop)(base::StringPiece)) const {
std::vector<base::StringPiece> result;
for (blink::WebFrame* frame = begin_point == BeginPoint::kParentFrame
? GetWebFrame()->Parent()
: GetWebFrame();
frame; frame = frame->Parent()) {
result.push_back(UniqueNameForWebFrame(frame));
if (should_stop(result.back()))
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hns_rcb_comm_exc_irq_en(
struct rcb_common_cb *rcb_common, int en)
{
u32 clr_vlue = 0xfffffffful;
u32 msk_vlue = en ? 0 : 0xfffffffful;
/* clr int*/
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common, RCB_COM_INTSTS_ECC_ERR_REG, clr_vlue);
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common, RCB_COM_SF_CFG_RING_STS, clr_vlue);
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common, RCB_COM_SF_CFG_BD_RINT_STS, clr_vlue);
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common, RCB_COM_RINT_TX_PKT_REG, clr_vlue);
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common, RCB_COM_AXI_ERR_STS, clr_vlue);
/*en msk*/
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common, RCB_COM_INTMASK_ECC_ERR_REG, msk_vlue);
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common, RCB_COM_SF_CFG_INTMASK_RING, msk_vlue);
/*for tx bd neednot cacheline, so msk sf_txring_fbd_intmask (bit 1)**/
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common, RCB_COM_SF_CFG_INTMASK_BD, msk_vlue | 2);
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common, RCB_COM_INTMSK_TX_PKT_REG, msk_vlue);
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common, RCB_COM_AXI_WR_ERR_INTMASK, msk_vlue);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void terminate_walk(struct nameidata *nd)
{
drop_links(nd);
if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)) {
int i;
path_put(&nd->path);
for (i = 0; i < nd->depth; i++)
path_put(&nd->stack[i].link);
if (nd->root.mnt && !(nd->flags & LOOKUP_ROOT)) {
path_put(&nd->root);
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
}
} else {
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_RCU;
if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_ROOT))
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
nd->depth = 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 43,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sock *dccp_v4_request_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct sock *newsk;
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto exit_overflow;
newsk = dccp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (newsk == NULL)
goto exit_nonewsk;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
newinet->inet_daddr = ireq->rmt_addr;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->inet_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->inet_opt = ireq->opt;
ireq->opt = NULL;
newinet->mc_index = inet_iif(skb);
newinet->mc_ttl = ip_hdr(skb)->ttl;
newinet->inet_id = jiffies;
if (dst == NULL && (dst = inet_csk_route_child_sock(sk, newsk, req)) == NULL)
goto put_and_exit;
sk_setup_caps(newsk, dst);
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0)
goto put_and_exit;
__inet_hash_nolisten(newsk, NULL);
return newsk;
exit_overflow:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
exit_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
exit:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
put_and_exit:
sock_put(newsk);
goto exit;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: irc_server_get_prefix_chars (struct t_irc_server *server)
{
return (server && server->prefix_chars) ?
server->prefix_chars : irc_server_prefix_chars_default;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline zend_bool check_str(const char *chk_str, size_t chk_len, const char *sep_str, size_t sep_len) {
return 0 < sep_len && chk_len >= sep_len && *chk_str == *sep_str && !memcmp(chk_str + 1, sep_str + 1, sep_len - 1);
}
Commit Message: fix bug #73055
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 93,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BlackBerry::Platform::String WebPage::textHasAttribute(const BlackBerry::Platform::String& query) const
{
if (Document* doc = d->m_page->focusController()->focusedOrMainFrame()->document())
return doc->queryCommandValue(query);
return "";
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
unsigned long stack_start,
struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned long stack_size,
int __user *child_tidptr,
struct pid *pid,
int trace)
{
int retval;
struct task_struct *p;
int cgroup_callbacks_done = 0;
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_FS))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
* can only be started up within the thread group.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) && !(clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Shared signal handlers imply shared VM. By way of the above,
* thread groups also imply shared VM. Blocking this case allows
* for various simplifications in other code.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND) && !(clone_flags & CLONE_VM))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Siblings of global init remain as zombies on exit since they are
* not reaped by their parent (swapper). To solve this and to avoid
* multi-rooted process trees, prevent global and container-inits
* from creating siblings.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT) &&
current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
retval = security_task_create(clone_flags);
if (retval)
goto fork_out;
retval = -ENOMEM;
p = dup_task_struct(current);
if (!p)
goto fork_out;
ftrace_graph_init_task(p);
rt_mutex_init_task(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->hardirqs_enabled);
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
#endif
retval = -EAGAIN;
if (atomic_read(&p->real_cred->user->processes) >=
task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NPROC)) {
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
p->real_cred->user != INIT_USER)
goto bad_fork_free;
}
retval = copy_creds(p, clone_flags);
if (retval < 0)
goto bad_fork_free;
/*
* If multiple threads are within copy_process(), then this check
* triggers too late. This doesn't hurt, the check is only there
* to stop root fork bombs.
