instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::ReadonlyWindowAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_readonlyWindowAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::ReadonlyWindowAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String XMLHttpRequest::getResponseHeader(const AtomicString& name, ExceptionState& es) const
{
if (m_state < HEADERS_RECEIVED) {
es.throwDOMException(InvalidStateError, ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("getResponseHeader", "XMLHttpRequest", "the object's state must not be UNSENT or OPENED."));
return String();
}
if (isSetCookieHeader(name) && !securityOrigin()->canLoadLocalResources()) {
logConsoleError(scriptExecutionContext(), "Refused to get unsafe header \"" + name + "\"");
return String();
}
HTTPHeaderSet accessControlExposeHeaderSet;
parseAccessControlExposeHeadersAllowList(m_response.httpHeaderField("Access-Control-Expose-Headers"), accessControlExposeHeaderSet);
if (!m_sameOriginRequest && !isOnAccessControlResponseHeaderWhitelist(name) && !accessControlExposeHeaderSet.contains(name)) {
logConsoleError(scriptExecutionContext(), "Refused to get unsafe header \"" + name + "\"");
return String();
}
return m_response.httpHeaderField(name);
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int Read16(const uint8_t* p) {
return p[0] << 8 | p[1];
}
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by adtolbar@microsoft.com.
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <chcunningham@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_activation_action (NautilusFile *file)
{
ActivationAction action;
char *activation_uri;
gboolean can_extract;
can_extract = g_settings_get_boolean (nautilus_preferences,
NAUTILUS_PREFERENCES_AUTOMATIC_DECOMPRESSION);
if (can_extract && nautilus_file_is_archive (file))
{
return ACTIVATION_ACTION_EXTRACT;
}
if (nautilus_file_is_nautilus_link (file))
{
return ACTIVATION_ACTION_LAUNCH_DESKTOP_FILE;
}
activation_uri = nautilus_file_get_activation_uri (file);
if (activation_uri == NULL)
{
activation_uri = nautilus_file_get_uri (file);
}
action = ACTIVATION_ACTION_DO_NOTHING;
if (nautilus_file_is_launchable (file))
{
char *executable_path;
action = ACTIVATION_ACTION_LAUNCH;
executable_path = g_filename_from_uri (activation_uri, NULL, NULL);
if (!executable_path)
{
action = ACTIVATION_ACTION_DO_NOTHING;
}
else if (nautilus_file_contains_text (file))
{
action = get_default_executable_text_file_action ();
}
g_free (executable_path);
}
if (action == ACTIVATION_ACTION_DO_NOTHING)
{
if (nautilus_file_opens_in_view (file))
{
action = ACTIVATION_ACTION_OPEN_IN_VIEW;
}
else
{
action = ACTIVATION_ACTION_OPEN_IN_APPLICATION;
}
}
g_free (activation_uri);
return action;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,186
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _load_ucode_intel_bsp(struct mc_saved_data *mc_saved_data,
unsigned long *mc_saved_in_initrd,
unsigned long initrd_start_early,
unsigned long initrd_end_early,
struct ucode_cpu_info *uci)
{
enum ucode_state ret;
collect_cpu_info_early(uci);
scan_microcode(initrd_start_early, initrd_end_early, mc_saved_data,
mc_saved_in_initrd, uci);
ret = load_microcode(mc_saved_data, mc_saved_in_initrd,
initrd_start_early, uci);
if (ret == UCODE_OK)
apply_microcode_early(uci, true);
}
Commit Message: x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader
mc_saved_tmp is a static array allocated on the stack, we need to make
sure mc_saved_count stays within its bounds, otherwise we're overflowing
the stack in _save_mc(). A specially crafted microcode header could lead
to a kernel crash or potentially kernel execution.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422964824-22056-1-git-send-email-quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Plugin::DidChangeView(const pp::View& view) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::DidChangeView (this=%p)\n",
static_cast<void*>(this)));
if (!BrowserPpp::is_valid(ppapi_proxy_)) {
view_to_replay_ = view;
} else {
ppapi_proxy_->ppp_instance_interface()->DidChangeView(
pp_instance(), view.pp_resource());
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int uaddr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_tipc *addr = (struct sockaddr_tipc *)uaddr;
u32 portref = tipc_sk_port(sock->sk)->ref;
if (unlikely(!uaddr_len))
return tipc_withdraw(portref, 0, NULL);
if (uaddr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_tipc))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->family != AF_TIPC)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (addr->addrtype == TIPC_ADDR_NAME)
addr->addr.nameseq.upper = addr->addr.nameseq.lower;
else if (addr->addrtype != TIPC_ADDR_NAMESEQ)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (addr->addr.nameseq.type < TIPC_RESERVED_TYPES)
return -EACCES;
return (addr->scope > 0) ?
tipc_publish(portref, addr->scope, &addr->addr.nameseq) :
tipc_withdraw(portref, -addr->scope, &addr->addr.nameseq);
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix info leaks via msg_name in recv_msg/recv_stream
The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union
is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() --
the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the
msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c.
Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update
the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e.
"success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will
lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with
memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it
will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Cc: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int phar_file_type(HashTable *mimes, char *file, char **mime_type TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *ext;
phar_mime_type *mime;
ext = strrchr(file, '.');
if (!ext) {
*mime_type = "text/plain";
/* no file extension = assume text/plain */
return PHAR_MIME_OTHER;
}
++ext;
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_find(mimes, ext, strlen(ext), (void **) &mime)) {
*mime_type = "application/octet-stream";
return PHAR_MIME_OTHER;
}
*mime_type = mime->mime;
return mime->type;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,429
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UrlData::set_etag(const std::string& etag) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
etag_ = etag;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::EmitGLWarning(const char* function_name,
const char* description) {
if (synthesized_errors_to_console_) {
String message =
String("WebGL: ") + String(function_name) + ": " + String(description);
PrintGLErrorToConsole(message);
}
probe::didFireWebGLWarning(canvas());
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::OnAuthSubmitted(
const std::string& user,
const std::string& password,
const std::string& captcha,
const std::string& access_code) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentStarted,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
captcha_token_.clear();
user_ = user;
auth_fetcher_.reset(
new GaiaAuthFetcher(this, GaiaConstants::kChromeSource,
g_browser_process->system_request_context()));
if (access_code.empty()) {
auth_fetcher_->StartClientLogin(user, password,
GaiaConstants::kDeviceManagementService,
captcha_token_, captcha,
GaiaAuthFetcher::HostedAccountsAllowed);
} else {
auth_fetcher_->StartClientLogin(user, access_code,
GaiaConstants::kDeviceManagementService,
std::string(), std::string(),
GaiaAuthFetcher::HostedAccountsAllowed);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 97,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface::destroy(JSC::JSCell* cell)
{
JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface* thisObject = jsCast<JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface*>(cell);
thisObject->JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface::~JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface();
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lua_apr_b64decode(lua_State *L)
{
const char *encoded;
char *plain;
size_t encoded_len, decoded_len;
request_rec *r;
r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
encoded = lua_tolstring(L, 2, &encoded_len);
decoded_len = apr_base64_decode_len(encoded);
if (decoded_len) {
plain = apr_palloc(r->pool, decoded_len);
decoded_len = apr_base64_decode(plain, encoded);
if (decoded_len > 0 && plain[decoded_len - 1] == '\0')
decoded_len--;
lua_pushlstring(L, plain, decoded_len);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 45,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _nfs4_lookup_root(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
struct nfs_fsinfo *info)
{
u32 bitmask[3];
struct nfs4_lookup_root_arg args = {
.bitmask = bitmask,
};
struct nfs4_lookup_res res = {
.server = server,
.fattr = info->fattr,
.fh = fhandle,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_LOOKUP_ROOT],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
bitmask[0] = nfs4_fattr_bitmap[0];
bitmask[1] = nfs4_fattr_bitmap[1];
/*
* Process the label in the upcoming getfattr
*/
bitmask[2] = nfs4_fattr_bitmap[2] & ~FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL;
nfs_fattr_init(info->fattr);
return nfs4_call_sync(server->client, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PrintPreviewDataSource::~PrintPreviewDataSource() {
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 105,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: INLINE void impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(void* pv_ctxt, UWORD32 u4_no_of_bits)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = (stream_t *)pv_ctxt;
if (ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
{
FLUSH_BITS(ps_stream->u4_offset,ps_stream->u4_buf,ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_no_of_bits,ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Fixed out of bound read in flush_bits
Bug: 28168413
Change-Id: I3db5432a08daf665e160c0dab2d1928a576418b4
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 173,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void S_AL_StopLoopingSound(int entityNum )
{
if(entityList[entityNum].srcAllocated)
S_AL_SrcKill(entityList[entityNum].srcIndex);
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,562
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::SetShadowCascadeOrder(ShadowCascadeOrder order) {
DCHECK_NE(order, ShadowCascadeOrder::kShadowCascadeNone);
if (order == shadow_cascade_order_)
return;
if (order == ShadowCascadeOrder::kShadowCascadeV0) {
may_contain_v0_shadow_ = true;
if (shadow_cascade_order_ == ShadowCascadeOrder::kShadowCascadeV1)
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kMixedShadowRootV0AndV1);
}
if (shadow_cascade_order_ == ShadowCascadeOrder::kShadowCascadeV0 &&
order == ShadowCascadeOrder::kShadowCascadeV1) {
this->SetNeedsStyleRecalc(
kSubtreeStyleChange,
StyleChangeReasonForTracing::Create(StyleChangeReason::kShadow));
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kMixedShadowRootV0AndV1);
}
if (order > shadow_cascade_order_)
shadow_cascade_order_ = order;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_cpu_vmxoff(void)
{
asm volatile (__ex(ASM_VMX_VMXOFF) : : : "cc");
intel_pt_handle_vmx(0);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 48,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Direct_Move_Orig_X( TT_ExecContext exc,
TT_GlyphZone zone,
FT_UShort point,
FT_F26Dot6 distance )
{
FT_UNUSED( exc );
zone->org[point].x = ADD_LONG( zone->org[point].x, distance );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 10,569
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: upnpevents_removeSubscriber(const char * sid, int sidlen)
{
struct subscriber * sub;
if(!sid)
return -1;
for(sub = subscriberlist.lh_first; sub != NULL; sub = sub->entries.le_next) {
if((sidlen == 41) && (memcmp(sid, sub->uuid, 41) == 0)) {
if(sub->notify) {
sub->notify->sub = NULL;
}
LIST_REMOVE(sub, entries);
free(sub);
return 0;
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: upnp_event_prepare(): check the return value of snprintf()
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 89,890
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_pmd_numa_page(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr, pmd_t *pmdp)
{
BUG();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vm: add vm_iomap_memory() helper function
Various drivers end up replicating the code to mmap() their memory
buffers into user space, and our core memory remapping function may be
very flexible but it is unnecessarily complicated for the common cases
to use.
