instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm,
unsigned long flags, struct key *dest)
{
struct key *keyring;
int ret;
keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, description,
uid, gid, cred, perm, flags);
if (!IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, dest, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
key_put(keyring);
keyring = ERR_PTR(ret);
}
}
return keyring;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: ensure we free the assoc array edit if edit is valid
__key_link_end is not freeing the associated array edit structure
and this leads to a 512 byte memory leak each time an identical
existing key is added with add_key().
The reason the add_key() system call returns okay is that
key_create_or_update() calls __key_link_begin() before checking to see
whether it can update a key directly rather than adding/replacing - which
it turns out it can. Thus __key_link() is not called through
__key_instantiate_and_link() and __key_link_end() must cancel the edit.
CVE-2015-1333
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 44,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ppp_channel_push(struct channel *pch)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ppp *ppp;
spin_lock_bh(&pch->downl);
if (pch->chan) {
while (!skb_queue_empty(&pch->file.xq)) {
skb = skb_dequeue(&pch->file.xq);
if (!pch->chan->ops->start_xmit(pch->chan, skb)) {
/* put the packet back and try again later */
skb_queue_head(&pch->file.xq, skb);
break;
}
}
} else {
/* channel got deregistered */
skb_queue_purge(&pch->file.xq);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&pch->downl);
/* see if there is anything from the attached unit to be sent */
if (skb_queue_empty(&pch->file.xq)) {
read_lock_bh(&pch->upl);
ppp = pch->ppp;
if (ppp)
ppp_xmit_process(ppp);
read_unlock_bh(&pch->upl);
}
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 52,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameView::removeScrollableArea(ScrollableArea* scrollableArea)
{
if (!m_scrollableAreas)
return;
m_scrollableAreas->remove(scrollableArea);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int is_qtext(char ch)
{
unsigned char uch = (unsigned char) ch;
if (is_no_ws_ctl(ch))
return TRUE;
if (uch < 33)
return FALSE;
if (uch == 34)
return FALSE;
if (uch == 92)
return FALSE;
if (uch == 127)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 66,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zone_set_script(int zone_index, script_t* script)
{
script_t* old_script;
struct map_zone* zone;
zone = vector_get(s_map->zones, zone_index);
old_script = zone->script;
zone->script = script_ref(script);
script_unref(old_script);
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::setChecked(bool nowChecked, TextFieldEventBehavior eventBehavior)
{
if (checked() == nowChecked)
return;
m_reflectsCheckedAttribute = false;
m_isChecked = nowChecked;
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
if (CheckedRadioButtons* buttons = checkedRadioButtons())
buttons->updateCheckedState(this);
if (renderer() && renderer()->style()->hasAppearance())
RenderTheme::theme().stateChanged(renderer(), CheckedState);
setNeedsValidityCheck();
if (renderer()) {
if (AXObjectCache* cache = renderer()->document().existingAXObjectCache())
cache->checkedStateChanged(this);
}
if (eventBehavior != DispatchNoEvent && inDocument() && m_inputType->shouldSendChangeEventAfterCheckedChanged()) {
setTextAsOfLastFormControlChangeEvent(String());
dispatchFormControlChangeEvent();
}
didAffectSelector(AffectedSelectorChecked);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ATSParser::Program::signalEOS(status_t finalResult) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < mStreams.size(); ++i) {
mStreams.editValueAt(i)->signalEOS(finalResult);
}
}
Commit Message: Check section size when verifying CRC
Bug: 28333006
Change-Id: Ief7a2da848face78f0edde21e2f2009316076679
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void logit(int data_type, int display, const char *fmt, ...) {
va_list ap;
char *buffer = NULL;
va_start(ap, fmt);
if(vasprintf(&buffer, fmt, ap) > 0) {
write_to_logs_and_console(buffer, data_type, display);
free(buffer);
}
va_end(ap);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'maint'
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 48,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipmr_mfc_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct ipmr_mfc_iter *it = seq->private;
struct mr6_table *mrt = it->mrt;
if (it->cache == &mrt->mfc6_unres_queue)
spin_unlock_bh(&mfc_unres_lock);
else if (it->cache == &mrt->mfc6_cache_array[it->ct])
read_unlock(&mrt_lock);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 93,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static EAS_RESULT PushcdlStack (EAS_U32 *pStack, EAS_INT *pStackPtr, EAS_U32 value)
{
/* stack overflow, return an error */
if (*pStackPtr >= CDL_STACK_SIZE)
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
/* push the value onto the stack */
*pStackPtr = *pStackPtr + 1;
pStack[*pStackPtr] = value;
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: eas_mdls: fix OOB read.
Bug: 34031018
Change-Id: I8d373c905f64286b23ec819bdbee51368b12e85a
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigatorImpl::DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError_Params& params) {
VLOG(1) << "Failed Provisional Load: " << params.url.possibly_invalid_spec()
<< ", error_code: " << params.error_code
<< ", error_description: " << params.error_description
<< ", showing_repost_interstitial: "
<< params.showing_repost_interstitial
<< ", frame_id: " << render_frame_host->GetRoutingID();
GURL validated_url(params.url);
RenderProcessHost* render_process_host = render_frame_host->GetProcess();
render_process_host->FilterURL(false, &validated_url);
if (net::ERR_ABORTED == params.error_code) {
if (delegate_ && delegate_->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Discarding message during interstitial.";
return;
}
}
int expected_pending_entry_id =
render_frame_host->GetNavigationHandle()
? render_frame_host->GetNavigationHandle()->pending_nav_entry_id()
: 0;
DiscardPendingEntryIfNeeded(expected_pending_entry_id);
}
Commit Message: Don't preserve NavigationEntry for failed navigations with invalid URLs.
The formatting logic may rewrite such URLs into an unsafe state. This
is a first step before preventing navigations to invalid URLs entirely.
Bug: 850824
Change-Id: I71743bfb4b610d55ce901ee8902125f934a2bb23
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1252942
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597304}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayoutBlockFlow::adjustPositionedBlock(LayoutBox& child, const MarginInfo& marginInfo)
{
LayoutUnit logicalTop = logicalHeight();
updateStaticInlinePositionForChild(child, logicalTop);
if (!marginInfo.canCollapseWithMarginBefore()) {
LayoutUnit collapsedBeforePos = marginInfo.positiveMargin();
LayoutUnit collapsedBeforeNeg = marginInfo.negativeMargin();
logicalTop += collapsedBeforePos - collapsedBeforeNeg;
}
PaintLayer* childLayer = child.layer();
if (childLayer->staticBlockPosition() != logicalTop)
childLayer->setStaticBlockPosition(logicalTop);
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 122,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE OMX::OnEmptyBufferDone(
node_id node, buffer_id buffer, OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *pBuffer, int fenceFd) {
ALOGV("OnEmptyBufferDone buffer=%p", pBuffer);
omx_message msg;
msg.type = omx_message::EMPTY_BUFFER_DONE;
msg.node = node;
msg.fenceFd = fenceFd;
msg.u.buffer_data.buffer = buffer;
findDispatcher(node)->post(msg);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 160,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void display_motd() {
FILE *fp;
int c;
if ((fp = fopen("/etc/motd", "r"))) {
while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF) {
putchar(c);
}
fclose(fp);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void lzh_free(struct kwajd_stream *lzh)
{
struct mspack_system *sys;
if (!lzh || !lzh->sys) return;
sys = lzh->sys;
sys->free(lzh);
}
Commit Message: kwaj_read_headers(): fix handling of non-terminated strings
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 79,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::NativeView OmniboxViewWin::GetRelativeWindowForNativeView(
gfx::NativeView edit_native_view) {
HWND ime_window = ImmGetDefaultIMEWnd(edit_native_view);
return ime_window ? ime_window : HWND_NOTOPMOST;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gsm_xsmp_server_set_client_store (GsmXsmpServer *xsmp_server,
GsmStore *store)
{
g_return_if_fail (GSM_IS_XSMP_SERVER (xsmp_server));
if (store != NULL) {
g_object_ref (store);
}
if (xsmp_server->priv->client_store != NULL) {
g_object_unref (xsmp_server->priv->client_store);
}
xsmp_server->priv->client_store = store;
}
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 63,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const CLSID& GetToastActivatorClsid() {
return InstallDetails::Get().toast_activator_clsid();
}
Commit Message: Ignore switches following "--" when parsing a command line.
