instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HeadlessDevToolsClientMinimizeWindowTest()
: HeadlessDevToolsClientChangeWindowStateTest(
browser::WindowState::MINIMIZED){};
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,755
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ParamTraits<gfx::Size>::Write(Message* m, const gfx::Size& p) {
m->WriteInt(p.width());
m->WriteInt(p.height());
}
Commit Message: Beware of print-read inconsistency when serializing GURLs.
BUG=165622
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11576038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173583 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 117,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteARTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
if ((image->columns > 65535UL) || (image->rows > 65535UL))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
image->endian=MSBEndian;
image->depth=1;
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->rows);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
length=(image->columns+7)/8;
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Convert image to a bi-level image.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GrayQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
ThrowWriterException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToWriteImageData");
count=WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (-(ssize_t) length) & 0x01,pixels);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,446
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit tcp_illinois_unregister(void)
{
tcp_unregister_congestion_control(&tcp_illinois);
}
Commit Message: net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinois
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 18,535
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebLocalFrameImpl::ExecuteCommand(const WebString& name,
const WebString& value) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
WebPluginContainerImpl* plugin_container =
GetFrame()->GetWebPluginContainer();
if (plugin_container && plugin_container->ExecuteEditCommand(name, value))
return true;
return GetFrame()->GetEditor().ExecuteCommand(name, value);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct inode *dquot_to_inode(struct dquot *dquot)
{
return sb_dqopt(dquot->dq_sb)->files[dquot->dq_type];
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,437
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zsetdevice(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
gx_device *dev = gs_currentdevice(igs);
os_ptr op = osp;
int code = 0;
check_write_type(*op, t_device);
if (dev->LockSafetyParams) { /* do additional checking if locked */
if(op->value.pdevice != dev) /* don't allow a different device */
return_error(gs_error_invalidaccess);
}
dev->ShowpageCount = 0;
code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(igs, op->value.pdevice);
if (code < 0)
return code;
make_bool(op, code != 0); /* erase page if 1 */
invalidate_stack_devices(i_ctx_p);
clear_pagedevice(istate);
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 1
| 164,638
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_recvrcvinfo(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
int val = 0;
if (len < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(int);
if (sctp_sk(sk)->recvrcvinfo)
val = 1;
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 43,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: apply_nonancestor_delayed_set_stat (char const *file_name, bool after_links)
{
size_t file_name_len = strlen (file_name);
bool check_for_renamed_directories = 0;
while (delayed_set_stat_head)
{
struct delayed_set_stat *data = delayed_set_stat_head;
bool skip_this_one = 0;
struct stat st;
mode_t current_mode = data->current_mode;
mode_t current_mode_mask = data->current_mode_mask;
check_for_renamed_directories |= data->after_links;
if (after_links < data->after_links
|| (data->file_name_len < file_name_len
&& file_name[data->file_name_len]
&& (ISSLASH (file_name[data->file_name_len])
|| ISSLASH (file_name[data->file_name_len - 1]))
&& memcmp (file_name, data->file_name, data->file_name_len) == 0))
break;
chdir_do (data->change_dir);
if (check_for_renamed_directories)
{
if (fstatat (chdir_fd, data->file_name, &st, data->atflag) != 0)
{
stat_error (data->file_name);
skip_this_one = 1;
}
else
{
current_mode = st.st_mode;
current_mode_mask = ALL_MODE_BITS;
if (! (st.st_dev == data->dev && st.st_ino == data->ino))
{
ERROR ((0, 0,
_("%s: Directory renamed before its status could be extracted"),
quotearg_colon (data->file_name)));
skip_this_one = 1;
}
}
}
if (! skip_this_one)
{
struct tar_stat_info sb;
sb.stat.st_mode = data->mode;
sb.stat.st_uid = data->uid;
sb.stat.st_gid = data->gid;
sb.atime = data->atime;
sb.mtime = data->mtime;
sb.cntx_name = data->cntx_name;
sb.acls_a_ptr = data->acls_a_ptr;
sb.acls_a_len = data->acls_a_len;
sb.acls_d_ptr = data->acls_d_ptr;
sb.acls_d_len = data->acls_d_len;
sb.xattr_map = data->xattr_map;
sb.xattr_map_size = data->xattr_map_size;
set_stat (data->file_name, &sb,
-1, current_mode, current_mode_mask,
DIRTYPE, data->interdir, data->atflag);
}
delayed_set_stat_head = data->next;
free_delayed_set_stat (data);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 9,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType TransformImages(Image **images,
const char *crop_geometry,const char *image_geometry,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image,
**image_list,
*transform_images;
MagickStatusType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
assert(images != (Image **) NULL);
assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
(*images)->filename);
image_list=ImageListToArray(*images,exception);
if (image_list == (Image **) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
status=MagickTrue;
transform_images=NewImageList();
for (i=0; image_list[i] != (Image *) NULL; i++)
{
image=image_list[i];
status&=TransformImage(&image,crop_geometry,image_geometry,exception);
AppendImageToList(&transform_images,image);
}
*images=transform_images;
image_list=(Image **) RelinquishMagickMemory(image_list);
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: Fixed out of bounds error in SpliceImage.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 74,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::setValueAsNumber(double newValue, ExceptionCode& ec, TextFieldEventBehavior eventBehavior)
{
if (!std::isfinite(newValue)) {
ec = NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
m_inputType->setValueAsDouble(newValue, eventBehavior, ec);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 113,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_desktop_file_keys_from_client (GsmClient *client,
GKeyFile *keyfile)
{
SmProp *prop;
char *name;
char *comment;
prop = find_property (GSM_XSMP_CLIENT (client), SmProgram, NULL);
name = g_strdup (prop->vals[0].value);
comment = g_strdup_printf ("Client %s which was automatically saved",
gsm_client_peek_startup_id (client));
g_key_file_set_string (keyfile,
G_KEY_FILE_DESKTOP_GROUP,
G_KEY_FILE_DESKTOP_KEY_NAME,
name);
g_key_file_set_string (keyfile,
G_KEY_FILE_DESKTOP_GROUP,
G_KEY_FILE_DESKTOP_KEY_COMMENT,
comment);
g_key_file_set_string (keyfile,
G_KEY_FILE_DESKTOP_GROUP,
G_KEY_FILE_DESKTOP_KEY_ICON,
"system-run");
g_key_file_set_string (keyfile,
G_KEY_FILE_DESKTOP_GROUP,
G_KEY_FILE_DESKTOP_KEY_TYPE,
"Application");
g_key_file_set_boolean (keyfile,
G_KEY_FILE_DESKTOP_GROUP,
G_KEY_FILE_DESKTOP_KEY_STARTUP_NOTIFY,
TRUE);
g_free (name);
g_free (comment);
}
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 63,578
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: qboolean FS_IsDemoExt(const char *filename, int namelen)
{
char *ext_test;
int index, protocol;
ext_test = strrchr(filename, '.');
if(ext_test && !Q_stricmpn(ext_test + 1, DEMOEXT, ARRAY_LEN(DEMOEXT) - 1))
{
protocol = atoi(ext_test + ARRAY_LEN(DEMOEXT));
if(protocol == com_protocol->integer)
return qtrue;
#ifdef LEGACY_PROTOCOL
if(protocol == com_legacyprotocol->integer)
return qtrue;
#endif
for(index = 0; demo_protocols[index]; index++)
{
if(demo_protocols[index] == protocol)
return qtrue;
}
}
return qfalse;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GraphicsLayerFactory* RenderLayerCompositor::graphicsLayerFactory() const
{
if (Page* page = this->page())
return page->chrome().client().graphicsLayerFactory();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 113,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TextTrackCue::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(track_);
EventTargetWithInlineData::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: match(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *magic, uint32_t nmagic,
const unsigned char *s, size_t nbytes, size_t offset, int mode, int text,
int flip, int recursion_level, int *printed_something, int *need_separator,
int *returnval)
{
uint32_t magindex = 0;
unsigned int cont_level = 0;
int returnvalv = 0, e; /* if a match is found it is set to 1*/
int firstline = 1; /* a flag to print X\n X\n- X */
int print = (ms->flags & (MAGIC_MIME|MAGIC_APPLE)) == 0;
if (returnval == NULL)
returnval = &returnvalv;
if (file_check_mem(ms, cont_level) == -1)
return -1;
for (magindex = 0; magindex < nmagic; magindex++) {
int flush = 0;
struct magic *m = &magic[magindex];
if (m->type != FILE_NAME)
if ((IS_LIBMAGIC_STRING(m->type) &&
#define FLT (STRING_BINTEST | STRING_TEXTTEST)
((text && (m->str_flags & FLT) == STRING_BINTEST) ||
(!text && (m->str_flags & FLT) == STRING_TEXTTEST))) ||
(m->flag & mode) != mode) {
/* Skip sub-tests */
while (magindex + 1 < nmagic &&
magic[magindex + 1].cont_level != 0 &&
++magindex)
continue;
continue; /* Skip to next top-level test*/
}
ms->offset = m->offset;
ms->line = m->lineno;
/* if main entry matches, print it... */
switch (mget(ms, s, m, nbytes, offset, cont_level, mode, text,
flip, recursion_level + 1, printed_something,
need_separator, returnval)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 0:
flush = m->reln != '!';
break;
default:
if (m->type == FILE_INDIRECT)
*returnval = 1;
switch (magiccheck(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 0:
flush++;
break;
default:
flush = 0;
break;
}
break;
}
if (flush) {
/*
* main entry didn't match,
* flush its continuations
*/
while (magindex < nmagic - 1 &&
magic[magindex + 1].cont_level != 0)
magindex++;
continue;
}
if ((e = handle_annotation(ms, m)) != 0) {
*returnval = 1;
return e;
}
/*
* If we are going to print something, we'll need to print
* a blank before we print something else.
*/
if (*m->desc) {
*need_separator = 1;
*printed_something = 1;
if (print_sep(ms, firstline) == -1)
return -1;
}
if (print && mprint(ms, m) == -1)
return -1;
ms->c.li[cont_level].off = moffset(ms, m);
/* and any continuations that match */
if (file_check_mem(ms, ++cont_level) == -1)
return -1;
while (magindex + 1 < nmagic && magic[magindex+1].cont_level != 0 &&
++magindex) {
m = &magic[magindex];
ms->line = m->lineno; /* for messages */
if (cont_level < m->cont_level)
continue;
if (cont_level > m->cont_level) {
/*
* We're at the end of the level
* "cont_level" continuations.
