instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(MultipleIterator, __construct)
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern;
long flags = MIT_NEED_ALL|MIT_KEYS_NUMERIC;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_InvalidArgumentException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|l", &flags) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
intern = (spl_SplObjectStorage*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
intern->flags = flags;
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fwnet_update(struct fw_unit *unit)
{
struct fw_device *device = fw_parent_device(unit);
struct fwnet_peer *peer = dev_get_drvdata(&unit->device);
int generation;
generation = device->generation;
spin_lock_irq(&peer->dev->lock);
peer->node_id = device->node_id;
peer->generation = generation;
spin_unlock_irq(&peer->dev->lock);
}
Commit Message: firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TEE_Result syscall_get_cancellation_flag(uint32_t *cancel)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_ta_session *s = NULL;
uint32_t c;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&s);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
c = tee_ta_session_is_cancelled(s, NULL);
return tee_svc_copy_to_user(cancel, &c, sizeof(c));
}
Commit Message: core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MYSQLND_METHOD(mysqlnd_conn_data, list_method)(MYSQLND_CONN_DATA * conn, const char * query, const char *achtung_wild, char *par1 TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t this_func = STRUCT_OFFSET(struct st_mysqlnd_conn_data_methods, list_method);
char * show_query = NULL;
size_t show_query_len;
MYSQLND_RES * result = NULL;
DBG_ENTER("mysqlnd_conn_data::list_method");
DBG_INF_FMT("conn=%llu query=%s wild=%u", conn->thread_id, query, achtung_wild);
if (PASS == conn->m->local_tx_start(conn, this_func TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (par1) {
if (achtung_wild) {
show_query_len = mnd_sprintf(&show_query, 0, query, par1, achtung_wild);
} else {
show_query_len = mnd_sprintf(&show_query, 0, query, par1);
}
} else {
if (achtung_wild) {
show_query_len = mnd_sprintf(&show_query, 0, query, achtung_wild);
} else {
show_query_len = strlen(show_query = (char *)query);
}
}
if (PASS == conn->m->query(conn, show_query, show_query_len TSRMLS_CC)) {
result = conn->m->store_result(conn TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (show_query != query) {
mnd_sprintf_free(show_query);
}
conn->m->local_tx_end(conn, this_func, result == NULL? FAIL:PASS TSRMLS_CC);
}
DBG_RETURN(result);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 14,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsPinned(const ash::wm::WindowState* window_state) {
return window_state->IsPinned() || window_state->IsTrustedPinned();
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 137,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::dispatchBeforeUnloadEvent(Chrome& chrome, bool& didAllowNavigation)
{
if (!m_domWindow)
return true;
if (!body())
return true;
if (processingBeforeUnload())
return false;
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Document> protect(this);
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<BeforeUnloadEvent> beforeUnloadEvent = BeforeUnloadEvent::create();
m_loadEventProgress = BeforeUnloadEventInProgress;
m_domWindow->dispatchEvent(beforeUnloadEvent.get(), this);
m_loadEventProgress = BeforeUnloadEventCompleted;
if (!beforeUnloadEvent->defaultPrevented())
defaultEventHandler(beforeUnloadEvent.get());
if (beforeUnloadEvent->returnValue().isNull())
return true;
if (didAllowNavigation) {
addConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::create(JSMessageSource, ErrorMessageLevel, "Blocked attempt to show multiple 'beforeunload' confirmation panels for a single navigation."));
return true;
}
String text = beforeUnloadEvent->returnValue();
if (chrome.runBeforeUnloadConfirmPanel(text, m_frame)) {
didAllowNavigation = true;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Text* GranularityStrategyTest::SetupRotate(String str) {
SetInnerHTML(
"<html>"
"<head>"
"<style>"
"div {"
"transform: translate(0px,600px) rotate(90deg);"
"}"
"</style>"
"</head>"
"<body>"
"<div id='mytext'></div>"
"</body>"
"</html>");
Text* text = GetDocument().createTextNode(str);
Element* div = GetDocument().getElementById("mytext");
div->AppendChild(text);
GetDocument().View()->UpdateAllLifecyclePhases();
ParseText(text);
return text;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void cJSON_AddItemReferenceToArray( cJSON *array, cJSON *item )
{
cJSON_AddItemToArray( array, create_reference( item ) );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AccessibilityOrientation AXObject::orientation() const {
return AccessibilityOrientationUndefined;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pfkey_dump(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_msg *hdr, void * const *ext_hdrs)
{
u8 proto;
struct pfkey_sock *pfk = pfkey_sk(sk);
if (pfk->dump.dump != NULL)
return -EBUSY;
proto = pfkey_satype2proto(hdr->sadb_msg_satype);
if (proto == 0)
return -EINVAL;
pfk->dump.msg_version = hdr->sadb_msg_version;
pfk->dump.msg_portid = hdr->sadb_msg_pid;
pfk->dump.dump = pfkey_dump_sa;
pfk->dump.done = pfkey_dump_sa_done;
xfrm_state_walk_init(&pfk->dump.u.state, proto);
return pfkey_do_dump(pfk);
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::URLFetcher::OnResponseStarted(
net::URLRequest *request) {
DCHECK(request == request_);
int response_code = -1;
if (request->status().is_success()) {
response_code = request->GetResponseCode();
job_->MadeProgress();
}
if ((response_code / 100) != 2) {
if (response_code > 0)
result_ = SERVER_ERROR;
else
result_ = NETWORK_ERROR;
OnResponseCompleted();
return;
}
if (url_.SchemeIsCryptographic()) {
const net::HttpNetworkSession::Params* session_params =
request->context()->GetNetworkSessionParams();
bool ignore_cert_errors = session_params &&
session_params->ignore_certificate_errors;
if ((net::IsCertStatusError(request->ssl_info().cert_status) &&
!ignore_cert_errors) ||
(url_.GetOrigin() != job_->manifest_url_.GetOrigin() &&
request->response_headers()->
HasHeaderValue("cache-control", "no-store"))) {
DCHECK_EQ(-1, redirect_response_code_);
request->Cancel();
result_ = SECURITY_ERROR;
OnResponseCompleted();
return;
}
}
if (fetch_type_ == URL_FETCH || fetch_type_ == MASTER_ENTRY_FETCH) {
response_writer_.reset(job_->CreateResponseWriter());
scoped_refptr<HttpResponseInfoIOBuffer> io_buffer(
new HttpResponseInfoIOBuffer(
new net::HttpResponseInfo(request->response_info())));
response_writer_->WriteInfo(
io_buffer.get(),
base::Bind(&URLFetcher::OnWriteComplete, base::Unretained(this)));
} else {
ReadResponseData();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct uffd_msg userfault_msg(unsigned long address,
unsigned int flags,
unsigned long reason,
unsigned int features)
{
struct uffd_msg msg;
msg_init(&msg);
msg.event = UFFD_EVENT_PAGEFAULT;
msg.arg.pagefault.address = address;
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE)
/*
* If UFFD_FEATURE_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WP was set in the
* uffdio_api.features and UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WRITE
* was not set in a UFFD_EVENT_PAGEFAULT, it means it
* was a read fault, otherwise if set it means it's
* a write fault.
*/
msg.arg.pagefault.flags |= UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
if (reason & VM_UFFD_WP)
/*
* If UFFD_FEATURE_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WP was set in the
* uffdio_api.features and UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WP was
* not set in a UFFD_EVENT_PAGEFAULT, it means it was
* a missing fault, otherwise if set it means it's a
* write protect fault.
