instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptValue Document::registerElement(WebCore::ScriptState* state, const AtomicString& name, ExceptionState& es)
{
return registerElement(state, name, Dictionary(), es);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct perf_event *ptrace_hbp_create(struct task_struct *tsk, int type)
{
struct perf_event_attr attr;
ptrace_breakpoint_init(&attr);
/* Initialise fields to sane defaults. */
attr.bp_addr = 0;
attr.bp_len = HW_BREAKPOINT_LEN_4;
attr.bp_type = type;
attr.disabled = 1;
return register_user_hw_breakpoint(&attr, ptrace_hbptriggered, NULL,
tsk);
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 58,350
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: string16 GetAppListShortcutName() {
chrome::VersionInfo::Channel channel = chrome::VersionInfo::GetChannel();
if (channel == chrome::VersionInfo::CHANNEL_CANARY)
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_APP_LIST_SHORTCUT_NAME_CANARY);
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_APP_LIST_SHORTCUT_NAME);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 113,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GDataRootDirectory::CacheEntry* GDataRootDirectory::GetCacheEntry(
const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5) {
CacheMap::iterator iter = cache_map_.find(resource_id);
if (iter == cache_map_.end()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Can't find " << resource_id << " in cache map";
return NULL;
}
CacheEntry* entry = iter->second;
if (!entry->IsDirty() && !md5.empty() && entry->md5 != md5) {
DVLOG(1) << "Non-matching md5: want=" << md5
<< ", found=[res_id=" << resource_id
<< ", " << entry->ToString()
<< "]";
return NULL;
}
DVLOG(1) << "Found entry for res_id=" << resource_id
<< ", " << entry->ToString();
return entry;
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline long decode_twos_comp(ulong c, int prec)
{
long result;
assert(prec >= 2);
jas_eprintf("warning: support for signed data is untested\n");
result = (c & ((1 << (prec - 1)) - 1)) - (c & (1 << (prec - 1)));
return result;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 168,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: connection_edge_process_inbuf(edge_connection_t *conn, int package_partial)
{
tor_assert(conn);
switch (conn->base_.state) {
case AP_CONN_STATE_SOCKS_WAIT:
if (connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)) <0) {
/* already marked */
return -1;
}
return 0;
case AP_CONN_STATE_NATD_WAIT:
if (connection_ap_process_natd(EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)) < 0) {
/* already marked */
return -1;
}
return 0;
case AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
case EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
if (connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(conn, package_partial, NULL) < 0) {
/* (We already sent an end cell if possible) */
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return -1;
}
return 0;
case AP_CONN_STATE_CONNECT_WAIT:
if (connection_ap_supports_optimistic_data(EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn))) {
log_info(LD_EDGE,
"data from edge while in '%s' state. Sending it anyway. "
"package_partial=%d, buflen=%ld",
conn_state_to_string(conn->base_.type, conn->base_.state),
package_partial,
(long)connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn)));
if (connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(conn, package_partial, NULL)<0) {
/* (We already sent an end cell if possible) */
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Fall through if the connection is on a circuit without optimistic
* data support. */
case EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING:
case AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT:
case AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT:
case AP_CONN_STATE_RESOLVE_WAIT:
case AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT:
log_info(LD_EDGE,
"data from edge while in '%s' state. Leaving it on buffer.",
conn_state_to_string(conn->base_.type, conn->base_.state));
return 0;
}
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Got unexpected state %d. Closing.",conn->base_.state);
tor_fragile_assert();
connection_edge_end(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return -1;
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 69,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView(WKContextRef contextRef, WKPageGroupRef pageGroupRef)
: m_view(new QQuickWebView(contextRef, pageGroupRef))
, m_window(new WrapperWindow(m_view))
, m_windowIsKey(true)
, m_modalEventLoop(0)
{
QQuickWebViewExperimental experimental(m_view);
experimental.setRenderToOffscreenBuffer(true);
m_view->setAllowAnyHTTPSCertificateForLocalHost(true);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 1
| 170,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int netif_set_real_num_tx_queues(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int txq)
{
int rc;
if (txq < 1 || txq > dev->num_tx_queues)
return -EINVAL;
if (dev->reg_state == NETREG_REGISTERED ||
dev->reg_state == NETREG_UNREGISTERING) {
ASSERT_RTNL();
rc = netdev_queue_update_kobjects(dev, dev->real_num_tx_queues,
txq);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (dev->num_tc)
netif_setup_tc(dev, txq);
if (txq < dev->real_num_tx_queues) {
qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt(dev, txq);
#ifdef CONFIG_XPS
netif_reset_xps_queues_gt(dev, txq);
#endif
}
}
dev->real_num_tx_queues = txq;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,917
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, copy)
{
char *oldfile, *newfile, *error;
const char *pcr_error;
int oldfile_len, newfile_len;
phar_entry_info *oldentry, newentry = {0}, *temp;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss", &oldfile, &oldfile_len, &newfile, &newfile_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Cannot copy \"%s\" to \"%s\", phar is read-only", oldfile, newfile);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (oldfile_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(oldfile, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
/* can't copy a meta file */
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", cannot copy Phar meta-file in %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (newfile_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(newfile, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
/* can't copy a meta file */
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", cannot copy to Phar meta-file in %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!zend_hash_exists(&phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest, oldfile, (uint) oldfile_len) || SUCCESS != zend_hash_find(&phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest, oldfile, (uint) oldfile_len, (void**)&oldentry) || oldentry->is_deleted) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", file does not exist in %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_exists(&phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest, newfile, (uint) newfile_len)) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest, newfile, (uint) newfile_len, (void**)&temp) || !temp->is_deleted) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"file \"%s\" cannot be copied to file \"%s\", file must not already exist in phar %s", oldfile, newfile, phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (phar_path_check(&newfile, &newfile_len, &pcr_error) > pcr_is_ok) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"file \"%s\" contains invalid characters %s, cannot be copied from \"%s\" in phar %s", newfile, pcr_error, oldfile, phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->is_persistent) {
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->arc.archive) TSRMLS_CC)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
/* re-populate with copied-on-write entry */
zend_hash_find(&phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest, oldfile, (uint) oldfile_len, (void**)&oldentry);
}
memcpy((void *) &newentry, oldentry, sizeof(phar_entry_info));
if (newentry.metadata) {
zval *t;
t = newentry.metadata;
ALLOC_ZVAL(newentry.metadata);
*newentry.metadata = *t;
zval_copy_ctor(newentry.metadata);
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(newentry.metadata, 1);
newentry.metadata_str.c = NULL;
newentry.metadata_str.len = 0;
}
newentry.filename = estrndup(newfile, newfile_len);
newentry.filename_len = newfile_len;
newentry.fp_refcount = 0;
if (oldentry->fp_type != PHAR_FP) {
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_entry_fp(oldentry, &newentry, &error TSRMLS_CC)) {
efree(newentry.filename);
php_stream_close(newentry.fp);
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
return;
}
}