BUG=933004
R=wfh@chromium.org
Change-Id: I911be4cbfc38a4d41dec85d85f7fe0f50ddca392
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481210
Auto-Submit: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634604}
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 152,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hns_xgmac_set_tx_auto_pause_frames(void *mac_drv, u16 enable)
{
struct mac_driver *drv = (struct mac_driver *)mac_drv;
dsaf_set_dev_bit(drv, XGMAC_MAC_PAUSE_CTRL_REG,
XGMAC_PAUSE_CTL_TX_B, !!enable);
/*if enable is not zero ,set tx pause time */
if (enable)
dsaf_write_dev(drv, XGMAC_MAC_PAUSE_TIME_REG, enable);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::SendUpdateFaviconURL(
blink::WebIconURL::Type icon_types_mask) {
if (frame_->Parent())
return;
WebVector<blink::WebIconURL> icon_urls = frame_->IconURLs(icon_types_mask);
if (icon_urls.empty())
return;
std::vector<FaviconURL> urls;
urls.reserve(icon_urls.size());
for (const blink::WebIconURL& icon_url : icon_urls) {
urls.push_back(FaviconURL(icon_url.GetIconURL(),
ToFaviconType(icon_url.IconType()),
ConvertToFaviconSizes(icon_url.Sizes())));
}
DCHECK_EQ(icon_urls.size(), urls.size());
Send(new FrameHostMsg_UpdateFaviconURL(GetRoutingID(), urls));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: URLRequestContext* BrowserContextIOData::CreateMainRequestContext(
content::ProtocolHandlerMap& protocol_handlers,
content::URLRequestInterceptorScopedVector request_interceptors) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(!main_request_context_);
std::unique_ptr<net::CookieStore> cookie_store;
scoped_refptr<net::SQLiteChannelIDStore> channel_id_store;
if (!IsOffTheRecord() && !GetPath().empty()) {
cookie_store =
content::CreateCookieStore(
content::CookieStoreConfig(GetPath().Append(kCookiesFilename),
GetSessionCookieMode(),
nullptr, nullptr));
channel_id_store =
new net::SQLiteChannelIDStore(
GetPath().Append(kChannelIDFilename),
content::BrowserThread::GetBlockingPool()->GetSequencedTaskRunner(
base::SequencedWorkerPool::GetSequenceToken()));
} else {
cookie_store = content::CreateCookieStore(content::CookieStoreConfig());
}
cookie_store_owner_->set_store(std::move(cookie_store));
IOThread::Globals* io_thread_globals = IOThread::instance()->globals();
ssl_config_service_ = new SSLConfigService();
http_user_agent_settings_.reset(new HttpUserAgentSettings(this));
ftp_transaction_factory_.reset(
new net::FtpNetworkLayer(io_thread_globals->host_resolver()));
http_server_properties_.reset(new net::HttpServerPropertiesImpl());
network_delegate_.reset(new NetworkDelegate(this));
transport_security_state_.reset(new net::TransportSecurityState());
transport_security_persister_.reset(
new net::TransportSecurityPersister(
transport_security_state_.get(),
GetPath(),
content::BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(
content::BrowserThread::FILE),
IsOffTheRecord()));
host_mapping_rules_.reset(new net::HostMappingRules());
const std::vector<std::string>& host_mapping_rules =
GetSharedData().host_mapping_rules;
for (std::vector<std::string>::const_iterator it =
host_mapping_rules.begin();
it != host_mapping_rules.end(); ++it) {
host_mapping_rules_->AddRuleFromString(*it);
}
main_request_context_.reset(new URLRequestContext());
URLRequestContext* context = main_request_context_.get();
net::URLRequestContextStorage* storage = context->storage();
storage->set_ssl_config_service(ssl_config_service_.get());
context->set_network_delegate(network_delegate_.get());
context->set_http_user_agent_settings(http_user_agent_settings_.get());
storage->set_channel_id_service(
base::MakeUnique<net::ChannelIDService>(
new net::DefaultChannelIDStore(channel_id_store.get()),
base::WorkerPool::GetTaskRunner(true)));
context->set_http_server_properties(http_server_properties_.get());
context->set_cookie_store(cookie_store_owner_->store());
context->set_transport_security_state(transport_security_state_.get());
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(
content::BrowserThread::FILE,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&CleanupOldCacheDir, GetCachePath().Append(kCacheDirname)));
std::unique_ptr<net::HttpCache::BackendFactory> cache_backend;
if (IsOffTheRecord() || GetCachePath().empty()) {
cache_backend = net::HttpCache::DefaultBackend::InMemory(0);
} else {
cache_backend.reset(new net::HttpCache::DefaultBackend(
net::DISK_CACHE,
net::CACHE_BACKEND_SIMPLE,
GetCachePath().Append(kCacheDirname2),
GetMaxCacheSizeHint() * 1024 * 1024, // MB -> bytes
content::BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(
content::BrowserThread::CACHE)));
}
net::HttpNetworkSession::Params session_params;
session_params.host_resolver = context->host_resolver();
session_params.cert_verifier = context->cert_verifier();
session_params.channel_id_service = context->channel_id_service();
session_params.transport_security_state =
context->transport_security_state();
session_params.cert_transparency_verifier =
context->cert_transparency_verifier();
session_params.ct_policy_enforcer = context->ct_policy_enforcer();
session_params.proxy_service = context->proxy_service();
session_params.ssl_config_service = context->ssl_config_service();
session_params.http_auth_handler_factory =
context->http_auth_handler_factory();
session_params.http_server_properties =
context->http_server_properties();
session_params.net_log = context->net_log();
session_params.host_mapping_rules = host_mapping_rules_.get();
http_network_session_ =
base::WrapUnique(new net::HttpNetworkSession(session_params));
{
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
storage->set_http_transaction_factory(
base::WrapUnique(
new net::HttpCache(http_network_session_.get(),
std::move(cache_backend),
true)));
}
std::unique_ptr<net::URLRequestJobFactoryImpl> job_factory(
new net::URLRequestJobFactoryImpl());
bool set_protocol = false;
for (content::ProtocolHandlerMap::iterator it = protocol_handlers.begin();
it != protocol_handlers.end();
++it) {
set_protocol =
job_factory->SetProtocolHandler(it->first,
base::WrapUnique(it->second.release()));
DCHECK(set_protocol);
}
protocol_handlers.clear();
set_protocol = job_factory->SetProtocolHandler(
oxide::kFileScheme,
base::WrapUnique(
new net::FileProtocolHandler(
content::BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(
content::BrowserThread::FILE))));
DCHECK(set_protocol);
set_protocol = job_factory->SetProtocolHandler(
oxide::kDataScheme,
base::WrapUnique(new net::DataProtocolHandler()));
DCHECK(set_protocol);
set_protocol = job_factory->SetProtocolHandler(
oxide::kFtpScheme,
base::WrapUnique(new net::FtpProtocolHandler(
ftp_transaction_factory_.get())));
DCHECK(set_protocol);
std::unique_ptr<net::URLRequestJobFactory> top_job_factory(
new URLRequestDelegatedJobFactory(std::move(job_factory),
this));
for (content::URLRequestInterceptorScopedVector::reverse_iterator it =
request_interceptors.rbegin();
it != request_interceptors.rend();
++it) {
top_job_factory.reset(
new net::URLRequestInterceptingJobFactory(std::move(top_job_factory),
base::WrapUnique(*it)));
}
request_interceptors.weak_clear();
storage->set_job_factory(std::move(top_job_factory));
resource_context_->request_context_ = context;
return main_request_context_.get();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMB2_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses)
{
struct smb2_negotiate_req *req;
struct smb2_negotiate_rsp *rsp;
struct kvec iov[1];
struct kvec rsp_iov;
int rc = 0;
int resp_buftype;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = ses->server;
int blob_offset, blob_length;
char *security_blob;
int flags = CIFS_NEG_OP;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Negotiate protocol\n");
if (!server) {
WARN(1, "%s: server is NULL!\n", __func__);
return -EIO;
}
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_NEGOTIATE, NULL, (void **) &req);
if (rc)
return rc;
req->hdr.sync_hdr.SessionId = 0;
req->Dialects[0] = cpu_to_le16(ses->server->vals->protocol_id);
req->DialectCount = cpu_to_le16(1); /* One vers= at a time for now */
inc_rfc1001_len(req, 2);
/* only one of SMB2 signing flags may be set in SMB2 request */
if (ses->sign)
req->SecurityMode = cpu_to_le16(SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED);
else if (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_SIGN)
req->SecurityMode = cpu_to_le16(SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED);
else
req->SecurityMode = 0;
req->Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(ses->server->vals->req_capabilities);
/* ClientGUID must be zero for SMB2.02 dialect */
if (ses->server->vals->protocol_id == SMB20_PROT_ID)
memset(req->ClientGUID, 0, SMB2_CLIENT_GUID_SIZE);
else {
memcpy(req->ClientGUID, server->client_guid,
SMB2_CLIENT_GUID_SIZE);
if (ses->server->vals->protocol_id == SMB311_PROT_ID)
assemble_neg_contexts(req);
}
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field */
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4;
rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, iov, 1, &resp_buftype, flags, &rsp_iov);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
rsp = (struct smb2_negotiate_rsp *)rsp_iov.iov_base;
/*
* No tcon so can't do
* cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->stats.smb2_stats.smb2_com_fail[SMB2...]);
*/
if (rc != 0)
goto neg_exit;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "mode 0x%x\n", rsp->SecurityMode);
/* BB we may eventually want to match the negotiated vs. requested
dialect, even though we are only requesting one at a time */
if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB20_PROT_ID))
cifs_dbg(FYI, "negotiated smb2.0 dialect\n");
else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB21_PROT_ID))
cifs_dbg(FYI, "negotiated smb2.1 dialect\n");
else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB30_PROT_ID))
cifs_dbg(FYI, "negotiated smb3.0 dialect\n");
else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB302_PROT_ID))
cifs_dbg(FYI, "negotiated smb3.02 dialect\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_SMB311
else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB311_PROT_ID))
cifs_dbg(FYI, "negotiated smb3.1.1 dialect\n");
#endif /* SMB311 */
else {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Illegal dialect returned by server 0x%x\n",
le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision));
rc = -EIO;
goto neg_exit;
}
server->dialect = le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision);
/* SMB2 only has an extended negflavor */
server->negflavor = CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED;
/* set it to the maximum buffer size value we can send with 1 credit */
server->maxBuf = min_t(unsigned int, le32_to_cpu(rsp->MaxTransactSize),
SMB2_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE);
server->max_read = le32_to_cpu(rsp->MaxReadSize);
server->max_write = le32_to_cpu(rsp->MaxWriteSize);
/* BB Do we need to validate the SecurityMode? */
server->sec_mode = le16_to_cpu(rsp->SecurityMode);
server->capabilities = le32_to_cpu(rsp->Capabilities);
/* Internal types */
server->capabilities |= SMB2_NT_FIND | SMB2_LARGE_FILES;
security_blob = smb2_get_data_area_len(&blob_offset, &blob_length,
&rsp->hdr);
/*
* See MS-SMB2 section 2.2.4: if no blob, client picks default which
* for us will be
* ses->sectype = RawNTLMSSP;
* but for time being this is our only auth choice so doesn't matter.
