instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Automation::MouseButtonUp(int tab_id,
const gfx::Point& p,
Error** error) {
*error = CheckAdvancedInteractionsSupported();
if (*error)
return;
int windex = 0, tab_index = 0;
*error = GetIndicesForTab(tab_id, &windex, &tab_index);
if (*error)
return;
std::string error_msg;
if (!SendMouseButtonUpJSONRequest(
automation(), windex, tab_index, p.x(), p.y(), &error_msg)) {
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg);
}
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::Activate() {
WebContentsImpl* wc = static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(web_contents());
if (wc) {
wc->Activate();
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Field_CompleteKeyname( void )
{
matchCount = 0;
shortestMatch[ 0 ] = 0;
Key_KeynameCompletion( FindMatches );
if( !Field_Complete( ) )
Key_KeynameCompletion( PrintMatches );
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ion_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct ion_client *client = file->private_data;
pr_debug("%s: %d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
ion_client_destroy(client);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 48,566 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FVChangeChar(FontView *fv,int i) {
if ( i!=-1 ) {
FVDeselectAll(fv);
fv->b.selected[i] = true;
fv->sel_index = 1;
fv->end_pos = fv->pressed_pos = i;
FVToggleCharSelected(fv,i);
FVScrollToChar(fv,i);
FVShowInfo(fv);
}
}
Commit Message: Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts (#3852)
* Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts
This closes #3846.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __map_bio(struct dm_target_io *tio)
{
int r;
sector_t sector;
struct dm_offload o;
struct bio *clone = &tio->clone;
struct dm_target *ti = tio->ti;
clone->bi_end_io = clone_endio;
/*
* Map the clone. If r == 0 we don't need to do
* anything, the target has assumed ownership of
* this io.
*/
atomic_inc(&tio->io->io_count);
sector = clone->bi_iter.bi_sector;
dm_offload_start(&o);
r = ti->type->map(ti, clone);
dm_offload_end(&o);
switch (r) {
case DM_MAPIO_SUBMITTED:
break;
case DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED:
/* the bio has been remapped so dispatch it */
trace_block_bio_remap(clone->bi_disk->queue, clone,
bio_dev(tio->io->bio), sector);
generic_make_request(clone);
break;
case DM_MAPIO_KILL:
dec_pending(tio->io, BLK_STS_IOERR);
free_tio(tio);
break;
case DM_MAPIO_REQUEUE:
dec_pending(tio->io, BLK_STS_DM_REQUEUE);
free_tio(tio);
break;
default:
DMWARN("unimplemented target map return value: %d", r);
BUG();
}
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline QString toQString(JSStringRef string)
{
return QString(reinterpret_cast<const QChar*>(JSStringGetCharactersPtr(string)), JSStringGetLength(string));
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, current)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
} else if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object_create_type(0, intern, SPL_FS_INFO, NULL, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
RETURN_ZVAL(getThis(), 1, 0);
/*RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);*/
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FakeCrosDisksClient::Mount(const std::string& source_path,
const std::string& source_format,
const std::string& mount_label,
const std::vector<std::string>& mount_options,
MountAccessMode access_mode,
RemountOption remount,
VoidDBusMethodCallback callback) {
MountType type =
source_format.empty() ? MOUNT_TYPE_DEVICE : MOUNT_TYPE_ARCHIVE;
if (GURL(source_path).is_valid())
type = MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE;
base::FilePath mounted_path;
switch (type) {
case MOUNT_TYPE_ARCHIVE:
mounted_path = GetArchiveMountPoint().Append(
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(mount_label));
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_DEVICE:
mounted_path = GetRemovableDiskMountPoint().Append(
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(mount_label));
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE:
if (custom_mount_point_callback_) {
mounted_path =
custom_mount_point_callback_.Run(source_path, mount_options);
}
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_INVALID:
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
mounted_paths_.insert(mounted_path);
base::PostTaskWithTraitsAndReplyWithResult(
FROM_HERE,
{base::MayBlock(), base::TaskShutdownBehavior::CONTINUE_ON_SHUTDOWN},
base::BindOnce(&PerformFakeMount, source_path, mounted_path),
base::BindOnce(&FakeCrosDisksClient::DidMount,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), source_path, type,
mounted_path, std::move(callback)));
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainGetJobInfo(virDomainPtr domain, virDomainJobInfoPtr info)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "info=%p", info);
virResetLastError();
if (info)
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(info, error);
conn = domain->conn;
if (conn->driver->domainGetJobInfo) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainGetJobInfo(domain, info);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedGLErrorSuppressor::~ScopedGLErrorSuppressor() {
ERRORSTATE_CLEAR_REAL_GL_ERRORS(error_state_, function_name_);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WaitForMonitoredRequest() {
if (saw_request_url_)
return;
run_loop_.reset(new base::RunLoop());
run_loop_->Run();
run_loop_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Allow origin lock for WebUI pages.
Returning true for WebUI pages in DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess helps
to keep enforcing a SiteInstance swap during chrome://foo ->
chrome://bar navigation, even after relaxing
BrowsingInstance::GetSiteInstanceForURL to consider RPH::IsSuitableHost
(see https://crrev.com/c/783470 for that fixes process sharing in
isolated(b(c),d(c)) scenario).
I've manually tested this CL by visiting the following URLs:
- chrome://welcome/
- chrome://settings
- chrome://extensions
- chrome://history
- chrome://help and chrome://chrome (both redirect to chrome://settings/help)
Bug: 510588, 847127
Change-Id: I55073bce00f32cb8bc5c1c91034438ff9a3f8971
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1237392
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595259}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void git_index_entry__init_from_stat(
git_index_entry *entry, struct stat *st, bool trust_mode)
{
entry->ctime.seconds = (int32_t)st->st_ctime;
entry->mtime.seconds = (int32_t)st->st_mtime;
#if defined(GIT_USE_NSEC)
entry->mtime.nanoseconds = st->st_mtime_nsec;
entry->ctime.nanoseconds = st->st_ctime_nsec;
#endif
entry->dev = st->st_rdev;
entry->ino = st->st_ino;
entry->mode = (!trust_mode && S_ISREG(st->st_mode)) ?
git_index__create_mode(0666) : git_index__create_mode(st->st_mode);
entry->uid = st->st_uid;
entry->gid = st->st_gid;
entry->file_size = (uint32_t)st->st_size;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int br_ip4_multicast_add_group(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port *port,
__be32 group)
{
struct br_ip br_group;
if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(group))
return 0;
br_group.u.ip4 = group;
br_group.proto = htons(ETH_P_IP);
return br_multicast_add_group(br, port, &br_group);
}
Commit Message: bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_usb_audio_descriptor(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, void *data)
{
gint offset = 0;
usb_conv_info_t *usb_conv_info;
proto_tree *desc_tree = NULL;
proto_item *desc_tree_item;
guint8 desc_len;
guint8 desc_type;
guint8 desc_subtype;
const gchar *subtype_str;
usb_conv_info = (usb_conv_info_t *)data;
if (!usb_conv_info || usb_conv_info->interfaceClass!=IF_CLASS_AUDIO)
return 0;
desc_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
desc_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+1);
if (desc_type==CS_INTERFACE &&
usb_conv_info->interfaceSubclass==AUDIO_IF_SUBCLASS_AUDIOCONTROL) {
desc_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, desc_len,
ett_usb_audio_desc, &desc_tree_item,
"Class-specific Audio Control Interface Descriptor");
dissect_usb_descriptor_header(desc_tree, tvb, offset,
&aud_descriptor_type_vals_ext);
offset += 2;
desc_subtype = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(desc_tree, hf_ac_if_desc_subtype,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
subtype_str = try_val_to_str_ext(desc_subtype, &ac_subtype_vals_ext);
if (subtype_str)
proto_item_append_text(desc_tree_item, ": %s", subtype_str);
offset++;
switch(desc_subtype) {
case AC_SUBTYPE_HEADER:
/* these subfunctions return the number of bytes dissected,
this is not necessarily the length of the body
as some components are not yet dissected
we rely on the descriptor's length byte instead */
dissect_ac_if_hdr_body(tvb, offset, pinfo, desc_tree, usb_conv_info);
break;
case AC_SUBTYPE_INPUT_TERMINAL:
dissect_ac_if_input_terminal(tvb, offset, pinfo, desc_tree, usb_conv_info);
break;
case AC_SUBTYPE_OUTPUT_TERMINAL:
dissect_ac_if_output_terminal(tvb, offset, pinfo, desc_tree, usb_conv_info);
break;
case AC_SUBTYPE_FEATURE_UNIT:
dissect_ac_if_feature_unit(tvb, offset, pinfo, desc_tree, usb_conv_info);
break;
default:
proto_tree_add_expert(desc_tree, pinfo, &ei_usb_audio_undecoded, tvb, offset-3, desc_len);
break;
}
}
else if (desc_type==CS_INTERFACE &&
usb_conv_info->interfaceSubclass==AUDIO_IF_SUBCLASS_AUDIOSTREAMING) {
desc_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, desc_len,
ett_usb_audio_desc, &desc_tree_item,
"Class-specific Audio Streaming Interface Descriptor");
dissect_usb_descriptor_header(desc_tree, tvb, offset,
&aud_descriptor_type_vals_ext);
offset += 2;
desc_subtype = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(desc_tree, hf_as_if_desc_subtype,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
subtype_str = try_val_to_str_ext(desc_subtype, &as_subtype_vals_ext);
if (subtype_str)
proto_item_append_text(desc_tree_item, ": %s", subtype_str);
offset++;
switch(desc_subtype) {
case AS_SUBTYPE_GENERAL:
dissect_as_if_general_body(tvb, offset, pinfo,
desc_tree, usb_conv_info);
break;
case AS_SUBTYPE_FORMAT_TYPE:
dissect_as_if_format_type_body(tvb, offset, pinfo,
desc_tree, usb_conv_info);
break;
default:
proto_tree_add_expert(desc_tree, pinfo, &ei_usb_audio_undecoded, tvb, offset-3, desc_len);
break;
}
}
/* there are no class-specific endpoint descriptors for audio control */
else if (desc_type == CS_ENDPOINT &&
usb_conv_info->interfaceSubclass==AUDIO_IF_SUBCLASS_AUDIOSTREAMING) {
desc_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, desc_len,
ett_usb_audio_desc, &desc_tree_item,
"Class-specific Audio Streaming Endpoint Descriptor");
dissect_usb_descriptor_header(desc_tree, tvb, offset,
&aud_descriptor_type_vals_ext);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_item(desc_tree, hf_as_ep_desc_subtype,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
}
else
return 0;
return desc_len;
}
Commit Message: Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 51,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ebt_basic_match(const struct ebt_entry *e, const struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct net_device *in, const struct net_device *out)
{
const struct ethhdr *h = eth_hdr(skb);
const struct net_bridge_port *p;
__be16 ethproto;
if (skb_vlan_tag_present(skb))
ethproto = htons(ETH_P_8021Q);
else
ethproto = h->h_proto;
if (e->bitmask & EBT_802_3) {
if (NF_INVF(e, EBT_IPROTO, eth_proto_is_802_3(ethproto)))
return 1;
} else if (!(e->bitmask & EBT_NOPROTO) &&
NF_INVF(e, EBT_IPROTO, e->ethproto != ethproto))
return 1;
if (NF_INVF(e, EBT_IIN, ebt_dev_check(e->in, in)))
return 1;
if (NF_INVF(e, EBT_IOUT, ebt_dev_check(e->out, out)))
return 1;
/* rcu_read_lock()ed by nf_hook_thresh */
if (in && (p = br_port_get_rcu(in)) != NULL &&
NF_INVF(e, EBT_ILOGICALIN,
ebt_dev_check(e->logical_in, p->br->dev)))
return 1;
if (out && (p = br_port_get_rcu(out)) != NULL &&
NF_INVF(e, EBT_ILOGICALOUT,
ebt_dev_check(e->logical_out, p->br->dev)))
return 1;
if (e->bitmask & EBT_SOURCEMAC) {
if (NF_INVF(e, EBT_ISOURCE,
!ether_addr_equal_masked(h->h_source, e->sourcemac,
e->sourcemsk)))
return 1;
}
if (e->bitmask & EBT_DESTMAC) {
if (NF_INVF(e, EBT_IDEST,
!ether_addr_equal_masked(h->h_dest, e->destmac,
e->destmsk)))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets
We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.