zend_hash_add(&oldentry->phar->manifest, newfile, newfile_len, (void*)&newentry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), NULL);
phar_obj->arc.archive->is_modified = 1;
phar_flush(phar_obj->arc.archive, 0, 0, 0, &error TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,392
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SWFShape_getLines(SWFShape shape, SWFLineStyle** lines, int* nLines)
{
*lines = shape->lines;
*nLines = shape->nLines;
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 89,513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void openpic_cpu_write_internal(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
uint32_t val, int idx)
{
OpenPICState *opp = opaque;
IRQSource *src;
IRQDest *dst;
int s_IRQ, n_IRQ;
DPRINTF("%s: cpu %d addr %#" HWADDR_PRIx " <= 0x%08x\n", __func__, idx,
addr, val);
if (idx < 0) {
return;
}
if (addr & 0xF) {
return;
}
dst = &opp->dst[idx];
addr &= 0xFF0;
switch (addr) {
case 0x40: /* IPIDR */
case 0x50:
case 0x60:
case 0x70:
idx = (addr - 0x40) >> 4;
/* we use IDE as mask which CPUs to deliver the IPI to still. */
opp->src[opp->irq_ipi0 + idx].destmask |= val;
openpic_set_irq(opp, opp->irq_ipi0 + idx, 1);
openpic_set_irq(opp, opp->irq_ipi0 + idx, 0);
break;
case 0x80: /* CTPR */
dst->ctpr = val & 0x0000000F;
DPRINTF("%s: set CPU %d ctpr to %d, raised %d servicing %d\n",
__func__, idx, dst->ctpr, dst->raised.priority,
dst->servicing.priority);
if (dst->raised.priority <= dst->ctpr) {
DPRINTF("%s: Lower OpenPIC INT output cpu %d due to ctpr\n",
__func__, idx);
qemu_irq_lower(dst->irqs[OPENPIC_OUTPUT_INT]);
} else if (dst->raised.priority > dst->servicing.priority) {
DPRINTF("%s: Raise OpenPIC INT output cpu %d irq %d\n",
__func__, idx, dst->raised.next);
qemu_irq_raise(dst->irqs[OPENPIC_OUTPUT_INT]);
}
break;
case 0x90: /* WHOAMI */
/* Read-only register */
break;
case 0xA0: /* IACK */
/* Read-only register */
break;
case 0xB0: /* EOI */
DPRINTF("EOI\n");
s_IRQ = IRQ_get_next(opp, &dst->servicing);
if (s_IRQ < 0) {
DPRINTF("%s: EOI with no interrupt in service\n", __func__);
break;
}
IRQ_resetbit(&dst->servicing, s_IRQ);
/* Set up next servicing IRQ */
s_IRQ = IRQ_get_next(opp, &dst->servicing);
/* Check queued interrupts. */
n_IRQ = IRQ_get_next(opp, &dst->raised);
src = &opp->src[n_IRQ];
if (n_IRQ != -1 &&
(s_IRQ == -1 ||
IVPR_PRIORITY(src->ivpr) > dst->servicing.priority)) {
DPRINTF("Raise OpenPIC INT output cpu %d irq %d\n",
idx, n_IRQ);
qemu_irq_raise(opp->dst[idx].irqs[OPENPIC_OUTPUT_INT]);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit ifb_cleanup_module(void)
{
rtnl_link_unregister(&ifb_link_ops);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ath_tx_start(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ath_tx_control *txctl)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
struct ieee80211_sta *sta = txctl->sta;
struct ieee80211_vif *vif = info->control.vif;
struct ath_softc *sc = hw->priv;
struct ath_txq *txq = txctl->txq;
struct ath_atx_tid *tid = NULL;
struct ath_buf *bf;
int q;
int ret;
ret = ath_tx_prepare(hw, skb, txctl);
if (ret)
return ret;
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
/*
* At this point, the vif, hw_key and sta pointers in the tx control
* info are no longer valid (overwritten by the ath_frame_info data.
*/
q = skb_get_queue_mapping(skb);
ath_txq_lock(sc, txq);
if (txq == sc->tx.txq_map[q] &&
++txq->pending_frames > sc->tx.txq_max_pending[q] &&
!txq->stopped) {
ieee80211_stop_queue(sc->hw, q);
txq->stopped = true;
}
if (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_PS_RESPONSE) {
ath_txq_unlock(sc, txq);
txq = sc->tx.uapsdq;
ath_txq_lock(sc, txq);
} else if (txctl->an &&
ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control)) {
tid = ath_get_skb_tid(sc, txctl->an, skb);
WARN_ON(tid->ac->txq != txctl->txq);
if (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_CLEAR_PS_FILT)
tid->ac->clear_ps_filter = true;
/*
* Add this frame to software queue for scheduling later
* for aggregation.
*/
TX_STAT_INC(txq->axq_qnum, a_queued_sw);
__skb_queue_tail(&tid->buf_q, skb);
if (!txctl->an->sleeping)
ath_tx_queue_tid(txq, tid);
ath_txq_schedule(sc, txq);
goto out;
}
bf = ath_tx_setup_buffer(sc, txq, tid, skb);
if (!bf) {
ath_txq_skb_done(sc, txq, skb);
if (txctl->paprd)
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
else
ieee80211_free_txskb(sc->hw, skb);
goto out;
}
bf->bf_state.bfs_paprd = txctl->paprd;
if (txctl->paprd)
bf->bf_state.bfs_paprd_timestamp = jiffies;
ath_set_rates(vif, sta, bf);
ath_tx_send_normal(sc, txq, tid, skb);
out:
ath_txq_unlock(sc, txq);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <maxim.stargazer@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 38,708
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void shmem_delete_from_page_cache(struct page *page, void *radswap)
{
struct address_space *mapping = page->mapping;
int error;
spin_lock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
error = shmem_radix_tree_replace(mapping, page->index, page, radswap);
page->mapping = NULL;
mapping->nrpages--;
__dec_zone_page_state(page, NR_FILE_PAGES);
__dec_zone_page_state(page, NR_SHMEM);
spin_unlock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
page_cache_release(page);
BUG_ON(error);
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void f_parser (lua_State *L, void *ud) {
int i;
Proto *tf;
Closure *cl;
struct SParser *p = cast(struct SParser *, ud);
int c = luaZ_lookahead(p->z);
luaC_checkGC(L);
tf = ((c == LUA_SIGNATURE[0]) ? luaU_undump : luaY_parser)(L, p->z,
&p->buff, p->name);
cl = luaF_newLclosure(L, tf->nups, hvalue(gt(L)));
cl->l.p = tf;
for (i = 0; i < tf->nups; i++) /* initialize eventual upvalues */
cl->l.upvals[i] = luaF_newupval(L);
setclvalue(L, L->top, cl);
incr_top(L);
}
Commit Message: disable loading lua bytecode
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 1
| 166,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nicklist_destroy(CHANNEL_REC *channel, NICK_REC *nick)
{
signal_emit("nicklist remove", 2, channel, nick);
if (channel->ownnick == nick)
channel->ownnick = NULL;
/*MODULE_DATA_DEINIT(nick);*/
g_free(nick->nick);
g_free_not_null(nick->realname);
g_free_not_null(nick->host);
g_free(nick);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 63,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::getCurrentPosition(int *msec)
{
ALOGV("getCurrentPosition");
sp<MediaPlayerBase> p = getPlayer();
if (p == 0) return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
status_t ret = p->getCurrentPosition(msec);
if (ret == NO_ERROR) {
ALOGV("[%d] getCurrentPosition = %d", mConnId, *msec);
} else {
ALOGE("getCurrentPosition returned %d", ret);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostWatcher::RenderProcessHostDestroyed(
RenderProcessHost* host) {
render_process_host_ = nullptr;
if (type_ == WATCH_FOR_HOST_DESTRUCTION)
message_loop_runner_->Quit();
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 156,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void qeth_check_outbound_queue(struct qeth_qdio_out_q *queue)
{
int index;
int flush_cnt = 0;
int q_was_packing = 0;
/*
* check if weed have to switch to non-packing mode or if
* we have to get a pci flag out on the queue
*/
if ((atomic_read(&queue->used_buffers) <= QETH_LOW_WATERMARK_PACK) ||
!atomic_read(&queue->set_pci_flags_count)) {
if (atomic_xchg(&queue->state, QETH_OUT_Q_LOCKED_FLUSH) ==
QETH_OUT_Q_UNLOCKED) {
/*
* If we get in here, there was no action in
* do_send_packet. So, we check if there is a
* packing buffer to be flushed here.
*/
netif_stop_queue(queue->card->dev);
index = queue->next_buf_to_fill;
q_was_packing = queue->do_pack;
/* queue->do_pack may change */
barrier();
flush_cnt += qeth_switch_to_nonpacking_if_needed(queue);
if (!flush_cnt &&
!atomic_read(&queue->set_pci_flags_count))
flush_cnt +=
qeth_flush_buffers_on_no_pci(queue);
if (queue->card->options.performance_stats &&
q_was_packing)
queue->card->perf_stats.bufs_sent_pack +=
flush_cnt;
if (flush_cnt)
qeth_flush_buffers(queue, index, flush_cnt);
atomic_set(&queue->state, QETH_OUT_Q_UNLOCKED);
}
}
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool GetValidScheme(const std::string &text,
url_parse::Component* scheme_component,
std::string* canon_scheme) {
if (!url_parse::ExtractScheme(text.data(), static_cast<int>(text.length()),
scheme_component))
return false;
url_canon::StdStringCanonOutput canon_scheme_output(canon_scheme);
url_parse::Component canon_scheme_component;
if (!url_canon::CanonicalizeScheme(text.data(), *scheme_component,
&canon_scheme_output,
&canon_scheme_component))
return false;
DCHECK_EQ(0, canon_scheme_component.begin);
canon_scheme->erase(canon_scheme_component.len);
if (canon_scheme->find('.') != std::string::npos)
return false;
if (HasPort(text, *scheme_component))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Be a little more careful whether something is an URL or a file path.
