instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int alloc_fresh_gigantic_page(struct hstate *h,
nodemask_t *nodes_allowed) { return 0; }
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::setLocationBarMode(
oxide::qt::LocationBarMode mode) {
if (!proxy_) {
construct_props_->location_bar_mode = mode;
} else {
proxy_->setLocationBarMode(mode);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StackTrace::Print() const {
#if !defined(__UCLIBC__)
PrintBacktraceOutputHandler handler;
ProcessBacktrace(trace_, count_, &handler);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 110,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_qtdemux_get_duration (GstQTDemux * qtdemux, gint64 * duration)
{
gboolean res = TRUE;
*duration = GST_CLOCK_TIME_NONE;
if (qtdemux->duration != 0) {
if (qtdemux->duration != G_MAXINT32 && qtdemux->timescale != 0) {
*duration = gst_util_uint64_scale (qtdemux->duration,
GST_SECOND, qtdemux->timescale);
}
}
return res;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VideoCaptureManager::GetPhotoState(
int session_id,
media::VideoCaptureDevice::GetPhotoStateCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
const VideoCaptureController* controller =
LookupControllerBySessionId(session_id);
if (!controller)
return;
if (controller->IsDeviceAlive()) {
controller->GetPhotoState(std::move(callback));
return;
}
photo_request_queue_.emplace_back(
session_id,
base::Bind(&VideoCaptureController::GetPhotoState,
base::Unretained(controller), base::Passed(&callback)));
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int64_t get_server_clock(HTTPContext *c)
{
/* compute current pts value from system time */
return (cur_time - c->start_time) * 1000;
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 70,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct block_device *bdgrab(struct block_device *bdev)
{
ihold(bdev->bd_inode);
return bdev;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,252
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string UrlmonUrlRequest::me() const {
return base::StringPrintf(" id: %i Obj: %X ", id(), this);
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 100,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock_iocb *siocb = kiocb_to_siocb(kiocb);
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_nl *addr = msg->msg_name;
u32 dst_pid;
u32 dst_group;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
struct scm_cookie scm;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (NULL == siocb->scm)
siocb->scm = &scm;
err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm, true);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (msg->msg_namelen) {
err = -EINVAL;
if (addr->nl_family != AF_NETLINK)
goto out;
dst_pid = addr->nl_pid;
dst_group = ffs(addr->nl_groups);
err = -EPERM;
if (dst_group && !netlink_capable(sock, NL_NONROOT_SEND))
goto out;
} else {
dst_pid = nlk->dst_pid;
dst_group = nlk->dst_group;
}
if (!nlk->pid) {
err = netlink_autobind(sock);
if (err)
goto out;
}
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > sk->sk_sndbuf - 32)
goto out;
err = -ENOBUFS;
skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
NETLINK_CB(skb).pid = nlk->pid;
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = dst_group;
memcpy(NETLINK_CREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, sizeof(struct ucred));
err = -EFAULT;
if (memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
err = security_netlink_send(sk, skb);
if (err) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
if (dst_group) {
atomic_inc(&skb->users);
netlink_broadcast(sk, skb, dst_pid, dst_group, GFP_KERNEL);
}
err = netlink_unicast(sk, skb, dst_pid, msg->msg_flags&MSG_DONTWAIT);
out:
scm_destroy(siocb->scm);
return err;
}
Commit Message: netlink: fix possible spoofing from non-root processes
Non-root user-space processes can send Netlink messages to other
processes that are well-known for being subscribed to Netlink
asynchronous notifications. This allows ilegitimate non-root
process to send forged messages to Netlink subscribers.
The userspace process usually verifies the legitimate origin in
two ways:
a) Socket credentials. If UID != 0, then the message comes from
some ilegitimate process and the message needs to be dropped.
b) Netlink portID. In general, portID == 0 means that the origin
of the messages comes from the kernel. Thus, discarding any
message not coming from the kernel.
However, ctnetlink sets the portID in event messages that has
been triggered by some user-space process, eg. conntrack utility.
So other processes subscribed to ctnetlink events, eg. conntrackd,
know that the event was triggered by some user-space action.
Neither of the two ways to discard ilegitimate messages coming
from non-root processes can help for ctnetlink.
This patch adds capability validation in case that dst_pid is set
in netlink_sendmsg(). This approach is aggressive since existing
applications using any Netlink bus to deliver messages between
two user-space processes will break. Note that the exception is
NETLINK_USERSOCK, since it is reserved for netlink-to-netlink
userspace communication.
Still, if anyone wants that his Netlink bus allows netlink-to-netlink
userspace, then they can set NL_NONROOT_SEND. However, by default,
I don't think it makes sense to allow to use NETLINK_ROUTE to
communicate two processes that are sending no matter what information
that is not related to link/neighbouring/routing. They should be using
NETLINK_USERSOCK instead for that.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 167,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::strokeRect(double x,
double y,
double width,
double height) {
if (!ValidateRectForCanvas(x, y, width, height))
return;
if (!DrawingCanvas())
return;
SkRect rect = SkRect::MakeXYWH(x, y, width, height);
FloatRect bounds = rect;
InflateStrokeRect(bounds);
Draw([&rect](PaintCanvas* c, const PaintFlags* flags) // draw lambda
{ StrokeRectOnCanvas(rect, c, flags); },
[](const SkIRect& clip_bounds) // overdraw test lambda
{ return false; },
bounds, CanvasRenderingContext2DState::kStrokePaintType);
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mergeWithNextTextNode(PassRefPtr<Node> node, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
ASSERT(node && node->isTextNode());
Node* next = node->nextSibling();
if (!next || !next->isTextNode())
return;
RefPtr<Text> textNode = toText(node.get());
RefPtr<Text> textNext = toText(next);
textNode->appendData(textNext->data(), ec);
if (ec)
return;
if (textNext->parentNode()) // Might have been removed by mutation event.
textNext->remove(ec);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PixelBufferWorkerPoolTaskImpl(internal::RasterWorkerPoolTask* task,
uint8_t* buffer,
const Reply& reply)
: task_(task),
buffer_(buffer),
reply_(reply),
needs_upload_(false) {
}
Commit Message: cc: Simplify raster task completion notification logic
(Relanding after missing activation bug fixed in https://codereview.chromium.org/131763003/)
Previously the pixel buffer raster worker pool used a combination of
polling and explicit notifications from the raster worker pool to decide
when to tell the client about the completion of 1) all tasks or 2) the
subset of tasks required for activation. This patch simplifies the logic
by only triggering the notification based on the OnRasterTasksFinished
and OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished calls from the worker
pool.
BUG=307841,331534
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/99873007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@243991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_minst_from_memory(const gs_memory_t *mem)
{
#ifdef PSI_INCLUDED
extern gs_main_instance *ps_impl_get_minst( const gs_memory_t *mem );
return ps_impl_get_minst(mem);
#else
return (gs_main_instance*)mem->gs_lib_ctx->top_of_system;
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,024
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings::GetFileSystem(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
DCHECK(args.Length() == 2);
DCHECK(args[0]->IsString());
DCHECK(args[1]->IsString());
std::string name(*v8::String::Utf8Value(args[0]));
std::string root_url(*v8::String::Utf8Value(args[1]));
blink::WebLocalFrame* webframe =
blink::WebLocalFrame::frameForContext(context()->v8_context());
DCHECK(webframe);
args.GetReturnValue().Set(
blink::WebDOMFileSystem::create(webframe,
blink::WebFileSystemTypeExternal,
blink::WebString::fromUTF8(name),
GURL(root_url))
.toV8Value(context()->v8_context()->Global(), args.GetIsolate()));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 156,425
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __die(const char *str, int err, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
static int die_counter;
int ret;
printk(KERN_EMERG "Internal error: %s: %x [#%d]" S_PREEMPT S_SMP
S_ISA "\n", str, err, ++die_counter);
/* trap and error numbers are mostly meaningless on ARM */
ret = notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, err, tsk->thread.trap_no, SIGSEGV);
if (ret == NOTIFY_STOP)
return 1;
print_modules();
__show_regs(regs);
printk(KERN_EMERG "Process %.*s (pid: %d, stack limit = 0x%p)\n",
TASK_COMM_LEN, tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk), end_of_stack(tsk));
if (!user_mode(regs) || in_interrupt()) {
dump_mem(KERN_EMERG, "Stack: ", regs->ARM_sp,
THREAD_SIZE + (unsigned long)task_stack_page(tsk));
dump_backtrace(regs, tsk);
dump_instr(KERN_EMERG, regs);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 58,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Browser::CreateParams::CreateParams(Type type, Profile* profile)
: type(type),
profile(profile),
host_desktop_type(kDefaultHostDesktopType),
app_type(APP_TYPE_HOST),
initial_show_state(ui::SHOW_STATE_DEFAULT),
is_session_restore(false),
window(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::ClearImportsController() {
if (!Loader())
fetcher_->ClearContext();
imports_controller_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int test_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *a, *c, *d, *e;
int i, ret = 0;
a = BN_new();
c = BN_new();
d = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
if (a == NULL || c == NULL || d == NULL || e == NULL) {
goto err;
}
for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
BN_bntest_rand(a, 40 + i * 10, 0, 0);
a->neg = rand_neg();
BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
}
BN_print(bp, c);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
}
BN_div(d, e, c, a, ctx);
BN_sub(d, d, a);
if (!BN_is_zero(d) || !BN_is_zero(e)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed!\n");
goto err;
}
}
/* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
BN_hex2bn(&a,
"80000000000000008000000000000001"
"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE0000000000000000");
BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
}
BN_print(bp, c);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
}
BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
if (BN_cmp(c, d)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
"different results!\n");
goto err;
}
/* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
BN_hex2bn(&a,
"80000000000000000000000080000001"
"FFFFFFFE000000000000000000000000");
BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
}
BN_print(bp, c);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
}
BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
if (BN_cmp(c, d)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
"different results!\n");
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (a != NULL)
BN_free(a);
if (c != NULL)
BN_free(c);
if (d != NULL)
BN_free(d);
if (e != NULL)
BN_free(e);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 3,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PepperPlatformAudioInput::StartCapture() {
DCHECK(main_message_loop_proxy_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
io_message_loop_proxy_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&PepperPlatformAudioInput::StartCaptureOnIOThread, this));
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
char* name = argv[0];
bool applyColorCorrection = false;
#if USE(QCMSLIB)
if (argc >= 2 && strcmp(argv[1], "--color-correct") == 0)
applyColorCorrection = (--argc, ++argv, true);
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [--color-correct] file [iterations] [packetSize]\n", name);
exit(1);
}
#else
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s file [iterations] [packetSize]\n", name);
exit(1);
}
#endif
size_t iterations = 1;
if (argc >= 3) {
char* end = 0;
iterations = strtol(argv[2], &end, 10);
if (*end != '\0' || !iterations) {
fprintf(stderr, "Second argument should be number of iterations. "
"The default is 1. You supplied %s\n", argv[2]);
exit(1);
}
}
size_t packetSize = 0;
if (argc >= 4) {
char* end = 0;
packetSize = strtol(argv[3], &end, 10);
if (*end != '\0') {
fprintf(stderr, "Third argument should be packet size. Default is "
"0, meaning to decode the entire image in one packet. You "
"supplied %s\n", argv[3]);
exit(1);
}
}
class WebPlatform : public blink::Platform {
public:
const unsigned char* getTraceCategoryEnabledFlag(const char*) override
{
return reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>("nope-none-nada");
}
void cryptographicallyRandomValues(unsigned char*, size_t) override
{
}
void screenColorProfile(WebVector<char>* profile) override
{
getScreenColorProfile(profile); // Returns a whacked color profile.
