instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int copy_vm86_regs_to_user(struct vm86_regs __user *user,
const struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs)
{
int ret = 0;
/*
* kernel_vm86_regs is missing gs, so copy everything up to
* (but not including) orig_eax, and then rest including orig_eax.
*/
ret += copy_to_user(user, regs, offsetof(struct kernel_vm86_regs, pt.orig_ax));
ret += copy_to_user(&user->orig_eax, ®s->pt.orig_ax,
sizeof(struct kernel_vm86_regs) -
offsetof(struct kernel_vm86_regs, pt.orig_ax));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void bdrv_qcow2_init(void)
{
bdrv_register(&bdrv_qcow2);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 16,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int rds_notify_queue_get(struct rds_sock *rs, struct msghdr *msghdr)
{
struct rds_notifier *notifier;
struct rds_rdma_notify cmsg = { 0 }; /* fill holes with zero */
unsigned int count = 0, max_messages = ~0U;
unsigned long flags;
LIST_HEAD(copy);
int err = 0;
/* put_cmsg copies to user space and thus may sleep. We can't do this
* with rs_lock held, so first grab as many notifications as we can stuff
* in the user provided cmsg buffer. We don't try to copy more, to avoid
* losing notifications - except when the buffer is so small that it wouldn't
* even hold a single notification. Then we give him as much of this single
* msg as we can squeeze in, and set MSG_CTRUNC.
*/
if (msghdr) {
max_messages = msghdr->msg_controllen / CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(cmsg));
if (!max_messages)
max_messages = 1;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
while (!list_empty(&rs->rs_notify_queue) && count < max_messages) {
notifier = list_entry(rs->rs_notify_queue.next,
struct rds_notifier, n_list);
list_move(¬ifier->n_list, ©);
count++;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
if (!count)
return 0;
while (!list_empty(©)) {
notifier = list_entry(copy.next, struct rds_notifier, n_list);
if (msghdr) {
cmsg.user_token = notifier->n_user_token;
cmsg.status = notifier->n_status;
err = put_cmsg(msghdr, SOL_RDS, RDS_CMSG_RDMA_STATUS,
sizeof(cmsg), &cmsg);
if (err)
break;
}
list_del_init(¬ifier->n_list);
kfree(notifier);
}
/* If we bailed out because of an error in put_cmsg,
* we may be left with one or more notifications that we
* didn't process. Return them to the head of the list. */
if (!list_empty(©)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
list_splice(©, &rs->rs_notify_queue);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: rds: set correct msg_namelen
Jay Fenlason (fenlason@redhat.com) found a bug,
that recvfrom() on an RDS socket can return the contents of random kernel
memory to userspace if it was called with a address length larger than
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in).
rds_recvmsg() also fails to set the addr_len paramater properly before
returning, but that's just a bug.
There are also a number of cases wher recvfrom() can return an entirely bogus
address. Anything in rds_recvmsg() that returns a non-negative value but does
not go through the "sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;" code path
at the end of the while(1) loop will return up to 128 bytes of kernel memory
to userspace.
And I write two test programs to reproduce this bug, you will see that in
rds_server, fromAddr will be overwritten and the following sock_fd will be
destroyed.
Yes, it is the programmer's fault to set msg_namelen incorrectly, but it is
better to make the kernel copy the real length of address to user space in
such case.
How to run the test programs ?
I test them on 32bit x86 system, 3.5.0-rc7.
1 compile
gcc -o rds_client rds_client.c
gcc -o rds_server rds_server.c
2 run ./rds_server on one console
3 run ./rds_client on another console
4 you will see something like:
server is waiting to receive data...
old socket fd=3
server received data from client:data from client
msg.msg_namelen=32
new socket fd=-1067277685
sendmsg()
: Bad file descriptor
/***************** rds_client.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
struct sockaddr_in toAddr;
char recvBuffer[128] = "data from client";
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if (sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(1);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4001);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
memset(&toAddr, 0, sizeof(toAddr));
toAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
toAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
toAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = strlen(recvBuffer) + 1;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendto() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("client send data:%s\n", recvBuffer);
memset(recvBuffer, '\0', 128);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("receive data from server:%s\n", recvBuffer);
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
/***************** rds_server.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
struct sockaddr_in fromAddr;
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
unsigned int addrLen;
char recvBuffer[128];
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if(sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(0);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server is waiting to receive data...\n");
msg.msg_name = &fromAddr;
/*
* I add 16 to sizeof(fromAddr), ie 32,
* and pay attention to the definition of fromAddr,
* recvmsg() will overwrite sock_fd,
* since kernel will copy 32 bytes to userspace.
*
* If you just use sizeof(fromAddr), it works fine.
* */
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr) + 16;
/* msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr); */
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
while (1) {
printf("old socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server received data from client:%s\n", recvBuffer);
printf("msg.msg_namelen=%d\n", msg.msg_namelen);
printf("new socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
strcat(recvBuffer, "--data from server");
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendmsg()\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
}
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Weiping Pan <wpan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 19,359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sparse_dump_file (int fd, struct tar_stat_info *st)
{
bool rc;
struct tar_sparse_file file;
if (!tar_sparse_init (&file))
return dump_status_not_implemented;
file.stat_info = st;
file.fd = fd;
file.seekable = true; /* File *must* be seekable for dump to work */
rc = sparse_scan_file (&file);
if (rc && file.optab->dump_region)
{
tar_sparse_dump_header (&file);
if (fd >= 0)
{
size_t i;
mv_begin_write (file.stat_info->file_name,
file.stat_info->stat.st_size,
file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size);
for (i = 0; rc && i < file.stat_info->sparse_map_avail; i++)
rc = tar_sparse_dump_region (&file, i);
}
}
pad_archive (file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size);
return (tar_sparse_done (&file) && rc) ? dump_status_ok : dump_status_short;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 5,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::GetFrameHostTestInterface(
blink::mojom::FrameHostTestInterfaceRequest request) {
class FrameHostTestInterfaceImpl
: public blink::mojom::FrameHostTestInterface {
public:
void Ping(const GURL& url, const std::string& event) override {}
void GetName(GetNameCallback callback) override {
std::move(callback).Run("RenderFrameHostImpl");
}
};
mojo::MakeStrongBinding(std::make_unique<FrameHostTestInterfaceImpl>(),
std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
unsigned char *p;
/*-
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
* 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
* + (ocsp response)
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* do the header */
*(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
/* message length */
l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
/* status type */
*(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
/* length of OCSP response */
l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
/* actual response */
memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
s->init_off = 0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 3,596
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ShouldCancelAndIgnore(NavigationHandle* handle) {
return handle->GetFrameTreeNodeId() == frame_tree_node_id_;
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 173,049
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zipx_lzma_alone_init(struct archive_read *a, struct zip *zip)
{
lzma_ret r;
const uint8_t* p;
#pragma pack(push)
#pragma pack(1)
struct _alone_header {
uint8_t bytes[5];
uint64_t uncompressed_size;
} alone_header;
#pragma pack(pop)
/* To unpack ZIPX's "LZMA" (id 14) stream we can use standard liblzma that
* is a part of XZ Utils. The stream format stored inside ZIPX file is a
* modified "lzma alone" file format, that was used by the `lzma` utility
* which was later deprecated in favour of `xz` utility. Since those
* formats are nearly the same, we can use a standard "lzma alone" decoder
* from XZ Utils. */
memset(&zip->zipx_lzma_stream, 0, sizeof(zip->zipx_lzma_stream));
r = lzma_alone_decoder(&zip->zipx_lzma_stream, UINT64_MAX);
if (r != LZMA_OK) {
archive_set_error(&(a->archive), ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"lzma initialization failed(%d)", r);
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
/* Flag the cleanup function that we want our lzma-related structures
* to be freed later. */
zip->zipx_lzma_valid = 1;
/* The "lzma alone" file format and the stream format inside ZIPx are
* almost the same. Here's an example of a structure of "lzma alone"
* format:
*
* $ cat /bin/ls | lzma | xxd | head -n 1
* 00000000: 5d00 0080 00ff ffff ffff ffff ff00 2814
*
* 5 bytes 8 bytes n bytes
* <lzma_params><uncompressed_size><data...>
*
* lzma_params is a 5-byte blob that has to be decoded to extract
* parameters of this LZMA stream. The uncompressed_size field is an
* uint64_t value that contains information about the size of the
* uncompressed file, or UINT64_MAX if this value is unknown. The <data...>
* part is the actual lzma-compressed data stream.
*
* Now here's the structure of the stream inside the ZIPX file:
*
* $ cat stream_inside_zipx | xxd | head -n 1
* 00000000: 0914 0500 5d00 8000 0000 2814 .... ....
*
* 2byte 2byte 5 bytes n bytes
* <magic1><magic2><lzma_params><data...>
*
* This means that the ZIPX file contains an additional magic1 and magic2
* headers, the lzma_params field contains the same parameter set as in the
* "lzma alone" format, and the <data...> field is the same as in the "lzma
* alone" format as well. Note that also the zipx format is missing the
* uncompressed_size field.
*
* So, in order to use the "lzma alone" decoder for the zipx lzma stream,
* we simply need to shuffle around some fields, prepare a new lzma alone
* header, feed it into lzma alone decoder so it will initialize itself
* properly, and then we can start feeding normal zipx lzma stream into the
* decoder.