BUG=72492
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7572046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@95731 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,442
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: edge_reason_is_retriable(int reason)
{
return reason == END_STREAM_REASON_HIBERNATING ||
reason == END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT ||
reason == END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY ||
reason == END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED ||
reason == END_STREAM_REASON_MISC ||
reason == END_STREAM_REASON_NOROUTE;
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 69,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_proc_write_rpc_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, struct nfs_write_data *data)
{
if (nfs4_setup_sequence(NFS_SERVER(data->inode),
&data->args.seq_args,
&data->res.seq_res,
task))
return;
rpc_call_start(task);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetFragDataIndexEXT(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (!features().ext_blend_func_extended) {
return error::kUnknownCommand;
}
const volatile gles2::cmds::GetFragDataIndexEXT& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::GetFragDataIndexEXT*>(cmd_data);
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(c.name_bucket_id);
if (!bucket) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
std::string name_str;
if (!bucket->GetAsString(&name_str)) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
return GetFragDataIndexHelper(c.program, c.index_shm_id, c.index_shm_offset,
name_str);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int getch() {
struct termios old;
struct termios new;
int rc;
if (tcgetattr(0, &old) == -1) {
return -1;
}
new = old;
new.c_lflag &= ~(ICANON | ECHO);
new.c_cc[VMIN] = 1;
new.c_cc[VTIME] = 0;
if (tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &new) == -1) {
return -1;
}
rc = getchar();
(void) tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &old);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: add some boundary checks on gf_text_get_utf8_line (#1188)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 92,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
const unsigned char **pcurves,
size_t *num_curves)
{
size_t pcurveslen = 0;
if (sess) {
*pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
} else {
/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
break;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
pcurveslen = 2;
break;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
*pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
pcurveslen = 2;
break;
default:
*pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
}
if (!*pcurves) {
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode()) {
*pcurves = fips_curves_default;
pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
} else
# endif
{
*pcurves = eccurves_default;
pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
}
}
}
/* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
if (pcurveslen & 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*num_curves = 0;
return 0;
} else {
*num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
return 1;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,170
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void copy_gigantic_page(struct page *dst, struct page *src)
{
int i;
struct hstate *h = page_hstate(src);
struct page *dst_base = dst;
struct page *src_base = src;
for (i = 0; i < pages_per_huge_page(h); ) {
cond_resched();
copy_highpage(dst, src);
i++;
dst = mem_map_next(dst, dst_base, i);
src = mem_map_next(src, src_base, i);
}
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: map_engine_set_subject(person_t* person)
{
s_camera_person = person;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XScopedImage::~XScopedImage() {
reset(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 119,239
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderLayerCompositor::requiresScrollCornerLayer() const
{
FrameView* view = m_renderView->frameView();
return shouldCompositeOverflowControls(view) && view->isScrollCornerVisible();
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 113,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gs_lib_ctx_get_non_gc_memory_t()
{
return mem_err_print ? mem_err_print : NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetIntegerv(GLenum pname, GLint* params) {
DCHECK(params);
GLsizei num_written;
if (!GetHelper(pname, params, &num_written)) {
glGetIntegerv(pname, params);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: service_manager::InterfaceProvider* RenderFrameImpl::GetInterfaceProvider() {
return &remote_interfaces_;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::GetName() const {
if (!IsPresent())
return std::string();
BluetoothAdapterClient::Properties* properties =
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothAdapterClient()->
GetProperties(object_path_);
DCHECK(properties);
return properties->alias.value();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virDomainPMWakeup(virDomainPtr dom,
unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(dom, "flags=%x", flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(dom, -1);
conn = dom->conn;
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->domainPMWakeup) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainPMWakeup(dom, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 93,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::clearArchiveResources()
{
m_archiveResourceCollection.clear();
m_substituteResourceDeliveryTimer.stop();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Layer::RemoveLayerAnimationEventObserver(
LayerAnimationEventObserver* animation_observer) {
layer_animation_controller_->RemoveEventObserver(animation_observer);
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebGLTexture* WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateTexImageBinding(
const char* func_name,
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
GLenum target) {
return ValidateTexture2DBinding(func_name, target);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
int i;
unsigned long field;
u64 field_value;
struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs = vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs;
const unsigned long *fields = shadow_read_write_fields;
const int num_fields = max_shadow_read_write_fields;
preempt_disable();
vmcs_load(shadow_vmcs);
for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) {
field = fields[i];
switch (vmcs_field_type(field)) {
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_U16:
field_value = vmcs_read16(field);
break;
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_U32:
field_value = vmcs_read32(field);
break;
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_U64:
field_value = vmcs_read64(field);
break;
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_NATURAL_WIDTH:
field_value = vmcs_readl(field);
break;
default:
WARN_ON(1);
continue;
}
vmcs12_write_any(&vmx->vcpu, field, field_value);
}
vmcs_clear(shadow_vmcs);
vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
preempt_enable();
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 48,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int FLTIsGMLDefaultProperty(const char* pszName)
{
return (strcmp(pszName, "gml:name") == 0 ||
strcmp(pszName, "gml:description") == 0 ||
strcmp(pszName, "gml:descriptionReference") == 0 ||
strcmp(pszName, "gml:identifier") == 0 ||
strcmp(pszName, "gml:boundedBy") == 0 ||
strcmp(pszName, "@gml:id") == 0);
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 68,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::ExitFullscreen() {
if (!IsFullscreen())
return; // Nothing to do.
ProcessFullscreen(false, GURL(), EXCLUSIVE_ACCESS_BUBBLE_TYPE_NONE);
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ASCIIHexEncoder::ASCIIHexEncoder(Stream *strA):
FilterStream(strA) {
bufPtr = bufEnd = buf;
lineLen = 0;
eof = gFalse;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int crc32c_sparc64_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
u32 *crcp = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
crc32c_compute(crcp, (const u64 *) data, len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Element::clientTop()
{
document()->updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
if (RenderBox* renderer = renderBox())
return adjustForAbsoluteZoom(roundToInt(renderer->clientTop()), renderer);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::voidMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnDatabaseDeleteFile(const string16& vfs_file_name,
const bool& sync_dir,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
DatabaseDeleteFile(vfs_file_name, sync_dir, reply_msg, kNumDeleteRetries);
}
Commit Message: WebDatabase: check path traversal in origin_identifier
BUG=172264
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12212091
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@183141 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 116,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mainloop_set_trigger(crm_trigger_t * source)
{
source->trigger = TRUE;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *ReadPCDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register ssize_t
i,
y;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*c1,
*c2,
*yy;
size_t
height,
number_images,
rotate,
scene,
width;
ssize_t
count,
x;
unsigned char
*chroma1,
*chroma2,
*header,
*luma;
unsigned int
overview;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a PCD file.
*/
header=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(0x800,3UL*sizeof(*header));
if (header == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,3*0x800,header);
overview=LocaleNCompare((char *) header,"PCD_OPA",7) == 0;
if ((count == 0) ||
((LocaleNCompare((char *) header+0x800,"PCD",3) != 0) && (overview == 0)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
rotate=header[0x0e02] & 0x03;
number_images=(header[10] << 8) | header[11];
if (number_images > 65535)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
header=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(header);
/*
Determine resolution by scene specification.
*/
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
scene=3;
else
{
width=192;
height=128;
for (scene=1; scene < 6; scene++)
{
if ((width >= image->columns) && (height >= image->rows))
break;
width<<=1;
height<<=1;
}
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
scene=(size_t) MagickMin(image_info->scene,6);
if (overview != 0)
scene=1;
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
width=192;
height=128;
for (i=1; i < (ssize_t) MagickMin(scene,3); i++)
{
width<<=1;
height<<=1;
}
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
image->depth=8;
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
{
image->columns<<=1;
image->rows<<=1;
}
/*
Allocate luma and chroma memory.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if (number_pixels != (size_t) number_pixels)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
chroma1=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns+1UL,image->rows*
sizeof(*chroma1));
chroma2=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns+1UL,image->rows*
sizeof(*chroma2));
luma=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns+1UL,image->rows*
sizeof(*luma));
if ((chroma1 == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(chroma2 == (unsigned char *) NULL) || (luma == (unsigned char *) NULL))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Advance to image data.