*/
retval = -EAGAIN;
if (nr_threads >= max_threads)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_count;
if (!try_module_get(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_count;
p->did_exec = 0;
delayacct_tsk_init(p); /* Must remain after dup_task_struct() */
copy_flags(clone_flags, p);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->children);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->sibling);
rcu_copy_process(p);
p->vfork_done = NULL;
spin_lock_init(&p->alloc_lock);
init_sigpending(&p->pending);
p->utime = cputime_zero;
p->stime = cputime_zero;
p->gtime = cputime_zero;
p->utimescaled = cputime_zero;
p->stimescaled = cputime_zero;
#ifndef CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING
p->prev_utime = cputime_zero;
p->prev_stime = cputime_zero;
#endif
#if defined(SPLIT_RSS_COUNTING)
memset(&p->rss_stat, 0, sizeof(p->rss_stat));
#endif
p->default_timer_slack_ns = current->timer_slack_ns;
task_io_accounting_init(&p->ioac);
acct_clear_integrals(p);
posix_cpu_timers_init(p);
p->lock_depth = -1; /* -1 = no lock */
do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&p->start_time);
p->real_start_time = p->start_time;
monotonic_to_bootbased(&p->real_start_time);
p->io_context = NULL;
p->audit_context = NULL;
cgroup_fork(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
p->mempolicy = mpol_dup(p->mempolicy);
if (IS_ERR(p->mempolicy)) {
retval = PTR_ERR(p->mempolicy);
p->mempolicy = NULL;
goto bad_fork_cleanup_cgroup;
}
mpol_fix_fork_child_flag(p);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
p->irq_events = 0;
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_INTERRUPTS_ON_CTXSW
p->hardirqs_enabled = 1;
#else
p->hardirqs_enabled = 0;
#endif
p->hardirq_enable_ip = 0;
p->hardirq_enable_event = 0;
p->hardirq_disable_ip = _THIS_IP_;
p->hardirq_disable_event = 0;
p->softirqs_enabled = 1;
p->softirq_enable_ip = _THIS_IP_;
p->softirq_enable_event = 0;
p->softirq_disable_ip = 0;
p->softirq_disable_event = 0;
p->hardirq_context = 0;
p->softirq_context = 0;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
p->lockdep_depth = 0; /* no locks held yet */
p->curr_chain_key = 0;
p->lockdep_recursion = 0;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES
p->blocked_on = NULL; /* not blocked yet */
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_MEM_RES_CTLR
p->memcg_batch.do_batch = 0;
p->memcg_batch.memcg = NULL;
#endif
/* Perform scheduler related setup. Assign this task to a CPU. */
sched_fork(p, clone_flags);
retval = perf_event_init_task(p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_policy;
if ((retval = audit_alloc(p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_policy;
/* copy all the process information */
if ((retval = copy_semundo(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_audit;
if ((retval = copy_files(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_semundo;
if ((retval = copy_fs(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_files;
if ((retval = copy_sighand(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_fs;
if ((retval = copy_signal(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_sighand;
if ((retval = copy_mm(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_signal;
if ((retval = copy_namespaces(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm;
if ((retval = copy_io(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;
retval = copy_thread(clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, regs);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
if (pid != &init_struct_pid) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
pid = alloc_pid(p->nsproxy->pid_ns);
if (!pid)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWPID) {
retval = pid_ns_prepare_proc(p->nsproxy->pid_ns);
if (retval < 0)
goto bad_fork_free_pid;
}
}
p->pid = pid_nr(pid);
p->tgid = p->pid;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
p->tgid = current->tgid;
if (current->nsproxy != p->nsproxy) {
retval = ns_cgroup_clone(p, pid);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_free_pid;
}
p->set_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL;
/*
* Clear TID on mm_release()?