*/
msg.arg.pagefault.flags |= UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WP;
if (features & UFFD_FEATURE_THREAD_ID)
msg.arg.pagefault.feat.ptid = task_pid_vnr(current);
return msg;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: shmem/hugetlbfs: only allow to register VM_MAYWRITE vmas
After the VMA to register the uffd onto is found, check that it has
VM_MAYWRITE set before allowing registration. This way we inherit all
common code checks before allowing to fill file holes in shmem and
hugetlbfs with UFFDIO_COPY.
The userfaultfd memory model is not applicable for readonly files unless
it's a MAP_PRIVATE.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-4-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: ff62a3421044 ("hugetlb: implement memfd sealing")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int cg_write(const char *path, const char *buf, size_t size, off_t offset,
struct fuse_file_info *fi)
{
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char *localbuf = NULL;
struct cgfs_files *k = NULL;
struct file_info *f = (struct file_info *)fi->fh;
bool r;
if (f->type != LXC_TYPE_CGFILE) {
fprintf(stderr, "Internal error: directory cache info used in cg_write\n");
return -EIO;
}
if (offset)
return 0;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
localbuf = alloca(size+1);
localbuf[size] = '\0';
memcpy(localbuf, buf, size);
if ((k = cgfs_get_key(f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file)) == NULL) {
size = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, O_WRONLY)) {
size = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(f->file, "tasks") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "/tasks") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "/cgroup.procs") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "cgroup.procs") == 0)
r = do_write_pids(fc->pid, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);
else
r = cgfs_set_value(f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);
if (!r)
size = -EINVAL;
out:
free_key(k);
return size;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 166,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SocketStream::OnReadCompleted(int result) {
if (result == 0) {
server_closed_ = true;
} else if (result > 0 && read_buf_.get()) {
result = DidReceiveData(result);
}
DoLoop(result);
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::DoIsShader(GLuint client_id) {
const Shader* shader = GetShader(client_id);
return shader != NULL && !shader->IsDeleted();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::RemoveObserver(RenderViewObserver* observer) {
observer->set_render_view(NULL);
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutomationMouseEventProcessor::InvokeCallback(
const automation::Error& error) {
if (has_point_)
completion_callback_.Run(point_);
else
error_callback_.Run(error);
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetWindowScroll(FrameTreeNode* node, int x, int y) {
ASSERT_TRUE(ExecuteScript(
node, base::StringPrintf("window.scrollTo(%d, %d);", x, y)));
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 143,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void macvtap_dellink(struct net_device *dev,
struct list_head *head)
{
macvtap_del_queues(dev);
macvlan_dellink(dev, head);
}
Commit Message: macvtap: zerocopy: validate vectors before building skb
There're several reasons that the vectors need to be validated:
- Return error when caller provides vectors whose num is greater than UIO_MAXIOV.
- Linearize part of skb when userspace provides vectors grater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
- Return error when userspace provides vectors whose total length may exceed
- MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 34,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip_recv_error(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len, int *addr_len)
{
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in *, sin, msg->msg_name);
struct {
struct sock_extended_err ee;
struct sockaddr_in offender;
} errhdr;
int err;
int copied;
WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_family == AF_INET6);
err = -EAGAIN;
skb = sock_dequeue_err_skb(sk);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, 0, msg, copied);
if (unlikely(err)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
if (sin && ipv4_datagram_support_addr(serr)) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = *(__be32 *)(skb_network_header(skb) +
serr->addr_offset);
sin->sin_port = serr->port;
memset(&sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
}
memcpy(&errhdr.ee, &serr->ee, sizeof(struct sock_extended_err));
sin = &errhdr.offender;
memset(sin, 0, sizeof(*sin));
if (ipv4_datagram_support_cmsg(sk, skb, serr->ee.ee_origin)) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
if (inet_sk(sk)->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
}
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR, sizeof(errhdr), &errhdr);
/* Now we could try to dump offended packet options */
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_ERRQUEUE;
err = copied;
consume_skb(skb);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: ip: fix IP_CHECKSUM handling
The skbs processed by ip_cmsg_recv() are not guaranteed to
be linear e.g. when sending UDP packets over loopback with
MSGMORE.
Using csum_partial() on [potentially] the whole skb len
is dangerous; instead be on the safe side and use skb_checksum().
Thanks to syzkaller team to detect the issue and provide the
reproducer.
v1 -> v2:
- move the variable declaration in a tighter scope
Fixes: ad6f939ab193 ("ip: Add offset parameter to ip_cmsg_recv")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BindButtonColors(Model* model, V* view, C colors, S setter) {
view->AddBinding(base::MakeUnique<Binding<ButtonColors>>(
base::Bind([](Model* m, C c) { return (m->color_scheme()).*c; },
base::Unretained(model), colors),
base::Bind([](V* v, S s, const ButtonColors& value) { (v->*s)(value); },
base::Unretained(view), setter)));
}
Commit Message: Fix wrapping behavior of description text in omnibox suggestion
This regression is introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/827033
The description text should not wrap.
Bug: NONE
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Iaac5e6176e1730853406602835d61fe1e80ec0d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/839960
Reviewed-by: Christopher Grant <cjgrant@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525806}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 155,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval *key, *data, **old_data;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(key);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&key, p, max, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) {
var_push_dtor_no_addref(var_hash, &key);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_LONG && Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_STRING) {
var_push_dtor_no_addref(var_hash, &key);
return 0;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(data);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&data, p, max, var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
var_push_dtor_no_addref(var_hash, &key);
var_push_dtor_no_addref(var_hash, &data);
return 0;
}
if (!objprops) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(key)) {
case IS_LONG:
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_index_update(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
case IS_STRING:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_symtable_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
}
} else {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(key);
if (zend_hash_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data,
sizeof data, NULL);
}
var_push_dtor(var_hash, &data);
var_push_dtor_no_addref(var_hash, &key);
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void opl3_panning(int dev, int voice, int value)
{
devc->voc[voice].panning = value;
}
Commit Message: sound/oss/opl3: validate voice and channel indexes
User-controllable indexes for voice and channel values may cause reading
and writing beyond the bounds of their respective arrays, leading to
potentially exploitable memory corruption. Validate these indexes.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 165,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jslReset() {
jslSeekTo(0);
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Com_ReadCDKey( const char *filename ) {
fileHandle_t f;
char buffer[33];
char fbuffer[MAX_OSPATH];
Com_sprintf(fbuffer, sizeof(fbuffer), "%s/q3key", filename);
FS_SV_FOpenFileRead( fbuffer, &f );
if ( !f ) {
Q_strncpyz( cl_cdkey, " ", 17 );
return;
}
Com_Memset( buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer) );
FS_Read( buffer, 16, f );
FS_FCloseFile( f );
if (CL_CDKeyValidate(buffer, NULL)) {
Q_strncpyz( cl_cdkey, buffer, 17 );
} else {
Q_strncpyz( cl_cdkey, " ", 17 );
}
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u16d(double d)
{
d = closestinteger(d);
return (png_uint_16)d;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EditorClientBlackBerry::getGuessesForWord(const String&, const String&, Vector<String>&)
{
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InsecureProofVerifier() {}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SetKeyboardEventText(blink::WebUChar* to, Maybe<std::string> from) {
if (!from.isJust())
return true;
base::string16 text16 = base::UTF8ToUTF16(from.fromJust());
if (text16.size() > blink::WebKeyboardEvent::kTextLengthCap)