*/
offset=93;
if (overview != 0)
offset=2;
else
if (scene == 2)
offset=20;
else
if (scene <= 1)
offset=1;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (offset*0x800); i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (overview != 0)
{
Image
*overview_image;
MagickProgressMonitor
progress_monitor;
register ssize_t
j;
/*
Read thumbnails from overview image.
*/
for (j=1; j <= (ssize_t) number_images; j++)
{
progress_monitor=SetImageProgressMonitor(image,
(MagickProgressMonitor) NULL,image->client_data);
(void) FormatLocaleString(image->filename,MaxTextExtent,
"images/img%04ld.pcd",(long) j);
(void) FormatLocaleString(image->magick_filename,MaxTextExtent,
"images/img%04ld.pcd",(long) j);
image->scene=(size_t) j;
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
image->depth=8;
yy=luma;
c1=chroma1;
c2=chroma2;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) height; y+=2)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,width,yy);
yy+=image->columns;
count=ReadBlob(image,width,yy);
yy+=image->columns;
count=ReadBlob(image,width >> 1,c1);
c1+=image->columns;
count=ReadBlob(image,width >> 1,c2);
c2+=image->columns;
}
Upsample(image->columns >> 1,image->rows >> 1,image->columns,chroma1);
Upsample(image->columns >> 1,image->rows >> 1,image->columns,chroma2);
/*
Transfer luminance and chrominance channels.
*/
yy=luma;
c1=chroma1;
c2=chroma2;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*yy++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*c1++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*c2++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
image->colorspace=YCCColorspace;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PCDS") == 0)
SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (j < (ssize_t) number_images)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
(void) SetImageProgressMonitor(image,progress_monitor,
image->client_data);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,j-1,number_images);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
chroma2=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chroma2);
chroma1=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chroma1);
luma=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(luma);
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
overview_image=OverviewImage(image_info,image,exception);
return(overview_image);
}
/*
Read interleaved image.
*/
yy=luma;
c1=chroma1;
c2=chroma2;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) height; y+=2)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,width,yy);
yy+=image->columns;
count=ReadBlob(image,width,yy);
yy+=image->columns;
count=ReadBlob(image,width >> 1,c1);
c1+=image->columns;
count=ReadBlob(image,width >> 1,c2);
c2+=image->columns;
}
if (scene >= 4)
{
/*
Recover luminance deltas for 1536x1024 image.
*/
Upsample(768,512,image->columns,luma);
Upsample(384,256,image->columns,chroma1);
Upsample(384,256,image->columns,chroma2);
image->rows=1024;
for (i=0; i < (4*0x800); i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
status=DecodeImage(image,luma,chroma1,chroma2);
if ((scene >= 5) && status)
{
/*
Recover luminance deltas for 3072x2048 image.
*/
Upsample(1536,1024,image->columns,luma);
Upsample(768,512,image->columns,chroma1);
Upsample(768,512,image->columns,chroma2);
image->rows=2048;
offset=TellBlob(image)/0x800+12;
offset=SeekBlob(image,offset*0x800,SEEK_SET);
status=DecodeImage(image,luma,chroma1,chroma2);
if ((scene >= 6) && (status != MagickFalse))
{
/*
Recover luminance deltas for 6144x4096 image (vaporware).
*/
Upsample(3072,2048,image->columns,luma);
Upsample(1536,1024,image->columns,chroma1);
Upsample(1536,1024,image->columns,chroma2);
image->rows=4096;
}
}
}
Upsample(image->columns >> 1,image->rows >> 1,image->columns,chroma1);
Upsample(image->columns >> 1,image->rows >> 1,image->columns,chroma2);
/*
Transfer luminance and chrominance channels.
*/
yy=luma;
c1=chroma1;
c2=chroma2;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*yy++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*c1++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*c2++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
chroma2=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chroma2);
chroma1=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chroma1);
luma=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(luma);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
if ((rotate == 1) || (rotate == 3))
{
double
degrees;
Image
*rotate_image;
/*
Rotate image.
*/
degrees=rotate == 1 ? -90.0 : 90.0;
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,degrees,exception);
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
image=rotate_image;
}
}
/*
Set CCIR 709 primaries with a D65 white point.
*/
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=0.6400f;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=0.3300f;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=0.3000f;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=0.6000f;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=0.1500f;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=0.0600f;
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=0.3127f;
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=0.3290f;
image->gamma=1.000f/2.200f;
image->colorspace=YCCColorspace;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PCDS") == 0)
SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 168,590
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetOriginLock(int child_id) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id);
if (state == security_state_.end())
return GURL();
return state->second->origin_lock();
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 143,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IfaddrsToNetworkInterfaceList(int policy,
const ifaddrs* interfaces,
IPAttributesGetter* ip_attributes_getter,
NetworkInterfaceList* networks) {
for (const ifaddrs* interface = interfaces; interface != NULL;
interface = interface->ifa_next) {
if (!(IFF_RUNNING & interface->ifa_flags))
continue;
if (IFF_LOOPBACK & interface->ifa_flags)
continue;
struct sockaddr* addr = interface->ifa_addr;
if (!addr)
continue;
if (IsLoopbackOrUnspecifiedAddress(addr))
continue;
std::string name = interface->ifa_name;
if (ShouldIgnoreInterface(name, policy)) {
continue;
}
NetworkChangeNotifier::ConnectionType connection_type =
NetworkChangeNotifier::CONNECTION_UNKNOWN;
int ip_attributes = IP_ADDRESS_ATTRIBUTE_NONE;
if (ip_attributes_getter && ip_attributes_getter->IsInitialized()) {
if (addr->sa_family == AF_INET6 &&
ip_attributes_getter->GetAddressAttributes(interface,
&ip_attributes)) {
if (ip_attributes &
(IP_ADDRESS_ATTRIBUTE_ANYCAST | IP_ADDRESS_ATTRIBUTE_DUPLICATED |
IP_ADDRESS_ATTRIBUTE_TENTATIVE | IP_ADDRESS_ATTRIBUTE_DETACHED)) {
continue;
}
}
connection_type =
ip_attributes_getter->GetNetworkInterfaceType(interface);
}
IPEndPoint address;
int addr_size = 0;
if (addr->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
addr_size = sizeof(sockaddr_in6);
} else if (addr->sa_family == AF_INET) {
addr_size = sizeof(sockaddr_in);
}
if (address.FromSockAddr(addr, addr_size)) {
uint8_t prefix_length = 0;
if (interface->ifa_netmask) {
if (interface->ifa_netmask->sa_family == 0) {
interface->ifa_netmask->sa_family = addr->sa_family;
}
IPEndPoint netmask;
if (netmask.FromSockAddr(interface->ifa_netmask, addr_size)) {
prefix_length = MaskPrefixLength(netmask.address());
}
}
networks->push_back(NetworkInterface(
name, name, if_nametoindex(name.c_str()), connection_type,
address.address(), prefix_length, ip_attributes));
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 156,302
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void OverloadedMethodN2Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8TestCallbackInterface* test_callback_interface_arg;
if (info[0]->IsObject()) {
test_callback_interface_arg = V8TestCallbackInterface::Create(info[0].As<v8::Object>());
} else {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("overloadedMethodN", "TestObject", "The callback provided as parameter 1 is not an object."));
return;
}
impl->overloadedMethodN(test_callback_interface_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static netdev_tx_t airo_start_xmit11(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *dev)
{
s16 len;
int i, j;
struct airo_info *priv = dev->ml_priv;
u32 *fids = priv->fids;
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI, &priv->flags)) {
/* Not implemented yet for MPI350 */
netif_stop_queue(dev);
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
if ( skb == NULL ) {
airo_print_err(dev->name, "%s: skb == NULL!", __func__);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
/* Find a vacant FID */
for( i = MAX_FIDS / 2; i < MAX_FIDS && (fids[i] & 0xffff0000); i++ );
for( j = i + 1; j < MAX_FIDS && (fids[j] & 0xffff0000); j++ );
if ( j >= MAX_FIDS ) {
netif_stop_queue(dev);
if (i == MAX_FIDS) {
dev->stats.tx_fifo_errors++;
return NETDEV_TX_BUSY;
}
}
/* check min length*/
len = ETH_ZLEN < skb->len ? skb->len : ETH_ZLEN;
/* Mark fid as used & save length for later */
fids[i] |= (len << 16);
priv->xmit11.skb = skb;
priv->xmit11.fid = i;
if (down_trylock(&priv->sem) != 0) {
set_bit(FLAG_PENDING_XMIT11, &priv->flags);
netif_stop_queue(dev);
set_bit(JOB_XMIT11, &priv->jobs);
wake_up_interruptible(&priv->thr_wait);
} else
airo_end_xmit11(dev);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,006
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: export_pamenv (void)
{
char **env;
/* This is a copy but don't care to free as we exec later anyways. */
env = pam_getenvlist (pamh);
while (env && *env)
{
if (putenv (*env) != 0)
err (EXIT_FAILURE, NULL);
env++;
}
}
Commit Message: su: properly clear child PID
Reported-by: Tobias Stöckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 86,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::RegisterInterceptor(
const std::string& http_header,
const std::string& starts_with,
const InterceptorCallback& interceptor) {
DCHECK(!http_header.empty());
DCHECK(interceptor);
DCHECK(http_header_interceptor_map_.find(http_header) ==
http_header_interceptor_map_.end());
HeaderInterceptorInfo interceptor_info;
interceptor_info.starts_with = starts_with;
interceptor_info.interceptor = interceptor;
http_header_interceptor_map_[http_header] = interceptor_info;
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 152,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BluetoothAdapter::GetPendingAdvertisementsForTesting() const {
return {};
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FileHandlersMimeUtilTest()
: ExtensionsTest(std::make_unique<content::TestBrowserThreadBundle>()) {}
Commit Message: Revert "Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol"
This reverts commit 3519e867dc606437f804561f889d7ed95b95876a.