* We just found a server which sets blob length to zero expecting raw.
*/
if (blob_length == 0)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "missing security blob on negprot\n");
rc = cifs_enable_signing(server, ses->sign);
if (rc)
goto neg_exit;
if (blob_length) {
rc = decode_negTokenInit(security_blob, blob_length, server);
if (rc == 1)
rc = 0;
else if (rc == 0)
rc = -EIO;
}
neg_exit:
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 84,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: prng_reset_nonce ()
{
const int size = md_kt_size (nonce_md) + nonce_secret_len;
#if 1 /* Must be 1 for real usage */
if (!rand_bytes (nonce_data, size))
msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: Random number generator cannot obtain entropy for PRNG");
#else
/* Only for testing -- will cause a predictable PRNG sequence */
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < size; ++i)
nonce_data[i] = (uint8_t) i;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Use constant time memcmp when comparing HMACs in openvpn_decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 32,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err stdp_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_DegradationPriorityBox *ptr = (GF_DegradationPriorityBox *)s;
ptr->size += (2 * ptr->nb_entries);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reparent_thread(struct task_struct *p, struct task_struct *father)
{
if (p->pdeath_signal)
/* We already hold the tasklist_lock here. */
group_send_sig_info(p->pdeath_signal, SEND_SIG_NOINFO, p);
list_move_tail(&p->sibling, &p->real_parent->children);
/* If this is a threaded reparent there is no need to
* notify anyone anything has happened.
*/
if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, father))
return;
/* We don't want people slaying init. */
if (!task_detached(p))
p->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
/* If we'd notified the old parent about this child's death,
* also notify the new parent.
*/
if (!ptrace_reparented(p) &&
p->exit_state == EXIT_ZOMBIE &&
!task_detached(p) && thread_group_empty(p))
do_notify_parent(p, p->exit_signal);
kill_orphaned_pgrp(p, father);
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::overrideContainingBlockContentLogicalWidth() const
{
ASSERT(hasOverrideContainingBlockLogicalWidth());
return gOverrideContainingBlockLogicalWidthMap->get(this);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
int i;
a = BN_new();
b = BN_new();
c = BN_new();
d = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
BN_one(a);
BN_one(b);
BN_zero(c);
if (BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
return 0;
}
BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
if (!BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx))
return (0);
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
BN_print(bp, b);
BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
BN_print(bp, c);
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
}
BN_print(bp, d);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
}
BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx);
BN_sub(e, e, d);
BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx);
if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n");
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
BN_zero(c);
if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with zero modulus "
"succeeded\n");
return 0;
}
BN_set_word(c, 16);
if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with even modulus "
"succeeded\n");
return 0;
}
BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL))
return (00);
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
BN_print(bp, b);
BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
BN_print(bp, c);
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
}
BN_print(bp, d);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
}
BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx);
BN_sub(e, e, d);
BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx);
if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n");
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
BN_free(d);
BN_free(e);
return (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 164,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_nothing(request_rec *r) { return OK; }
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormElement::setDemoted(bool demoted) {
if (demoted)
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::DemotedFormElement);
m_wasDemoted = demoted;
}
Commit Message: Enforce form-action CSP even when form.target is present.
BUG=630332
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2464123004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#429922}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 142,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void net_set_todo(struct net_device *dev)
{
list_add_tail(&dev->todo_list, &net_todo_list);
dev_net(dev)->dev_unreg_count++;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PassOwnPtr<FrameProgressTracker> create(Frame* frame) { return adoptPtr(new FrameProgressTracker(frame)); }
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mif6_add(struct net *net, struct mr6_table *mrt,
struct mif6ctl *vifc, int mrtsock)
{
int vifi = vifc->mif6c_mifi;
struct mif_device *v = &mrt->vif6_table[vifi];
struct net_device *dev;
struct inet6_dev *in6_dev;
int err;
/* Is vif busy ? */
if (MIF_EXISTS(mrt, vifi))
return -EADDRINUSE;
switch (vifc->mif6c_flags) {
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_PIMSM_V2
case MIFF_REGISTER:
/*
* Special Purpose VIF in PIM
* All the packets will be sent to the daemon
*/
if (mrt->mroute_reg_vif_num >= 0)
return -EADDRINUSE;
dev = ip6mr_reg_vif(net, mrt);
if (!dev)
return -ENOBUFS;
err = dev_set_allmulti(dev, 1);
if (err) {
unregister_netdevice(dev);
dev_put(dev);
return err;
}
break;
#endif
case 0:
dev = dev_get_by_index(net, vifc->mif6c_pifi);
if (!dev)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
err = dev_set_allmulti(dev, 1);
if (err) {
dev_put(dev);
return err;
}
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
in6_dev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
if (in6_dev) {
in6_dev->cnf.mc_forwarding++;
inet6_netconf_notify_devconf(dev_net(dev),
NETCONFA_MC_FORWARDING,
dev->ifindex, &in6_dev->cnf);
}
/*
* Fill in the VIF structures
*/
v->rate_limit = vifc->vifc_rate_limit;
v->flags = vifc->mif6c_flags;
if (!mrtsock)
v->flags |= VIFF_STATIC;
v->threshold = vifc->vifc_threshold;
v->bytes_in = 0;
v->bytes_out = 0;
v->pkt_in = 0;
v->pkt_out = 0;
v->link = dev->ifindex;
if (v->flags & MIFF_REGISTER)
v->link = dev_get_iflink(dev);
/* And finish update writing critical data */
write_lock_bh(&mrt_lock);
v->dev = dev;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_PIMSM_V2
if (v->flags & MIFF_REGISTER)
mrt->mroute_reg_vif_num = vifi;
#endif
if (vifi + 1 > mrt->maxvif)
mrt->maxvif = vifi + 1;
write_unlock_bh(&mrt_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 93,566 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool checkExifHeader(jpeg_saved_marker_ptr marker, bool& isBigEndian, unsigned& ifdOffset)
{
const unsigned exifHeaderSize = 14;
if (!(marker->marker == exifMarker
&& marker->data_length >= exifHeaderSize
&& marker->data[0] == 'E'
&& marker->data[1] == 'x'
&& marker->data[2] == 'i'
&& marker->data[3] == 'f'
&& marker->data[4] == '\0'
&& ((marker->data[6] == 'I' && marker->data[7] == 'I')
|| (marker->data[6] == 'M' && marker->data[7] == 'M'))))
return false;
isBigEndian = marker->data[6] == 'M';
if (readUint16(marker->data + 8, isBigEndian) != 42)
return false;
ifdOffset = readUint32(marker->data + 10, isBigEndian);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
R=pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: force_sig_info_fault(int si_signo, int si_code, unsigned long address,
struct task_struct *tsk, int fault)
{
unsigned lsb = 0;
siginfo_t info;
info.si_signo = si_signo;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = si_code;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)address;
if (fault & VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE)
lsb = hstate_index_to_shift(VM_FAULT_GET_HINDEX(fault));
if (fault & VM_FAULT_HWPOISON)
lsb = PAGE_SHIFT;
info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
force_sig_info(si_signo, &info, tsk);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String HTMLFormElement::action() const
{
return getAttribute(actionAttr);
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash in HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission.
BUG=297478
TEST=automated with ASAN.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24910003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158428 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static String cachedStorageDirectory(DWORD pathIdentifier)
{
static HashMap<DWORD, String> directories;
HashMap<DWORD, String>::iterator it = directories.find(pathIdentifier);
if (it != directories.end())
return it->value;
String directory = storageDirectory(pathIdentifier);
directories.add(pathIdentifier, directory);
return directory;
}
Commit Message: [WIN] Implement WebCore::fileSystemRepresentation() for !USE(CF)
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=104456
Reviewed by Brent Fulgham.
Convert the UTF-16 path to the system default Windows ANSI code page (usually Windows Latin1).