Our internal VM uses pfn's ("page frame numbers") which simplifies
things for the VM, and allows us to pass physical addresses around in a
denser and more efficient format than passing a "phys_addr_t" around,
and having to shift it up and down by the page size. But it just means
that drivers end up doing that shifting instead at the interface level.
It also means that drivers end up mucking around with internal VM things
like the vma details (vm_pgoff, vm_start/end) way more than they really
need to.
So this just exports a function to map a certain physical memory range
into user space (using a phys_addr_t based interface that is much more
natural for a driver) and hides all the complexity from the driver.
Some drivers will still end up tweaking the vm_page_prot details for
things like prefetching or cacheability etc, but that's actually
relevant to the driver, rather than caring about what the page offset of
the mapping is into the particular IO memory region.
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 94,446
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __weak void board_spl_fit_post_load(ulong load_addr, size_t length)
{
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 89,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AddWebSocketHeaders(HttpRequestHeaders* headers) {
headers->SetHeader("Connection", "Upgrade");
headers->SetHeader("Upgrade", "websocket");
headers->SetHeader("Origin", "http://www.example.org");
headers->SetHeader("Sec-WebSocket-Version", "13");
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,775
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sock *__sco_get_sock_listen_by_addr(bdaddr_t *ba)
{
struct sock *sk;
sk_for_each(sk, &sco_sk_list.head) {
if (sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN)
continue;
if (!bacmp(&bt_sk(sk)->src, ba))
return sk;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: SCO - Fix missing msg_namelen update in sco_sock_recvmsg()
If the socket is in state BT_CONNECT2 and BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP is set in
the flags, sco_sock_recvmsg() returns early with 0 without updating the
possibly set msg_namelen member. This, in turn, leads to a 128 byte
kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NaClSubprocess* Plugin::LoadHelperNaClModule(nacl::DescWrapper* wrapper,
const Manifest* manifest,
ErrorInfo* error_info) {
nacl::scoped_ptr<NaClSubprocess> nacl_subprocess(
new NaClSubprocess("helper module", NULL, NULL));
if (NULL == nacl_subprocess.get()) {
error_info->SetReport(ERROR_SEL_LDR_INIT,
"unable to allocate helper subprocess.");
return NULL;
}
if (!LoadNaClModuleCommon(wrapper, nacl_subprocess.get(), manifest,
false, error_info,
pp::BlockUntilComplete(),
pp::BlockUntilComplete())) {
return NULL;
}
if (!nacl_subprocess->StartSrpcServices()) {
error_info->SetReport(ERROR_SRPC_CONNECTION_FAIL,
"SRPC connection failure for " +
nacl_subprocess->description());
return NULL;
}
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::LoadHelperNaClModule (%s)\n",
nacl_subprocess.get()->detailed_description().c_str()));
return nacl_subprocess.release();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid)
{
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
uid_t old_fsuid;
kuid_t kuid;
old = current_cred();
old_fsuid = from_kuid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsuid);
kuid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, uid);
if (!uid_valid(kuid))
return old_fsuid;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return old_fsuid;
if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) ||
uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) ||
nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) {
new->fsuid = kuid;
if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
goto change_okay;
}
}
abort_creds(new);
return old_fsuid;
change_okay:
commit_creds(new);
return old_fsuid;
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-16
| 0
| 21,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dom_document_version_write(dom_object *obj, zval *newval TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval value_copy;
xmlDoc *docp;
docp = (xmlDocPtr) dom_object_get_node(obj);
if (docp == NULL) {
php_dom_throw_error(INVALID_STATE_ERR, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
if (docp->version != NULL) {
xmlFree((xmlChar *) docp->version );
}
if (newval->type != IS_STRING) {
if(Z_REFCOUNT_P(newval) > 1) {
value_copy = *newval;
zval_copy_ctor(&value_copy);
newval = &value_copy;
}
convert_to_string(newval);
}
docp->version = xmlStrdup((const xmlChar *) Z_STRVAL_P(newval));
if (newval == &value_copy) {
zval_dtor(newval);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator::OnDestroy() {
DCHECK(video_decode_accelerator_.get());
video_decode_accelerator_.release()->Destroy();
}
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void addranges_w(struct cstate *g)
{
addrange(g, '0', '9');
addrange(g, 'A', 'Z');
addrange(g, '_', '_');
addrange(g, 'a', 'z');
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 90,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableAdTagging(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetAdTaggingEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,589
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_smi_msg(struct ipmi_smi_msg *msg)
{
atomic_dec(&smi_msg_inuse_count);
kfree(msg);
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,238
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::MarkInitiatorsAsRequiringSeparateURLLoaderFactory(
base::flat_set<url::Origin> request_initiators,
bool push_to_renderer_now) {
size_t old_size = initiators_requiring_separate_url_loader_factory_.size();
initiators_requiring_separate_url_loader_factory_.insert(
request_initiators.begin(), request_initiators.end());
size_t new_size = initiators_requiring_separate_url_loader_factory_.size();
bool insertion_took_place = (old_size != new_size);
if (push_to_renderer_now && insertion_took_place &&
has_committed_any_navigation_) {
std::unique_ptr<URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo> subresource_loader_factories =
std::make_unique<URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo>();
subresource_loader_factories->initiator_specific_factory_infos() =
CreateInitiatorSpecificURLLoaderFactories(request_initiators);
GetNavigationControl()->UpdateSubresourceLoaderFactories(
std::move(subresource_loader_factories));
}
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,106
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sg_fill_request_table(Sg_fd *sfp, sg_req_info_t *rinfo)
{
Sg_request *srp;
int val;
unsigned int ms;
val = 0;
list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
if (val >= SG_MAX_QUEUE)
break;
rinfo[val].req_state = srp->done + 1;
rinfo[val].problem =
srp->header.masked_status &
srp->header.host_status &
srp->header.driver_status;
if (srp->done)
rinfo[val].duration =
srp->header.duration;
else {
ms = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies);
rinfo[val].duration =
(ms > srp->header.duration) ?