Reason for revert: crbug.com/786150. Application compatibility for Android WebView applications means we need to allow sniffing on that platform.
Original change's description:
> Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol
>
> To reduce attack surface, Chrome should not MIME-sniff to text/html for
> any document delivered via the file protocol. This change only impacts
> the file protocol (documents served via HTTP/HTTPS/etc are unaffected).
>
> Bug: 777737
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
> Change-Id: I7086454356b8d2d092be9e1bca0f5ff6dd3b62c0
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/751402
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Achuith Bhandarkar <achuith@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Asanka Herath <asanka@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514372}
TBR=achuith@chromium.org,benwells@chromium.org,mmenke@chromium.org,sdefresne@chromium.org,asanka@chromium.org,elawrence@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 777737
Change-Id: I864ae060ce3277d41ea257ae75e0b80c51f3ea98
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/790790
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519347}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xps_parse_glyphs_imp(xps_context_t *ctx, xps_font_t *font, float size,
float originx, float originy, int is_sideways, int bidi_level,
char *indices, char *unicode, int is_charpath, int sim_bold)
{
xps_text_buffer_t buf;
xps_glyph_metrics_t mtx;
float x = originx;
float y = originy;
char *us = unicode;
char *is = indices;
int un = 0;
int code;
buf.count = 0;
if (!unicode && !indices)
return gs_throw(-1, "no text in glyphs element");
if (us)
{
if (us[0] == '{' && us[1] == '}')
us = us + 2;
un = strlen(us);
}
while ((us && un > 0) || (is && *is))
{
int char_code = '?';
int code_count = 1;
int glyph_count = 1;
if (is && *is)
{
is = xps_parse_cluster_mapping(is, &code_count, &glyph_count);
}
if (code_count < 1)
code_count = 1;
if (glyph_count < 1)
glyph_count = 1;
while (code_count--)
{
if (us && un > 0)
{
int t = xps_utf8_to_ucs(&char_code, us, un);
if (t < 0)
return gs_rethrow(-1, "error decoding UTF-8 string");
us += t; un -= t;
}
}
while (glyph_count--)
{
int glyph_index = -1;
float u_offset = 0.0;
float v_offset = 0.0;
float advance;
if (is && *is)
is = xps_parse_glyph_index(is, &glyph_index);
if (glyph_index == -1)
glyph_index = xps_encode_font_char(font, char_code);
xps_measure_font_glyph(ctx, font, glyph_index, &mtx);
if (is_sideways)
advance = mtx.vadv * 100.0;
else if (bidi_level & 1)
advance = -mtx.hadv * 100.0;
else
advance = mtx.hadv * 100.0;
if (is && *is)
{
is = xps_parse_glyph_metrics(is, &advance, &u_offset, &v_offset, bidi_level);
if (*is == ';')
is ++;
}
if (bidi_level & 1)
u_offset = -mtx.hadv * 100 - u_offset;
u_offset = u_offset * 0.01 * size;
v_offset = v_offset * 0.01 * size;
/* Adjust glyph offset and advance width for emboldening */
if (sim_bold)
{
advance *= 1.02f;
u_offset += 0.01 * size;
v_offset += 0.01 * size;
}
if (buf.count == XPS_TEXT_BUFFER_SIZE)
{
code = xps_flush_text_buffer(ctx, font, &buf, is_charpath);
if (code)
return gs_rethrow(code, "cannot flush buffered text");
}
if (is_sideways)
{
buf.x[buf.count] = x + u_offset + (mtx.vorg * size);
buf.y[buf.count] = y - v_offset + (mtx.hadv * 0.5 * size);
}
else
{
buf.x[buf.count] = x + u_offset;
buf.y[buf.count] = y - v_offset;
}
buf.g[buf.count] = glyph_index;
buf.count ++;
x += advance * 0.01 * size;
}
}
if (buf.count > 0)
{
code = xps_flush_text_buffer(ctx, font, &buf, is_charpath);
if (code)
return gs_rethrow(code, "cannot flush buffered text");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,579
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool fc_may_access(struct fuse_context *fc, const char *contrl, const char *cg, const char *file, mode_t mode)
{
struct cgfs_files *k = NULL;
bool ret = false;
if (!file)
file = "tasks";
if (*file == '/')
file++;
k = cgfs_get_key(contrl, cg, file);
if (!k)
return false;
if (is_privileged_over(fc->pid, fc->uid, k->uid, NS_ROOT_OPT)) {
if (perms_include(k->mode >> 6, mode)) {
ret = true;
goto out;
}
}
if (fc->gid == k->gid) {
if (perms_include(k->mode >> 3, mode)) {
ret = true;
goto out;
}
}
ret = perms_include(k->mode, mode);
out:
free_key(k);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nf_ct_frag6_reasm(struct nf_ct_frag6_queue *fq, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct sk_buff *fp, *op, *head = fq->q.fragments;
int payload_len;
fq_kill(fq);
WARN_ON(head == NULL);
WARN_ON(NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head)->offset != 0);
/* Unfragmented part is taken from the first segment. */
payload_len = ((head->data - skb_network_header(head)) -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + fq->q.len -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
if (payload_len > IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
pr_debug("payload len is too large.\n");
goto out_oversize;
}
/* Head of list must not be cloned. */
if (skb_cloned(head) && pskb_expand_head(head, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) {
pr_debug("skb is cloned but can't expand head");
goto out_oom;
}
/* If the first fragment is fragmented itself, we split
* it to two chunks: the first with data and paged part
* and the second, holding only fragments. */
if (skb_has_frags(head)) {
struct sk_buff *clone;
int i, plen = 0;
if ((clone = alloc_skb(0, GFP_ATOMIC)) == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't alloc skb\n");
goto out_oom;
}
clone->next = head->next;
head->next = clone;
skb_shinfo(clone)->frag_list = skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list;
skb_frag_list_init(head);
for (i=0; i<skb_shinfo(head)->nr_frags; i++)
plen += skb_shinfo(head)->frags[i].size;
clone->len = clone->data_len = head->data_len - plen;
head->data_len -= clone->len;
head->len -= clone->len;
clone->csum = 0;
clone->ip_summed = head->ip_summed;
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(clone)->orig = NULL;
atomic_add(clone->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
}
/* We have to remove fragment header from datagram and to relocate
* header in order to calculate ICV correctly. */
skb_network_header(head)[fq->nhoffset] = skb_transport_header(head)[0];
memmove(head->head + sizeof(struct frag_hdr), head->head,
(head->data - head->head) - sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
head->mac_header += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
head->network_header += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list = head->next;
skb_reset_transport_header(head);
skb_push(head, head->data - skb_network_header(head));
atomic_sub(head->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
for (fp=head->next; fp; fp = fp->next) {
head->data_len += fp->len;
head->len += fp->len;
if (head->ip_summed != fp->ip_summed)
head->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
else if (head->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
head->csum = csum_add(head->csum, fp->csum);
head->truesize += fp->truesize;
atomic_sub(fp->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
}
head->next = NULL;
head->dev = dev;
head->tstamp = fq->q.stamp;
ipv6_hdr(head)->payload_len = htons(payload_len);
/* Yes, and fold redundant checksum back. 8) */
if (head->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
head->csum = csum_partial(skb_network_header(head),
skb_network_header_len(head),
head->csum);
fq->q.fragments = NULL;
/* all original skbs are linked into the NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head).orig */
fp = skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list;
if (NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig == NULL)
/* at above code, head skb is divided into two skbs. */
fp = fp->next;
op = NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head)->orig;
for (; fp; fp = fp->next) {
struct sk_buff *orig = NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig;
op->next = orig;
op = orig;
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig = NULL;
}
return head;
out_oversize:
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_DEBUG "nf_ct_frag6_reasm: payload len = %d\n", payload_len);
goto out_fail;
out_oom:
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_DEBUG "nf_ct_frag6_reasm: no memory for reassembly\n");
out_fail:
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: properly handle packets fragmented into a single fragment
When an ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG message is received with a MTU below 1280,
all further packets include a fragment header.