* platform/win/FileSystemWin.cpp:
(WebCore::fileSystemRepresentation):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137547 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int modbus_report_slave_id(modbus_t *ctx, int max_dest, uint8_t *dest)
{
int rc;
int req_length;
uint8_t req[_MIN_REQ_LENGTH];
if (ctx == NULL || max_dest <= 0) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
req_length = ctx->backend->build_request_basis(ctx, MODBUS_FC_REPORT_SLAVE_ID,
0, 0, req);
/* HACKISH, addr and count are not used */
req_length -= 4;
rc = send_msg(ctx, req, req_length);
if (rc > 0) {
int i;
int offset;
uint8_t rsp[MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH];
rc = _modbus_receive_msg(ctx, rsp, MSG_CONFIRMATION);
if (rc == -1)
return -1;
rc = check_confirmation(ctx, req, rsp, rc);
if (rc == -1)
return -1;
offset = ctx->backend->header_length + 2;
/* Byte count, slave id, run indicator status and
additional data. Truncate copy to max_dest. */
for (i=0; i < rc && i < max_dest; i++) {
dest[i] = rsp[offset + i];
}
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 88,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ecryptfs_encode_for_filename(unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_size,
unsigned char *src, size_t src_size)
{
size_t num_blocks;
size_t block_num = 0;
size_t dst_offset = 0;
unsigned char last_block[3];
if (src_size == 0) {
(*dst_size) = 0;
goto out;
}
num_blocks = (src_size / 3);
if ((src_size % 3) == 0) {
memcpy(last_block, (&src[src_size - 3]), 3);
} else {
num_blocks++;
last_block[2] = 0x00;
switch (src_size % 3) {
case 1:
last_block[0] = src[src_size - 1];
last_block[1] = 0x00;
break;
case 2:
last_block[0] = src[src_size - 2];
last_block[1] = src[src_size - 1];
}
}
(*dst_size) = (num_blocks * 4);
if (!dst)
goto out;
while (block_num < num_blocks) {
unsigned char *src_block;
unsigned char dst_block[4];
if (block_num == (num_blocks - 1))
src_block = last_block;
else
src_block = &src[block_num * 3];
dst_block[0] = ((src_block[0] >> 2) & 0x3F);
dst_block[1] = (((src_block[0] << 4) & 0x30)
| ((src_block[1] >> 4) & 0x0F));
dst_block[2] = (((src_block[1] << 2) & 0x3C)
| ((src_block[2] >> 6) & 0x03));
dst_block[3] = (src_block[2] & 0x3F);
dst[dst_offset++] = portable_filename_chars[dst_block[0]];
dst[dst_offset++] = portable_filename_chars[dst_block[1]];
dst[dst_offset++] = portable_filename_chars[dst_block[2]];
dst[dst_offset++] = portable_filename_chars[dst_block[3]];
block_num++;
}
out:
return;
}
Commit Message: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 45,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void gen_extu(TCGMemOp ot, TCGv reg)
{
gen_ext_tl(reg, reg, ot, false);
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 0 | 66,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostQt::renderNextFrame()
{
m_waitingForUIProcess = false;
scheduleLayerFlush();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebGLId WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::createBuffer() {
GLuint o;
gl_->GenBuffers(1, &o);
return o;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int perf_rotate_context(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = NULL;
int rotate = 0;
if (cpuctx->ctx.nr_events) {
if (cpuctx->ctx.nr_events != cpuctx->ctx.nr_active)
rotate = 1;
}
ctx = cpuctx->task_ctx;
if (ctx && ctx->nr_events) {
if (ctx->nr_events != ctx->nr_active)
rotate = 1;
}
if (!rotate)
goto done;
perf_ctx_lock(cpuctx, cpuctx->task_ctx);
perf_pmu_disable(cpuctx->ctx.pmu);
cpu_ctx_sched_out(cpuctx, EVENT_FLEXIBLE);
if (ctx)
ctx_sched_out(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_FLEXIBLE);
rotate_ctx(&cpuctx->ctx);
if (ctx)
rotate_ctx(ctx);
perf_event_sched_in(cpuctx, ctx, current);
perf_pmu_enable(cpuctx->ctx.pmu);
perf_ctx_unlock(cpuctx, cpuctx->task_ctx);
done:
return rotate;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: webrtc::RTCErrorType RTCPeerConnectionHandler::SetConfiguration(
const webrtc::PeerConnectionInterface::RTCConfiguration& blink_config) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
TRACE_EVENT0("webrtc", "RTCPeerConnectionHandler::setConfiguration");
webrtc::PeerConnectionInterface::RTCConfiguration new_configuration =
configuration_;
new_configuration.servers = blink_config.servers;
new_configuration.type = blink_config.type;
new_configuration.bundle_policy = blink_config.bundle_policy;
new_configuration.rtcp_mux_policy = blink_config.rtcp_mux_policy;
new_configuration.sdp_semantics = blink_config.sdp_semantics;
new_configuration.certificates = blink_config.certificates;
new_configuration.ice_candidate_pool_size =
blink_config.ice_candidate_pool_size;
if (peer_connection_tracker_)
peer_connection_tracker_->TrackSetConfiguration(this, new_configuration);
webrtc::RTCError webrtc_error;
bool ret = native_peer_connection_->SetConfiguration(new_configuration,
&webrtc_error);
DCHECK_EQ(ret, webrtc_error.type() == webrtc::RTCErrorType::NONE);
if (webrtc_error.ok()) {
configuration_ = new_configuration;
}
return webrtc_error.type();
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 153,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _asn1_set_right (asn1_node node, asn1_node right)
{
if (node == NULL)
return node;
node->right = right;
if (right)
{
right->left = node;
if (right->up == NULL)
right->up = node->up;
}
return node;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void init_dequant8_coeff_table(H264Context *h)
{
int i, j, q, x;
const int max_qp = 51 + 6 * (h->sps.bit_depth_luma - 8);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
h->dequant8_coeff[i] = h->dequant8_buffer[i];
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
if (!memcmp(h->pps.scaling_matrix8[j], h->pps.scaling_matrix8[i],
64 * sizeof(uint8_t))) {
h->dequant8_coeff[i] = h->dequant8_buffer[j];
break;
}
if (j < i)
continue;
for (q = 0; q < max_qp + 1; q++) {
int shift = div6[q];
int idx = rem6[q];
for (x = 0; x < 64; x++)
h->dequant8_coeff[i][q][(x >> 3) | ((x & 7) << 3)] =
((uint32_t)dequant8_coeff_init[idx][dequant8_coeff_init_scan[((x >> 1) & 12) | (x & 3)]] *
h->pps.scaling_matrix8[i][x]) << shift;
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::paintCustomHighlight(const LayoutPoint& paintOffset, const AtomicString& type, bool behindText)
{
Frame* frame = this->frame();
if (!frame)
return;
Page* page = frame->page();
if (!page)
return;
InlineBox* boxWrap = inlineBoxWrapper();
RootInlineBox* r = boxWrap ? boxWrap->root() : 0;
if (r) {
FloatRect rootRect(paintOffset.x() + r->x(), paintOffset.y() + r->selectionTop(), r->logicalWidth(), r->selectionHeight());
FloatRect imageRect(paintOffset.x() + x(), rootRect.y(), width(), rootRect.height());
page->chrome()->client()->paintCustomHighlight(node(), type, imageRect, rootRect, behindText, false);
} else {
FloatRect imageRect(paintOffset.x() + x(), paintOffset.y() + y(), width(), height());
page->chrome()->client()->paintCustomHighlight(node(), type, imageRect, imageRect, behindText, false);
}
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContentBrowserClient::AllowAppCache(const GURL& manifest_url,
const GURL& first_party,
ResourceContext* context) {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long sock_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct sock *sk;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int pid, err;
struct net *net;
sock = file->private_data;
sk = sock->sk;
net = sock_net(sk);
if (unlikely(cmd >= SIOCDEVPRIVATE && cmd <= (SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 15))) {
struct ifreq ifr;
bool need_copyout;
if (copy_from_user(&ifr, argp, sizeof(struct ifreq)))
return -EFAULT;
err = dev_ioctl(net, cmd, &ifr, &need_copyout);
if (!err && need_copyout)
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ifr, sizeof(struct ifreq)))
return -EFAULT;
} else
#ifdef CONFIG_WEXT_CORE
if (cmd >= SIOCIWFIRST && cmd <= SIOCIWLAST) {
err = wext_handle_ioctl(net, cmd, argp);
} else
#endif
switch (cmd) {
case FIOSETOWN:
case SIOCSPGRP:
err = -EFAULT;
if (get_user(pid, (int __user *)argp))
break;
err = f_setown(sock->file, pid, 1);
break;
case FIOGETOWN:
case SIOCGPGRP:
err = put_user(f_getown(sock->file),
(int __user *)argp);
break;
case SIOCGIFBR:
case SIOCSIFBR:
case SIOCBRADDBR:
case SIOCBRDELBR:
err = -ENOPKG;
if (!br_ioctl_hook)
request_module("bridge");
mutex_lock(&br_ioctl_mutex);
if (br_ioctl_hook)
err = br_ioctl_hook(net, cmd, argp);
mutex_unlock(&br_ioctl_mutex);
break;
case SIOCGIFVLAN:
case SIOCSIFVLAN:
err = -ENOPKG;
if (!vlan_ioctl_hook)
request_module("8021q");
mutex_lock(&vlan_ioctl_mutex);
if (vlan_ioctl_hook)
err = vlan_ioctl_hook(net, argp);
mutex_unlock(&vlan_ioctl_mutex);
break;
case SIOCADDDLCI:
case SIOCDELDLCI:
err = -ENOPKG;
if (!dlci_ioctl_hook)
request_module("dlci");
mutex_lock(&dlci_ioctl_mutex);
if (dlci_ioctl_hook)
err = dlci_ioctl_hook(cmd, argp);
mutex_unlock(&dlci_ioctl_mutex);
break;
case SIOCGSKNS:
err = -EPERM;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
err = open_related_ns(&net->ns, get_net_ns);
break;
default:
err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, arg);
break;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 82,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DataReductionProxySettings::SetUnreachable(bool unreachable) {
unreachable_ = unreachable;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: apr_status_t h2_stream_out_prepare(h2_stream *stream, apr_off_t *plen,
int *peos, h2_headers **presponse)
{
conn_rec *c = stream->session->c;
apr_status_t status = APR_SUCCESS;
apr_off_t requested;
apr_bucket *b, *e;
if (presponse) {
*presponse = NULL;
}
if (stream->rst_error) {
*plen = 0;
*peos = 1;
return APR_ECONNRESET;
}
if (!output_open(stream)) {
return APR_ECONNRESET;
}
prep_output(stream);
if (*plen > 0) {
requested = H2MIN(*plen, H2_DATA_CHUNK_SIZE);
}
else {
requested = H2_DATA_CHUNK_SIZE;
}
*plen = requested;
H2_STREAM_OUT_LOG(APLOG_TRACE2, stream, "h2_stream_out_prepare_pre");
h2_util_bb_avail(stream->out_buffer, plen, peos);
if (!*peos && *plen < requested) {
/* try to get more data */
status = fill_buffer(stream, (requested - *plen) + H2_DATA_CHUNK_SIZE);
if (APR_STATUS_IS_EOF(status)) {
