instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void xhci_oper_write(void *ptr, hwaddr reg,
uint64_t val, unsigned size)
{
XHCIState *xhci = ptr;
DeviceState *d = DEVICE(ptr);
trace_usb_xhci_oper_write(reg, val);
switch (reg) {
case 0x00: /* USBCMD */
if ((val & USBCMD_RS) && !(xhci->usbcmd & USBCMD_RS)) {
xhci_run(xhci);
} else if (!(val & USBCMD_RS) && (xhci->usbcmd & USBCMD_RS)) {
xhci_stop(xhci);
}
if (val & USBCMD_CSS) {
/* save state */
xhci->usbsts &= ~USBSTS_SRE;
}
if (val & USBCMD_CRS) {
/* restore state */
xhci->usbsts |= USBSTS_SRE;
}
xhci->usbcmd = val & 0xc0f;
xhci_mfwrap_update(xhci);
if (val & USBCMD_HCRST) {
xhci_reset(d);
}
xhci_intx_update(xhci);
break;
case 0x04: /* USBSTS */
/* these bits are write-1-to-clear */
xhci->usbsts &= ~(val & (USBSTS_HSE|USBSTS_EINT|USBSTS_PCD|USBSTS_SRE));
xhci_intx_update(xhci);
break;
case 0x14: /* DNCTRL */
xhci->dnctrl = val & 0xffff;
break;
case 0x18: /* CRCR low */
xhci->crcr_low = (val & 0xffffffcf) | (xhci->crcr_low & CRCR_CRR);
break;
case 0x1c: /* CRCR high */
xhci->crcr_high = val;
if (xhci->crcr_low & (CRCR_CA|CRCR_CS) && (xhci->crcr_low & CRCR_CRR)) {
XHCIEvent event = {ER_COMMAND_COMPLETE, CC_COMMAND_RING_STOPPED};
xhci->crcr_low &= ~CRCR_CRR;
xhci_event(xhci, &event, 0);
DPRINTF("xhci: command ring stopped (CRCR=%08x)\n", xhci->crcr_low);
} else {
dma_addr_t base = xhci_addr64(xhci->crcr_low & ~0x3f, val);
xhci_ring_init(xhci, &xhci->cmd_ring, base);
}
xhci->crcr_low &= ~(CRCR_CA | CRCR_CS);
break;
case 0x30: /* DCBAAP low */
xhci->dcbaap_low = val & 0xffffffc0;
break;
case 0x34: /* DCBAAP high */
xhci->dcbaap_high = val;
break;
case 0x38: /* CONFIG */
xhci->config = val & 0xff;
break;
default:
trace_usb_xhci_unimplemented("oper write", reg);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FrameLoader::ShouldTreatURLAsSrcdocDocument(const KURL& url) const {
if (!url.IsAboutSrcdocURL())
return false;
HTMLFrameOwnerElement* owner_element = frame_->DeprecatedLocalOwner();
if (!IsHTMLIFrameElement(owner_element))
return false;
return owner_element->FastHasAttribute(srcdocAttr);
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 125,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLSelectElement::menuListDefaultEventHandler(Event* event)
{
RenderTheme& renderTheme = RenderTheme::theme();
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::keydown) {
if (!renderer() || !event->isKeyboardEvent())
return;
if (platformHandleKeydownEvent(toKeyboardEvent(event)))
return;
if (isSpatialNavigationEnabled(document().frame())) {
if (!m_activeSelectionState)
return;
}
const String& keyIdentifier = toKeyboardEvent(event)->keyIdentifier();
bool handled = true;
const Vector<HTMLElement*>& listItems = this->listItems();
int listIndex = optionToListIndex(selectedIndex());
if (keyIdentifier == "Down" || keyIdentifier == "Right")
listIndex = nextValidIndex(listIndex, SkipForwards, 1);
else if (keyIdentifier == "Up" || keyIdentifier == "Left")
listIndex = nextValidIndex(listIndex, SkipBackwards, 1);
else if (keyIdentifier == "PageDown")
listIndex = nextValidIndex(listIndex, SkipForwards, 3);
else if (keyIdentifier == "PageUp")
listIndex = nextValidIndex(listIndex, SkipBackwards, 3);
else if (keyIdentifier == "Home")
listIndex = nextValidIndex(-1, SkipForwards, 1);
else if (keyIdentifier == "End")
listIndex = nextValidIndex(listItems.size(), SkipBackwards, 1);
else
handled = false;
if (handled && static_cast<size_t>(listIndex) < listItems.size())
selectOption(listToOptionIndex(listIndex), DeselectOtherOptions | DispatchChangeEvent | UserDriven);
if (handled)
event->setDefaultHandled();
}
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::keypress) {
if (!renderer() || !event->isKeyboardEvent())
return;
int keyCode = toKeyboardEvent(event)->keyCode();
bool handled = false;
if (keyCode == ' ' && isSpatialNavigationEnabled(document().frame())) {
m_activeSelectionState = !m_activeSelectionState;
event->setDefaultHandled();
return;
}
if (renderTheme.popsMenuBySpaceOrReturn()) {
if (keyCode == ' ' || keyCode == '\r') {
focus();
if (!renderer() || !renderer()->isMenuList())
return;
saveLastSelection();
if (RenderMenuList* menuList = toRenderMenuList(renderer()))
menuList->showPopup();
handled = true;
}
} else if (renderTheme.popsMenuByArrowKeys()) {
if (keyCode == ' ') {
focus();
if (!renderer() || !renderer()->isMenuList())
return;
saveLastSelection();
if (RenderMenuList* menuList = toRenderMenuList(renderer()))
menuList->showPopup();
handled = true;
} else if (keyCode == '\r') {
if (form())
form()->submitImplicitly(event, false);
dispatchChangeEventForMenuList();
handled = true;
}
}
if (handled)
event->setDefaultHandled();
}
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mousedown && event->isMouseEvent() && toMouseEvent(event)->button() == LeftButton) {
focus();
if (renderer() && renderer()->isMenuList()) {
if (RenderMenuList* menuList = toRenderMenuList(renderer())) {
if (menuList->popupIsVisible())
menuList->hidePopup();
else {
saveLastSelection();
menuList->showPopup();
}
}
}
event->setDefaultHandled();
}
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::blur) {
if (RenderMenuList* menuList = toRenderMenuList(renderer())) {
if (menuList->popupIsVisible())
menuList->hidePopup();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 114,054
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t f_hid_opts_report_desc_show(struct config_item *item, char *page)
{
struct f_hid_opts *opts = to_f_hid_opts(item);
int result;
mutex_lock(&opts->lock);
result = opts->report_desc_length;
memcpy(page, opts->report_desc, opts->report_desc_length);
mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
return result;
}
Commit Message: USB: gadget: f_hid: fix deadlock in f_hidg_write()
In f_hidg_write() the write_spinlock is acquired before calling
usb_ep_queue() which causes a deadlock when dummy_hcd is being used.
This is because dummy_queue() callbacks into f_hidg_req_complete() which
tries to acquire the same spinlock. This is (part of) the backtrace when
the deadlock occurs:
0xffffffffc06b1410 in f_hidg_req_complete
0xffffffffc06a590a in usb_gadget_giveback_request
0xffffffffc06cfff2 in dummy_queue
0xffffffffc06a4b96 in usb_ep_queue
0xffffffffc06b1eb6 in f_hidg_write
0xffffffff8127730b in __vfs_write
0xffffffff812774d1 in vfs_write
0xffffffff81277725 in SYSC_write
Fix this by releasing the write_spinlock before calling usb_ep_queue()
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.11+
Fixes: 749494b6bdbb ("usb: gadget: f_hid: fix: Move IN request allocation to set_alt()")
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Gerganov <rgerganov@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 96,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int *dccp_get_timeouts(struct net *net)
{
return dccp_pernet(net)->dccp_timeout;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_dccp: fix skb_header_pointer API usages
Some occurences in the netfilter tree use skb_header_pointer() in
the following way ...
struct dccp_hdr _dh, *dh;
...
skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
... where dh itself is a pointer that is being passed as the copy
buffer. Instead, we need to use &_dh as the forth argument so that
we're copying the data into an actual buffer that sits on the stack.
Currently, we probably could overwrite memory on the stack (e.g.
with a possibly mal-formed DCCP packet), but unintentionally, as
we only want the buffer to be placed into _dh variable.