*/
p->clear_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) ? child_tidptr: NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
p->robust_list = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
p->compat_robust_list = NULL;
#endif
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->pi_state_list);
p->pi_state_cache = NULL;
#endif
/*
* sigaltstack should be cleared when sharing the same VM
*/
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VM|CLONE_VFORK)) == CLONE_VM)
p->sas_ss_sp = p->sas_ss_size = 0;
/*
* Syscall tracing and stepping should be turned off in the
* child regardless of CLONE_PTRACE.
*/
user_disable_single_step(p);
clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE);
#ifdef TIF_SYSCALL_EMU
clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SYSCALL_EMU);
#endif
clear_all_latency_tracing(p);
/* ok, now we should be set up.. */
p->exit_signal = (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) ? -1 : (clone_flags & CSIGNAL);
p->pdeath_signal = 0;
p->exit_state = 0;
/*
* Ok, make it visible to the rest of the system.
* We dont wake it up yet.
*/
p->group_leader = p;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->thread_group);
/* Now that the task is set up, run cgroup callbacks if
* necessary. We need to run them before the task is visible
* on the tasklist. */
cgroup_fork_callbacks(p);
cgroup_callbacks_done = 1;
/* Need tasklist lock for parent etc handling! */
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/* CLONE_PARENT re-uses the old parent */
if (clone_flags & (CLONE_PARENT|CLONE_THREAD)) {
p->real_parent = current->real_parent;
p->parent_exec_id = current->parent_exec_id;
} else {
p->real_parent = current;
p->parent_exec_id = current->self_exec_id;
}
spin_lock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
/*
* Process group and session signals need to be delivered to just the
* parent before the fork or both the parent and the child after the
* fork. Restart if a signal comes in before we add the new process to
* it's process group.
* A fatal signal pending means that current will exit, so the new
* thread can't slip out of an OOM kill (or normal SIGKILL).
*/
recalc_sigpending();
if (signal_pending(current)) {
spin_unlock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
retval = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
goto bad_fork_free_pid;
}
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) {
current->signal->nr_threads++;
atomic_inc(¤t->signal->live);
atomic_inc(¤t->signal->sigcnt);
p->group_leader = current->group_leader;
list_add_tail_rcu(&p->thread_group, &p->group_leader->thread_group);
}
if (likely(p->pid)) {
tracehook_finish_clone(p, clone_flags, trace);
if (thread_group_leader(p)) {
if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWPID)
p->nsproxy->pid_ns->child_reaper = p;
p->signal->leader_pid = pid;
p->signal->tty = tty_kref_get(current->signal->tty);
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, task_pgrp(current));
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_SID, task_session(current));
list_add_tail(&p->sibling, &p->real_parent->children);
list_add_tail_rcu(&p->tasks, &init_task.tasks);
__get_cpu_var(process_counts)++;
}
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID, pid);
nr_threads++;
}
total_forks++;
spin_unlock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
proc_fork_connector(p);
cgroup_post_fork(p);
perf_event_fork(p);
return p;
bad_fork_free_pid:
if (pid != &init_struct_pid)
free_pid(pid);
bad_fork_cleanup_io:
if (p->io_context)
exit_io_context(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces:
exit_task_namespaces(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_mm:
if (p->mm) {
task_lock(p);
if (p->signal->oom_score_adj == OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN)
atomic_dec(&p->mm->oom_disable_count);
task_unlock(p);
mmput(p->mm);
}
bad_fork_cleanup_signal:
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD))
free_signal_struct(p->signal);
bad_fork_cleanup_sighand:
__cleanup_sighand(p->sighand);
bad_fork_cleanup_fs:
exit_fs(p); /* blocking */
bad_fork_cleanup_files:
exit_files(p); /* blocking */
bad_fork_cleanup_semundo:
exit_sem(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_audit:
audit_free(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_policy:
perf_event_free_task(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
mpol_put(p->mempolicy);
bad_fork_cleanup_cgroup:
#endif
cgroup_exit(p, cgroup_callbacks_done);
delayacct_tsk_free(p);
module_put(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module);
bad_fork_cleanup_count:
atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes);
exit_creds(p);
bad_fork_free:
free_task(p);
fork_out:
return ERR_PTR(retval);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IndexedDBTransaction::UnregisterOpenCursor(IndexedDBCursor* cursor) {
open_cursors_.erase(cursor);