apr_bucket *eos = apr_bucket_eos_create(c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(stream->out_buffer, eos);
status = APR_SUCCESS;
}
else if (status == APR_EAGAIN) {
/* did not receive more, it's ok */
status = APR_SUCCESS;
}
*plen = requested;
h2_util_bb_avail(stream->out_buffer, plen, peos);
}
H2_STREAM_OUT_LOG(APLOG_TRACE2, stream, "h2_stream_out_prepare_post");
b = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(stream->out_buffer);
while (b != APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(stream->out_buffer)) {
e = APR_BUCKET_NEXT(b);
if (APR_BUCKET_IS_FLUSH(b)
|| (!APR_BUCKET_IS_METADATA(b) && b->length == 0)) {
APR_BUCKET_REMOVE(b);
apr_bucket_destroy(b);
}
else {
break;
}
b = e;
}
b = get_first_headers_bucket(stream->out_buffer);
if (b) {
/* there are HEADERS to submit */
*peos = 0;
*plen = 0;
if (b == APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(stream->out_buffer)) {
if (presponse) {
*presponse = h2_bucket_headers_get(b);
APR_BUCKET_REMOVE(b);
apr_bucket_destroy(b);
status = APR_SUCCESS;
}
else {
/* someone needs to retrieve the response first */
h2_mplx_keep_active(stream->session->mplx, stream->id);
status = APR_EAGAIN;
}
}
else {
apr_bucket *e = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(stream->out_buffer);
while (e != APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(stream->out_buffer)) {
if (e == b) {
break;
}
else if (e->length != (apr_size_t)-1) {
*plen += e->length;
}
e = APR_BUCKET_NEXT(e);
}
}
}
if (!*peos && !*plen && status == APR_SUCCESS
&& (!presponse || !*presponse)) {
status = APR_EAGAIN;
}
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, status, c,
"h2_stream(%ld-%d): prepare, len=%ld eos=%d",
c->id, stream->id, (long)*plen, *peos);
return status;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RequestPolicy() {
MockRead data_reads[] = {
MockRead("HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\n"),
MockRead("NEL: {\"report_to\": \"nel\", \"max_age\": 86400}\r\n"),
MockRead("\r\n"),
MockRead("hello world"),
MockRead(SYNCHRONOUS, OK),
};
MockWrite data_writes[] = {
MockWrite("GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n"
"Host: www.example.org\r\n"
"Connection: keep-alive\r\n\r\n"),
};
HttpRequestInfo request;
request.method = "GET";
request.url = GURL(url_);
request.traffic_annotation =
net::MutableNetworkTrafficAnnotationTag(TRAFFIC_ANNOTATION_FOR_TESTS);
SSLSocketDataProvider ssl(ASYNC, OK);
if (request.url.SchemeIsCryptographic()) {
ssl.ssl_info.cert =
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "wildcard.pem");
ASSERT_TRUE(ssl.ssl_info.cert);
ssl.ssl_info.cert_status = cert_status_;
session_deps_.socket_factory->AddSSLSocketDataProvider(&ssl);
}
StaticSocketDataProvider reads(data_reads, data_writes);
session_deps_.socket_factory->AddSocketDataProvider(&reads);
TestCompletionCallback callback;
auto session = CreateSession(&session_deps_);
HttpNetworkTransaction trans(DEFAULT_PRIORITY, session.get());
int rv = trans.Start(&request, callback.callback(), NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_IO_PENDING));
EXPECT_THAT(callback.WaitForResult(), IsOk());
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __proc_set_tty(struct task_struct *tsk, struct tty_struct *tty)
{
if (tty) {
unsigned long flags;
/* We should not have a session or pgrp to put here but.... */
spin_lock_irqsave(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
put_pid(tty->session);
put_pid(tty->pgrp);
tty->pgrp = get_pid(task_pgrp(tsk));
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
tty->session = get_pid(task_session(tsk));
if (tsk->signal->tty) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "tty not NULL!!\n");
tty_kref_put(tsk->signal->tty);
}
}
put_pid(tsk->signal->tty_old_pgrp);
tsk->signal->tty = tty_kref_get(tty);
tsk->signal->tty_old_pgrp = NULL;
}
Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
{
s->d1->timeout_duration *= 2;
if (s->d1->timeout_duration > 60)
s->d1->timeout_duration = 60;
dtls1_start_timer(s);
}
Commit Message: Free up s->d1->buffered_app_data.q properly.
PR#3286
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 46,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ignoreSectionProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *start, const char *end,
const char **endPtr) {
enum XML_Error result
= doIgnoreSection(parser, parser->m_encoding, &start, end, endPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
if (start) {
parser->m_processor = prologProcessor;
return prologProcessor(parser, start, end, endPtr);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 88,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LockScreenMediaControlsView::FlushForTesting() {
media_controller_remote_.FlushForTesting();
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GestureSequence::Gestures* GestureSequence::ProcessTouchEventForGesture(
const TouchEvent& event,
ui::TouchStatus status) {
if (status != ui::TOUCH_STATUS_UNKNOWN)
return NULL; // The event was consumed by a touch sequence.
if (event.touch_id() >= kMaxGesturePoints)
return NULL;
if (event.type() == ui::ET_TOUCH_PRESSED) {
if (point_count_ == kMaxGesturePoints)
return NULL;
++point_count_;
}
GestureState last_state = state_;
scoped_ptr<Gestures> gestures(new Gestures());
GesturePoint& point = GesturePointForEvent(event);
point.UpdateValues(event);
flags_ = event.flags();
switch (Signature(state_, event.touch_id(), event.type(), false)) {
case GST_NO_GESTURE_FIRST_PRESSED:
TouchDown(event, point, gestures.get());
set_state(GS_PENDING_SYNTHETIC_CLICK);
break;
case GST_PENDING_SYNTHETIC_CLICK_FIRST_RELEASED:
if (Click(event, point, gestures.get()))
point.UpdateForTap();
set_state(GS_NO_GESTURE);
break;
case GST_PENDING_SYNTHETIC_CLICK_FIRST_MOVED:
case GST_PENDING_SYNTHETIC_CLICK_FIRST_STATIONARY:
if (ScrollStart(event, point, gestures.get())) {
set_state(GS_SCROLL);
if (ScrollUpdate(event, point, gestures.get()))
point.UpdateForScroll();
}
break;
case GST_PENDING_SYNTHETIC_CLICK_FIRST_CANCELLED:
NoGesture(event, point, gestures.get());
break;
case GST_SCROLL_FIRST_MOVED:
case GST_SCROLL_SECOND_MOVED:
if (scroll_type_ == ST_VERTICAL ||
scroll_type_ == ST_HORIZONTAL)
BreakRailScroll(event, point, gestures.get());
if (ScrollUpdate(event, point, gestures.get()))
point.UpdateForScroll();
break;
case GST_SCROLL_FIRST_RELEASED:
case GST_SCROLL_FIRST_CANCELLED:
case GST_SCROLL_SECOND_RELEASED:
case GST_SCROLL_SECOND_CANCELLED:
ScrollEnd(event, point, gestures.get());
set_state(GS_NO_GESTURE);
break;
case GST_SCROLL_FIRST_PRESSED:
case GST_SCROLL_SECOND_PRESSED:
case GST_PENDING_SYNTHETIC_CLICK_SECOND_PRESSED:
PinchStart(event, point, gestures.get());
set_state(GS_PINCH);
break;
case GST_PINCH_FIRST_MOVED:
case GST_PINCH_SECOND_MOVED:
if (PinchUpdate(event, point, gestures.get())) {
points_[0].UpdateForScroll();
points_[1].UpdateForScroll();
}
break;
case GST_PINCH_FIRST_RELEASED:
case GST_PINCH_SECOND_RELEASED:
case GST_PINCH_FIRST_CANCELLED:
case GST_PINCH_SECOND_CANCELLED:
PinchEnd(event, point, gestures.get());
scroll_type_ = ST_FREE;
set_state(GS_SCROLL);
break;
}
if (state_ != last_state)
VLOG(4) << "Gesture Sequence"
<< " State: " << state_
<< " touch id: " << event.touch_id();
if (event.type() == ui::ET_TOUCH_RELEASED)
--point_count_;
return gestures.release();
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::VerifyServiceTextureObjectsExist() {
resources_->texture_object_map.ForEach(
[this](GLuint client_id, scoped_refptr<TexturePassthrough> texture) {
DCHECK_EQ(GL_TRUE, api()->glIsTextureFn(texture->service_id()));
});
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOL rdp_recv_set_error_info_data_pdu(rdpRdp* rdp, STREAM* s)
{
if (stream_get_left(s) < 4)
return FALSE;
stream_read_UINT32(s, rdp->errorInfo); /* errorInfo (4 bytes) */
if (rdp->errorInfo != ERRINFO_SUCCESS)
rdp_print_errinfo(rdp->errorInfo);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 58,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HasPermissionsForFile(const FilePath& file, int permissions) {
FilePath current_path = file.StripTrailingSeparators();
FilePath last_path;
while (current_path != last_path) {
if (file_permissions_.find(current_path) != file_permissions_.end())
return (file_permissions_[current_path] & permissions) == permissions;
last_path = current_path;
current_path = current_path.DirName();
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Apply missing kParentDirectory check
BUG=161564
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11414046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 170,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __udp6_lib_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
u8 type, u8 code, int offset, __be32 info,
struct udp_table *udptable)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np;
const struct ipv6hdr *hdr = (const struct ipv6hdr *)skb->data;
const struct in6_addr *saddr = &hdr->saddr;
const struct in6_addr *daddr = &hdr->daddr;
struct udphdr *uh = (struct udphdr*)(skb->data+offset);
struct sock *sk;
int err;
sk = __udp6_lib_lookup(dev_net(skb->dev), daddr, uh->dest,
saddr, uh->source, inet6_iif(skb), udptable);
if (sk == NULL)
return;
if (type == ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG)
ip6_sk_update_pmtu(skb, sk, info);
if (type == NDISC_REDIRECT)
ip6_sk_redirect(skb, sk);
np = inet6_sk(sk);
if (!icmpv6_err_convert(type, code, &err) && !np->recverr)
goto out;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED && !np->recverr)
goto out;
if (np->recverr)
ipv6_icmp_error(sk, skb, err, uh->dest, ntohl(info), (u8 *)(uh+1));
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
out:
sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: call udp_push_pending_frames when uncorking a socket with AF_INET pending data
We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>] [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS: 00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
[<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
[<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
[<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
[<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>
This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.