*/
/* Read magic1,magic2,lzma_params from the ZIPX stream. */
if((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, 9, NULL)) == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated lzma data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if(p[2] != 0x05 || p[3] != 0x00) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid lzma data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Prepare an lzma alone header: copy the lzma_params blob into a proper
* place into the lzma alone header. */
memcpy(&alone_header.bytes[0], p + 4, 5);
/* Initialize the 'uncompressed size' field to unknown; we'll manually
* monitor how many bytes there are still to be uncompressed. */
alone_header.uncompressed_size = UINT64_MAX;
if(!zip->uncompressed_buffer) {
zip->uncompressed_buffer_size = 256 * 1024;
zip->uncompressed_buffer =
(uint8_t*) malloc(zip->uncompressed_buffer_size);
if (zip->uncompressed_buffer == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"No memory for lzma decompression");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
}
zip->zipx_lzma_stream.next_in = (void*) &alone_header;
zip->zipx_lzma_stream.avail_in = sizeof(alone_header);
zip->zipx_lzma_stream.total_in = 0;
zip->zipx_lzma_stream.next_out = zip->uncompressed_buffer;
zip->zipx_lzma_stream.avail_out = zip->uncompressed_buffer_size;
zip->zipx_lzma_stream.total_out = 0;
/* Feed only the header into the lzma alone decoder. This will effectively
* initialize the decoder, and will not produce any output bytes yet. */
r = lzma_code(&zip->zipx_lzma_stream, LZMA_RUN);
if (r != LZMA_OK) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_PROGRAMMER,
"lzma stream initialization error");
return ARCHIVE_FATAL;
}
/* We've already consumed some bytes, so take this into account. */
__archive_read_consume(a, 9);
zip->entry_bytes_remaining -= 9;
zip->entry_compressed_bytes_read += 9;
zip->decompress_init = 1;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Fix typo in preprocessor macro in archive_read_format_zip_cleanup()
Frees lzma_stream on cleanup()
Fixes #1165
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 90,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~CCThreadProxyScrollControllerAdapter() { }
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebPageSerializer::serialize(WebLocalFrame* frame,
WebPageSerializerClient* client,
const WebVector<WebURL>& links,
const WebVector<WebString>& localPaths,
const WebString& localDirectoryName)
{
WebPageSerializerImpl serializerImpl(
frame, client, links, localPaths, localDirectoryName);
return serializerImpl.serialize();
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 125,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UNCURL_EXPORT void uncurl_close(struct uncurl_conn *ucc)
{
if (!ucc) return;
tls_close(ucc->tls);
net_close(ucc->net);
free(ucc->host);
http_free_header(ucc->hin);
free(ucc->hout);
free(ucc->netbuf);
free(ucc);
}
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
CWE ID: CWE-352
| 0
| 84,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void overloadedPerWorldMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::overloadedPerWorldMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PopupHeaderView::SetIdentityStatus(const base::string16& status,
SkColor text_color) {
status_->SetText(status);
status_->SetEnabledColor(text_color);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,234
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ScriptLoader::prepareScript(const TextPosition& scriptStartPosition, LegacyTypeSupport supportLegacyTypes)
{
if (m_alreadyStarted)
return false;
ScriptLoaderClient* client = this->client();
bool wasParserInserted;
if (m_parserInserted) {
wasParserInserted = true;
m_parserInserted = false;
} else {
wasParserInserted = false;
}
if (wasParserInserted && !client->asyncAttributeValue())
m_forceAsync = true;
if (!client->hasSourceAttribute() && !m_element->firstChild())
return false;
if (!m_element->inDocument())
return false;
if (!isScriptTypeSupported(supportLegacyTypes))
return false;
if (wasParserInserted) {
m_parserInserted = true;
m_forceAsync = false;
}
m_alreadyStarted = true;
Document& elementDocument = m_element->document();
Document* contextDocument = elementDocument.contextDocument().get();
if (!contextDocument || !contextDocument->allowExecutingScripts(m_element))
return false;
if (!isScriptForEventSupported())
return false;
if (!client->charsetAttributeValue().isEmpty())
m_characterEncoding = client->charsetAttributeValue();
else
m_characterEncoding = elementDocument.charset();
if (client->hasSourceAttribute()) {
if (!fetchScript(client->sourceAttributeValue()))
return false;
}
if (client->hasSourceAttribute() && client->deferAttributeValue() && m_parserInserted && !client->asyncAttributeValue()) {
m_willExecuteWhenDocumentFinishedParsing = true;
m_willBeParserExecuted = true;
} else if (client->hasSourceAttribute() && m_parserInserted && !client->asyncAttributeValue()) {
m_willBeParserExecuted = true;
} else if (!client->hasSourceAttribute() && m_parserInserted && !elementDocument.haveStylesheetsAndImportsLoaded()) {
m_willBeParserExecuted = true;
m_readyToBeParserExecuted = true;
} else if (client->hasSourceAttribute() && !client->asyncAttributeValue() && !m_forceAsync) {
m_willExecuteInOrder = true;
contextDocument->scriptRunner()->queueScriptForExecution(this, m_resource, ScriptRunner::IN_ORDER_EXECUTION);
m_resource->addClient(this);
} else if (client->hasSourceAttribute()) {
contextDocument->scriptRunner()->queueScriptForExecution(this, m_resource, ScriptRunner::ASYNC_EXECUTION);
m_resource->addClient(this);
} else {
TextPosition position = elementDocument.isInDocumentWrite() ? TextPosition() : scriptStartPosition;
KURL scriptURL = (!elementDocument.isInDocumentWrite() && m_parserInserted) ? elementDocument.url() : KURL();
executeScript(ScriptSourceCode(scriptContent(), scriptURL, position));
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Apply 'x-content-type-options' check to dynamically inserted script.
BUG=348581
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/185593011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 115,366
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace::getCMYK(GfxColor *color, GfxCMYK *cmyk) {
cmyk->c = cmyk->m = cmyk->y = 0;
cmyk->k = clip01(gfxColorComp1 - color->c[0]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fz_skip_string(fz_context *ctx, fz_stream *stm, const char *str)
{
while (*str)
{
int c = fz_peek_byte(ctx, stm);
if (c == EOF || c != *str++)
return 1;
(void)fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Part::slotLoadingStarted()
{
m_model->filesToMove.clear();
m_model->filesToCopy.clear();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 9,932
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ImageLoader::BypassMainWorldBehavior shouldBypassMainWorldCSP(
ImageLoader* loader) {
DCHECK(loader);
DCHECK(loader->element());
if (loader->element()->document().frame() &&
loader->element()
->document()
.frame()
->script()
.shouldBypassMainWorldCSP())
return ImageLoader::BypassMainWorldCSP;
return ImageLoader::DoNotBypassMainWorldCSP;
}
Commit Message: Move ImageLoader timer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
Move ImageLoader timer m_derefElementTimer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
This associates it with the frame's Networking timer task queue.
BUG=624694
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2642103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#444927}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnIdleTimeout() {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(!stale_state_override_for_testing_.has_value());
if (IsPrerollAttemptNeeded()) {
delegate_->ClearStaleFlag(delegate_id_);
return;
}
UpdatePlayState();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: INST_HANDLER (mul) { // MUL Rd, Rr
int d = ((buf[1] << 4) & 0x10) | ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0x0f);
int r = ((buf[1] << 3) & 0x10) | (buf[0] & 0x0f);
ESIL_A ("r%d,r%d,*,", r, d); // 0: (Rd*Rr)<<1
ESIL_A ("DUP,0xff,&,r0,=,"); // r0 = LO(0)
ESIL_A ("8,0,RPICK,>>,0xff,&,r1,=,"); // r1 = HI(0)
ESIL_A ("DUP,0x8000,&,!,!,cf,=,"); // C = R/15
ESIL_A ("DUP,!,zf,=,"); // Z = !R
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 82,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd_statfs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, struct kstatfs *stat, int access)
{
__be32 err;
err = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, 0, NFSD_MAY_NOP | access);
if (!err) {
struct path path = {
.mnt = fhp->fh_export->ex_path.mnt,
.dentry = fhp->fh_dentry,
};
if (vfs_statfs(&path, stat))
err = nfserr_io;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,912
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rb_event_is_commit(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer,
struct ring_buffer_event *event)
{
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)event;
unsigned long index;
index = rb_event_index(event);
addr &= PAGE_MASK;
return cpu_buffer->commit_page->page == (void *)addr &&
rb_commit_index(cpu_buffer) == index;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_do_read_interlace(png_row_infop row_info, png_bytep row, int pass,
png_uint_32 transformations /* Because these may affect the byte layout */)
{
/* Arrays to facilitate easy interlacing - use pass (0 - 6) as index */
/* Offset to next interlace block */
static PNG_CONST unsigned int png_pass_inc[7] = {8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1};
png_debug(1, "in png_do_read_interlace");
if (row != NULL && row_info != NULL)
{
png_uint_32 final_width;
final_width = row_info->width * png_pass_inc[pass];
switch (row_info->pixel_depth)
{
case 1:
{
png_bytep sp = row + (size_t)((row_info->width - 1) >> 3);
png_bytep dp = row + (size_t)((final_width - 1) >> 3);
unsigned int sshift, dshift;
unsigned int s_start, s_end;
int s_inc;
int jstop = (int)png_pass_inc[pass];
png_byte v;
png_uint_32 i;
int j;
#ifdef PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED
if ((transformations & PNG_PACKSWAP) != 0)
{
sshift = ((row_info->width + 7) & 0x07);
dshift = ((final_width + 7) & 0x07);
s_start = 7;
s_end = 0;
s_inc = -1;
}
else
#endif
{
sshift = 7 - ((row_info->width + 7) & 0x07);
dshift = 7 - ((final_width + 7) & 0x07);
s_start = 0;
s_end = 7;
s_inc = 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < row_info->width; i++)
{
v = (png_byte)((*sp >> sshift) & 0x01);
for (j = 0; j < jstop; j++)
{
unsigned int tmp = *dp & (0x7f7f >> (7 - dshift));
tmp |= (unsigned int)(v << dshift);
*dp = (png_byte)(tmp & 0xff);
if (dshift == s_end)
{
dshift = s_start;
dp--;
}
else
dshift = (unsigned int)((int)dshift + s_inc);
}
if (sshift == s_end)
{
sshift = s_start;
sp--;
}
else
sshift = (unsigned int)((int)sshift + s_inc);
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
png_bytep sp = row + (png_uint_32)((row_info->width - 1) >> 2);
png_bytep dp = row + (png_uint_32)((final_width - 1) >> 2);
unsigned int sshift, dshift;
unsigned int s_start, s_end;
int s_inc;
int jstop = (int)png_pass_inc[pass];
png_uint_32 i;
#ifdef PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED
if ((transformations & PNG_PACKSWAP) != 0)
{
sshift = (((row_info->width + 3) & 0x03) << 1);
dshift = (((final_width + 3) & 0x03) << 1);
s_start = 6;
s_end = 0;
s_inc = -2;
}
else
#endif
{
sshift = ((3 - ((row_info->width + 3) & 0x03)) << 1);
dshift = ((3 - ((final_width + 3) & 0x03)) << 1);
s_start = 0;
s_end = 6;
s_inc = 2;
}
for (i = 0; i < row_info->width; i++)
{
png_byte v;
int j;
v = (png_byte)((*sp >> sshift) & 0x03);
for (j = 0; j < jstop; j++)
{
unsigned int tmp = *dp & (0x3f3f >> (6 - dshift));
tmp |= (unsigned int)(v << dshift);
*dp = (png_byte)(tmp & 0xff);
if (dshift == s_end)
{
dshift = s_start;
dp--;
}
else
dshift = (unsigned int)((int)dshift + s_inc);
}
if (sshift == s_end)
{
sshift = s_start;
sp--;
}
else
sshift = (unsigned int)((int)sshift + s_inc);
}
break;
}
case 4:
{
png_bytep sp = row + (size_t)((row_info->width - 1) >> 1);
png_bytep dp = row + (size_t)((final_width - 1) >> 1);