The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.
Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.
Reported-by: <syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 84,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ieee80211_tx_frags(struct ieee80211_local *local,
struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
struct ieee80211_sta *sta,
struct sk_buff_head *skbs,
bool txpending)
{
struct ieee80211_tx_control control;
struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp;
unsigned long flags;
skb_queue_walk_safe(skbs, skb, tmp) {
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
int q = info->hw_queue;
#ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_VERBOSE_DEBUG
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(q >= local->hw.queues)) {
__skb_unlink(skb, skbs);
ieee80211_free_txskb(&local->hw, skb);
continue;
}
#endif
spin_lock_irqsave(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock, flags);
if (local->queue_stop_reasons[q] ||
(!txpending && !skb_queue_empty(&local->pending[q]))) {
if (unlikely(info->flags &
IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_OFFCHAN_TX_OK)) {
if (local->queue_stop_reasons[q] &
~BIT(IEEE80211_QUEUE_STOP_REASON_OFFCHANNEL)) {
/*
* Drop off-channel frames if queues
* are stopped for any reason other
* than off-channel operation. Never
* queue them.
*/
spin_unlock_irqrestore(
&local->queue_stop_reason_lock,
flags);
ieee80211_purge_tx_queue(&local->hw,
skbs);
return true;
}
} else {
/*
* Since queue is stopped, queue up frames for
* later transmission from the tx-pending
* tasklet when the queue is woken again.
*/
if (txpending)
skb_queue_splice_init(skbs,
&local->pending[q]);
else
skb_queue_splice_tail_init(skbs,
&local->pending[q]);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock,
flags);
return false;
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock, flags);
info->control.vif = vif;
control.sta = sta;
__skb_unlink(skb, skbs);
drv_tx(local, &control, skb);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 35,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sync_api::HttpPostProviderFactory* SyncBackendHost::MakeHttpBridgeFactory(
net::URLRequestContextGetter* getter) {
return new HttpBridgeFactory(getter);
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool nfs4_read_stateid_changed(struct rpc_task *task,
struct nfs_pgio_args *args)
{
if (!nfs4_error_stateid_expired(task->tk_status) ||
nfs4_stateid_is_current(&args->stateid,
args->context,
args->lock_context,
FMODE_READ))
return false;
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
return true;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaControlsProgressView::OnGestureEvent(ui::GestureEvent* event) {
gfx::Point location_in_bar(event->location());
ConvertPointToTarget(this, this->progress_bar_, &location_in_bar);
if (event->type() != ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP ||
!progress_bar_->GetLocalBounds().Contains(location_in_bar)) {
return;
}
HandleSeeking(location_in_bar);
event->SetHandled();
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 172,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_name (ksba_cert_t cert, int idx, int use_subject, char **result)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *p;
int i;
const char *oid;
struct tag_info ti;
const unsigned char *der;
size_t off, derlen, seqlen;
if (!cert || !cert->initialized || !result)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (idx < 0)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_INDEX);
*result = NULL;
if (!idx)
{ /* Get the required DN */
AsnNode n;
n = _ksba_asn_find_node (cert->root,
(use_subject?
"Certificate.tbsCertificate.subject":
"Certificate.tbsCertificate.issuer") );
if (!n || !n->down)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_VALUE); /* oops - should be there */
n = n->down; /* dereference the choice node */
if (n->off == -1)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_VALUE);
err = _ksba_dn_to_str (cert->image, n, &p);
if (err)
return err;
*result = p;
return 0;
}
/* get {issuer,subject}AltName */
for (i=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_extension (cert, i, &oid, NULL,
&off, &derlen)); i++)
{
if (!strcmp (oid, (use_subject?
oidstr_subjectAltName:oidstr_issuerAltName)))
break;
}
if (err)
return err; /* no alt name or error*/
der = cert->image + off;
/* FIXME: We should use _ksba_name_new_from_der and ksba_name_enum here */
err = _ksba_ber_parse_tl (&der, &derlen, &ti);
if (err)
return err;
if ( !(ti.class == CLASS_UNIVERSAL && ti.tag == TYPE_SEQUENCE
&& ti.is_constructed) )
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CERT_OBJ);
if (ti.ndef)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_DER_ENCODED);
seqlen = ti.length;
if (seqlen > derlen)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_BER);
if (!seqlen)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CERT_OBJ); /* empty sequence is not allowed */
while (seqlen)
{
err = _ksba_ber_parse_tl (&der, &derlen, &ti);
if (err)
return err;
if (ti.class != CLASS_CONTEXT)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CERT_OBJ); /* we expected a tag */
if (ti.ndef)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_DER_ENCODED);
if (seqlen < ti.nhdr)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_BER);
seqlen -= ti.nhdr;
if (seqlen < ti.length)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_BER);
seqlen -= ti.length;
if (derlen < ti.length)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_BER);
if (!(ti.tag == 1 || ti.tag == 2 || ti.tag == 6))
; /* Not a supported tag: Do not change IDX. */
else if (--idx)
; /* not yet at the desired index */
else if (ti.tag == 1)
{ /* rfc822Name - this is an implicit IA5_STRING */
p = xtrymalloc (ti.length+3);
if (!p)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
*p = '<';
memcpy (p+1, der, ti.length);
p[ti.length+1] = '>';
p[ti.length+2] = 0;
*result = p;
return 0;
}
else if (ti.tag == 2 || ti.tag == 6)
{ /* dNSName or URI - this are implicit IA5_STRINGs */
char numbuf[20], *numbufp;
size_t numbuflen;
numbufp = smklen (numbuf, DIM(numbuf), ti.length, &numbuflen);
p = xtrymalloc (11 + numbuflen + ti.length + 3);
if (!p)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
*result = p;
p = stpcpy (p, ti.tag == 2? "(8:dns-name" : "(3:uri");
p = stpcpy (p, numbufp);
memcpy (p, der, ti.length);
p += ti.length;
*p++ = ')';
*p = 0;
return 0;
}
/* advance pointer */
der += ti.length;
derlen -= ti.length;
}
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void zend_ts_hash_reverse_apply(TsHashTable *ht, apply_func_t apply_func TSRMLS_DC)
{
begin_write(ht);
zend_hash_reverse_apply(TS_HASH(ht), apply_func TSRMLS_CC);
end_write(ht);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void conn_free(conn *c) {
if (c) {
assert(c != NULL);
assert(c->sfd >= 0 && c->sfd < max_fds);
MEMCACHED_CONN_DESTROY(c);
conns[c->sfd] = NULL;
if (c->hdrbuf)
free(c->hdrbuf);
if (c->msglist)
free(c->msglist);
if (c->rbuf)
free(c->rbuf);
if (c->wbuf)
free(c->wbuf);
if (c->ilist)
free(c->ilist);
if (c->suffixlist)
free(c->suffixlist);
if (c->iov)
free(c->iov);
#ifdef TLS
if (c->ssl_wbuf)
c->ssl_wbuf = NULL;
#endif
free(c);
}
}
Commit Message: fix strncpy call to avoid ASAN violation
Ensure we're only reading to the size of the smallest buffer, since
they're both on the stack and could potentially overlap. Overlapping is
defined as ... undefined behavior. I've looked through all available
implementations of strncpy and they still only copy from the first \0
found.