This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.
(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs_write_rpcsetup(struct nfs_write_data *data,
unsigned int count, unsigned int offset,
int how, struct nfs_commit_info *cinfo)
{
struct nfs_page *req = data->header->req;
/* Set up the RPC argument and reply structs
* NB: take care not to mess about with data->commit et al. */
data->args.fh = NFS_FH(data->header->inode);
data->args.offset = req_offset(req) + offset;
/* pnfs_set_layoutcommit needs this */
data->mds_offset = data->args.offset;
data->args.pgbase = req->wb_pgbase + offset;
data->args.pages = data->pages.pagevec;
data->args.count = count;
data->args.context = get_nfs_open_context(req->wb_context);
data->args.lock_context = req->wb_lock_context;
data->args.stable = NFS_UNSTABLE;
switch (how & (FLUSH_STABLE | FLUSH_COND_STABLE)) {
case 0:
break;
case FLUSH_COND_STABLE:
if (nfs_reqs_to_commit(cinfo))
break;
default:
data->args.stable = NFS_FILE_SYNC;
}
data->res.fattr = &data->fattr;
data->res.count = count;
data->res.verf = &data->verf;
nfs_fattr_init(&data->fattr);
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_indirect_calc_metadata_amount(struct inode *inode,
sector_t lblock)
{
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
int dind_mask = EXT4_ADDR_PER_BLOCK(inode->i_sb) - 1;
int blk_bits;
if (lblock < EXT4_NDIR_BLOCKS)
return 0;
lblock -= EXT4_NDIR_BLOCKS;
if (ei->i_da_metadata_calc_len &&
(lblock & dind_mask) == ei->i_da_metadata_calc_last_lblock) {
ei->i_da_metadata_calc_len++;
return 0;
}
ei->i_da_metadata_calc_last_lblock = lblock & dind_mask;
ei->i_da_metadata_calc_len = 1;
blk_bits = roundup_pow_of_two(lblock + 1);
return (blk_bits / EXT4_ADDR_PER_BLOCK_BITS(inode->i_sb)) + 1;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long Track::GetNumber() const { return m_info.number; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void make_mmu_pages_available(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
if (likely(kvm_mmu_available_pages(vcpu->kvm) >= KVM_MIN_FREE_MMU_PAGES))
return;
while (kvm_mmu_available_pages(vcpu->kvm) < KVM_REFILL_PAGES) {
if (!prepare_zap_oldest_mmu_page(vcpu->kvm, &invalid_list))
break;
++vcpu->kvm->stat.mmu_recycled;
}
kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(vcpu->kvm, &invalid_list);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DatabaseImpl::RemoveObservers(const std::vector<int32_t>& observers) {
idb_runner_->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&IDBThreadHelper::RemoveObservers,
base::Unretained(helper_), observers));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 136,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: http_find_header(char * const *hh, const char *hdr)
{
int n, l;
char *r;
l = strlen(hdr);
for (n = 3; hh[n] != NULL; n++) {
if (strncasecmp(hdr, hh[n], l) || hh[n][l] != ':')
continue;
for (r = hh[n] + l + 1; vct_issp(*r); r++)
continue;
return (r);
}
return (NULL);
}
Commit Message: Do not consider a CR by itself as a valid line terminator
Varnish (prior to version 4.0) was not following the standard with
regard to line separator.
Spotted and analyzed by: Régis Leroy [regilero] regis.leroy@makina-corpus.com
CWE ID: | 0 | 95,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstance::RequestInputBuffers() {
DCHECK(parent_->encoder_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
struct v4l2_format format;
memset(&format, 0, sizeof(format));
format.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
format.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = input_buffer_pixelformat_;
IOCTL_OR_ERROR_RETURN_FALSE(VIDIOC_G_FMT, &format);
struct v4l2_requestbuffers reqbufs;
memset(&reqbufs, 0, sizeof(reqbufs));
reqbufs.count = kBufferCount;
reqbufs.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
reqbufs.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_MMAP;
IOCTL_OR_ERROR_RETURN_FALSE(VIDIOC_REQBUFS, &reqbufs);
DCHECK(input_buffer_map_.empty());
input_buffer_map_.resize(reqbufs.count);
for (size_t i = 0; i < input_buffer_map_.size(); ++i) {
free_input_buffers_.push_back(i);
struct v4l2_buffer buffer;
struct v4l2_plane planes[kMaxI420Plane];
memset(&buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
memset(planes, 0, sizeof(planes));
buffer.index = i;
buffer.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
buffer.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_MMAP;
buffer.m.planes = planes;
buffer.length = base::size(planes);
IOCTL_OR_ERROR_RETURN_FALSE(VIDIOC_QUERYBUF, &buffer);
if (input_buffer_num_planes_ != buffer.length) {
return false;
}
for (size_t j = 0; j < buffer.length; ++j) {
if (base::checked_cast<int64_t>(planes[j].length) <
VideoFrame::PlaneSize(
PIXEL_FORMAT_I420, j,
gfx::Size(format.fmt.pix_mp.width, format.fmt.pix_mp.height))
.GetArea()) {
return false;
}
void* address =
device_->Mmap(NULL, planes[j].length, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED, planes[j].m.mem_offset);
if (address == MAP_FAILED) {
VPLOGF(1) << "mmap() failed";
return false;
}
input_buffer_map_[i].address[j] = address;
input_buffer_map_[i].length[j] = planes[j].length;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SWFInput_file_eof(SWFInput input)
{
return feof((FILE *)input->data);
}
Commit Message: Fix left shift of a negative value in SWFInput_readSBits. Check for number before before left-shifting by (number-1).
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 89,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateLoadingAnimations(bool should_animate) {
if (should_animate) {
if (!loading_animation_timer_.IsRunning()) {
loading_animation_timer_.Start(FROM_HERE,
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kLoadingAnimationFrameTimeMs), this,
&BrowserWindowGtk::LoadingAnimationCallback);
}
} else {
if (loading_animation_timer_.IsRunning()) {
loading_animation_timer_.Stop();
LoadingAnimationCallback();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,034 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::Hide() {
if (!is_layer_attached_)
return;
is_layer_attached_ = false;
if (content_view_core_)
content_view_core_->RemoveLayer(layer_);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_mapped_name(const struct usbmix_name_map *p, char *buf, int buflen)
{
if (!p || !p->name)
return 0;
buflen--;
return strlcpy(buf, p->name, buflen);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tcp_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int answ;
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCINQ:
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_SYN_SENT | TCPF_SYN_RECV))
answ = 0;
else if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_URGINLINE) ||
!tp->urg_data ||
before(tp->urg_seq, tp->copied_seq) ||
!before(tp->urg_seq, tp->rcv_nxt)) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
answ = tp->rcv_nxt - tp->copied_seq;
/* Subtract 1, if FIN is in queue. */
skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (answ && skb)
answ -= tcp_hdr(skb)->fin;
} else
answ = tp->urg_seq - tp->copied_seq;
release_sock(sk);
break;
case SIOCATMARK:
answ = tp->urg_data && tp->urg_seq == tp->copied_seq;
break;
case SIOCOUTQ:
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
return -EINVAL;
if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_SYN_SENT | TCPF_SYN_RECV))
answ = 0;
else
answ = tp->write_seq - tp->snd_una;
break;
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
return put_user(answ, (int __user *)arg);
}
Commit Message: net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: got_buffer_from_side (ProxySide *side, Buffer *buffer)
{
FlatpakProxyClient *client = side->client;
if (side == &client->client_side)
got_buffer_from_client (client, side, buffer);
else
got_buffer_from_bus (client, side, buffer);
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 84,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ExtensionPrefs::GetPageIndex(const std::string& extension_id) {
int value = -1;
ReadExtensionPrefInteger(extension_id, kPrefPageIndex, &value);
return value;
}
Commit Message: Coverity: Add a missing NULL check.
BUG=none
TEST=none
CID=16813
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7216034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 98,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_trace_event_unreg(struct perf_event *p_event)
{
struct ftrace_event_call *tp_event = p_event->tp_event;
int i;
if (--tp_event->perf_refcount > 0)
goto out;
tp_event->class->reg(tp_event, TRACE_REG_PERF_UNREGISTER, NULL);
/*
* Ensure our callback won't be called anymore. The buffers
* will be freed after that.
*/
tracepoint_synchronize_unregister();
free_percpu(tp_event->perf_events);
tp_event->perf_events = NULL;
if (!--total_ref_count) {
for (i = 0; i < PERF_NR_CONTEXTS; i++) {
free_percpu(perf_trace_buf[i]);
perf_trace_buf[i] = NULL;
}
}
out:
module_put(tp_event->mod);
}
Commit Message: perf/ftrace: Fix paranoid level for enabling function tracer
The current default perf paranoid level is "1" which has
"perf_paranoid_kernel()" return false, and giving any operations that
use it, access to normal users. Unfortunately, this includes function
tracing and normal users should not be allowed to enable function
tracing by default.
The proper level is defined at "-1" (full perf access), which
"perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw()" will only give access to. Use that
check instead for enabling function tracing.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.4+
CVE: CVE-2013-2930
Fixes: ced39002f5ea ("ftrace, perf: Add support to use function tracepoint in perf")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 30,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gdImagePtr gdImageCreateFromGd2 (FILE * inFile)
{
gdIOCtx *in = gdNewFileCtx(inFile);
gdImagePtr im;
im = gdImageCreateFromGd2Ctx(in);
in->gd_free(in);
return im;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #72339 Integer Overflow in _gd2GetHeader() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void conf__set_cur_security_options(struct mosquitto__config *config, struct mosquitto__listener *cur_listener, struct mosquitto__security_options **security_options)
{
if(config->per_listener_settings){
(*security_options) = &cur_listener->security_options;
}else{
(*security_options) = &config->security_options;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix acl_file being ignore for default listener if with per_listener_settings
Close #1073. Thanks to Jef Driesen.