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool IsDangerousHTTPEquiv(const String& value) {
String equiv = value.StripWhiteSpace();
return DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(equiv, "refresh") ||
DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(equiv, "set-cookie");
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 147,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXObject::updateCachedAttributeValuesIfNeeded() const {
if (isDetached())
return;
AXObjectCacheImpl& cache = axObjectCache();
if (cache.modificationCount() == m_lastModificationCount)
return;
m_lastModificationCount = cache.modificationCount();
m_cachedBackgroundColor = computeBackgroundColor();
m_cachedIsInertOrAriaHidden = computeIsInertOrAriaHidden();
m_cachedIsDescendantOfLeafNode = (leafNodeAncestor() != 0);
m_cachedIsDescendantOfDisabledNode = (disabledAncestor() != 0);
m_cachedHasInheritedPresentationalRole =
(inheritsPresentationalRoleFrom() != 0);
m_cachedIsPresentationalChild =
(ancestorForWhichThisIsAPresentationalChild() != 0);
m_cachedIsIgnored = computeAccessibilityIsIgnored();
m_cachedLiveRegionRoot =
isLiveRegion()
? const_cast<AXObject*>(this)
: (parentObjectIfExists() ? parentObjectIfExists()->liveRegionRoot()
: 0);
m_cachedAncestorExposesActiveDescendant =
computeAncestorExposesActiveDescendant();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit ObjectNode(Object* obj) : obj_(obj) {}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ShouldCompleteDownload(
DownloadItem* item,
const base::Closure& user_complete_callback) {
return IsDownloadReadyForCompletion(item, base::Bind(
&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ShouldCompleteDownloadInternal, this,
item->GetId(), user_complete_callback));
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_jcxz(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
if (address_mask(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX)) == 0)
rc = jmp_rel(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParamTraits<ListValue>::Write(Message* m, const param_type& p) {
WriteValue(m, &p, 0);
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: views::Widget* BrowserView::GetWidget() {
return View::GetWidget();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OutOfProcessInstance::LoadUrlInternal(
const std::string& url,
pp::URLLoader* loader,
void (OutOfProcessInstance::* method)(int32_t)) {
pp::URLRequestInfo request(this);
request.SetURL(url);
request.SetMethod("GET");
*loader = CreateURLLoaderInternal();
pp::CompletionCallback callback = loader_factory_.NewCallback(method);
int rv = loader->Open(request, callback);
if (rv != PP_OK_COMPLETIONPENDING)
callback.Run(rv);
}
Commit Message: Prevent leaking PDF data cross-origin
BUG=520422
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1311973002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#345267}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 129,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnDocumentOnLoadCompleted() {
delegate_->DocumentOnLoadCompleted(this);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppendCopyOf(int pos, int size) {
target_.AppendCopyOf(data_->data() + pos, size);
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void atmpvc_exit(void)
{
sock_unregister(PF_ATMPVC);
}
Commit Message: atm: fix info leak via getsockname()
The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 94,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LockScreenMediaControlsView::CreateMediaButton(
int size,
MediaSessionAction action,
const base::string16& accessible_name) {
auto button = views::CreateVectorImageButton(this);
button->set_tag(static_cast<int>(action));
button->SetPreferredSize(kMediaButtonSize);
button->SetAccessibleName(accessible_name);
button->SetFocusBehavior(views::View::FocusBehavior::ALWAYS);
views::SetImageFromVectorIcon(button.get(),
GetVectorIconForMediaAction(action), size,
kMediaButtonColor);
button_row_->AddChildView(std::move(button));
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void kvmppc_set_vsr_dword_dump(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u64 gpr)
{
union kvmppc_one_reg val;
int index = vcpu->arch.io_gpr & KVM_MMIO_REG_MASK;
if (vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_tx_sx_enabled) {
val.vval = VCPU_VSX_VR(vcpu, index);
val.vsxval[0] = gpr;
val.vsxval[1] = gpr;
VCPU_VSX_VR(vcpu, index) = val.vval;
} else {
VCPU_VSX_FPR(vcpu, index, 0) = gpr;
VCPU_VSX_FPR(vcpu, index, 1) = gpr;
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage void do_cpu(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int __user *epc;
unsigned long old_epc;
unsigned int opcode;
unsigned int cpid;
int status;
unsigned long __maybe_unused flags;
die_if_kernel("do_cpu invoked from kernel context!", regs);
cpid = (regs->cp0_cause >> CAUSEB_CE) & 3;
switch (cpid) {
case 0:
epc = (unsigned int __user *)exception_epc(regs);