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < text16.size(); ++i)
to[i] = text16[i];
return true;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::scheduleNotifyPlaying() {
scheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::playing);
scheduleResolvePlayPromises();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _dbus_path_is_absolute (const DBusString *filename)
{
if (_dbus_string_get_length (filename) > 0)
return _dbus_string_get_byte (filename, 1) == ':'
|| _dbus_string_get_byte (filename, 0) == '\\'
|| _dbus_string_get_byte (filename, 0) == '/';
else
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XcursorFileSave (FILE * file,
const XcursorComments *comments,
const XcursorImages *images)
{
XcursorFile f;
if (!file || !comments || !images)
return XcursorFalse;
_XcursorStdioFileInitialize (file, &f);
return XcursorXcFileSave (&f, comments, images) && fflush (file) != EOF;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 1,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::DispatchProtocolMessage(
DevToolsSession* session,
const std::string& message) {
session->DispatchProtocolMessage(message);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jsonb_set(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
Jsonb *in = PG_GETARG_JSONB(0);
ArrayType *path = PG_GETARG_ARRAYTYPE_P(1);
Jsonb *newval = PG_GETARG_JSONB(2);
bool create = PG_GETARG_BOOL(3);
JsonbValue *res = NULL;
Datum *path_elems;
bool *path_nulls;
int path_len;
JsonbIterator *it;
JsonbParseState *st = NULL;
if (ARR_NDIM(path) > 1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("wrong number of array subscripts")));
if (JB_ROOT_IS_SCALAR(in))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("cannot set path in scalar")));
if (JB_ROOT_COUNT(in) == 0 && !create)
PG_RETURN_JSONB(in);
deconstruct_array(path, TEXTOID, -1, false, 'i',
&path_elems, &path_nulls, &path_len);
if (path_len == 0)
PG_RETURN_JSONB(in);
it = JsonbIteratorInit(&in->root);
res = setPath(&it, path_elems, path_nulls, path_len, &st,
0, newval, create);
Assert(res != NULL);
PG_RETURN_JSONB(JsonbValueToJsonb(res));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoDeleteFramebuffers(
GLsizei n,
const volatile GLuint* framebuffers) {
if (n < 0) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "n cannot be negative.");
return error::kNoError;
}
std::vector<GLuint> framebuffers_copy(framebuffers, framebuffers + n);
for (GLuint framebuffer : framebuffers_copy) {
if (framebuffer == bound_draw_framebuffer_) {
bound_draw_framebuffer_ = 0;
if (emulated_back_buffer_) {
api()->glBindFramebufferEXTFn(
GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER, emulated_back_buffer_->framebuffer_service_id);
}
ApplySurfaceDrawOffset();
}
if (framebuffer == bound_read_framebuffer_) {
bound_read_framebuffer_ = 0;
if (emulated_back_buffer_) {
api()->glBindFramebufferEXTFn(
GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER, emulated_back_buffer_->framebuffer_service_id);
}
}
}
return DeleteHelper(n, framebuffers_copy.data(), &framebuffer_id_map_,
[this](GLsizei n, GLuint* framebuffers) {
api()->glDeleteFramebuffersEXTFn(n, framebuffers);
});
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
ALOGI("There are reordered frames present.");
if (mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries != NULL || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t flags = U32_AT(header);
uint32_t version = flags >> 24;
flags &= 0xffffff;
if ((version != 0 && version != 1) || flags != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
size_t numEntries = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (((SIZE_MAX / 8) - 1 < numEntries) || (data_size != (numEntries + 1) * 8)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mNumCompositionTimeDeltaEntries = numEntries;
uint64_t allocSize = (uint64_t)numEntries * 2 * sizeof(int32_t);
if (allocSize > kMaxTotalSize) {
ALOGE("Composition-time-to-sample table size too large.");
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mTotalSize += allocSize;
if (mTotalSize > kMaxTotalSize) {
ALOGE("Composition-time-to-sample table would make sample table too large.\n"
" Requested composition-time-to-sample table size = %llu\n"
" Eventual sample table size >= %llu\n"
" Allowed sample table size = %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)allocSize,
(unsigned long long)mTotalSize,
(unsigned long long)kMaxTotalSize);
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries = new (std::nothrow) int32_t[2 * numEntries];
if (!mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries) {
ALOGE("Cannot allocate composition-time-to-sample table with %llu "
"entries.", (unsigned long long)numEntries);
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries,
(size_t)allocSize) < (ssize_t)allocSize) {
delete[] mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries;
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < 2 * numEntries; ++i) {
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries[i] = ntohl(mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries[i]);
}
mCompositionDeltaLookup->setEntries(
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries, mNumCompositionTimeDeltaEntries);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix 'potential memory leak' compiler warning.
This CL fixes the following compiler warning:
frameworks/av/media/libstagefright/SampleTable.cpp:569:9: warning:
Memory allocated by 'new[]' should be deallocated by 'delete[]', not
'delete'.
Bug: 33137046
Test: Compiled with change; no warning generated.
Change-Id: I29abd90e02bf482fa840d1f7206ebbdacf7dfa37
(cherry picked from commit 158c197b668ad684f92829db6a31bee3aec794ba)
(cherry picked from commit 37c428cd521351837fccb6864f509f996820b234)
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 162,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didChangeContentsSize(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebSize& size) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (frame->parent())
return;
WebView* frameView = frame->view();
if (!frameView)
return;
GetRenderWidget()->DidChangeScrollbarsForMainFrame(
frame->hasHorizontalScrollbar(),
frame->hasVerticalScrollbar());
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlErrAttributeDup(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar * prefix,
const xmlChar * localname)
{
if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->disableSAX != 0) &&
(ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF))
return;
if (ctxt != NULL)
ctxt->errNo = XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_REDEFINED;
if (prefix == NULL)
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, NULL, XML_FROM_PARSER,
XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_REDEFINED, XML_ERR_FATAL, NULL, 0,
(const char *) localname, NULL, NULL, 0, 0,
"Attribute %s redefined\n", localname);
else
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, NULL, XML_FROM_PARSER,
XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_REDEFINED, XML_ERR_FATAL, NULL, 0,
(const char *) prefix, (const char *) localname,
NULL, 0, 0, "Attribute %s:%s redefined\n", prefix,
localname);
if (ctxt != NULL) {
ctxt->wellFormed = 0;
if (ctxt->recovery == 0)
ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::OnWindowEndUserBoundsChange() {
if (!interactive_resize_)
return;
auto now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
DCHECK(!interactive_resize_->begin_timestamp.is_null());
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("BrowserWindow.Resize.Duration",
now - interactive_resize_->begin_timestamp);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_1000("BrowserWindow.Resize.StepCount",
interactive_resize_->step_count);
interactive_resize_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __xml_acl_apply(xmlNode *xml)
{
GListPtr aIter = NULL;
xml_private_t *p = NULL;
xmlXPathObjectPtr xpathObj = NULL;
if(xml_acl_enabled(xml) == FALSE) {
p = xml->doc->_private;
crm_trace("Not applying ACLs for %s", p->user);
return;
}
p = xml->doc->_private;
for(aIter = p->acls; aIter != NULL; aIter = aIter->next) {
int max = 0, lpc = 0;
xml_acl_t *acl = aIter->data;
xpathObj = xpath_search(xml, acl->xpath);
max = numXpathResults(xpathObj);
for(lpc = 0; lpc < max; lpc++) {
xmlNode *match = getXpathResult(xpathObj, lpc);
char *path = xml_get_path(match);
p = match->_private;
crm_trace("Applying %x to %s for %s", acl->mode, path, acl->xpath);
#ifdef SUSE_ACL_COMPAT
if(is_not_set(p->flags, acl->mode)) {
if(is_set(p->flags, xpf_acl_read)
|| is_set(p->flags, xpf_acl_write)
|| is_set(p->flags, xpf_acl_deny)) {
crm_config_warn("Configuration element %s is matched by multiple ACL rules, only the first applies ('%s' wins over '%s')",
path, __xml_acl_to_text(p->flags), __xml_acl_to_text(acl->mode));
free(path);
continue;
}
}
#endif
p->flags |= acl->mode;
free(path);
}
crm_trace("Now enforcing ACL: %s (%d matches)", acl->xpath, max);
freeXpathObject(xpathObj);
}
p = xml->_private;
if(is_not_set(p->flags, xpf_acl_read) && is_not_set(p->flags, xpf_acl_write)) {
p->flags |= xpf_acl_deny;
p = xml->doc->_private;
crm_info("Enforcing default ACL for %s to %s", p->user, crm_element_name(xml));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 43,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_attr3_leaf_setflag(
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote *name_rmt;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
int error;
#ifdef DEBUG
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
#endif
trace_xfs_attr_leaf_setflag(args);
/*
* Set up the operation.