Bug: https://github.com/eclipse/mosquitto/issues/1073
CWE ID: | 0 | 75,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetDelegate(WebContentsDelegate* delegate) {
if (delegate == delegate_)
return;
if (delegate_)
delegate_->Detach(this);
delegate_ = delegate;
if (delegate_) {
delegate_->Attach(this);
if (view_)
view_->SetOverscrollControllerEnabled(CanOverscrollContent());
}
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OffscreenCanvas::RegisterRenderingContextFactory(
std::unique_ptr<CanvasRenderingContextFactory> rendering_context_factory) {
CanvasRenderingContext::ContextType type =
rendering_context_factory->GetContextType();
DCHECK_LE(type, CanvasRenderingContext::kMaxValue);
DCHECK(!RenderingContextFactories()[type]);
RenderingContextFactories()[type] = std::move(rendering_context_factory);
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void get_tcp4_sock(struct sock *sk, struct seq_file *f, int i)
{
int timer_active;
unsigned long timer_expires;
const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
const struct fastopen_queue *fastopenq = &icsk->icsk_accept_queue.fastopenq;
__be32 dest = inet->inet_daddr;
__be32 src = inet->inet_rcv_saddr;
__u16 destp = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
__u16 srcp = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
int rx_queue;
int state;
if (icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_RETRANS ||
icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_EARLY_RETRANS ||
icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_LOSS_PROBE) {
timer_active = 1;
timer_expires = icsk->icsk_timeout;
} else if (icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_PROBE0) {
timer_active = 4;
timer_expires = icsk->icsk_timeout;
} else if (timer_pending(&sk->sk_timer)) {
timer_active = 2;
timer_expires = sk->sk_timer.expires;
} else {
timer_active = 0;
timer_expires = jiffies;
}
state = sk_state_load(sk);
if (state == TCP_LISTEN)
rx_queue = sk->sk_ack_backlog;
else
/* Because we don't lock the socket,
* we might find a transient negative value.
*/
rx_queue = max_t(int, tp->rcv_nxt - tp->copied_seq, 0);
seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX "
"%08X %5u %8d %lu %d %pK %lu %lu %u %u %d",
i, src, srcp, dest, destp, state,
tp->write_seq - tp->snd_una,
rx_queue,
timer_active,
jiffies_delta_to_clock_t(timer_expires - jiffies),
icsk->icsk_retransmits,
from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(f), sock_i_uid(sk)),
icsk->icsk_probes_out,
sock_i_ino(sk),
atomic_read(&sk->sk_refcnt), sk,
jiffies_to_clock_t(icsk->icsk_rto),
jiffies_to_clock_t(icsk->icsk_ack.ato),
(icsk->icsk_ack.quick << 1) | icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong,
tp->snd_cwnd,
state == TCP_LISTEN ?
fastopenq->max_qlen :
(tcp_in_initial_slowstart(tp) ? -1 : tp->snd_ssthresh));
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 49,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestContentClient::SetActiveURL(const GURL& url) {
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int add_get_assoc_string_ex(zval *arg, const char *key, uint key_len, const char *str, void **dest, int duplicate) /* {{{ */
{
zval *tmp;
size_t _len = strlen(str);
if (UNEXPECTED(_len > INT_MAX)) {
zend_error_noreturn(E_ERROR, "String overflow, max size is %d", INT_MAX);
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(tmp, str, _len, duplicate);
return zend_symtable_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(arg), key, key_len, (void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), dest);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int aio_set_page_dirty(struct page *page)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: aio: fix kernel memory disclosure in io_getevents() introduced in v3.10
A kernel memory disclosure was introduced in aio_read_events_ring() in v3.10
by commit a31ad380bed817aa25f8830ad23e1a0480fef797. The changes made to
aio_read_events_ring() failed to correctly limit the index into
ctx->ring_pages[], allowing an attacked to cause the subsequent kmap() of
an arbitrary page with a copy_to_user() to copy the contents into userspace.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2014-0206. Thanks to Mateusz and
Petr for disclosing this issue.
This patch applies to v3.12+. A separate backport is needed for 3.10/3.11.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: | 0 | 39,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage long sys_oabi_connect(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *addr, int addrlen)
{
sa_family_t sa_family;
if (addrlen == 112 &&
get_user(sa_family, &addr->sa_family) == 0 &&
sa_family == AF_UNIX)
addrlen = 110;
return sys_connect(fd, addr, addrlen);
}
Commit Message: ARM: 6891/1: prevent heap corruption in OABI semtimedop
When CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT is set, the wrapper for semtimedop does not
bound the nsops argument. A sufficiently large value will cause an
integer overflow in allocation size, followed by copying too much data
into the allocated buffer. Fix this by restricting nsops to SEMOPM.
Untested.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 27,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void report_error(struct translate_ctx *ctx, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
int line = 1;
int column = 1;
const char *itr = ctx->text;
debug_printf("\nTGSI asm error: ");
va_start(args, format);
_debug_vprintf(format, args);
va_end(args);
while (itr != ctx->cur) {
if (*itr == '\n') {
column = 1;
++line;
}
++column;
++itr;
}
debug_printf(" [%d : %d] \n", line, column);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestingAutomationProvider::SetReleaseTrack(DictionaryValue* args,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
AutomationJSONReply reply(this, reply_message);
std::string track;
if (!args->GetString("track", &track)) {
reply.SendError("Invalid or missing args.");
return;
}
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetUpdateEngineClient()->SetReleaseTrack(track);
reply.SendSuccess(NULL);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltCompilePattern(const xmlChar *pattern, xmlDocPtr doc,
xmlNodePtr node, xsltStylesheetPtr style,
xsltTransformContextPtr runtime) {
return (xsltCompilePatternInternal(pattern, doc, node, style, runtime, 0));
}
Commit Message: Handle a bad XSLT expression better.
BUG=138672
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10830177
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@150123 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 106,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidStartProvisionalLoad(
blink::WebDocumentLoader* document_loader) {
if (!document_loader)
return;
TRACE_EVENT2("navigation,benchmark,rail",
"RenderFrameImpl::didStartProvisionalLoad", "id", routing_id_,
"url", document_loader->GetUrl().GetString().Utf8());
NavigationState* navigation_state =
NavigationState::FromDocumentLoader(document_loader);
if (!navigation_state->was_initiated_in_this_frame()) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidStartNavigation(document_loader->GetUrl(), base::nullopt);
}
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.ReadyToCommitNavigation(document_loader);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void checkSecurityForNodeReadonlyDocumentAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::GetterContext, "checkSecurityForNodeReadonlyDocumentAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (!BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToNode(info.GetIsolate(), imp->checkSecurityForNodeReadonlyDocumentAttribute(), exceptionState)) {
v8SetReturnValueNull(info);
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, WTF::getPtr(imp->checkSecurityForNodeReadonlyDocumentAttribute()), imp);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AtomicString& TextTrack::HiddenKeyword() {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(const AtomicString, hidden, ("hidden"));
return hidden;
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: box_overbelow(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
BOX *box1 = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(0);
BOX *box2 = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPle(box1->high.y, box2->high.y));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,822 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct wdm_device *wdm_find_device(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct wdm_device *desc;
spin_lock(&wdm_device_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(desc, &wdm_device_list, device_list)
if (desc->intf == intf)
goto found;
desc = NULL;
found:
spin_unlock(&wdm_device_list_lock);
return desc;
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __init int sysctl_init(void)
{
sysctl_set_parent(NULL, root_table);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL_SYSCALL_CHECK
sysctl_check_table(current->nsproxy, root_table);
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sock_no_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: connection_ap_get_begincell_flags(entry_connection_t *ap_conn)
{
edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ap_conn);
const node_t *exitnode = NULL;
const crypt_path_t *cpath_layer = edge_conn->cpath_layer;
uint32_t flags = 0;
/* No flags for begindir */
if (ap_conn->use_begindir)
return 0;
/* No flags for hidden services. */
if (edge_conn->on_circuit->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL)
return 0;
/* If only IPv4 is supported, no flags */
if (ap_conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic && !ap_conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic)
return 0;
if (! cpath_layer ||
! cpath_layer->extend_info)
return 0;
if (!ap_conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic)