Fixes: 2bc780499aa3 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: add DCCP protocol support")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void b43_dma_direct_fifo_rx(struct b43_wldev *dev,
unsigned int engine_index, bool enable)
{
enum b43_dmatype type;
u16 mmio_base;
type = dma_mask_to_engine_type(supported_dma_mask(dev));
mmio_base = b43_dmacontroller_base(type, engine_index);
direct_fifo_rx(dev, type, mmio_base, enable);
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void disable_write_same(struct mapped_device *md)
{
struct queue_limits *limits = dm_get_queue_limits(md);
/* device doesn't really support WRITE SAME, disable it */
limits->max_write_same_sectors = 0;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GetLRUOriginOnDBThread(StorageType type,
std::set<GURL>* exceptions,
SpecialStoragePolicy* policy,
GURL* url,
QuotaDatabase* database) {
DCHECK(database);
database->GetLRUOrigin(type, *exceptions, policy, url);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,186
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm;
/* If not set up, return error */
if (!cctx->key_set)
return -1;
if (cctx->tls_aad_len >= 0)
return aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
if (!cctx->iv_set)
return -1;
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) && !cctx->tag_set)
return -1;
if (!out) {
if (!in) {
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
15 - cctx->L, len))
return -1;
cctx->len_set = 1;
return len;
}
/* If have AAD need message length */
if (!cctx->len_set && len)
return -1;
CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, in, len);
return len;
}
/* EVP_*Final() doesn't return any data */
if (!in)
return 0;
/* If not set length yet do it */
if (!cctx->len_set) {
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
15 - cctx->L, len))
return -1;
cctx->len_set = 1;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
cctx->str) :
CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len))
return -1;
cctx->tag_set = 1;
return len;
} else {
int rv = -1;
if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
cctx->str) :
!CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) {
unsigned char tag[16];
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) {
if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
cctx->M))
rv = len;
}
}
if (rv == -1)
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
cctx->iv_set = 0;
cctx->tag_set = 0;
cctx->len_set = 0;
return rv;
}
}
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 69,316
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int fd_nonblock(int fd, bool nonblock) {
int flags;
assert(fd >= 0);
if ((flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0)) < 0)
return -errno;
if (nonblock)
flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
else
flags &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags) < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 11,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gs_main_run_file(gs_main_instance * minst, const char *file_name, int user_errors, int *pexit_code, ref * perror_object)
{
ref initial_file;
int code = gs_main_run_file_open(minst, file_name, &initial_file);
if (code < 0)
return code;
return gs_main_interpret(minst, &initial_file, user_errors,
pexit_code, perror_object);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::FilePath GetBlacklistPath() {
base::FilePath blacklist_dir;
base::PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_USER_DATA, &blacklist_dir);
return blacklist_dir.AppendASCII(kBlacklistFilename);
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void flush_echoes(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
if ((!L_ECHO(tty) && !L_ECHONL(tty)) ||
ldata->echo_commit == ldata->echo_head)
return;
mutex_lock(&ldata->output_lock);
ldata->echo_commit = ldata->echo_head;
__process_echoes(tty);
mutex_unlock(&ldata->output_lock);
}
Commit Message: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 39,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ClipByte(int value) {
if (value > 255)
return 255;
else if (value < 0)
return 0;
return value;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey)
{
return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_KEY,EC_KEY_new,d2i_ECPrivateKey,bp,eckey);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 94,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GpuProcessHost::OnCommandBufferCreated(const int32 route_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnCommandBufferCreated");
if (!create_command_buffer_requests_.empty()) {
CreateCommandBufferCallback callback =
create_command_buffer_requests_.front();
create_command_buffer_requests_.pop();
if (route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
CreateCommandBufferError(callback, route_id);
else
callback.Run(route_id);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
TBR=posciak@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CWebServer::GetFloorplanImage(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, reply & rep)
{
std::string idx = request::findValue(&req, "idx");
if (idx == "") {
return;
}
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
result = m_sql.safe_queryBlob("SELECT Image FROM Floorplans WHERE ID=%s", idx.c_str());
if (result.empty())
return;
reply::set_content(&rep, result[0][0].begin(), result[0][0].end());
std::string oname = "floorplan";
if (result[0][0].size() > 10)
{
if (result[0][0][0] == 'P')
oname += ".png";
else if (result[0][0][0] == -1)
oname += ".jpg";
else if (result[0][0][0] == 'B')
oname += ".bmp";
else if (result[0][0][0] == 'G')
oname += ".gif";
}
reply::add_header_attachment(&rep, oname);
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89
| 1
| 169,714
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CreateUIRequest(const std::string& requested_audio_device_id,
const std::string& requested_video_device_id) {
DCHECK(!ui_request_);
target_process_id_ = requesting_process_id;
target_frame_id_ = requesting_frame_id;
ui_request_.reset(new MediaStreamRequest(
requesting_process_id, requesting_frame_id, page_request_id,
salt_and_origin.origin.GetURL(), user_gesture, request_type_,
requested_audio_device_id, requested_video_device_id, audio_type_,
video_type_, controls.disable_local_echo));
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: record_peer_stats(
sockaddr_u *addr,
int status,
double offset, /* offset */
double delay, /* delay */
double dispersion, /* dispersion */
double jitter /* jitter */
)
{
l_fp now;
u_long day;
if (!stats_control)
return;
get_systime(&now);
filegen_setup(&peerstats, now.l_ui);
day = now.l_ui / 86400 + MJD_1900;
now.l_ui %= 86400;
if (peerstats.fp != NULL) {
fprintf(peerstats.fp,
"%lu %s %s %x %.9f %.9f %.9f %.9f\n", day,
ulfptoa(&now, 3), stoa(addr), status, offset,
delay, dispersion, jitter);
fflush(peerstats.fp);
}
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Register(aura::Window* window) {
window->AddObserver(this);
auto policy = window->event_targeting_policy();
window->SetEventTargetingPolicy(aura::EventTargetingPolicy::kNone);
policy_map_.emplace(window, policy);
for (auto* child : window->children())
Register(child);
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 137,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
unsigned int mss;
unsigned int unfrag_ip6hlen, unfrag_len;
struct frag_hdr *fptr;
u8 *packet_start, *prevhdr;
u8 nexthdr;
u8 frag_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
int offset;
__wsum csum;
int tnl_hlen;
mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
goto out;
if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) {
/* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. */
int type = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type;
if (unlikely(type & ~(SKB_GSO_UDP |
SKB_GSO_DODGY |
SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL |
SKB_GSO_GRE |
SKB_GSO_IPIP |
SKB_GSO_SIT |
SKB_GSO_MPLS) ||
!(type & (SKB_GSO_UDP))))
goto out;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss);
segs = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (skb->encapsulation && skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL)
segs = skb_udp_tunnel_segment(skb, features);
else {
/* Do software UFO. Complete and fill in the UDP checksum as HW cannot
* do checksum of UDP packets sent as multiple IP fragments.
*/
offset = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
csum = skb_checksum(skb, offset, skb->len - offset, 0);
offset += skb->csum_offset;
*(__sum16 *)(skb->data + offset) = csum_fold(csum);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
/* Check if there is enough headroom to insert fragment header. */
tnl_hlen = skb_tnl_header_len(skb);
if (skb_headroom(skb) < (tnl_hlen + frag_hdr_sz)) {
if (gso_pskb_expand_head(skb, tnl_hlen + frag_hdr_sz))
goto out;
}
/* Find the unfragmentable header and shift it left by frag_hdr_sz
* bytes to insert fragment header.
*/
unfrag_ip6hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
unfrag_len = (skb_network_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb)) +
unfrag_ip6hlen + tnl_hlen;
packet_start = (u8 *) skb->head + SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->mac_offset;
memmove(packet_start-frag_hdr_sz, packet_start, unfrag_len);
SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->mac_offset -= frag_hdr_sz;
skb->mac_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
skb->network_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + unfrag_ip6hlen);
fptr->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fptr->reserved = 0;
ipv6_select_ident(fptr, (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb));
/* Fragment the skb. ipv6 header and the remaining fields of the
* fragment header are updated in ipv6_gso_segment()
*/
segs = skb_segment(skb, features);
}
out:
return segs;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: fix headroom calculation in udp6_ufo_fragment
Commit 1e2bd517c108816220f262d7954b697af03b5f9c ("udp6: Fix udp
fragmentation for tunnel traffic.") changed the calculation if
there is enough space to include a fragment header in the skb from a
skb->mac_header dervived one to skb_headroom. Because we already peeled
off the skb to transport_header this is wrong. Change this back to check
if we have enough room before the mac_header.
This fixes a panic Saran Neti reported. He used the tbf scheduler which
skb_gso_segments the skb. The offsets get negative and we panic in memcpy
because the skb was erroneously not expanded at the head.
Reported-by: Saran Neti <Saran.Neti@telus.com>
Cc: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 165,960
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_ISECT( INS_ARG )
{
FT_UShort point,
a0, a1,
b0, b1;
FT_F26Dot6 discriminant;
FT_F26Dot6 dx, dy,
dax, day,
dbx, dby;
FT_F26Dot6 val;
FT_Vector R;
point = (FT_UShort)args[0];
a0 = (FT_UShort)args[1];
a1 = (FT_UShort)args[2];
b0 = (FT_UShort)args[3];
b1 = (FT_UShort)args[4];
if ( BOUNDS( b0, CUR.zp0.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( b1, CUR.zp0.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( a0, CUR.zp1.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( a1, CUR.zp1.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( point, CUR.zp2.n_points ) )
{
if ( CUR.pedantic_hinting )
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
dbx = CUR.zp0.cur[b1].x - CUR.zp0.cur[b0].x;
dby = CUR.zp0.cur[b1].y - CUR.zp0.cur[b0].y;
dax = CUR.zp1.cur[a1].x - CUR.zp1.cur[a0].x;
day = CUR.zp1.cur[a1].y - CUR.zp1.cur[a0].y;
dx = CUR.zp0.cur[b0].x - CUR.zp1.cur[a0].x;
dy = CUR.zp0.cur[b0].y - CUR.zp1.cur[a0].y;
CUR.zp2.tags[point] |= FT_CURVE_TAG_TOUCH_BOTH;
discriminant = TT_MULDIV( dax, -dby, 0x40 ) +
TT_MULDIV( day, dbx, 0x40 );
if ( FT_ABS( discriminant ) >= 0x40 )
{
val = TT_MULDIV( dx, -dby, 0x40 ) + TT_MULDIV( dy, dbx, 0x40 );
R.x = TT_MULDIV( val, dax, discriminant );
R.y = TT_MULDIV( val, day, discriminant );
CUR.zp2.cur[point].x = CUR.zp1.cur[a0].x + R.x;
CUR.zp2.cur[point].y = CUR.zp1.cur[a0].y + R.y;
}
else
{
/* else, take the middle of the middles of A and B */
CUR.zp2.cur[point].x = ( CUR.zp1.cur[a0].x +
CUR.zp1.cur[a1].x +
CUR.zp0.cur[b0].x +
CUR.zp0.cur[b1].x ) / 4;
CUR.zp2.cur[point].y = ( CUR.zp1.cur[a0].y +
CUR.zp1.cur[a1].y +
CUR.zp0.cur[b0].y +
CUR.zp0.cur[b1].y ) / 4;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_write_tsc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
{
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
u64 offset, ns, elapsed;
unsigned long flags;
s64 usdiff;
bool matched;
bool already_matched;
u64 data = msr->data;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock, flags);
offset = kvm_x86_ops->compute_tsc_offset(vcpu, data);
ns = get_kernel_ns();
elapsed = ns - kvm->arch.last_tsc_nsec;
if (vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz) {
int faulted = 0;
/* n.b - signed multiplication and division required */
usdiff = data - kvm->arch.last_tsc_write;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
usdiff = (usdiff * 1000) / vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz;
#else
/* do_div() only does unsigned */
asm("1: idivl %[divisor]\n"
"2: xor %%edx, %%edx\n"
" movl $0, %[faulted]\n"
"3:\n"
".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
"4: movl $1, %[faulted]\n"
" jmp 3b\n"
".previous\n"
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 4b)
: "=A"(usdiff), [faulted] "=r" (faulted)
: "A"(usdiff * 1000), [divisor] "rm"(vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz));
#endif
do_div(elapsed, 1000);
usdiff -= elapsed;
if (usdiff < 0)
usdiff = -usdiff;
/* idivl overflow => difference is larger than USEC_PER_SEC */
if (faulted)
usdiff = USEC_PER_SEC;
} else
usdiff = USEC_PER_SEC; /* disable TSC match window below */
/*
* Special case: TSC write with a small delta (1 second) of virtual
* cycle time against real time is interpreted as an attempt to
* synchronize the CPU.