We'll also never read past the end of sun_path since we _supply_
sun_path with a proper null terminator.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 88,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void minf_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_MediaInformationBox *ptr = (GF_MediaInformationBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
if (ptr->dataHandler) {
gf_isom_datamap_close(ptr);
}
if (ptr->InfoHeader) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->InfoHeader);
if (ptr->dataInformation) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->dataInformation);
if (ptr->sampleTable) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->sampleTable);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::scheduleAnimation()
{
m_webView->scheduleAnimation();
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline int kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn_t pfn)
{
if (pfn_valid(pfn)) {
int reserved;
struct page *tail = pfn_to_page(pfn);
struct page *head = compound_trans_head(tail);
reserved = PageReserved(head);
if (head != tail) {
/*
* "head" is not a dangling pointer
* (compound_trans_head takes care of that)
* but the hugepage may have been splitted
* from under us (and we may not hold a
* reference count on the head page so it can
* be reused before we run PageReferenced), so
* we've to check PageTail before returning
* what we just read.
*/
smp_rmb();
if (PageTail(tail))
return reserved;
}
return PageReserved(tail);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool e1000_has_rxbufs(E1000State *s, size_t total_size)
{
int bufs;
/* Fast-path short packets */
if (total_size <= s->rxbuf_size) {
return s->mac_reg[RDH] != s->mac_reg[RDT];
}
if (s->mac_reg[RDH] < s->mac_reg[RDT]) {
bufs = s->mac_reg[RDT] - s->mac_reg[RDH];
} else if (s->mac_reg[RDH] > s->mac_reg[RDT]) {
bufs = s->mac_reg[RDLEN] / sizeof(struct e1000_rx_desc) +
s->mac_reg[RDT] - s->mac_reg[RDH];
} else {
return false;
}
return total_size <= bufs * s->rxbuf_size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const String& ContentSecurityPolicy::getSelfProtocol() const {
return m_selfProtocol;
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfs41_setup_sequence(struct nfs4_session *session,
struct nfs4_sequence_args *args,
struct nfs4_sequence_res *res,
int cache_reply,
struct rpc_task *task)
{
struct nfs4_slot *slot;
struct nfs4_slot_table *tbl;
u8 slotid;
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
/* slot already allocated? */
if (res->sr_slot != NULL)
return 0;
tbl = &session->fc_slot_table;
spin_lock(&tbl->slot_tbl_lock);
if (test_bit(NFS4_SESSION_DRAINING, &session->session_state) &&
!rpc_task_has_priority(task, RPC_PRIORITY_PRIVILEGED)) {
/* The state manager will wait until the slot table is empty */
rpc_sleep_on(&tbl->slot_tbl_waitq, task, NULL);
spin_unlock(&tbl->slot_tbl_lock);
dprintk("%s session is draining\n", __func__);
return -EAGAIN;
}
if (!rpc_queue_empty(&tbl->slot_tbl_waitq) &&
!rpc_task_has_priority(task, RPC_PRIORITY_PRIVILEGED)) {
rpc_sleep_on(&tbl->slot_tbl_waitq, task, NULL);
spin_unlock(&tbl->slot_tbl_lock);
dprintk("%s enforce FIFO order\n", __func__);
return -EAGAIN;
}
slotid = nfs4_find_slot(tbl);
if (slotid == NFS4_MAX_SLOT_TABLE) {
rpc_sleep_on(&tbl->slot_tbl_waitq, task, NULL);
spin_unlock(&tbl->slot_tbl_lock);
dprintk("<-- %s: no free slots\n", __func__);
return -EAGAIN;
}
spin_unlock(&tbl->slot_tbl_lock);
rpc_task_set_priority(task, RPC_PRIORITY_NORMAL);
slot = tbl->slots + slotid;
args->sa_session = session;
args->sa_slotid = slotid;
args->sa_cache_this = cache_reply;
dprintk("<-- %s slotid=%d seqid=%d\n", __func__, slotid, slot->seq_nr);
res->sr_session = session;
res->sr_slot = slot;
res->sr_renewal_time = jiffies;
res->sr_status_flags = 0;
/*
* sr_status is only set in decode_sequence, and so will remain
* set to 1 if an rpc level failure occurs.
*/
res->sr_status = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void shortAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->shortAttribute());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static cycle_t read_tsc(void)
{
cycle_t ret;
u64 last;
/*
* Empirically, a fence (of type that depends on the CPU)
* before rdtsc is enough to ensure that rdtsc is ordered
* with respect to loads. The various CPU manuals are unclear
* as to whether rdtsc can be reordered with later loads,
* but no one has ever seen it happen.
*/
rdtsc_barrier();
ret = (cycle_t)vget_cycles();
last = pvclock_gtod_data.clock.cycle_last;
if (likely(ret >= last))
return ret;
/*
* GCC likes to generate cmov here, but this branch is extremely
* predictable (it's just a funciton of time and the likely is
* very likely) and there's a data dependence, so force GCC
* to generate a branch instead. I don't barrier() because
* we don't actually need a barrier, and if this function
* ever gets inlined it will generate worse code.
*/
asm volatile ("");
return last;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ext4_set_aops(struct inode *inode)
{
switch (ext4_inode_journal_mode(inode)) {
case EXT4_INODE_ORDERED_DATA_MODE:
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_ORDERED_MODE);
break;
case EXT4_INODE_WRITEBACK_DATA_MODE:
ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_ORDERED_MODE);
break;
case EXT4_INODE_JOURNAL_DATA_MODE:
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &ext4_journalled_aops;
return;
default:
BUG();
}
if (test_opt(inode->i_sb, DELALLOC))
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &ext4_da_aops;
else
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &ext4_aops;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: atmarp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length, u_int caplen)
{
const struct atmarp_pkthdr *ap;
u_short pro, hrd, op;
ap = (const struct atmarp_pkthdr *)bp;
ND_TCHECK(*ap);
hrd = ATMHRD(ap);
pro = ATMPRO(ap);
op = ATMOP(ap);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*aar_tpa(ap), ATMTPROTO_LEN(ap))) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, length);
return;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ARP, "));
}
if ((pro != ETHERTYPE_IP && pro != ETHERTYPE_TRAIL) ||
ATMSPROTO_LEN(ap) != 4 ||
ATMTPROTO_LEN(ap) != 4 ||
ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s, %s (len %u/%u)",
tok2str(arphrd_values, "Unknown Hardware (%u)", hrd),
tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)", pro),
ATMSPROTO_LEN(ap),
ATMTPROTO_LEN(ap)));
/* don't know know about the address formats */
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
goto out;
}
}
/* print operation */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s ",
ndo->ndo_vflag ? ", " : "",
tok2str(arpop_values, "Unknown (%u)", op)));
switch (op) {
case ARPOP_REQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-has %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMTPA(ap))));
if (ATMTHRD_LEN(ap) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ("));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMTHA(ap), ATMTHRD_LEN(ap),
ATMTSA(ap), ATMTSLN(ap));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "tell %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_REPLY:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s is-at ", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMSHA(ap), ATMSHRD_LEN(ap), ATMSSA(ap),
ATMSSLN(ap));
break;
case ARPOP_INVREQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-is "));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMTHA(ap), ATMTHRD_LEN(ap), ATMTSA(ap),
ATMTSLN(ap));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tell "));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMSHA(ap), ATMSHRD_LEN(ap), ATMSSA(ap),
ATMSSLN(ap));
break;
case ARPOP_INVREPLY:
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMSHA(ap), ATMSHRD_LEN(ap), ATMSSA(ap),
ATMSSLN(ap));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "at %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_NAK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "for %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
break;
default:
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, caplen);
return;
}
out:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13013/ARP: Fix printing of ARP protocol addresses.
If the protocol type isn't ETHERTYPE_IP or ETHERTYPE_TRAIL, or if the
protocol address length isn't 4, don't print the address as an IPv4 address.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update another test file's tcpdump output to reflect this change.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::startPlaybackProgressTimer() {
if (m_playbackProgressTimer.isActive())
return;
m_previousProgressTime = WTF::currentTime();
m_playbackProgressTimer.startRepeating(maxTimeupdateEventFrequency,
BLINK_FROM_HERE);
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int udp6_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_puts(seq, IPV6_SEQ_DGRAM_HEADER);
} else {
int bucket = ((struct udp_iter_state *)seq->private)->bucket;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(v);
__u16 srcp = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
__u16 destp = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
ip6_dgram_sock_seq_show(seq, v, srcp, destp, bucket);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: call udp_push_pending_frames when uncorking a socket with AF_INET pending data
We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>] [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS: 00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
[<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
[<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
[<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
[<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>
This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.
This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.