}
};
blink::initializeWithoutV8(new WebPlatform());
#if USE(QCMSLIB)
ImageDecoder::qcmsOutputDeviceProfile(); // Initialize screen colorProfile.
#endif
RefPtr<SharedBuffer> data = readFile(argv[1]);
if (!data.get() || !data->size()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error reading image data from [%s]\n", argv[1]);
exit(2);
}
data->data();
double totalTime = 0.0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < iterations; ++i) {
double startTime = getCurrentTime();
bool decoded = decodeImageData(data.get(), applyColorCorrection, packetSize);
double elapsedTime = getCurrentTime() - startTime;
totalTime += elapsedTime;
if (!decoded) {
fprintf(stderr, "Image decode failed [%s]\n", argv[1]);
exit(3);
}
}
double averageTime = totalTime / static_cast<double>(iterations);
printf("%f %f\n", totalTime, averageTime);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 1
| 172,240
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::SetStateForNewFormElements(const Vector<String>& state_vector) {
if (!state_vector.size() && !form_controller_)
return;
GetFormController().SetStateForNewFormElements(state_vector);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int asf_read_content_desc(AVFormatContext *s, const GUIDParseTable *g)
{
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
int i;
static const char *const titles[] =
{ "Title", "Author", "Copyright", "Description", "Rate" };
uint16_t len[5], buflen[5] = { 0 };
uint8_t *ch;
uint64_t size = avio_rl64(pb);
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
len[i] = avio_rl16(pb);
buflen[i] = 2 * len[i] + 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
ch = av_malloc(buflen[i]);
if (!ch)
return(AVERROR(ENOMEM));
asf_read_metadata(s, titles[i], len[i], ch, buflen[i]);
av_freep(&ch);
}
align_position(pb, asf->offset, size);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 74,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const Cluster* Segment::GetNext(const Cluster* pCurr)
{
assert(pCurr);
assert(pCurr != &m_eos);
assert(m_clusters);
long idx = pCurr->m_index;
if (idx >= 0)
{
assert(m_clusterCount > 0);
assert(idx < m_clusterCount);
assert(pCurr == m_clusters[idx]);
++idx;
if (idx >= m_clusterCount)
return &m_eos; //caller will LoadCluster as desired
Cluster* const pNext = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pNext);
assert(pNext->m_index >= 0);
assert(pNext->m_index == idx);
return pNext;
}
assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0);
long long pos = pCurr->m_element_start;
assert(m_size >= 0); //TODO
const long long stop = m_start + m_size; //end of segment
{
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop); //TODO
if (result != 0)
return NULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(id == 0x0F43B675); //Cluster ID
if (id != 0x0F43B675)
return NULL;
pos += len; //consume ID
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0); //TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop); //TODO
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(size > 0); //TODO
pos += len; //consume length of size of element
assert((pos + size) <= stop); //TODO
pos += size; //consume payload
}
long long off_next = 0;
while (pos < stop)
{
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop); //TODO
if (result != 0)
return NULL;
const long long idpos = pos; //pos of next (potential) cluster
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
assert(id > 0); //TODO
pos += len; //consume ID
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0); //TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop); //TODO
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0); //TODO
pos += len; //consume length of size of element
assert((pos + size) <= stop); //TODO
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
if (id == 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
{
const long long off_next_ = idpos - m_start;
long long pos_;
long len_;
const long status = Cluster::HasBlockEntries(
this,
off_next_,
pos_,
len_);
assert(status >= 0);
if (status > 0)
{
off_next = off_next_;
break;
}
}
pos += size; //consume payload
}
if (off_next <= 0)
return 0;
Cluster** const ii = m_clusters + m_clusterCount;
Cluster** i = ii;
Cluster** const jj = ii + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j)
{
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
Cluster* const pNext = *k;
assert(pNext);
assert(pNext->m_index < 0);
pos = pNext->GetPosition();
if (pos < off_next)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > off_next)
j = k;
else
return pNext;
}
assert(i == j);
Cluster* const pNext = Cluster::Create(this,
-1,
off_next);
assert(pNext);
const ptrdiff_t idx_next = i - m_clusters; //insertion position
PreloadCluster(pNext, idx_next);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(idx_next < m_clusterSize);
assert(m_clusters[idx_next] == pNext);
return pNext;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct netdev_queue *dev_ingress_queue_create(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct netdev_queue *queue = dev_ingress_queue(dev);
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT
if (queue)
return queue;
queue = kzalloc(sizeof(*queue), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!queue)
return NULL;
netdev_init_one_queue(dev, queue, NULL);
queue->qdisc = &noop_qdisc;
queue->qdisc_sleeping = &noop_qdisc;
rcu_assign_pointer(dev->ingress_queue, queue);
#endif
return queue;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,255
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContents* GetActiveWebContents() {
return browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 132,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BackTexture::Destroy() {
if (image_) {
DCHECK(texture_ref_);
ScopedTextureBinder binder(&decoder_->state_, id(), Target());
DestroyNativeGpuMemoryBuffer(true);
}
if (texture_ref_) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor("BackTexture::Destroy",
decoder_->state_.GetErrorState());
texture_ref_ = nullptr;
}
memory_tracker_.TrackMemFree(bytes_allocated_);
bytes_allocated_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 145,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetActiveUniformBlockiv(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (!feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context())
return error::kUnknownCommand;
const volatile gles2::cmds::GetActiveUniformBlockiv& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::GetActiveUniformBlockiv*>(
cmd_data);
GLuint program_id = c.program;
GLuint index = static_cast<GLuint>(c.index);
GLenum pname = static_cast<GLenum>(c.pname);
Program* program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program_id, "glGetActiveUniformBlockiv");
if (!program) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint service_id = program->service_id();
GLint link_status = GL_FALSE;
api()->glGetProgramivFn(service_id, GL_LINK_STATUS, &link_status);
if (link_status != GL_TRUE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glGetActiveActiveUniformBlockiv", "program not linked");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (index >= program->uniform_block_size_info().size()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glGetActiveUniformBlockiv",
"uniformBlockIndex >= active uniform blocks");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLsizei num_values = 1;
if (pname == GL_UNIFORM_BLOCK_ACTIVE_UNIFORM_INDICES) {
GLint num = 0;
api()->glGetActiveUniformBlockivFn(service_id, index,
GL_UNIFORM_BLOCK_ACTIVE_UNIFORMS, &num);
GLenum error = api()->glGetErrorFn();
if (error != GL_NO_ERROR) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(error, "GetActiveUniformBlockiv", "");
return error::kNoError;
}
num_values = static_cast<GLsizei>(num);
}
typedef cmds::GetActiveUniformBlockiv::Result Result;
uint32_t checked_size = 0;
if (!Result::ComputeSize(num_values).AssignIfValid(&checked_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.params_shm_id, c.params_shm_offset, checked_size);
GLint* params = result ? result->GetData() : nullptr;
if (params == nullptr) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (result->size != 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
api()->glGetActiveUniformBlockivFn(service_id, index, pname, params);
result->SetNumResults(num_values);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nf_ct_frag6_sysctl_register(struct net *net)
{
struct ctl_table *table;
struct ctl_table_header *hdr;
table = nf_ct_frag6_sysctl_table;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) {
table = kmemdup(table, sizeof(nf_ct_frag6_sysctl_table),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (table == NULL)
goto err_alloc;
table[0].data = &net->nf_frag.frags.timeout;
table[1].data = &net->nf_frag.frags.low_thresh;
table[1].extra2 = &net->nf_frag.frags.high_thresh;
table[2].data = &net->nf_frag.frags.high_thresh;
table[2].extra1 = &net->nf_frag.frags.low_thresh;
table[2].extra2 = &init_net.nf_frag.frags.high_thresh;
}
hdr = register_net_sysctl(net, "net/netfilter", table);
if (hdr == NULL)
goto err_reg;
net->nf_frag.sysctl.frags_hdr = hdr;
return 0;
err_reg:
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
kfree(table);
err_alloc:
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: drop mangled skb on ream error
Dmitry Vyukov reported GPF in network stack that Andrey traced down to
negative nh offset in nf_ct_frag6_queue().