*
* For a reliable TSC, we can match TSC offsets, and for an unstable
* TSC, we add elapsed time in this computation. We could let the
* compensation code attempt to catch up if we fall behind, but
* it's better to try to match offsets from the beginning.
*/
if (usdiff < USEC_PER_SEC &&
vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz == kvm->arch.last_tsc_khz) {
if (!check_tsc_unstable()) {
offset = kvm->arch.cur_tsc_offset;
pr_debug("kvm: matched tsc offset for %llu\n", data);
} else {
u64 delta = nsec_to_cycles(vcpu, elapsed);
data += delta;
offset = kvm_x86_ops->compute_tsc_offset(vcpu, data);
pr_debug("kvm: adjusted tsc offset by %llu\n", delta);
}
matched = true;
already_matched = (vcpu->arch.this_tsc_generation == kvm->arch.cur_tsc_generation);
} else {
/*
* We split periods of matched TSC writes into generations.
* For each generation, we track the original measured
* nanosecond time, offset, and write, so if TSCs are in
* sync, we can match exact offset, and if not, we can match
* exact software computation in compute_guest_tsc()
*
* These values are tracked in kvm->arch.cur_xxx variables.
*/
kvm->arch.cur_tsc_generation++;
kvm->arch.cur_tsc_nsec = ns;
kvm->arch.cur_tsc_write = data;
kvm->arch.cur_tsc_offset = offset;
matched = false;
pr_debug("kvm: new tsc generation %llu, clock %llu\n",
kvm->arch.cur_tsc_generation, data);
}
/*
* We also track th most recent recorded KHZ, write and time to
* allow the matching interval to be extended at each write.
*/
kvm->arch.last_tsc_nsec = ns;
kvm->arch.last_tsc_write = data;
kvm->arch.last_tsc_khz = vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz;
vcpu->arch.last_guest_tsc = data;
/* Keep track of which generation this VCPU has synchronized to */
vcpu->arch.this_tsc_generation = kvm->arch.cur_tsc_generation;
vcpu->arch.this_tsc_nsec = kvm->arch.cur_tsc_nsec;
vcpu->arch.this_tsc_write = kvm->arch.cur_tsc_write;
if (guest_cpuid_has_tsc_adjust(vcpu) && !msr->host_initiated)
update_ia32_tsc_adjust_msr(vcpu, offset);
kvm_x86_ops->write_tsc_offset(vcpu, offset);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock, flags);
spin_lock(&kvm->arch.pvclock_gtod_sync_lock);
if (!matched) {
kvm->arch.nr_vcpus_matched_tsc = 0;
} else if (!already_matched) {
kvm->arch.nr_vcpus_matched_tsc++;
}
kvm_track_tsc_matching(vcpu);
spin_unlock(&kvm->arch.pvclock_gtod_sync_lock);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 35,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GIFColorMap::buildTable(const unsigned char* data, size_t length)
{
if (!m_isDefined || !m_table.isEmpty())
return;
RELEASE_ASSERT(m_position + m_colors * BYTES_PER_COLORMAP_ENTRY <= length);
const unsigned char* srcColormap = data + m_position;
m_table.resize(m_colors);
for (Table::iterator iter = m_table.begin(); iter != m_table.end(); ++iter) {
*iter = SkPackARGB32NoCheck(255, srcColormap[0], srcColormap[1], srcColormap[2]);
srcColormap += BYTES_PER_COLORMAP_ENTRY;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of broken GIFs with weird frame sizes
Code didn't handle well if a GIF frame has dimension greater than the
"screen" dimension. This will break deferred image decoding.
This change reports the size as final only when the first frame is
encountered.
Added a test to verify this behavior. Frame size reported by the decoder
should be constant.
BUG=437651
R=pkasting@chromium.org, senorblanco@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/813943003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@188423 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ebt_get_udc_positions(struct ebt_entry *e, struct ebt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *n, struct ebt_cl_stack *udc)
{
int i;
/* we're only interested in chain starts */
if (e->bitmask)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] == (struct ebt_entries *)e)
break;
}
/* only care about udc */
if (i != NF_BR_NUMHOOKS)
return 0;
udc[*n].cs.chaininfo = (struct ebt_entries *)e;
/* these initialisations are depended on later in check_chainloops() */
udc[*n].cs.n = 0;
udc[*n].hookmask = 0;
(*n)++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets
We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.
The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.
Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.
Reported-by: <syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 84,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::ShowKeyboardOverlay() {
window_->ShowKeyboardOverlay(window_->GetNativeHandle());
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t OMXCodec::getComponentQuirks(
const sp<MediaCodecInfo> &info) {
uint32_t quirks = 0;
if (info->hasQuirk("requires-allocate-on-input-ports")) {
quirks |= kRequiresAllocateBufferOnInputPorts;
}
if (info->hasQuirk("requires-allocate-on-output-ports")) {
quirks |= kRequiresAllocateBufferOnOutputPorts;
}
if (info->hasQuirk("output-buffers-are-unreadable")) {
quirks |= kOutputBuffersAreUnreadable;
}
return quirks;
}
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AppCacheStorageImpl* storage() {
return static_cast<AppCacheStorageImpl*>(service()->storage());
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void perf_tp_register(void)
{
perf_pmu_register(&perf_tracepoint, "tracepoint", PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virDomainLookupByUUID(virConnectPtr conn, const unsigned char *uuid)
{
VIR_UUID_DEBUG(conn, uuid);
virResetLastError();
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(uuid, error);
if (conn->driver->domainLookupByUUID) {
virDomainPtr ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainLookupByUUID(conn, uuid);
if (!ret)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(conn);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 93,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_random_number ()
{
int rv, pid;
/* Reset for command and process substitution. */
pid = getpid ();
if (subshell_environment && seeded_subshell != pid)
{
seedrand ();
seeded_subshell = pid;
}
do
rv = brand ();
while (rv == last_random_value);
return rv;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
kfree(prep->payload[0]);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 69,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned AccessibilityUIElement::indexOfChild(AccessibilityUIElement* element)
{
if (!m_element || !ATK_IS_OBJECT(m_element))
return 0;
Vector<RefPtr<AccessibilityUIElement> > children;
getChildren(children);
unsigned count = children.size();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < count; i++)
if (children[i]->isEqual(element))
return i;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: find_file (const char *currpath, grub_fshelp_node_t currroot,
grub_fshelp_node_t *currfound,
struct grub_fshelp_find_file_closure *c)
{
#ifndef _MSC_VER
char fpath[grub_strlen (currpath) + 1];
#else
char *fpath = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (currpath) + 1);
#endif
char *name = fpath;
char *next;
enum grub_fshelp_filetype type = GRUB_FSHELP_DIR;
grub_fshelp_node_t currnode = currroot;
grub_fshelp_node_t oldnode = currroot;
c->currroot = currroot;
grub_strncpy (fpath, currpath, grub_strlen (currpath) + 1);
/* Remove all leading slashes. */
while (*name == '/')
name++;
if (! *name)
{
*currfound = currnode;
return 0;
}
for (;;)
{
int found;
struct find_file_closure cc;
/* Extract the actual part from the pathname. */
next = grub_strchr (name, '/');
if (next)
{
/* Remove all leading slashes. */
while (*next == '/')
*(next++) = '\0';
}
/* At this point it is expected that the current node is a
directory, check if this is true. */
if (type != GRUB_FSHELP_DIR)
{
free_node (currnode, c);
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "not a directory");
}
cc.name = name;
cc.type = &type;
cc.oldnode = &oldnode;
cc.currnode = &currnode;
/* Iterate over the directory. */
found = c->iterate_dir (currnode, iterate, &cc);
if (! found)
{
if (grub_errno)
return grub_errno;
break;
}
/* Read in the symlink and follow it. */
if (type == GRUB_FSHELP_SYMLINK)
{
char *symlink;
/* Test if the symlink does not loop. */
if (++(c->symlinknest) == 8)
{
free_node (currnode, c);
free_node (oldnode, c);
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_SYMLINK_LOOP,
"too deep nesting of symlinks");
}
symlink = c->read_symlink (currnode);
free_node (currnode, c);
if (!symlink)
{
free_node (oldnode, c);
return grub_errno;
}
/* The symlink is an absolute path, go back to the root inode. */
if (symlink[0] == '/')
{
free_node (oldnode, c);
oldnode = c->rootnode;
}
/* Lookup the node the symlink points to. */
find_file (symlink, oldnode, &currnode, c);
type = c->foundtype;