(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::ClearUnclearedTextures() {
if (!texture_manager()->HaveUnsafeTextures()) {
return true;
}
if (current_program_) {
const ProgramManager::ProgramInfo::SamplerIndices& sampler_indices =
current_program_->sampler_indices();
for (size_t ii = 0; ii < sampler_indices.size(); ++ii) {
const ProgramManager::ProgramInfo::UniformInfo* uniform_info =
current_program_->GetUniformInfo(sampler_indices[ii]);
DCHECK(uniform_info);
for (size_t jj = 0; jj < uniform_info->texture_units.size(); ++jj) {
GLuint texture_unit_index = uniform_info->texture_units[jj];
if (texture_unit_index < group_->max_texture_units()) {
TextureUnit& texture_unit = texture_units_[texture_unit_index];
TextureManager::TextureInfo* texture_info =
texture_unit.GetInfoForSamplerType(uniform_info->type);
if (texture_info && !texture_info->SafeToRenderFrom()) {
if (!texture_manager()->ClearRenderableLevels(this, texture_info)) {
return false;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TraceEvent::Initialize(
int thread_id,
TraceTicks timestamp,
ThreadTicks thread_timestamp,
char phase,
const unsigned char* category_group_enabled,
const char* name,
unsigned long long id,
unsigned long long context_id,
unsigned long long bind_id,
int num_args,
const char** arg_names,
const unsigned char* arg_types,
const unsigned long long* arg_values,
const scoped_refptr<ConvertableToTraceFormat>* convertable_values,
unsigned int flags) {
timestamp_ = timestamp;
thread_timestamp_ = thread_timestamp;
duration_ = TimeDelta::FromInternalValue(-1);
id_ = id;
context_id_ = context_id;
category_group_enabled_ = category_group_enabled;
name_ = name;
thread_id_ = thread_id;
phase_ = phase;
flags_ = flags;
bind_id_ = bind_id;
num_args = (num_args > kTraceMaxNumArgs) ? kTraceMaxNumArgs : num_args;
int i = 0;
for (; i < num_args; ++i) {
arg_names_[i] = arg_names[i];
arg_types_[i] = arg_types[i];
if (arg_types[i] == TRACE_VALUE_TYPE_CONVERTABLE)
convertable_values_[i] = convertable_values[i];
else
arg_values_[i].as_uint = arg_values[i];
}
for (; i < kTraceMaxNumArgs; ++i) {
arg_names_[i] = NULL;
arg_values_[i].as_uint = 0u;
convertable_values_[i] = NULL;
arg_types_[i] = TRACE_VALUE_TYPE_UINT;
}
bool copy = !!(flags & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_COPY);
size_t alloc_size = 0;
if (copy) {
alloc_size += GetAllocLength(name);
for (i = 0; i < num_args; ++i) {
alloc_size += GetAllocLength(arg_names_[i]);
if (arg_types_[i] == TRACE_VALUE_TYPE_STRING)
arg_types_[i] = TRACE_VALUE_TYPE_COPY_STRING;
}
}
bool arg_is_copy[kTraceMaxNumArgs];
for (i = 0; i < num_args; ++i) {
if (arg_types_[i] == TRACE_VALUE_TYPE_CONVERTABLE)
continue;
arg_is_copy[i] = (arg_types_[i] == TRACE_VALUE_TYPE_COPY_STRING);
if (arg_is_copy[i])
alloc_size += GetAllocLength(arg_values_[i].as_string);
}
if (alloc_size) {
parameter_copy_storage_ = new RefCountedString;
parameter_copy_storage_->data().resize(alloc_size);
char* ptr = string_as_array(¶meter_copy_storage_->data());
const char* end = ptr + alloc_size;
if (copy) {
CopyTraceEventParameter(&ptr, &name_, end);
for (i = 0; i < num_args; ++i) {
CopyTraceEventParameter(&ptr, &arg_names_[i], end);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < num_args; ++i) {
if (arg_types_[i] == TRACE_VALUE_TYPE_CONVERTABLE)
continue;
if (arg_is_copy[i])
CopyTraceEventParameter(&ptr, &arg_values_[i].as_string, end);
}
DCHECK_EQ(end, ptr) << "Overrun by " << ptr - end;
}
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_fault_code(int nr, int (*fn)(unsigned long, unsigned int, struct pt_regs *),
int sig, int code, const char *name)
{
if (nr < 0 || nr >= ARRAY_SIZE(fsr_info))
BUG();
fsr_info[nr].fn = fn;
fsr_info[nr].sig = sig;
fsr_info[nr].code = code;
fsr_info[nr].name = name;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MockRenderThread::AddFilter(IPC::ChannelProxy::MessageFilter* filter) {
filter->OnFilterAdded(&sink());
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TextureBase* GLES2Decoder::GetTextureBase(uint32_t client_id) {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::MovePluginWindows(
const gfx::Vector2d& scroll_offset,
const std::vector<webkit::npapi::WebPluginGeometry>& plugin_window_moves) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (!window_->GetRootWindow()) {
DCHECK(plugin_window_moves.empty());
return;
}
HWND parent = window_->GetRootWindow()->GetAcceleratedWidget();
gfx::Rect view_bounds = window_->GetBoundsInRootWindow();
std::vector<webkit::npapi::WebPluginGeometry> moves = plugin_window_moves;
gfx::Rect view_port(scroll_offset.x(), scroll_offset.y(), view_bounds.width(),
view_bounds.height());
for (size_t i = 0; i < moves.size(); ++i) {
gfx::Rect clip(moves[i].clip_rect);
gfx::Vector2d view_port_offset(
moves[i].window_rect.OffsetFromOrigin() + scroll_offset);
clip.Offset(view_port_offset);
clip.Intersect(view_port);
clip.Offset(-view_port_offset);
moves[i].clip_rect = clip;
moves[i].window_rect.Offset(view_bounds.OffsetFromOrigin());
}
MovePluginWindowsHelper(parent, moves);
for (size_t i = 0; i < moves.size(); ++i) {
HWND window = moves[i].window;
if (GetParent(window) != parent) {
window = GetParent(window);
DCHECK(GetParent(window) == parent);
}
if (!GetProp(window, kWidgetOwnerProperty))
CHECK(SetProp(window, kWidgetOwnerProperty, this));
}
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::DiscardTransientEntry() {
if (transient_entry_index_ == -1)
return;
entries_.erase(entries_.begin() + transient_entry_index_);
if (last_committed_entry_index_ > transient_entry_index_)
last_committed_entry_index_--;
if (pending_entry_index_ > transient_entry_index_)
pending_entry_index_--;
transient_entry_index_ = -1;
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 150,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fc_dma_sync_single_for_device(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t addr, size_t size,
enum dma_data_direction dir)
{
if (dev)
dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, addr, size, dir);
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::readDouble(double *pArg) const
{
return readAligned(pArg);
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PermissionsData::CanCaptureVisiblePage(const GURL& document_url,
int tab_id,
std::string* error) const {
bool has_active_tab = false;
bool has_all_urls = false;
url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(document_url);
const GURL origin_url = origin.GetURL();
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
if (location_ != Manifest::COMPONENT &&
IsPolicyBlockedHostUnsafe(origin_url)) {
if (error)
*error = extension_misc::kPolicyBlockedScripting;
return false;
}
const PermissionSet* tab_permissions = GetTabSpecificPermissions(tab_id);
has_active_tab = tab_permissions &&
tab_permissions->HasAPIPermission(APIPermission::kTab);
const URLPattern all_urls(URLPattern::SCHEME_ALL,
URLPattern::kAllUrlsPattern);
has_all_urls =
active_permissions_unsafe_->explicit_hosts().ContainsPattern(all_urls);
}
if (!has_active_tab && !has_all_urls) {
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kAllURLOrActiveTabNeeded;
return false;
}
std::string access_error;
if (GetPageAccess(origin_url, tab_id, &access_error) == PageAccess::kAllowed)
return true;
if (origin_url.host() == extension_id_)
return true;
bool allowed_with_active_tab =
origin_url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme) ||
origin_url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme) ||
document_url.SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme) ||
origin.IsSameOriginWith(
url::Origin::Create(ExtensionsClient::Get()->GetWebstoreBaseURL()));
if (!allowed_with_active_tab) {
if (error)
*error = access_error;
return false;
}
if (has_active_tab)
return true;
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kActiveTabPermissionNotGranted;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: netdev_tx_t usbnet_start_xmit (struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *net)
{
struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(net);
unsigned int length;
struct urb *urb = NULL;
struct skb_data *entry;
struct driver_info *info = dev->driver_info;
unsigned long flags;
int retval;
if (skb)
skb_tx_timestamp(skb);
if (info->tx_fixup) {
skb = info->tx_fixup (dev, skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb) {
/* packet collected; minidriver waiting for more */
if (info->flags & FLAG_MULTI_PACKET)
goto not_drop;
netif_dbg(dev, tx_err, dev->net, "can't tx_fixup skb\n");
goto drop;
}
}
if (!(urb = usb_alloc_urb (0, GFP_ATOMIC))) {
netif_dbg(dev, tx_err, dev->net, "no urb\n");
goto drop;
}
entry = (struct skb_data *) skb->cb;
entry->urb = urb;
entry->dev = dev;
usb_fill_bulk_urb (urb, dev->udev, dev->out,
skb->data, skb->len, tx_complete, skb);
if (dev->can_dma_sg) {
if (build_dma_sg(skb, urb) < 0)
goto drop;
}
length = urb->transfer_buffer_length;
/* don't assume the hardware handles USB_ZERO_PACKET
* NOTE: strictly conforming cdc-ether devices should expect
* the ZLP here, but ignore the one-byte packet.
* NOTE2: CDC NCM specification is different from CDC ECM when
* handling ZLP/short packets, so cdc_ncm driver will make short
* packet itself if needed.