Problem is that all network headers before fragment header are pulled.
Normal ipv6 reassembly will drop the skb when errors occur further down
the line.
netfilter doesn't do this, and instead passed the original fragment
along. That was also fine back when netfilter ipv6 defrag worked with
cloned fragments, as the original, pristine fragment was passed on.
So we either have to undo the pull op, or discard such fragments.
Since they're malformed after all (e.g. overlapping fragment) it seems
preferrable to just drop them.
Same for temporary errors -- it doesn't make sense to accept (and
perhaps forward!) only some fragments of same datagram.
Fixes: 029f7f3b8701cc7ac ("netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: avoid/free clone operations")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Debugged-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Diagnosed-by: Eric Dumazet <Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 47,990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: init_user_id_from_FQN (const char * _fqn) {
char * uid = NULL;
char * domain = NULL;
char * fqn = NULL;
char default_uid [] = "nobody";
if (_fqn) {
fqn = strdup (_fqn);
uid = fqn;
char * pAt = strchr (fqn, '@');
if (pAt) {
*pAt='\0';
domain = pAt+1;
}
}
if (uid == NULL) {
uid = default_uid;
}
int rc = init_user_ids (uid, domain);
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "Switching to user %s@%s, result = %d\n", uid, domain, rc);
if (fqn)
free (fqn);
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,110
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void modbus_mapping_free(modbus_mapping_t *mb_mapping)
{
if (mb_mapping == NULL) {
return;
}
free(mb_mapping->tab_input_registers);
free(mb_mapping->tab_registers);
free(mb_mapping->tab_input_bits);
free(mb_mapping->tab_bits);
free(mb_mapping);
}
Commit Message: Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 88,734
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _WM_do_control_dummy(struct _mdi *mdi, struct _event_data *data) {
#ifdef DEBUG_MIDI
uint8_t ch = data->channel;
MIDI_EVENT_DEBUG(__FUNCTION__, ch, data->data.value);
#else
UNUSED(data);
#endif
UNUSED(mdi);
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 63,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decode_NXAST_RAW_SET_TUNNEL64(uint64_t tun_id,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
struct ofpact_tunnel *tunnel = ofpact_put_SET_TUNNEL(out);
tunnel->ofpact.raw = NXAST_RAW_SET_TUNNEL64;
tunnel->tun_id = tun_id;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GlobalConfirmInfoBar::DelegateProxy::Cancel() {
base::WeakPtr<GlobalConfirmInfoBar> info_bar = global_info_bar_;
if (info_bar) {
info_bar->OnInfoBarRemoved(info_bar_, false);
info_bar->delegate_->Cancel();
}
if (info_bar)
info_bar->Close();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,166
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void paravirt_end_context_switch(struct task_struct *next)
{
BUG_ON(preemptible());
leave_lazy(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU);
if (test_and_clear_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(next), TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES))
arch_enter_lazy_mmu_mode();
}
Commit Message: x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests
Nadav reported that on guests we're failing to rewrite the indirect
calls to CALLEE_SAVE paravirt functions. In particular the
pv_queued_spin_unlock() call is left unpatched and that is all over the
place. This obviously wrecks Spectre-v2 mitigation (for paravirt
guests) which relies on not actually having indirect calls around.
The reason is an incorrect clobber test in paravirt_patch_call(); this
function rewrites an indirect call with a direct call to the _SAME_
function, there is no possible way the clobbers can be different
because of this.
Therefore remove this clobber check. Also put WARNs on the other patch
failure case (not enough room for the instruction) which I've not seen
trigger in my (limited) testing.
Three live kernel image disassemblies for lock_sock_nested (as a small
function that illustrates the problem nicely). PRE is the current
situation for guests, POST is with this patch applied and NATIVE is with
or without the patch for !guests.
PRE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq *0xffffffff822299e8
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
POST:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq 0xffffffff810a0c20 <__raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock>
0xffffffff817be9a5 <+53>: xchg %ax,%ax
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063aa0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
NATIVE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: movb $0x0,(%rdi)
0xffffffff817be9a3 <+51>: nopl 0x0(%rax)
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
Fixes: 63f70270ccd9 ("[PATCH] i386: PARAVIRT: add common patching machinery")
Fixes: 3010a0663fd9 ("x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls")
Reported-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 79,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::initContentSecurityPolicy(PassRefPtr<ContentSecurityPolicy> csp)
{
setContentSecurityPolicy(csp ? csp : ContentSecurityPolicy::create());
if (m_frame && m_frame->tree().parent() && m_frame->tree().parent()->isLocalFrame()) {
ContentSecurityPolicy* parentCSP = toLocalFrame(m_frame->tree().parent())->document()->contentSecurityPolicy();
if (shouldInheritSecurityOriginFromOwner(m_url)) {
contentSecurityPolicy()->copyStateFrom(parentCSP);
} else if (isPluginDocument()) {
contentSecurityPolicy()->copyPluginTypesFrom(parentCSP);
}
}
contentSecurityPolicy()->bindToExecutionContext(this);
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ieee802_15_4_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
int hdrlen;
uint16_t fc;
uint8_t seq;
if (caplen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4] %x", caplen));
return caplen;
}
fc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
hdrlen = extract_header_length(fc);
seq = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(p + 2);
p += 3;
caplen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"IEEE 802.15.4 %s packet ", ftypes[fc & 0x7]));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"seq %02x ", seq));
if (hdrlen == -1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"invalid! "));
return caplen;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
p+= hdrlen;
caplen -= hdrlen;
} else {
uint16_t panid = 0;
switch ((fc >> 10) & 0x3) {
case 0x00:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case 0x01:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved destination addressing mode"));
return 0;
case 0x02:
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p)));
p += 2;
break;
case 0x03:
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p)));
p += 8;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"< "));
switch ((fc >> 14) & 0x3) {
case 0x00:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case 0x01:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved source addressing mode"));
return 0;
case 0x02:
if (!(fc & (1 << 6))) {
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p)));
p += 2;
break;
case 0x03:
if (!(fc & (1 << 6))) {
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p)));
p += 8;
break;
}
caplen -= hdrlen;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13000/IEEE 802.15.4: Add more bounds checks.
While we're at it, add a bunch of macros for the frame control field's
subfields, have the reserved frame types show the frame type value, use
the same code path for processing source and destination addresses
regardless of whether -v was specified (just leave out the addresses in
non-verbose mode), and return the header length in all cases.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 170,030
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ExtensionTabUtil::GetWindowIdOfTab(const WebContents* web_contents) {
return SessionID::IdForWindowContainingTab(web_contents);
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 116,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_wait_thread(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct task_struct *p;
list_for_each_entry(p, &tsk->children, sibling) {
/*
* Do not consider detached threads.
*/
if (!task_detached(p)) {
int ret = wait_consider_task(wo, 0, p);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after failure of clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, parent's io_context->nr_tasks is incremented, but never
decremented whenever copy_process() fails afterwards, which prevents
exit_io_context() from calling IO schedulers exit functions.
Give a task_struct to exit_io_context(), and call exit_io_context() instead of
put_io_context() in copy_process() cleanup path.
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 94,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: queue_wildcard_initial_name_ops (FlatpakProxyClient *client, Header *header, Buffer *buffer)
{
GDBusMessage *decoded_message = g_dbus_message_new_from_blob (buffer->data, buffer->size, 0, NULL);
GVariant *body, *arg0;
if (decoded_message != NULL &&
header->type == G_DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_METHOD_RETURN &&
(body = g_dbus_message_get_body (decoded_message)) != NULL &&
(arg0 = g_variant_get_child_value (body, 0)) != NULL &&
g_variant_is_of_type (arg0, G_VARIANT_TYPE_STRING_ARRAY))
{
const gchar **names = g_variant_get_strv (arg0, NULL);
int i;
/* Loop over all current names and get the owner for all the ones that match our wildcard
policies so that we can update the unique id policies for those */
for (i = 0; names[i] != NULL; i++)
{
const char *name = names[i];
if (name[0] != ':' &&
flatpak_proxy_get_wildcard_policy (client->proxy, name) != FLATPAK_POLICY_NONE)
{
/* Get the current owner of the name (if any) so we can apply policy to it */
GDBusMessage *message = g_dbus_message_new_method_call ("org.freedesktop.DBus", "/", "org.freedesktop.DBus", "GetNameOwner");
g_dbus_message_set_body (message, g_variant_new ("(s)", name));
queue_fake_message (client, message, EXPECTED_REPLY_FAKE_GET_NAME_OWNER);
g_hash_table_replace (client->get_owner_reply, GINT_TO_POINTER (client->last_serial), g_strdup (name));
if (client->proxy->log_messages)
g_print ("C%d: -> org.freedesktop.DBus fake GetNameOwner for %s\n", client->last_serial, name);
}
}
g_free (names);
}
g_object_unref (decoded_message);
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436
| 0
| 84,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void submit_flushes(struct work_struct *ws)
{
struct mddev *mddev = container_of(ws, struct mddev, flush_work);
struct md_rdev *rdev;
INIT_WORK(&mddev->flush_work, md_submit_flush_data);
atomic_set(&mddev->flush_pending, 1);
rcu_read_lock();
rdev_for_each_rcu(rdev, mddev)
if (rdev->raid_disk >= 0 &&
!test_bit(Faulty, &rdev->flags)) {
/* Take two references, one is dropped
* when request finishes, one after
* we reclaim rcu_read_lock
*/
struct bio *bi;
atomic_inc(&rdev->nr_pending);
atomic_inc(&rdev->nr_pending);
rcu_read_unlock();
bi = bio_alloc_mddev(GFP_NOIO, 0, mddev);
bi->bi_end_io = md_end_flush;
bi->bi_private = rdev;
bi->bi_bdev = rdev->bdev;
atomic_inc(&mddev->flush_pending);
submit_bio(WRITE_FLUSH, bi);
rcu_read_lock();
rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->flush_pending))
queue_work(md_wq, &mddev->flush_work);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,545
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int convert_mode(long *msgtyp, int msgflg)
{
if (msgflg & MSG_COPY)
return SEARCH_NUMBER;
/*
* find message of correct type.