grub_free (symlink);
if (grub_errno)
{
free_node (oldnode, c);
return grub_errno;
}
}
free_node (oldnode, c);
/* Found the node! */
if (! next || *next == '\0')
{
*currfound = currnode;
c->foundtype = type;
return 0;
}
name = next;
}
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "file not found");
}
Commit Message: Fix #7723 - crash in ext2 GRUB code because of variable size array in stack
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 168,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void raptor_rdfa_character_data(void *user_data,
raptor_xml_element* xml_element,
const unsigned char *s, int len)
{
character_data(user_data, (const char *)s, len);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 21,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int wp512_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *source,
unsigned int len)
{
struct wp512_ctx *wctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
int sourcePos = 0;
unsigned int bits_len = len * 8; // convert to number of bits
int sourceGap = (8 - ((int)bits_len & 7)) & 7;
int bufferRem = wctx->bufferBits & 7;
int i;
u32 b, carry;
u8 *buffer = wctx->buffer;
u8 *bitLength = wctx->bitLength;
int bufferBits = wctx->bufferBits;
int bufferPos = wctx->bufferPos;
u64 value = bits_len;
for (i = 31, carry = 0; i >= 0 && (carry != 0 || value != 0ULL); i--) {
carry += bitLength[i] + ((u32)value & 0xff);
bitLength[i] = (u8)carry;
carry >>= 8;
value >>= 8;
}
while (bits_len > 8) {
b = ((source[sourcePos] << sourceGap) & 0xff) |
((source[sourcePos + 1] & 0xff) >> (8 - sourceGap));
buffer[bufferPos++] |= (u8)(b >> bufferRem);
bufferBits += 8 - bufferRem;
if (bufferBits == WP512_BLOCK_SIZE * 8) {
wp512_process_buffer(wctx);
bufferBits = bufferPos = 0;
}
buffer[bufferPos] = b << (8 - bufferRem);
bufferBits += bufferRem;
bits_len -= 8;
sourcePos++;
}
if (bits_len > 0) {
b = (source[sourcePos] << sourceGap) & 0xff;
buffer[bufferPos] |= b >> bufferRem;
} else {
b = 0;
}
if (bufferRem + bits_len < 8) {
bufferBits += bits_len;
} else {
bufferPos++;
bufferBits += 8 - bufferRem;
bits_len -= 8 - bufferRem;
if (bufferBits == WP512_BLOCK_SIZE * 8) {
wp512_process_buffer(wctx);
bufferBits = bufferPos = 0;
}
buffer[bufferPos] = b << (8 - bufferRem);
bufferBits += (int)bits_len;
}
wctx->bufferBits = bufferBits;
wctx->bufferPos = bufferPos;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static storeProc storeProcForPicture (PicturePtr pict)
{
switch(pict->format) {
case PICT_a8r8g8b8: return fbStore_a8r8g8b8;
case PICT_x8r8g8b8: return fbStore_x8r8g8b8;
case PICT_a8b8g8r8: return fbStore_a8b8g8r8;
case PICT_x8b8g8r8: return fbStore_x8b8g8r8;
/* 24bpp formats */
case PICT_r8g8b8: return fbStore_r8g8b8;
case PICT_b8g8r8: return fbStore_b8g8r8;
/* 16bpp formats */
case PICT_r5g6b5: return fbStore_r5g6b5;
case PICT_b5g6r5: return fbStore_b5g6r5;
case PICT_a1r5g5b5: return fbStore_a1r5g5b5;
case PICT_x1r5g5b5: return fbStore_x1r5g5b5;
case PICT_a1b5g5r5: return fbStore_a1b5g5r5;
case PICT_x1b5g5r5: return fbStore_x1b5g5r5;
case PICT_a4r4g4b4: return fbStore_a4r4g4b4;
case PICT_x4r4g4b4: return fbStore_x4r4g4b4;
case PICT_a4b4g4r4: return fbStore_a4b4g4r4;
case PICT_x4b4g4r4: return fbStore_x4b4g4r4;
/* 8bpp formats */
case PICT_a8: return fbStore_a8;
case PICT_r3g3b2: return fbStore_r3g3b2;
case PICT_b2g3r3: return fbStore_b2g3r3;
case PICT_a2r2g2b2: return fbStore_a2r2g2b2;
case PICT_c8: return fbStore_c8;
case PICT_g8: return fbStore_c8;
case PICT_x4a4: return fbStore_x4a4;
/* 4bpp formats */
case PICT_a4: return fbStore_a4;
case PICT_r1g2b1: return fbStore_r1g2b1;
case PICT_b1g2r1: return fbStore_b1g2r1;
case PICT_a1r1g1b1: return fbStore_a1r1g1b1;
case PICT_a1b1g1r1: return fbStore_a1b1g1r1;
case PICT_c4: return fbStore_c4;
case PICT_g4: return fbStore_c4;
/* 1bpp formats */
case PICT_a1: return fbStore_a1;
case PICT_g1: return fbStore_g1;
default:
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 11,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlinkTestRunner::OnSessionHistory(
const std::vector<int>& routing_ids,
const std::vector<std::vector<PageState>>& session_histories,
const std::vector<unsigned>& current_entry_indexes) {
routing_ids_ = routing_ids;
session_histories_ = session_histories;
current_entry_indexes_ = current_entry_indexes;
CaptureDump();
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void addjump(JF, enum js_AstType type, js_Ast *target, int inst)
{
js_JumpList *jump = js_malloc(J, sizeof *jump);
jump->type = type;
jump->inst = inst;
jump->next = target->jumps;
target->jumps = jump;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 7,890
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UpdateDownloadCheckStats(SBStatsType stat_type) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("SB2.DownloadChecks",
stat_type,
DOWNLOAD_CHECKS_MAX);
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::releaseShaderCompiler() {
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,835
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct object_entry *new_object(unsigned char *sha1)
{
struct object_entry *e;
if (blocks->next_free == blocks->end)
alloc_objects(object_entry_alloc);
e = blocks->next_free++;
hashcpy(e->idx.sha1, sha1);
return e;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u32 skb_get_poff(const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct flow_keys keys;
if (!skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys(skb, &keys))
return 0;
return __skb_get_poff(skb, skb->data, &keys, skb_headlen(skb));
}
Commit Message: flow_dissector: Jump to exit code in __skb_flow_dissect
Instead of returning immediately (on a parsing failure for instance) we
jump to cleanup code. This always sets protocol values in key_control
(even on a failure there is still valid information in the key_tags that
was set before the problem was hit).
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntRect RenderLayerScrollableArea::convertFromContainingViewToScrollbar(const Scrollbar* scrollbar, const IntRect& parentRect) const
{
RenderView* view = box().view();
if (!view)
return parentRect;
IntRect rect = view->frameView()->convertToRenderer(box(), parentRect);
rect.move(-scrollbarOffset(scrollbar));
return rect;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 119,973
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_get_argv(mrb_state *mrb)
{
mrb_int argc = mrb->c->ci->argc;
mrb_value *array_argv;
if (argc < 0) {
struct RArray *a = mrb_ary_ptr(mrb->c->stack[1]);
array_argv = ARY_PTR(a);
}
else {
array_argv = NULL;
}
return array_argv;
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::suspendScriptedAnimationControllerCallbacks()
{
#if ENABLE(REQUEST_ANIMATION_FRAME)
if (m_scriptedAnimationController)
m_scriptedAnimationController->suspend();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void red_client_add_channel(RedClient *client, RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
spice_assert(rcc && client);
ring_add(&client->channels, &rcc->client_link);
if (client->during_target_migrate && client->seamless_migrate) {
red_channel_client_set_migration_seamless(rcc);
}
client->channels_num++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,186
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pathcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
{
/* Skip leading './' */
if (a[0] == '.' && a[1] == '/' && a[2] != '\0')
a += 2;
if (b[0] == '.' && b[1] == '/' && b[2] != '\0')
b += 2;
/* Find the first difference, or return (0) if none. */
while (*a == *b) {
if (*a == '\0')
return (0);
a++;
b++;
}
/*
* If one ends in '/' and the other one doesn't,
* they're the same.
*/
if (a[0] == '/' && a[1] == '\0' && b[0] == '\0')
return (0);
if (a[0] == '\0' && b[0] == '/' && b[1] == '\0')
return (0);
/* They're really different, return the correct sign. */
return (*(const unsigned char *)a - *(const unsigned char *)b);
}
Commit Message: Issue #767: Buffer overflow printing a filename
The safe_fprintf function attempts to ensure clean output for an
arbitrary sequence of bytes by doing a trial conversion of the
multibyte characters to wide characters -- if the resulting wide
character is printable then we pass through the corresponding bytes
unaltered, otherwise, we convert them to C-style ASCII escapes.
The stack trace in Issue #767 suggest that the 20-byte buffer
was getting overflowed trying to format a non-printable multibyte
character. This should only happen if there is a valid multibyte
character of more than 5 bytes that was unprintable. (Each byte
would get expanded to a four-charcter octal-style escape of the form
"\123" resulting in >20 characters for the >5 byte multibyte character.)