*/
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_read(args->trans, args->dp, args->blkno, -1, &bp);
if (error)
return(error);
leaf = bp->b_addr;
#ifdef DEBUG
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(&ichdr, leaf);
ASSERT(args->index < ichdr.count);
ASSERT(args->index >= 0);
#endif
entry = &xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf)[args->index];
ASSERT((entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE) == 0);
entry->flags |= XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE;
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf, entry, sizeof(*entry)));
if ((entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) == 0) {
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, args->index);
name_rmt->valueblk = 0;
name_rmt->valuelen = 0;
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf, name_rmt, sizeof(*name_rmt)));
}
/*
* Commit the flag value change and start the next trans in series.
*/
return xfs_trans_roll(&args->trans, args->dp);
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 44,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_trns_chunk(AVCodecContext *avctx, PNGDecContext *s,
uint32_t length)
{
int v, i;
if (s->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) {
if (length > 256 || !(s->state & PNG_PLTE))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
v = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->gb);
s->palette[i] = (s->palette[i] & 0x00ffffff) | (v << 24);
}
} else if (s->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY || s->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB) {
if ((s->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY && length != 2) ||
(s->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB && length != 6))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (i = 0; i < length / 2; i++) {
/* only use the least significant bits */
v = av_mod_uintp2(bytestream2_get_be16(&s->gb), s->bit_depth);
if (s->bit_depth > 8)
AV_WB16(&s->transparent_color_be[2 * i], v);
else
s->transparent_color_be[i] = v;
}
} else {
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, 4); /* crc */
s->has_trns = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/pngdec: Check trns more completely
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 546/clusterfuzz-testcase-4809433909559296
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 168,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_compr_write_data(struct snd_compr_stream *stream,
const char __user *buf, size_t count)
{
void *dstn;
size_t copy;
struct snd_compr_runtime *runtime = stream->runtime;
/* 64-bit Modulus */
u64 app_pointer = div64_u64(runtime->total_bytes_available,
runtime->buffer_size);
app_pointer = runtime->total_bytes_available -
(app_pointer * runtime->buffer_size);
dstn = runtime->buffer + app_pointer;
pr_debug("copying %ld at %lld\n",
(unsigned long)count, app_pointer);
if (count < runtime->buffer_size - app_pointer) {
if (copy_from_user(dstn, buf, count))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
copy = runtime->buffer_size - app_pointer;
if (copy_from_user(dstn, buf, copy))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(runtime->buffer, buf + copy, count - copy))
return -EFAULT;
}
/* if DSP cares, let it know data has been written */
if (stream->ops->ack)
stream->ops->ack(stream, count);
return count;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LocationBarView* BrowserView::GetLocationBarView() const {
return toolbar_ ? toolbar_->location_bar() : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
{
struct tty_struct *tty = file_tty(filp);
int retval;
tty_lock(tty);
retval = __tty_fasync(fd, filp, on);
tty_unlock(tty);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t IPCThreadState::handlePolledCommands()
{
status_t result;
do {
result = getAndExecuteCommand();
} while (mIn.dataPosition() < mIn.dataSize());
processPendingDerefs();
flushCommands();
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #27252896: Security Vulnerability -- weak binder
Sending transaction to freed BBinder through weak handle
can cause use of a (mostly) freed object. We need to try to
safely promote to a strong reference first.
Change-Id: Ic9c6940fa824980472e94ed2dfeca52a6b0fd342
(cherry picked from commit c11146106f94e07016e8e26e4f8628f9a0c73199)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_acl_add_entry_w_len(struct archive_acl *acl,
int type, int permset, int tag, int id, const wchar_t *name, size_t len)
{
struct archive_acl_entry *ap;
if (acl_special(acl, type, permset, tag) == 0)
return ARCHIVE_OK;
ap = acl_new_entry(acl, type, permset, tag, id);
if (ap == NULL) {
/* XXX Error XXX */
return ARCHIVE_FAILED;
}
if (name != NULL && *name != L'\0' && len > 0)
archive_mstring_copy_wcs_len(&ap->name, name, len);
else
archive_mstring_clean(&ap->name);
return ARCHIVE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Skip 0-length ACL fields
Currently, it is possible to create an archive that crashes bsdtar
with a malformed ACL:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
archive_acl_from_text_l (acl=<optimised out>, text=0x7e2e92 "", want_type=<optimised out>, sc=<optimised out>) at libarchive/archive_acl.c:1726
1726 switch (*s) {
(gdb) p n
$1 = 1
(gdb) p field[n]
$2 = {start = 0x0, end = 0x0}
Stop this by checking that the length is not zero before beginning
the switch statement.
I am pretty sure this is the bug mentioned in the qsym paper [1],
and I was able to replicate it with a qsym + AFL + afl-rb setup.
[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yun
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 74,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vfat_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
{
struct super_block *sb = dir->i_sb;
struct inode *inode;
struct fat_slot_info sinfo;
struct timespec ts;
int err, cluster;
lock_super(sb);
ts = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
cluster = fat_alloc_new_dir(dir, &ts);
if (cluster < 0) {
err = cluster;
goto out;
}
err = vfat_add_entry(dir, &dentry->d_name, 1, cluster, &ts, &sinfo);
if (err)
goto out_free;
dir->i_version++;
inc_nlink(dir);
inode = fat_build_inode(sb, sinfo.de, sinfo.i_pos);
brelse(sinfo.bh);
if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
err = PTR_ERR(inode);
/* the directory was completed, just return a error */
goto out;
}
inode->i_version++;
set_nlink(inode, 2);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = ts;
/* timestamp is already written, so mark_inode_dirty() is unneeded. */
dentry->d_time = dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_version;
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
unlock_super(sb);
return 0;
out_free:
fat_free_clusters(dir, cluster);
out:
unlock_super(sb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 33,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zreadonly(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
return access_check(i_ctx_p, a_readonly, true);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct inode *btrfs_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct btrfs_inode *ei;
struct inode *inode;
ei = kmem_cache_alloc(btrfs_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ei)
return NULL;
ei->root = NULL;
ei->generation = 0;
ei->last_trans = 0;
ei->last_sub_trans = 0;
ei->logged_trans = 0;
ei->delalloc_bytes = 0;
ei->disk_i_size = 0;
ei->flags = 0;
ei->csum_bytes = 0;
ei->index_cnt = (u64)-1;
ei->last_unlink_trans = 0;
ei->last_log_commit = 0;
spin_lock_init(&ei->lock);
ei->outstanding_extents = 0;
ei->reserved_extents = 0;
ei->runtime_flags = 0;
ei->force_compress = BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE;
ei->delayed_node = NULL;
inode = &ei->vfs_inode;
extent_map_tree_init(&ei->extent_tree);
extent_io_tree_init(&ei->io_tree, &inode->i_data);
extent_io_tree_init(&ei->io_failure_tree, &inode->i_data);
ei->io_tree.track_uptodate = 1;
ei->io_failure_tree.track_uptodate = 1;
atomic_set(&ei->sync_writers, 0);
mutex_init(&ei->log_mutex);
mutex_init(&ei->delalloc_mutex);
btrfs_ordered_inode_tree_init(&ei->ordered_tree);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->delalloc_inodes);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->ordered_operations);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&ei->rb_node);
return inode;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: allocate_buffers(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
if (!server->bigbuf) {
server->bigbuf = (char *)cifs_buf_get();
if (!server->bigbuf) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "No memory for large SMB response\n");
msleep(3000);
/* retry will check if exiting */
return false;
}
} else if (server->large_buf) {
/* we are reusing a dirty large buf, clear its start */
memset(server->bigbuf, 0, HEADER_SIZE(server));
}
if (!server->smallbuf) {
server->smallbuf = (char *)cifs_small_buf_get();
if (!server->smallbuf) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "No memory for SMB response\n");
msleep(1000);
/* retry will check if exiting */
return false;
}
/* beginning of smb buffer is cleared in our buf_get */
} else {
/* if existing small buf clear beginning */
memset(server->smallbuf, 0, HEADER_SIZE(server));
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteImageChannels(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const MagickBooleanType separate,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
size_t
channels,
packet_size;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
/*
Write uncompressed pixels as separate planes.