* msgtyp = 0 => get first.
* msgtyp > 0 => get first message of matching type.
* msgtyp < 0 => get message with least type must be < abs(msgtype).
*/
if (*msgtyp == 0)
return SEARCH_ANY;
if (*msgtyp < 0) {
*msgtyp = -*msgtyp;
return SEARCH_LESSEQUAL;
}
if (msgflg & MSG_EXCEPT)
return SEARCH_NOTEQUAL;
return SEARCH_EQUAL;
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int FLTLayerApplyCondSQLFilterToLayer(FilterEncodingNode *psNode, mapObj *map, int iLayerIndex)
{
return FLTLayerApplyPlainFilterToLayer(psNode, map, iLayerIndex);
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 69,012
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static WORD32 ihevcd_parse_vui_parameters(bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm,
vui_t *ps_vui,
WORD32 sps_max_sub_layers_minus1)
{
WORD32 ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
BITS_PARSE("aspect_ratio_info_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_info_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_idc = SAR_UNUSED;
ps_vui->u2_sar_width = 0;
ps_vui->u2_sar_height = 0;
if(ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_info_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("aspect_ratio_idc", ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_idc, ps_bitstrm, 8);
if(ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_idc == EXTENDED_SAR)
{
BITS_PARSE("sar_width", ps_vui->u2_sar_width, ps_bitstrm, 16);
BITS_PARSE("sar_height", ps_vui->u2_sar_height, ps_bitstrm, 16);
}
}
BITS_PARSE("overscan_info_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_overscan_info_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_overscan_appropriate_flag = 0;
if(ps_vui->u1_overscan_info_present_flag)
BITS_PARSE("overscan_appropriate_flag", ps_vui->u1_overscan_appropriate_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("video_signal_type_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_video_signal_type_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_video_format = VID_FMT_UNSPECIFIED;
ps_vui->u1_video_full_range_flag = 0;
ps_vui->u1_colour_description_present_flag = 0;
if(ps_vui->u1_video_signal_type_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("video_format", ps_vui->u1_video_format, ps_bitstrm, 3);
BITS_PARSE("video_full_range_flag", ps_vui->u1_video_full_range_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("colour_description_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_colour_description_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_colour_primaries = 2;
ps_vui->u1_transfer_characteristics = 2;
if(ps_vui->u1_colour_description_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("colour_primaries", ps_vui->u1_colour_primaries, ps_bitstrm, 8);
BITS_PARSE("transfer_characteristics", ps_vui->u1_transfer_characteristics, ps_bitstrm, 8);
BITS_PARSE("matrix_coeffs", ps_vui->u1_matrix_coefficients, ps_bitstrm, 8);
}
}
BITS_PARSE("chroma_loc_info_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_chroma_loc_info_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_top_field = 0;
ps_vui->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_bottom_field = 0;
if(ps_vui->u1_chroma_loc_info_present_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("chroma_sample_loc_type_top_field", ps_vui->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_top_field, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("chroma_sample_loc_type_bottom_field", ps_vui->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_bottom_field, ps_bitstrm);
}
BITS_PARSE("neutral_chroma_indication_flag", ps_vui->u1_neutral_chroma_indication_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("field_seq_flag", ps_vui->u1_field_seq_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("frame_field_info_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_frame_field_info_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("default_display_window_flag", ps_vui->u1_default_display_window_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_left_offset = 0;
ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_right_offset = 0;
ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_top_offset = 0;
ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_bottom_offset = 0;
if(ps_vui->u1_default_display_window_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("def_disp_win_left_offset", ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_left_offset, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("def_disp_win_right_offset", ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_right_offset, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("def_disp_win_top_offset", ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_top_offset, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("def_disp_win_bottom_offset", ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_bottom_offset, ps_bitstrm);
}
BITS_PARSE("vui_timing_info_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_vui_timing_info_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
if(ps_vui->u1_vui_timing_info_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("vui_num_units_in_tick", ps_vui->u4_vui_num_units_in_tick, ps_bitstrm, 32);
BITS_PARSE("vui_time_scale", ps_vui->u4_vui_time_scale, ps_bitstrm, 32);
BITS_PARSE("vui_poc_proportional_to_timing_flag", ps_vui->u1_poc_proportional_to_timing_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
if(ps_vui->u1_poc_proportional_to_timing_flag)
UEV_PARSE("vui_num_ticks_poc_diff_one_minus1", ps_vui->u1_num_ticks_poc_diff_one_minus1, ps_bitstrm);
BITS_PARSE("vui_hrd_parameters_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_vui_hrd_parameters_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
if(ps_vui->u1_vui_hrd_parameters_present_flag)
ihevcd_parse_hrd_parameters(ps_bitstrm, &ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters, 1, sps_max_sub_layers_minus1);
}
BITS_PARSE("bitstream_restriction_flag", ps_vui->u1_bitstream_restriction_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_tiles_fixed_structure_flag = 0;
ps_vui->u1_motion_vectors_over_pic_boundaries_flag = 1;
ps_vui->u1_restricted_ref_pic_lists_flag = 0;
ps_vui->u4_min_spatial_segmentation_idc = 0;
ps_vui->u1_max_bytes_per_pic_denom = 2;
ps_vui->u1_max_bits_per_mincu_denom = 1;
ps_vui->u1_log2_max_mv_length_horizontal = 15;
ps_vui->u1_log2_max_mv_length_vertical = 15;
if(ps_vui->u1_bitstream_restriction_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("tiles_fixed_structure_flag", ps_vui->u1_tiles_fixed_structure_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("motion_vectors_over_pic_boundaries_flag", ps_vui->u1_motion_vectors_over_pic_boundaries_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("restricted_ref_pic_lists_flag", ps_vui->u1_restricted_ref_pic_lists_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
UEV_PARSE("min_spatial_segmentation_idc", ps_vui->u4_min_spatial_segmentation_idc, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("max_bytes_per_pic_denom", ps_vui->u1_max_bytes_per_pic_denom, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("max_bits_per_min_cu_denom", ps_vui->u1_max_bits_per_mincu_denom, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("log2_max_mv_length_horizontal", ps_vui->u1_log2_max_mv_length_horizontal, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("log2_max_mv_length_vertical", ps_vui->u1_log2_max_mv_length_vertical, ps_bitstrm);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Handle invalid num_reorder_pics & max_dec_pic_buffering in SPS
Bug: 33864300
Change-Id: I920e45c3420a1a41a366ad45bd4186c5f6af6d6b
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 162,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bootp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register const struct bootp *bp;
static const u_char vm_cmu[4] = VM_CMU;
static const u_char vm_rfc1048[4] = VM_RFC1048;
bp = (const struct bootp *)cp;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_op);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BOOTP/DHCP, %s",
tok2str(bootp_op_values, "unknown (0x%02x)", bp->bp_op)));
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_hlen);
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6 && bp->bp_op == BOOTPREQUEST) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " from %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_secs);
/* The usual hardware address type is 1 (10Mb Ethernet) */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", htype %d", bp->bp_htype));
/* The usual length for 10Mb Ethernet address is 6 bytes */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1 || bp->bp_hlen != 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hlen %d", bp->bp_hlen));
/* Only print interesting fields */
if (bp->bp_hops)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hops %d", bp->bp_hops));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", xid 0x%x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid)));
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", secs %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(bootp_flag_values, "none", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags))));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (0x%04x)", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags)));
/* Client's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_ciaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_ciaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_ciaddr)));
/* 'your' ip address (bootp client) */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_yiaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_yiaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Your-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_yiaddr)));
/* Server's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_siaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_siaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Server-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_siaddr)));
/* Gateway's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_giaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_giaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Gateway-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_giaddr)));
/* Client's Ethernet address */
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-Ethernet-Address %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_sname[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_sname) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t sname \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_sname, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_sname,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_file[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_file) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t file \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_file, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_file,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
/* Decode the vendor buffer */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_vend[0]);
if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_rfc1048,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
rfc1048_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_cmu,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
cmu_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else {
uint32_t ul;
ul = EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_vend);
if (ul != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Vendor-#0x%x", ul));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13028/BOOTP: Add a bounds check before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't cause 'tcpdump: pcap_loop: truncated dump file'
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 170,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int macvlan_link_register(struct rtnl_link_ops *ops)
{
/* common fields */
ops->priv_size = sizeof(struct macvlan_dev);
ops->validate = macvlan_validate;
ops->maxtype = IFLA_MACVLAN_MAX;
ops->policy = macvlan_policy;
ops->changelink = macvlan_changelink;
ops->get_size = macvlan_get_size;
ops->fill_info = macvlan_fill_info;
return rtnl_link_register(ops);
};
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool is_thread_check_enabled_1(void)
{
const char *thread_check_str;
if ((thread_check_str = getenv("NPW_THREAD_CHECK")) != NULL)
return ((strcmp(thread_check_str, "yes") == 0) ||
(strcmp(thread_check_str, "1") == 0));
/* enable main-thread checks by default for all builds from snapshots */
return NPW_SNAPSHOT > 0;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,149
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool BetterSniffMPEG4(
const sp<DataSource> &source, String8 *mimeType, float *confidence,
sp<AMessage> *meta) {
static const off64_t kMaxScanOffset = 128ll;
off64_t offset = 0ll;
bool foundGoodFileType = false;
off64_t moovAtomEndOffset = -1ll;
bool done = false;
while (!done && offset < kMaxScanOffset) {
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (source->readAt(offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return false;
}
uint64_t chunkSize = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunkType = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t chunkDataOffset = offset + 8;
if (chunkSize == 1) {
if (source->readAt(offset + 8, &chunkSize, 8) < 8) {
return false;
}
chunkSize = ntoh64(chunkSize);
chunkDataOffset += 8;
if (chunkSize < 16) {
return false;
}
} else if (chunkSize < 8) {
return false;
}
off64_t chunkDataSize = offset + chunkSize - chunkDataOffset;
char chunkstring[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunkType, chunkstring);
ALOGV("saw chunk type %s, size %lld @ %lld", chunkstring, chunkSize, offset);
switch (chunkType) {
case FOURCC('f', 't', 'y', 'p'):
{
if (chunkDataSize < 8) {
return false;
}
uint32_t numCompatibleBrands = (chunkDataSize - 8) / 4;
for (size_t i = 0; i < numCompatibleBrands + 2; ++i) {
if (i == 1) {
continue;
}
uint32_t brand;
if (source->readAt(
chunkDataOffset + 4 * i, &brand, 4) < 4) {
return false;
}
brand = ntohl(brand);
if (isCompatibleBrand(brand)) {
foundGoodFileType = true;
break;
}
}
if (!foundGoodFileType) {
return false;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
{
moovAtomEndOffset = offset + chunkSize;
done = true;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
offset += chunkSize;
}
if (!foundGoodFileType) {
return false;
}
*mimeType = MEDIA_MIMETYPE_CONTAINER_MPEG4;
*confidence = 0.4f;
if (moovAtomEndOffset >= 0) {
*meta = new AMessage;
(*meta)->setInt64("meta-data-size", moovAtomEndOffset);
ALOGV("found metadata size: %lld", moovAtomEndOffset);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix out-of-bounds write
Bug: 26365349
Change-Id: Ia363d9f8c231cf255dea852e0bbf5ca466c7990b
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 161,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void computeJD(DateTime *p){
int Y, M, D, A, B, X1, X2;
if( p->validJD ) return;
if( p->validYMD ){
Y = p->Y;
M = p->M;
D = p->D;
}else{
Y = 2000; /* If no YMD specified, assume 2000-Jan-01 */
M = 1;
D = 1;
}
if( Y<-4713 || Y>9999 || p->rawS ){
datetimeError(p);
return;
}
if( M<=2 ){
Y--;
M += 12;
}
A = Y/100;
B = 2 - A + (A/4);
X1 = 36525*(Y+4716)/100;
X2 = 306001*(M+1)/10000;
p->iJD = (sqlite3_int64)((X1 + X2 + D + B - 1524.5 ) * 86400000);
p->validJD = 1;
if( p->validHMS ){
p->iJD += p->h*3600000 + p->m*60000 + (sqlite3_int64)(p->s*1000);
if( p->validTZ ){
p->iJD -= p->tz*60000;
p->validYMD = 0;
p->validHMS = 0;
p->validTZ = 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserLauncherItemController::HasWindow(aura::Window* window) const {
return window_ == window;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void sched_init_numa(void) { }
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HTMLFormElement* HTMLFormControlElement::formOwner() const {
return ListedElement::Form();
}
Commit Message: autofocus: Fix a crash with an autofocus element in a document without browsing context.