(ms - srp->header.duration) : 0;
}
rinfo[val].orphan = srp->orphan;
rinfo[val].sg_io_owned = srp->sg_io_owned;
rinfo[val].pack_id = srp->header.pack_id;
rinfo[val].usr_ptr = srp->header.usr_ptr;
val++;
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in sg_build_indirect()
This shall help avoid copying uninitialized memory to the userspace when
calling ioctl(fd, SG_IO) with an empty command.
Reported-by: syzbot+7d26fc1eea198488deab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 75,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::OneQuarterTest() {
memset(src_, 255, block_size_);
const int half = block_size_ / 2;
memset(ref_, 255, half);
memset(ref_ + half, 0, half);
unsigned int sse;
unsigned int var;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var = variance_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse));
const unsigned int expected = block_size_ * 255 * 255 / 4;
EXPECT_EQ(expected, var);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int megasas_map_dcmd(MegasasState *s, MegasasCmd *cmd)
{
dma_addr_t iov_pa, iov_size;
cmd->flags = le16_to_cpu(cmd->frame->header.flags);
if (!cmd->frame->header.sge_count) {
trace_megasas_dcmd_zero_sge(cmd->index);
cmd->iov_size = 0;
return 0;
} else if (cmd->frame->header.sge_count > 1) {
trace_megasas_dcmd_invalid_sge(cmd->index,
cmd->frame->header.sge_count);
cmd->iov_size = 0;
return -1;
}
iov_pa = megasas_sgl_get_addr(cmd, &cmd->frame->dcmd.sgl);
iov_size = megasas_sgl_get_len(cmd, &cmd->frame->dcmd.sgl);
pci_dma_sglist_init(&cmd->qsg, PCI_DEVICE(s), 1);
qemu_sglist_add(&cmd->qsg, iov_pa, iov_size);
cmd->iov_size = iov_size;
return cmd->iov_size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 10,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: node_has_ipv6_orport(const node_t *node)
{
tor_addr_port_t ipv6_orport;
node_get_pref_ipv6_orport(node, &ipv6_orport);
return tor_addr_port_is_valid_ap(&ipv6_orport, 0);
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 69,802
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: smb_com_flush(smb_request_t *sr)
{
smb_ofile_t *file;
smb_llist_t *flist;
int rc;
if (smb_flush_required == 0) {
rc = smbsr_encode_empty_result(sr);
return ((rc == 0) ? SDRC_SUCCESS : SDRC_ERROR);
}
if (sr->smb_fid != 0xffff) {
smbsr_lookup_file(sr);
if (sr->fid_ofile == NULL) {
smbsr_error(sr, NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE,
ERRDOS, ERRbadfid);
return (SDRC_ERROR);
}
smb_flush_file(sr, sr->fid_ofile);
} else {
flist = &sr->tid_tree->t_ofile_list;
smb_llist_enter(flist, RW_READER);
file = smb_llist_head(flist);
while (file) {
mutex_enter(&file->f_mutex);
smb_flush_file(sr, file);
mutex_exit(&file->f_mutex);
file = smb_llist_next(flist, file);
}
smb_llist_exit(flist);
}
rc = smbsr_encode_empty_result(sr);
return ((rc == 0) ? SDRC_SUCCESS : SDRC_ERROR);
}
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <matt.barden@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <evan.layton@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 168,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void* hashbin_find( hashbin_t* hashbin, long hashv, const char* name )
{
int bin;
irda_queue_t* entry;
pr_debug("hashbin_find()\n");
IRDA_ASSERT( hashbin != NULL, return NULL;);
IRDA_ASSERT( hashbin->magic == HB_MAGIC, return NULL;);
/*
* Locate hashbin
*/
if ( name )
hashv = hash( name );
bin = GET_HASHBIN( hashv );
/*
* Search for entry
*/
entry = hashbin->hb_queue[ bin];
if ( entry ) {
do {
/*
* Check for key
*/
if ( entry->q_hash == hashv ) {
/*
* Name compare too?
*/
if ( name ) {
if ( strcmp( entry->q_name, name ) == 0 ) {
return entry;
}
} else {
return entry;
}
}
entry = entry->q_next;
} while ( entry != hashbin->hb_queue[ bin ] );
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix lockdep annotations in hashbin_delete().
A nested lock depth was added to the hasbin_delete() code but it
doesn't actually work some well and results in tons of lockdep splats.
Fix the code instead to properly drop the lock around the operation
and just keep peeking the head of the hashbin queue.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 68,154
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned WebMediaPlayerImpl::DecodedFrameCount() const {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
return GetPipelineStatistics().video_frames_decoded;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sasl_timeout_callback(struct Event* ev)
{
struct Client *cptr;
assert(0 != ev_timer(ev));
assert(0 != t_data(ev_timer(ev)));
if (ev_type(ev) == ET_EXPIRE) {
cptr = (struct Client*) t_data(ev_timer(ev));
abort_sasl(cptr, 1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix to prevent SASL security vulnerability
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 73,708
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DeletedGpuMemoryBuffer(ThreadSafeSender* sender,
gfx::GpuMemoryBufferType type,
const gfx::GpuMemoryBufferId& id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer", "RenderThreadImpl::DeletedGpuMemoryBuffer");
sender->Send(new ChildProcessHostMsg_DeletedGpuMemoryBuffer(type, id));
}
Commit Message: Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler
Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler to avoid some
regressions which it has introduced.
BUG=391005,415758,415478,412714,416362,416827,417608
TBR=jamesr@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/609483002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#296916}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __tracing_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, bool snapshot)
{
struct trace_array *tr = inode->i_private;
struct trace_iterator *iter;
int cpu;
if (tracing_disabled)
return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
iter = __seq_open_private(file, &tracer_seq_ops, sizeof(*iter));
if (!iter)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
iter->buffer_iter = kcalloc(nr_cpu_ids, sizeof(*iter->buffer_iter),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iter->buffer_iter)
goto release;
/*
* We make a copy of the current tracer to avoid concurrent
* changes on it while we are reading.