*/
if (length % dev->maxpacket == 0) {
if (!(info->flags & FLAG_SEND_ZLP)) {
if (!(info->flags & FLAG_MULTI_PACKET)) {
length++;
if (skb_tailroom(skb) && !urb->num_sgs) {
skb->data[skb->len] = 0;
__skb_put(skb, 1);
} else if (urb->num_sgs)
sg_set_buf(&urb->sg[urb->num_sgs++],
dev->padding_pkt, 1);
}
} else
urb->transfer_flags |= URB_ZERO_PACKET;
}
urb->transfer_buffer_length = length;
if (info->flags & FLAG_MULTI_PACKET) {
/* Driver has set number of packets and a length delta.
* Calculate the complete length and ensure that it's
* positive.
*/
entry->length += length;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(entry->length <= 0))
entry->length = length;
} else {
usbnet_set_skb_tx_stats(skb, 1, length);
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->txq.lock, flags);
retval = usb_autopm_get_interface_async(dev->intf);
if (retval < 0) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->txq.lock, flags);
goto drop;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PM
/* if this triggers the device is still a sleep */
if (test_bit(EVENT_DEV_ASLEEP, &dev->flags)) {
/* transmission will be done in resume */
usb_anchor_urb(urb, &dev->deferred);
/* no use to process more packets */
netif_stop_queue(net);
usb_put_urb(urb);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->txq.lock, flags);
netdev_dbg(dev->net, "Delaying transmission for resumption\n");
goto deferred;
}
#endif
switch ((retval = usb_submit_urb (urb, GFP_ATOMIC))) {
case -EPIPE:
netif_stop_queue (net);
usbnet_defer_kevent (dev, EVENT_TX_HALT);
usb_autopm_put_interface_async(dev->intf);
break;
default:
usb_autopm_put_interface_async(dev->intf);
netif_dbg(dev, tx_err, dev->net,
"tx: submit urb err %d\n", retval);
break;
case 0:
net->trans_start = jiffies;
__usbnet_queue_skb(&dev->txq, skb, tx_start);
if (dev->txq.qlen >= TX_QLEN (dev))
netif_stop_queue (net);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore (&dev->txq.lock, flags);
if (retval) {
netif_dbg(dev, tx_err, dev->net, "drop, code %d\n", retval);
drop:
dev->net->stats.tx_dropped++;
not_drop:
if (skb)
dev_kfree_skb_any (skb);
if (urb) {
kfree(urb->sg);
usb_free_urb(urb);
}
} else
netif_dbg(dev, tx_queued, dev->net,
"> tx, len %u, type 0x%x\n", length, skb->protocol);
#ifdef CONFIG_PM
deferred:
#endif
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 94,917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
{
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/*
* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats
* we support if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note
* that the server is not supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
*/
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
|| (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
if (using_ecc) {
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] =
TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] =
TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GBool matches(SplashFontFileID *id) {
return ((SplashOutFontFileID *)id)->r.num == r.num &&
((SplashOutFontFileID *)id)->r.gen == r.gen;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::ProcessAckedTouchEvent(
const TouchEventWithLatencyInfo& touch,
InputEventAckState ack_result) {
aura::WindowTreeHost* host = window_->GetHost();
if (!host)
return;
DCHECK(touch.event.GetType() != blink::WebInputEvent::kTouchScrollStarted);
ui::EventResult result = (ack_result == INPUT_EVENT_ACK_STATE_CONSUMED)
? ui::ER_HANDLED
: ui::ER_UNHANDLED;
blink::WebTouchPoint::State required_state;
switch (touch.event.GetType()) {
case blink::WebInputEvent::kTouchStart:
required_state = blink::WebTouchPoint::kStatePressed;
break;
case blink::WebInputEvent::kTouchEnd:
required_state = blink::WebTouchPoint::kStateReleased;
break;
case blink::WebInputEvent::kTouchMove:
required_state = blink::WebTouchPoint::kStateMoved;
break;
case blink::WebInputEvent::kTouchCancel:
required_state = blink::WebTouchPoint::kStateCancelled;
break;
default:
required_state = blink::WebTouchPoint::kStateUndefined;
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
bool sent_ack = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < touch.event.touches_length; ++i) {
if (touch.event.touches[i].state == required_state) {
DCHECK(!sent_ack);
host->dispatcher()->ProcessedTouchEvent(touch.event.unique_touch_event_id,
window_, result);
sent_ack = true;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: escapeGahpString(const char * input)
{
static std::string output;
if (!input) return NULL;
output = "";
unsigned int i = 0;
size_t input_len = strlen(input);
for (i=0; i < input_len; i++) {
if ( input[i] == ' ' || input[i] == '\\' || input[i] == '\r' ||
input[i] == '\n' ) {
output += '\\';
}
output += input[i];
}
return output.c_str();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxEditModel::SetCaretVisibility(bool visible) {
if (focus_state_ != OMNIBOX_FOCUS_NONE) {
SetFocusState(visible ? OMNIBOX_FOCUS_VISIBLE : OMNIBOX_FOCUS_INVISIBLE,
OMNIBOX_FOCUS_CHANGE_EXPLICIT);
}
}
Commit Message: [OriginChip] Re-enable the chip as necessary when switching tabs.
BUG=369500
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/292493003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@271161 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::TestEnumAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_testEnumAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::TestEnumAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long ContentEncoding::GetCompressionCount() const {
const ptrdiff_t count = compression_entries_end_ - compression_entries_;
assert(count >= 0);
return static_cast<unsigned long>(count);
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(struct sock *sk,
struct sock *other)
{
unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, other);
wake_up_interruptible_poll(sk_sleep(sk),
POLLOUT |
POLLWRNORM |
POLLWRBAND);
}
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 54,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Performance::AddLongTaskTiming(
TimeTicks start_time,
TimeTicks end_time,
const String& name,
const String& frame_src,
const String& frame_id,
const String& frame_name,
const SubTaskAttribution::EntriesVector& sub_task_attributions) {
if (!HasObserverFor(PerformanceEntry::kLongTask))
return;
for (auto&& it : sub_task_attributions) {
it->setHighResStartTime(
MonotonicTimeToDOMHighResTimeStamp(it->startTime()));
it->setHighResDuration(
ConvertTimeDeltaToDOMHighResTimeStamp(it->duration()));
}
PerformanceEntry* entry = PerformanceLongTaskTiming::Create(
MonotonicTimeToDOMHighResTimeStamp(start_time),
MonotonicTimeToDOMHighResTimeStamp(end_time), name, frame_src, frame_id,
frame_name, sub_task_attributions);
NotifyObserversOfEntry(*entry);
}
Commit Message: Fix timing allow check algorithm for service workers
This CL uses the OriginalURLViaServiceWorker() in the timing allow check
algorithm if the response WasFetchedViaServiceWorker(). This way, if a
service worker changes a same origin request to become cross origin,
then the timing allow check algorithm will still fail.
resource-timing-worker.js is changed so it avoids an empty Response,
which is an odd case in terms of same origin checks.
Bug: 837275
Change-Id: I7e497a6fcc2ee14244121b915ca5f5cceded417a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1038229
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Reviewed-by: Timothy Dresser <tdresser@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555476}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 153,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: htmlEncodeEntities(unsigned char* out, int *outlen,
const unsigned char* in, int *inlen, int quoteChar) {
const unsigned char* processed = in;
const unsigned char* outend;
const unsigned char* outstart = out;
const unsigned char* instart = in;
const unsigned char* inend;
unsigned int c, d;
int trailing;
if ((out == NULL) || (outlen == NULL) || (inlen == NULL) || (in == NULL))
return(-1);
outend = out + (*outlen);
inend = in + (*inlen);
while (in < inend) {
d = *in++;
if (d < 0x80) { c= d; trailing= 0; }
else if (d < 0xC0) {
/* trailing byte in leading position */
*outlen = out - outstart;
*inlen = processed - instart;
return(-2);
} else if (d < 0xE0) { c= d & 0x1F; trailing= 1; }
else if (d < 0xF0) { c= d & 0x0F; trailing= 2; }
else if (d < 0xF8) { c= d & 0x07; trailing= 3; }
else {
/* no chance for this in Ascii */
*outlen = out - outstart;
*inlen = processed - instart;
return(-2);
}
if (inend - in < trailing)
break;
while (trailing--) {
if (((d= *in++) & 0xC0) != 0x80) {
*outlen = out - outstart;
*inlen = processed - instart;
return(-2);
}
c <<= 6;
c |= d & 0x3F;
}
/* assertion: c is a single UTF-4 value */
if ((c < 0x80) && (c != (unsigned int) quoteChar) &&
(c != '&') && (c != '<') && (c != '>')) {
if (out >= outend)
break;
*out++ = c;
} else {
const htmlEntityDesc * ent;
const char *cp;
char nbuf[16];
int len;
/*
* Try to lookup a predefined HTML entity for it
*/
ent = htmlEntityValueLookup(c);
if (ent == NULL) {
snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "#%u", c);
cp = nbuf;
}
else
cp = ent->name;
len = strlen(cp);
if (out + 2 + len > outend)
break;
*out++ = '&';
memcpy(out, cp, len);
out += len;
*out++ = ';';
}
processed = in;
}
*outlen = out - outstart;
*inlen = processed - instart;
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int process_cpu_timer_create(struct k_itimer *timer)
{
timer->it_clock = PROCESS_CLOCK;
return posix_cpu_timer_create(timer);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ApplyBlockElementCommand::ApplyBlockElementCommand(Document& document, const QualifiedName& tagName)
: CompositeEditCommand(document)
, m_tagName(tagName)
{
}
Commit Message: Remove false assertion in ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection()
Note: This patch is preparation of fixing issue 294456.