ShouldAutofocus() should check existence of the browsing context.
Otherwise, doc.TopFrameOrigin() returns null.
Before crrev.com/695830, ShouldAutofocus() was called only for
rendered elements. That is to say, the document always had
browsing context.
Bug: 1003228
Change-Id: I2a941c34e9707d44869a6d7585dc7fb9f06e3bf4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1800902
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keishi Hattori <keishi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#696291}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 136,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLAnchorElement::setRel(const AtomicString& value)
{
m_linkRelations = 0;
SpaceSplitString newLinkRelations(value, SpaceSplitString::ShouldFoldCase);
if (newLinkRelations.contains("noreferrer"))
m_linkRelations |= RelationNoReferrer;
if (newLinkRelations.contains("noopener"))
m_linkRelations |= RelationNoOpener;
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_MSHUTDOWN_FUNCTION(mcrypt) /* {{{ */
{
php_stream_filter_unregister_factory("mcrypt.*" TSRMLS_CC);
php_stream_filter_unregister_factory("mdecrypt.*" TSRMLS_CC);
if (MCG(fd[RANDOM]) > 0) {
close(MCG(fd[RANDOM]));
}
if (MCG(fd[URANDOM]) > 0) {
close(MCG(fd[URANDOM]));
}
UNREGISTER_INI_ENTRIES();
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 51,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(lchown, const char __user *, filename, uid_t, user, gid_t, group)
{
return sys_fchownat(AT_FDCWD, filename, user, group,
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 46,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
bool pr = false;
u32 msr = msr_info->index;
u64 data = msr_info->data;
switch (msr) {
case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE:
case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
case MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER:
case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2:
break;
case MSR_EFER:
return set_efer(vcpu, data);
case MSR_K7_HWCR:
data &= ~(u64)0x40; /* ignore flush filter disable */
data &= ~(u64)0x100; /* ignore ignne emulation enable */
data &= ~(u64)0x8; /* ignore TLB cache disable */
data &= ~(u64)0x40000; /* ignore Mc status write enable */
if (data != 0) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented HWCR wrmsr: 0x%llx\n",
data);
return 1;
}
break;
case MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE:
if (data != 0) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented MMIO_CONF_BASE wrmsr: "
"0x%llx\n", data);
return 1;
}
break;
case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
if (!data) {
/* We support the non-activated case already */
break;
} else if (data & ~(DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR | DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF)) {
/* Values other than LBR and BTF are vendor-specific,
thus reserved and should throw a #GP */
return 1;
}
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "%s: MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR 0x%llx, nop\n",
__func__, data);
break;
case 0x200 ... 0x2ff:
return kvm_mtrr_set_msr(vcpu, msr, data);
case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
return kvm_set_apic_base(vcpu, msr_info);
case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0x3ff:
return kvm_x2apic_msr_write(vcpu, msr, data);
case MSR_IA32_TSCDEADLINE:
kvm_set_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(vcpu, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
if (guest_cpuid_has_tsc_adjust(vcpu)) {
if (!msr_info->host_initiated) {
s64 adj = data - vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr;
adjust_tsc_offset_guest(vcpu, adj);
}
vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr = data;
}
break;
case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr = data;
break;
case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
return 1;
vcpu->arch.smbase = data;
break;
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW:
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK:
vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock = data;
kvm_write_wall_clock(vcpu->kvm, data);
break;
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW:
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME: {
u64 gpa_offset;
struct kvm_arch *ka = &vcpu->kvm->arch;
kvmclock_reset(vcpu);
if (vcpu->vcpu_id == 0 && !msr_info->host_initiated) {
bool tmp = (msr == MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME);
if (ka->boot_vcpu_runs_old_kvmclock != tmp)
set_bit(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE,
&vcpu->requests);
ka->boot_vcpu_runs_old_kvmclock = tmp;
}
vcpu->arch.time = data;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_GLOBAL_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
/* we verify if the enable bit is set... */
if (!(data & 1))
break;
gpa_offset = data & ~(PAGE_MASK | 1);
if (kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(vcpu->kvm,
&vcpu->arch.pv_time, data & ~1ULL,
sizeof(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info)))
vcpu->arch.pv_time_enabled = false;
else
vcpu->arch.pv_time_enabled = true;
break;
}
case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN:
if (kvm_pv_enable_async_pf(vcpu, data))
return 1;
break;
case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
if (unlikely(!sched_info_on()))
return 1;
if (data & KVM_STEAL_RESERVED_MASK)
return 1;
if (kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.st.stime,
data & KVM_STEAL_VALID_BITS,
sizeof(struct kvm_steal_time)))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.st.msr_val = data;
if (!(data & KVM_MSR_ENABLED))
break;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE, vcpu);
break;
case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN:
if (kvm_lapic_enable_pv_eoi(vcpu, data))
return 1;
break;
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
return set_msr_mce(vcpu, msr, data);
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_P6_PERFCTR1:
pr = true; /* fall through */
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_K7_EVNTSEL3:
case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1:
if (kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(vcpu, msr))
return kvm_pmu_set_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
if (pr || data != 0)
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "disabled perfctr wrmsr: "
"0x%x data 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
break;
case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL:
/*
* Ignore all writes to this no longer documented MSR.
* Writes are only relevant for old K7 processors,
* all pre-dating SVM, but a recommended workaround from
* AMD for these chips. It is possible to specify the
* affected processor models on the command line, hence
* the need to ignore the workaround.
*/
break;
case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15:
case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P0 ... HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P4:
case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_CTL:
return kvm_hv_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr, data,
msr_info->host_initiated);
case MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3:
/* Drop writes to this legacy MSR -- see rdmsr
* counterpart for further detail.
*/
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "ignored wrmsr: 0x%x data %llx\n", msr, data);
break;
case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_osvw(vcpu))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.osvw.length = data;
break;
case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_osvw(vcpu))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.osvw.status = data;
break;
default:
if (msr && (msr == vcpu->kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr))
return xen_hvm_config(vcpu, data);
if (kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(vcpu, msr))
return kvm_pmu_set_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
if (!ignore_msrs) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled wrmsr: 0x%x data %llx\n",
msr, data);
return 1;
} else {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "ignored wrmsr: 0x%x data %llx\n",
msr, data);
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __forceinline void prep_huffman(vorb *f)
{
if (f->valid_bits <= 24) {
if (f->valid_bits == 0) f->acc = 0;
do {
int z;
if (f->last_seg && !f->bytes_in_seg) return;
z = get8_packet_raw(f);
if (z == EOP) return;
f->acc += (unsigned) z << f->valid_bits;
f->valid_bits += 8;
} while (f->valid_bits <= 24);
}
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 75,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vcard_response_new_data(unsigned char *buf, int len)
{
VCardResponse *new_response;
new_response = g_new(VCardResponse, 1);
new_response->b_data = g_malloc(len + 2);
memcpy(new_response->b_data, buf, len);
new_response->b_total_len = len+2;
new_response->b_len = len;
new_response->b_type = VCARD_MALLOC;
return new_response;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 8,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ip6_finish_output2(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;
struct neighbour *neigh;
struct in6_addr *nexthop;
int ret;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
skb->dev = dev;
if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr)) {
struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb));
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) && sk_mc_loop(sk) &&
((mroute6_socket(net, skb) &&
!(IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)) ||
ipv6_chk_mcast_addr(dev, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr))) {
struct sk_buff *newskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
/* Do not check for IFF_ALLMULTI; multicast routing
is not supported in any case.