*/
mutex_lock(&trace_types_lock);
iter->trace = kzalloc(sizeof(*iter->trace), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iter->trace)
goto fail;
*iter->trace = *tr->current_trace;
if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&iter->started, GFP_KERNEL))
goto fail;
iter->tr = tr;
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE
/* Currently only the top directory has a snapshot */
if (tr->current_trace->print_max || snapshot)
iter->trace_buffer = &tr->max_buffer;
else
#endif
iter->trace_buffer = &tr->trace_buffer;
iter->snapshot = snapshot;
iter->pos = -1;
iter->cpu_file = tracing_get_cpu(inode);
mutex_init(&iter->mutex);
/* Notify the tracer early; before we stop tracing. */
if (iter->trace && iter->trace->open)
iter->trace->open(iter);
/* Annotate start of buffers if we had overruns */
if (ring_buffer_overruns(iter->trace_buffer->buffer))
iter->iter_flags |= TRACE_FILE_ANNOTATE;
/* Output in nanoseconds only if we are using a clock in nanoseconds. */
if (trace_clocks[tr->clock_id].in_ns)
iter->iter_flags |= TRACE_FILE_TIME_IN_NS;
/* stop the trace while dumping if we are not opening "snapshot" */
if (!iter->snapshot)
tracing_stop_tr(tr);
if (iter->cpu_file == RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) {
for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
iter->buffer_iter[cpu] =
ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter->trace_buffer->buffer,
cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
}
ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync();
for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
ring_buffer_read_start(iter->buffer_iter[cpu]);
tracing_iter_reset(iter, cpu);
}
} else {
cpu = iter->cpu_file;
iter->buffer_iter[cpu] =
ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter->trace_buffer->buffer,
cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync();
ring_buffer_read_start(iter->buffer_iter[cpu]);
tracing_iter_reset(iter, cpu);
}
mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock);
return iter;
fail:
mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock);
kfree(iter->trace);
kfree(iter->buffer_iter);
release:
seq_release_private(inode, file);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,898
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::EvaluateMediaQueryList() {
if (media_query_matcher_)
media_query_matcher_->MediaFeaturesChanged();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pk_mk_padata(krb5_context context,
krb5_pk_init_ctx ctx,
const KDC_REQ_BODY *req_body,
unsigned nonce,
METHOD_DATA *md)
{
struct ContentInfo content_info;
krb5_error_code ret;
const heim_oid *oid = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
krb5_data buf, sd_buf;
int pa_type = -1;
krb5_data_zero(&buf);
krb5_data_zero(&sd_buf);
memset(&content_info, 0, sizeof(content_info));
if (ctx->type == PKINIT_WIN2K) {
AuthPack_Win2k ap;
krb5_timestamp sec;
int32_t usec;
memset(&ap, 0, sizeof(ap));
/* fill in PKAuthenticator */
ret = copy_PrincipalName(req_body->sname, &ap.pkAuthenticator.kdcName);
if (ret) {
free_AuthPack_Win2k(&ap);
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
ret = copy_Realm(&req_body->realm, &ap.pkAuthenticator.kdcRealm);
if (ret) {
free_AuthPack_Win2k(&ap);
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
krb5_us_timeofday(context, &sec, &usec);
ap.pkAuthenticator.ctime = sec;
ap.pkAuthenticator.cusec = usec;
ap.pkAuthenticator.nonce = nonce;
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthPack_Win2k, buf.data, buf.length,
&ap, &size, ret);
free_AuthPack_Win2k(&ap);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Failed encoding AuthPackWin: %d", ""),
(int)ret);
goto out;
}
if (buf.length != size)
krb5_abortx(context, "internal ASN1 encoder error");
oid = &asn1_oid_id_pkcs7_data;
} else if (ctx->type == PKINIT_27) {
AuthPack ap;
memset(&ap, 0, sizeof(ap));
ret = build_auth_pack(context, nonce, ctx, req_body, &ap);
if (ret) {
free_AuthPack(&ap);
goto out;
}
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthPack, buf.data, buf.length, &ap, &size, ret);
free_AuthPack(&ap);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Failed encoding AuthPack: %d", ""),
(int)ret);
goto out;
}
if (buf.length != size)
krb5_abortx(context, "internal ASN1 encoder error");
oid = &asn1_oid_id_pkauthdata;
} else
krb5_abortx(context, "internal pkinit error");
ret = create_signature(context, oid, &buf, ctx->id,
ctx->peer, &sd_buf);
krb5_data_free(&buf);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = hx509_cms_wrap_ContentInfo(&asn1_oid_id_pkcs7_signedData, &sd_buf, &buf);
krb5_data_free(&sd_buf);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("ContentInfo wrapping of signedData failed",""));
goto out;
}
if (ctx->type == PKINIT_WIN2K) {
PA_PK_AS_REQ_Win2k winreq;
pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN;
memset(&winreq, 0, sizeof(winreq));
winreq.signed_auth_pack = buf;
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_PK_AS_REQ_Win2k, buf.data, buf.length,
&winreq, &size, ret);
free_PA_PK_AS_REQ_Win2k(&winreq);
} else if (ctx->type == PKINIT_27) {
PA_PK_AS_REQ req;
pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ;
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
req.signedAuthPack = buf;
if (ctx->trustedCertifiers) {
req.trustedCertifiers = calloc(1, sizeof(*req.trustedCertifiers));
if (req.trustedCertifiers == NULL) {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
free_PA_PK_AS_REQ(&req);
goto out;
}
ret = build_edi(context, context->hx509ctx,
ctx->id->anchors, req.trustedCertifiers);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("pk-init: failed to build "
"trustedCertifiers", ""));
free_PA_PK_AS_REQ(&req);
goto out;
}
}
req.kdcPkId = NULL;
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_PK_AS_REQ, buf.data, buf.length,
&req, &size, ret);
free_PA_PK_AS_REQ(&req);
} else
krb5_abortx(context, "internal pkinit error");
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "PA-PK-AS-REQ %d", (int)ret);
goto out;
}
if (buf.length != size)
krb5_abortx(context, "Internal ASN1 encoder error");
ret = krb5_padata_add(context, md, pa_type, buf.data, buf.length);
if (ret)
free(buf.data);
if (ret == 0)
krb5_padata_add(context, md, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_09_BINDING, NULL, 0);
out:
free_ContentInfo(&content_info);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320
| 0
| 89,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void unsignedLongMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueUnsigned(info, imp->unsignedLongMethod());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int svc_rdma_xdr_decode_req(struct xdr_buf *rq_arg)
{
__be32 *p, *end, *rdma_argp;
unsigned int hdr_len;
/* Verify that there's enough bytes for header + something */
if (rq_arg->len <= RPCRDMA_HDRLEN_ERR)
goto out_short;
rdma_argp = rq_arg->head[0].iov_base;
if (*(rdma_argp + 1) != rpcrdma_version)
goto out_version;
switch (*(rdma_argp + 3)) {
case rdma_msg:
case rdma_nomsg:
break;
case rdma_done:
goto out_drop;
case rdma_error:
goto out_drop;
default:
goto out_proc;
}
end = (__be32 *)((unsigned long)rdma_argp + rq_arg->len);
p = xdr_check_read_list(rdma_argp + 4, end);
if (!p)
goto out_inval;
p = xdr_check_write_list(p, end);
if (!p)
goto out_inval;
p = xdr_check_reply_chunk(p, end);
if (!p)
goto out_inval;
if (p > end)
goto out_inval;
rq_arg->head[0].iov_base = p;
hdr_len = (unsigned long)p - (unsigned long)rdma_argp;
rq_arg->head[0].iov_len -= hdr_len;
return hdr_len;
out_short:
dprintk("svcrdma: header too short = %d\n", rq_arg->len);
return -EINVAL;
out_version:
dprintk("svcrdma: bad xprt version: %u\n",
be32_to_cpup(rdma_argp + 1));
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
out_drop:
dprintk("svcrdma: dropping RDMA_DONE/ERROR message\n");
return 0;
out_proc:
dprintk("svcrdma: bad rdma procedure (%u)\n",
be32_to_cpup(rdma_argp + 3));
return -EINVAL;
out_inval:
dprintk("svcrdma: failed to parse transport header\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DoResolveRelativeURL(const char* base_url,
const url_parse::Parsed& base_parsed,
bool base_is_file,
const CHAR* relative_url,
const url_parse::Component& relative_component,
CharsetConverter* query_converter,
CanonOutput* output,
url_parse::Parsed* out_parsed) {
*out_parsed = base_parsed;
if (base_parsed.path.len <= 0) {
int base_len = base_parsed.Length();
for (int i = 0; i < base_len; i++)
output->push_back(base_url[i]);
return false;
}
if (relative_component.len <= 0) {
int base_len = base_parsed.Length();
base_len -= base_parsed.ref.len + 1;
out_parsed->ref.reset();
output->Append(base_url, base_len);
return true;
}
int num_slashes = url_parse::CountConsecutiveSlashes(
relative_url, relative_component.begin, relative_component.end());
#ifdef WIN32
int after_slashes = relative_component.begin + num_slashes;
if (url_parse::DoesBeginUNCPath(relative_url, relative_component.begin,
relative_component.end(), !base_is_file) ||
((num_slashes == 0 || base_is_file) &&
url_parse::DoesBeginWindowsDriveSpec(relative_url, after_slashes,
relative_component.end()))) {
return DoResolveAbsoluteFile(relative_url, relative_component,
query_converter, output, out_parsed);
}
#else
if (base_is_file &&
(num_slashes > 2 || num_slashes == relative_component.len)) {
return DoResolveAbsoluteFile(relative_url, relative_component,
query_converter, output, out_parsed);
}
#endif
if (num_slashes >= 2) {
return DoResolveRelativeHost(base_url, base_parsed,
relative_url, relative_component,
query_converter, output, out_parsed);
}
return DoResolveRelativePath(base_url, base_parsed, base_is_file,
relative_url, relative_component,
query_converter, output, out_parsed);
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB read when parsing protocol-relative URLs
BUG=285742
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23902014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@223735 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 111,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: renderCoTable(struct table *tbl, int maxlimit)
{
struct readbuffer obuf;
struct html_feed_environ h_env;
struct environment envs[MAX_ENV_LEVEL];
struct table *t;
int i, col, row;
int indent, maxwidth;
if (cotable_level >= MAX_COTABLE_LEVEL)
return; /* workaround to prevent infinite recursion */
cotable_level++;
for (i = 0; i < tbl->ntable; i++) {
t = tbl->tables[i].ptr;
if (t == NULL)
continue;
col = tbl->tables[i].col;