I've not been able to reproduce this, but have expanded the conversion
buffer to 128 bytes on the belief that no multibyte character set
has a single character of more than 32 bytes.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,242
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void op32_tx_resume(struct b43_dmaring *ring)
{
b43_dma_write(ring, B43_DMA32_TXCTL, b43_dma_read(ring, B43_DMA32_TXCTL)
& ~B43_DMA32_TXSUSPEND);
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_PGSQL_API int php_pgsql_insert(PGconn *pg_link, const char *table, zval *var_array, ulong opt, char **sql TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval **val, *converted = NULL;
char buf[256];
char *fld;
smart_str querystr = {0};
int key_type, ret = FAILURE;
uint fld_len;
ulong num_idx;
HashPosition pos;
assert(pg_link != NULL);
assert(table != NULL);
assert(Z_TYPE_P(var_array) == IS_ARRAY);
if (zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(var_array)) == 0) {
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "INSERT INTO ");
build_tablename(&querystr, pg_link, table);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, " DEFAULT VALUES");
goto no_values;
}
/* convert input array if needed */
if (!(opt & PGSQL_DML_NO_CONV)) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(converted);
array_init(converted);
if (php_pgsql_convert(pg_link, table, var_array, converted, (opt & PGSQL_CONV_OPTS) TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
goto cleanup;
}
var_array = converted;
}
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "INSERT INTO ");
build_tablename(&querystr, pg_link, table);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, " (");
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(var_array), &pos);
while ((key_type = zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(var_array), &fld,
&fld_len, &num_idx, 0, &pos)) != HASH_KEY_NON_EXISTANT) {
if (key_type == HASH_KEY_IS_LONG) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Expects associative array for values to be inserted");
goto cleanup;
}
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, fld, fld_len - 1);
smart_str_appendc(&querystr, ',');
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(var_array), &pos);
}
querystr.len--;
smart_str_appends(&querystr, ") VALUES (");
/* make values string */
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(var_array), &pos);
zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(var_array), (void **)&val, &pos) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(var_array), &pos)) {
/* we can avoid the key_type check here, because we tested it in the other loop */
switch(Z_TYPE_PP(val)) {
case IS_STRING:
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, Z_STRVAL_PP(val), Z_STRLEN_PP(val));
break;
case IS_LONG:
smart_str_append_long(&querystr, Z_LVAL_PP(val));
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, buf, snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%F", Z_DVAL_PP(val)));
break;
default:
/* should not happen */
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Report this error to php-dev@lists.php.net, type = %d", Z_TYPE_PP(val));
goto cleanup;
break;
}
smart_str_appendc(&querystr, ',');
}
/* Remove the trailing "," */
querystr.len--;
smart_str_appends(&querystr, ");");
no_values:
smart_str_0(&querystr);
if ((opt & (PGSQL_DML_EXEC|PGSQL_DML_ASYNC)) &&
do_exec(&querystr, PGRES_COMMAND_OK, pg_link, (opt & PGSQL_CONV_OPTS) TSRMLS_CC) == 0) {
ret = SUCCESS;
}
else if (opt & PGSQL_DML_STRING) {
ret = SUCCESS;
}
cleanup:
if (!(opt & PGSQL_DML_NO_CONV) && converted) {
zval_dtor(converted);
FREE_ZVAL(converted);
}
if (ret == SUCCESS && (opt & PGSQL_DML_STRING)) {
*sql = querystr.c;
}
else {
smart_str_free(&querystr);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,240
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void setHorizontalScrollPolicy(WebKitWebView* webView, GtkScrollablePolicy policy)
{
webView->priv->horizontalScrollingPolicy = policy;
gtk_widget_queue_resize(GTK_WIDGET(webView));
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int rtnl_dev_get_flags(const struct net_device *dev)
{
return (dev->flags & ~(IFF_PROMISC | IFF_ALLMULTI)) |
(dev->gflags & (IFF_PROMISC | IFF_ALLMULTI));
}
Commit Message: rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 31,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ConnectionInfoPopupAndroid::ConnectionInfoPopupAndroid(
JNIEnv* env,
jobject java_website_settings_pop,
WebContents* web_contents) {
content::NavigationEntry* nav_entry =
web_contents->GetController().GetVisibleEntry();
if (nav_entry == NULL)
return;
popup_jobject_.Reset(env, java_website_settings_pop);
presenter_.reset(new WebsiteSettings(
this,
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext()),
TabSpecificContentSettings::FromWebContents(web_contents),
InfoBarService::FromWebContents(web_contents),
nav_entry->GetURL(),
nav_entry->GetSSL(),
content::CertStore::GetInstance()));
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,777
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void usb_xhci_init(XHCIState *xhci)
{
DeviceState *dev = DEVICE(xhci);
XHCIPort *port;
int i, usbports, speedmask;
xhci->usbsts = USBSTS_HCH;
if (xhci->numports_2 > MAXPORTS_2) {
xhci->numports_2 = MAXPORTS_2;
}
if (xhci->numports_3 > MAXPORTS_3) {
xhci->numports_3 = MAXPORTS_3;
}
usbports = MAX(xhci->numports_2, xhci->numports_3);
xhci->numports = xhci->numports_2 + xhci->numports_3;
usb_bus_new(&xhci->bus, sizeof(xhci->bus), &xhci_bus_ops, dev);
for (i = 0; i < usbports; i++) {
speedmask = 0;
if (i < xhci->numports_2) {
if (xhci_get_flag(xhci, XHCI_FLAG_SS_FIRST)) {
port = &xhci->ports[i + xhci->numports_3];
port->portnr = i + 1 + xhci->numports_3;
} else {
port = &xhci->ports[i];
port->portnr = i + 1;
}
port->uport = &xhci->uports[i];
port->speedmask =
USB_SPEED_MASK_LOW |
USB_SPEED_MASK_FULL |
USB_SPEED_MASK_HIGH;
snprintf(port->name, sizeof(port->name), "usb2 port #%d", i+1);
speedmask |= port->speedmask;
}
if (i < xhci->numports_3) {
if (xhci_get_flag(xhci, XHCI_FLAG_SS_FIRST)) {
port = &xhci->ports[i];
port->portnr = i + 1;
} else {
port = &xhci->ports[i + xhci->numports_2];
port->portnr = i + 1 + xhci->numports_2;
}
port->uport = &xhci->uports[i];
port->speedmask = USB_SPEED_MASK_SUPER;
snprintf(port->name, sizeof(port->name), "usb3 port #%d", i+1);
speedmask |= port->speedmask;
}
usb_register_port(&xhci->bus, &xhci->uports[i], xhci, i,
&xhci_uport_ops, speedmask);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tracer_tracing_is_on(struct trace_array *tr)
{
if (tr->trace_buffer.buffer)
return ring_buffer_record_is_on(tr->trace_buffer.buffer);
return !tr->buffer_disabled;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_xdr_enc_delegreturn(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p, const struct nfs4_delegreturnargs *args)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.nops = 3,
};
int status;
xdr_init_encode(&xdr, &req->rq_snd_buf, p);
encode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
status = encode_putfh(&xdr, args->fhandle);
if (status != 0)
goto out;
status = encode_delegreturn(&xdr, args->stateid);
if (status != 0)
goto out;
status = encode_getfattr(&xdr, args->bitmask);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mc_clear_all(mrb_state *mrb)
{
struct mrb_cache_entry *mc = mrb->cache;
int i;
for (i=0; i<MRB_METHOD_CACHE_SIZE; i++) {
mc[i].c = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,057
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void j2k_dump(opj_j2k_t* p_j2k, OPJ_INT32 flag, FILE* out_stream)
{
/* Check if the flag is compatible with j2k file*/
if ((flag & OPJ_JP2_INFO) || (flag & OPJ_JP2_IND)) {
fprintf(out_stream, "Wrong flag\n");
return;
}
/* Dump the image_header */
if (flag & OPJ_IMG_INFO) {
if (p_j2k->m_private_image) {
j2k_dump_image_header(p_j2k->m_private_image, 0, out_stream);
}
}
/* Dump the codestream info from main header */
if (flag & OPJ_J2K_MH_INFO) {
if (p_j2k->m_private_image) {
opj_j2k_dump_MH_info(p_j2k, out_stream);
}
}
/* Dump all tile/codestream info */
if (flag & OPJ_J2K_TCH_INFO) {
OPJ_UINT32 l_nb_tiles = p_j2k->m_cp.th * p_j2k->m_cp.tw;
OPJ_UINT32 i;
opj_tcp_t * l_tcp = p_j2k->m_cp.tcps;
if (p_j2k->m_private_image) {
for (i = 0; i < l_nb_tiles; ++i) {
opj_j2k_dump_tile_info(l_tcp, (OPJ_INT32)p_j2k->m_private_image->numcomps,
out_stream);
++l_tcp;
}
}
}
/* Dump the codestream info of the current tile */
if (flag & OPJ_J2K_TH_INFO) {
}
/* Dump the codestream index from main header */
if (flag & OPJ_J2K_MH_IND) {
opj_j2k_dump_MH_index(p_j2k, out_stream);
}
/* Dump the codestream index of the current tile */
if (flag & OPJ_J2K_TH_IND) {
}
}
Commit Message: opj_j2k_write_sot(): fix potential write heap buffer overflow (#991)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 61,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationRequest::OnRequestFailed(
const network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus& status) {
bool collapse_frame =
status.extended_error_code ==
static_cast<int>(blink::ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kCollapsedByClient);
OnRequestFailedInternal(status, false /* skip_throttles */,
base::nullopt /* error_page_content */,
collapse_frame);
}
Commit Message: Use an opaque URL rather than an empty URL for request's site for cookies.
Apparently this makes a big difference to the cookie settings backend.
Bug: 881715
Change-Id: Id87fa0c6a858bae6a3f8fff4d6af3f974b00d5e4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1212846
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#589512}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 132,953
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vips_foreign_operation_init( void )
{
extern GType vips_foreign_load_rad_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_rad_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_rad_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_mat_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_ppm_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_ppm_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_png_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_png_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_png_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_png_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_csv_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_csv_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_matrix_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_matrix_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_print_matrix_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_fits_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_fits_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_analyze_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_openexr_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_openslide_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_jpeg_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_jpeg_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_jpeg_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_jpeg_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_jpeg_mime_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_tiff_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_tiff_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_tiff_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_tiff_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_vips_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_vips_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_raw_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_raw_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_raw_fd_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_magick_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_magick_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_magick7_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_magick7_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_dz_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_dz_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_webp_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_webp_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_webp_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_webp_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_pdf_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_pdf_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_pdf_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_svg_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_svg_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_svg_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_gif_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_gif_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_gif_buffer_get_type( void );
vips_foreign_load_csv_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_csv_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_matrix_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_matrix_get_type();
vips_foreign_print_matrix_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_raw_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_raw_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_raw_fd_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_vips_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_vips_get_type();
#ifdef HAVE_ANALYZE
vips_foreign_load_analyze_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_ANALYZE*/
#ifdef HAVE_PPM
vips_foreign_load_ppm_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_ppm_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_PPM*/
#ifdef HAVE_RADIANCE
vips_foreign_load_rad_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_rad_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_rad_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_RADIANCE*/
#ifdef HAVE_POPPLER
vips_foreign_load_pdf_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_pdf_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_pdf_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_POPPLER*/
#ifdef HAVE_RSVG
vips_foreign_load_svg_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_svg_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_svg_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_RSVG*/
#ifdef HAVE_GIFLIB
vips_foreign_load_gif_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_gif_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_gif_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_GIFLIB*/
#ifdef HAVE_GSF
vips_foreign_save_dz_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_dz_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_GSF*/
#ifdef HAVE_PNG
vips_foreign_load_png_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_png_buffer_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_png_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_png_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_PNG*/
#ifdef HAVE_MATIO
vips_foreign_load_mat_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_MATIO*/
#ifdef HAVE_JPEG
vips_foreign_load_jpeg_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_jpeg_buffer_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_jpeg_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_jpeg_buffer_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_jpeg_mime_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_JPEG*/
#ifdef HAVE_LIBWEBP
vips_foreign_load_webp_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_webp_buffer_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_webp_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_webp_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_LIBWEBP*/
#ifdef HAVE_TIFF
vips_foreign_load_tiff_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_tiff_buffer_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_tiff_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_tiff_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_TIFF*/
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSLIDE
vips_foreign_load_openslide_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_OPENSLIDE*/
#ifdef HAVE_MAGICK
vips_foreign_load_magick_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_magick_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_MAGICK*/
#ifdef HAVE_MAGICK7
vips_foreign_load_magick7_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_magick7_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_MAGICK7*/
#ifdef HAVE_CFITSIO
vips_foreign_load_fits_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_fits_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_CFITSIO*/
#ifdef HAVE_OPENEXR
vips_foreign_load_openexr_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_OPENEXR*/
vips__foreign_load_operation =
g_quark_from_static_string( "vips-foreign-load-operation" );
}
Commit Message: fix a crash with delayed load
If a delayed load failed, it could leave the pipeline only half-set up.