Unlike regular defragmentation, conntrack also needs to "reassemble"
those fragments in order to obtain a packet without the fragment
header for connection tracking. Currently nf_conntrack_reasm checks
whether a fragment has either IP6_MF set or an offset != 0, which
makes it ignore those fragments.
Remove the invalid check and make reassembly handle fragment queues
containing only a single fragment.
Reported-and-tested-by: Ulrich Weber <uweber@astaro.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 165,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_xdr_dec_rename(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs_renameres *res)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
status = decode_compound_hdr(xdr, &hdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_sequence(xdr, &res->seq_res, rqstp);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_putfh(xdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_savefh(xdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_putfh(xdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_rename(xdr, &res->old_cinfo, &res->new_cinfo);
if (status)
goto out;
/* Current FH is target directory */
if (decode_getfattr(xdr, res->new_fattr, res->server,
!RPC_IS_ASYNC(rqstp->rq_task)) != 0)
goto out;
status = decode_restorefh(xdr);
if (status)
goto out;
decode_getfattr(xdr, res->old_fattr, res->server,
!RPC_IS_ASYNC(rqstp->rq_task));
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,439
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRTCAudioDeviceTest::OnGetHardwareSampleRate(double* sample_rate) {
EXPECT_TRUE(audio_util_callback_);
*sample_rate = audio_util_callback_ ?
audio_util_callback_->GetAudioHardwareSampleRate() : 0.0;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,542
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state)
{
if (!state)
return;
kfree(state->stack);
kfree(state);
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 76,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int local_unlinkat_common(FsContext *ctx, int dirfd, const char *name,
int flags)
{
int ret = -1;
if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE) {
int map_dirfd;
if (flags == AT_REMOVEDIR) {
int fd;
fd = openat_dir(dirfd, name);
if (fd == -1) {
goto err_out;
}
/*
* If directory remove .virtfs_metadata contained in the
* directory
*/
ret = unlinkat(fd, VIRTFS_META_DIR, AT_REMOVEDIR);
close_preserve_errno(fd);
if (ret < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
/*
* We didn't had the .virtfs_metadata file. May be file created
* in non-mapped mode ?. Ignore ENOENT.
*/
goto err_out;
}
}
/*
* Now remove the name from parent directory
* .virtfs_metadata directory.
*/
map_dirfd = openat_dir(dirfd, VIRTFS_META_DIR);
ret = unlinkat(map_dirfd, name, 0);
close_preserve_errno(map_dirfd);
if (ret < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
/*
* We didn't had the .virtfs_metadata file. May be file created
* in non-mapped mode ?. Ignore ENOENT.
*/
goto err_out;
}
}
ret = unlinkat(dirfd, name, flags);
err_out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 17,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_rpcap_open_request (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_,
proto_tree *parent_tree, gint offset)
{
gint len;
len = tvb_captured_length_remaining (tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item (parent_tree, hf_open_request, tvb, offset, len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
}
Commit Message: The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 51,756
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::OnPagesFoundWithSameURL(
const OfflinePageItem& offline_page,
size_t pages_allowed,
const MultipleOfflinePageItemResult& items) {
std::vector<OfflinePageItem> pages_to_delete;
for (const auto& item : items) {
if (item.offline_id != offline_page.offline_id &&
item.client_id.name_space == offline_page.client_id.name_space) {
pages_to_delete.push_back(item);
}
}
if (pages_to_delete.size() >= pages_allowed) {
sort(pages_to_delete.begin(), pages_to_delete.end(),
[](const OfflinePageItem& a, const OfflinePageItem& b) -> bool {
return a.last_access_time < b.last_access_time;
});
pages_to_delete.resize(pages_to_delete.size() - pages_allowed + 1);
}
std::vector<int64_t> page_ids_to_delete;
for (const auto& item : pages_to_delete)
page_ids_to_delete.push_back(item.offline_id);
DeletePagesByOfflineId(
page_ids_to_delete,
base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::OnDeleteOldPagesWithSameURL,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 155,912
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void XMLHttpRequest::didSendData(unsigned long long bytesSent, unsigned long long totalBytesToBeSent)
{
if (!m_upload)
return;
if (m_uploadEventsAllowed)
m_upload->dispatchEvent(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().progressEvent, true, bytesSent, totalBytesToBeSent));
if (bytesSent == totalBytesToBeSent && !m_uploadComplete) {
m_uploadComplete = true;
if (m_uploadEventsAllowed)
m_upload->dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().loadEvent));
}
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,913
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err hvcc_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i, count;
const char *name = (a->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HVCC) ? "HEVC" : "L-HEVC";
char boxname[256];
GF_HEVCConfigurationBox *p = (GF_HEVCConfigurationBox *) a;
sprintf(boxname, "%sConfigurationBox", name);
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, boxname, trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (! p->config) {
if (p->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<!-- INVALID HEVC ENTRY: no HEVC/SHVC config record -->\n");
} else {
fprintf(trace, "<%sDecoderConfigurationRecord nal_unit_size=\"\" configurationVersion=\"\" ", name);
if (a->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HVCC) {
fprintf(trace, "profile_space=\"\" tier_flag=\"\" profile_idc=\"\" general_profile_compatibility_flags=\"\" progressive_source_flag=\"\" interlaced_source_flag=\"\" non_packed_constraint_flag=\"\" frame_only_constraint_flag=\"\" constraint_indicator_flags=\"\" level_idc=\"\" ");
}
fprintf(trace, "min_spatial_segmentation_idc=\"\" parallelismType=\"\" ");
if (a->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HVCC)
fprintf(trace, "chroma_format=\"\" luma_bit_depth=\"\" chroma_bit_depth=\"\" avgFrameRate=\"\" constantFrameRate=\"\" numTemporalLayers=\"\" temporalIdNested=\"\"");
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
fprintf(trace, "<ParameterSetArray nalu_type=\"\" complete_set=\"\">\n");
fprintf(trace, "<ParameterSet size=\"\" content=\"\"/>\n");
fprintf(trace, "</ParameterSetArray>\n");
fprintf(trace, "</%sDecoderConfigurationRecord>\n", name);
}
fprintf(trace, "</%sConfigurationBox>\n", name);
return GF_OK;
}
fprintf(trace, "<%sDecoderConfigurationRecord nal_unit_size=\"%d\" ", name, p->config->nal_unit_size);
fprintf(trace, "configurationVersion=\"%u\" ", p->config->configurationVersion);
if (a->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HVCC) {
fprintf(trace, "profile_space=\"%u\" ", p->config->profile_space);
fprintf(trace, "tier_flag=\"%u\" ", p->config->tier_flag);
fprintf(trace, "profile_idc=\"%u\" ", p->config->profile_idc);
fprintf(trace, "general_profile_compatibility_flags=\"%X\" ", p->config->general_profile_compatibility_flags);
fprintf(trace, "progressive_source_flag=\"%u\" ", p->config->progressive_source_flag);
fprintf(trace, "interlaced_source_flag=\"%u\" ", p->config->interlaced_source_flag);
fprintf(trace, "non_packed_constraint_flag=\"%u\" ", p->config->non_packed_constraint_flag);
fprintf(trace, "frame_only_constraint_flag=\"%u\" ", p->config->frame_only_constraint_flag);
fprintf(trace, "constraint_indicator_flags=\""LLX"\" ", p->config->constraint_indicator_flags);
fprintf(trace, "level_idc=\"%d\" ", p->config->level_idc);
}