This patch removes false assertion in ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection(), when contents of being indent is modified, e.g. mutation event, |endOfNextParagraph| can hold removed contents.
BUG=294456
TEST=n/a
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25657004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158701 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ScrollHitTestDisplayItem::Record(
GraphicsContext& context,
const DisplayItemClient& client,
DisplayItem::Type type,
scoped_refptr<const TransformPaintPropertyNode> scroll_offset_node) {
PaintController& paint_controller = context.GetPaintController();
DCHECK_NE(paint_controller.CurrentPaintChunkProperties().Transform(),
scroll_offset_node.get());
if (paint_controller.DisplayItemConstructionIsDisabled())
return;
paint_controller.CreateAndAppend<ScrollHitTestDisplayItem>(
client, type, std::move(scroll_offset_node));
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int next_signal(struct sigpending *pending, sigset_t *mask)
{
unsigned long i, *s, *m, x;
int sig = 0;
s = pending->signal.sig;
m = mask->sig;
/*
* Handle the first word specially: it contains the
* synchronous signals that need to be dequeued first.
*/
x = *s &~ *m;
if (x) {
if (x & SYNCHRONOUS_MASK)
x &= SYNCHRONOUS_MASK;
sig = ffz(~x) + 1;
return sig;
}
switch (_NSIG_WORDS) {
default:
for (i = 1; i < _NSIG_WORDS; ++i) {
x = *++s &~ *++m;
if (!x)
continue;
sig = ffz(~x) + i*_NSIG_BPW + 1;
break;
}
break;
case 2:
x = s[1] &~ m[1];
if (!x)
break;
sig = ffz(~x) + _NSIG_BPW + 1;
break;
case 1:
/* Nothing to do */
break;
}
return sig;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabAlertState TabStrip::GetTabAlertState(int tab_index) const {
return tab_at(tab_index)->data().alert_state;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: epass2003_set_security_env(struct sc_card *card, const sc_security_env_t * env, int se_num)
{
struct sc_apdu apdu;
u8 sbuf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE] = { 0 };
u8 *p;
unsigned short fid = 0;
int r, locked = 0;
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x22, 0x41, 0);
p = sbuf;
*p++ = 0x80; /* algorithm reference */
*p++ = 0x01;
*p++ = 0x84;
*p++ = 0x81;
*p++ = 0x02;
fid = 0x2900;
fid += (unsigned short)(0x20 * (env->key_ref[0] & 0xff));
*p++ = fid >> 8;
*p++ = fid & 0xff;
r = p - sbuf;
apdu.lc = r;
apdu.datalen = r;
apdu.data = sbuf;
if (env->algorithm == SC_ALGORITHM_EC)
{
apdu.p2 = 0xB6;
exdata->currAlg = SC_ALGORITHM_EC;
if(env->algorithm_flags & SC_ALGORITHM_ECDSA_HASH_SHA1)
{
sbuf[2] = 0x91;
exdata->ecAlgFlags = SC_ALGORITHM_ECDSA_HASH_SHA1;
}
else if (env->algorithm_flags & SC_ALGORITHM_ECDSA_HASH_SHA256)
{
sbuf[2] = 0x92;
exdata->ecAlgFlags = SC_ALGORITHM_ECDSA_HASH_SHA256;
}
else
{
sc_log(card->ctx, "%0x Alg Not Support! ", env->algorithm_flags);
goto err;
}
}
else if(env->algorithm == SC_ALGORITHM_RSA)
{
exdata->currAlg = SC_ALGORITHM_RSA;
apdu.p2 = 0xB8;
sc_log(card->ctx, "setenv RSA Algorithm alg_flags = %0x\n",env->algorithm_flags);
}
else
{
sc_log(card->ctx, "%0x Alg Not Support! ", env->algorithm);
}
if (se_num > 0) {
r = sc_lock(card);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "sc_lock() failed");
locked = 1;
}
if (apdu.datalen != 0) {
r = sc_transmit_apdu_t(card, &apdu);
if (r) {
sc_log(card->ctx, "%s: APDU transmit failed", sc_strerror(r));
goto err;
}
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
if (r) {
sc_log(card->ctx, "%s: Card returned error", sc_strerror(r));
goto err;
}
}
if (se_num <= 0)
return 0;
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x22, 0xF2, se_num);
r = sc_transmit_apdu_t(card, &apdu);
sc_unlock(card);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
return sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
err:
if (locked)
sc_unlock(card);
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate(Profile* profile)
: profile_(profile),
next_download_id_(content::DownloadItem::kInvalidId),
download_prefs_(new DownloadPrefs(profile)),
disk_access_task_runner_(base::CreateSequencedTaskRunnerWithTraits(
{base::MayBlock(), base::TaskPriority::BACKGROUND,
base::TaskShutdownBehavior::CONTINUE_ON_SHUTDOWN})),
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cdrom_ioctl_drive_status(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
unsigned long arg)
{
cd_dbg(CD_DO_IOCTL, "entering CDROM_DRIVE_STATUS\n");
if (!(cdi->ops->capability & CDC_DRIVE_STATUS))
return -ENOSYS;
if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_SELECT_DISC) ||
(arg == CDSL_CURRENT || arg == CDSL_NONE))
return cdi->ops->drive_status(cdi, CDSL_CURRENT);
if (arg >= cdi->capacity)
return -EINVAL;
return cdrom_slot_status(cdi, arg);
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 76,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void SetUpCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) {
GpuFeatureTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedCompositing);
}
Commit Message: Revert 124346 - Add basic threaded compositor test to gpu_feature_browsertest.cc
BUG=113159
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9509001
TBR=jbates@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9561011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@124356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::setValue(const String& value, TextFieldEventBehavior eventBehavior)
{
if (!m_inputType->canSetValue(value))
return;
RefPtr<HTMLInputElement> protector(this);
EventQueueScope scope;
String sanitizedValue = sanitizeValue(value);
bool valueChanged = sanitizedValue != this->value();
setLastChangeWasNotUserEdit();
setFormControlValueMatchesRenderer(false);
m_suggestedValue = String(); // Prevent TextFieldInputType::setValue from using the suggested value.
m_inputType->setValue(sanitizedValue, valueChanged, eventBehavior);
if (!valueChanged)
return;
notifyFormStateChanged();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Com_WriteCDKey( const char *filename, const char *ikey ) {
fileHandle_t f;
char fbuffer[MAX_OSPATH];
char key[17];
#ifndef _WIN32
mode_t savedumask;
#endif
Com_sprintf(fbuffer, sizeof(fbuffer), "%s/rtcwkey", filename);
Q_strncpyz( key, ikey, 17 );
if ( !CL_CDKeyValidate( key, NULL ) ) {
return;
}
#ifndef _WIN32
savedumask = umask(0077);
#endif
f = FS_SV_FOpenFileWrite( fbuffer );
if ( !f ) {
Com_Printf ("Couldn't write CD key to %s.\n", fbuffer );
goto out;
}
FS_Write( key, 16, f );
FS_Printf( f, "\n// generated by RTCW, do not modify\r\n" );
FS_Printf( f, "// Do not give this file to ANYONE.\r\n" );
#ifdef __APPLE__
FS_Printf( f, "// Aspyr will NOT ask you to send this file to them.\r\n" );
#else
FS_Printf( f, "// id Software and Activision will NOT ask you to send this file to them.\r\n" );
#endif
FS_FCloseFile( f );
out:
#ifndef _WIN32
umask(savedumask);
#else
;
#endif
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipxcfg_set_auto_select(char val)
{
ipxcfg_auto_select_primary = val;
if (val && !ipx_primary_net)
ipx_primary_net = ipx_interfaces_head();
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::UnsignedLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_unsignedLongAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::UnsignedLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::OnNavigationResponseReceived(
const NavigationRequest& nav_request,
const network::ResourceResponse& response) {
FrameTreeNode* ftn = nav_request.frame_tree_node();
std::string id = nav_request.devtools_navigation_token().ToString();
std::string frame_id = ftn->devtools_frame_token().ToString();
GURL url = nav_request.common_params().url;
DispatchToAgents(ftn, &protocol::NetworkHandler::ResponseReceived, id, id,
url, protocol::Page::ResourceTypeEnum::Document,
response.head, frame_id);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not create target handler for restricted sessions
Bug: 805224
Change-Id: I08528e44e79d0a097cfe72ab4949dda538efd098
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/988695
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547496}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
unsigned long stack_top,
int executable_stack)
{
unsigned long ret;
unsigned long stack_shift;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = bprm->vma;
struct vm_area_struct *prev = NULL;
unsigned long vm_flags;
unsigned long stack_base;
unsigned long stack_size;
unsigned long stack_expand;
unsigned long rlim_stack;
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
/* Limit stack size to 1GB */
stack_base = rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK);
if (stack_base > (1 << 30))
stack_base = 1 << 30;
/* Make sure we didn't let the argument array grow too large. */
if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start > stack_base)
return -ENOMEM;
stack_base = PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top - stack_base);
stack_shift = vma->vm_start - stack_base;
mm->arg_start = bprm->p - stack_shift;
bprm->p = vma->vm_end - stack_shift;
#else
stack_top = arch_align_stack(stack_top);
stack_top = PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top);
if (unlikely(stack_top < mmap_min_addr) ||
unlikely(vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start >= stack_top - mmap_min_addr))
return -ENOMEM;
stack_shift = vma->vm_end - stack_top;
bprm->p -= stack_shift;
mm->arg_start = bprm->p;
#endif
if (bprm->loader)
bprm->loader -= stack_shift;
bprm->exec -= stack_shift;
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS;
/*
* Adjust stack execute permissions; explicitly enable for
* EXSTACK_ENABLE_X, disable for EXSTACK_DISABLE_X and leave alone
* (arch default) otherwise.