old_epc = regs->cp0_epc;
opcode = 0;
status = -1;
if (unlikely(compute_return_epc(regs) < 0))
return;
if (unlikely(get_user(opcode, epc) < 0))
status = SIGSEGV;
if (!cpu_has_llsc && status < 0)
status = simulate_llsc(regs, opcode);
if (status < 0)
status = simulate_rdhwr(regs, opcode);
if (status < 0)
status = SIGILL;
if (unlikely(status > 0)) {
regs->cp0_epc = old_epc; /* Undo skip-over. */
force_sig(status, current);
}
return;
case 1:
if (used_math()) /* Using the FPU again. */
own_fpu(1);
else { /* First time FPU user. */
init_fpu();
set_used_math();
}
if (!raw_cpu_has_fpu) {
int sig;
void __user *fault_addr = NULL;
sig = fpu_emulator_cop1Handler(regs,
¤t->thread.fpu,
0, &fault_addr);
if (!process_fpemu_return(sig, fault_addr))
mt_ase_fp_affinity();
}
return;
case 2:
raw_notifier_call_chain(&cu2_chain, CU2_EXCEPTION, regs);
return;
case 3:
break;
}
force_sig(SIGILL, current);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct key *old;
might_sleep();
/* create an empty session keyring */
if (!keyring) {
flags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN;
if (cred->session_keyring)
flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid, cred,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
} else {
__key_get(keyring);
}
/* install the keyring */
old = cred->session_keyring;
rcu_assign_pointer(cred->session_keyring, keyring);
if (old)
key_put(old);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring()
This fixes CVE-2016-0728.
If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
int i = 0;
key_serial_t serial;
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
/proc/keys:
3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty
with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.
Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 55,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: live_consensus_is_missing(const guard_selection_t *gs)
{
tor_assert(gs);
if (gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE) {
/* We don't update bridges from the consensus; they aren't there. */
return 0;
}
return networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time()) == NULL;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PointerEventActivates(const ui::Event& event) {
if (event.type() == ui::ET_MOUSE_PRESSED)
return true;
if (event.type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_BEGIN) {
const ui::GestureEvent& gesture =
static_cast<const ui::GestureEvent&>(event);
return gesture.details().touch_points() == 1;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnWebIntentDispatchCompleted(
const FilePath& file_path,
webkit_glue::WebIntentReplyType intent_reply) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DeleteFile, file_path));
}
Commit Message: For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PreconnectManager::AllPreresolvesForUrlFinished(PreresolveInfo* info) {
DCHECK(info);
DCHECK(info->is_done());
auto it = preresolve_info_.find(info->url.host());
DCHECK(it != preresolve_info_.end());
DCHECK(info == it->second.get());
if (delegate_)
delegate_->PreconnectFinished(std::move(info->stats));
preresolve_info_.erase(it);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CStarter::SSHDFailed(Stream *s,char const *fmt,...)
{
va_list args;
va_start( args, fmt );
vSSHDFailed(s,false,fmt,args);
va_end( args );
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t shmem_file_aio_read(struct kiocb *iocb,
const struct iovec *iov, unsigned long nr_segs, loff_t pos)
{
struct file *filp = iocb->ki_filp;
ssize_t retval;
unsigned long seg;
size_t count;
loff_t *ppos = &iocb->ki_pos;
retval = generic_segment_checks(iov, &nr_segs, &count, VERIFY_WRITE);
if (retval)
return retval;
for (seg = 0; seg < nr_segs; seg++) {
read_descriptor_t desc;
desc.written = 0;
desc.arg.buf = iov[seg].iov_base;
desc.count = iov[seg].iov_len;
if (desc.count == 0)
continue;
desc.error = 0;
do_shmem_file_read(filp, ppos, &desc, file_read_actor);
retval += desc.written;
if (desc.error) {
retval = retval ?: desc.error;
break;
}
if (desc.count > 0)
break;
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::AllowedToUseDynamicMarkUpInsertion(
const char* api_name,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::ExperimentalProductivityFeaturesEnabled()) {
return true;
}
if (!frame_ || IsFeatureEnabled(mojom::FeaturePolicyFeature::kDocumentWrite,
ReportOptions::kReportOnFailure)) {
return true;
}
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kNotAllowedError,
String::Format(
"The use of method '%s' has been blocked by feature policy. The "
"feature "
"'document-write' is disabled in this document.",
api_name));
return false;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SplitStringAlongWhitespace(const string16& str,
std::vector<string16>* result) {
SplitStringAlongWhitespaceT(str, result);
}
Commit Message: wstring: remove wstring version of SplitString
Retry of r84336.