*/
cont_level = m->cont_level;
}
ms->offset = m->offset;
if (m->flag & OFFADD) {
ms->offset +=
ms->c.li[cont_level - 1].off;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_CONDITIONALS
if (m->cond == COND_ELSE ||
m->cond == COND_ELIF) {
if (ms->c.li[cont_level].last_match == 1)
continue;
}
#endif
switch (mget(ms, s, m, nbytes, offset, cont_level, mode,
text, flip, recursion_level + 1, printed_something,
need_separator, returnval)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 0:
if (m->reln != '!')
continue;
flush = 1;
break;
default:
if (m->type == FILE_INDIRECT)
*returnval = 1;
flush = 0;
break;
}
switch (flush ? 1 : magiccheck(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 0:
#ifdef ENABLE_CONDITIONALS
ms->c.li[cont_level].last_match = 0;
#endif
break;
default:
#ifdef ENABLE_CONDITIONALS
ms->c.li[cont_level].last_match = 1;
#endif
if (m->type != FILE_DEFAULT)
ms->c.li[cont_level].got_match = 1;
else if (ms->c.li[cont_level].got_match) {
ms->c.li[cont_level].got_match = 0;
break;
}
if ((e = handle_annotation(ms, m)) != 0) {
*returnval = 1;
return e;
}
/*
* If we are going to print something,
* make sure that we have a separator first.
*/
if (*m->desc) {
if (!*printed_something) {
*printed_something = 1;
if (print_sep(ms, firstline)
== -1)
return -1;
}
}
/*
* This continuation matched. Print
* its message, with a blank before it
* if the previous item printed and
* this item isn't empty.
*/
/* space if previous printed */
if (*need_separator
&& ((m->flag & NOSPACE) == 0)
&& *m->desc) {
if (print &&
file_printf(ms, " ") == -1)
return -1;
*need_separator = 0;
}
if (print && mprint(ms, m) == -1)
return -1;
ms->c.li[cont_level].off = moffset(ms, m);
if (*m->desc)
*need_separator = 1;
/*
* If we see any continuations
* at a higher level,
* process them.
*/
if (file_check_mem(ms, ++cont_level) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
}
if (*printed_something) {
firstline = 0;
if (print)
*returnval = 1;
}
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_CONTINUE) == 0 && *printed_something) {
return *returnval; /* don't keep searching */
}
}
return *returnval; /* This is hit if -k is set or there is no match */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLboolean WebGL2RenderingContextBase::isTransformFeedback(
WebGLTransformFeedback* feedback) {
if (isContextLost() || !feedback)
return 0;
if (!feedback->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsTransformFeedback(feedback->Object());
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 173,126
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nvmet_fc_handle_fcp_rqst(struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport,
struct nvmet_fc_fcp_iod *fod)
{
struct nvme_fc_cmd_iu *cmdiu = &fod->cmdiubuf;
int ret;
/*
* Fused commands are currently not supported in the linux
* implementation.
*
* As such, the implementation of the FC transport does not
* look at the fused commands and order delivery to the upper
* layer until we have both based on csn.
*/
fod->fcpreq->done = nvmet_fc_xmt_fcp_op_done;
fod->total_length = be32_to_cpu(cmdiu->data_len);
if (cmdiu->flags & FCNVME_CMD_FLAGS_WRITE) {
fod->io_dir = NVMET_FCP_WRITE;
if (!nvme_is_write(&cmdiu->sqe))
goto transport_error;
} else if (cmdiu->flags & FCNVME_CMD_FLAGS_READ) {
fod->io_dir = NVMET_FCP_READ;
if (nvme_is_write(&cmdiu->sqe))
goto transport_error;
} else {
fod->io_dir = NVMET_FCP_NODATA;
if (fod->total_length)
goto transport_error;
}
fod->req.cmd = &fod->cmdiubuf.sqe;
fod->req.rsp = &fod->rspiubuf.cqe;
fod->req.port = fod->queue->port;
/* ensure nvmet handlers will set cmd handler callback */
fod->req.execute = NULL;
/* clear any response payload */
memset(&fod->rspiubuf, 0, sizeof(fod->rspiubuf));
fod->data_sg = NULL;
fod->data_sg_cnt = 0;
ret = nvmet_req_init(&fod->req,
&fod->queue->nvme_cq,
&fod->queue->nvme_sq,
&nvmet_fc_tgt_fcp_ops);
if (!ret) {
/* bad SQE content or invalid ctrl state */
/* nvmet layer has already called op done to send rsp. */
return;
}
/* keep a running counter of tail position */
atomic_inc(&fod->queue->sqtail);
if (fod->total_length) {
ret = nvmet_fc_alloc_tgt_pgs(fod);
if (ret) {
nvmet_req_complete(&fod->req, ret);
return;
}
}
fod->req.sg = fod->data_sg;
fod->req.sg_cnt = fod->data_sg_cnt;
fod->offset = 0;
if (fod->io_dir == NVMET_FCP_WRITE) {
/* pull the data over before invoking nvmet layer */
nvmet_fc_transfer_fcp_data(tgtport, fod, NVMET_FCOP_WRITEDATA);
return;
}
/*
* Reads or no data:
*
* can invoke the nvmet_layer now. If read data, cmd completion will
* push the data
*/
fod->req.execute(&fod->req);
return;
transport_error:
nvmet_fc_abort_op(tgtport, fod);
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nsc_decode(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
UINT16 rw = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
BYTE shift = context->ColorLossLevel - 1; /* colorloss recovery + YCoCg shift */
BYTE* bmpdata = context->BitmapData;
for (y = 0; y < context->height; y++)
{
const BYTE* yplane;
const BYTE* coplane;
const BYTE* cgplane;
const BYTE* aplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[3] + y * context->width; /* A */
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel)
{
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * rw; /* Y */
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + (y >> 1) * (rw >>
1); /* Co, supersampled */
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + (y >> 1) * (rw >>
1); /* Cg, supersampled */
}
else
{
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * context->width; /* Y */
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * context->width; /* Co */
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * context->width; /* Cg */
}
for (x = 0; x < context->width; x++)
{
INT16 y_val = (INT16) * yplane;
INT16 co_val = (INT16)(INT8)(*coplane << shift);
INT16 cg_val = (INT16)(INT8)(*cgplane << shift);
INT16 r_val = y_val + co_val - cg_val;
INT16 g_val = y_val + cg_val;
INT16 b_val = y_val - co_val - cg_val;
*bmpdata++ = MINMAX(b_val, 0, 0xFF);
*bmpdata++ = MINMAX(g_val, 0, 0xFF);
*bmpdata++ = MINMAX(r_val, 0, 0xFF);
*bmpdata++ = *aplane;
yplane++;
coplane += (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel ? x % 2 : 1);
cgplane += (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel ? x % 2 : 1);
aplane++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 169,282
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueAsInteger() const
{
return m_selectedIndex;
}
Commit Message: INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 103,255
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cmd_xfer(const char *tag, const char *name,
const char *toserver, const char *topart)
{
int r = 0, partial_success = 0, mbox_count = 0;
struct xfer_header *xfer = NULL;
struct xfer_list list = { &imapd_namespace, imapd_userid, NULL, 0, NULL };
struct xfer_item *item, *next;
char *intname = NULL;
/* administrators only please */
/* however, proxys can do this, if their authzid is an admin */
if (!imapd_userisadmin && !imapd_userisproxyadmin) {
r = IMAP_PERMISSION_DENIED;
goto done;
}
if (!strcmp(toserver, config_servername)) {
r = IMAP_BAD_SERVER;
goto done;
}
/* Build list of users/mailboxes to transfer */
if (config_partitiondir(name)) {
/* entire partition */
list.part = name;
mboxlist_findall(NULL, "*", 1, NULL, NULL, xfer_addmbox, &list);
} else {
/* mailbox pattern */
mbname_t *mbname;
intname = mboxname_from_external(name, &imapd_namespace, imapd_userid);
mbname = mbname_from_intname(intname);
if (mbname_localpart(mbname) &&
(mbname_isdeleted(mbname) || strarray_size(mbname_boxes(mbname)))) {
/* targeted a user submailbox */
list.allow_usersubs = 1;
}
mbname_free(&mbname);
mboxlist_findall(NULL, intname, 1, NULL, NULL, xfer_addmbox, &list);
free(intname);
}
r = xfer_init(toserver, &xfer);
if (r) goto done;
for (item = list.mboxes; item; item = next) {
mbentry_t *mbentry = item->mbentry;
/* NOTE: Since XFER can only be used by an admin, and we always connect
* to the destination backend as an admin, we take advantage of the fact
* that admins *always* use a consistent mailbox naming scheme.
* So, 'name' should be used in any command we send to a backend, and
* 'intname' is the internal name to be used for mupdate and findall.