*/
if (newskb)
NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
net, sk, newskb, NULL, newskb->dev,
dev_loopback_xmit);
if (ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit == 0) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev,
IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
}
IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST, skb->len);
if (IPV6_ADDR_MC_SCOPE(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr) <=
IPV6_ADDR_SCOPE_NODELOCAL &&
!(dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
}
if (lwtunnel_xmit_redirect(dst->lwtstate)) {
int res = lwtunnel_xmit(skb);
if (res < 0 || res == LWTUNNEL_XMIT_DONE)
return res;
}
rcu_read_lock_bh();
nexthop = rt6_nexthop((struct rt6_info *)dst, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr);
neigh = __ipv6_neigh_lookup_noref(dst->dev, nexthop);
if (unlikely(!neigh))
neigh = __neigh_create(&nd_tbl, nexthop, dst->dev, false);
if (!IS_ERR(neigh)) {
sock_confirm_neigh(skb, neigh);
ret = neigh_output(neigh, skb);
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return ret;
}
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: fix out of bound writes in __ip6_append_data()
Andrey Konovalov and idaifish@gmail.com reported crashes caused by
one skb shared_info being overwritten from __ip6_append_data()
Andrey program lead to following state :
copy -4200 datalen 2000 fraglen 2040
maxfraglen 2040 alloclen 2048 transhdrlen 0 offset 0 fraggap 6200
The skb_copy_and_csum_bits(skb_prev, maxfraglen, data + transhdrlen,
fraggap, 0); is overwriting skb->head and skb_shared_info
Since we apparently detect this rare condition too late, move the
code earlier to even avoid allocating skb and risking crashes.
Once again, many thanks to Andrey and syzkaller team.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reported-by: <idaifish@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 64,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_write_init_3(png_structpp ptr_ptr, png_const_charp user_png_ver,
png_size_t png_struct_size)
{
png_structp png_ptr = *ptr_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
jmp_buf tmp_jmp; /* to save current jump buffer */
#endif
int i = 0;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
do
{
if (user_png_ver[i] != png_libpng_ver[i])
{
#ifdef PNG_LEGACY_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_LIBRARY_MISMATCH;
#else
png_ptr->warning_fn = NULL;
png_warning(png_ptr,
"Application uses deprecated png_write_init() and should be recompiled.");
#endif
}
i++;
} while (png_libpng_ver[i] != 0 && user_png_ver[i] != 0);
png_debug(1, "in png_write_init_3");
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
/* Save jump buffer and error functions */
png_memcpy(tmp_jmp, png_ptr->jmpbuf, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
if (png_sizeof(png_struct) > png_struct_size)
{
png_destroy_struct(png_ptr);
png_ptr = (png_structp)png_create_struct(PNG_STRUCT_PNG);
*ptr_ptr = png_ptr;
}
/* Reset all variables to 0 */
png_memset(png_ptr, 0, png_sizeof(png_struct));
/* Added at libpng-1.2.6 */
#ifdef PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->user_width_max = PNG_USER_WIDTH_MAX;
png_ptr->user_height_max = PNG_USER_HEIGHT_MAX;
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
/* Restore jump buffer */
png_memcpy(png_ptr->jmpbuf, tmp_jmp, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
png_set_write_fn(png_ptr, png_voidp_NULL, png_rw_ptr_NULL,
png_flush_ptr_NULL);
/* Initialize zbuf - compression buffer */
png_ptr->zbuf_size = PNG_ZBUF_SIZE;
png_ptr->zbuf = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)png_ptr->zbuf_size);
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
png_set_filter_heuristics(png_ptr, PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_DEFAULT,
1, png_doublep_NULL, png_doublep_NULL);
#endif
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 172,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int re_yyget_lineno (yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
if (! YY_CURRENT_BUFFER)
return 0;
return yylineno;
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 168,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u64 __update_clear_spte_slow(u64 *sptep, u64 spte)
{
union split_spte *ssptep, sspte, orig;
ssptep = (union split_spte *)sptep;
sspte = (union split_spte)spte;
/* xchg acts as a barrier before the setting of the high bits */
orig.spte_low = xchg(&ssptep->spte_low, sspte.spte_low);
orig.spte_high = ssptep->spte_high;
ssptep->spte_high = sspte.spte_high;
count_spte_clear(sptep, spte);
return orig.spte;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,398
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jp2_box_destroy(jp2_box_t *box)
{
if (box->ops->destroy) {
(*box->ops->destroy)(box);
}
jas_free(box);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 67,945
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: b64reverse(char letter)
{
if ((letter >= 'A') && (letter <= 'Z')) {
return letter - 'A';
}
if ((letter >= 'a') && (letter <= 'z')) {
return letter - 'a' + 26;
}
if ((letter >= '0') && (letter <= '9')) {
return letter - '0' + 52;
}
if (letter == '+') {
return 62;
}
if (letter == '/') {
return 63;
}
if (letter == '=') {
return 255; /* normal end */
}
return 254; /* error */
}
Commit Message: Check length of memcmp
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 81,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int randomize(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned char *r, unsigned int r_len)
{
int ok = 0;
int fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
if (0 <= fd && read(fd, r, r_len) == (ssize_t)r_len) {
ok = 1;
} else {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, "Error reading from /dev/urandom: %s",
strerror(errno));
}
if (0 <= fd) {
close(fd);
}
return ok;
}
Commit Message: Use EVP_PKEY_size() to allocate correct size of signature buffer. (#18)
Do not use fixed buffer size for signature, EVP_SignFinal() requires
buffer for signature at least EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes in size.
Fixes crash when using 4K RSA signatures (https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/16, https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/15)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 87,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool test_mem_cgroup_node_reclaimable(struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
int nid, bool noswap)
{
if (mem_cgroup_node_nr_lru_pages(memcg, nid, LRU_ALL_FILE))
return true;
if (noswap || !total_swap_pages)
return false;
if (mem_cgroup_node_nr_lru_pages(memcg, nid, LRU_ALL_ANON))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,181
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cbc3_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct des3_ede_sparc64_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
const u64 *K;
int err;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
K = &ctx->decrypt_expkey[0];
des3_ede_sparc64_load_keys(K);
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
unsigned int block_len = nbytes & DES_BLOCK_MASK;
if (likely(block_len)) {
const u64 *src64 = (const u64 *)walk.src.virt.addr;
des3_ede_sparc64_cbc_decrypt(K, src64,
(u64 *) walk.dst.virt.addr,
block_len,
(u64 *) walk.iv);
}
nbytes &= DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
fprs_write(0);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void arcmsr_hbaB_postqueue_isr(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
uint32_t index;
uint32_t flag_ccb;
struct MessageUnit_B *reg = acb->pmuB;
struct ARCMSR_CDB *pARCMSR_CDB;
struct CommandControlBlock *pCCB;
bool error;
index = reg->doneq_index;
while ((flag_ccb = reg->done_qbuffer[index]) != 0) {
reg->done_qbuffer[index] = 0;
pARCMSR_CDB = (struct ARCMSR_CDB *)(acb->vir2phy_offset+(flag_ccb << 5));/*frame must be 32 bytes aligned*/
pCCB = container_of(pARCMSR_CDB, struct CommandControlBlock, arcmsr_cdb);
error = (flag_ccb & ARCMSR_CCBREPLY_FLAG_ERROR_MODE0) ? true : false;
arcmsr_drain_donequeue(acb, pCCB, error);
index++;
index %= ARCMSR_MAX_HBB_POSTQUEUE;
reg->doneq_index = index;
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,777
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NEVER_INLINE FreeList::ZapFreedMemory(Address address, size_t size) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
if (address[i] != kReuseAllowedZapValue)
address[i] = kReuseForbiddenZapValue;
}
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 153,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
{
int ret = 0;
const SSL_METHOD *meth;
if (session != NULL) {
meth = s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
if (meth == NULL)
meth = s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
if (meth == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
return (0);
}
if (meth != s->method) {
if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, meth))
return (0);
}
/* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); */
CRYPTO_add(&session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = session;
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
/* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); */
ret = 1;
} else {
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = NULL;
meth = s->ctx->method;
if (meth != s->method) {
if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, meth))
return (0);
}
ret = 1;
}
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 44,214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static TEE_Result tee_svc_cryp_obj_populate_type(
struct tee_obj *o,
const struct tee_cryp_obj_type_props *type_props,
const TEE_Attribute *attrs,
uint32_t attr_count)
{
TEE_Result res;
uint32_t have_attrs = 0;
size_t obj_size = 0;
size_t n;
int idx;
const struct attr_ops *ops;
void *attr;
for (n = 0; n < attr_count; n++) {
idx = tee_svc_cryp_obj_find_type_attr_idx(
attrs[n].attributeID,
type_props);
/* attribute not defined in current object type */
if (idx < 0)
return TEE_ERROR_ITEM_NOT_FOUND;
have_attrs |= BIT32(idx);
ops = attr_ops + type_props->type_attrs[idx].ops_index;
attr = (uint8_t *)o->attr +
type_props->type_attrs[idx].raw_offs;
if (attrs[n].attributeID & TEE_ATTR_BIT_VALUE)
res = ops->from_user(attr, &attrs[n].content.value,
sizeof(attrs[n].content.value));
else
res = ops->from_user(attr, attrs[n].content.ref.buffer,
attrs[n].content.ref.length);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
/*
* First attr_idx signifies the attribute that gives the size
* of the object
*/
if (type_props->type_attrs[idx].flags &
TEE_TYPE_ATTR_SIZE_INDICATOR) {
/*
* For ECDSA/ECDH we need to translate curve into
* object size
*/
if (attrs[n].attributeID == TEE_ATTR_ECC_CURVE) {
res = get_ec_key_size(attrs[n].content.value.a,
&obj_size);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
} else {
obj_size += (attrs[n].content.ref.length * 8);
}
}
}
/*
* We have to do it like this because the parity bits aren't counted
* when telling the size of the key in bits.