Sebsequent threads could then segv.
Set a load-has-failed flag and test before generate.
See https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/issues/893
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 83,912
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlPushInput(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserInputPtr input) {
int ret;
if (input == NULL) return(-1);
if (xmlParserDebugEntities) {
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && (ctxt->input->filename))
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"%s(%d): ", ctxt->input->filename,
ctxt->input->line);
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"Pushing input %d : %.30s\n", ctxt->inputNr+1, input->cur);
}
ret = inputPush(ctxt, input);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(-1);
GROW;
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 163,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cmd_parse_enabled(struct ImapData *idata, const char *s)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Handling ENABLED\n");
while ((s = imap_next_word((char *) s)) && *s != '\0')
{
if ((mutt_str_strncasecmp(s, "UTF8=ACCEPT", 11) == 0) ||
(mutt_str_strncasecmp(s, "UTF8=ONLY", 9) == 0))
{
idata->unicode = 1;
}
}
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 79,555
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int phar_test_compression(void *pDest, void *argument TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
phar_entry_info *entry = (phar_entry_info *)pDest;
if (entry->is_deleted) {
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_KEEP;
}
if (!PHAR_G(has_bz2)) {
if (entry->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_BZ2) {
*(int *) argument = 0;
}
}
if (!PHAR_G(has_zlib)) {
if (entry->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_GZ) {
*(int *) argument = 0;
}
}
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_KEEP;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,437
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LayerTreeHostImpl::Mutate(base::TimeTicks monotonic_time) {
if (!mutator_)
return false;
TRACE_EVENT0("compositor-worker", "LayerTreeHostImpl::Mutate");
if (mutator_->Mutate(monotonic_time, active_tree()))
client_->SetNeedsOneBeginImplFrameOnImplThread();
return true;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SessionService::UpdateSelectedTabIndex(
std::vector<SessionWindow*>* windows) {
for (std::vector<SessionWindow*>::const_iterator i = windows->begin();
i != windows->end(); ++i) {
int new_index = 0;
for (std::vector<SessionTab*>::const_iterator j = (*i)->tabs.begin();
j != (*i)->tabs.end(); ++j) {
if ((*j)->tab_visual_index == (*i)->selected_tab_index) {
new_index = static_cast<int>(j - (*i)->tabs.begin());
break;
}
}
(*i)->selected_tab_index = new_index;
}
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 108,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int armpmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct arm_pmu *armpmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu);
int err = 0;
atomic_t *active_events = &armpmu->active_events;
if (armpmu->map_event(event) == -ENOENT)
return -ENOENT;
event->destroy = hw_perf_event_destroy;
if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(active_events)) {
mutex_lock(&armpmu->reserve_mutex);
if (atomic_read(active_events) == 0)
err = armpmu_reserve_hardware(armpmu);
if (!err)
atomic_inc(active_events);
mutex_unlock(&armpmu->reserve_mutex);
}
if (err)
return err;
err = __hw_perf_event_init(event);
if (err)
hw_perf_event_destroy(event);
return err;
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 56,186
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ParseJsonPath(
const std::string& path,
std::string* command,
std::string* target_id) {
if (path.empty()) {
*command = "list";
return true;
}
if (!base::StartsWith(path, "/", base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
return false;
}
*command = path.substr(1);
size_t separator_pos = command->find("/");
if (separator_pos != std::string::npos) {
*target_id = command->substr(separator_pos + 1);
*command = command->substr(0, separator_pos);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: check Host header for being IP or localhost when connecting over RDP.
Bug: 813540
Change-Id: I9338aa2475c15090b8a60729be25502eb866efb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/952522
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#541547}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void fz_find_color_converter(fz_context *ctx, fz_color_converter *cc, const fz_colorspace *is, const fz_colorspace *ds, const fz_colorspace *ss, const fz_color_params *params)
{
if (ds == NULL)
ds = fz_device_gray(ctx);
if (ss == NULL)
ss = fz_device_gray(ctx);
cc->ds = ds;
cc->ss = ss;
cc->is = is;
cc->link = NULL;
if (ss == default_gray)
{
if ((ds == default_rgb) || (ds == default_bgr))
cc->convert = g2rgb;
else if (ds == default_cmyk)
cc->convert = g2cmyk;
else
cc->convert = std_conv_color;
}
else if (ss == default_rgb)
{
if (ds == default_gray)
cc->convert = rgb2g;
else if (ds == default_bgr)
cc->convert = rgb2bgr;
else if (ds == default_cmyk)
cc->convert = rgb2cmyk;
else
cc->convert = std_conv_color;
}
else if (ss == default_bgr)
{
if (ds == default_gray)
cc->convert = bgr2g;
else if (ds == default_rgb)
cc->convert = rgb2bgr;
else if (ds == default_cmyk)
cc->convert = bgr2cmyk;
else
cc->convert = std_conv_color;
}
else if (ss == default_cmyk)
{
if (ds == default_gray)
cc->convert = cmyk2g;
else if (ds == default_rgb)
cc->convert = cmyk2rgb;
else if (ds == default_bgr)
cc->convert = cmyk2bgr;
else
cc->convert = std_conv_color;
}
else if ((ss == fz_device_rgb(ctx) && ds == fz_device_bgr(ctx)) ||
(ss == fz_device_bgr(ctx) && ds == fz_device_rgb(ctx)))
{
cc->convert = rgb2bgr;
}
else
{
const fz_colorspace *ss_base = fz_source_colorspace_cm(ctx, ss);
if (ss_base != NULL && fz_colorspace_is_icc(ctx, ds))
{
if (ss_base == ss)
cc->convert = icc_conv_color;
else
cc->convert = icc_base_conv_color;
/* Special case: Do not set link if we are doing DeviceGray to CMYK. */
/* Handle DeviceGray to CMYK as K only. See note in Section 6.3 of PDF spec 1.7. */
if (!(fz_colorspace_is_device_gray(ctx, ss_base) && fz_colorspace_is_cmyk(ctx, ds)))
cc->link = fz_get_icc_link(ctx, ds, 0, ss_base, 0, is, params, 2, 0, &cc->n);
}
else
cc->convert = std_conv_color;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 377
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int TextDistance(const PositionInFlatTree& start,
const PositionInFlatTree& end) {
return TextIteratorInFlatTree::RangeLength(
start, end,
TextIteratorBehavior::AllVisiblePositionsRangeLengthBehavior());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void whiteheat_close(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
firm_report_tx_done(port);
firm_close(port);
usb_serial_generic_close(port);
stop_command_port(port->serial);
}
Commit Message: USB: whiteheat: Added bounds checking for bulk command response
This patch fixes a potential security issue in the whiteheat USB driver
which might allow a local attacker to cause kernel memory corrpution. This
is due to an unchecked memcpy into a fixed size buffer (of 64 bytes). On
EHCI and XHCI busses it's possible to craft responses greater than 64
bytes leading a buffer overflow.
Signed-off-by: James Forshaw <forshaw@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 38,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void snro_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_SeqOffHintEntryBox *snro = (GF_SeqOffHintEntryBox *)s;
gf_free(snro);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Element::scrollIntoView(bool alignToTop)
{
document()->updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
if (!renderer())
return;
LayoutRect bounds = boundingBox();
if (alignToTop)
renderer()->scrollRectToVisible(bounds, ScrollAlignment::alignToEdgeIfNeeded, ScrollAlignment::alignTopAlways);
else
renderer()->scrollRectToVisible(bounds, ScrollAlignment::alignToEdgeIfNeeded, ScrollAlignment::alignBottomAlways);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb,
AVStream *st, RMStream *rst,
unsigned int codec_data_size, const uint8_t *mime)
{
unsigned int v;
int size;
int64_t codec_pos;
int ret;
if (codec_data_size > INT_MAX)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (codec_data_size == 0)
return 0;
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 64, 1, 1000);
codec_pos = avio_tell(pb);
v = avio_rb32(pb);
if (v == MKTAG(0xfd, 'a', 'r', '.')) {
/* ra type header */
if (rm_read_audio_stream_info(s, pb, st, rst, 0))
return -1;
} else if (v == MKBETAG('L', 'S', 'D', ':')) {
avio_seek(pb, -4, SEEK_CUR);
if ((ret = rm_read_extradata(s, pb, st->codecpar, codec_data_size)) < 0)
return ret;
st->codecpar->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO;
st->codecpar->codec_tag = AV_RL32(st->codecpar->extradata);
st->codecpar->codec_id = ff_codec_get_id(ff_rm_codec_tags,
st->codecpar->codec_tag);
} else if(mime && !strcmp(mime, "logical-fileinfo")){
int stream_count, rule_count, property_count, i;
ff_free_stream(s, st);
if (avio_rb16(pb) != 0) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Unsupported version\n");
goto skip;
}
stream_count = avio_rb16(pb);
avio_skip(pb, 6*stream_count);
rule_count = avio_rb16(pb);
avio_skip(pb, 2*rule_count);
property_count = avio_rb16(pb);
for(i=0; i<property_count; i++){
uint8_t name[128], val[128];
avio_rb32(pb);
if (avio_rb16(pb) != 0) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Unsupported Name value property version\n");
goto skip; //FIXME skip just this one
}
get_str8(pb, name, sizeof(name));
switch(avio_rb32(pb)) {
case 2: get_strl(pb, val, sizeof(val), avio_rb16(pb));
av_dict_set(&s->metadata, name, val, 0);
break;
default: avio_skip(pb, avio_rb16(pb));
}
}
} else {
int fps;
if (avio_rl32(pb) != MKTAG('V', 'I', 'D', 'O')) {
fail1:
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Unsupported stream type %08x\n", v);
goto skip;
}
st->codecpar->codec_tag = avio_rl32(pb);
st->codecpar->codec_id = ff_codec_get_id(ff_rm_codec_tags,
st->codecpar->codec_tag);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "%"PRIX32" %X\n",
st->codecpar->codec_tag, MKTAG('R', 'V', '2', '0'));
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_NONE)
goto fail1;
st->codecpar->width = avio_rb16(pb);
st->codecpar->height = avio_rb16(pb);
avio_skip(pb, 2); // looks like bits per sample
avio_skip(pb, 4); // always zero?