*/
r = 0;
intname = mbentry->name;
xfer->topart = xstrdup(topart ? topart : mbentry->partition);
/* if we are not moving a user, just move the one mailbox */
if (item->state != XFER_MOVING_USER) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "XFER: mailbox '%s' -> %s!%s",
mbentry->name, xfer->toserver, xfer->topart);
/* is the selected mailbox the one we're moving? */
if (!strcmpsafe(intname, index_mboxname(imapd_index))) {
r = IMAP_MAILBOX_LOCKED;
goto next;
}
/* we're moving this mailbox */
xfer_addusermbox(mbentry, xfer);
mbox_count++;
r = do_xfer(xfer);
} else {
xfer->userid = mboxname_to_userid(intname);
syslog(LOG_INFO, "XFER: user '%s' -> %s!%s",
xfer->userid, xfer->toserver, xfer->topart);
if (!config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_ALLOWUSERMOVES)) {
/* not configured to allow user moves */
r = IMAP_MAILBOX_NOTSUPPORTED;
} else if (!strcmp(xfer->userid, imapd_userid)) {
/* don't move your own inbox, that could be troublesome */
r = IMAP_MAILBOX_NOTSUPPORTED;
} else if (!strncmpsafe(intname, index_mboxname(imapd_index),
strlen(intname))) {
/* selected mailbox is in the namespace we're moving */
r = IMAP_MAILBOX_LOCKED;
}
if (r) goto next;
if (!xfer->use_replication) {
/* set the quotaroot if needed */
r = xfer_setquotaroot(xfer, intname);
if (r) goto next;
/* backport the seen file if needed */
if (xfer->remoteversion < 12) {
r = seen_open(xfer->userid, SEEN_CREATE, &xfer->seendb);
if (r) goto next;
}
}
r = mboxlist_usermboxtree(xfer->userid, xfer_addusermbox,
xfer, MBOXTREE_DELETED);
/* NOTE: mailboxes were added in reverse, so the inbox is
* done last */
r = do_xfer(xfer);
if (r) goto next;
/* this was a successful user move, and we need to delete
certain user meta-data (but not seen state!) */
syslog(LOG_INFO, "XFER: deleting user metadata");
user_deletedata(xfer->userid, 0);
}
next:
if (r) {
if (xfer->userid)
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* NO USER %s (%s)\r\n",
xfer->userid, error_message(r));
else
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* NO MAILBOX \"%s\" (%s)\r\n",
item->extname, error_message(r));
} else {
partial_success = 1;
if (xfer->userid)
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* OK USER %s\r\n", xfer->userid);
else
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* OK MAILBOX \"%s\"\r\n", item->extname);
}
prot_flush(imapd_out);
mboxlist_entry_free(&mbentry);
next = item->next;
free(item);
if (xfer->userid || mbox_count > 1000) {
/* RESTART after each user or after every 1000 mailboxes */
mbox_count = 0;
sync_send_restart(xfer->be->out);
r = sync_parse_response("RESTART", xfer->be->in, NULL);
if (r) goto done;
}
xfer_cleanup(xfer);
if (partial_success) r = 0;
}
done:
if (xfer) xfer_done(&xfer);
imapd_check(NULL, 0);
if (r) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(r));
} else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED));
}
return;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 95,185
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageconvolution)
{
zval *SIM, *hash_matrix;
zval **var = NULL, **var2 = NULL;
gdImagePtr im_src = NULL;
double div, offset;
int nelem, i, j, res;
float matrix[3][3] = {{0,0,0}, {0,0,0}, {0,0,0}};
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "radd", &SIM, &hash_matrix, &div, &offset) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_src, gdImagePtr, &SIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
nelem = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(hash_matrix));
if (nelem != 3) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must have 3x3 array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i<3; i++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(hash_matrix), (i), (void **) &var) == SUCCESS && Z_TYPE_PP(var) == IS_ARRAY) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(var) != IS_ARRAY || zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_PP(var)) != 3 ) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must have 3x3 array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (j=0; j<3; j++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(var), (j), (void **) &var2) == SUCCESS) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(var2) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = **var2;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
matrix[i][j] = (float)Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
matrix[i][j] = (float)Z_DVAL_PP(var2);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must have a 3x3 matrix");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
}
res = gdImageConvolution(im_src, matrix, (float)div, (float)offset);
if (res) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72730 - imagegammacorrect allows arbitrary write access
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 50,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::writeDoubleVector(const std::unique_ptr<std::vector<double>>& val)
{
return writeNullableTypedVector(val, &Parcel::writeDouble);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
source_stride_ = (width_ + 31) & ~31;
reference_stride_ = width_ * 2;
rnd_.Reset(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sco_sock_cleanup_listen(struct sock *parent)
{
struct sock *sk;
BT_DBG("parent %p", parent);
/* Close not yet accepted channels */
while ((sk = bt_accept_dequeue(parent, NULL))) {
sco_sock_close(sk);
sco_sock_kill(sk);
}
parent->sk_state = BT_CLOSED;
sock_set_flag(parent, SOCK_ZAPPED);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: sco: fix information leak to userspace
struct sco_conninfo has one padding byte in the end. Local variable
cinfo of type sco_conninfo is copied to userspace with this uninizialized
one byte, leading to old stack contents leak.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 27,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void json_tokener_free(struct json_tokener *tok)
{
json_tokener_reset(tok);
if (tok->pb) printbuf_free(tok->pb);
if (tok->stack) free(tok->stack);
free(tok);
}
Commit Message: Patch to address the following issues:
* CVE-2013-6371: hash collision denial of service
* CVE-2013-6370: buffer overflow if size_t is larger than int
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 40,945
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Splash::pipeRunAACMYK8(SplashPipe *pipe) {
Guchar aSrc, aDest, alpha2, aResult;
SplashColor cDest;
Guchar cResult0, cResult1, cResult2, cResult3;
cDest[0] = pipe->destColorPtr[0];
cDest[1] = pipe->destColorPtr[1];
cDest[2] = pipe->destColorPtr[2];
cDest[3] = pipe->destColorPtr[3];
aDest = *pipe->destAlphaPtr;
aSrc = div255(pipe->aInput * pipe->shape);
aResult = aSrc + aDest - div255(aSrc * aDest);
alpha2 = aResult;
if (alpha2 == 0) {
cResult0 = 0;
cResult1 = 0;
cResult2 = 0;
cResult3 = 0;
} else {
cResult0 = state->cmykTransferC[(Guchar)(((alpha2 - aSrc) * cDest[0] +
aSrc * pipe->cSrc[0]) / alpha2)];
cResult1 = state->cmykTransferM[(Guchar)(((alpha2 - aSrc) * cDest[1] +
aSrc * pipe->cSrc[1]) / alpha2)];
cResult2 = state->cmykTransferY[(Guchar)(((alpha2 - aSrc) * cDest[2] +
aSrc * pipe->cSrc[2]) / alpha2)];
cResult3 = state->cmykTransferK[(Guchar)(((alpha2 - aSrc) * cDest[3] +
aSrc * pipe->cSrc[3]) / alpha2)];
}
if (state->overprintMask & 1) {
pipe->destColorPtr[0] = (state->overprintAdditive && pipe->shape != 0) ?
std::min<int>(pipe->destColorPtr[0] + cResult0, 255) :
cResult0;
}
if (state->overprintMask & 2) {
pipe->destColorPtr[1] = (state->overprintAdditive && pipe->shape != 0) ?
std::min<int>(pipe->destColorPtr[1] + cResult1, 255) :
cResult1;
}
if (state->overprintMask & 4) {
pipe->destColorPtr[2] = (state->overprintAdditive && pipe->shape != 0) ?
std::min<int>(pipe->destColorPtr[2] + cResult2, 255) :
cResult2;
}
if (state->overprintMask & 8) {
pipe->destColorPtr[3] = (state->overprintAdditive && pipe->shape != 0) ?
std::min<int>(pipe->destColorPtr[3] + cResult3, 255) :
cResult3;
}
pipe->destColorPtr += 4;
*pipe->destAlphaPtr++ = aResult;
++pipe->x;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameHostManager::CreateSpeculativeRenderFrameHost(
SiteInstance* old_instance,
SiteInstance* new_instance) {
CHECK(new_instance);
CHECK_NE(old_instance, new_instance);
if (!new_instance->GetProcess()->Init())
return false;
CreateProxiesForNewRenderFrameHost(old_instance, new_instance);
speculative_render_frame_host_ =
CreateRenderFrame(new_instance, delegate_->IsHidden(), nullptr);
if (speculative_render_frame_host_) {
speculative_render_frame_host_->render_view_host()
->DispatchRenderViewCreated();
}
return !!speculative_render_frame_host_;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ContentBrowserClient* ShellMainDelegate::CreateContentBrowserClient() {
browser_client_.reset(switches::IsRunWebTestsSwitchPresent()
? new LayoutTestContentBrowserClient
: new ShellContentBrowserClient);
return browser_client_.get();
}
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <jcivelli@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 131,052
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, setFlags)
{
zval *object = getThis();
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
long ar_flags = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &ar_flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern->ar_flags = (intern->ar_flags & SPL_ARRAY_INT_MASK) | (ar_flags & ~SPL_ARRAY_INT_MASK);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContext::setHostMappingRules(const QStringList& rules) {
DCHECK(!IsInitialized());
construct_props_->host_mapping_rules.clear();
for (QStringList::const_iterator it = rules.cbegin();
it != rules.cend(); ++it) {
construct_props_->host_mapping_rules.push_back((*it).toStdString());
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool jsvIsNameWithValue(const JsVar *v) { return v && (v->flags&JSV_VARTYPEMASK)>=_JSV_NAME_WITH_VALUE_START && (v->flags&JSV_VARTYPEMASK)<=_JSV_NAME_WITH_VALUE_END; }
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,477
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionService::ExtensionRuntimeData::ExtensionRuntimeData()
: background_page_ready(false),
being_upgraded(false) {
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 98,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sBIT0_error_fn(png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
/* 0 is invalid... */
png_color_8 bad;
bad.red = bad.green = bad.blue = bad.gray = bad.alpha = 0;
png_set_sBIT(pp, pi, &bad);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void deflate_comp_exit(struct deflate_ctx *ctx)
{
zlib_deflateEnd(&ctx->comp_stream);
vfree(ctx->comp_stream.workspace);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct ns_common *netns_get(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct net *net = NULL;
struct nsproxy *nsproxy;
task_lock(task);
nsproxy = task->nsproxy;
if (nsproxy)
net = get_net(nsproxy->net_ns);
task_unlock(task);
return net ? &net->ns : NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()
(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)
Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.
It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been
finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory
corruption:
put_net(peer) rtnl_lock()
atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ...
__put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id)
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id)
| get_net(peer) [count=1]
| ...
| (use after final put)
v ...
cleanup_net() ...
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ...
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
... ...
... put_net(peer)
... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]
... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... queue_work()
... rtnl_unlock()
rtnl_lock() ...
for_each_net(tmp) { ...
id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ...
spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ...
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ...
... ...
net_drop_ns() ...
net_free(peer) ...
} ...
|
v
cleanup_net()
...
(Second free of peer)
Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list
will be corrupted.
Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while
put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be
enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick
the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely.
The patch fixes the problem in standard way.
(Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires
check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but
in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be
safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should
be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send
a separate message to netdev@ later).