row = tbl->tables[i].row;
indent = tbl->tables[i].indent;
init_henv(&h_env, &obuf, envs, MAX_ENV_LEVEL, tbl->tables[i].buf,
get_spec_cell_width(tbl, row, col), indent);
check_row(tbl, row);
if (h_env.limit > maxlimit)
h_env.limit = maxlimit;
if (t->total_width == 0)
maxwidth = h_env.limit - indent;
else if (t->total_width > 0)
maxwidth = t->total_width;
else
maxwidth = t->total_width = -t->total_width * h_env.limit / 100;
renderTable(t, maxwidth, &h_env);
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 84,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs_revalidate_mapping(struct inode *inode, struct address_space *mapping)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(inode);
int ret = 0;
if ((nfsi->cache_validity & NFS_INO_REVAL_PAGECACHE)
|| nfs_attribute_timeout(inode) || NFS_STALE(inode)) {
ret = __nfs_revalidate_inode(NFS_SERVER(inode), inode);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
}
if (nfsi->cache_validity & NFS_INO_INVALID_DATA)
ret = nfs_invalidate_mapping(inode, mapping);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FT_Stream_Free( FT_Stream stream,
FT_Int external )
{
if ( stream )
{
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
FT_Stream_Close( stream );
if ( !external )
FT_FREE( stream );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,679
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: midi_synth_controller(int dev, int channel, int ctrl_num, int value)
{
int orig_dev = synth_devs[dev]->midi_dev;
int chn, msg;
if (ctrl_num < 0 || ctrl_num > 127)
return;
if (channel < 0 || channel > 15)
return;
leave_sysex(dev);
msg = prev_out_status[orig_dev] & 0xf0;
chn = prev_out_status[orig_dev] & 0x0f;
if (msg != 0xb0 || chn != channel)
{
if (!prefix_cmd(orig_dev, 0xb0 | (channel & 0x0f)))
return;
midi_outc(orig_dev, 0xb0 | (channel & 0x0f));
} else if (!prefix_cmd(orig_dev, ctrl_num))
return;
midi_outc(orig_dev, ctrl_num);
midi_outc(orig_dev, value & 0x7f);
}
Commit Message: sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 27,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _PUBLIC_ struct smb_iconv_handle *smb_iconv_handle_reinit(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *dos_charset,
const char *unix_charset,
bool use_builtin_handlers,
struct smb_iconv_handle *old_ic)
{
struct smb_iconv_handle *ret;
if (old_ic != NULL) {
ret = old_ic;
close_iconv_handle(ret);
talloc_free(ret->child_ctx);
ZERO_STRUCTP(ret);
} else {
ret = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct smb_iconv_handle);
}
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
/* we use a child context to allow us to free all ptrs without
freeing the structure itself */
ret->child_ctx = talloc_new(ret);
if (ret->child_ctx == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
talloc_set_destructor(ret, close_iconv_handle);
if (strcasecmp(dos_charset, "UTF8") == 0 || strcasecmp(dos_charset, "UTF-8") == 0) {
DEBUG(0,("ERROR: invalid DOS charset: 'dos charset' must not be UTF8, using (default value) CP850 instead\n"));
dos_charset = "CP850";
}
ret->dos_charset = talloc_strdup(ret->child_ctx, dos_charset);
ret->unix_charset = talloc_strdup(ret->child_ctx, unix_charset);
ret->use_builtin_handlers = use_builtin_handlers;
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 2,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cg_releasedir(const char *path, struct fuse_file_info *fi)
{
struct file_info *d = (struct file_info *)fi->fh;
do_release_file_info(d);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,384
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pixel_cmp(png_const_bytep pa, png_const_bytep pb, png_uint_32 bit_width)
{
#if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10506
if (memcmp(pa, pb, bit_width>>3) == 0)
{
png_uint_32 p;
if ((bit_width & 7) == 0) return 0;
/* Ok, any differences? */
p = pa[bit_width >> 3];
p ^= pb[bit_width >> 3];
if (p == 0) return 0;
/* There are, but they may not be significant, remove the bits
* after the end (the low order bits in PNG.)
*/
bit_width &= 7;
p >>= 8-bit_width;
if (p == 0) return 0;
}
#else
/* From libpng-1.5.6 the overwrite should be fixed, so compare the trailing
* bits too:
*/
if (memcmp(pa, pb, (bit_width+7)>>3) == 0)
return 0;
#endif
/* Return the index of the changed byte. */
{
png_uint_32 where = 0;
while (pa[where] == pb[where]) ++where;
return 1+where;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int frame_cnt = 0;
FILE *outfile = NULL;
vpx_codec_ctx_t codec;
vpx_codec_err_t res;
VpxVideoReader *reader = NULL;
const VpxInterface *decoder = NULL;
const VpxVideoInfo *info = NULL;
exec_name = argv[0];
if (argc != 3)
die("Invalid number of arguments.");
reader = vpx_video_reader_open(argv[1]);
if (!reader)
die("Failed to open %s for reading.", argv[1]);
if (!(outfile = fopen(argv[2], "wb")))
die("Failed to open %s for writing", argv[2]);
info = vpx_video_reader_get_info(reader);
decoder = get_vpx_decoder_by_fourcc(info->codec_fourcc);
if (!decoder)
die("Unknown input codec.");
printf("Using %s\n", vpx_codec_iface_name(decoder->interface()));
res = vpx_codec_dec_init(&codec, decoder->interface(), NULL,
VPX_CODEC_USE_POSTPROC);
if (res == VPX_CODEC_INCAPABLE)
die_codec(&codec, "Postproc not supported by this decoder.");
if (res)
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to initialize decoder.");
while (vpx_video_reader_read_frame(reader)) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
size_t frame_size = 0;
const unsigned char *frame = vpx_video_reader_get_frame(reader,
&frame_size);
++frame_cnt;
if (frame_cnt % 30 == 1) {
vp8_postproc_cfg_t pp = {0, 0, 0};
if (vpx_codec_control(&codec, VP8_SET_POSTPROC, &pp))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to turn off postproc.");
} else if (frame_cnt % 30 == 16) {
vp8_postproc_cfg_t pp = {VP8_DEBLOCK | VP8_DEMACROBLOCK | VP8_MFQE,
4, 0};
if (vpx_codec_control(&codec, VP8_SET_POSTPROC, &pp))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to turn on postproc.");
};
if (vpx_codec_decode(&codec, frame, (unsigned int)frame_size, NULL, 15000))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to decode frame");
while ((img = vpx_codec_get_frame(&codec, &iter)) != NULL) {
vpx_img_write(img, outfile);
}
}
printf("Processed %d frames.\n", frame_cnt);
if (vpx_codec_destroy(&codec))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to destroy codec");
printf("Play: ffplay -f rawvideo -pix_fmt yuv420p -s %dx%d %s\n",
info->frame_width, info->frame_height, argv[2]);
vpx_video_reader_close(reader);
fclose(outfile);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PepperMediaDeviceManager::CloseDevice(const std::string& label) {
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
GetMediaStreamDispatcher()->CloseDevice(label);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey)
{
ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa = ecdsa_check(eckey);
if (ecdsa == NULL)
return 0;
return ecdsa->meth->ecdsa_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, eckey);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 94,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VOID ParaNdis_ResetRxClassification(PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext)
{
ULONG i;
PPARANDIS_RECEIVE_QUEUE pUnclassified = &pContext->ReceiveQueues[PARANDIS_RECEIVE_QUEUE_UNCLASSIFIED];
NdisAcquireSpinLock(&pUnclassified->Lock);
for(i = PARANDIS_RECEIVE_QUEUE_UNCLASSIFIED + 1; i < ARRAYSIZE(pContext->ReceiveQueues); i++)
{
PPARANDIS_RECEIVE_QUEUE pCurrQueue = &pContext->ReceiveQueues[i];
NdisAcquireSpinLock(&pCurrQueue->Lock);
while(!IsListEmpty(&pCurrQueue->BuffersList))
{
PLIST_ENTRY pListEntry = RemoveHeadList(&pCurrQueue->BuffersList);
InsertTailList(&pUnclassified->BuffersList, pListEntry);
}
NdisReleaseSpinLock(&pCurrQueue->Lock);
}
NdisReleaseSpinLock(&pUnclassified->Lock);
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,384
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_vmptrst(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
u32 vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
gva_t vmcs_gva;
struct x86_exception e;
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
return 1;
if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qualification,
vmx_instruction_info, &vmcs_gva))
return 1;
/* ok to use *_system, as nested_vmx_check_permission verified cpl=0 */
if (kvm_write_guest_virt_system(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, vmcs_gva,
(void *)&to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.current_vmptr,
sizeof(u64), &e)) {
kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e);
return 1;
}
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,635
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mgr_debug_toggle(p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl, fm_mgr_type_t mgr, int argc, char *argv[]) {
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
fm_msg_ret_code_t ret_code;
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_DEBUG_TOGGLE, mgr, 0, NULL, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "mgr_debug_toggle: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("Successfully sent Debug output control to local Manager instance\n");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 96,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GfxRadialShading::~GfxRadialShading() {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nFuncs; ++i) {
delete funcs[i];
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::UpdateCommandsForDevTools() {
bool dev_tools_enabled =
!profile_->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kDevToolsDisabled);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_DEV_TOOLS,
dev_tools_enabled);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_DEV_TOOLS_CONSOLE,
dev_tools_enabled);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_DEV_TOOLS_INSPECT,
dev_tools_enabled);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2Util::ComputeImagePaddedRowSize(int width,
int format,
int type,
int alignment,
uint32_t* padded_row_size) {
uint32_t bytes_per_group = ComputeImageGroupSize(format, type);
return ComputeImageRowSizeHelper(
width, bytes_per_group, alignment, nullptr, padded_row_size, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Validate glClearBuffer*v function |buffer| param on the client side
Otherwise we could read out-of-bounds even if an invalid |buffer| is passed
in and in theory we should not read the buffer at all.