*/
if (unlikely(executable_stack == EXSTACK_ENABLE_X))
vm_flags |= VM_EXEC;
else if (executable_stack == EXSTACK_DISABLE_X)
vm_flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
vm_flags |= mm->def_flags;
vm_flags |= VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP;
ret = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
vm_flags);
if (ret)
goto out_unlock;
BUG_ON(prev != vma);
/* Move stack pages down in memory. */
if (stack_shift) {
ret = shift_arg_pages(vma, stack_shift);
if (ret)
goto out_unlock;
}
/* mprotect_fixup is overkill to remove the temporary stack flags */
vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP;
stack_expand = 131072UL; /* randomly 32*4k (or 2*64k) pages */
stack_size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
/*
* Align this down to a page boundary as expand_stack
* will align it up.
*/
rlim_stack = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK) & PAGE_MASK;
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
if (stack_size + stack_expand > rlim_stack)
stack_base = vma->vm_start + rlim_stack;
else
stack_base = vma->vm_end + stack_expand;
#else
if (stack_size + stack_expand > rlim_stack)
stack_base = vma->vm_end - rlim_stack;
else
stack_base = vma->vm_start - stack_expand;
#endif
current->mm->start_stack = bprm->p;
ret = expand_stack(vma, stack_base);
if (ret)
ret = -EFAULT;
out_unlock:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 30,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_dec_cp_isvalid(jpc_dec_cp_t *cp)
{
uint_fast16_t compcnt;
jpc_dec_ccp_t *ccp;
if (!(cp->flags & JPC_CSET) || !(cp->flags & JPC_QSET)) {
return 0;
}
for (compcnt = cp->numcomps, ccp = cp->ccps; compcnt > 0; --compcnt,
++ccp) {
/* Is there enough step sizes for the number of bands? */
if ((ccp->qsty != JPC_QCX_SIQNT && JAS_CAST(int, ccp->numstepsizes) < 3 *
ccp->numrlvls - 2) || (ccp->qsty == JPC_QCX_SIQNT &&
ccp->numstepsizes != 1)) {
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void setup_decoding_thread_data(VP8D_COMP *pbi, MACROBLOCKD *xd, MB_ROW_DEC *mbrd, int count)
{
VP8_COMMON *const pc = & pbi->common;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
MACROBLOCKD *mbd = &mbrd[i].mbd;
mbd->subpixel_predict = xd->subpixel_predict;
mbd->subpixel_predict8x4 = xd->subpixel_predict8x4;
mbd->subpixel_predict8x8 = xd->subpixel_predict8x8;
mbd->subpixel_predict16x16 = xd->subpixel_predict16x16;
mbd->mode_info_context = pc->mi + pc->mode_info_stride * (i + 1);
mbd->mode_info_stride = pc->mode_info_stride;
mbd->frame_type = pc->frame_type;
mbd->pre = xd->pre;
mbd->dst = xd->dst;
mbd->segmentation_enabled = xd->segmentation_enabled;
mbd->mb_segement_abs_delta = xd->mb_segement_abs_delta;
memcpy(mbd->segment_feature_data, xd->segment_feature_data, sizeof(xd->segment_feature_data));
/*signed char ref_lf_deltas[MAX_REF_LF_DELTAS];*/
memcpy(mbd->ref_lf_deltas, xd->ref_lf_deltas, sizeof(xd->ref_lf_deltas));
/*signed char mode_lf_deltas[MAX_MODE_LF_DELTAS];*/
memcpy(mbd->mode_lf_deltas, xd->mode_lf_deltas, sizeof(xd->mode_lf_deltas));
/*unsigned char mode_ref_lf_delta_enabled;
unsigned char mode_ref_lf_delta_update;*/
mbd->mode_ref_lf_delta_enabled = xd->mode_ref_lf_delta_enabled;
mbd->mode_ref_lf_delta_update = xd->mode_ref_lf_delta_update;
mbd->current_bc = &pbi->mbc[0];
memcpy(mbd->dequant_y1_dc, xd->dequant_y1_dc, sizeof(xd->dequant_y1_dc));
memcpy(mbd->dequant_y1, xd->dequant_y1, sizeof(xd->dequant_y1));
memcpy(mbd->dequant_y2, xd->dequant_y2, sizeof(xd->dequant_y2));
memcpy(mbd->dequant_uv, xd->dequant_uv, sizeof(xd->dequant_uv));
mbd->fullpixel_mask = 0xffffffff;
if (pc->full_pixel)
mbd->fullpixel_mask = 0xfffffff8;
}
for (i = 0; i < pc->mb_rows; i++)
pbi->mt_current_mb_col[i] = -1;
}
Commit Message: vp8:fix threading issues
1 - stops de allocating before threads are closed.
2 - limits threads to mb_rows when mb_rows < partitions
BUG=webm:851
Bug: 30436808
Change-Id: Ie017818ed28103ca9d26d57087f31361b642e09b
(cherry picked from commit 70cca742efa20617c70c3209aa614a70f282f90e)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static GIOStatus irssi_ssl_close(GIOChannel *handle, GError **gerr)
{
GIOSSLChannel *chan = (GIOSSLChannel *)handle;
return chan->giochan->funcs->io_close(handle, gerr);
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedPixelUnpackState::ScopedPixelUnpackState(ContextState* state)
: state_(state) {
DCHECK(state_);
state_->PushTextureUnpackState();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestDisplayItemRequiringSeparateChunk(const DisplayItemClient& client)
: TestChunkerDisplayItem(client, DisplayItem::kForeignLayerPlugin) {}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Extension::AddWebExtentPattern(const URLPattern& pattern) {
extent_.AddPattern(pattern);
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 114,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int StreamTcpTest01 (void)
{
StreamTcpThread stt;
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return 0;
Flow f;
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow));
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
p->flow = &f;
int ret = 0;
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
TcpSession *ssn = StreamTcpNewSession(p, 0);
if (ssn == NULL) {
printf("Session can not be allocated: ");
goto end;
}
f.protoctx = ssn;
if (f.alparser != NULL) {
printf("AppLayer field not set to NULL: ");
goto end;
}
if (ssn->state != 0) {
printf("TCP state field not set to 0: ");
goto end;
}
StreamTcpSessionClear(p->flow->protoctx);
ret = 1;
end:
SCFree(p);
FLOW_DESTROY(&f);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 79,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::AddListenerTypeIfNeeded(const AtomicString& event_type,
EventTarget& event_target) {
if (event_type == EventTypeNames::DOMSubtreeModified) {
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kDOMSubtreeModifiedEvent);
AddMutationEventListenerTypeIfEnabled(kDOMSubtreeModifiedListener);
} else if (event_type == EventTypeNames::DOMNodeInserted) {
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kDOMNodeInsertedEvent);
AddMutationEventListenerTypeIfEnabled(kDOMNodeInsertedListener);
} else if (event_type == EventTypeNames::DOMNodeRemoved) {
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kDOMNodeRemovedEvent);
AddMutationEventListenerTypeIfEnabled(kDOMNodeRemovedListener);
} else if (event_type == EventTypeNames::DOMNodeRemovedFromDocument) {
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kDOMNodeRemovedFromDocumentEvent);
AddMutationEventListenerTypeIfEnabled(kDOMNodeRemovedFromDocumentListener);
} else if (event_type == EventTypeNames::DOMNodeInsertedIntoDocument) {
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kDOMNodeInsertedIntoDocumentEvent);
AddMutationEventListenerTypeIfEnabled(kDOMNodeInsertedIntoDocumentListener);
} else if (event_type == EventTypeNames::DOMCharacterDataModified) {
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kDOMCharacterDataModifiedEvent);
AddMutationEventListenerTypeIfEnabled(kDOMCharacterDataModifiedListener);
} else if (event_type == EventTypeNames::webkitAnimationStart ||
event_type == EventTypeNames::animationstart) {
AddListenerType(kAnimationStartListener);
} else if (event_type == EventTypeNames::webkitAnimationEnd ||
event_type == EventTypeNames::animationend) {
AddListenerType(kAnimationEndListener);
} else if (event_type == EventTypeNames::webkitAnimationIteration ||
event_type == EventTypeNames::animationiteration) {
AddListenerType(kAnimationIterationListener);
if (View()) {
View()->ScheduleAnimation();
}
} else if (event_type == EventTypeNames::webkitTransitionEnd ||
event_type == EventTypeNames::transitionend) {
AddListenerType(kTransitionEndListener);
} else if (event_type == EventTypeNames::scroll) {
AddListenerType(kScrollListener);
} else if (event_type == EventTypeNames::load) {
if (Node* node = event_target.ToNode()) {
if (isHTMLStyleElement(*node)) {
AddListenerType(kLoadListenerAtCapturePhaseOrAtStyleElement);
return;
}
}
if (event_target.HasCapturingEventListeners(event_type))
AddListenerType(kLoadListenerAtCapturePhaseOrAtStyleElement);
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mcryptd_free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
{
struct mcryptd_instance_ctx *ctx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
struct hashd_instance_ctx *hctx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
switch (inst->alg.cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) {
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH:
crypto_drop_ahash(&hctx->spawn);
kfree(ahash_instance(inst));
return;
default:
crypto_drop_spawn(&ctx->spawn);
kfree(inst);
}
}
Commit Message: crypto: mcryptd - Check mcryptd algorithm compatibility
Algorithms not compatible with mcryptd could be spawned by mcryptd
with a direct crypto_alloc_tfm invocation using a "mcryptd(alg)" name
construct. This causes mcryptd to crash the kernel if an arbitrary
"alg" is incompatible and not intended to be used with mcryptd. It is
an issue if AF_ALG tries to spawn mcryptd(alg) to expose it externally.