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids"
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 86,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: content::KeyboardEventProcessingResult DevToolsWindow::PreHandleKeyboardEvent(
WebContents* source,
const content::NativeWebKeyboardEvent& event) {
BrowserWindow* inspected_window = GetInspectedBrowserWindow();
if (inspected_window) {
return inspected_window->PreHandleKeyboardEvent(event);
}
return content::KeyboardEventProcessingResult::NOT_HANDLED;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Use no-referrer for DevTools links
Bug: 732751
Change-Id: I77753120e2424203dedcc7bc0847fb67f87fe2b2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/615021
Reviewed-by: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#494413}
CWE ID: CWE-668
| 0
| 151,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void clamp_mv(VP8mvbounds *s, VP56mv *dst, const VP56mv *src)
{
dst->x = av_clip(src->x, av_clip(s->mv_min.x, INT16_MIN, INT16_MAX),
av_clip(s->mv_max.x, INT16_MIN, INT16_MAX));
dst->y = av_clip(src->y, av_clip(s->mv_min.y, INT16_MIN, INT16_MAX),
av_clip(s->mv_max.y, INT16_MIN, INT16_MAX));
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pppol2tp_session_setsockopt(struct sock *sk,
struct l2tp_session *session,
int optname, int val)
{
int err = 0;
struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
switch (optname) {
case PPPOL2TP_SO_RECVSEQ:
if ((val != 0) && (val != 1)) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
session->recv_seq = val ? -1 : 0;
l2tp_info(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_CONTROL,
"%s: set recv_seq=%d\n",
session->name, session->recv_seq);
break;
case PPPOL2TP_SO_SENDSEQ:
if ((val != 0) && (val != 1)) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
session->send_seq = val ? -1 : 0;
{
struct sock *ssk = ps->sock;
struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(ssk);
po->chan.hdrlen = val ? PPPOL2TP_L2TP_HDR_SIZE_SEQ :
PPPOL2TP_L2TP_HDR_SIZE_NOSEQ;
}
l2tp_session_set_header_len(session, session->tunnel->version);
l2tp_info(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_CONTROL,
"%s: set send_seq=%d\n",
session->name, session->send_seq);
break;
case PPPOL2TP_SO_LNSMODE:
if ((val != 0) && (val != 1)) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
session->lns_mode = val ? -1 : 0;
l2tp_info(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_CONTROL,
"%s: set lns_mode=%d\n",
session->name, session->lns_mode);
break;
case PPPOL2TP_SO_DEBUG:
session->debug = val;
l2tp_info(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_CONTROL, "%s: set debug=%x\n",
session->name, session->debug);
break;
case PPPOL2TP_SO_REORDERTO:
session->reorder_timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(val);
l2tp_info(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_CONTROL,
"%s: set reorder_timeout=%d\n",
session->name, session->reorder_timeout);
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: net/l2tp: don't fall back on UDP [get|set]sockopt
The l2tp [get|set]sockopt() code has fallen back to the UDP functions
for socket option levels != SOL_PPPOL2TP since day one, but that has
never actually worked, since the l2tp socket isn't an inet socket.
As David Miller points out:
"If we wanted this to work, it'd have to look up the tunnel and then
use tunnel->sk, but I wonder how useful that would be"
Since this can never have worked so nobody could possibly have depended
on that functionality, just remove the broken code and return -EINVAL.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,425
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BackendImpl::BackendImpl(
const base::FilePath& path,
scoped_refptr<BackendCleanupTracker> cleanup_tracker,
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& cache_thread,
net::NetLog* net_log)
: cleanup_tracker_(std::move(cleanup_tracker)),
background_queue_(this, FallbackToInternalIfNull(cache_thread)),
path_(path),
block_files_(path),
mask_(0),
max_size_(0),
up_ticks_(0),
cache_type_(net::DISK_CACHE),
uma_report_(0),
user_flags_(0),
init_(false),
restarted_(false),
unit_test_(false),
read_only_(false),
disabled_(false),
new_eviction_(false),
first_timer_(true),
user_load_(false),
net_log_(net_log),
done_(base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::MANUAL,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::NOT_SIGNALED),
ptr_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 172,696
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int rpmPackageFilesRemove(rpmts ts, rpmte te, rpmfiles files,
rpmpsm psm, char ** failedFile)
{
rpmfi fi = rpmfilesIter(files, RPMFI_ITER_BACK);
rpmfs fs = rpmteGetFileStates(te);
rpmPlugins plugins = rpmtsPlugins(ts);
struct stat sb;
int rc = 0;
char *fpath = NULL;
while (!rc && rpmfiNext(fi) >= 0) {
rpmFileAction action = rpmfsGetAction(fs, rpmfiFX(fi));
fpath = fsmFsPath(fi, NULL);
rc = fsmStat(fpath, 1, &sb);
fsmDebug(fpath, action, &sb);
/* Run fsm file pre hook for all plugins */
rc = rpmpluginsCallFsmFilePre(plugins, fi, fpath,
sb.st_mode, action);
if (!XFA_SKIPPING(action))
rc = fsmBackup(fi, action);
/* Remove erased files. */
if (action == FA_ERASE) {
int missingok = (rpmfiFFlags(fi) & (RPMFILE_MISSINGOK | RPMFILE_GHOST));
rc = fsmRemove(fpath, sb.st_mode);
/*
* Missing %ghost or %missingok entries are not errors.
* XXX: Are non-existent files ever an actual error here? Afterall
* that's exactly what we're trying to accomplish here,
* and complaining about job already done seems like kinderkarten
* level "But it was MY turn!" whining...
*/
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT && missingok) {
rc = 0;
}
/*
* Dont whine on non-empty directories for now. We might be able
* to track at least some of the expected failures though,
* such as when we knowingly left config file backups etc behind.
*/
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOTEMPTY) {
rc = 0;
}
if (rc) {
int lvl = strict_erasures ? RPMLOG_ERR : RPMLOG_WARNING;
rpmlog(lvl, _("%s %s: remove failed: %s\n"),
S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) ? _("directory") : _("file"),
fpath, strerror(errno));
}
}
/* Run fsm file post hook for all plugins */
rpmpluginsCallFsmFilePost(plugins, fi, fpath,
sb.st_mode, action, rc);
/* XXX Failure to remove is not (yet) cause for failure. */
if (!strict_erasures) rc = 0;
if (rc)
*failedFile = xstrdup(fpath);
if (rc == 0) {
/* Notify on success. */
/* On erase we're iterating backwards, fixup for progress */
rpm_loff_t amount = rpmfiFC(fi) - rpmfiFX(fi);
rpmpsmNotify(psm, RPMCALLBACK_UNINST_PROGRESS, amount);
}
fpath = _free(fpath);
}
free(fpath);
rpmfiFree(fi);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Don't follow symlinks on file creation (CVE-2017-7501)
Open newly created files with O_EXCL to prevent symlink tricks.
When reopening hardlinks for writing the actual content, use append
mode instead. This is compatible with the write-only permissions but
is not destructive in case we got redirected to somebody elses file,
verify the target before actually writing anything.
As these are files with the temporary suffix, errors mean a local
user with sufficient privileges to break the installation of the package
anyway is trying to goof us on purpose, don't bother trying to mend it
(we couldn't fix the hardlink case anyhow) but just bail out.
Based on a patch by Florian Festi.
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 67,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int set_haschildren(const mbentry_t *mbentry __attribute__((unused)),
void *rock)
{
uint32_t *attributes = (uint32_t *)rock;
list_callback_calls++;
*attributes |= MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASCHILDREN;
return CYRUSDB_DONE;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 95,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: processLog_trace(const boost::format& fmt)
{
std::cout << "TRACE: " << fmt.str() << std::endl;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 13,225
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SoftMPEG2::~SoftMPEG2() {
CHECK_EQ(deInitDecoder(), (status_t)OK);
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 163,914
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
struct ext4_map_blocks split_map;
struct ext4_extent zero_ex;
struct ext4_extent *ex;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block, eof_block;
unsigned int ee_len, depth;
int allocated, max_zeroout = 0;
int err = 0;
int split_flag = 0;
ext_debug("ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu, max_blocks %u\n", inode->i_ino,
(unsigned long long)map->m_lblk, map->m_len);
sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
eof_block = (inode->i_size + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1) >>
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (eof_block < map->m_lblk + map->m_len)
eof_block = map->m_lblk + map->m_len;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
allocated = ee_len - (map->m_lblk - ee_block);
trace_ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized_enter(inode, map, ex);
/* Pre-conditions */
BUG_ON(!ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(ex));
BUG_ON(!in_range(map->m_lblk, ee_block, ee_len));
/*
* Attempt to transfer newly initialized blocks from the currently
* uninitialized extent to its left neighbor. This is much cheaper
* than an insertion followed by a merge as those involve costly
* memmove() calls. This is the common case in steady state for
* workloads doing fallocate(FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE) followed by append
* writes.
*
* Limitations of the current logic:
* - L1: we only deal with writes at the start of the extent.
* The approach could be extended to writes at the end
* of the extent but this scenario was deemed less common.
* - L2: we do not deal with writes covering the whole extent.
* This would require removing the extent if the transfer
* is possible.
* - L3: we only attempt to merge with an extent stored in the
* same extent tree node.
*/
if ((map->m_lblk == ee_block) && /*L1*/
(map->m_len < ee_len) && /*L2*/
(ex > EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh))) { /*L3*/
struct ext4_extent *prev_ex;
ext4_lblk_t prev_lblk;
ext4_fsblk_t prev_pblk, ee_pblk;
unsigned int prev_len, write_len;
prev_ex = ex - 1;
prev_lblk = le32_to_cpu(prev_ex->ee_block);
prev_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(prev_ex);
prev_pblk = ext4_ext_pblock(prev_ex);
ee_pblk = ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
write_len = map->m_len;
/*
* A transfer of blocks from 'ex' to 'prev_ex' is allowed
* upon those conditions:
* - C1: prev_ex is initialized,
* - C2: prev_ex is logically abutting ex,
* - C3: prev_ex is physically abutting ex,
* - C4: prev_ex can receive the additional blocks without
* overflowing the (initialized) length limit.
*/
if ((!ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(prev_ex)) && /*C1*/
((prev_lblk + prev_len) == ee_block) && /*C2*/
((prev_pblk + prev_len) == ee_pblk) && /*C3*/
(prev_len < (EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN - write_len))) { /*C4*/
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
trace_ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized_fastpath(inode,
map, ex, prev_ex);
/* Shift the start of ex by 'write_len' blocks */
ex->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(ee_block + write_len);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ee_pblk + write_len);
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len - write_len);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex); /* Restore the flag */
/* Extend prev_ex by 'write_len' blocks */
prev_ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(prev_len + write_len);
/* Mark the block containing both extents as dirty */
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* Update path to point to the right extent */
path[depth].p_ext = prev_ex;
/* Result: number of initialized blocks past m_lblk */
allocated = write_len;
goto out;
}
}
WARN_ON(map->m_lblk < ee_block);
/*
* It is safe to convert extent to initialized via explicit
* zeroout only if extent is fully insde i_size or new_size.
*/
split_flag |= ee_block + ee_len <= eof_block ? EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT : 0;
if (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT & split_flag)
max_zeroout = sbi->s_extent_max_zeroout_kb >>
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits;
/* If extent is less than s_max_zeroout_kb, zeroout directly */
if (max_zeroout && (ee_len <= max_zeroout)) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, ex);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
goto out;
}
/*
* four cases:
* 1. split the extent into three extents.
* 2. split the extent into two extents, zeroout the first half.
* 3. split the extent into two extents, zeroout the second half.
* 4. split the extent into two extents with out zeroout.