unsigned int sshift, dshift;
unsigned int s_start, s_end;
int s_inc;
png_uint_32 i;
int jstop = (int)png_pass_inc[pass];
#ifdef PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED
if ((transformations & PNG_PACKSWAP) != 0)
{
sshift = (((row_info->width + 1) & 0x01) << 2);
dshift = (((final_width + 1) & 0x01) << 2);
s_start = 4;
s_end = 0;
s_inc = -4;
}
else
#endif
{
sshift = ((1 - ((row_info->width + 1) & 0x01)) << 2);
dshift = ((1 - ((final_width + 1) & 0x01)) << 2);
s_start = 0;
s_end = 4;
s_inc = 4;
}
for (i = 0; i < row_info->width; i++)
{
png_byte v = (png_byte)((*sp >> sshift) & 0x0f);
int j;
for (j = 0; j < jstop; j++)
{
unsigned int tmp = *dp & (0xf0f >> (4 - dshift));
tmp |= (unsigned int)(v << dshift);
*dp = (png_byte)(tmp & 0xff);
if (dshift == s_end)
{
dshift = s_start;
dp--;
}
else
dshift = (unsigned int)((int)dshift + s_inc);
}
if (sshift == s_end)
{
sshift = s_start;
sp--;
}
else
sshift = (unsigned int)((int)sshift + s_inc);
}
break;
}
default:
{
size_t pixel_bytes = (row_info->pixel_depth >> 3);
png_bytep sp = row + (size_t)(row_info->width - 1)
* pixel_bytes;
png_bytep dp = row + (size_t)(final_width - 1) * pixel_bytes;
int jstop = (int)png_pass_inc[pass];
png_uint_32 i;
for (i = 0; i < row_info->width; i++)
{
png_byte v[8]; /* SAFE; pixel_depth does not exceed 64 */
int j;
memcpy(v, sp, pixel_bytes);
for (j = 0; j < jstop; j++)
{
memcpy(dp, v, pixel_bytes);
dp -= pixel_bytes;
}
sp -= pixel_bytes;
}
break;
}
}
row_info->width = final_width;
row_info->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(row_info->pixel_depth, final_width);
}
#ifndef PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED
PNG_UNUSED(transformations) /* Silence compiler warning */
#endif
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 79,722
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderLayerScrollableArea::updateResizerStyle()
{
if (!m_resizer && !box().canResize())
return;
RenderObject* actualRenderer = rendererForScrollbar(box());
RefPtr<RenderStyle> resizer = box().hasOverflowClip() ? actualRenderer->getUncachedPseudoStyle(PseudoStyleRequest(RESIZER), actualRenderer->style()) : PassRefPtr<RenderStyle>(nullptr);
if (resizer) {
if (!m_resizer) {
m_resizer = RenderScrollbarPart::createAnonymous(&box().document());
m_resizer->setParent(&box());
}
m_resizer->setStyle(resizer.release());
} else if (m_resizer) {
m_resizer->destroy();
m_resizer = nullptr;
}
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 120,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gfn_t pse36_gfn_delta(u32 gpte)
{
int shift = 32 - PT32_DIR_PSE36_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT;
return (gpte & PT32_DIR_PSE36_MASK) << shift;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,569
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: perf_mmap_to_page(struct ring_buffer *rb, unsigned long pgoff)
{
if (pgoff > rb->nr_pages)
return NULL;
if (pgoff == 0)
return virt_to_page(rb->user_page);
return virt_to_page(rb->data_pages[pgoff - 1]);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int test_div_word(BIO *bp)
{
BIGNUM a, b;
BN_ULONG r, s;
int i;
BN_init(&a);
BN_init(&b);
for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
do {
BN_bntest_rand(&a, 512, -1, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(&b, BN_BITS2, -1, 0);
} while (BN_is_zero(&b));
s = b.d[0];
BN_copy(&b, &a);
r = BN_div_word(&b, s);
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, &a);
BIO_puts(bp, " / ");
print_word(bp, s);
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
}
BN_print(bp, &b);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, &a);
BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
print_word(bp, s);
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
}
print_word(bp, r);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
}
BN_mul_word(&b, s);
BN_add_word(&b, r);
BN_sub(&b, &a, &b);
if (!BN_is_zero(&b)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Division (word) test failed!\n");
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(&a);
BN_free(&b);
return (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 3,648
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlSAXParseDoc(xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax, const xmlChar *cur, int recovery) {
xmlDocPtr ret;
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
xmlSAXHandlerPtr oldsax = NULL;
if (cur == NULL) return(NULL);
ctxt = xmlCreateDocParserCtxt(cur);
if (ctxt == NULL) return(NULL);
if (sax != NULL) {
oldsax = ctxt->sax;
ctxt->sax = sax;
ctxt->userData = NULL;
}
xmlDetectSAX2(ctxt);
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if ((ctxt->wellFormed) || recovery) ret = ctxt->myDoc;
else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
if (sax != NULL)
ctxt->sax = oldsax;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 163,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __kmem_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cachep, unsigned long flags)
{
size_t ralign = BYTES_PER_WORD;
gfp_t gfp;
int err;
size_t size = cachep->size;
#if DEBUG
#if FORCED_DEBUG
/*
* Enable redzoning and last user accounting, except for caches with
* large objects, if the increased size would increase the object size
* above the next power of two: caches with object sizes just above a
* power of two have a significant amount of internal fragmentation.
*/
if (size < 4096 || fls(size - 1) == fls(size-1 + REDZONE_ALIGN +
2 * sizeof(unsigned long long)))
flags |= SLAB_RED_ZONE | SLAB_STORE_USER;
if (!(flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU))
flags |= SLAB_POISON;
#endif
#endif
/*
* Check that size is in terms of words. This is needed to avoid
* unaligned accesses for some archs when redzoning is used, and makes
* sure any on-slab bufctl's are also correctly aligned.
*/
if (size & (BYTES_PER_WORD - 1)) {
size += (BYTES_PER_WORD - 1);
size &= ~(BYTES_PER_WORD - 1);
}
if (flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
ralign = REDZONE_ALIGN;
/* If redzoning, ensure that the second redzone is suitably
* aligned, by adjusting the object size accordingly. */
size += REDZONE_ALIGN - 1;
size &= ~(REDZONE_ALIGN - 1);
}
/* 3) caller mandated alignment */
if (ralign < cachep->align) {
ralign = cachep->align;
}
/* disable debug if necessary */
if (ralign > __alignof__(unsigned long long))
flags &= ~(SLAB_RED_ZONE | SLAB_STORE_USER);
/*
* 4) Store it.
*/
cachep->align = ralign;
cachep->colour_off = cache_line_size();
/* Offset must be a multiple of the alignment. */
if (cachep->colour_off < cachep->align)
cachep->colour_off = cachep->align;
if (slab_is_available())
gfp = GFP_KERNEL;
else
gfp = GFP_NOWAIT;
#if DEBUG
/*
* Both debugging options require word-alignment which is calculated
* into align above.
*/
if (flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
/* add space for red zone words */
cachep->obj_offset += sizeof(unsigned long long);
size += 2 * sizeof(unsigned long long);
}
if (flags & SLAB_STORE_USER) {
/* user store requires one word storage behind the end of
* the real object. But if the second red zone needs to be
* aligned to 64 bits, we must allow that much space.
*/
if (flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
size += REDZONE_ALIGN;
else
size += BYTES_PER_WORD;
}
#endif
kasan_cache_create(cachep, &size, &flags);
size = ALIGN(size, cachep->align);
/*
* We should restrict the number of objects in a slab to implement
* byte sized index. Refer comment on SLAB_OBJ_MIN_SIZE definition.
*/
if (FREELIST_BYTE_INDEX && size < SLAB_OBJ_MIN_SIZE)
size = ALIGN(SLAB_OBJ_MIN_SIZE, cachep->align);
#if DEBUG
/*
* To activate debug pagealloc, off-slab management is necessary
* requirement. In early phase of initialization, small sized slab
* doesn't get initialized so it would not be possible. So, we need
* to check size >= 256. It guarantees that all necessary small
* sized slab is initialized in current slab initialization sequence.
*/
if (debug_pagealloc_enabled() && (flags & SLAB_POISON) &&
size >= 256 && cachep->object_size > cache_line_size()) {
if (size < PAGE_SIZE || size % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
size_t tmp_size = ALIGN(size, PAGE_SIZE);
if (set_off_slab_cache(cachep, tmp_size, flags)) {
flags |= CFLGS_OFF_SLAB;
cachep->obj_offset += tmp_size - size;
size = tmp_size;
goto done;
}
}
}
#endif
if (set_objfreelist_slab_cache(cachep, size, flags)) {
flags |= CFLGS_OBJFREELIST_SLAB;
goto done;
}
if (set_off_slab_cache(cachep, size, flags)) {
flags |= CFLGS_OFF_SLAB;
goto done;
}
if (set_on_slab_cache(cachep, size, flags))
goto done;
return -E2BIG;
done:
cachep->freelist_size = cachep->num * sizeof(freelist_idx_t);
cachep->flags = flags;
cachep->allocflags = __GFP_COMP;
if (flags & SLAB_CACHE_DMA)
cachep->allocflags |= GFP_DMA;
cachep->size = size;
cachep->reciprocal_buffer_size = reciprocal_value(size);
#if DEBUG
/*
* If we're going to use the generic kernel_map_pages()
* poisoning, then it's going to smash the contents of
* the redzone and userword anyhow, so switch them off.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING) &&
(cachep->flags & SLAB_POISON) &&
is_debug_pagealloc_cache(cachep))
cachep->flags &= ~(SLAB_RED_ZONE | SLAB_STORE_USER);
#endif
if (OFF_SLAB(cachep)) {
cachep->freelist_cache =
kmalloc_slab(cachep->freelist_size, 0u);
}
err = setup_cpu_cache(cachep, gfp);
if (err) {
__kmem_cache_release(cachep);
return err;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 68,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void xilinx_ethlite_reset(DeviceState *dev)
{
struct xlx_ethlite *s = XILINX_ETHLITE(dev);
s->rxbuf = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,635
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BrowserContextIOData* BrowserContextIOData::FromResourceContext(
content::ResourceContext* resource_context) {
return static_cast<ResourceContext*>(resource_context)->io_data_;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CSPInfo::~CSPInfo() {
}
Commit Message: Disallow CSP source * matching of data:, blob:, and filesystem: URLs
The CSP spec specifically excludes matching of data:, blob:, and
filesystem: URLs with the source '*' wildcard. This adds checks to make
sure that doesn't happen, along with tests.
BUG=534570
R=mkwst@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1361763005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#350950}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 125,379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> SafeBuiltins::GetRegExp() const {
return Load("RegExp", context_->v8_context());
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Finish freezing schema
BUG=604901
BUG=603725
BUG=591164
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1906593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#388945}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 132,692
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int find_source_vc(char **ret_path, unsigned *ret_idx) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
int r, err = 0;
unsigned i;
path = new(char, sizeof("/dev/tty63"));
if (!path)
return log_oom();
for (i = 1; i <= 63; i++) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
r = verify_vc_allocation(i);
if (r < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -r;
continue;
}
sprintf(path, "/dev/tty%u", i);
fd = open_terminal(path, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
if (fd < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -fd;
continue;
}
r = verify_vc_kbmode(fd);
if (r < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -r;
continue;
}
/* all checks passed, return this one as a source console */
*ret_idx = i;
*ret_path = TAKE_PTR(path);
return TAKE_FD(fd);
}
return log_error_errno(err, "No usable source console found: %m");
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255
| 1
| 169,777
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void set_not_modified(bool value) { not_modified_ = value; }
Commit Message: Http cache: Test deleting an entry with a pending_entry when
adding the truncated flag.