BUG=23581
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6930047
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@84355 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuProcessHost::GetProcessHandles(
const GpuDataManager::GetGpuProcessHandlesCallback& callback) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO)) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GpuProcessHost::GetProcessHandles, callback));
return;
}
std::list<base::ProcessHandle> handles;
for (int i = 0; i < GPU_PROCESS_KIND_COUNT; ++i) {
GpuProcessHost* host = g_gpu_process_hosts[i];
if (host && HostIsValid(host))
handles.push_back(host->process_->GetHandle());
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(callback, handles));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xdr_terminate_string(struct xdr_buf *buf, const u32 len)
{
char *kaddr;
kaddr = kmap_atomic(buf->pages[0], KM_USER0);
kaddr[buf->page_base + len] = '\0';
kunmap_atomic(kaddr, KM_USER0);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WallpaperManagerBase::CustomizedWallpaperRescaledFiles::path_rescaled_large()
const {
return path_rescaled_large_;
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 128,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnDidDownloadImage(
int id,
int http_status_code,
const GURL& image_url,
const std::vector<SkBitmap>& bitmaps,
const std::vector<gfx::Size>& original_bitmap_sizes) {
ImageDownloadMap::iterator iter = image_download_map_.find(id);
if (iter == image_download_map_.end()) {
return;
}
if (!iter->second.is_null()) {
iter->second.Run(
id, http_status_code, image_url, bitmaps, original_bitmap_sizes);
}
image_download_map_.erase(id);
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int megasas_io_attach(struct megasas_instance *instance)
{
struct Scsi_Host *host = instance->host;
/*
* Export parameters required by SCSI mid-layer
*/
host->unique_id = instance->unique_id;
host->can_queue = instance->max_scsi_cmds;
host->this_id = instance->init_id;
host->sg_tablesize = instance->max_num_sge;
if (instance->fw_support_ieee)
instance->max_sectors_per_req = MEGASAS_MAX_SECTORS_IEEE;
/*
* Check if the module parameter value for max_sectors can be used
*/
if (max_sectors && max_sectors < instance->max_sectors_per_req)
instance->max_sectors_per_req = max_sectors;
else {
if (max_sectors) {
if (((instance->pdev->device ==
PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS1078GEN2) ||
(instance->pdev->device ==
PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_SAS0079GEN2)) &&
(max_sectors <= MEGASAS_MAX_SECTORS)) {
instance->max_sectors_per_req = max_sectors;
} else {
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev, "max_sectors should be > 0"
"and <= %d (or < 1MB for GEN2 controller)\n",
instance->max_sectors_per_req);
}
}
}
host->max_sectors = instance->max_sectors_per_req;
host->cmd_per_lun = MEGASAS_DEFAULT_CMD_PER_LUN;
host->max_channel = MEGASAS_MAX_CHANNELS - 1;
host->max_id = MEGASAS_MAX_DEV_PER_CHANNEL;
host->max_lun = MEGASAS_MAX_LUN;
host->max_cmd_len = 16;
/*
* Notify the mid-layer about the new controller
*/
if (scsi_add_host(host, &instance->pdev->dev)) {
dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev,
"Failed to add host from %s %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__);
return -ENODEV;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument::IsCompleteForPayment() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FilePath GDataCache::GetCacheDirectoryPath(
CacheSubDirectoryType sub_dir_type) const {
DCHECK_LE(0, sub_dir_type);
DCHECK_GT(NUM_CACHE_TYPES, sub_dir_type);
return cache_paths_[sub_dir_type];
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 105,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cqspi_config_baudrate_div(struct cqspi_st *cqspi)
{
const unsigned int ref_clk_hz = cqspi->master_ref_clk_hz;
void __iomem *reg_base = cqspi->iobase;
u32 reg, div;
/* Recalculate the baudrate divisor based on QSPI specification. */
div = DIV_ROUND_UP(ref_clk_hz, 2 * cqspi->sclk) - 1;
reg = readl(reg_base + CQSPI_REG_CONFIG);
reg &= ~(CQSPI_REG_CONFIG_BAUD_MASK << CQSPI_REG_CONFIG_BAUD_LSB);
reg |= (div & CQSPI_REG_CONFIG_BAUD_MASK) << CQSPI_REG_CONFIG_BAUD_LSB;
writel(reg, reg_base + CQSPI_REG_CONFIG);
}
Commit Message: mtd: spi-nor: Off by one in cqspi_setup_flash()
There are CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT elements in the ->f_pdata array so the >
should be >=.