*/
channels=1;
packet_size=next_image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((2*channels*
next_image->columns)+1,packet_size*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (IsImageGray(next_image) != MagickFalse)
{
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,GrayQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum,exception);
}
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
GrayQuantum,MagickTrue,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,1);
}
else
if (next_image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,IndexQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum,exception);
}
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
IndexQuantum,MagickTrue,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,1);
}
else
{
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,RedQuantum,exception);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,GreenQuantum,exception);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,BlueQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,BlackQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum,exception);
}
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
RedQuantum,MagickTrue,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,1,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
GreenQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,2,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
BlueQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,3,6);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
BlackQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,4,6);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,5,6);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
}
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Added check for out of bounds read (https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/108).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 73,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pdf_run_Tw(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, float wordspace)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
gstate->text.word_space = wordspace;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Tags::GetTagCount() const { return m_tags_count; }
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 164,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *resultFilename(const char *filename, const char *out,
const char *suffix) {
const char *base;
char res[500];
char suffixbuff[500];
/*************
if ((filename[0] == 't') && (filename[1] == 'e') &&
(filename[2] == 's') && (filename[3] == 't') &&
(filename[4] == '/'))
filename = &filename[5];
*************/
base = baseFilename(filename);
if (suffix == NULL)
suffix = ".tmp";
if (out == NULL)
out = "";
strncpy(suffixbuff,suffix,499);
#ifdef VMS
if(strstr(base,".") && suffixbuff[0]=='.')
suffixbuff[0]='_';
#endif
snprintf(res, 499, "%s%s%s", out, base, suffixbuff);
res[499] = 0;
return(strdup(res));
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_assigned_dev_ack_irq(struct kvm_irq_ack_notifier *kian)
{
struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel *dev;
if (kian->gsi == -1)
return;
dev = container_of(kian, struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel,
ack_notifier);
kvm_set_irq(dev->kvm, dev->irq_source_id, dev->guest_irq, 0);
/* The guest irq may be shared so this ack may be
* from another device.
*/
spin_lock(&dev->intx_lock);
if (dev->host_irq_disabled) {
enable_irq(dev->host_irq);
dev->host_irq_disabled = false;
}
spin_unlock(&dev->intx_lock);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Device assignment permission checks
(cherry picked from commit 3d27e23b17010c668db311140b17bbbb70c78fb9)
Only allow KVM device assignment to attach to devices which:
- Are not bridges
- Have BAR resources (assume others are special devices)
- The user has permissions to use
Assigning a bridge is a configuration error, it's not supported, and
typically doesn't result in the behavior the user is expecting anyway.
Devices without BAR resources are typically chipset components that
also don't have host drivers. We don't want users to hold such devices
captive or cause system problems by fencing them off into an iommu
domain. We determine "permission to use" by testing whether the user
has access to the PCI sysfs resource files. By default a normal user
will not have access to these files, so it provides a good indication
that an administration agent has granted the user access to the device.
[Yang Bai: add missing #include]
[avi: fix comment style]
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Bai <hamo.by@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 34,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void perf_event_release_pmc(void)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(&active_events, &pmc_grab_mutex)) {
if (atomic_read(&nmi_active) == 0)
on_each_cpu(start_nmi_watchdog, NULL, 1);
mutex_unlock(&pmc_grab_mutex);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Track::Info::Clear()
{
delete[] nameAsUTF8;
nameAsUTF8 = NULL;
delete[] language;
language = NULL;
delete[] codecId;
codecId = NULL;
delete[] codecPrivate;
codecPrivate = NULL;
codecPrivateSize = 0;
delete[] codecNameAsUTF8;
codecNameAsUTF8 = NULL;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer",
"GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer");
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void lodepng_chunk_type(char type[5], const unsigned char* chunk)
{
unsigned i;
for(i = 0; i < 4; i++) type[i] = (char)chunk[4 + i];
type[4] = 0; /*null termination char*/
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gp_g16(Pixel *p, png_const_voidp pb)
{
png_const_uint_16p pp = voidcast(png_const_uint_16p, pb);
p->r = p->g = p->b = pp[0];
p->a = 65535;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: extract_mb_char(char *s)
{
char *res;
int len;
len = pg_mblen(s);
res = palloc(len + 1);
memcpy(res, s, len);
res[len] = '\0';
return res;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL );
return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(
ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 87,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const extensions::Extension* InstallExtension(
const base::FilePath::StringType& name) {
base::FilePath extension_path(ui_test_utils::GetTestFilePath(
base::FilePath(kTestExtensionsDir), base::FilePath(name)));
scoped_refptr<extensions::CrxInstaller> installer =
extensions::CrxInstaller::CreateSilent(extension_service());
installer->set_allow_silent_install(true);
installer->set_install_cause(extension_misc::INSTALL_CAUSE_UPDATE);
installer->set_creation_flags(extensions::Extension::FROM_WEBSTORE);
content::WindowedNotificationObserver observer(
extensions::NOTIFICATION_CRX_INSTALLER_DONE,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
installer->InstallCrx(extension_path);
observer.Wait();
content::Details<const extensions::Extension> details = observer.details();
return details.ptr();
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ImportGrayQuantum(const Image *image,QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickSizeType number_pixels,const unsigned char *magick_restrict p,
Quantum *magick_restrict q,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
bit;
unsigned int
pixel;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
switch (quantum_info->depth)
{
case 1:
{
register Quantum
black,
white;
black=0;
white=QuantumRange;
if (quantum_info->min_is_white != MagickFalse)
{
black=QuantumRange;
white=0;
}
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) number_pixels-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
SetPixelGray(image,((*p) & (1 << (7-bit))) == 0 ? black : white,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (number_pixels % 8); bit++)
{
SetPixelGray(image,((*p) & (0x01 << (7-bit))) == 0 ? black : white,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (bit != 0)
p++;
break;
}
case 4:
{
register unsigned char
pixel;
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) number_pixels-1); x+=2)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ((*p >> 4) & 0xf);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
pixel=(unsigned char) ((*p) & 0xf);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (number_pixels % 2); bit++)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) (*p++ >> 4);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
if (quantum_info->min_is_white != MagickFalse)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 10:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
if (image->endian == LSBEndian)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (number_pixels-2); x+=3)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff,
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff,
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff,
range),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
if (x++ < (ssize_t) (number_pixels-1))
{
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff,
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (x++ < (ssize_t) number_pixels)
{
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff,
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (number_pixels-2); x+=3)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff,range),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff,range),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff,range),
q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
if (x++ < (ssize_t) (number_pixels-1))
{
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff,
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (x++ < (ssize_t) number_pixels)
{
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff,
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 12:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (number_pixels-1); x+=2)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (pixel >> 4),
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (pixel >> 4),
range),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (number_pixels % 2); bit++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (pixel >> 4),
range),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (bit != 0)
p++;
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
if (quantum_info->min_is_white != MagickFalse)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
float
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 64:
{
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
double
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 168,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebLocalFrameImpl::SetEditableSelectionOffsets(int start, int end) {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "WebLocalFrameImpl::setEditableSelectionOffsets");
GetFrame()->GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
return GetFrame()->GetInputMethodController().SetEditableSelectionOffsets(
PlainTextRange(start, end));
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_attr_shortform_verify(
struct xfs_inode *ip)
{
struct xfs_attr_shortform *sfp;
struct xfs_attr_sf_entry *sfep;
struct xfs_attr_sf_entry *next_sfep;
char *endp;
struct xfs_ifork *ifp;
int i;
int size;
ASSERT(ip->i_d.di_aformat == XFS_DINODE_FMT_LOCAL);
ifp = XFS_IFORK_PTR(ip, XFS_ATTR_FORK);
sfp = (struct xfs_attr_shortform *)ifp->if_u1.if_data;
size = ifp->if_bytes;
/*
* Give up if the attribute is way too short.