But such algorithms must be used internally and not be exposed.
We added a check to enforce that only internal algorithms are allowed
with mcryptd at the time mcryptd is spawning an algorithm.
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=148063683310477&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 71,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int msr_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_msrs __user *user_msrs,
int (*do_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned index, u64 *data),
int writeback)
{
struct kvm_msrs msrs;
struct kvm_msr_entry *entries;
int r, n;
unsigned size;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&msrs, user_msrs, sizeof msrs))
goto out;
r = -E2BIG;
if (msrs.nmsrs >= MAX_IO_MSRS)
goto out;
size = sizeof(struct kvm_msr_entry) * msrs.nmsrs;
entries = memdup_user(user_msrs->entries, size);
if (IS_ERR(entries)) {
r = PTR_ERR(entries);
goto out;
}
r = n = __msr_io(vcpu, &msrs, entries, do_msr);
if (r < 0)
goto out_free;
r = -EFAULT;
if (writeback && copy_to_user(user_msrs->entries, entries, size))
goto out_free;
r = n;
out_free:
kfree(entries);
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> strawberryAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.strawberry._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return v8::Integer::New(imp->blueberry());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: getvalue(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m, const char **p, int action)
{
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16:
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
case FILE_REGEX:
case FILE_SEARCH:
case FILE_NAME:
case FILE_USE:
*p = getstr(ms, m, *p, action == FILE_COMPILE);
if (*p == NULL) {
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms, "cannot get string from `%s'",
m->value.s);
return -1;
}
return 0;
case FILE_FLOAT:
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
if (m->reln != 'x') {
char *ep;
#ifdef HAVE_STRTOF
m->value.f = strtof(*p, &ep);
#else
m->value.f = (float)strtod(*p, &ep);
#endif
*p = ep;
}
return 0;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
if (m->reln != 'x') {
char *ep;
m->value.d = strtod(*p, &ep);
*p = ep;
}
return 0;
default:
if (m->reln != 'x') {
char *ep;
m->value.q = file_signextend(ms, m,
(uint64_t)strtoull(*p, &ep, 0));
*p = ep;
eatsize(p);
}
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 7,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PNG_FUNCTION(void, display_exit, (display *d), static PNG_NORETURN)
{
++(d->error_count);
if (d->png_ptr != NULL)
clean_display(d);
/* During initialization and if this is a single command line argument set
* exit now - there is only one test, otherwise longjmp to do the next test.
*/
if (d->test == init || d->test == cmd)
exit(1);
longjmp(d->error_return, 1);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestSocketStreamNetworkDelegate()
: before_connect_result_(OK) {}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gx_device_copy_color_params(gx_device *dev, const gx_device *target)
{
COPY_PARAM(color_info);
COPY_PARAM(cached_colors);
gx_device_copy_color_procs(dev, target);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 2,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xhci_epmask_to_eps_with_streams(XHCIState *xhci,
unsigned int slotid,
uint32_t epmask,
XHCIEPContext **epctxs,
USBEndpoint **eps)
{
XHCISlot *slot;
XHCIEPContext *epctx;
USBEndpoint *ep;
int i, j;
assert(slotid >= 1 && slotid <= xhci->numslots);
slot = &xhci->slots[slotid - 1];
for (i = 2, j = 0; i <= 31; i++) {
if (!(epmask & (1u << i))) {
continue;
}
epctx = slot->eps[i - 1];
ep = xhci_epid_to_usbep(epctx);
if (!epctx || !epctx->nr_pstreams || !ep) {
continue;
}
if (epctxs) {
epctxs[j] = epctx;
}
eps[j++] = ep;
}
return j;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,708 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DefaultTabHandler::DuplicateContentsAt(int index) {
delegate_->AsBrowser()->DuplicateContentsAt(index);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __set_spte(u64 *sptep, u64 spte)
{
union split_spte *ssptep, sspte;
ssptep = (union split_spte *)sptep;
sspte = (union split_spte)spte;
ssptep->spte_high = sspte.spte_high;
/*
* If we map the spte from nonpresent to present, We should store
* the high bits firstly, then set present bit, so cpu can not
* fetch this spte while we are setting the spte.
*/
smp_wmb();
ssptep->spte_low = sspte.spte_low;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int update_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
unsigned int len)
{
struct ebt_replace hlp;
if (copy_from_user(&hlp, user, sizeof(hlp)))
return -EFAULT;
if (len != sizeof(hlp) + hlp.num_counters * sizeof(struct ebt_counter))
return -EINVAL;
return do_update_counters(net, hlp.name, hlp.counters,
hlp.num_counters, user, len);
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void br_netfilter_fini(void)
{
nf_unregister_hooks(br_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(br_nf_ops));
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
unregister_sysctl_table(brnf_sysctl_header);
#endif
dst_entries_destroy(&fake_dst_ops);
}
Commit Message: bridge: reset IPCB in br_parse_ip_options
Commit 462fb2af9788a82 (bridge : Sanitize skb before it enters the IP
stack), missed one IPCB init before calling ip_options_compile()
Thanks to Scot Doyle for his tests and bug reports.
Reported-by: Scot Doyle <lkml@scotdoyle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Hiroaki SHIMODA <shimoda.hiroaki@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Bandan Das <bandan.das@stratus.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Cc: Jan Lübbe <jluebbe@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void setProtocolError(client *c, int pos) {
if (server.verbosity <= LL_VERBOSE) {
sds client = catClientInfoString(sdsempty(),c);
serverLog(LL_VERBOSE,
"Protocol error from client: %s", client);
sdsfree(client);
}
c->flags |= CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_REPLY;
sdsrange(c->querybuf,pos,-1);
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 69,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PreconnectManager::Stop(const GURL& url) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
auto it = preresolve_info_.find(url.host());
if (it == preresolve_info_.end()) {
return;
}
it->second->was_canceled = true;
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _asn1_ltostr (long v, char *str)
{
long d, r;
char temp[LTOSTR_MAX_SIZE];
int count, k, start;
if (v < 0)
{
str[0] = '-';
start = 1;
v = -v;
}
else
start = 0;
count = 0;
do
{
d = v / 10;
r = v - d * 10;
temp[start + count] = '0' + (char) r;
count++;
v = d;
}
while (v);
for (k = 0; k < count; k++)
str[k + start] = temp[start + count - k - 1];
str[count + start] = 0;
return str;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 164,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cp2112_set_usb_config(struct hid_device *hdev,
struct cp2112_usb_config_report *cfg)
{
int ret;
BUG_ON(cfg->report != CP2112_USB_CONFIG);
ret = cp2112_hid_output(hdev, (u8 *)cfg, sizeof(*cfg),
HID_FEATURE_REPORT);
if (ret != sizeof(*cfg)) {
hid_err(hdev, "error writing usb config: %d\n", ret);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
return -EIO;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: HID: cp2112: fix gpio-callback error handling
In case of a zero-length report, the gpio direction_input callback would
currently return success instead of an errno.
Fixes: 1ffb3c40ffb5 ("HID: cp2112: make transfer buffers DMA capable")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 66,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MODRET set_rootlogin(cmd_rec *cmd) {
int bool = -1;
config_rec *c = NULL;
CHECK_ARGS(cmd,1);
CHECK_CONF(cmd, CONF_ROOT|CONF_VIRTUAL|CONF_GLOBAL|CONF_ANON);
bool = get_boolean(cmd, 1);
if (bool == -1)
CONF_ERROR(cmd, "expected Boolean parameter");
c = add_config_param(cmd->argv[0], 1, NULL);
c->argv[0] = pcalloc(c->pool, sizeof(unsigned char));
*((unsigned char *) c->argv[0]) = (unsigned char) bool;
c->flags |= CF_MERGEDOWN;
return PR_HANDLED(cmd);
}
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 67,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaElementAudioSourceNode::SetFormat(size_t number_of_channels,
float sample_rate) {
GetMediaElementAudioSourceHandler().SetFormat(number_of_channels,
sample_rate);
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 153,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnSeekBackward(double seconds) {
DCHECK_GE(seconds, 0) << "Attempted to seek by a negative number of seconds";
client_->RequestSeek(CurrentTime() - seconds);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UDPSocketLibevent::Close() {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
if (!is_connected())
return;
read_buf_ = NULL;
read_buf_len_ = 0;
read_callback_.Reset();
recv_from_address_ = NULL;
write_buf_ = NULL;
write_buf_len_ = 0;
write_callback_.Reset();
send_to_address_.reset();
bool ok = read_socket_watcher_.StopWatchingFileDescriptor();
DCHECK(ok);
ok = write_socket_watcher_.StopWatchingFileDescriptor();
DCHECK(ok);
if (IGNORE_EINTR(close(socket_)) < 0)
PLOG(ERROR) << "close";
socket_ = kInvalidSocket;
addr_family_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Gfx::display(Object *obj, GBool topLevel) {
Object obj2;
int i;
if (obj->isArray()) {
for (i = 0; i < obj->arrayGetLength(); ++i) {
obj->arrayGet(i, &obj2);
if (!obj2.isStream()) {
error(-1, "Weird page contents");
obj2.free();
return;
}
obj2.free();
}
} else if (!obj->isStream()) {
error(-1, "Weird page contents");
return;
}
parser = new Parser(xref, new Lexer(xref, obj), gFalse);
go(topLevel);
delete parser;
parser = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,072 |
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