*/
if (o->info.objectType == TEE_TYPE_DES ||
o->info.objectType == TEE_TYPE_DES3)
obj_size -= obj_size / 8; /* Exclude parity in size of key */
o->have_attrs = have_attrs;
o->info.keySize = obj_size;
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sysctl_schedstats(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ctl_table t;
int err;
int state = static_branch_likely(&sched_schedstats);
if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
t = *table;
t.data = &state;
err = proc_dointvec_minmax(&t, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (write)
set_schedstats(state);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void locationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeGetterCallbackForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::locationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeGetterForMainWorld(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,380
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebView* RenderViewImpl::createView(
WebFrame* creator,
const WebURLRequest& request,
const WebWindowFeatures& features,
const WebString& frame_name,
WebNavigationPolicy policy) {
if (shared_popup_counter_->data > kMaximumNumberOfUnacknowledgedPopups)
return NULL;
ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params params;
params.opener_id = routing_id_;
params.user_gesture = creator->isProcessingUserGesture();
params.window_container_type = WindowFeaturesToContainerType(features);
params.session_storage_namespace_id = session_storage_namespace_id_;
if (frame_name != "_blank")
params.frame_name = frame_name;
params.opener_frame_id = creator->identifier();
params.opener_url = creator->document().url();
GURL security_url(creator->document().securityOrigin().toString().utf8());
if (!security_url.is_valid())
security_url = GURL();
params.opener_security_origin = security_url;
params.opener_suppressed = creator->willSuppressOpenerInNewFrame();
params.disposition = NavigationPolicyToDisposition(policy);
if (!request.isNull())
params.target_url = request.url();
int32 routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
int32 surface_id = 0;
int64 cloned_session_storage_namespace_id;
RenderThread::Get()->Send(
new ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow(params,
&routing_id,
&surface_id,
&cloned_session_storage_namespace_id));
if (routing_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
return NULL;
creator->consumeUserGesture();
RenderViewImpl* view = RenderViewImpl::Create(
routing_id_,
renderer_preferences_,
webkit_preferences_,
shared_popup_counter_,
routing_id,
surface_id,
cloned_session_storage_namespace_id,
string16(), // WebCore will take care of setting the correct name.
true,
false,
1,
screen_info_,
accessibility_mode_);
view->opened_by_user_gesture_ = params.user_gesture;
view->opener_suppressed_ = params.opener_suppressed;
view->alternate_error_page_url_ = alternate_error_page_url_;
return view->webview();
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: file_free (File *file)
{
if (file)
{
XFREE (file->name);
XFREE (file->data);
XFREE (file->mime_type);
XFREE (file->content_id);
XFREE (file->path);
memset (file, '\0', sizeof (File));
}
}
Commit Message: Check types to avoid invalid reads/writes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 68,234
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void asf_reset_header(AVFormatContext *s)
{
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
ASFStream *asf_st;
int i;
asf->packet_size_left = 0;
asf->packet_flags = 0;
asf->packet_property = 0;
asf->packet_timestamp = 0;
asf->packet_segsizetype = 0;
asf->packet_segments = 0;
asf->packet_seq = 0;
asf->packet_replic_size = 0;
asf->packet_key_frame = 0;
asf->packet_padsize = 0;
asf->packet_frag_offset = 0;
asf->packet_frag_size = 0;
asf->packet_frag_timestamp = 0;
asf->packet_multi_size = 0;
asf->packet_time_delta = 0;
asf->packet_time_start = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) {
asf_st = &asf->streams[i];
av_packet_unref(&asf_st->pkt);
asf_st->packet_obj_size = 0;
asf_st->frag_offset = 0;
asf_st->seq = 0;
}
asf->asf_st = NULL;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 61,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: V8ProfilerAgentImpl* profilerAgent()
{
if (V8InspectorSessionImpl* session = currentSession()) {
if (session && session->profilerAgent()->enabled())
return session->profilerAgent();
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: generic_file_aio_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, loff_t pos)
{
struct file *filp = iocb->ki_filp;
ssize_t retval;
unsigned long seg;
size_t count;
loff_t *ppos = &iocb->ki_pos;
count = 0;
retval = generic_segment_checks(iov, &nr_segs, &count, VERIFY_WRITE);
if (retval)
return retval;
/* coalesce the iovecs and go direct-to-BIO for O_DIRECT */
if (filp->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
loff_t size;
struct address_space *mapping;
struct inode *inode;
mapping = filp->f_mapping;
inode = mapping->host;
retval = 0;
if (!count)
goto out; /* skip atime */
size = i_size_read(inode);
if (pos < size) {
retval = generic_file_direct_IO(READ, iocb,
iov, pos, nr_segs);
if (retval > 0)
*ppos = pos + retval;
}
if (likely(retval != 0)) {
file_accessed(filp);
goto out;
}
}
retval = 0;
if (count) {
for (seg = 0; seg < nr_segs; seg++) {
read_descriptor_t desc;
desc.written = 0;
desc.arg.buf = iov[seg].iov_base;
desc.count = iov[seg].iov_len;
if (desc.count == 0)
continue;
desc.error = 0;
do_generic_file_read(filp,ppos,&desc,file_read_actor);
retval += desc.written;
if (desc.error) {
retval = retval ?: desc.error;
break;
}
if (desc.count > 0)
break;
}
}
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 58,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: free_regex_ext(RegexExt* ext)
{
if (IS_NOT_NULL(ext)) {
if (IS_NOT_NULL(ext->pattern))
xfree((void* )ext->pattern);
#ifdef USE_CALLOUT
if (IS_NOT_NULL(ext->tag_table))
onig_callout_tag_table_free(ext->tag_table);
if (IS_NOT_NULL(ext->callout_list))
onig_free_reg_callout_list(ext->callout_num, ext->callout_list);
#endif
xfree(ext);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zend_function *spl_filesystem_object_get_method_check(zval **object_ptr, char *method, int method_len, const struct _zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *fsobj = zend_object_store_get_object(*object_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
if (fsobj->u.dir.entry.d_name[0] == '\0' && fsobj->orig_path == NULL) {
method = "_bad_state_ex";
method_len = sizeof("_bad_state_ex") - 1;
key = NULL;
}
return zend_get_std_object_handlers()->get_method(object_ptr, method, method_len, key TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 167,085
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int write_to_fifo(AVFifoBuffer *fifo, AVFrame *buf)
{
int ret;
if (!av_fifo_space(fifo) &&
(ret = av_fifo_realloc2(fifo, 2*av_fifo_size(fifo)))) {
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
av_fifo_generic_write(fifo, &buf, sizeof(buf), NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avfilter/vf_fps: make sure the fifo is not empty before using it
Fixes Ticket2905
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameHostManager::IsCurrentlySameSite(RenderFrameHostImpl* candidate,
const GURL& dest_url) {
BrowserContext* browser_context =
delegate_->GetControllerForRenderManager().GetBrowserContext();
bool src_has_effective_url = SiteInstanceImpl::HasEffectiveURL(
browser_context, candidate->GetSiteInstance()->original_url());
bool dest_has_effective_url =
SiteInstanceImpl::HasEffectiveURL(browser_context, dest_url);
bool should_compare_effective_urls = true;
if (!frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame() ||
(src_has_effective_url && !dest_has_effective_url &&
candidate->GetSiteInstance()->GetRelatedActiveContentsCount() > 1u))
should_compare_effective_urls = false;
bool should_check_for_wrong_process =
should_compare_effective_urls ||
(!src_has_effective_url && !dest_has_effective_url);
if (should_check_for_wrong_process &&
candidate->GetSiteInstance()->HasWrongProcessForURL(dest_url))
return false;
if (candidate->last_successful_url().is_empty()) {
return SiteInstanceImpl::IsSameWebSite(
browser_context, candidate->GetSiteInstance()->original_url(), dest_url,
should_compare_effective_urls);
}
if (SiteInstanceImpl::IsSameWebSite(
browser_context, candidate->last_successful_url(), dest_url,
should_compare_effective_urls)) {
return true;
}
if (!candidate->GetLastCommittedOrigin().unique() &&
SiteInstanceImpl::IsSameWebSite(
browser_context,
GURL(candidate->GetLastCommittedOrigin().Serialize()), dest_url,
should_compare_effective_urls)) {
return true;
}
if (candidate->last_successful_url().IsAboutBlank() &&
candidate->GetLastCommittedOrigin().unique() &&
SiteInstanceImpl::IsSameWebSite(
browser_context, candidate->GetSiteInstance()->original_url(),
dest_url, should_compare_effective_urls)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 154,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_write_pCAL(png_structp png_ptr, png_charp purpose, png_int_32 X0,
png_int_32 X1, int type, int nparams, png_charp units, png_charpp params)
{
#ifdef PNG_USE_LOCAL_ARRAYS
PNG_pCAL;
#endif
png_size_t purpose_len, units_len, total_len;
png_uint_32p params_len;
png_byte buf[10];
png_charp new_purpose;
int i;
png_debug1(1, "in png_write_pCAL (%d parameters)", nparams);
if (type >= PNG_EQUATION_LAST)
png_warning(png_ptr, "Unrecognized equation type for pCAL chunk");
purpose_len = png_check_keyword(png_ptr, purpose, &new_purpose) + 1;
png_debug1(3, "pCAL purpose length = %d", (int)purpose_len);
units_len = png_strlen(units) + (nparams == 0 ? 0 : 1);
png_debug1(3, "pCAL units length = %d", (int)units_len);
total_len = purpose_len + units_len + 10;
params_len = (png_uint_32p)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(nparams * png_sizeof(png_uint_32)));
/* Find the length of each parameter, making sure we don't count the
null terminator for the last parameter. */
for (i = 0; i < nparams; i++)
{
params_len[i] = png_strlen(params[i]) + (i == nparams - 1 ? 0 : 1);
png_debug2(3, "pCAL parameter %d length = %lu", i,
(unsigned long) params_len[i]);
total_len += (png_size_t)params_len[i];
}
png_debug1(3, "pCAL total length = %d", (int)total_len);