*/
if (size < sizeof(struct xfs_attr_sf_hdr))
return __this_address;
endp = (char *)sfp + size;
/* Check all reported entries */
sfep = &sfp->list[0];
for (i = 0; i < sfp->hdr.count; i++) {
/*
* struct xfs_attr_sf_entry has a variable length.
* Check the fixed-offset parts of the structure are
* within the data buffer.
*/
if (((char *)sfep + sizeof(*sfep)) >= endp)
return __this_address;
/* Don't allow names with known bad length. */
if (sfep->namelen == 0)
return __this_address;
/*
* Check that the variable-length part of the structure is
* within the data buffer. The next entry starts after the
* name component, so nextentry is an acceptable test.
*/
next_sfep = XFS_ATTR_SF_NEXTENTRY(sfep);
if ((char *)next_sfep > endp)
return __this_address;
/*
* Check for unknown flags. Short form doesn't support
* the incomplete or local bits, so we can use the namespace
* mask here.
*/
if (sfep->flags & ~XFS_ATTR_NSP_ONDISK_MASK)
return __this_address;
/*
* Check for invalid namespace combinations. We only allow
* one namespace flag per xattr, so we can just count the
* bits (i.e. hweight) here.
*/
if (hweight8(sfep->flags & XFS_ATTR_NSP_ONDISK_MASK) > 1)
return __this_address;
sfep = next_sfep;
}
if ((void *)sfep != (void *)endp)
return __this_address;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't call xfs_da_shrink_inode with NULL bp
xfs_attr3_leaf_create may have errored out before instantiating a buffer,
for example if the blkno is out of range. In that case there is no work
to do to remove it, and in fact xfs_da_shrink_inode will lead to an oops
if we try.
This also seems to fix a flaw where the original error from
xfs_attr3_leaf_create gets overwritten in the cleanup case, and it
removes a pointless assignment to bp which isn't used after this.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199969
Reported-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 79,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const views::Widget* BrowserView::GetWidget() const {
return View::GetWidget();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static LayoutRect AbsoluteToLocal(const LayoutBox& box, LayoutRect rect) {
return LayoutRect(
box.AbsoluteToLocalQuad(FloatQuad(FloatRect(rect)), kUseTransforms)
.BoundingBox());
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SetWantsAnimateOnlyBeginFrames() {
if (view_)
view_->SetWantsAnimateOnlyBeginFrames();
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CSPSource::matches(const KURL& url, ContentSecurityPolicy::RedirectStatus redirectStatus) const
{
if (!schemeMatches(url))
return false;
if (isSchemeOnly())
return true;
bool pathsMatch = (redirectStatus == ContentSecurityPolicy::DidRedirect) || pathMatches(url);
return hostMatches(url) && portMatches(url) && pathsMatch;
}
Commit Message: CSP: Source expressions can no longer lock sites into insecurity.
CSP's matching algorithm has been updated to make clever folks like Yan
slightly less able to gather data on user's behavior based on CSP
reports[1]. This matches Firefox's existing behavior (they apparently
changed this behavior a few months ago, via a happy accident[2]), and
mitigates the CSP-variant of Sniffly[3].
On the dashboard at https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/6653486812889088.
[1]: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/commit/0e81d81b64c42ca3c81c048161162b9697ff7b60
[2]: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1218524#c2
[3]: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1218778#c7
BUG=544765,558232
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1455973003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360562}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 132,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bpf_register_map_type(struct bpf_map_type_list *tl)
{
list_add(&tl->list_node, &bpf_map_types);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UNCURL_EXPORT int32_t uncurl_poll(struct uncurl_conn *ucc, int32_t timeout_ms)
{
return net_poll(ucc->net, NET_POLLIN, timeout_ms);
}
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
CWE ID: CWE-352 | 0 | 84,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Box *stsg_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_SubTrackSampleGroupBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSG);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id)
{
struct key *authkey;
long ret;
/* special key IDs aren't permitted */
ret = -EINVAL;
if (id < 0)
goto error;
/* we divest ourselves of authority if given an ID of 0 */
if (id == 0) {
ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
goto error;
}
/* attempt to assume the authority temporarily granted to us whilst we
* instantiate the specified key
* - the authorisation key must be in the current task's keyrings
* somewhere
*/
authkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(id);
if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
goto error;
}
ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(authkey);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
key_put(authkey);
ret = authkey->serial;
error:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke
This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
semaphore instead of before.