BUG=908749
TEST=gl_tests in ASAN build
R=piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I94b69b56ce3358ff9bfc0e21f0618aec4371d1ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1354571
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#612023}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 153,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnRequestPpapiBrokerPermission(
RenderViewHostImpl* source,
int ppb_broker_route_id,
const GURL& url,
const base::FilePath& plugin_path) {
base::Callback<void(bool)> permission_result_callback = base::Bind(
&WebContentsImpl::SendPpapiBrokerPermissionResult, base::Unretained(this),
source->GetProcess()->GetID(), ppb_broker_route_id);
if (!delegate_) {
permission_result_callback.Run(false);
return;
}
if (!delegate_->RequestPpapiBrokerPermission(this, url, plugin_path,
permission_result_callback)) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
permission_result_callback.Run(false);
}
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FrameFetchContextModifyRequestTest()
: example_origin(SecurityOrigin::Create(
KURL(kParsedURLString, "https://example.test/"))),
secure_origin(SecurityOrigin::Create(
KURL(kParsedURLString, "https://secureorigin.test/image.png"))) {}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,797
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _snd_timer_stop(struct snd_timer_instance * timeri,
int keep_flag, int event)
{
struct snd_timer *timer;
unsigned long flags;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!timeri))
return -ENXIO;
if (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_SLAVE) {
if (!keep_flag) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&slave_active_lock, flags);
timeri->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&slave_active_lock, flags);
}
goto __end;
}
timer = timeri->timer;
if (!timer)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
list_del_init(&timeri->ack_list);
list_del_init(&timeri->active_list);
if ((timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING) &&
!(--timer->running)) {
timer->hw.stop(timer);
if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED) {
timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED;
snd_timer_reschedule(timer, 0);
if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE) {
timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE;
timer->hw.start(timer);
}
}
}
if (!keep_flag)
timeri->flags &=
~(SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING | SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_START);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
__end:
if (event != SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)
snd_timer_notify1(timeri, event);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Harden slave timer list handling
A slave timer instance might be still accessible in a racy way while
operating the master instance as it lacks of locking. Since the
master operation is mostly protected with timer->lock, we should cope
with it while changing the slave instance, too. Also, some linked
lists (active_list and ack_list) of slave instances aren't unlinked
immediately at stopping or closing, and this may lead to unexpected
accesses.
This patch tries to address these issues. It adds spin lock of
timer->lock (either from master or slave, which is equivalent) in a
few places. For avoiding a deadlock, we ensure that the global
slave_active_lock is always locked at first before each timer lock.
Also, ack and active_list of slave instances are properly unlinked at
snd_timer_stop() and snd_timer_close().
Last but not least, remove the superfluous call of _snd_timer_stop()
at removing slave links. This is a noop, and calling it may confuse
readers wrt locking. Further cleanup will follow in a later patch.
Actually we've got reports of use-after-free by syzkaller fuzzer, and
this hopefully fixes these issues.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 167,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UrlFetcher::Core::SetUploadData(const std::string& upload_content_type,
const std::string& upload_content) {
upload_content_type_ = upload_content_type;
upload_content_ = upload_content;
}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual status_t dequeueBuffer(int *buf, sp<Fence>* fence, bool async,
uint32_t width, uint32_t height, PixelFormat format,
uint32_t usage) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferProducer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32(static_cast<int32_t>(async));
data.writeUint32(width);
data.writeUint32(height);
data.writeInt32(static_cast<int32_t>(format));
data.writeUint32(usage);
status_t result = remote()->transact(DEQUEUE_BUFFER, data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
*buf = reply.readInt32();
bool nonNull = reply.readInt32();
if (nonNull) {
*fence = new Fence();
reply.read(**fence);
}
result = reply.readInt32();
return result;
}
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 160,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BackingStoreEvents(Display* d, Picture pic, Pixmap pix,
const base::Closure& c)
: display(d),
picture(pic),
pixmap(pix),
closure(c) {
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 119,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_static)(ELFOBJ *bin) {
int i;
if (!bin->phdr) {
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->ehdr.e_phnum; i++) {
if (bin->phdr[i].p_type == PT_INTERP) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 60,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: isSVD(struct iso9660 *iso9660, const unsigned char *h)
{
const unsigned char *p;
ssize_t logical_block_size;
int32_t volume_block;
int32_t location;
(void)iso9660; /* UNUSED */
/* Type 2 means it's a SVD. */
if (h[SVD_type_offset] != 2)
return (0);
/* Reserved field must be 0. */
if (!isNull(iso9660, h, SVD_reserved1_offset, SVD_reserved1_size))
return (0);
if (!isNull(iso9660, h, SVD_reserved2_offset, SVD_reserved2_size))
return (0);
if (!isNull(iso9660, h, SVD_reserved3_offset, SVD_reserved3_size))
return (0);
/* File structure version must be 1 for ISO9660/ECMA119. */
if (h[SVD_file_structure_version_offset] != 1)
return (0);
logical_block_size =
archive_le16dec(h + SVD_logical_block_size_offset);
if (logical_block_size <= 0)
return (0);
volume_block = archive_le32dec(h + SVD_volume_space_size_offset);
if (volume_block <= SYSTEM_AREA_BLOCK+4)
return (0);
/* Location of Occurrence of Type L Path Table must be
* available location,
* >= SYSTEM_AREA_BLOCK(16) + 2 and < Volume Space Size. */
location = archive_le32dec(h+SVD_type_L_path_table_offset);
if (location < SYSTEM_AREA_BLOCK+2 || location >= volume_block)
return (0);
/* The Type M Path Table must be at a valid location (WinISO
* and probably other programs omit this, so we allow zero)
*
* >= SYSTEM_AREA_BLOCK(16) + 2 and < Volume Space Size. */
location = archive_be32dec(h+SVD_type_M_path_table_offset);
if ((location > 0 && location < SYSTEM_AREA_BLOCK+2)
|| location >= volume_block)
return (0);
/* Read Root Directory Record in Volume Descriptor. */
p = h + SVD_root_directory_record_offset;
if (p[DR_length_offset] != 34)
return (0);
return (48);
}
Commit Message: Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 51,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void conn_close(conn *c) {
assert(c != NULL);
/* delete the event, the socket and the conn */
event_del(&c->event);
if (settings.verbose > 1)
fprintf(stderr, "<%d connection closed.\n", c->sfd);
conn_cleanup(c);
MEMCACHED_CONN_RELEASE(c->sfd);
conn_set_state(c, conn_closed);
#ifdef TLS
if (c->ssl) {
SSL_shutdown(c->ssl);
SSL_free(c->ssl);
}
#endif
close(c->sfd);
pthread_mutex_lock(&conn_lock);
allow_new_conns = true;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&conn_lock);
STATS_LOCK();
stats_state.curr_conns--;
STATS_UNLOCK();
return;
}
Commit Message: fix strncpy call to avoid ASAN violation
Ensure we're only reading to the size of the smallest buffer, since
they're both on the stack and could potentially overlap. Overlapping is
defined as ... undefined behavior. I've looked through all available
implementations of strncpy and they still only copy from the first \0
found.