*/
split_map.m_lblk = map->m_lblk;
split_map.m_len = map->m_len;
if (max_zeroout && (allocated > map->m_len)) {
if (allocated <= max_zeroout) {
/* case 3 */
zero_ex.ee_block =
cpu_to_le32(map->m_lblk);
zero_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&zero_ex,
ext4_ext_pblock(ex) + map->m_lblk - ee_block);
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &zero_ex);
if (err)
goto out;
split_map.m_lblk = map->m_lblk;
split_map.m_len = allocated;
} else if (map->m_lblk - ee_block + map->m_len < max_zeroout) {
/* case 2 */
if (map->m_lblk != ee_block) {
zero_ex.ee_block = ex->ee_block;
zero_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(map->m_lblk -
ee_block);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&zero_ex,
ext4_ext_pblock(ex));
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &zero_ex);
if (err)
goto out;
}
split_map.m_lblk = ee_block;
split_map.m_len = map->m_lblk - ee_block + map->m_len;
allocated = map->m_len;
}
}
allocated = ext4_split_extent(handle, inode, path,
&split_map, split_flag, 0);
if (allocated < 0)
err = allocated;
out:
return err ? err : allocated;
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int req_aprtable2luatable_cb(void *l, const char *key,
const char *value)
{
int t;
lua_State *L = (lua_State *) l; /* [table<s,t>, table<s,s>] */
/* rstack_dump(L, RRR, "start of cb"); */
/* L is [table<s,t>, table<s,s>] */
/* build complex */
lua_getfield(L, -1, key); /* [VALUE, table<s,t>, table<s,s>] */
/* rstack_dump(L, RRR, "after getfield"); */
t = lua_type(L, -1);
switch (t) {
case LUA_TNIL:
case LUA_TNONE:{
lua_pop(L, 1); /* [table<s,t>, table<s,s>] */
lua_newtable(L); /* [array, table<s,t>, table<s,s>] */
lua_pushnumber(L, 1); /* [1, array, table<s,t>, table<s,s>] */
lua_pushstring(L, value); /* [string, 1, array, table<s,t>, table<s,s>] */
lua_settable(L, -3); /* [array, table<s,t>, table<s,s>] */
lua_setfield(L, -2, key); /* [table<s,t>, table<s,s>] */
break;
}
case LUA_TTABLE:{
/* [array, table<s,t>, table<s,s>] */
int size = lua_rawlen(L, -1);
lua_pushnumber(L, size + 1); /* [#, array, table<s,t>, table<s,s>] */
lua_pushstring(L, value); /* [string, #, array, table<s,t>, table<s,s>] */
lua_settable(L, -3); /* [array, table<s,t>, table<s,s>] */
lua_setfield(L, -2, key); /* [table<s,t>, table<s,s>] */
break;
}
}
/* L is [table<s,t>, table<s,s>] */
/* build simple */
lua_getfield(L, -2, key); /* [VALUE, table<s,s>, table<s,t>] */
if (lua_isnoneornil(L, -1)) { /* only set if not already set */
lua_pop(L, 1); /* [table<s,s>, table<s,t>]] */
lua_pushstring(L, value); /* [string, table<s,s>, table<s,t>] */
lua_setfield(L, -3, key); /* [table<s,s>, table<s,t>] */
}
else {
lua_pop(L, 1);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 45,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int trashacl(struct protstream *pin, struct protstream *pout,
char *mailbox)
{
int i=0, j=0;
char tagbuf[128];
int c; /* getword() returns an int */
struct buf cmd, tmp, user;
int r = 0;
memset(&cmd, 0, sizeof(struct buf));
memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(struct buf));
memset(&user, 0, sizeof(struct buf));
prot_printf(pout, "ACL0 GETACL {" SIZE_T_FMT "+}\r\n%s\r\n",
strlen(mailbox), mailbox);
while(1) {
c = prot_getc(pin);
if (c != '*') {
prot_ungetc(c, pin);
r = getresult(pin, "ACL0");
break;
}
c = prot_getc(pin); /* skip SP */
c = getword(pin, &cmd);
if (c == EOF) {
r = IMAP_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE;
break;
}
if (!strncmp(cmd.s, "ACL", 3)) {
while(c != '\n') {
/* An ACL response, we should send a DELETEACL command */
c = getastring(pin, pout, &tmp);
if (c == EOF) {
r = IMAP_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE;
goto cleanup;
}
if(c == '\r') {
c = prot_getc(pin);
if(c != '\n') {
r = IMAP_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE;
goto cleanup;
}
}
if(c == '\n') break; /* end of * ACL */
c = getastring(pin, pout, &user);
if (c == EOF) {
r = IMAP_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE;
goto cleanup;
}
snprintf(tagbuf, sizeof(tagbuf), "ACL%d", ++i);
prot_printf(pout, "%s DELETEACL {" SIZE_T_FMT "+}\r\n%s"
" {" SIZE_T_FMT "+}\r\n%s\r\n",
tagbuf, strlen(mailbox), mailbox,
strlen(user.s), user.s);
if(c == '\r') {
c = prot_getc(pin);
if(c != '\n') {
r = IMAP_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE;
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* if the next character is \n, we'll exit the loop */
}
}
else {
/* skip this line, we don't really care */
eatline(pin, c);
}
}
cleanup:
/* Now cleanup after all the DELETEACL commands */
if(!r) {
while(j < i) {
snprintf(tagbuf, sizeof(tagbuf), "ACL%d", ++j);
r = getresult(pin, tagbuf);
if (r) break;
}
}
if(r) eatline(pin, c);
buf_free(&user);
buf_free(&tmp);
buf_free(&cmd);
return r;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 95,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t SmushXGap(const Image *smush_image,const Image *images,
const ssize_t offset,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*left_view,
*right_view;
const Image
*left_image,
*right_image;
RectangleInfo
left_geometry,
right_geometry;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
y;
size_t
gap;
ssize_t
x;
if (images->previous == (Image *) NULL)
return(0);
right_image=images;
SetGeometry(smush_image,&right_geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(right_image->columns,right_image->rows,
right_image->gravity,&right_geometry);
left_image=images->previous;
SetGeometry(smush_image,&left_geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(left_image->columns,left_image->rows,
left_image->gravity,&left_geometry);
gap=right_image->columns;
left_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(left_image,exception);
right_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(right_image,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) smush_image->rows; y++)
{
for (x=(ssize_t) left_image->columns-1; x > 0; x--)
{
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(left_view,x,left_geometry.y+y,1,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(GetPixelOpacity(p) != TransparentOpacity) ||
((left_image->columns-x-1) >= gap))
break;
}
i=(ssize_t) left_image->columns-x-1;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) right_image->columns; x++)
{
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(right_view,x,right_geometry.y+y,1,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(GetPixelOpacity(p) != TransparentOpacity) ||
((x+i) >= (ssize_t) gap))
break;
}
if ((x+i) < (ssize_t) gap)
gap=(size_t) (x+i);
}
right_view=DestroyCacheView(right_view);
left_view=DestroyCacheView(left_view);
if (y < (ssize_t) smush_image->rows)
return(offset);
return((ssize_t) gap-offset);
}
Commit Message: Fixed incorrect call to DestroyImage reported in #491.
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 64,540
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleStencilThenCoverStrokePathInstancedCHROMIUM(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
static const char kFunctionName[] =
"glStencilThenCoverStrokeInstancedCHROMIUM";
const volatile gles2::cmds::StencilThenCoverStrokePathInstancedCHROMIUM& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::
StencilThenCoverStrokePathInstancedCHROMIUM*>(cmd_data);
if (!features().chromium_path_rendering)
return error::kUnknownCommand;
PathCommandValidatorContext v(this, kFunctionName);
GLuint num_paths = 0;
GLenum path_name_type = GL_NONE;
GLenum cover_mode = GL_BOUNDING_BOX_OF_BOUNDING_BOXES_CHROMIUM;
GLenum transform_type = GL_NONE;
if (!v.GetPathCountAndType(c, &num_paths, &path_name_type) ||
!v.GetCoverMode(c, &cover_mode) ||
!v.GetTransformType(c, &transform_type))
return v.error();
if (num_paths == 0)
return error::kNoError;
std::unique_ptr<GLuint[]> paths;
if (!v.GetPathNameData(c, num_paths, path_name_type, &paths))
return v.error();
const GLfloat* transforms = nullptr;
if (!v.GetTransforms(c, num_paths, transform_type, &transforms))
return v.error();
GLint reference = static_cast<GLint>(c.reference);
GLuint mask = static_cast<GLuint>(c.mask);
if (!CheckBoundDrawFramebufferValid(kFunctionName))
return error::kNoError;
ApplyDirtyState();
api()->glStencilThenCoverStrokePathInstancedNVFn(
num_paths, GL_UNSIGNED_INT, paths.get(), 0, reference, mask, cover_mode,
transform_type, transforms);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntSize RenderLayerScrollableArea::clampScrollOffset(const IntSize& scrollOffset) const
{
int maxX = scrollWidth() - box().pixelSnappedClientWidth();
int maxY = scrollHeight() - box().pixelSnappedClientHeight();
int x = std::max(std::min(scrollOffset.width(), maxX), 0);
int y = std::max(std::min(scrollOffset.height(), maxY), 0);
return IntSize(x, y);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 119,970
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ProxyLocaltimeCallToBrowser(time_t input, struct tm* output,
char* timezone_out,
size_t timezone_out_len) {
base::Pickle request;
request.WriteInt(LinuxSandbox::METHOD_LOCALTIME);
request.WriteString(
std::string(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&input), sizeof(input)));
uint8_t reply_buf[512];
const ssize_t r = base::UnixDomainSocket::SendRecvMsg(
GetSandboxFD(), reply_buf, sizeof(reply_buf), NULL, request);
if (r == -1) {
memset(output, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
return;
}
base::Pickle reply(reinterpret_cast<char*>(reply_buf), r);
base::PickleIterator iter(reply);
std::string result;
std::string timezone;
if (!iter.ReadString(&result) ||
!iter.ReadString(&timezone) ||
result.size() != sizeof(struct tm)) {
memset(output, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
return;
}
memcpy(output, result.data(), sizeof(struct tm));
if (timezone_out_len) {
const size_t copy_len = std::min(timezone_out_len - 1, timezone.size());
memcpy(timezone_out, timezone.data(), copy_len);
timezone_out[copy_len] = 0;
output->tm_zone = timezone_out;
} else {
base::AutoLock lock(g_timezones_lock.Get());
auto ret_pair = g_timezones.Get().insert(timezone);
output->tm_zone = ret_pair.first->c_str();
}
}
Commit Message: Serialize struct tm in a safe way.