I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <pthread.h>
void *thr0(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
keyctl_revoke(key);
return 0;
}
void *thr1(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
char buffer[16];
keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
return 0;
}
int main()
{
key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
pthread_t th[5];
pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_join(th[0], 0);
pthread_join(th[1], 0);
pthread_join(th[2], 0);
pthread_join(th[3], 0);
return 0;
}
Build as:
cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
Run as:
while keyctl-race; do :; done
as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
summarised as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
[<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
[<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 57,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wc_X963_KDF(enum wc_HashType type, const byte* secret, word32 secretSz,
const byte* sinfo, word32 sinfoSz, byte* out, word32 outSz)
{
int ret, i;
int digestSz, copySz;
int remaining = outSz;
byte* outIdx;
byte counter[4];
byte tmp[WC_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
wc_HashAlg* hash;
#else
wc_HashAlg hash[1];
#endif
if (secret == NULL || secretSz == 0 || out == NULL)
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
/* X9.63 allowed algos only */
if (type != WC_HASH_TYPE_SHA && type != WC_HASH_TYPE_SHA224 &&
type != WC_HASH_TYPE_SHA256 && type != WC_HASH_TYPE_SHA384 &&
type != WC_HASH_TYPE_SHA512)
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
digestSz = wc_HashGetDigestSize(type);
if (digestSz < 0)
return digestSz;
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
hash = (wc_HashAlg*)XMALLOC(sizeof(wc_HashAlg), NULL,
DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES);
if (hash == NULL)
return MEMORY_E;
#endif
ret = wc_HashInit(hash, type);
if (ret != 0) {
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
XFREE(hash, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES);
#endif
return ret;
}
outIdx = out;
XMEMSET(counter, 0, sizeof(counter));
for (i = 1; remaining > 0; i++) {
IncrementX963KdfCounter(counter);
ret = wc_HashUpdate(hash, type, secret, secretSz);
if (ret != 0) {
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
XFREE(hash, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES);
#endif
return ret;
}
ret = wc_HashUpdate(hash, type, counter, sizeof(counter));
if (ret != 0) {
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
XFREE(hash, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES);
#endif
return ret;
}
if (sinfo) {
ret = wc_HashUpdate(hash, type, sinfo, sinfoSz);
if (ret != 0) {
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
XFREE(hash, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES);
#endif
return ret;
}
}
ret = wc_HashFinal(hash, type, tmp);
if (ret != 0) {
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
XFREE(hash, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES);
#endif
return ret;
}
copySz = min(remaining, digestSz);
XMEMCPY(outIdx, tmp, copySz);
remaining -= copySz;
outIdx += copySz;
}
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
XFREE(hash, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HASHES);
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 81,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_free_vcpu_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int r;
r = vcpu_load(vcpu);
BUG_ON(r);
vmx_load_vmcs01(vcpu);
free_nested(vmx);
vcpu_put(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_allocate_static_bufs(iv_obj_t **dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
ih264d_create_ip_t *ps_create_ip;
ih264d_create_op_t *ps_create_op;
void *pv_buf;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
dec_struct_t *ps_dec;
void *(*pf_aligned_alloc)(void *pv_mem_ctxt, WORD32 alignment, WORD32 size);
void (*pf_aligned_free)(void *pv_mem_ctxt, void *pv_buf);
void *pv_mem_ctxt;
WORD32 size;
ps_create_ip = (ih264d_create_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_create_op = (ih264d_create_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
pf_aligned_alloc = ps_create_ip->s_ivd_create_ip_t.pf_aligned_alloc;
pf_aligned_free = ps_create_ip->s_ivd_create_ip_t.pf_aligned_free;
pv_mem_ctxt = ps_create_ip->s_ivd_create_ip_t.pv_mem_ctxt;
/* Initialize return handle to NULL */
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.pv_handle = NULL;
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, sizeof(iv_obj_t));
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
*dec_hdl = (iv_obj_t *)pv_buf;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.pv_handle = *dec_hdl;
(*dec_hdl)->pv_codec_handle = NULL;
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, sizeof(dec_struct_t));
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
(*dec_hdl)->pv_codec_handle = (dec_struct_t *)pv_buf;
ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)pv_buf;
memset(ps_dec, 0, sizeof(dec_struct_t));
#ifndef LOGO_EN
ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf = ps_create_ip->s_ivd_create_ip_t.u4_share_disp_buf;
#else
ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf = 0;
#endif
ps_dec->u1_chroma_format =
(UWORD8)(ps_create_ip->s_ivd_create_ip_t.e_output_format);
if((ps_dec->u1_chroma_format != IV_YUV_420P)
&& (ps_dec->u1_chroma_format
!= IV_YUV_420SP_UV)
&& (ps_dec->u1_chroma_format
!= IV_YUV_420SP_VU))
{
ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf = 0;
}
ps_dec->pf_aligned_alloc = pf_aligned_alloc;
ps_dec->pf_aligned_free = pf_aligned_free;
ps_dec->pv_mem_ctxt = pv_mem_ctxt;
size = ((sizeof(dec_seq_params_t)) * MAX_NUM_SEQ_PARAMS);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_sps = pv_buf;
size = (sizeof(dec_pic_params_t)) * MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS;
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_pps = pv_buf;
size = ithread_get_handle_size();
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle = pv_buf;
size = ithread_get_handle_size();
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(dpb_manager_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(pred_info_t) * 2 * 32;
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_pred = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(disp_mgr_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pv_disp_buf_mgr = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(buf_mgr_t) + ithread_get_mutex_lock_size();
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(struct pic_buffer_t) * (H264_MAX_REF_PICS * 2);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_pic_buf_base = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(dec_err_status_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status = (dec_err_status_t *)pv_buf;
size = sizeof(sei);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_sei = (sei *)pv_buf;
size = sizeof(dpb_commands_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds = (dpb_commands_t *)pv_buf;
size = sizeof(dec_bit_stream_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_bitstrm = (dec_bit_stream_t *)pv_buf;
size = sizeof(dec_slice_params_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice = (dec_slice_params_t *)pv_buf;
size = MAX(sizeof(dec_seq_params_t), sizeof(dec_pic_params_t));
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pv_scratch_sps_pps = pv_buf;
ps_dec->u4_static_bits_buf_size = 256000;
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, ps_dec->u4_static_bits_buf_size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_static = pv_buf;
size = ((TOTAL_LIST_ENTRIES + PAD_MAP_IDX_POC)
* sizeof(void *));
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_base = pv_buf;
memset(ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_base, 0, size);
ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_base + OFFSET_MAP_IDX_POC;
size = (sizeof(bin_ctxt_model_t) * NUM_CABAC_CTXTS);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->p_cabac_ctxt_table_t = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(ctxt_inc_mb_info_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_left_mb_ctxt_info = pv_buf;
size = MAX_REF_BUF_SIZE * 2;
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu1_ref_buff_base = pv_buf;
ps_dec->pu1_ref_buff = ps_dec->pu1_ref_buff_base + MAX_REF_BUF_SIZE;
size = ((sizeof(WORD16)) * PRED_BUFFER_WIDTH
* PRED_BUFFER_HEIGHT * 2);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pi2_pred1 = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(UWORD8) * (MB_LUM_SIZE);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu1_temp_mc_buffer = pv_buf;
size = 8 * MAX_REF_BUFS * sizeof(struct pic_buffer_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu1_init_dpb_base = pv_buf;
pu1_buf = pv_buf;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][0] = (struct pic_buffer_t *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += size / 2;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[1][0] = (struct pic_buffer_t *)pu1_buf;
size = (sizeof(UWORD32) * 3
* (MAX_FRAMES * MAX_FRAMES))
<< 3;
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu4_mbaff_wt_mat = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(UWORD32) * 2 * 3
* (MAX_FRAMES * MAX_FRAMES);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu4_wts_ofsts_mat = pv_buf;
size = (sizeof(neighbouradd_t) << 2);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_left_mvpred_addr = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(buf_mgr_t) + ithread_get_mutex_lock_size();
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(col_mv_buf_t) * (H264_MAX_REF_PICS * 2);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_col_mv_base = pv_buf;
memset(ps_dec->ps_col_mv_base, 0, size);
{
UWORD8 i;
struct pic_buffer_t *ps_init_dpb;
ps_init_dpb = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][0];
for(i = 0; i < 2 * MAX_REF_BUFS; i++)
{
ps_init_dpb->pu1_buf1 = NULL;
ps_init_dpb->u1_long_term_frm_idx = MAX_REF_BUFS + 1;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][i] = ps_init_dpb;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_mod_dpb[0][i] = ps_init_dpb;
ps_init_dpb++;
}
ps_init_dpb = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[1][0];
for(i = 0; i < 2 * MAX_REF_BUFS; i++)
{
ps_init_dpb->pu1_buf1 = NULL;
ps_init_dpb->u1_long_term_frm_idx = MAX_REF_BUFS + 1;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[1][i] = ps_init_dpb;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_mod_dpb[1][i] = ps_init_dpb;