We'll also never read past the end of sun_path since we _supply_
sun_path with a proper null terminator.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 88,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int path_has_submounts(const struct path *parent)
{
struct check_mount data = { .mnt = parent->mnt, .mounted = 0 };
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
d_walk(parent->dentry, &data, path_check_mount, NULL);
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
return data.mounted;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 67,362
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_decompress_chunk(png_structp png_ptr, int comp_type,
png_size_t chunklength,
png_size_t prefix_size, png_size_t *newlength)
{
/* The caller should guarantee this */
if (prefix_size > chunklength)
{
/* The recovery is to delete the chunk. */
png_warning(png_ptr, "invalid chunklength");
prefix_size = 0; /* To delete everything */
}
else if (comp_type == PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE)
{
png_size_t expanded_size = png_inflate(png_ptr,
(png_bytep)(png_ptr->chunkdata + prefix_size),
chunklength - prefix_size,
0/*output*/, 0/*output size*/);
/* Now check the limits on this chunk - if the limit fails the
* compressed data will be removed, the prefix will remain.
*/
if (prefix_size >= (~(png_size_t)0) - 1 ||
expanded_size >= (~(png_size_t)0) - 1 - prefix_size
#ifdef PNG_USER_CHUNK_MALLOC_MAX
|| ((PNG_USER_CHUNK_MALLOC_MAX > 0) &&
prefix_size + expanded_size >= PNG_USER_CHUNK_MALLOC_MAX - 1)
#endif
)
png_warning(png_ptr, "Exceeded size limit while expanding chunk");
/* If the size is zero either there was an error and a message
* has already been output (warning) or the size really is zero
* and we have nothing to do - the code will exit through the
* error case below.
*/
else if (expanded_size > 0)
{
/* Success (maybe) - really uncompress the chunk. */
png_size_t new_size = 0;
png_charp text = png_malloc_warn(png_ptr,
prefix_size + expanded_size + 1);
if (text != NULL)
{
png_memcpy(text, png_ptr->chunkdata, prefix_size);
new_size = png_inflate(png_ptr,
(png_bytep)(png_ptr->chunkdata + prefix_size),
chunklength - prefix_size,
(png_bytep)(text + prefix_size), expanded_size);
text[prefix_size + expanded_size] = 0; /* just in case */
if (new_size == expanded_size)
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = text;
*newlength = prefix_size + expanded_size;
return; /* The success return! */
}
png_warning(png_ptr, "png_inflate logic error");
png_free(png_ptr, text);
}
else
png_warning(png_ptr, "Not enough memory to decompress chunk.");
}
}
else /* if (comp_type != PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE) */
{
#if defined(PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
char umsg[50];
png_snprintf(umsg, sizeof umsg, "Unknown zTXt compression type %d",
comp_type);
png_warning(png_ptr, umsg);
#else
png_warning(png_ptr, "Unknown zTXt compression type");
#endif
/* The recovery is to simply drop the data. */
}
/* Generic error return - leave the prefix, delete the compressed
* data, reallocate the chunkdata to remove the potentially large
* amount of compressed data.
*/
{
png_charp text = png_malloc_warn(png_ptr, prefix_size + 1);
if (text != NULL)
{
if (prefix_size > 0)
png_memcpy(text, png_ptr->chunkdata, prefix_size);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = text;
/* This is an extra zero in the 'uncompressed' part. */
*(png_ptr->chunkdata + prefix_size) = 0x00;
}
/* Ignore a malloc error here - it is safe. */
}
*newlength = prefix_size;
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 131,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::ClearUIResources() {
for (UIResourceMap::const_iterator iter = ui_resource_map_.begin();
iter != ui_resource_map_.end(); ++iter) {
evicted_ui_resources_.insert(iter->first);
resource_provider_->DeleteResource(iter->second.resource_id);
}
ui_resource_map_.clear();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::~RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid() {
SetContentViewCore(NULL);
if (!shared_surface_.is_null()) {
ImageTransportFactoryAndroid::GetInstance()->DestroySharedSurfaceHandle(
shared_surface_);
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,371
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext3_create_journal(struct super_block *sb,
struct ext3_super_block *es,
unsigned int journal_inum)
{
journal_t *journal;
int err;
if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: readonly filesystem when trying to "
"create journal");
return -EROFS;
}
journal = ext3_get_journal(sb, journal_inum);
if (!journal)
return -EINVAL;
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "creating new journal on inode %u",
journal_inum);
err = journal_create(journal);
if (err) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error creating journal");
journal_destroy(journal);
return -EIO;
}
EXT3_SB(sb)->s_journal = journal;
ext3_update_dynamic_rev(sb);
EXT3_SET_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT3_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_RECOVER);
EXT3_SET_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT3_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL);
es->s_journal_inum = cpu_to_le32(journal_inum);
/* Make sure we flush the recovery flag to disk. */
ext3_commit_super(sb, es, 1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 32,917
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleStencilThenCoverFillPathCHROMIUM(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
static const char kFunctionName[] = "glStencilThenCoverFillPathCHROMIUM";
const volatile gles2::cmds::StencilThenCoverFillPathCHROMIUM& c =
*static_cast<
const volatile gles2::cmds::StencilThenCoverFillPathCHROMIUM*>(
cmd_data);
if (!features().chromium_path_rendering)
return error::kUnknownCommand;
PathCommandValidatorContext v(this, kFunctionName);
GLenum fill_mode = GL_COUNT_UP_CHROMIUM;
GLuint mask = 0;
GLenum cover_mode = GL_BOUNDING_BOX_CHROMIUM;
if (!v.GetFillModeAndMask(c, &fill_mode, &mask) ||
!v.GetCoverMode(c, &cover_mode))
return v.error();
GLuint service_id = 0;
if (!path_manager()->GetPath(static_cast<GLuint>(c.path), &service_id))
return error::kNoError;
if (!CheckBoundDrawFramebufferValid(kFunctionName))
return error::kNoError;
ApplyDirtyState();
api()->glStencilThenCoverFillPathNVFn(service_id, fill_mode, mask,
cover_mode);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,590
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int asepcos_change_key(sc_card_t *card, sc_cardctl_asepcos_change_key_t *p)
{
int r, atype;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
if (p->datalen > 255)
atype = SC_APDU_CASE_3_EXT;
else
atype = SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT;
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, atype, 0x24, 0x01, 0x80);
apdu.lc = p->datalen;
apdu.datalen = p->datalen;
apdu.data = p->data;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
return sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: STATIC ptr_t GC_alloc_large_and_clear(size_t lb, int k, unsigned flags)
{
ptr_t result = GC_alloc_large(lb, k, flags);
word n_blocks = OBJ_SZ_TO_BLOCKS(lb);
if (0 == result) return 0;
if (GC_debugging_started || GC_obj_kinds[k].ok_init) {
/* Clear the whole block, in case of GC_realloc call. */
BZERO(result, n_blocks * HBLKSIZE);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix calloc() overflow
* malloc.c (calloc): Check multiplication overflow in calloc(),
assuming REDIRECT_MALLOC.
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabStripModelObserver::TabPinnedStateChanged(WebContents* contents,
int index) {
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,256
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InputConnectionImpl::UpdateTextInputState(
bool is_input_state_update_requested) {
if (state_update_timer_.IsRunning()) {
is_input_state_update_requested = true;
}
state_update_timer_.Stop();
imm_bridge_->SendUpdateTextInputState(
GetTextInputState(is_input_state_update_requested));
}
Commit Message: Clear |composing_text_| after CommitText() is called.
|composing_text_| of InputConnectionImpl should be cleared after
CommitText() is called. Otherwise, FinishComposingText() will commit the
same text twice.