BUG=765512
Change-Id: If235b8677eb527be2ac0fe621fc210e4116a7566
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/679441
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 172,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct xenvif *poll_net_schedule_list(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
{
struct xenvif *vif = NULL;
spin_lock_irq(&netbk->net_schedule_list_lock);
if (list_empty(&netbk->net_schedule_list))
goto out;
vif = list_first_entry(&netbk->net_schedule_list,
struct xenvif, schedule_list);
if (!vif)
goto out;
xenvif_get(vif);
remove_from_net_schedule_list(vif);
out:
spin_unlock_irq(&netbk->net_schedule_list_lock);
return vif;
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CCLayerTreeHostTestShortlived3() { }
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::Rect BrowserView::GetToolbarBounds() const {
gfx::Rect toolbar_bounds(toolbar_->bounds());
if (toolbar_bounds.IsEmpty())
return toolbar_bounds;
toolbar_bounds.Inset(-views::NonClientFrameView::kClientEdgeThickness, 0);
return toolbar_bounds;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,372
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void set_client_host(ExtensionDevToolsClientHost* client_host) {
client_host_ = client_host;
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 120,629
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned RenderViewImpl::GetLocalSessionHistoryLengthForTesting() const {
return history_list_length_;
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ext4_seq_options_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *offset)
{
struct super_block *sb = seq->private;
int rc;
seq_puts(seq, (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) ? "ro" : "rw");
rc = _ext4_show_options(seq, sb, 1);
seq_puts(seq, "\n");
return rc;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _warc_rdtyp(const char *buf, size_t bsz)
{
static const char _key[] = "\r\nWARC-Type:";
const char *val, *eol;
if ((val = xmemmem(buf, bsz, _key, sizeof(_key) - 1U)) == NULL) {
/* no bother */
return WT_NONE;
}
val += sizeof(_key) - 1U;
if ((eol = _warc_find_eol(val, buf + bsz - val)) == NULL) {
/* no end of line */
return WT_NONE;
}
/* overread whitespace */
while (val < eol && (*val == ' ' || *val == '\t'))
++val;
if (val + 8U == eol) {
if (memcmp(val, "resource", 8U) == 0)
return WT_RSRC;
else if (memcmp(val, "response", 8U) == 0)
return WT_RSP;
}
return WT_NONE;
}
Commit Message: warc: consume data once read
The warc decoder only used read ahead, it wouldn't actually consume
data that had previously been printed. This means that if you specify
an invalid content length, it will just reprint the same data over
and over and over again until it hits the desired length.
This means that a WARC resource with e.g.
Content-Length: 666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666665
but only a few hundred bytes of data, causes a quasi-infinite loop.
Consume data in subsequent calls to _warc_read.
Found with an AFL + afl-rb + qsym setup.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 74,912
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int free_fid(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp)
{
int retval = 0;
if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_FILE) {
/* If we reclaimed the fd no need to close */
if (fidp->fs.fd != -1) {
retval = v9fs_co_close(pdu, &fidp->fs);
}
} else if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_DIR) {
if (fidp->fs.dir.stream != NULL) {
retval = v9fs_co_closedir(pdu, &fidp->fs);
}
} else if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_XATTR) {
retval = v9fs_xattr_fid_clunk(pdu, fidp);
}
v9fs_path_free(&fidp->path);
g_free(fidp);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_qtdemux_get_type (void)
{
static GType qtdemux_type = 0;
if (!qtdemux_type) {
static const GTypeInfo qtdemux_info = {
sizeof (GstQTDemuxClass),
(GBaseInitFunc) gst_qtdemux_base_init, NULL,
(GClassInitFunc) gst_qtdemux_class_init,
NULL, NULL, sizeof (GstQTDemux), 0,
(GInstanceInitFunc) gst_qtdemux_init,
};
qtdemux_type =
g_type_register_static (GST_TYPE_ELEMENT, "GstQTDemux", &qtdemux_info,
0);
}
return qtdemux_type;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void* GLES2Implementation::MapTransferCacheEntry(uint32_t serialized_size) {
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_mem_rx_release(struct tg3 *tp)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < tp->irq_max; i++) {
struct tg3_napi *tnapi = &tp->napi[i];
tg3_rx_prodring_fini(tp, &tnapi->prodring);
if (!tnapi->rx_rcb)
continue;
dma_free_coherent(&tp->pdev->dev,
TG3_RX_RCB_RING_BYTES(tp),
tnapi->rx_rcb,
tnapi->rx_rcb_mapping);
tnapi->rx_rcb = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheGroup::QueueUpdate(AppCacheHost* host,
const GURL& new_master_resource) {
DCHECK(update_job_ && host && !new_master_resource.is_empty());
queued_updates_.insert(QueuedUpdates::value_type(
host, std::make_pair(host, new_master_resource)));
host->AddObserver(host_observer_.get());
if (FindObserver(host, observers_)) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(host);
queued_observers_.AddObserver(host);
}
}
Commit Message: Refcount AppCacheGroup correctly.
Bug: 888926
Change-Id: Iab0d82d272e2f24a5e91180d64bc8e2aa8a8238d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1246827
Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594475}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<WebUIImpl> WebContentsImpl::CreateWebUI(
const GURL& url,
const std::string& frame_name) {
std::unique_ptr<WebUIImpl> web_ui =
base::MakeUnique<WebUIImpl>(this, frame_name);
WebUIController* controller =
WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()
->CreateWebUIControllerForURL(web_ui.get(), url);
if (controller) {
web_ui->AddMessageHandler(base::MakeUnique<GenericHandler>());
web_ui->SetController(controller);
return web_ui;
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sigalrm_handler()
{
rotate = (rotate + 1) % 4;
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 74,304
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmxnet3_qdev_reset(DeviceState *dev)
{
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(dev);
VMXNET3State *s = VMXNET3(d);
VMW_CBPRN("Starting QDEV reset...");
vmxnet3_reset(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 9,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL DevToolsUI::SanitizeFrontendURL(const GURL& url) {
return ::SanitizeFrontendURL(url, content::kChromeDevToolsScheme,
chrome::kChromeUIDevToolsHost, SanitizeFrontendPath(url.path()), true);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 172,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err moof_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
return gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, moof_AddBox);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,255
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t tun_do_read(struct tun_struct *tun,
struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *iv,
ssize_t len, int noblock)
{
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
struct sk_buff *skb;
ssize_t ret = 0;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "tun_chr_read\n");
if (unlikely(!noblock))
add_wait_queue(&tun->wq.wait, &wait);
while (len) {
current->state = TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE;
/* Read frames from the queue */
if (!(skb=skb_dequeue(&tun->socket.sk->sk_receive_queue))) {
if (noblock) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
if (tun->dev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED) {
ret = -EIO;
break;
}
/* Nothing to read, let's sleep */
schedule();
continue;
}
netif_wake_queue(tun->dev);
ret = tun_put_user(tun, skb, iv, len);
kfree_skb(skb);
break;
}
current->state = TASK_RUNNING;
if (unlikely(!noblock))
remove_wait_queue(&tun->wq.wait, &wait);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int test_ifmod_section(cmd_parms *cmd, const char *arg)
{
return find_module(cmd->server, arg) != NULL;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,326
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetShaderSource(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::GetShaderSource& c) {
GLuint shader = c.shader;
uint32 bucket_id = static_cast<uint32>(c.bucket_id);
Bucket* bucket = CreateBucket(bucket_id);
ShaderManager::ShaderInfo* info = GetShaderInfoNotProgram(
shader, "glGetShaderSource");
if (!info || !info->source()) {
bucket->SetSize(0);
return error::kNoError;
}
bucket->SetFromString(info->source()->c_str());
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pte_t *huge_pte_offset(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long sz)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pgd = pgd_offset(mm, addr);
if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
return NULL;
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
if (!p4d_present(*p4d))
return NULL;
pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
if (!pud_present(*pud))
return NULL;
if (pud_huge(*pud))
return (pte_t *)pud;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
return (pte_t *) pmd;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: remove superfluous page unlock in VM_SHARED case
huge_add_to_page_cache->add_to_page_cache implicitly unlocks the page
before returning in case of errors.
The error returned was -EEXIST by running UFFDIO_COPY on a non-hole
offset of a VM_SHARED hugetlbfs mapping. It was an userland bug that
triggered it and the kernel must cope with it returning -EEXIST from
ioctl(UFFDIO_COPY) as expected.
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageLocked(page))
kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:964!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 22582 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.11.11-300.fc26.x86_64 #1
RIP: unlock_page+0x4a/0x50
Call Trace:
hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte+0xc0/0x320
mcopy_atomic+0x96f/0xbe0
userfaultfd_ioctl+0x218/0xe90
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa5/0x600
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa9
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170802165145.22628-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexey Perevalov <a.perevalov@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 86,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u32 h264bsdMatrixCoefficients(storage_t *pStorage)
{
/* Variables */
/* Code */
ASSERT(pStorage);
if (pStorage->activeSps && pStorage->activeSps->vuiParametersPresentFlag &&
pStorage->activeSps->vuiParameters &&
pStorage->activeSps->vuiParameters->videoSignalTypePresentFlag &&
pStorage->activeSps->vuiParameters->colourDescriptionPresentFlag)
return(pStorage->activeSps->vuiParameters->matrixCoefficients);
else /* default unspecified */
return(2);
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,894
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const uint8_t *get_signature(const uint8_t *asn1_sig, int *len)
{
int offset = 0;
const uint8_t *ptr = NULL;
if (asn1_next_obj(asn1_sig, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0 ||
asn1_skip_obj(asn1_sig, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE))
goto end_get_sig;
if (asn1_sig[offset++] != ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
goto end_get_sig;
*len = get_asn1_length(asn1_sig, &offset);
ptr = &asn1_sig[offset]; /* all ok */
end_get_sig:
return ptr;
}
Commit Message: Apply CVE fixes for X509 parsing
Apply patches developed by Sze Yiu which correct a vulnerability in
X509 parsing. See CVE-2018-16150 and CVE-2018-16149 for more info.
CWE ID: CWE-347
| 1
| 169,085
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ndp_sock_open(struct ndp *ndp)
{
int sock;
int ret;
int err;
int val;
sock = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_ICMPV6);
if (sock == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to create ICMP6 socket.");
return -errno;
}
val = 1;
ret = setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RECVPKTINFO,
&val, sizeof(val));
if (ret == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to setsockopt IPV6_RECVPKTINFO.");
err = -errno;
goto close_sock;
}
val = 255;
ret = setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS,
&val, sizeof(val));
if (ret == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to setsockopt IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS.");
err = -errno;
goto close_sock;
}
ndp->sock = sock;
return 0;
close_sock:
close(sock);
return err;
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 167,349
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Performance::RegisterPerformanceObserver(PerformanceObserver& observer) {
observer_filter_options_ |= observer.FilterOptions();
observers_.insert(&observer);
UpdateLongTaskInstrumentation();
}
Commit Message: Fix timing allow check algorithm for service workers
This CL uses the OriginalURLViaServiceWorker() in the timing allow check
algorithm if the response WasFetchedViaServiceWorker(). This way, if a
service worker changes a same origin request to become cross origin,
then the timing allow check algorithm will still fail.
resource-timing-worker.js is changed so it avoids an empty Response,
which is an odd case in terms of same origin checks.