BUG=125159
TEST=net_unittests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10356113
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139331 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 108,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct compat_cmsghdr __user *cmsg_compat_nxthdr(struct msghdr *msg,
struct compat_cmsghdr __user *cmsg, int cmsg_len)
{
char __user *ptr = (char __user *)cmsg + CMSG_COMPAT_ALIGN(cmsg_len);
if ((unsigned long)(ptr + 1 - (char __user *)msg->msg_control) >
msg->msg_controllen)
return NULL;
return (struct compat_cmsghdr __user *)ptr;
}
Commit Message: x86, x32: Correct invalid use of user timespec in the kernel
The x32 case for the recvmsg() timout handling is broken:
asmlinkage long compat_sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct compat_mmsghdr __user *mmsg,
unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags,
struct compat_timespec __user *timeout)
{
int datagrams;
struct timespec ktspec;
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen,
flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT,
(struct timespec *) timeout);
...
The timeout pointer parameter is provided by userland (hence the __user
annotation) but for x32 syscalls it's simply cast to a kernel pointer
and is passed to __sys_recvmmsg which will eventually directly
dereference it for both reading and writing. Other callers to
__sys_recvmmsg properly copy from userland to the kernel first.
The bug was introduced by commit ee4fa23c4bfc ("compat: Use
COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in net/compat.c") and should affect all kernels
since 3.4 (and perhaps vendor kernels if they backported x32 support
along with this code).
Note that CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI gets enabled at build time and only if
CONFIG_X86_X32 is enabled and ld can build x32 executables.
Other uses of COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME seem fine.
This addresses CVE-2014-0038.
Signed-off-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t Histogram::FindCorruption(const HistogramSamples& samples) const {
int inconsistencies = NO_INCONSISTENCIES;
Sample previous_range = -1; // Bottom range is always 0.
for (uint32_t index = 0; index < bucket_count(); ++index) {
int new_range = ranges(index);
if (previous_range >= new_range)
inconsistencies |= BUCKET_ORDER_ERROR;
previous_range = new_range;
}
if (!bucket_ranges()->HasValidChecksum())
inconsistencies |= RANGE_CHECKSUM_ERROR;
int64_t delta64 = samples.redundant_count() - samples.TotalCount();
if (delta64 != 0) {
int delta = static_cast<int>(delta64);
if (delta != delta64)
delta = INT_MAX; // Flag all giant errors as INT_MAX.
if (delta > 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("Histogram.InconsistentCountHigh", delta);
if (delta > kCommonRaceBasedCountMismatch)
inconsistencies |= COUNT_HIGH_ERROR;
} else {
DCHECK_GT(0, delta);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("Histogram.InconsistentCountLow", -delta);
if (-delta > kCommonRaceBasedCountMismatch)
inconsistencies |= COUNT_LOW_ERROR;
}
}
return inconsistencies;
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 140,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rlvl_destroy(jpc_enc_rlvl_t *rlvl)
{
jpc_enc_band_t *band;
uint_fast16_t bandno;
if (rlvl->bands) {
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands; bandno < rlvl->numbands;
++bandno, ++band) {
band_destroy(band);
}
jas_free(rlvl->bands);
}
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __glXDisp_SwapBuffers(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
ClientPtr client = cl->client;
xGLXSwapBuffersReq *req = (xGLXSwapBuffersReq *) pc;
GLXContextTag tag = req->contextTag;
XID drawId = req->drawable;
__GLXcontext *glxc = NULL;
__GLXdrawable *pGlxDraw;
int error;
if (tag) {
glxc = __glXLookupContextByTag(cl, tag);
if (!glxc) {
return __glXError(GLXBadContextTag);
}
/*
** The calling thread is swapping its current drawable. In this case,
** glxSwapBuffers is in both GL and X streams, in terms of
** sequentiality.
*/
if (__glXForceCurrent(cl, tag, &error)) {
/*
** Do whatever is needed to make sure that all preceding requests
** in both streams are completed before the swap is executed.
*/
CALL_Finish( GET_DISPATCH(), () );
__GLX_NOTE_FLUSHED_CMDS(glxc);
} else {
return error;
}
}
pGlxDraw = __glXGetDrawable(glxc, drawId, client, &error);
if (pGlxDraw == NULL)
return error;
if (pGlxDraw->type == DRAWABLE_WINDOW &&
(*pGlxDraw->swapBuffers)(cl->client, pGlxDraw) == GL_FALSE)
return __glXError(GLXBadDrawable);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Action::AuthStatus Polkit1Backend::authorizeAction(const QString &action)
{
Q_UNUSED(action)
return Action::Authorized;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290
| 0
| 7,225
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline MagickBooleanType IsPathWritable(const char *path)
{
if (IsPathAccessible(path) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
if (access_utf8(path,W_OK) != 0)
return(MagickFalse);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1623
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 88,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __btrfs_setxattr(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct inode *inode, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
int ret;
if (trans)
return do_setxattr(trans, inode, name, value, size, flags);
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 2);
if (IS_ERR(trans))
return PTR_ERR(trans);
ret = do_setxattr(trans, inode, name, value, size, flags);
if (ret)
goto out;
inode_inc_iversion(inode);
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING, &BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags);
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode);
BUG_ON(ret);
out:
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 45,391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void gd_error(const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, format);
gd_error_ex(GD_WARNING, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: fix #215 gdImageFillToBorder stack-overflow when invalid color is used
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 96,159
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebGL2RenderingContextBase::ValidateUniformBlockIndex(
const char* function_name,
WebGLProgram* program,
GLuint block_index) {
DCHECK(program);
if (!program->LinkStatus(this)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"program not linked");
return false;
}
GLint active_uniform_blocks = 0;
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORM_BLOCKS,
&active_uniform_blocks);
if (block_index >= static_cast<GLuint>(active_uniform_blocks)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"invalid uniform block index");
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XcursorLibraryLoadCursors (Display *dpy, const char *file)
{
int size = XcursorGetDefaultSize (dpy);
char *theme = XcursorGetTheme (dpy);
XcursorImages *images = XcursorLibraryLoadImages (file, theme, size);
XcursorCursors *cursors;
if (!file)
return NULL;
if (!images)
{
int id = XcursorLibraryShape (file);
if (id >= 0)
{
cursors = XcursorCursorsCreate (dpy, 1);
if (cursors)
{
cursors->cursors[0] = _XcursorCreateFontCursor (dpy, id);
if (cursors->cursors[0] == None)
{
XcursorCursorsDestroy (cursors);
cursors = NULL;
}
else
cursors->ncursor = 1;
}
}
else
cursors = NULL;
}
else
{
cursors = XcursorImagesLoadCursors (dpy, images);
XcursorImagesDestroy (images);
}
return cursors;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHostQt::invalidate()
{
cancelPendingLayerFlush();
ASSERT(m_isValid);
m_rootLayer = nullptr;
m_isValid = false;
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 101,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FcCacheRemoveUnlocked (FcCache *cache)
{
FcCacheSkip **update[FC_CACHE_MAX_LEVEL];
FcCacheSkip *s, **next;
int i;
/*
* Find links along each chain
*/
next = fcCacheChains;
for (i = fcCacheMaxLevel; --i >= 0; )
{
for (; (s = next[i]); next = s->next)
if (s->cache >= cache)
break;
update[i] = &next[i];
}
s = next[0];
for (i = 0; i < fcCacheMaxLevel && *update[i] == s; i++)
*update[i] = s->next[i];
while (fcCacheMaxLevel > 0 && fcCacheChains[fcCacheMaxLevel - 1] == NULL)
fcCacheMaxLevel--;
free (s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 10,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: radeon_atombios_encoder_crtc_scratch_regs(struct drm_encoder *encoder, int crtc)
{
struct drm_device *dev = encoder->dev;
struct radeon_device *rdev = dev->dev_private;
struct radeon_encoder *radeon_encoder = to_radeon_encoder(encoder);
uint32_t bios_3_scratch;
if (rdev->family >= CHIP_R600)
bios_3_scratch = RREG32(R600_BIOS_3_SCRATCH);
else
bios_3_scratch = RREG32(RADEON_BIOS_3_SCRATCH);
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_TV1_SUPPORT) {
bios_3_scratch &= ~ATOM_S3_TV1_CRTC_ACTIVE;
bios_3_scratch |= (crtc << 18);
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_CV_SUPPORT) {
bios_3_scratch &= ~ATOM_S3_CV_CRTC_ACTIVE;
bios_3_scratch |= (crtc << 24);
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_CRT1_SUPPORT) {
bios_3_scratch &= ~ATOM_S3_CRT1_CRTC_ACTIVE;
bios_3_scratch |= (crtc << 16);
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_CRT2_SUPPORT) {
bios_3_scratch &= ~ATOM_S3_CRT2_CRTC_ACTIVE;
bios_3_scratch |= (crtc << 20);
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_LCD1_SUPPORT) {
bios_3_scratch &= ~ATOM_S3_LCD1_CRTC_ACTIVE;
bios_3_scratch |= (crtc << 17);
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_DFP1_SUPPORT) {
bios_3_scratch &= ~ATOM_S3_DFP1_CRTC_ACTIVE;
bios_3_scratch |= (crtc << 19);
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_DFP2_SUPPORT) {
bios_3_scratch &= ~ATOM_S3_DFP2_CRTC_ACTIVE;
bios_3_scratch |= (crtc << 23);
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_DFP3_SUPPORT) {
bios_3_scratch &= ~ATOM_S3_DFP3_CRTC_ACTIVE;
bios_3_scratch |= (crtc << 25);
}
if (rdev->family >= CHIP_R600)
WREG32(R600_BIOS_3_SCRATCH, bios_3_scratch);
else
WREG32(RADEON_BIOS_3_SCRATCH, bios_3_scratch);
}
Commit Message: drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_atombios.c: range check issues
This change makes the array larger, "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2" is 3
and the original size "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING" is 2.