st->codecpar->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO;
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_TIMESTAMPS;
fps = avio_rb32(pb);
if ((ret = rm_read_extradata(s, pb, st->codecpar, codec_data_size - (avio_tell(pb) - codec_pos))) < 0)
return ret;
if (fps > 0) {
av_reduce(&st->avg_frame_rate.den, &st->avg_frame_rate.num,
0x10000, fps, (1 << 30) - 1);
#if FF_API_R_FRAME_RATE
st->r_frame_rate = st->avg_frame_rate;
#endif
} else if (s->error_recognition & AV_EF_EXPLODE) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid framerate\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
skip:
/* skip codec info */
size = avio_tell(pb) - codec_pos;
if (codec_data_size >= size) {
avio_skip(pb, codec_data_size - size);
} else {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "codec_data_size %u < size %d\n", codec_data_size, size);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rmdec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check
Fixes: loop.ivr
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,844
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_attr_bitmap(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap)
{
uint32_t bmlen;
__be32 *p;
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
bmlen = be32_to_cpup(p);
bitmap[0] = bitmap[1] = bitmap[2] = 0;
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, (bmlen << 2));
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
if (bmlen > 0) {
bitmap[0] = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (bmlen > 1) {
bitmap[1] = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (bmlen > 2)
bitmap[2] = be32_to_cpup(p);
}
}
return 0;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,255
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: deep_count_more_files_callback (GObject *source_object,
GAsyncResult *res,
gpointer user_data)
{
DeepCountState *state;
NautilusDirectory *directory;
GList *files, *l;
GFileInfo *info;
state = user_data;
if (state->directory == NULL)
{
/* Operation was cancelled. Bail out */
deep_count_state_free (state);
return;
}
directory = nautilus_directory_ref (state->directory);
g_assert (directory->details->deep_count_in_progress != NULL);
g_assert (directory->details->deep_count_in_progress == state);
files = g_file_enumerator_next_files_finish (state->enumerator,
res, NULL);
for (l = files; l != NULL; l = l->next)
{
info = l->data;
deep_count_one (state, info);
g_object_unref (info);
}
if (files == NULL)
{
g_file_enumerator_close_async (state->enumerator, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
g_object_unref (state->enumerator);
state->enumerator = NULL;
deep_count_next_dir (state);
}
else
{
g_file_enumerator_next_files_async (state->enumerator,
DIRECTORY_LOAD_ITEMS_PER_CALLBACK,
G_PRIORITY_LOW,
state->cancellable,
deep_count_more_files_callback,
state);
}
g_list_free (files);
nautilus_directory_unref (directory);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void smbd_setup_sig_term_handler(void)
{
struct tevent_signal *se;
se = tevent_add_signal(smbd_event_context(),
smbd_event_context(),
SIGTERM, 0,
smbd_sig_term_handler,
NULL);
if (!se) {
exit_server("failed to setup SIGTERM handler");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_sysenter(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct desc_struct cs, ss;
u64 msr_data;
u16 cs_sel, ss_sel;
u64 efer = 0;
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
/* inject #GP if in real mode */
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
/*
* Not recognized on AMD in compat mode (but is recognized in legacy
* mode).
*/
if ((ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32) && (efer & EFER_LMA)
&& !vendor_intel(ctxt))
return emulate_ud(ctxt);
/* XXX sysenter/sysexit have not been tested in 64bit mode.
* Therefore, we inject an #UD.
*/
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
return emulate_ud(ctxt);
setup_syscalls_segments(ctxt, &cs, &ss);
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, &msr_data);
switch (ctxt->mode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
if ((msr_data & 0xfffc) == 0x0)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
break;
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
if (msr_data == 0x0)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
break;
default:
break;
}
ctxt->eflags &= ~(EFLG_VM | EFLG_IF);
cs_sel = (u16)msr_data;
cs_sel &= ~SELECTOR_RPL_MASK;
ss_sel = cs_sel + 8;
ss_sel &= ~SELECTOR_RPL_MASK;
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 || (efer & EFER_LMA)) {
cs.d = 0;
cs.l = 1;
}
ops->set_segment(ctxt, cs_sel, &cs, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS);
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, &msr_data);
ctxt->_eip = msr_data;
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, &msr_data);
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = msr_data;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PDFiumEngine::New(const char* url, const char* headers) {
url_ = url;
if (headers)
headers_ = headers;
else
headers_.clear();
return true;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 146,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int file_read_actor(read_descriptor_t *desc, struct page *page,
unsigned long offset, unsigned long size)
{
char *kaddr;
unsigned long left, count = desc->count;
if (size > count)
size = count;
/*
* Faults on the destination of a read are common, so do it before
* taking the kmap.
*/
if (!fault_in_pages_writeable(desc->arg.buf, size)) {
kaddr = kmap_atomic(page, KM_USER0);
left = __copy_to_user_inatomic(desc->arg.buf,
kaddr + offset, size);
kunmap_atomic(kaddr, KM_USER0);
if (left == 0)
goto success;
}
/* Do it the slow way */
kaddr = kmap(page);
left = __copy_to_user(desc->arg.buf, kaddr + offset, size);
kunmap(page);
if (left) {
size -= left;
desc->error = -EFAULT;
}
success:
desc->count = count - size;
desc->written += size;
desc->arg.buf += size;
return size;
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 58,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void dref_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_DataReferenceBox *ptr = (GF_DataReferenceBox *) s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __init config_types(void)
{
bool has_drive = false;
int drive;
/* read drive info out of physical CMOS */
drive = 0;
if (!UDP->cmos)
UDP->cmos = FLOPPY0_TYPE;
drive = 1;
if (!UDP->cmos && FLOPPY1_TYPE)
UDP->cmos = FLOPPY1_TYPE;
/* FIXME: additional physical CMOS drive detection should go here */
for (drive = 0; drive < N_DRIVE; drive++) {
unsigned int type = UDP->cmos;
struct floppy_drive_params *params;
const char *name = NULL;
static char temparea[32];
if (type < ARRAY_SIZE(default_drive_params)) {
params = &default_drive_params[type].params;
if (type) {
name = default_drive_params[type].name;
allowed_drive_mask |= 1 << drive;
} else
allowed_drive_mask &= ~(1 << drive);
} else {
params = &default_drive_params[0].params;
sprintf(temparea, "unknown type %d (usb?)", type);
name = temparea;
}
if (name) {
const char *prepend;
if (!has_drive) {
prepend = "";
has_drive = true;
pr_info("Floppy drive(s):");
} else {
prepend = ",";
}
pr_cont("%s fd%d is %s", prepend, drive, name);
}
*UDP = *params;
}
if (has_drive)
pr_cont("\n");
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 39,332
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __d_drop(struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (!d_unhashed(dentry)) {
struct hlist_bl_head *b;
/*
* Hashed dentries are normally on the dentry hashtable,
* with the exception of those newly allocated by
* d_obtain_alias, which are always IS_ROOT:
*/
if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(dentry)))
b = &dentry->d_sb->s_anon;
else
b = d_hash(dentry->d_name.hash);
hlist_bl_lock(b);
__hlist_bl_del(&dentry->d_hash);
dentry->d_hash.pprev = NULL;
hlist_bl_unlock(b);
/* After this call, in-progress rcu-walk path lookup will fail. */
write_seqcount_invalidate(&dentry->d_seq);
}
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 67,265
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::Matches(SharedWorkerHost* worker_host) {
return instance_->Matches(*worker_host->instance());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,734
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void uvesafb_cn_callback(struct cn_msg *msg, struct netlink_skb_parms *nsp)
{
struct uvesafb_task *utask;
struct uvesafb_ktask *task;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return;
if (msg->seq >= UVESAFB_TASKS_MAX)
return;
mutex_lock(&uvfb_lock);
task = uvfb_tasks[msg->seq];
if (!task || msg->ack != task->ack) {
mutex_unlock(&uvfb_lock);
return;
}
utask = (struct uvesafb_task *)msg->data;
/* Sanity checks for the buffer length. */
if (task->t.buf_len < utask->buf_len ||
utask->buf_len > msg->len - sizeof(*utask)) {
mutex_unlock(&uvfb_lock);
return;
}
uvfb_tasks[msg->seq] = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&uvfb_lock);
memcpy(&task->t, utask, sizeof(*utask));
if (task->t.buf_len && task->buf)
memcpy(task->buf, utask + 1, task->t.buf_len);
complete(task->done);
return;
}
Commit Message: video: uvesafb: Fix integer overflow in allocation
cmap->len can get close to INT_MAX/2, allowing for an integer overflow in
allocation. This uses kmalloc_array() instead to catch the condition.
Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8bdb3a2d7df48 ("uvesafb: the driver core")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 79,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Read(gfx::mojom::BufferUsageAndFormatDataView data,
gfx::BufferUsageAndFormat* out) {
return data.ReadUsage(&out->usage) && data.ReadFormat(&out->format);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,629
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<DocumentParser> Document::implicitOpen(ParserSynchronizationPolicy parserSyncPolicy)
{
cancelParsing();
removeChildren();
ASSERT(!m_focusedElement);
setCompatibilityMode(NoQuirksMode);
if (!threadedParsingEnabledForTesting())
parserSyncPolicy = ForceSynchronousParsing;
m_parserSyncPolicy = parserSyncPolicy;
m_parser = createParser();
setParsingState(Parsing);
setReadyState(Loading);
return m_parser;
}
Commit Message: Don't change Document load progress in any page dismissal events.
This can confuse the logic for blocking modal dialogs.
BUG=536652
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1373113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351419}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 125,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
struct list_head *invalid_list)
{
int ret;
trace_kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(sp);
++kvm->stat.mmu_shadow_zapped;
ret = mmu_zap_unsync_children(kvm, sp, invalid_list);
kvm_mmu_page_unlink_children(kvm, sp);
kvm_mmu_unlink_parents(kvm, sp);
if (!sp->role.invalid && !sp->role.direct)
unaccount_shadowed(kvm, sp->gfn);
if (sp->unsync)
kvm_unlink_unsync_page(kvm, sp);
if (!sp->root_count) {
/* Count self */
ret++;
list_move(&sp->link, invalid_list);
kvm_mod_used_mmu_pages(kvm, -1);
} else {
list_move(&sp->link, &kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages);
/*
* The obsolete pages can not be used on any vcpus.
* See the comments in kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_all_pages().
*/
if (!sp->role.invalid && !is_obsolete_sp(kvm, sp))
kvm_reload_remote_mmus(kvm);
}
sp->role.invalid = 1;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,481
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dtoieee(double *dp)
{
double_t num;
double x;
int exp;
num.d = *dp;
if (!num.d) { /* Zero is just binary all zeros */
num.l[0] = num.l[1] = 0;
return;
}
if (num.d < 0) { /* Sign is encoded separately */
num.d = -num.d;
num.ieee.sign = 1;
} else {
num.ieee.sign = 0;
}
/* Now separate the absolute value into mantissa and exponent */
x = frexp(num.d, &exp);
/*
* Handle cases where the value is outside the
* range for IEEE floating point numbers.
* (Overflow cannot happen on a VAX, but underflow
* can happen for G float.)
*/
if (exp < -1022) { /* Unnormalized number */
x = ldexp(x, -1023-exp);
exp = 0;
} else if (exp > 1023) { /* +/- infinity */
x = 0;
exp = 2047;
} else { /* Get rid of most significant bit */
x *= 2;
x -= 1;
exp += 1022; /* fix NDR: 1.0 -> x=0.5, exp=1 -> ieee.exp = 1023 */
}
num.ieee.exp = exp;
x *= (double) (1<<20);
num.ieee.mant = (long) x;
x -= (double) num.ieee.mant;
num.ieee.mant2 = (long) (x*((double) (1<<16)*(double) (1<<16)));
if (!(num.ieee.mant || num.ieee.exp || num.ieee.mant2)) {
/* Avoid negative zero */
num.ieee.sign = 0;
}
((double_t*)dp)->ieee = num.ieee;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 86,797
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniform2fv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
const FlexibleFloat32ArrayView& v,
GLuint src_offset,
GLuint src_length) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateUniformParameters<WTF::Float32Array>("uniform2fv", location, v,
2, src_offset, src_length))
return;
ContextGL()->Uniform2fv(
location->Location(),
(src_length ? src_length : (v.length() - src_offset)) >> 1,
v.DataMaybeOnStack() + src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncTest::TriggerBirthdayError() {
ASSERT_TRUE(ServerSupportsErrorTriggering());
std::string path = "chromiumsync/birthdayerror";
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(), sync_server_.GetURL(path));
ASSERT_EQ("Birthday error",
UTF16ToASCII(browser()->GetSelectedWebContents()->GetTitle()));
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 105,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int evdns_resolve_ipv4(const char *name, int flags,
evdns_callback_type callback, void *ptr)
{
return evdns_base_resolve_ipv4(current_base, name, flags, callback, ptr)
? 0 : -1;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ActivateViewForTextInputManager(RenderWidgetHostViewBase* view,
ui::TextInputType type) {
DCHECK_NE(ui::TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_NONE, type);
if (render_widget_host_delegate()->GetFocusedRenderWidgetHost(
widget_host_) != view->GetRenderWidgetHost()) {
render_widget_host_delegate()->set_focused_widget(view->host());
}
TextInputManager* manager =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostImpl*>(view->GetRenderWidgetHost())
->delegate()
->GetTextInputManager();
if (manager->GetActiveWidget()) {
manager->active_view_for_testing()->TextInputStateChanged(
TextInputState());
}
if (!view)
return;
TextInputState state_with_type_text;
state_with_type_text.type = type;
view->TextInputStateChanged(state_with_type_text);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,579
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, int tag, int iclass)
{
int i, ret, flags, ttag, tclass, ndef;
flags = tt->flags;
/*
* Work out tag and class to use: tagging may come either from the
* template or the arguments, not both because this would create
* ambiguity. Additionally the iclass argument may contain some
* additional flags which should be noted and passed down to other
* levels.
*/
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_MASK) {
/* Error if argument and template tagging */
if (tag != -1)
/* FIXME: error code here */
return -1;
/* Get tagging from template */
ttag = tt->tag;
tclass = flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS;
} else if (tag != -1) {
/* No template tagging, get from arguments */
ttag = tag;
tclass = iclass & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS;
} else {
ttag = -1;
tclass = 0;
}
/*
* Remove any class mask from iflag.
*/
iclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS;
/*
* At this point 'ttag' contains the outer tag to use, 'tclass' is the
* class and iclass is any flags passed to this function.
*/
/* if template and arguments require ndef, use it */
if ((flags & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF) && (iclass & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF))
ndef = 2;
else
ndef = 1;
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) {
/* SET OF, SEQUENCE OF */
STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*pval;
int isset, sktag, skaclass;
int skcontlen, sklen;
ASN1_VALUE *skitem;
if (!*pval)
return 0;
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF) {
isset = 1;
/* 2 means we reorder */
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF)
isset = 2;
} else
isset = 0;
/*
* Work out inner tag value: if EXPLICIT or no tagging use underlying
* type.
*/
if ((ttag != -1) && !(flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)) {
sktag = ttag;
skaclass = tclass;
} else {
skaclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
if (isset)
sktag = V_ASN1_SET;
else
sktag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
}
/* Determine total length of items */
skcontlen = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++) {
skitem = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(sk, i);
skcontlen += ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&skitem, NULL,
ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
-1, iclass);
}
sklen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, skcontlen, sktag);
/* If EXPLICIT need length of surrounding tag */
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, sklen, ttag);
else
ret = sklen;
if (!out)
return ret;
/* Now encode this lot... */
/* EXPLICIT tag */
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, sklen, ttag, tclass);
/* SET or SEQUENCE and IMPLICIT tag */
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, skcontlen, sktag, skaclass);
/* And the stuff itself */
asn1_set_seq_out(sk, out, skcontlen, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
isset, iclass);
if (ndef == 2) {
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
}
return ret;
}
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG) {
/* EXPLICIT tagging */
/* Find length of tagged item */
i = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, NULL, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, iclass);
if (!i)
return 0;
/* Find length of EXPLICIT tag */
ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, i, ttag);
if (out) {
/* Output tag and item */
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, i, ttag, tclass);
ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, out, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, iclass);
if (ndef == 2)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
}
return ret;
}
/* Either normal or IMPLICIT tagging: combine class and flags */
return ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, out, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
ttag, tclass | iclass);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs40_call_sync_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_call_sync_data *data = calldata;
nfs4_sequence_done(task, data->seq_res);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AddScheme(const std::string& scheme) {
schemes_.insert(scheme);
}
Commit Message: Apply missing kParentDirectory check
BUG=161564
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11414046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::DidCompletePageScaleAnimation() {
if (auto* focused_frame = GetWebView()->FocusedFrame()) {
if (focused_frame->AutofillClient())
focused_frame->AutofillClient()->DidCompleteFocusChangeInFrame();
}
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dealloc_ofp_port(struct ofproto *ofproto, ofp_port_t ofp_port)
{
if (ofp_to_u16(ofp_port) < ofproto->max_ports) {
ofport_set_usage(ofproto, ofp_port, time_msec());
}
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,220
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_xdr_enc_lockt(struct rpc_rqst *req, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs_lockt_args *args)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = nfs4_xdr_minorversion(&args->seq_args),
};
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->fh, &hdr);
encode_lockt(xdr, args, &hdr);
encode_nops(&hdr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: channel_lookup(int id)
{
Channel *c;
if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL)
return (NULL);
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
return (c);
}
logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type);
return (NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GahpClient::nordugrid_exit_info(const char *hostname, const char *job_id,
bool &normal_exit, int &exit_code,
float &wallclock, float &sys_cpu,
float &user_cpu )
{
static const char* command = "NORDUGRID_EXIT_INFO";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!hostname) hostname=NULLSTRING;
if (!job_id) job_id=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
char *esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(hostname) );
char *esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(job_id) );
int x = sprintf(reqline, "%s %s", esc1, esc2 );
free( esc1 );
free( esc2 );
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,deleg_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 8) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
if ( atoi( result->argv[2] ) ) {
normal_exit = true;
} else {
normal_exit = false;
}
exit_code = atoi( result->argv[3] );
wallclock = atof( result->argv[4] );
sys_cpu = atof( result->argv[5] );
user_cpu = atof( result->argv[6] );
if ( strcasecmp(result->argv[7], NULLSTRING) ) {
error_string = result->argv[7];
} else {
error_string = "";
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,213
|
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