Bug: 899736
Test: unit_tests
Change-Id: Idb22d968ffe95d946789fbe62454e8e79cb0b384
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1304773
Commit-Queue: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#603518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,947
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::Destroy(bool also_delete) {
DCHECK(!destroyed_);
destroyed_ = true;
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.RenderWidgetHostDestroyed(this);
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_HOST_DESTROYED, Source<RenderWidgetHost>(this),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
if (view_) {
view_->Destroy();
view_.reset();
}
if (shared_bitmap_manager_) {
for (const auto& id : owned_bitmaps_)
shared_bitmap_manager_->ChildDeletedSharedBitmap(id);
} else {
DCHECK(owned_bitmaps_.empty());
}
process_->RemoveWidget(this);
process_->RemoveRoute(routing_id_);
g_routing_id_widget_map.Get().erase(
RenderWidgetHostID(process_->GetID(), routing_id_));
if (delegate_)
delegate_->RenderWidgetDeleted(this);
if (also_delete) {
CHECK(!owner_delegate_);
delete this;
}
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_wcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *rd,
const struct kvm_one_reg *reg, void __user *uaddr)
{
__u64 *r = &vcpu->arch.vcpu_debug_state.dbg_wcr[rd->reg];
if (copy_to_user(uaddr, r, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 62,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnFindMatchRectsReply(
RenderFrameHostImpl* source,
int version,
const std::vector<gfx::RectF>& rects,
const gfx::RectF& active_rect) {
GetOrCreateFindRequestManager()->OnFindMatchRectsReply(source, version, rects,
active_rect);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::GetPDFiumRect(
int page_index, const pp::Rect& rect, int* start_x, int* start_y,
int* size_x, int* size_y) const {
pp::Rect page_rect = GetScreenRect(pages_[page_index]->rect());
page_rect.Offset(-rect.x(), -rect.y());
*start_x = page_rect.x();
*start_y = page_rect.y();
*size_x = page_rect.width();
*size_y = page_rect.height();
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BackendImpl::TrimForTest(bool empty) {
eviction_.SetTestMode();
eviction_.TrimCache(empty);
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nested_release_page_clean(struct page *page)
{
kvm_release_page_clean(page);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sched_autogroup_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct inode *inode = m->private;
struct task_struct *p;
p = get_proc_task(inode);
if (!p)
return -ESRCH;
proc_sched_autogroup_show_task(p, m);
put_task_struct(p);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebDevToolsAgent* DevToolsAgent::GetWebAgent() {
WebView* web_view = render_view()->webview();
if (!web_view)
return NULL;
return web_view->devToolsAgent();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::useBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(params);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_UseBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta,
params->size(), static_cast<OMX_U8 *>(params->pointer()));
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, err, SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, params->size(), params->pointer()));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(useBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p", params->size(), params->pointer()));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proxy_closedir(FsContext *ctx, V9fsFidOpenState *fs)
{
return closedir(fs->dir.stream);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 7,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::BeginNavigationRequest(
ResourceContext* resource_context,
const NavigationRequestInfo& info,
NavigationURLLoaderImplCore* loader,
ServiceWorkerNavigationHandleCore* service_worker_handle_core) {
CHECK(IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled());
ResourceType resource_type = info.is_main_frame ?
RESOURCE_TYPE_MAIN_FRAME : RESOURCE_TYPE_SUB_FRAME;
if (is_shutdown_ ||
(delegate_ && !delegate_->ShouldBeginRequest(
info.begin_params.method,
info.common_params.url,
resource_type,
resource_context))) {
loader->NotifyRequestFailed(false, net::ERR_ABORTED);
return;
}
char url_buf[128];
base::strlcpy(
url_buf, info.common_params.url.spec().c_str(), arraysize(url_buf));
base::debug::Alias(url_buf);
CHECK(ContainsKey(active_resource_contexts_, resource_context));
const net::URLRequestContext* request_context =
resource_context->GetRequestContext();
int load_flags = info.begin_params.load_flags;
load_flags |= net::LOAD_VERIFY_EV_CERT;
if (info.is_main_frame)
load_flags |= net::LOAD_MAIN_FRAME;
DCHECK(!(load_flags & net::LOAD_IGNORE_LIMITS));
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequest> new_request;
new_request = request_context->CreateRequest(
info.common_params.url, net::HIGHEST, nullptr);
new_request->set_method(info.begin_params.method);
new_request->set_first_party_for_cookies(
info.first_party_for_cookies);
new_request->set_initiator(info.request_initiator);
if (info.is_main_frame) {
new_request->set_first_party_url_policy(
net::URLRequest::UPDATE_FIRST_PARTY_URL_ON_REDIRECT);
}
SetReferrerForRequest(new_request.get(), info.common_params.referrer);
net::HttpRequestHeaders headers;
headers.AddHeadersFromString(info.begin_params.headers);
new_request->SetExtraRequestHeaders(headers);
new_request->SetLoadFlags(load_flags);
storage::BlobStorageContext* blob_context = GetBlobStorageContext(
GetChromeBlobStorageContextForResourceContext(resource_context));
if (info.request_body.get()) {
AttachRequestBodyBlobDataHandles(
info.request_body.get(),
blob_context);
new_request->set_upload(UploadDataStreamBuilder::Build(
info.request_body.get(),
blob_context,
nullptr, // file_system_context
BrowserThread::GetMessageLoopProxyForThread(BrowserThread::FILE)
.get()));
}
request_id_--;
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* extra_info = new ResourceRequestInfoImpl(
PROCESS_TYPE_BROWSER,
-1, // child_id
-1, // route_id
info.frame_tree_node_id,
-1, // request_data.origin_pid,
request_id_,
-1, // request_data.render_frame_id,
info.is_main_frame, info.parent_is_main_frame, resource_type,
info.common_params.transition,
false,
false, // is download
false, // is stream
info.common_params.allow_download, info.begin_params.has_user_gesture,
true, // enable_load_timing
false, // enable_upload_progress
false, // do_not_prompt_for_login
info.common_params.referrer.policy,
blink::WebPageVisibilityStateVisible, resource_context,
base::WeakPtr<ResourceMessageFilter>(), // filter
false, // request_data.report_raw_headers
true, // is_async
IsUsingLoFi(info.common_params.lofi_state, delegate_, *new_request,
resource_context, info.is_main_frame),
std::string()); // original_headers
extra_info->AssociateWithRequest(new_request.get());
if (new_request->url().SchemeIs(url::kBlobScheme)) {
storage::BlobProtocolHandler::SetRequestedBlobDataHandle(
new_request.get(),
blob_context->GetBlobDataFromPublicURL(new_request->url()));
}
RequestContextFrameType frame_type =
info.is_main_frame ? REQUEST_CONTEXT_FRAME_TYPE_TOP_LEVEL
: REQUEST_CONTEXT_FRAME_TYPE_NESTED;
ServiceWorkerRequestHandler::InitializeForNavigation(
new_request.get(), service_worker_handle_core, blob_context,
info.begin_params.skip_service_worker, resource_type,
info.begin_params.request_context_type, frame_type, info.request_body);
scoped_ptr<ResourceHandler> handler(new NavigationResourceHandler(
new_request.get(), loader));
handler =
AddStandardHandlers(new_request.get(), resource_type, resource_context,
nullptr, // appcache_service
-1, // child_id
-1, // route_id
std::move(handler));
BeginRequestInternal(std::move(new_request), std::move(handler));
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 132,797
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int WebPagePrivate::playerID() const
{
return m_client ? m_client->getInstanceId() : 0;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,334
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int follow_up(struct path *path)
{
struct vfsmount *parent;
struct dentry *mountpoint;
spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
parent = path->mnt->mnt_parent;
if (parent == path->mnt) {
spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
return 0;
}
mntget(parent);
mountpoint = dget(path->mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
dput(path->dentry);
path->dentry = mountpoint;
mntput(path->mnt);
path->mnt = parent;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,685
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return kvm_x86_ops->interrupt_allowed(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(unsigned long vm_flags)
{
pgprot_t ret = __pgprot(pgprot_val(protection_map[vm_flags &
(VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC|VM_SHARED)]) |
pgprot_val(arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags)));
return arch_filter_pgprot(ret);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static UINT dvcman_write_channel(IWTSVirtualChannel* pChannel, ULONG cbSize,
const BYTE* pBuffer, void* pReserved)
{
UINT status;
DVCMAN_CHANNEL* channel = (DVCMAN_CHANNEL*) pChannel;
if (!channel || !channel->dvcman)
return CHANNEL_RC_BAD_CHANNEL;
EnterCriticalSection(&(channel->lock));
status = drdynvc_write_data(channel->dvcman->drdynvc,
channel->channel_id, pBuffer, cbSize);
LeaveCriticalSection(&(channel->lock));
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID:
| 0
| 74,988
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vhost_zerocopy_callback(struct ubuf_info *ubuf)
{
struct vhost_ubuf_ref *ubufs = ubuf->ctx;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = ubufs->vq;
vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
/* set len = 1 to mark this desc buffers done DMA */
vq->heads[ubuf->desc].len = VHOST_DMA_DONE_LEN;
kref_put(&ubufs->kref, vhost_zerocopy_done_signal);
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix length for cross region descriptor
If a single descriptor crosses a region, the
second chunk length should be decremented
by size translated so far, instead it includes
the full descriptor length.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,819
|
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