Bug: 837275
Change-Id: I7e497a6fcc2ee14244121b915ca5f5cceded417a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1038229
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Reviewed-by: Timothy Dresser <tdresser@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555476}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 153,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lxcfs_releasedir(const char *path, struct fuse_file_info *fi)
{
if (strcmp(path, "/") == 0)
return 0;
if (strncmp(path, "/cgroup", 7) == 0) {
return cg_releasedir(path, fi);
}
if (strcmp(path, "/proc") == 0)
return 0;
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void normalizeSpacesAndMirrorChars(const UChar* source, UChar* destination, int length, HarfBuzzShaperBase::NormalizeMode normalizeMode)
{
int position = 0;
bool error = false;
while (position < length) {
UChar32 character;
int nextPosition = position;
U16_NEXT(source, nextPosition, length, character);
if (Font::treatAsSpace(character))
character = ' ';
else if (Font::treatAsZeroWidthSpace(character))
character = zeroWidthSpace;
else if (normalizeMode == HarfBuzzShaperBase::NormalizeMirrorChars)
character = u_charMirror(character);
U16_APPEND(destination, position, length, character, error);
ASSERT(!error);
position = nextPosition;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized variables in HarfBuzzShaperBase
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=79546
Reviewed by Dirk Pranke.
These were introduced in r108733.
* platform/graphics/harfbuzz/HarfBuzzShaperBase.cpp:
(WebCore::HarfBuzzShaperBase::HarfBuzzShaperBase):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@108871 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 107,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bt_status_t btif_dm_cancel_bond(const bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr)
{
bdstr_t bdstr;
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s: bd_addr=%s", __FUNCTION__, bdaddr_to_string(bd_addr, bdstr, sizeof(bdstr)));
/* TODO:
** 1. Restore scan modes
** 2. special handling for HID devices
*/
if (pairing_cb.state == BT_BOND_STATE_BONDING)
{
#if (defined(BLE_INCLUDED) && (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE))
if (pairing_cb.is_ssp)
{
if (pairing_cb.is_le_only)
{
BTA_DmBleSecurityGrant((UINT8 *)bd_addr->address,BTA_DM_SEC_PAIR_NOT_SPT);
}
else
{
BTA_DmConfirm( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, FALSE);
BTA_DmBondCancel ((UINT8 *)bd_addr->address);
btif_storage_remove_bonded_device((bt_bdaddr_t *)bd_addr);
}
}
else
{
if (pairing_cb.is_le_only)
{
BTA_DmBondCancel ((UINT8 *)bd_addr->address);
}
else
{
BTA_DmPinReply( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, FALSE, 0, NULL);
}
/* Cancel bonding, in case it is in ACL connection setup state */
BTA_DmBondCancel ((UINT8 *)bd_addr->address);
}
#else
if (pairing_cb.is_ssp)
{
BTA_DmConfirm( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, FALSE);
}
else
{
BTA_DmPinReply( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, FALSE, 0, NULL);
}
/* Cancel bonding, in case it is in ACL connection setup state */
BTA_DmBondCancel ((UINT8 *)bd_addr->address);
btif_storage_remove_bonded_device((bt_bdaddr_t *)bd_addr);
#endif
}
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,579
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void OverloadedPerWorldBindingsMethod1MethodForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->overloadedPerWorldBindingsMethod();
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayoutSVGContainer::addOutlineRects(Vector<LayoutRect>& rects, const LayoutPoint&, IncludeBlockVisualOverflowOrNot) const
{
rects.append(LayoutRect(paintInvalidationRectInLocalSVGCoordinates()));
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const std::vector<GURL>& DownloadItemImpl::GetUrlChain() const {
return request_info_.url_chain;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<FakeSafeBrowsingService> fake_safe_browsing_service() {
return fake_safe_browsing_service_;
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 151,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ParseQualifiedNameResult ParseQualifiedNameInternal(
const AtomicString& qualified_name,
const CharType* characters,
unsigned length,
AtomicString& prefix,
AtomicString& local_name) {
bool name_start = true;
bool saw_colon = false;
int colon_pos = 0;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < length;) {
UChar32 c;
U16_NEXT(characters, i, length, c)
if (c == ':') {
if (saw_colon)
return ParseQualifiedNameResult(kQNMultipleColons);
name_start = true;
saw_colon = true;
colon_pos = i - 1;
} else if (name_start) {
if (!IsValidNameStart(c))
return ParseQualifiedNameResult(kQNInvalidStartChar, c);
name_start = false;
} else {
if (!IsValidNamePart(c))
return ParseQualifiedNameResult(kQNInvalidChar, c);
}
}
if (!saw_colon) {
prefix = g_null_atom;
local_name = qualified_name;
} else {
prefix = AtomicString(characters, colon_pos);
if (prefix.IsEmpty())
return ParseQualifiedNameResult(kQNEmptyPrefix);
int prefix_start = colon_pos + 1;
local_name = AtomicString(characters + prefix_start, length - prefix_start);
}
if (local_name.IsEmpty())
return ParseQualifiedNameResult(kQNEmptyLocalName);
return ParseQualifiedNameResult(kQNValid);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ip_vs_use_count_dec(void)
{
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage long sys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags)
{
int err = 0;
struct fs_struct *fs, *new_fs = NULL;
struct sighand_struct *new_sigh = NULL;
struct mm_struct *mm, *new_mm = NULL, *active_mm = NULL;
struct files_struct *fd, *new_fd = NULL;
struct nsproxy *new_nsproxy = NULL;
int do_sysvsem = 0;
check_unshare_flags(&unshare_flags);
/* Return -EINVAL for all unsupported flags */
err = -EINVAL;
if (unshare_flags & ~(CLONE_THREAD|CLONE_FS|CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_SIGHAND|
CLONE_VM|CLONE_FILES|CLONE_SYSVSEM|
CLONE_NEWUTS|CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_NEWUSER|
CLONE_NEWNET))
goto bad_unshare_out;
/*
* CLONE_NEWIPC must also detach from the undolist: after switching
* to a new ipc namespace, the semaphore arrays from the old
* namespace are unreachable.
*/
if (unshare_flags & (CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_SYSVSEM))
do_sysvsem = 1;
if ((err = unshare_thread(unshare_flags)))
goto bad_unshare_out;
if ((err = unshare_fs(unshare_flags, &new_fs)))
goto bad_unshare_cleanup_thread;
if ((err = unshare_sighand(unshare_flags, &new_sigh)))
goto bad_unshare_cleanup_fs;
if ((err = unshare_vm(unshare_flags, &new_mm)))
goto bad_unshare_cleanup_sigh;
if ((err = unshare_fd(unshare_flags, &new_fd)))
goto bad_unshare_cleanup_vm;
if ((err = unshare_nsproxy_namespaces(unshare_flags, &new_nsproxy,
new_fs)))
goto bad_unshare_cleanup_fd;
if (new_fs || new_mm || new_fd || do_sysvsem || new_nsproxy) {
if (do_sysvsem) {
/*
* CLONE_SYSVSEM is equivalent to sys_exit().
*/
exit_sem(current);
}
if (new_nsproxy) {
switch_task_namespaces(current, new_nsproxy);
new_nsproxy = NULL;
}
task_lock(current);
if (new_fs) {
fs = current->fs;
current->fs = new_fs;
new_fs = fs;
}
if (new_mm) {
mm = current->mm;
active_mm = current->active_mm;
current->mm = new_mm;
current->active_mm = new_mm;
activate_mm(active_mm, new_mm);
new_mm = mm;
}
if (new_fd) {
fd = current->files;
current->files = new_fd;
new_fd = fd;
}
task_unlock(current);
}
if (new_nsproxy)
put_nsproxy(new_nsproxy);
bad_unshare_cleanup_fd:
if (new_fd)
put_files_struct(new_fd);
bad_unshare_cleanup_vm:
if (new_mm)
mmput(new_mm);
bad_unshare_cleanup_sigh:
if (new_sigh)
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&new_sigh->count))
kmem_cache_free(sighand_cachep, new_sigh);
bad_unshare_cleanup_fs:
if (new_fs)
put_fs_struct(new_fs);
bad_unshare_cleanup_thread:
bad_unshare_out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameImpl* RenderFrameImpl::FromWebFrame(blink::WebFrame* web_frame) {
auto iter = g_frame_map.Get().find(web_frame);
if (iter != g_frame_map.Get().end())
return iter->second;
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int skb_vlan_pop(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u16 vlan_tci;
__be16 vlan_proto;
int err;
if (likely(skb_vlan_tag_present(skb))) {
skb->vlan_tci = 0;
} else {
if (unlikely(!eth_type_vlan(skb->protocol)))
return 0;
err = __skb_vlan_pop(skb, &vlan_tci);
if (err)
return err;
}
/* move next vlan tag to hw accel tag */
if (likely(!eth_type_vlan(skb->protocol)))
return 0;
vlan_proto = skb->protocol;
err = __skb_vlan_pop(skb, &vlan_tci);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
__vlan_hwaccel_put_tag(skb, vlan_proto, vlan_tci);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 67,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::load(const FrameLoadRequest& passedRequest, FrameLoadType frameLoadType,
HistoryItem* historyItem, HistoryLoadType historyLoadType)
{
ASSERT(m_frame->document());
if (!m_frame->isNavigationAllowed())
return;
if (m_inStopAllLoaders)
return;
if (m_frame->page()->defersLoading() && isBackForwardLoadType(frameLoadType)) {
m_deferredHistoryLoad = DeferredHistoryLoad::create(passedRequest.resourceRequest(), historyItem, frameLoadType, historyLoadType);
return;
}
FrameLoadRequest request(passedRequest);
request.resourceRequest().setHasUserGesture(UserGestureIndicator::processingUserGesture());
if (!prepareRequestForThisFrame(request))
return;
Frame* targetFrame = request.form() ? nullptr : m_frame->findFrameForNavigation(AtomicString(request.frameName()), *m_frame);
if (isBackForwardLoadType(frameLoadType)) {
ASSERT(historyItem);
m_provisionalItem = historyItem;
}
if (targetFrame && targetFrame != m_frame) {
bool wasInSamePage = targetFrame->page() == m_frame->page();
request.setFrameName("_self");
targetFrame->navigate(request);
Page* page = targetFrame->page();
if (!wasInSamePage && page)
page->chromeClient().focus();
return;
}
setReferrerForFrameRequest(request.resourceRequest(), request.getShouldSendReferrer(), request.originDocument());
FrameLoadType newLoadType = (frameLoadType == FrameLoadTypeStandard) ?