fprintf(trace, "min_spatial_segmentation_idc=\"%u\" ", p->config->min_spatial_segmentation_idc);
fprintf(trace, "parallelismType=\"%u\" ", p->config->parallelismType);
if (a->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HVCC)
fprintf(trace, "chroma_format=\"%s\" luma_bit_depth=\"%u\" chroma_bit_depth=\"%u\" avgFrameRate=\"%u\" constantFrameRate=\"%u\" numTemporalLayers=\"%u\" temporalIdNested=\"%u\"",
gf_avc_hevc_get_chroma_format_name(p->config->chromaFormat), p->config->luma_bit_depth, p->config->chroma_bit_depth, p->config->avgFrameRate, p->config->constantFrameRate, p->config->numTemporalLayers, p->config->temporalIdNested);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
count = gf_list_count(p->config->param_array);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
u32 nalucount, j;
GF_HEVCParamArray *ar = (GF_HEVCParamArray*)gf_list_get(p->config->param_array, i);
fprintf(trace, "<ParameterSetArray nalu_type=\"%d\" complete_set=\"%d\">\n", ar->type, ar->array_completeness);
nalucount = gf_list_count(ar->nalus);
for (j=0; j<nalucount; j++) {
GF_AVCConfigSlot *c = (GF_AVCConfigSlot *)gf_list_get(ar->nalus, j);
fprintf(trace, "<ParameterSet size=\"%d\" content=\"", c->size);
dump_data(trace, c->data, c->size);
fprintf(trace, "\"/>\n");
}
fprintf(trace, "</ParameterSetArray>\n");
}
fprintf(trace, "</%sDecoderConfigurationRecord>\n", name);
gf_isom_box_dump_done(boxname, a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void PartiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
scheduler::CooperativeSchedulingManager::Instance()->Safepoint();
bool is_arity_error = false;
switch (std::min(test_object_v8_internal::PartiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethodMethodMaxArg(), info.Length())) {
case 1:
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::RuntimeFeature2Enabled()) {
if (V8TestInterface::HasInstance(info[0], info.GetIsolate())) {
PartiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod2Method(info);
return;
}
}
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::RuntimeFeature1Enabled()) {
if (true) {
PartiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod1Method(info);
return;
}
}
break;
case 2:
if (true) {
PartiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod3Method(info);
return;
}
break;
case 3:
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::RuntimeFeature3Enabled()) {
if (true) {
PartiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod4Method(info);
return;
}
}
break;
default:
is_arity_error = true;
}
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "partiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod");
if (is_arity_error) {
if (info.Length() < test_object_v8_internal::PartiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethodMethodLength()) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(test_object_v8_internal::PartiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethodMethodLength(), info.Length()));
return;
}
}
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("No function was found that matched the signature provided.");
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static V9fsFidState *clunk_fid(V9fsState *s, int32_t fid)
{
V9fsFidState **fidpp, *fidp;
for (fidpp = &s->fid_list; *fidpp; fidpp = &(*fidpp)->next) {
if ((*fidpp)->fid == fid) {
break;
}
}
if (*fidpp == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
fidp = *fidpp;
*fidpp = fidp->next;
fidp->clunked = 1;
return fidp;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 1,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHPAPI void php_pcre_split_impl(pcre_cache_entry *pce, char *subject, int subject_len, zval *return_value,
long limit_val, long flags TSRMLS_DC)
{
pcre_extra *extra = NULL; /* Holds results of studying */
pcre *re_bump = NULL; /* Regex instance for empty matches */
pcre_extra *extra_bump = NULL; /* Almost dummy */
pcre_extra extra_data; /* Used locally for exec options */
int *offsets; /* Array of subpattern offsets */
int size_offsets; /* Size of the offsets array */
int exoptions = 0; /* Execution options */
int count = 0; /* Count of matched subpatterns */
int start_offset; /* Where the new search starts */
int next_offset; /* End of the last delimiter match + 1 */
int g_notempty = 0; /* If the match should not be empty */
char *last_match; /* Location of last match */
int rc;
int no_empty; /* If NO_EMPTY flag is set */
int delim_capture; /* If delimiters should be captured */
int offset_capture; /* If offsets should be captured */
no_empty = flags & PREG_SPLIT_NO_EMPTY;
delim_capture = flags & PREG_SPLIT_DELIM_CAPTURE;
offset_capture = flags & PREG_SPLIT_OFFSET_CAPTURE;
if (limit_val == 0) {
limit_val = -1;
}
if (extra == NULL) {
extra_data.flags = PCRE_EXTRA_MATCH_LIMIT | PCRE_EXTRA_MATCH_LIMIT_RECURSION;
extra = &extra_data;
}
extra->match_limit = PCRE_G(backtrack_limit);
extra->match_limit_recursion = PCRE_G(recursion_limit);
/* Initialize return value */
array_init(return_value);
/* Calculate the size of the offsets array, and allocate memory for it. */
rc = pcre_fullinfo(pce->re, extra, PCRE_INFO_CAPTURECOUNT, &size_offsets);
if (rc < 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Internal pcre_fullinfo() error %d", rc);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
size_offsets = (size_offsets + 1) * 3;
offsets = (int *)safe_emalloc(size_offsets, sizeof(int), 0);
/* Start at the beginning of the string */
start_offset = 0;
next_offset = 0;
last_match = subject;
PCRE_G(error_code) = PHP_PCRE_NO_ERROR;
/* Get next piece if no limit or limit not yet reached and something matched*/
while ((limit_val == -1 || limit_val > 1)) {
count = pcre_exec(pce->re, extra, subject,
subject_len, start_offset,
exoptions|g_notempty, offsets, size_offsets);
/* the string was already proved to be valid UTF-8 */
exoptions |= PCRE_NO_UTF8_CHECK;
/* Check for too many substrings condition. */
if (count == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC,E_NOTICE, "Matched, but too many substrings");
count = size_offsets/3;
}
/* If something matched */
if (count > 0) {
if (!no_empty || &subject[offsets[0]] != last_match) {
if (offset_capture) {
/* Add (match, offset) pair to the return value */
add_offset_pair(return_value, last_match, &subject[offsets[0]]-last_match, next_offset, NULL);
} else {
/* Add the piece to the return value */
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, last_match,
&subject[offsets[0]]-last_match, 1);
}
/* One less left to do */
if (limit_val != -1)
limit_val--;
}
last_match = &subject[offsets[1]];
next_offset = offsets[1];
if (delim_capture) {
int i, match_len;
for (i = 1; i < count; i++) {
match_len = offsets[(i<<1)+1] - offsets[i<<1];
/* If we have matched a delimiter */
if (!no_empty || match_len > 0) {
if (offset_capture) {
add_offset_pair(return_value, &subject[offsets[i<<1]], match_len, offsets[i<<1], NULL);
} else {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value,
&subject[offsets[i<<1]],
match_len, 1);
}
}
}
}
} else if (count == PCRE_ERROR_NOMATCH) {
/* If we previously set PCRE_NOTEMPTY after a null match,
this is not necessarily the end. We need to advance
the start offset, and continue. Fudge the offset values
to achieve this, unless we're already at the end of the string. */
if (g_notempty != 0 && start_offset < subject_len) {
if (pce->compile_options & PCRE_UTF8) {
if (re_bump == NULL) {
int dummy;
if ((re_bump = pcre_get_compiled_regex("/./us", &extra_bump, &dummy TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
count = pcre_exec(re_bump, extra_bump, subject,
subject_len, start_offset,
exoptions, offsets, size_offsets);
if (count < 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown error");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
offsets[0] = start_offset;
offsets[1] = start_offset + 1;
}
} else
break;
} else {
pcre_handle_exec_error(count TSRMLS_CC);
break;
}
/* If we have matched an empty string, mimic what Perl's /g options does.