Also there were checks that were off by one.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexdeucher@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void doi_log_cert_thinking(u_int16_t auth,
enum ike_cert_type certtype,
enum certpolicy policy,
bool gotcertrequest,
bool send_cert,
bool send_chain)
{
DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
DBG_log("thinking about whether to send my certificate:"));
DBG(DBG_CONTROL, {
struct esb_buf esb;
DBG_log(" I have RSA key: %s cert.type: %s ",
enum_showb(&oakley_auth_names, auth, &esb),
enum_show(&ike_cert_type_names, certtype));
});
DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
DBG_log(" sendcert: %s and I did%s get a certificate request ",
enum_show(&certpolicy_type_names, policy),
gotcertrequest ? "" : " not"));
DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
DBG_log(" so %ssend cert.", send_cert ? "" : "do not "));
if (!send_cert) {
if (auth == OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY) {
DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
DBG_log("I did not send a certificate "
"because digital signatures are not "
"being used. (PSK)"));
} else if (certtype == CERT_NONE) {
DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
DBG_log("I did not send a certificate because "
"I do not have one."));
} else if (policy == cert_sendifasked) {
DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
DBG_log("I did not send my certificate "
"because I was not asked to."));
}
/* ??? should there be an additional else catch-all? */
}
if (send_chain)
DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("Sending one or more authcerts"));
}
Commit Message: IKEv1: packet retransmit fixes for Main/Aggr/Xauth modes
- Do not schedule retransmits for inI1outR1 packets (prevent DDOS)
- Do schedule retransmits for XAUTH packets
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 51,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::DeleteSurroundingTextInCodePoints(int before,
int after) {
Send(new InputMsg_DeleteSurroundingTextInCodePoints(routing_id_, before,
after));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ProfileSyncService::OnPassphraseRequired(
sync_api::PassphraseRequiredReason reason,
const sync_pb::EncryptedData& pending_keys) {
DCHECK(backend_.get());
DCHECK(backend_->IsNigoriEnabled());
if (unrecoverable_error_detected_) {
return;
}
DVLOG(1) << "Passphrase required with reason: "
<< sync_api::PassphraseRequiredReasonToString(reason);
passphrase_required_reason_ = reason;
NotifyObservers();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 104,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: grub_ext2_open (struct grub_file *file, const char *name)
{
struct grub_ext2_data *data;
struct grub_fshelp_node *fdiro = 0;
grub_dl_ref (my_mod);
data = grub_ext2_mount (file->device->disk);
if (! data)
goto fail;
grub_fshelp_find_file (name, &data->diropen, &fdiro, grub_ext2_iterate_dir, 0,
grub_ext2_read_symlink, GRUB_FSHELP_REG);
if (grub_errno)
goto fail;
if (! fdiro->inode_read)
{
grub_ext2_read_inode (data, fdiro->ino, &fdiro->inode);
if (grub_errno)
goto fail;
}
grub_memcpy (data->inode, &fdiro->inode, sizeof (struct grub_ext2_inode));
grub_free (fdiro);
file->size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (data->inode->size);
file->data = data;
file->offset = 0;
return 0;
fail:
if (fdiro != &data->diropen)
grub_free (fdiro);
grub_free (data);
grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
return grub_errno;
}
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 64,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void guid_handler(struct ipmi_smi *intf, struct ipmi_recv_msg *msg)
{
struct bmc_device *bmc = intf->bmc;
if ((msg->addr.addr_type != IPMI_SYSTEM_INTERFACE_ADDR_TYPE)
|| (msg->msg.netfn != IPMI_NETFN_APP_RESPONSE)
|| (msg->msg.cmd != IPMI_GET_DEVICE_GUID_CMD))
/* Not for me */
return;
if (msg->msg.data[0] != 0) {
/* Error from getting the GUID, the BMC doesn't have one. */
bmc->dyn_guid_set = 0;
goto out;
}
if (msg->msg.data_len < 17) {
bmc->dyn_guid_set = 0;
dev_warn(intf->si_dev,
"The GUID response from the BMC was too short, it was %d but should have been 17. Assuming GUID is not available.\n",
msg->msg.data_len);
goto out;
}
memcpy(bmc->fetch_guid.b, msg->msg.data + 1, 16);
/*
* Make sure the guid data is available before setting
* dyn_guid_set.
*/
smp_wmb();
bmc->dyn_guid_set = 1;
out:
wake_up(&intf->waitq);
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,240
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nft_unregister_set(struct nft_set_ops *ops)
{
nfnl_lock(NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES);
list_del_rcu(&ops->list);
nfnl_unlock(NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 58,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct inode *__udf_iget(struct super_block *sb, struct kernel_lb_addr *ino,
bool hidden_inode)
{
unsigned long block = udf_get_lb_pblock(sb, ino, 0);
struct inode *inode = iget_locked(sb, block);
int err;
if (!inode)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (!(inode->i_state & I_NEW))
return inode;
memcpy(&UDF_I(inode)->i_location, ino, sizeof(struct kernel_lb_addr));
err = udf_read_inode(inode, hidden_inode);
if (err < 0) {
iget_failed(inode);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
unlock_new_inode(inode);
return inode;
}
Commit Message: udf: Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors
Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors when
loading inodes from disk. Otherwise corrupted filesystems could confuse
the code and make the kernel oops.
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sec_connect(char *server, char *username, char *domain, char *password, RD_BOOL reconnect)
{
uint32 selected_proto;
struct stream mcs_data;
/* Start a MCS connect sequence */
if (!mcs_connect_start(server, username, domain, password, reconnect, &selected_proto))
return False;
/* We exchange some RDP data during the MCS-Connect */
mcs_data.size = 512;
mcs_data.p = mcs_data.data = (uint8 *) xmalloc(mcs_data.size);
sec_out_mcs_connect_initial_pdu(&mcs_data, selected_proto);
/* finalize the MCS connect sequence */
if (!mcs_connect_finalize(&mcs_data))
return False;
/* sec_process_mcs_data(&mcs_data); */
if (g_encryption)
sec_establish_key();
xfree(mcs_data.data);
return True;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ancillary(const char *name)
{
return PNG_CHUNK_ANCILLARY(PNG_U32(name[0], name[1], name[2], name[3]));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gpgsm_set_colon_line_handler (void *engine, engine_colon_line_handler_t fnc,
void *fnc_value)
{
engine_gpgsm_t gpgsm = engine;
gpgsm->colon.fnc = fnc;
gpgsm->colon.fnc_value = fnc_value;
gpgsm->colon.any = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool can_do_async_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (unlikely(!irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm) ||
kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu)))
return false;
return kvm_x86_ops->interrupt_allowed(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DBusHelperProxy::~DBusHelperProxy()
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::clearCachedHitTestResult()
{
m_cachedHitTestContentPos = WebCore::IntPoint(-1, -1);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,135
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeCoordinator::createPageOverlayLayer()
{
ASSERT(!m_pageOverlayLayer);
m_pageOverlayLayer = GraphicsLayer::create(this);
#ifndef NDEBUG
m_pageOverlayLayer->setName("LayerTreeCoordinator page overlay content");
#endif
m_pageOverlayLayer->setDrawsContent(true);
m_pageOverlayLayer->setSize(m_webPage->size());
m_rootLayer->addChild(m_pageOverlayLayer.get());
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 97,579
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exsltFuncStyleShutdown (xsltStylesheetPtr style ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const xmlChar *URI ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
xmlHashTablePtr data) {
xmlHashFree(data, (xmlHashDeallocator) xmlFree);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cmd_parse_list(struct ImapData *idata, char *s)
{
struct ImapList *list = NULL;
struct ImapList lb;
char delimbuf[5]; /* worst case: "\\"\0 */
unsigned int litlen;
if (idata->cmddata && idata->cmdtype == IMAP_CT_LIST)
list = (struct ImapList *) idata->cmddata;
else
list = &lb;
memset(list, 0, sizeof(struct ImapList));
/* flags */
s = imap_next_word(s);
if (*s != '(')
{
mutt_debug(1, "Bad LIST response\n");
return;
}
s++;
while (*s)
{
if (mutt_str_strncasecmp(s, "\\NoSelect", 9) == 0)
list->noselect = true;
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp(s, "\\NoInferiors", 12) == 0)
list->noinferiors = true;
/* See draft-gahrns-imap-child-mailbox-?? */
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp(s, "\\HasNoChildren", 14) == 0)
list->noinferiors = true;
s = imap_next_word(s);
if (*(s - 2) == ')')
break;
}
/* Delimiter */
if (mutt_str_strncasecmp(s, "NIL", 3) != 0)
{
delimbuf[0] = '\0';
mutt_str_strcat(delimbuf, 5, s);
imap_unquote_string(delimbuf);
list->delim = delimbuf[0];
}
/* Name */
s = imap_next_word(s);
/* Notes often responds with literals here. We need a real tokenizer. */
if (imap_get_literal_count(s, &litlen) == 0)
{
if (imap_cmd_step(idata) != IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE)
{
idata->status = IMAP_FATAL;
return;
}
list->name = idata->buf;
}
else
{
imap_unmunge_mbox_name(idata, s);
list->name = s;
}
if (list->name[0] == '\0')
{
idata->delim = list->delim;
mutt_debug(3, "Root delimiter: %c\n", idata->delim);
}
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 79,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(epoll_pwait, int, epfd, struct epoll_event __user *, events,
int, maxevents, int, timeout, const sigset_t __user *, sigmask,
size_t, sigsetsize)
{
int error;
sigset_t ksigmask, sigsaved;
/*
* If the caller wants a certain signal mask to be set during the wait,
* we apply it here.
*/
if (sigmask) {
if (sigsetsize != sizeof(sigset_t))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&ksigmask, sigmask, sizeof(ksigmask)))
return -EFAULT;
sigdelsetmask(&ksigmask, sigmask(SIGKILL) | sigmask(SIGSTOP));
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &ksigmask, &sigsaved);
}
error = sys_epoll_wait(epfd, events, maxevents, timeout);
/*
* If we changed the signal mask, we need to restore the original one.
* In case we've got a signal while waiting, we do not restore the
* signal mask yet, and we allow do_signal() to deliver the signal on
* the way back to userspace, before the signal mask is restored.