Fixes: 140623410536 ('mtd: spi-nor: Add driver for Cadence Quad SPI Flash Controller')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen@atmel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int copy_user_to_fpregs_zeroing(void __user *buf, u64 xbv, int fx_only)
{
if (use_xsave()) {
if ((unsigned long)buf % 64 || fx_only) {
u64 init_bv = xfeatures_mask & ~XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE;
copy_kernel_to_xregs(&init_fpstate.xsave, init_bv);
return copy_user_to_fxregs(buf);
} else {
u64 init_bv = xfeatures_mask & ~xbv;
if (unlikely(init_bv))
copy_kernel_to_xregs(&init_fpstate.xsave, init_bv);
return copy_user_to_xregs(buf, xbv);
}
} else if (use_fxsr()) {
return copy_user_to_fxregs(buf);
} else
return copy_user_to_fregs(buf);
}
Commit Message: x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to
set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers. ptrace() can
set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with
NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task.
In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel
assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the
CPU can restore it.
However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate
format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable),
it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the
xstate_header to an arbitrary value. However, all bits in that field
are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with
nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault. This
caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit. In
addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from
the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked.
Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in
the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise.
The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it
with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly)
provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted
format.
Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state.
This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be
better to return an error before changing anything. But it seems the
"clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to
do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full
userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user().
This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned
WARN_ON_FPU():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000
RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0
RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40
FS: 00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff <0f> ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f
Here is a C reproducer. The expected behavior is that the program spin
forever with no output. However, on a buggy kernel running on a
processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature
(e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two
the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not
restored correctly. With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above
kernel warning.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();
uint64_t xstate[512];
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) };
if (pid == 0) {
bool tracee = true;
for (int i = 0; i < sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) && tracee; i++)
tracee = (fork() != 0);
uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF };
asm volatile(" movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n"
" mov %0, %%rbx\n"
"1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n"
" mov %0, %%rax\n"
" cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n"
" je 1b\n"
: "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0");
printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted! tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n",
tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]);
} else {
usleep(100000);
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
xstate[65] = -1;
ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call.
The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but
only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the
kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR
directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking).
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.17+]
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Fixes: 0b29643a5843 ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-25-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 60,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret)
{
unsigned int i,m;
unsigned int n;
BN_ULONG l;
BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
if (ret == NULL)
ret = bn = BN_new();
if (ret == NULL) return(NULL);
bn_check_top(ret);
l=0;
n=len;
if (n == 0)
{
ret->top=0;
return(ret);
}
i=((n-1)/BN_BYTES)+1;
m=((n-1)%(BN_BYTES));
if (bn_wexpand(ret, (int)i) == NULL)
{
if (bn) BN_free(bn);
return NULL;
}
ret->top=i;
ret->neg=0;
while (n--)
{
l=(l<<8L)| *(s++);
if (m-- == 0)
{
ret->d[--i]=l;
l=0;
m=BN_BYTES-1;
}
}
/* need to call this due to clear byte at top if avoiding
* having the top bit set (-ve number) */
bn_correct_top(ret);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 14,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_test_interrupt(struct tg3 *tp)
{
struct tg3_napi *tnapi = &tp->napi[0];
struct net_device *dev = tp->dev;
int err, i, intr_ok = 0;
u32 val;
if (!netif_running(dev))
return -ENODEV;
tg3_disable_ints(tp);
free_irq(tnapi->irq_vec, tnapi);
/*
* Turn off MSI one shot mode. Otherwise this test has no
* observable way to know whether the interrupt was delivered.