ps_init_dpb++;
}
}
ih264d_init_decoder(ps_dec);
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fixed error concealment when no MBs are decoded in the current pic
Bug: 29493002
Change-Id: I3fae547ddb0616b4e6579580985232bd3d65881e
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::HandleAccessibilityFindInPageResult(
int identifier,
int match_index,
const blink::WebNode& start_node,
int start_offset,
const blink::WebNode& end_node,
int end_offset) {
if (render_accessibility_) {
render_accessibility_->HandleAccessibilityFindInPageResult(
identifier, match_index, blink::WebAXObject::FromWebNode(start_node),
start_offset, blink::WebAXObject::FromWebNode(end_node), end_offset);
}
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: validGlxVisual(ClientPtr client, __GLXscreen *pGlxScreen, XID id,
__GLXconfig **config, int *err)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pGlxScreen->numVisuals; i++)
if (pGlxScreen->visuals[i]->visualID == id) {
*config = pGlxScreen->visuals[i];
return TRUE;
}
client->errorValue = id;
*err = BadValue;
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FlushMojo() { client_.FlushForTesting(); }
Commit Message: arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <muyuanli@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit EventFilterForPopupExit(RenderWidgetHostViewAura* rwhva)
: rwhva_(rwhva) {
DCHECK(rwhva_);
aura::Env::GetInstance()->AddPreTargetHandler(this);
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gc_test(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
test_mrb_field_write_barrier();
test_mrb_write_barrier();
test_add_gray_list();
test_gc_gray_mark();
test_incremental_gc();
test_incremental_sweep_phase();
return mrb_nil_value();
}
Commit Message: Clear unused stack region that may refer freed objects; fix #3596
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_NEG( INS_ARG )
{
DO_NEG
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int seq_sync(void)
{
if (qlen && !seq_playing && !signal_pending(current))
seq_startplay();
if (qlen > 0)
interruptible_sleep_on_timeout(&seq_sleeper, HZ);
return qlen;
}
Commit Message: sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 27,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableLazyFrameVisibleLoadTimeMetrics(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetLazyFrameVisibleLoadTimeMetricsEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputMsgWatcher::OnInputEventAck(InputEventAckSource ack_source,
InputEventAckState ack_state,
const blink::WebInputEvent& event) {
if (event.GetType() == wait_for_type_) {
ack_result_ = ack_state;
ack_source_ = ack_source;
if (!quit_.is_null())
quit_.Run();
}
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ScriptProcessorHandler::SetChannelCountMode(
const String& mode,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
BaseAudioContext::GraphAutoLocker locker(Context());
if ((mode == "max") || (mode == "clamped-max")) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kNotSupportedError,
"channelCountMode cannot be changed from 'explicit' to '" + mode + "'");
}
}
Commit Message: Keep ScriptProcessorHandler alive across threads
When posting a task from the ScriptProcessorHandler::Process to fire a
process event, we need to keep the handler alive in case the
ScriptProcessorNode goes away (because it has no onaudioprocess
handler) and removes the its handler.
Bug: 765495
Test:
Change-Id: Ib4fa39d7b112c7051897700a1eff9f59a4a7a054
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/677137
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503629}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 150,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::IsDataSaverEnabled(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context) {
data_reduction_proxy::DataReductionProxySettings*
data_reduction_proxy_settings =
DataReductionProxyChromeSettingsFactory::GetForBrowserContext(
browser_context);
return data_reduction_proxy_settings &&
data_reduction_proxy_settings->IsDataSaverEnabledByUser();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 172,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaStreamManager* GetMediaStreamManager() {
return media_stream_manager_.get();
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cm_dup_rep_handler(struct cm_work *work)
{
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv;
struct cm_rep_msg *rep_msg;
struct ib_mad_send_buf *msg = NULL;
int ret;
rep_msg = (struct cm_rep_msg *) work->mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.mad;
cm_id_priv = cm_acquire_id(rep_msg->remote_comm_id,
rep_msg->local_comm_id);
if (!cm_id_priv)
return;
atomic_long_inc(&work->port->counter_group[CM_RECV_DUPLICATES].
counter[CM_REP_COUNTER]);
ret = cm_alloc_response_msg(work->port, work->mad_recv_wc, &msg);
if (ret)
goto deref;
spin_lock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
if (cm_id_priv->id.state == IB_CM_ESTABLISHED)
cm_format_rtu((struct cm_rtu_msg *) msg->mad, cm_id_priv,
cm_id_priv->private_data,
cm_id_priv->private_data_len);
else if (cm_id_priv->id.state == IB_CM_MRA_REP_SENT)
cm_format_mra((struct cm_mra_msg *) msg->mad, cm_id_priv,
CM_MSG_RESPONSE_REP, cm_id_priv->service_timeout,
cm_id_priv->private_data,
cm_id_priv->private_data_len);
else
goto unlock;
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
ret = ib_post_send_mad(msg, NULL);
if (ret)
goto free;
goto deref;
unlock: spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
free: cm_free_msg(msg);
deref: cm_deref_id(cm_id_priv);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( const char *ciphersuite_name )
{
#if defined(POLARSSL_ARC4_C)
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-MD5"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA );
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_DES_C)
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"))
return( TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA );
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_AES_C)
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA"))
return( TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA"))
return( TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA );
#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA2_C)
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256"))
return( TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256"))
return( TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 );
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_GCM_C) && defined(POLARSSL_SHA2_C)
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 );
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_GCM_C) && defined(POLARSSL_SHA2_C)
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256"))
return( TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384"))
return( TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 );
#endif
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_C)
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA"))
return( TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA"))
return( TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA );
#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA2_C)
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256"))
return( TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256"))
return( TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 );
#endif
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES)
#if defined(POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-MD5"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA256"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 );
#endif /* defined(POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) */
#if defined(POLARSSL_DES_C)
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA"))
return( TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA );
if (0 == strcasecmp(ciphersuite_name, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA"))
return( TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA );
#endif
#endif /* defined(POLARSSL_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES) */
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabLifecycleUnitSource::TabLifecycleUnit::SetTabStripModel(
TabStripModel* tab_strip_model) {
tab_strip_model_ = tab_strip_model;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(clock_settime, const clockid_t, which_clock,
const struct __kernel_timespec __user *, tp)
{
const struct k_clock *kc = clockid_to_kclock(which_clock);
struct timespec64 new_tp;
if (!kc || !kc->clock_set)
return -EINVAL;
if (get_timespec64(&new_tp, tp))
return -EFAULT;
return kc->clock_set(which_clock, &new_tp);
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 81,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void peer_test_vnet_hdr(VirtIONet *n)
{
NetClientState *nc = qemu_get_queue(n->nic);
if (!nc->peer) {
return;
}
n->has_vnet_hdr = qemu_has_vnet_hdr(nc->peer);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,819 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::SendSensitiveInputVisibility() {
if (sensitive_input_visibility_task_.IsActive())
return;
sensitive_input_visibility_task_ = PostCancellableTask(
*GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalLoading), FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&Document::SendSensitiveInputVisibilityInternal,
WrapWeakPersistent(this)));
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::AgentHostClosed(
DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host) {
DCHECK(agent_host == agent_host_.get());
SendDetachedEvent();
delete this;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~ProcessingChangeGuard()
{
m_inputHandler->setProcessingChange(m_savedProcessingChange);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameImpl::GetEffectiveConnectionType() {
return effective_connection_type_;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int TestOpenThread(DWORD thread_id) {
HANDLE thread = ::OpenThread(THREAD_QUERY_INFORMATION,
FALSE, // Do not inherit handles.
thread_id);
if (NULL == thread) {
if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
return SBOX_TEST_DENIED;
} else {
return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND;
}
} else {
::CloseHandle(thread);
return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED;
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,658 |
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