*/
if (sigmask) {
if (error == -EINTR) {
memcpy(¤t->saved_sigmask, &sigsaved,
sizeof(sigsaved));
set_restore_sigmask();
} else
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigsaved, NULL);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: epoll: clear the tfile_check_list on -ELOOP
An epoll_ctl(,EPOLL_CTL_ADD,,) operation can return '-ELOOP' to prevent
circular epoll dependencies from being created. However, in that case we
do not properly clear the 'tfile_check_list'. Thus, add a call to
clear_tfile_check_list() for the -ELOOP case.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Yurij M. Plotnikov <Yurij.Plotnikov@oktetlabs.ru>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@nelhage.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Tested-by: Alexandra N. Kossovsky <Alexandra.Kossovsky@oktetlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,553
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void uio_free_minor(struct uio_device *idev)
{
mutex_lock(&minor_lock);
idr_remove(&uio_idr, idev->minor);
mutex_unlock(&minor_lock);
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __trace_userstack(struct trace_array *tr, unsigned long flags)
{
ftrace_trace_userstack(tr, flags, preempt_count());
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,241
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnAutoscrollFling(const gfx::Vector2dF& velocity) {
WebGestureEvent event = SyntheticWebGestureEventBuilder::Build(
WebInputEvent::kGestureFlingStart,
blink::kWebGestureDeviceSyntheticAutoscroll);
event.data.fling_start.velocity_x = velocity.x();
event.data.fling_start.velocity_y = velocity.y();
event.source_device = blink::kWebGestureDeviceSyntheticAutoscroll;
input_router_->SendGestureEvent(GestureEventWithLatencyInfo(event));
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 155,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<RenderStyle> StyleResolver::styleForKeyframe(Element* e, const RenderStyle& elementStyle, const StyleKeyframe* keyframe)
{
ASSERT(document().frame());
ASSERT(documentSettings());
if (e == document().documentElement())
resetDirectionAndWritingModeOnDocument(document());
StyleResolverState state(document(), e);
MatchResult result;
if (keyframe->properties())
result.addMatchedProperties(keyframe->properties());
ASSERT(!state.style());
state.setStyle(RenderStyle::clone(&elementStyle));
state.setLineHeightValue(0);
state.fontBuilder().initForStyleResolve(state.document(), state.style(), state.useSVGZoomRules());
bool inheritedOnly = false;
if (keyframe->properties()) {
applyMatchedProperties<AnimationProperties>(state, result, false, 0, result.matchedProperties.size() - 1, inheritedOnly);
applyMatchedProperties<HighPriorityProperties>(state, result, false, 0, result.matchedProperties.size() - 1, inheritedOnly);
}
updateFont(state);
if (state.lineHeightValue())
StyleBuilder::applyProperty(CSSPropertyLineHeight, state, state.lineHeightValue());
if (keyframe->properties())
applyMatchedProperties<LowPriorityProperties>(state, result, false, 0, result.matchedProperties.size() - 1, inheritedOnly);
updateFont(state);
m_styleResourceLoader.loadPendingResources(state.style(), state.elementStyleResources());
didAccess();
return state.takeStyle();
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct merge_simplify_state *locate_simplify_state(struct rev_info *revs, struct commit *commit)
{
struct merge_simplify_state *st;
st = lookup_decoration(&revs->merge_simplification, &commit->object);
if (!st) {
st = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*st));
add_decoration(&revs->merge_simplification, &commit->object, st);
}
return st;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void set_privileged_process_id(int process_id) {
browser_client_.set_privileged_process_id(process_id);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,286
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: in_irq_stack(unsigned long *stack, unsigned long *irq_stack,
unsigned long *irq_stack_end)
{
return (stack >= irq_stack && stack < irq_stack_end);
}
Commit Message: x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS
On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.
On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.
This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.
This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
enum bpf_reg_type which)
{
/* The register can already have a range from prior markings.
* This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its
* origin.
*/
return reg->type == which &&
reg->id == 0 &&
reg->off == 0 &&
tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 59,162
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static stf_status informational(struct msg_digest *md)
{
struct payload_digest *const n_pld = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_N];
/* If the Notification Payload is not null... */
if (n_pld != NULL) {
pb_stream *const n_pbs = &n_pld->pbs;
struct isakmp_notification *const n =
&n_pld->payload.notification;
struct state *st = md->st; /* may be NULL */
/* Switch on Notification Type (enum) */
/* note that we _can_ get notification payloads unencrypted
* once we are at least in R3/I4.
* and that the handler is expected to treat them suspiciously.
*/
DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("processing informational %s (%d)",
enum_name(&ikev1_notify_names,
n->isan_type),
n->isan_type));
switch (n->isan_type) {
case R_U_THERE:
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received bogus R_U_THERE informational message");
return STF_IGNORE;
}
return dpd_inI_outR(st, n, n_pbs);
case R_U_THERE_ACK:
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received bogus R_U_THERE_ACK informational message");
return STF_IGNORE;
}
return dpd_inR(st, n, n_pbs);
case PAYLOAD_MALFORMED:
if (st != NULL) {
st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_received++;
libreswan_log(
"received %u malformed payload notifies",
st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_received);
if (st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_sent >
MAXIMUM_MALFORMED_NOTIFY / 2 &&
((st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_sent +
st->hidden_variables.
st_malformed_received) >
MAXIMUM_MALFORMED_NOTIFY)) {
libreswan_log(
"too many malformed payloads (we sent %u and received %u",
st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_sent,
st->hidden_variables.st_malformed_received);
delete_state(st);
md->st = st = NULL;
}
}
return STF_IGNORE;
case ISAKMP_N_CISCO_LOAD_BALANCE:
if (st != NULL && IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)) {
/* Saving connection name and whack sock id */
const char *tmp_name = st->st_connection->name;
int tmp_whack_sock = dup_any(st->st_whack_sock);
/* deleting ISAKMP SA with the current remote peer */
delete_state(st);
md->st = st = NULL;
/* to find and store the connection associated with tmp_name */
/* ??? how do we know that tmp_name hasn't been freed? */
struct connection *tmp_c = con_by_name(tmp_name, FALSE);
DBG_cond_dump(DBG_PARSING,
"redirected remote end info:", n_pbs->cur + pbs_left(
n_pbs) - 4, 4);
/* Current remote peer info */
{
ipstr_buf b;
const struct spd_route *tmp_spd =
&tmp_c->spd;
int count_spd = 0;
do {
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("spd route number: %d",
++count_spd));
/**that info**/
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that id kind: %d",
tmp_spd->that.id.kind));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that id ipaddr: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_spd->that.id.ip_addr, &b)));
if (tmp_spd->that.id.name.ptr
!= NULL)
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_dump_chunk(
"that id name",
tmp_spd->
that.id.
name));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that host_addr: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_spd->that.host_addr, &b)));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that nexthop: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_spd->that.host_nexthop, &b)));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that srcip: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_spd->that.host_srcip, &b)));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that client_addr: %s, maskbits:%d",
ipstr(&tmp_spd->that.client.addr, &b),
tmp_spd->that.
client.maskbits));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that has_client: %d",
tmp_spd->that.
has_client));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that has_client_wildcard: %d",
tmp_spd->that.
has_client_wildcard));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that has_port_wildcard: %d",
tmp_spd->that.
has_port_wildcard));
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("that has_id_wildcards: %d",
tmp_spd->that.
has_id_wildcards));
tmp_spd = tmp_spd->spd_next;
} while (tmp_spd != NULL);
if (tmp_c->interface != NULL) {
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("Current interface_addr: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->interface->ip_addr, &b)));
}
if (tmp_c->gw_info != NULL) {
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, {
DBG_log("Current gw_client_addr: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->gw_info->client_id.ip_addr, &b));
DBG_log("Current gw_gw_addr: %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->gw_info->gw_id.ip_addr, &b));
});
}
}
/* storing old address for comparison purposes */
ip_address old_addr = tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
/* Decoding remote peer address info where connection has to be redirected to */
memcpy(&tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr.u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr,
(u_int32_t *)(n_pbs->cur +
pbs_left(n_pbs) - 4),
sizeof(tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr.u.v4.
sin_addr.
s_addr));
/* Modifying connection info to store the redirected remote peer info */
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("Old host_addr_name : %s",
tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr_name));
tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr_name = NULL;
tmp_c->spd.that.id.ip_addr =
tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, {
ipstr_buf b;
if (sameaddr(&tmp_c->spd.this.
host_nexthop,
&old_addr)) {
DBG_log("Old remote addr %s",
ipstr(&old_addr, &b));
DBG_log("Old this host next hop %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.this.host_nexthop, &b));
tmp_c->spd.this.host_nexthop = tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
DBG_log("New this host next hop %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.this.host_nexthop, &b));
}
if (sameaddr(&tmp_c->spd.that.
host_srcip,
&old_addr)) {
DBG_log("Old that host srcip %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.that.host_srcip, &b));
tmp_c->spd.that.host_srcip = tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
DBG_log("New that host srcip %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.that.host_srcip, &b));
}
if (sameaddr(&tmp_c->spd.that.
client.addr,
&old_addr)) {
DBG_log("Old that client ip %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.that.client.addr, &b));
tmp_c->spd.that.client.addr = tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
DBG_log("New that client ip %s",
ipstr(&tmp_c->spd.that.client.addr, &b));
}
});
tmp_c->host_pair->him.addr =
tmp_c->spd.that.host_addr;
/* Initiating connection to the redirected peer */
initiate_connection(tmp_name, tmp_whack_sock,
LEMPTY, pcim_demand_crypto);
return STF_IGNORE;
}
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received and ignored informational message with ISAKMP_N_CISCO_LOAD_BALANCE for unestablished state.");
return STF_IGNORE;
default:
if (st != NULL &&
(st->st_connection->extra_debugging &
IMPAIR_DIE_ONINFO)) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received unhandled informational notification payload %d: '%s'",
n->isan_type,
enum_name(&ikev1_notify_names,
n->isan_type));
return STF_FATAL;
}
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received and ignored informational message");
return STF_IGNORE;
}
} else {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"received and ignored empty informational notification payload");
return STF_IGNORE;
}
}
Commit Message: IKEv1: packet retransmit fixes for Main/Aggr/Xauth modes
- Do not schedule retransmits for inI1outR1 packets (prevent DDOS)
- Do schedule retransmits for XAUTH packets
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 51,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BitStack::~BitStack()
{
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,376
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BackgroundLoaderOfflinerTest::~BackgroundLoaderOfflinerTest() {}
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 139,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AXTableCell::isRowHeaderCell() const {
const AtomicString& scope = getAttribute(scopeAttr);
return equalIgnoringCase(scope, "row") ||
equalIgnoringCase(scope, "rowgroup");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 1
| 171,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mem_cgroup_swap_statistics(struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
bool charge)
{
int val = (charge) ? 1 : -1;
this_cpu_add(memcg->stat->count[MEM_CGROUP_STAT_SWAPOUT], val);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sco_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int len, err = 0;
struct bt_voice voice;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (level == SOL_SCO)
return sco_sock_getsockopt_old(sock, optname, optval, optlen);
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case BT_DEFER_SETUP:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (put_user(test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags),
(u32 __user *)optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case BT_VOICE:
voice.setting = sco_pi(sk)->setting;
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(voice));
if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *)&voice, len))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Validate socket address length in sco_sock_bind().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 57,362