*/
if (tg3_flag(tp, 57765_PLUS)) {
val = tr32(MSGINT_MODE) | MSGINT_MODE_ONE_SHOT_DISABLE;
tw32(MSGINT_MODE, val);
}
err = request_irq(tnapi->irq_vec, tg3_test_isr,
IRQF_SHARED, dev->name, tnapi);
if (err)
return err;
tnapi->hw_status->status &= ~SD_STATUS_UPDATED;
tg3_enable_ints(tp);
tw32_f(HOSTCC_MODE, tp->coalesce_mode | HOSTCC_MODE_ENABLE |
tnapi->coal_now);
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
u32 int_mbox, misc_host_ctrl;
int_mbox = tr32_mailbox(tnapi->int_mbox);
misc_host_ctrl = tr32(TG3PCI_MISC_HOST_CTRL);
if ((int_mbox != 0) ||
(misc_host_ctrl & MISC_HOST_CTRL_MASK_PCI_INT)) {
intr_ok = 1;
break;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, 57765_PLUS) &&
tnapi->hw_status->status_tag != tnapi->last_tag)
tw32_mailbox_f(tnapi->int_mbox, tnapi->last_tag << 24);
msleep(10);
}
tg3_disable_ints(tp);
free_irq(tnapi->irq_vec, tnapi);
err = tg3_request_irq(tp, 0);
if (err)
return err;
if (intr_ok) {
/* Reenable MSI one shot mode. */
if (tg3_flag(tp, 57765_PLUS) && tg3_flag(tp, 1SHOT_MSI)) {
val = tr32(MSGINT_MODE) & ~MSGINT_MODE_ONE_SHOT_DISABLE;
tw32(MSGINT_MODE, val);
}
return 0;
}
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::ClearInspectorSettings(RenderViewHost* rvh) {
RenderViewHostDelegateHelper::ClearInspectorSettings(
rvh->process()->profile());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *register_insert_filter_hook(cmd_parms *cmd, void *_cfg,
const char *file,
const char *function)
{
return "LuaHookInsertFilter not yet implemented";
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int PE_(bin_pe_get_claimed_checksum)(struct PE_(r_bin_pe_obj_t)* bin) {
if (!bin || !bin->optional_header) {
return 0;
}
return bin->optional_header->CheckSum;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in pe
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void setup_dell_poweredge_oem_data_handler(struct smi_info *smi_info)
{
struct ipmi_device_id *id = &smi_info->device_id;
if (id->manufacturer_id == DELL_IANA_MFR_ID) {
if (id->device_id == DELL_POWEREDGE_8G_BMC_DEVICE_ID &&
id->device_revision == DELL_POWEREDGE_8G_BMC_DEVICE_REV &&
id->ipmi_version == DELL_POWEREDGE_8G_BMC_IPMI_VERSION) {
smi_info->oem_data_avail_handler =
oem_data_avail_to_receive_msg_avail;
} else if (ipmi_version_major(id) < 1 ||
(ipmi_version_major(id) == 1 &&
ipmi_version_minor(id) < 5)) {
smi_info->oem_data_avail_handler =
oem_data_avail_to_receive_msg_avail;
}
}
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 90,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_end_io(struct multipath *m, struct request *clone,
int error, struct dm_mpath_io *mpio)
{
/*
* We don't queue any clone request inside the multipath target
* during end I/O handling, since those clone requests don't have
* bio clones. If we queue them inside the multipath target,
* we need to make bio clones, that requires memory allocation.
* (See drivers/md/dm.c:end_clone_bio() about why the clone requests
* don't have bio clones.)
* Instead of queueing the clone request here, we queue the original
* request into dm core, which will remake a clone request and
* clone bios for it and resubmit it later.
*/
int r = DM_ENDIO_REQUEUE;
unsigned long flags;
if (!error && !clone->errors)
return 0; /* I/O complete */
if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP || error == -EREMOTEIO || error == -EILSEQ)
return error;
if (mpio->pgpath)
fail_path(mpio->pgpath);
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
if (!m->nr_valid_paths) {
if (!m->queue_if_no_path) {
if (!__must_push_back(m))
r = -EIO;
} else {
if (error == -EBADE)
r = error;
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
return r;
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,584 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.