flags |= BEGIN_FLAG_IPV4_NOT_OK;
exitnode = node_get_by_id(cpath_layer->extend_info->identity_digest);
if (ap_conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic && exitnode) {
tor_addr_t a;
tor_addr_make_null(&a, AF_INET6);
if (compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(&a, ap_conn->socks_request->port,
exitnode)
!= ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED) {
/* Only say "IPv6 OK" if the exit node supports IPv6. Otherwise there's
* no point. */
flags |= BEGIN_FLAG_IPV6_OK;
}
}
if (flags == BEGIN_FLAG_IPV6_OK) {
/* When IPv4 and IPv6 are both allowed, consider whether to say we
* prefer IPv6. Otherwise there's no point in declaring a preference */
if (ap_conn->entry_cfg.prefer_ipv6)
flags |= BEGIN_FLAG_IPV6_PREFERRED;
}
if (flags == BEGIN_FLAG_IPV4_NOT_OK) {
log_warn(LD_EDGE, "I'm about to ask a node for a connection that I "
"am telling it to fulfil with neither IPv4 nor IPv6. That's "
"not going to work. Did you perhaps ask for an IPv6 address "
"on an IPv4Only port, or vice versa?");
}
return flags;
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 69,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CCITTFaxStream::lookChar() {
int code1, code2, code3;
int b1i, blackPixels, i, bits;
GBool gotEOL;
if (buf != EOF) {
return buf;
}
if (outputBits == 0) {
if (eof) {
return EOF;
}
err = gFalse;
if (nextLine2D) {
for (i = 0; i < columns && codingLine[i] < columns; ++i) {
refLine[i] = codingLine[i];
}
for (; i < columns + 2; ++i) {
refLine[i] = columns;
}
codingLine[0] = 0;
a0i = 0;
b1i = 0;
blackPixels = 0;
while (codingLine[a0i] < columns && !err) {
code1 = getTwoDimCode();
switch (code1) {
case twoDimPass:
if (likely(b1i + 1 < columns + 2)) {
addPixels(refLine[b1i + 1], blackPixels);
if (refLine[b1i + 1] < columns) {
b1i += 2;
}
}
break;
case twoDimHoriz:
code1 = code2 = 0;
if (blackPixels) {
do {
code1 += code3 = getBlackCode();
} while (code3 >= 64);
do {
code2 += code3 = getWhiteCode();
} while (code3 >= 64);
} else {
do {
code1 += code3 = getWhiteCode();
} while (code3 >= 64);
do {
code2 += code3 = getBlackCode();
} while (code3 >= 64);
}
addPixels(codingLine[a0i] + code1, blackPixels);
if (codingLine[a0i] < columns) {
addPixels(codingLine[a0i] + code2, blackPixels ^ 1);
}
while (refLine[b1i] <= codingLine[a0i] && refLine[b1i] < columns) {
b1i += 2;
if (unlikely(b1i > columns + 1)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
}
break;
case twoDimVertR3:
if (unlikely(b1i > columns + 1)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
addPixels(refLine[b1i] + 3, blackPixels);
blackPixels ^= 1;
if (codingLine[a0i] < columns) {
++b1i;
while (refLine[b1i] <= codingLine[a0i] && refLine[b1i] < columns) {
b1i += 2;
if (unlikely(b1i > columns + 1)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
}
}
break;
case twoDimVertR2:
if (unlikely(b1i > columns + 1)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
addPixels(refLine[b1i] + 2, blackPixels);
blackPixels ^= 1;
if (codingLine[a0i] < columns) {
++b1i;
while (refLine[b1i] <= codingLine[a0i] && refLine[b1i] < columns) {
b1i += 2;
if (unlikely(b1i > columns + 1)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
}
}
break;
case twoDimVertR1:
if (unlikely(b1i > columns + 1)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
addPixels(refLine[b1i] + 1, blackPixels);
blackPixels ^= 1;
if (codingLine[a0i] < columns) {
++b1i;
while (refLine[b1i] <= codingLine[a0i] && refLine[b1i] < columns) {
b1i += 2;
if (unlikely(b1i > columns + 1)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
}
}
break;
case twoDimVert0:
if (unlikely(b1i > columns + 1)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
addPixels(refLine[b1i], blackPixels);
blackPixels ^= 1;
if (codingLine[a0i] < columns) {
++b1i;
while (refLine[b1i] <= codingLine[a0i] && refLine[b1i] < columns) {
b1i += 2;
if (unlikely(b1i > columns + 1)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
}
}
break;
case twoDimVertL3:
if (unlikely(b1i > columns + 1)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
addPixelsNeg(refLine[b1i] - 3, blackPixels);
blackPixels ^= 1;
if (codingLine[a0i] < columns) {
if (b1i > 0) {
--b1i;
} else {
++b1i;
}
while (refLine[b1i] <= codingLine[a0i] && refLine[b1i] < columns) {
b1i += 2;
if (unlikely(b1i > columns + 1)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
}
}
break;
case twoDimVertL2:
if (unlikely(b1i > columns + 1)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
addPixelsNeg(refLine[b1i] - 2, blackPixels);
blackPixels ^= 1;
if (codingLine[a0i] < columns) {
if (b1i > 0) {
--b1i;
} else {
++b1i;
}
while (refLine[b1i] <= codingLine[a0i] && refLine[b1i] < columns) {
b1i += 2;
if (unlikely(b1i > columns + 1)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
}
}
break;
case twoDimVertL1:
if (unlikely(b1i > columns + 1)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
addPixelsNeg(refLine[b1i] - 1, blackPixels);
blackPixels ^= 1;
if (codingLine[a0i] < columns) {
if (b1i > 0) {
--b1i;
} else {
++b1i;
}
while (refLine[b1i] <= codingLine[a0i] && refLine[b1i] < columns) {
b1i += 2;
if (unlikely(b1i > columns + 1)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
}
}
break;
case EOF:
addPixels(columns, 0);
eof = gTrue;
break;
default:
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad 2D code {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", code1);
addPixels(columns, 0);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
}
} else {
codingLine[0] = 0;
a0i = 0;
blackPixels = 0;
while (codingLine[a0i] < columns) {
code1 = 0;
if (blackPixels) {
do {
code1 += code3 = getBlackCode();
} while (code3 >= 64);
} else {
do {
code1 += code3 = getWhiteCode();
} while (code3 >= 64);
}
addPixels(codingLine[a0i] + code1, blackPixels);
blackPixels ^= 1;
}
}
gotEOL = gFalse;
if (!endOfBlock && row == rows - 1) {
eof = gTrue;
} else if (endOfLine || !byteAlign) {
code1 = lookBits(12);
if (endOfLine) {
while (code1 != EOF && code1 != 0x001) {
eatBits(1);
code1 = lookBits(12);
}
} else {
while (code1 == 0) {
eatBits(1);
code1 = lookBits(12);
}
}
if (code1 == 0x001) {
eatBits(12);
gotEOL = gTrue;
}
}
if (byteAlign && !gotEOL) {
inputBits &= ~7;
}
if (lookBits(1) == EOF) {
eof = gTrue;
}
if (!eof && encoding > 0) {
nextLine2D = !lookBits(1);
eatBits(1);
}
if (endOfBlock && !endOfLine && byteAlign) {
code1 = lookBits(24);
if (code1 == 0x001001) {
eatBits(12);
gotEOL = gTrue;
}
}
if (endOfBlock && gotEOL) {
code1 = lookBits(12);
if (code1 == 0x001) {
eatBits(12);
if (encoding > 0) {
lookBits(1);
eatBits(1);
}
if (encoding >= 0) {
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
code1 = lookBits(12);
if (code1 != 0x001) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad RTC code in CCITTFax stream");
}
eatBits(12);
if (encoding > 0) {
lookBits(1);
eatBits(1);
}
}
}
eof = gTrue;
}
} else if (err && endOfLine) {
while (1) {
code1 = lookBits(13);
if (code1 == EOF) {
eof = gTrue;
return EOF;
}
if ((code1 >> 1) == 0x001) {
break;
}
eatBits(1);
}
eatBits(12);
if (encoding > 0) {
eatBits(1);
nextLine2D = !(code1 & 1);
}
}
if (codingLine[0] > 0) {
outputBits = codingLine[a0i = 0];
} else {
outputBits = codingLine[a0i = 1];
}
++row;
}
if (outputBits >= 8) {
buf = (a0i & 1) ? 0x00 : 0xff;
outputBits -= 8;
if (outputBits == 0 && codingLine[a0i] < columns) {
++a0i;
outputBits = codingLine[a0i] - codingLine[a0i - 1];
}
} else {
bits = 8;
buf = 0;
do {
if (outputBits > bits) {
buf <<= bits;
if (!(a0i & 1)) {
buf |= 0xff >> (8 - bits);
}
outputBits -= bits;
bits = 0;
} else {
buf <<= outputBits;
if (!(a0i & 1)) {
buf |= 0xff >> (8 - outputBits);
}
bits -= outputBits;
outputBits = 0;
if (codingLine[a0i] < columns) {
++a0i;
if (unlikely(a0i > columns)) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad bits {0:04x} in CCITTFax stream", bits);
err = gTrue;
break;
}
outputBits = codingLine[a0i] - codingLine[a0i - 1];
} else if (bits > 0) {
buf <<= bits;
bits = 0;
}
}
} while (bits);
}
if (black) {
buf ^= 0xff;
}
return buf;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static irqreturn_t multi_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
struct irq_info *iinfo = dev_id;
struct list_head *lhead, *end = NULL;
int pass_counter = 0;
spin_lock(&iinfo->lock);
lhead = iinfo->head;
do {
struct mp_port *mtpt;
unsigned int iir;
mtpt = list_entry(lhead, struct mp_port, list);
iir = serial_in(mtpt, UART_IIR);
printk("interrupt! port %d, iir 0x%x\n", mtpt->port.line, iir); //wlee
if (!(iir & UART_IIR_NO_INT))
{
printk("interrupt handle\n");
spin_lock(&mtpt->port.lock);
multi_handle_port(mtpt);
spin_unlock(&mtpt->port.lock);
end = NULL;
} else if (end == NULL)
end = lhead;
lhead = lhead->next;
if (lhead == iinfo->head && pass_counter++ > PASS_LIMIT)
{
printk(KERN_ERR "multi: too much work for "
"irq%d\n", irq);
printk( "multi: too much work for "
"irq%d\n", irq);
break;
}
} while (lhead != end);
spin_unlock(&iinfo->lock);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebKit::WebFileUtilities* TestWebKitPlatformSupport::fileUtilities() {
return &file_utilities_;
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 2)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
JSValue listener = exec->argument(1);
if (!listener.isObject())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->addEventListener(ustringToAtomicString(exec->argument(0).toString(exec)->value(exec)), JSEventListener::create(asObject(listener), castedThis, false, currentWorld(exec)), exec->argument(2).toBoolean(exec));
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int proc_nr_inodes(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
inodes_stat.nr_inodes = get_nr_inodes();
inodes_stat.nr_unused = get_nr_inodes_unused();
return proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,888 |
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