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *ReadMNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
MngInfo
*mng_info;
/* Open image file. */
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Enter ReadMNGImage()");
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
mng_info=(MngInfo *) NULL;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Image *) NULL);
/* Allocate a MngInfo structure. */
mng_info=(MngInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(MngInfo));
if (mng_info == (MngInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/* Initialize members of the MngInfo structure. */
(void) memset(mng_info,0,sizeof(MngInfo));
mng_info->image=image;
image=ReadOneMNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
mng_info=MngInfoFreeStruct(mng_info);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadMNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"exit ReadMNGImage()");
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1119
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,944
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int ext3_feature_set_ok(struct super_block *sb) { return 0; }
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,442
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiVP8Accelerator::OutputPicture(
const scoped_refptr<VP8Picture>& pic) {
scoped_refptr<VaapiDecodeSurface> dec_surface =
VP8PictureToVaapiDecodeSurface(pic);
dec_surface->set_visible_rect(pic->visible_rect);
vaapi_dec_->SurfaceReady(dec_surface);
return true;
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 172,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cirrus_cursor_draw_line(VGACommonState *s1, uint8_t *d1, int scr_y)
{
CirrusVGAState *s = container_of(s1, CirrusVGAState, vga);
int w, h, x1, x2, poffset;
unsigned int color0, color1;
const uint8_t *palette, *src;
uint32_t content;
if (!(s->vga.sr[0x12] & CIRRUS_CURSOR_SHOW))
return;
/* fast test to see if the cursor intersects with the scan line */
if (s->vga.sr[0x12] & CIRRUS_CURSOR_LARGE) {
h = 64;
} else {
h = 32;
}
if (scr_y < s->vga.hw_cursor_y ||
scr_y >= (s->vga.hw_cursor_y + h)) {
return;
}
src = s->vga.vram_ptr + s->real_vram_size - 16 * 1024;
if (s->vga.sr[0x12] & CIRRUS_CURSOR_LARGE) {
src += (s->vga.sr[0x13] & 0x3c) * 256;
src += (scr_y - s->vga.hw_cursor_y) * 16;
poffset = 8;
content = ((uint32_t *)src)[0] |
((uint32_t *)src)[1] |
((uint32_t *)src)[2] |
((uint32_t *)src)[3];
} else {
src += (s->vga.sr[0x13] & 0x3f) * 256;
src += (scr_y - s->vga.hw_cursor_y) * 4;
poffset = 128;
content = ((uint32_t *)src)[0] |
((uint32_t *)(src + 128))[0];
}
/* if nothing to draw, no need to continue */
if (!content)
return;
w = h;
x1 = s->vga.hw_cursor_x;
if (x1 >= s->vga.last_scr_width)
return;
x2 = s->vga.hw_cursor_x + w;
if (x2 > s->vga.last_scr_width)
x2 = s->vga.last_scr_width;
w = x2 - x1;
palette = s->cirrus_hidden_palette;
color0 = rgb_to_pixel32(c6_to_8(palette[0x0 * 3]),
c6_to_8(palette[0x0 * 3 + 1]),
c6_to_8(palette[0x0 * 3 + 2]));
color1 = rgb_to_pixel32(c6_to_8(palette[0xf * 3]),
c6_to_8(palette[0xf * 3 + 1]),
c6_to_8(palette[0xf * 3 + 2]));
d1 += x1 * 4;
vga_draw_cursor_line(d1, src, poffset, w, color0, color1, 0xffffff);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 16,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hns_nic_reset_subtask(struct hns_nic_priv *priv)
{
enum hnae_port_type type = priv->ae_handle->port_type;
if (!test_bit(NIC_STATE2_RESET_REQUESTED, &priv->state))
return;
clear_bit(NIC_STATE2_RESET_REQUESTED, &priv->state);
/* If we're already down, removing or resetting, just bail */
if (test_bit(NIC_STATE_DOWN, &priv->state) ||
test_bit(NIC_STATE_REMOVING, &priv->state) ||
test_bit(NIC_STATE_RESETTING, &priv->state))
return;
hns_nic_dump(priv);
netdev_info(priv->netdev, "try to reset %s port!\n",
(type == HNAE_PORT_DEBUG ? "debug" : "service"));
rtnl_lock();
/* put off any impending NetWatchDogTimeout */
netif_trans_update(priv->netdev);
if (type == HNAE_PORT_DEBUG) {
hns_nic_net_reinit(priv->netdev);
} else {
netif_carrier_off(priv->netdev);
netif_tx_disable(priv->netdev);
}
rtnl_unlock();
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 85,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::webkitDidExitFullScreenForElement(Element*)
{
if (!m_fullScreenElement)
return;
if (!attached() || inPageCache())
return;
m_fullScreenElement->setContainsFullScreenElementOnAncestorsCrossingFrameBoundaries(false);
m_areKeysEnabledInFullScreen = false;
if (m_fullScreenRenderer)
m_fullScreenRenderer->unwrapRenderer();
m_fullScreenElement = 0;
scheduleForcedStyleRecalc();
Document* exitingDocument = this;
if (m_fullScreenChangeEventTargetQueue.isEmpty() && m_fullScreenErrorEventTargetQueue.isEmpty())
exitingDocument = topDocument();
exitingDocument->m_fullScreenChangeDelayTimer.startOneShot(0);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::NotifyPassphraseAccepted(
const std::string& bootstrap_token) {
if (!host_ || !host_->frontend_)
return;
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), host_->frontend_loop_);
processing_passphrase_ = false;
host_->PersistEncryptionBootstrapToken(bootstrap_token);
host_->frontend_->OnPassphraseAccepted();
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long get_reaper_busy(pid_t task)
{
pid_t init = get_task_reaper_pid(task);
char *cgroup = NULL, *usage_str = NULL;
unsigned long usage = 0;
if (init == -1)
return 0;
cgroup = get_pid_cgroup(task, "cpuacct");
if (!cgroup)
goto out;
if (!cgfs_get_value("cpuacct", cgroup, "cpuacct.usage", &usage_str))
goto out;
usage = strtoul(usage_str, NULL, 10);
usage /= 100000000;
out:
free(cgroup);
free(usage_str);
return usage;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnSetParent(int32 parent_route_id,
uint32 parent_texture_id,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnSetParent");
GpuCommandBufferStub* parent_stub = NULL;
if (parent_route_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
parent_stub = channel_->LookupCommandBuffer(parent_route_id);
}
bool result = true;
if (scheduler_.get()) {
gpu::gles2::GLES2Decoder* parent_decoder =
parent_stub ? parent_stub->decoder_.get() : NULL;
result = decoder_->SetParent(parent_decoder, parent_texture_id);
} else {
parent_stub_for_initialization_ = parent_stub ?
parent_stub->AsWeakPtr() : base::WeakPtr<GpuCommandBufferStub>();
parent_texture_for_initialization_ = parent_texture_id;
}
GpuCommandBufferMsg_SetParent::WriteReplyParams(reply_message, result);
Send(reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PerformMouseClickOnView(views::View* view) {
ui::AXActionData data;
data.action = ax::mojom::Action::kDoDefault;
view->HandleAccessibleAction(data);
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 138,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_info(struct net *net, void __user *user,
const int *len, int compat)
{
char name[XT_TABLE_MAXNAMELEN];
struct xt_table *t;
int ret;
if (*len != sizeof(struct ipt_getinfo)) {
duprintf("length %u != %zu\n", *len,
sizeof(struct ipt_getinfo));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_from_user(name, user, sizeof(name)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
name[XT_TABLE_MAXNAMELEN-1] = '\0';
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (compat)
xt_compat_lock(AF_INET);
#endif
t = try_then_request_module(xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET, name),
"iptable_%s", name);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) {
struct ipt_getinfo info;
const struct xt_table_info *private = t->private;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
struct xt_table_info tmp;
if (compat) {
ret = compat_table_info(private, &tmp);
xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET);
private = &tmp;
}
#endif
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.valid_hooks = t->valid_hooks;
memcpy(info.hook_entry, private->hook_entry,
sizeof(info.hook_entry));
memcpy(info.underflow, private->underflow,
sizeof(info.underflow));
info.num_entries = private->number;
info.size = private->size;
strcpy(info.name, name);
if (copy_to_user(user, &info, *len) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
else
ret = 0;
xt_table_unlock(t);
module_put(t->me);
} else
ret = t ? PTR_ERR(t) : -ENOENT;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (compat)
xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET);
#endif
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 52,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decompileENUMERATE(int n, SWF_ACTION *actions, int maxn, int is_type2)
{
int i=0;
while (i < maxn && i < 5 && OpCode(actions, n+i, maxn))
i++;
INDENT
println("/* a for-var-in loop should follow below: */" );
return i-1; // preserve some code for decompileIF()...
} // ... and let decompileIF() do all the dirty work ;-)
Commit Message: decompileAction: Prevent heap buffer overflow and underflow with using OpCode
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 89,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: send_err_file( httpd_conn* hc, int status, char* title, char* extraheads, char* filename )
{
FILE* fp;
char buf[1000];
size_t r;
fp = fopen( filename, "r" );
if ( fp == (FILE*) 0 )
return 0;
send_mime(
hc, status, title, "", extraheads, "text/html; charset=%s", (off_t) -1,
(time_t) 0 );
for (;;)
{
r = fread( buf, 1, sizeof(buf) - 1, fp );
if ( r == 0 )
break;
buf[r] = '\0';
add_response( hc, buf );
}
(void) fclose( fp );
#ifdef ERR_APPEND_SERVER_INFO
send_response_tail( hc );
#endif /* ERR_APPEND_SERVER_INFO */
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: content::DownloadTestObserver* CreateWaiter(
Browser* browser, int num_downloads) {
DownloadManager* download_manager = DownloadManagerForBrowser(browser);
return new content::DownloadTestObserverTerminal(
download_manager, num_downloads,
content::DownloadTestObserver::ON_DANGEROUS_DOWNLOAD_FAIL);
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 151,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_video_decode(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
/* ! */
dec_struct_t * ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)(dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle);
WORD32 i4_err_status = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf = NULL;
WORD32 buflen;
UWORD32 u4_max_ofst, u4_length_of_start_code = 0;
UWORD32 bytes_consumed = 0;
UWORD32 cur_slice_is_nonref = 0;
UWORD32 u4_next_is_aud;
UWORD32 u4_first_start_code_found = 0;
WORD32 ret = 0,api_ret_value = IV_SUCCESS;
WORD32 header_data_left = 0,frame_data_left = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_bitstrm_buf;
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
ithread_set_name((void*)"Parse_thread");
ps_dec_ip = (ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (ivd_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
{
UWORD32 u4_size;
u4_size = ps_dec_op->u4_size;
memset(ps_dec_op, 0, sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->u4_size = u4_size;
}
ps_dec->pv_dec_out = ps_dec_op;
if(ps_dec->init_done != 1)
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
/*Data memory barries instruction,so that bitstream write by the application is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
if(0 == ps_dec->u1_flushfrm)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes <= 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_NUMBYTES_INV;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = NULL;
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_size
>= offsetof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t, s_out_buffer))
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = &ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code = 1;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = FMT_CONV_NUM_ROWS;
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf
&& ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
if((ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs == 0) ||
(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs > IVD_VIDDEC_MAX_IO_BUFFERS))
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUFS;
return IV_FAIL;
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->pu1_bufs[i] == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_OP_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_min_out_buf_size[i] == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |=
IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded >= NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ERROR_FRAME_LIMIT_OVER;
return IV_FAIL;
}
/* ! */
ps_dec->u4_ts = ps_dec_ip->u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = -1;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec->i4_frametype = -1;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
/* In case the deocder is not in flush mode(in shared mode),
then decoder has to pick up a buffer to write current frame.
Check if a frame is available in such cases */
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag == 1 && ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf == 1
&& ps_dec->u1_flushfrm == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
WORD32 disp_avail = 0, free_id;
/* Check if at least one buffer is available with the codec */
/* If not then return to application with error */
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->u1_pic_bufs; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i]
|| 1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
{
disp_avail = 1;
break;
}
}
if(0 == disp_avail)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
while(1)
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_pic_buf;
ps_pic_buf = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, &free_id);
if(ps_pic_buf == NULL)
{
UWORD32 i, display_queued = 0;
/* check if any buffer was given for display which is not returned yet */
for(i = 0; i < (MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW); i++)
{
if(0 != ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i])
{
display_queued = 1;
break;
}
}
/* If some buffer is queued for display, then codec has to singal an error and wait
for that buffer to be returned.