determineFrameLoadType(request) : frameLoadType;
NavigationPolicy policy = navigationPolicyForRequest(request);
if (shouldOpenInNewWindow(targetFrame, request, policy)) {
if (policy == NavigationPolicyDownload) {
client()->loadURLExternally(request.resourceRequest(), NavigationPolicyDownload, String(), false);
} else {
request.resourceRequest().setFrameType(WebURLRequest::FrameTypeAuxiliary);
createWindowForRequest(request, *m_frame, policy, request.getShouldSendReferrer(), request.getShouldSetOpener());
}
return;
}
const KURL& url = request.resourceRequest().url();
bool sameDocumentHistoryNavigation =
isBackForwardLoadType(newLoadType) && historyLoadType == HistorySameDocumentLoad;
bool sameDocumentNavigation = policy == NavigationPolicyCurrentTab
&& shouldPerformFragmentNavigation(
request.form(), request.resourceRequest().httpMethod(), newLoadType, url);
if (sameDocumentHistoryNavigation || sameDocumentNavigation) {
ASSERT(historyItem || !sameDocumentHistoryNavigation);
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> stateObject = sameDocumentHistoryNavigation ?
historyItem->stateObject() : nullptr;
if (!sameDocumentHistoryNavigation) {
m_documentLoader->setNavigationType(determineNavigationType(
newLoadType, false, request.triggeringEvent()));
if (shouldTreatURLAsSameAsCurrent(url))
newLoadType = FrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem;
}
loadInSameDocument(url, stateObject, newLoadType, historyLoadType, request.clientRedirect(), request.originDocument());
return;
}
startLoad(request, newLoadType, policy);
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,679
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k)
{
if (group == NULL)
return 0;
if (EC_GROUP_method_of(group)->group_set_curve !=
ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve || !((group->poly[0] != 0)
&& (group->poly[1] != 0)
&& (group->poly[2] == 0))) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (k)
*k = group->poly[1];
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,470
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t utf8_to_utf16_length(const uint8_t* u8str, size_t u8len)
{
const uint8_t* const u8end = u8str + u8len;
const uint8_t* u8cur = u8str;
/* Validate that the UTF-8 is the correct len */
size_t u16measuredLen = 0;
while (u8cur < u8end) {
u16measuredLen++;
int u8charLen = utf8_codepoint_len(*u8cur);
uint32_t codepoint = utf8_to_utf32_codepoint(u8cur, u8charLen);
if (codepoint > 0xFFFF) u16measuredLen++; // this will be a surrogate pair in utf16
u8cur += u8charLen;
}
/**
* Make sure that we ended where we thought we would and the output UTF-16
* will be exactly how long we were told it would be.
*/
if (u8cur != u8end) {
return -1;
}
return u16measuredLen;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 158,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: on_name_acquired(__attribute__((unused)) GDBusConnection *connection,
const gchar *name,
__attribute__((unused)) gpointer user_data)
{
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Acquired the name %s on the session bus", name);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 75,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cgroupstats_user_cmd(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
int rc = 0;
struct sk_buff *rep_skb;
struct cgroupstats *stats;
struct nlattr *na;
size_t size;
u32 fd;
struct file *file;
int fput_needed;
na = info->attrs[CGROUPSTATS_CMD_ATTR_FD];
if (!na)
return -EINVAL;
fd = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[CGROUPSTATS_CMD_ATTR_FD]);
file = fget_light(fd, &fput_needed);
if (!file)
return 0;
size = nla_total_size(sizeof(struct cgroupstats));
rc = prepare_reply(info, CGROUPSTATS_CMD_NEW, &rep_skb,
size);
if (rc < 0)
goto err;
na = nla_reserve(rep_skb, CGROUPSTATS_TYPE_CGROUP_STATS,
sizeof(struct cgroupstats));
stats = nla_data(na);
memset(stats, 0, sizeof(*stats));
rc = cgroupstats_build(stats, file->f_dentry);
if (rc < 0) {
nlmsg_free(rep_skb);
goto err;
}
rc = send_reply(rep_skb, info);
err:
fput_light(file, fput_needed);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Make TASKSTATS require root access
Ok, this isn't optimal, since it means that 'iotop' needs admin
capabilities, and we may have to work on this some more. But at the
same time it is very much not acceptable to let anybody just read
anybody elses IO statistics quite at this level.
Use of the GENL_ADMIN_PERM suggested by Johannes Berg as an alternative
to checking the capabilities by hand.
Reported-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 26,913
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int capture_pattern(vorb *f)
{
if (0x4f != get8(f)) return FALSE;
if (0x67 != get8(f)) return FALSE;
if (0x67 != get8(f)) return FALSE;
if (0x53 != get8(f)) return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 75,234
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromePluginServiceFilter::UnregisterResourceContext(
const void* context) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
resource_context_map_.erase(context);
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int release_wake_lock_callout(const char *lock_name) {
JNIEnv *env;
JavaVM *vm = AndroidRuntime::getJavaVM();
jint status = vm->GetEnv((void **)&env, JNI_VERSION_1_6);
if (status != JNI_OK && status != JNI_EDETACHED) {
ALOGE("%s unable to get environment for JNI call", __func__);
return BT_STATUS_FAIL;
}
if (status == JNI_EDETACHED && vm->AttachCurrentThread(&env, &sAttachArgs) != 0) {
ALOGE("%s unable to attach thread to VM", __func__);
return BT_STATUS_FAIL;
}
jboolean ret = JNI_FALSE;
jstring lock_name_jni = env->NewStringUTF(lock_name);
if (lock_name_jni) {
ret = env->CallBooleanMethod(sJniAdapterServiceObj, method_releaseWakeLock, lock_name_jni);
env->DeleteLocalRef(lock_name_jni);
} else {
ALOGE("%s unable to allocate string: %s", __func__, lock_name);
}
if (status == JNI_EDETACHED) {
vm->DetachCurrentThread();
}
return ret ? BT_STATUS_SUCCESS : BT_STATUS_FAIL;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 163,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage void kernel_unaligned_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int insn)
{
enum direction dir = decode_direction(insn);
int size = decode_access_size(regs, insn);
int orig_asi, asi;
current_thread_info()->kern_una_regs = regs;
current_thread_info()->kern_una_insn = insn;
orig_asi = asi = decode_asi(insn, regs);
/* If this is a {get,put}_user() on an unaligned userspace pointer,
* just signal a fault and do not log the event.
*/
if (asi == ASI_AIUS) {
kernel_mna_trap_fault(0);
return;
}
log_unaligned(regs);
if (!ok_for_kernel(insn) || dir == both) {
printk("Unsupported unaligned load/store trap for kernel "
"at <%016lx>.\n", regs->tpc);
unaligned_panic("Kernel does fpu/atomic "
"unaligned load/store.", regs);
kernel_mna_trap_fault(0);
} else {
unsigned long addr, *reg_addr;
int err;
addr = compute_effective_address(regs, insn,
((insn >> 25) & 0x1f));
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, addr);
switch (asi) {
case ASI_NL:
case ASI_AIUPL:
case ASI_AIUSL:
case ASI_PL:
case ASI_SL:
case ASI_PNFL:
case ASI_SNFL:
asi &= ~0x08;
break;
}
switch (dir) {
case load:
reg_addr = fetch_reg_addr(((insn>>25)&0x1f), regs);
err = do_int_load(reg_addr, size,
(unsigned long *) addr,
decode_signedness(insn), asi);
if (likely(!err) && unlikely(asi != orig_asi)) {
unsigned long val_in = *reg_addr;
switch (size) {
case 2:
val_in = swab16(val_in);
break;
case 4:
val_in = swab32(val_in);
break;
case 8:
val_in = swab64(val_in);
break;
case 16:
default:
BUG();
break;
}
*reg_addr = val_in;
}
break;
case store:
err = do_int_store(((insn>>25)&0x1f), size,
(unsigned long *) addr, regs,
asi, orig_asi);
break;
default:
panic("Impossible kernel unaligned trap.");
/* Not reached... */
}
if (unlikely(err))
kernel_mna_trap_fault(1);
else
advance(regs);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 165,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::DeleteTemporaryPagesInAbandonedCacheDir() {
std::vector<int64_t> offline_page_ids;
for (const auto& id_page_pair : offline_pages_) {
const OfflinePageItem& page = id_page_pair.second;
if (policy_controller_->IsRemovedOnCacheReset(page.client_id.name_space) &&
!archive_manager_->GetTemporaryArchivesDir().IsParent(page.file_path))
offline_page_ids.push_back(id_page_pair.first);
}
if (offline_page_ids.empty())
return;
DeletePagesByOfflineId(offline_page_ids,
base::Bind([](const std::vector<int64_t>& offline_ids,
DeletePageResult result) {},
offline_page_ids));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 155,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tty_ldisc_begin(void)
{
/* Setup the default TTY line discipline. */
(void) tty_register_ldisc(N_TTY, &tty_ldisc_N_TTY);
}
Commit Message: tty: Prevent ldisc drivers from re-using stale tty fields
Line discipline drivers may mistakenly misuse ldisc-related fields
when initializing. For example, a failure to initialize tty->receive_room
in the N_GIGASET_M101 line discipline was recently found and fixed [1].
Now, the N_X25 line discipline has been discovered accessing the previous
line discipline's already-freed private data [2].
Harden the ldisc interface against misuse by initializing revelant
tty fields before instancing the new line discipline.
[1]
commit fd98e9419d8d622a4de91f76b306af6aa627aa9c
Author: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Date: Tue Jul 14 00:37:13 2015 +0200
isdn/gigaset: reset tty->receive_room when attaching ser_gigaset
[2] Report from Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
[ 634.336761] ==================================================================
[ 634.338226] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_asy_open_tty+0x13d/0x490 at addr ffff8800a743efd0
[ 634.339558] Read of size 4 by task syzkaller_execu/8981
[ 634.340359] =============================================================================
[ 634.341598] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
...
[ 634.405018] Call Trace:
[ 634.405277] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
[ 634.405775] print_trailer (mm/slub.c:655)
[ 634.406361] object_err (mm/slub.c:662)
[ 634.406824] kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:138 mm/kasan/report.c:236)
[ 634.409581] __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report.c:279)
[ 634.411355] x25_asy_open_tty (drivers/net/wan/x25_asy.c:559 (discriminator 1))
[ 634.413997] tty_ldisc_open.isra.2 (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:447)
[ 634.414549] tty_set_ldisc (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:567)
[ 634.415057] tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2646 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2879)
[ 634.423524] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607)
[ 634.427491] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613)
[ 634.427945] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:188)
Cc: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: init_time (void)
{
gettime (&initial_time);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 5,651
|
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