png_write_chunk_start(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_pCAL, (png_uint_32)total_len);
png_write_chunk_data(png_ptr, (png_bytep)new_purpose,
(png_size_t)purpose_len);
png_save_int_32(buf, X0);
png_save_int_32(buf + 4, X1);
buf[8] = (png_byte)type;
buf[9] = (png_byte)nparams;
png_write_chunk_data(png_ptr, buf, (png_size_t)10);
png_write_chunk_data(png_ptr, (png_bytep)units, (png_size_t)units_len);
png_free(png_ptr, new_purpose);
for (i = 0; i < nparams; i++)
{
png_write_chunk_data(png_ptr, (png_bytep)params[i],
(png_size_t)params_len[i]);
}
png_free(png_ptr, params_len);
png_write_chunk_end(png_ptr);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 131,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int qemu_fdt_setprop_phandle(void *fdt, const char *node_path,
const char *property,
const char *target_node_path)
{
uint32_t phandle = qemu_fdt_get_phandle(fdt, target_node_path);
return qemu_fdt_setprop_cell(fdt, node_path, property, phandle);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SessionCrashedInfoBarDelegate::Accept() {
uint32 behavior = 0;
Browser* browser = BrowserList::GetLastActiveWithProfile(profile_);
if (browser && browser->tab_count() == 1
&& browser->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetURL() ==
GURL(chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL)) {
behavior = SessionRestore::CLOBBER_CURRENT_TAB;
}
SessionRestore::RestoreSession(
profile_, browser, behavior, std::vector<GURL>());
return true;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,350
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fbFetchPixel_g1 (const FbBits *bits, int offset, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
CARD32 pixel = ((CARD32 *)bits)[offset >> 5];
CARD32 a;
#if BITMAP_BIT_ORDER == MSBFirst
a = pixel >> (0x1f - (offset & 0x1f));
#else
a = pixel >> (offset & 0x1f);
#endif
a = a & 1;
return indexed->rgba[a];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 11,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool omx_venc::dev_get_buf_req(OMX_U32 *min_buff_count,
OMX_U32 *actual_buff_count,
OMX_U32 *buff_size,
OMX_U32 port)
{
return handle->venc_get_buf_req(min_buff_count,
actual_buff_count,
buff_size,
port);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AlarmManager* ExtensionSystemImpl::alarm_manager() {
return alarm_manager_.get();
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *get_revision_mark(const struct rev_info *revs, const struct commit *commit)
{
if (commit->object.flags & BOUNDARY)
return "-";
else if (commit->object.flags & UNINTERESTING)
return "^";
else if (commit->object.flags & PATCHSAME)
return "=";
else if (!revs || revs->left_right) {
if (commit->object.flags & SYMMETRIC_LEFT)
return "<";
else
return ">";
} else if (revs->graph)
return "*";
else if (revs->cherry_mark)
return "+";
return "";
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
unsigned int len)
{
int i;
SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
/* XXXX */
if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
|| ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
|| (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
return (-1);
}
for (;;) {
clear_sys_error();
if (s->wbio != NULL) {
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
(char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
(unsigned int)wb->left);
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
i = -1;
}
if (i == wb->left) {
wb->left = 0;
wb->offset += i;
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
} else if (i <= 0) {
if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
/*
* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
* using a datagram service
*/
wb->left = 0;
}
return (i);
}
wb->offset += i;
wb->left -= i;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 6,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofproto_reconnect_controllers(struct ofproto *ofproto)
{
connmgr_reconnect(ofproto->connmgr);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,371
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LockContentsView::UpdateAuthForPublicAccount(
LoginPublicAccountUserView* opt_to_update,
LoginPublicAccountUserView* opt_to_hide,
bool animate) {
if (opt_to_update)
opt_to_update->SetAuthEnabled(true /*enabled*/, animate);
if (opt_to_hide)
opt_to_hide->SetAuthEnabled(false /*enabled*/, animate);
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void netdev_init_one_queue(struct net_device *dev,
struct netdev_queue *queue,
void *_unused)
{
queue->dev = dev;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnRegistryKeyChanged() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
if (--registry_watcher_count_ == 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES(
"DefaultBrowser.SettingsInteraction.RegistryWatcherDuration",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - start_time_);
ConcludeInteraction(ConcludeReason::REGISTRY_WATCHER);
}
}
Commit Message: Validate external protocols before launching on Windows
Bug: 889459
Change-Id: Id33ca6444bff1e6dd71b6000823cf6fec09746ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1256208
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597611}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hfs_checked_read_random(TSK_FS_INFO * fs, char *buf, size_t len,
TSK_OFF_T offs)
{
ssize_t r;
r = tsk_fs_read(fs, offs, buf, len);
if (r != (ssize_t) len) {
if (r >= 0) {
tsk_error_reset();
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_READ);
}
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ReflectLongAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V0CustomElementProcessingStack::CallbackDeliveryScope delivery_scope;
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "reflectLongAttribute");
int32_t cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->SetIntegralAttribute(html_names::kReflectlongattributeAttr, cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *am_extract_query_parameter(apr_pool_t *pool,
const char *query_string,
const char *name)
{
const char *ip;
const char *value_end;
apr_size_t namelen;
if (query_string == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
ip = query_string;
namelen = strlen(name);
/* Find parameter. Searches for /[^&]<name>[&=$]/.
* Moves ip to the first character after the name (either '&', '='
* or '\0').
*/
for (;;) {
/* First we find the name of the parameter. */
ip = strstr(ip, name);
if (ip == NULL) {
/* Parameter not found. */
return NULL;
}
/* Then we check what is before the parameter name. */
if (ip != query_string && ip[-1] != '&') {
/* Name not preceded by [^&]. */
ip++;
continue;
}
/* And last we check what follows the parameter name. */
if (ip[namelen] != '=' && ip[namelen] != '&'
&& ip[namelen] != '\0') {
/* Name not followed by [&=$]. */
ip++;
continue;
}
/* We have found the pattern. */
ip += namelen;
break;
}
/* Now ip points to the first character after the name. If this
* character is '&' or '\0', then this field doesn't have a value.
* If this character is '=', then this field has a value.
*/
if (ip[0] == '=') {
ip += 1;
}
/* The value is from ip to '&' or to the end of the string, whichever
* comes first. */
value_end = strchr(ip, '&');
if (value_end != NULL) {
/* '&' comes first. */
return apr_pstrndup(pool, ip, value_end - ip);
} else {
/* Value continues until the end of the string. */
return apr_pstrdup(pool, ip);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601
| 0
| 91,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pharobj_set_compression(HashTable *manifest, php_uint32 compress) /* {{{ */
{
zend_hash_apply_with_argument(manifest, phar_set_compression, &compress);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,194
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThread::DoNotSuspendWebKitSharedTimer() {
suspend_webkit_shared_timer_ = false;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FetchManager::Loader::DidReceiveRedirectTo(const KURL& url) {
url_list_.push_back(url);
}
Commit Message: [Fetch API] Fix redirect leak on "no-cors" requests
The spec issue is now fixed, and this CL follows the spec change[1].
1: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/commit/14858d3e9402285a7ff3b5e47a22896ff3adc95d
Bug: 791324
Change-Id: Ic3e3955f43578b38fc44a5a6b2a1b43d56a2becb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023613
Reviewed-by: Tsuyoshi Horo <horo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552964}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 154,225
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int insert_cert(
sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,
const char *path,
unsigned char id,
int writable,
const char *label
){
sc_card_t *card=p15card->card;
sc_context_t *ctx=p15card->card->ctx;
struct sc_pkcs15_cert_info cert_info;
struct sc_pkcs15_object cert_obj;
unsigned char cert[20];
int r;
memset(&cert_info, 0, sizeof(cert_info));
cert_info.id.len = 1;
cert_info.id.value[0] = id;
cert_info.authority = 0;
sc_format_path(path, &cert_info.path);
memset(&cert_obj, 0, sizeof(cert_obj));
strlcpy(cert_obj.label, label, sizeof(cert_obj.label));
cert_obj.flags = writable ? SC_PKCS15_CO_FLAG_MODIFIABLE : 0;
if(sc_select_file(card, &cert_info.path, NULL)!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Select(%s) failed\n", path);
return 1;
}
if(sc_read_binary(card, 0, cert, sizeof(cert), 0)<0){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"ReadBinary(%s) failed\n", path);
return 2;
}
if(cert[0]!=0x30 || cert[1]!=0x82){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Invalid Cert: %02X:%02X:...\n", cert[0], cert[1]);
return 3;
}
/* some certificates are prefixed by an OID */
if(cert[4]==0x06 && cert[5]<10 && cert[6+cert[5]]==0x30 && cert[7+cert[5]]==0x82){
cert_info.path.index=6+cert[5];
cert_info.path.count=(cert[8+cert[5]]<<8) + cert[9+cert[5]] + 4;
} else {
cert_info.path.index=0;
cert_info.path.count=(cert[2]<<8) + cert[3] + 4;
}
r=sc_pkcs15emu_add_x509_cert(p15card, &cert_obj, &cert_info);
if(r!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "sc_pkcs15emu_add_x509_cert(%s) failed\n", path);
return 4;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "%s: OK, Index=%d, Count=%d\n", path, cert_info.path.index, cert_info.path.count);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,727
|
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