If nothing is queued for display then codec has ownership of all display buffers
and it can reuse any of the existing buffers and continue decoding */
if(1 == display_queued)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
else
{
/* If the buffer is with display, then mark it as in use and then look for a buffer again */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[free_id])
{
ih264_buf_mgr_set_status(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
else
{
/**
* Found a free buffer for present call. Release it now.
* Will be again obtained later.
*/
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
break;
}
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_flushfrm)
{
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag == 0)
{
/*Come out of flush mode and return*/
ps_dec->u1_flushfrm = 0;
return (IV_FAIL);
}
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
/* check output buffer size given by the application */
if(check_app_out_buf_size(ps_dec) != IV_SUCCESS)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return (IV_FAIL);
}
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
ps_dec_op->u4_new_seq = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = ps_dec->u4_output_present;
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_progressive_frame_flag;
ps_dec_op->e_output_format =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.e_output_format;
ps_dec_op->s_disp_frm_buf = ps_dec->s_disp_op.s_disp_frm_buf;
ps_dec_op->e4_fld_type = ps_dec->s_disp_op.e4_fld_type;
ps_dec_op->u4_ts = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_disp_buf_id = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_disp_buf_id;
/*In the case of flush ,since no frame is decoded set pic type as invalid*/
ps_dec_op->u4_is_ref_flag = -1;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
else
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if(ps_dec->u1_res_changed == 1)
{
/*if resolution has changed and all buffers have been flushed, reset decoder*/
ih264d_init_decoder(ps_dec);
}
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_dec_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_recon_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 1;
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ps_dec->u4_sps_cnt_in_process = 0;
DEBUG_THREADS_PRINTF(" Starting process call\n");
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 0;
do
{
WORD32 buf_size;
pu1_buf = (UWORD8*)ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer
+ ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
u4_max_ofst = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes
- ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
/* If dynamic bitstream buffer is not allocated and
* header decode is done, then allocate dynamic bitstream buffer
*/
if((NULL == ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic) &&
(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1))
{
WORD32 size;
void *pv_buf;
void *pv_mem_ctxt = ps_dec->pv_mem_ctxt;
size = MAX(256000, ps_dec->u2_pic_wd * ps_dec->u2_pic_ht * 3 / 2);
pv_buf = ps_dec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128,
size + EXTRA_BS_OFFSET);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic = pv_buf;
ps_dec->u4_dynamic_bits_buf_size = size;
}
if(ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic)
{
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic;
buf_size = ps_dec->u4_dynamic_bits_buf_size;
}
else
{
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_static;
buf_size = ps_dec->u4_static_bits_buf_size;
}
u4_next_is_aud = 0;
buflen = ih264d_find_start_code(pu1_buf, 0, u4_max_ofst,
&u4_length_of_start_code,
&u4_next_is_aud);
if(buflen == -1)
buflen = 0;
/* Ignore bytes beyond the allocated size of intermediate buffer */
/* Since 8 bytes are read ahead, ensure 8 bytes are free at the
end of the buffer, which will be memset to 0 after emulation prevention */
buflen = MIN(buflen, buf_size - 8);
bytes_consumed = buflen + u4_length_of_start_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed += bytes_consumed;
{
UWORD8 u1_firstbyte, u1_nal_ref_idc;
if(ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_B)
{
u1_firstbyte = *(pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code);
u1_nal_ref_idc = (UWORD8)(NAL_REF_IDC(u1_firstbyte));
if(u1_nal_ref_idc == 0)
{
/*skip non reference frames*/
cur_slice_is_nonref = 1;
continue;
}
else
{
if(1 == cur_slice_is_nonref)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -=
bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_B_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code =
IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size =
sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
}
}
if(buflen)
{
memcpy(pu1_bitstrm_buf, pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code,
buflen);
/* Decoder may read extra 8 bytes near end of the frame */
if((buflen + 8) < buf_size)
{
memset(pu1_bitstrm_buf + buflen, 0, 8);
}
u4_first_start_code_found = 1;
}
else
{
/*start code not found*/
if(u4_first_start_code_found == 0)
{
/*no start codes found in current process call*/
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_START_CODE_NOT_FOUND;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA;
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec,
ps_dec_op);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ps_dec->i4_error_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
return (IV_FAIL);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
continue;
}
}
else
{
/* a start code has already been found earlier in the same process call*/
frame_data_left = 0;
header_data_left = 0;
continue;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 0;
ret = ih264d_parse_nal_unit(dec_hdl, ps_dec_op,
pu1_bitstrm_buf, buflen);
if(ret != OK)
{
UWORD32 error = ih264d_map_error(ret);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = error | ret;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T)
|| (ret == IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE))
{
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
break;
}
if((ret == ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME) || (ret == ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC))
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
if(ret == ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC)
{
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_return_to_app)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
header_data_left = ((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1)
&& (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
frame_data_left = (((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
&& ((ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done == 0)
|| (u4_next_is_aud == 1)))
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
}
while(( header_data_left == 1)||(frame_data_left == 1));
if((ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 1)
&& (ret != IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
&& ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded < ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
WORD32 num_mb_skipped;
WORD32 prev_slice_err;
pocstruct_t temp_poc;
WORD32 ret1;
WORD32 ht_in_mbs;
ht_in_mbs = ps_dec->u2_pic_ht >> (4 + ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag);
num_mb_skipped = (ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic && (ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0))
prev_slice_err = 1;
else
prev_slice_err = 2;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic && (ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded == 0))
prev_slice_err = 1;
ret1 = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL, ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&temp_poc, prev_slice_err);
if((ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T) || (ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T) ||
(ret1 == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
ret = ret1;
}
}
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
/* signal the decode thread */
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
/* dont consume bitstream for change in resolution case */
if(ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
}
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 2)
{
/*do deblocking of all mbs*/
if((ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk == 0) &&(ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk == 1) && (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0))
{
UWORD32 u4_num_mbs,u4_max_addr;
tfr_ctxt_t s_tfr_ctxt;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_tfr_cxt = &s_tfr_ctxt;
pad_mgr_t *ps_pad_mgr = &ps_dec->s_pad_mgr;
/*BS is done for all mbs while parsing*/
u4_max_addr = (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs) - 1;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = u4_max_addr + 1;
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec, ps_pad_mgr, ps_tfr_cxt,
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
u4_num_mbs = u4_max_addr
- ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num + 1;
DEBUG_PERF_PRINTF("mbs left for deblocking= %d \n",u4_num_mbs);
if(u4_num_mbs != 0)
ih264d_check_mb_map_deblk(ps_dec, u4_num_mbs,
ps_tfr_cxt,1);
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
}
}
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
}
DATA_SYNC();
if((ps_dec_op->u4_error_code & 0xff)
!= ERROR_DYNAMIC_RESOLUTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
}
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if((ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 1)
&& (ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC != i4_err_status))
{
/*
* For field pictures, set the bottom and top picture decoded u4_flag correctly.
*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= TOP_FIELD_ONLY;
}
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
/* if new frame in not found (if we are still getting slices from previous frame)
* ih264d_deblock_display is not called. Such frames will not be added to reference /display
*/
if ((ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC) == 0)
{
/* Calling Function to deblock Picture and Display */
ret = ih264d_deblock_display(ps_dec);
}
/*set to complete ,as we dont support partial frame decode*/
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded == 3)
{
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1;
}
/*Update the i4_frametype at the end of picture*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_IDR_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_B_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_P_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_I_FRAME;
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Shouldn't come here\n");
}
ps_dec->i4_content_type = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded + 2;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded
- ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
{
/* In case the decoder is configured to run in low delay mode,
* then get display buffer and then format convert.
* Note in this mode, format conversion does not run paralelly in a thread and adds to the codec cycles
*/
if((IVD_DECODE_FRAME_OUT == ps_dec->e_frm_out_mode)
&& ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
}
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec, ps_dec_op);
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_output_present &&
(ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row < ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht))
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht
- ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) == 1)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 1;
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps) && (1 == (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_is_valid)))
{
if((0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
&& (0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag))
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 0;
}
}
if((TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY) == ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = 0;
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Do End of Pic processing. */
/* Should be called only if frame was decoded in previous process call*/
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 1)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded)
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
else
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
}
/*Data memory barrier instruction,so that yuv write by the library is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("The num bytes consumed: %d\n",
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed);
return api_ret_value;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Handle dec_hdl memory allocation failure gracefully
If memory allocation for dec_hdl fails, return gracefully
with an error code. All other allocation failures are
handled correctly.
Bug: 68300072
Test: ran poc before/after
Change-Id: I118ae71f4aded658441f1932bd4ede3536f5028b
(cherry picked from commit 7720b3fe3de04523da3a9ecec2b42a3748529bbd)
CWE ID: CWE-770
| 0
| 163,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: relay_crypt_one_payload(crypto_cipher_t *cipher, uint8_t *in,
int encrypt_mode)
{
int r;
(void)encrypt_mode;
r = crypto_cipher_crypt_inplace(cipher, (char*) in, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
if (r) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error during relay encryption");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 69,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AXNodeObject::childrenChanged() {
if (!getNode() && !getLayoutObject())
return;
if (ancestorForWhichThisIsAPresentationalChild()) {
setNeedsToUpdateChildren();
return;
}
axObjectCache().postNotification(this, AXObjectCacheImpl::AXChildrenChanged);
for (AXObject* parent = this; parent;
parent = parent->parentObjectIfExists()) {
parent->setNeedsToUpdateChildren();
if (parent->isLiveRegion())
axObjectCache().postNotification(parent,
AXObjectCacheImpl::AXLiveRegionChanged);
if (isNonNativeTextControl())
axObjectCache().postNotification(parent,
AXObjectCacheImpl::AXValueChanged);
}
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InspectorNetworkAgent::InspectorNetworkAgent(
InspectedFrames* inspected_frames,
WorkerGlobalScope* worker_global_scope)
: inspected_frames_(inspected_frames),
worker_global_scope_(worker_global_scope),
resources_data_(
NetworkResourcesData::Create(g_maximum_total_buffer_size,
g_maximum_resource_buffer_size)),
pending_request_(nullptr),
remove_finished_replay_xhr_timer_(
inspected_frames ? TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kUnspecedLoading,
inspected_frames->Root())
: TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kUnspecedLoading,
worker_global_scope),
this,
&InspectorNetworkAgent::RemoveFinishedReplayXHRFired) {
DCHECK((IsMainThread() && inspected_frames_ && !worker_global_scope_) ||
(!IsMainThread() && !inspected_frames_ && worker_global_scope_));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,511
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
{
int rv, start_idx, i;
if (x == NULL) {
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
start_idx = 1;
} else
start_idx = 0;
rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
if (rv != 1)
return rv;
for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
if (rv != 1)
return rv;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: free_config_fudge(
config_tree *ptree
)
{
FREE_ADDR_OPTS_FIFO(ptree->fudge);
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tq_thaw(struct thread_q *tq)
{
tq_freezethaw(tq, false);
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 36,646
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.