This turns out to be rather cunning. First we set PCRE_NOTEMPTY and try
the match again at the same point. If this fails (picked up above) we
advance to the next character. */
g_notempty = (offsets[1] == offsets[0])? PCRE_NOTEMPTY | PCRE_ANCHORED : 0;
/* Advance to the position right after the last full match */
start_offset = offsets[1];
}
start_offset = last_match - subject; /* the offset might have been incremented, but without further successful matches */
if (!no_empty || start_offset < subject_len)
{
if (offset_capture) {
/* Add the last (match, offset) pair to the return value */
add_offset_pair(return_value, &subject[start_offset], subject_len - start_offset, start_offset, NULL);
} else {
/* Add the last piece to the return value */
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, last_match, subject + subject_len - last_match, 1);
}
}
/* Clean up */
efree(offsets);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 61
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NTSTATUS TCDeviceIoControl (PWSTR deviceName, ULONG IoControlCode, void *InputBuffer, ULONG InputBufferSize, void *OutputBuffer, ULONG OutputBufferSize)
{
IO_STATUS_BLOCK ioStatusBlock;
NTSTATUS ntStatus;
PIRP irp;
PFILE_OBJECT fileObject;
PDEVICE_OBJECT deviceObject;
KEVENT event;
UNICODE_STRING name;
RtlInitUnicodeString(&name, deviceName);
ntStatus = IoGetDeviceObjectPointer (&name, FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES, &fileObject, &deviceObject);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (ntStatus))
return ntStatus;
KeInitializeEvent(&event, NotificationEvent, FALSE);
irp = IoBuildDeviceIoControlRequest (IoControlCode,
deviceObject,
InputBuffer, InputBufferSize,
OutputBuffer, OutputBufferSize,
FALSE,
&event,
&ioStatusBlock);
if (irp == NULL)
{
Dump ("IRP allocation failed\n");
ntStatus = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
goto ret;
}
IoGetNextIrpStackLocation (irp)->FileObject = fileObject;
ntStatus = IoCallDriver (deviceObject, irp);
if (ntStatus == STATUS_PENDING)
{
KeWaitForSingleObject (&event, Executive, KernelMode, FALSE, NULL);
ntStatus = ioStatusBlock.Status;
}
ret:
ObDereferenceObject (fileObject);
return ntStatus;
}
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 87,206
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PluginModule::InitAsProxiedNaCl(
scoped_ptr<PluginDelegate::OutOfProcessProxy> out_of_process_proxy,
PP_Instance instance) {
nacl_ipc_proxy_ = true;
InitAsProxied(out_of_process_proxy.release());
out_of_process_proxy_->AddInstance(instance);
PluginInstance* plugin_instance = host_globals->GetInstance(instance);
if (!plugin_instance)
return;
plugin_instance->ResetAsProxied();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 170,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteWEBPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
const char
*value;
int
webp_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register uint32_t
*magick_restrict q;
ssize_t
y;
WebPConfig
configure;
WebPPicture
picture;
WebPAuxStats
statistics;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if ((image->columns > 16383UL) || (image->rows > 16383UL))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
if ((WebPPictureInit(&picture) == 0) || (WebPConfigInit(&configure) == 0))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToEncodeImageFile");
picture.writer=WebPEncodeWriter;
picture.custom_ptr=(void *) image;
#if WEBP_DECODER_ABI_VERSION >= 0x0100
picture.progress_hook=WebPEncodeProgress;
#endif
picture.stats=(&statistics);
picture.width=(int) image->columns;
picture.height=(int) image->rows;
picture.argb_stride=(int) image->columns;
picture.use_argb=1;
if (image->quality != UndefinedCompressionQuality)
configure.quality=(float) image->quality;
if (image->quality >= 100)
configure.lossless=1;
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:lossless");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.lossless=(int) ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:method");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.method=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:image-hint");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(value,"default") == 0)
configure.image_hint=WEBP_HINT_DEFAULT;
if (LocaleCompare(value,"photo") == 0)
configure.image_hint=WEBP_HINT_PHOTO;
if (LocaleCompare(value,"picture") == 0)
configure.image_hint=WEBP_HINT_PICTURE;
#if WEBP_DECODER_ABI_VERSION >= 0x0200
if (LocaleCompare(value,"graph") == 0)
configure.image_hint=WEBP_HINT_GRAPH;
#endif
}
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:target-size");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.target_size=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:target-psnr");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.target_PSNR=(float) StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:segments");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.segments=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:sns-strength");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.sns_strength=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:filter-strength");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.filter_strength=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:filter-sharpness");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.filter_sharpness=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:filter-type");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.filter_type=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:auto-filter");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.autofilter=(int) ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:alpha-compression");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.alpha_compression=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:alpha-filtering");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.alpha_filtering=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:alpha-quality");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.alpha_quality=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:pass");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.pass=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:show-compressed");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.show_compressed=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:preprocessing");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.preprocessing=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:partitions");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.partitions=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:partition-limit");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.partition_limit=StringToInteger(value);
#if WEBP_DECODER_ABI_VERSION >= 0x0201
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:emulate-jpeg-size");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.emulate_jpeg_size=(int) ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:low-memory");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.low_memory=(int) ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:thread-level");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.thread_level=StringToInteger(value);
#endif
if (WebPValidateConfig(&configure) == 0)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToEncodeImageFile");
/*
Allocate memory for pixels.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*
sizeof(*picture.argb));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
picture.argb=(uint32_t *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Convert image to WebP raster pixels.
*/
q=picture.argb;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(uint32_t) (image->matte != MagickFalse ?
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelAlpha(p)) << 24 : 0xff000000u) |
(ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p)) << 16) |
(ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p)) << 8) |
(ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p)));
p++;
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
webp_status=WebPEncode(&configure,&picture);
if (webp_status == 0)
{
const char
*message;
switch (picture.error_code)
{
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY:
{
message="out of memory";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_BITSTREAM_OUT_OF_MEMORY:
{
message="bitstream out of memory";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_NULL_PARAMETER:
{
message="NULL parameter";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_INVALID_CONFIGURATION:
{
message="invalid configuration";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_BAD_DIMENSION:
{
message="bad dimension";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_PARTITION0_OVERFLOW:
{
message="partition 0 overflow (> 512K)";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_PARTITION_OVERFLOW:
{
message="partition overflow (> 16M)";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_BAD_WRITE:
{
message="bad write";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_FILE_TOO_BIG:
{
message="file too big (> 4GB)";
break;
}
#if WEBP_DECODER_ABI_VERSION >= 0x0100
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_USER_ABORT:
{
message="user abort";
break;
}
#endif
default:
{
message="unknown exception";
break;
}
}
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,(char *) message,"`%s'",image->filename);
}
picture.argb=(uint32_t *) NULL;
WebPPictureFree(&picture);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(webp_status == 0 ? MagickFalse : MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Fixed fd leak for webp coder (patch from #382)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 67,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void acpi_os_printf(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
acpi_os_vprintf(fmt, args);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 53,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u32 svc_max_payload(const struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
u32 max = rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_class->xcl_max_payload;
if (rqstp->rq_server->sv_max_payload < max)
max = rqstp->rq_server->sv_max_payload;
return max;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
/*
* Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
* previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
* that right?
*/
rl->packet = NULL;
rl->packet_length = 0;
rl->wnum = 0;
memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
rl->wpend_tot = 0;
rl->wpend_type = 0;
rl->wpend_ret = 0;
rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
rl->numrpipes = 0;
SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
if (rl->d)
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 69,282
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int DownloadManagerImpl::InProgressCount() const {
int count = 0;
for (const auto& it : downloads_) {
if (it.second->GetState() == DownloadItem::IN_PROGRESS)
++count;
}
return count;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,442
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *clap_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_CleanAppertureBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_CLAP);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlErrMsgStr(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserErrors error,
const char *msg, const xmlChar * val)
{
if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->disableSAX != 0) &&
(ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF))
return;
if (ctxt != NULL)
ctxt->errNo = error;
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, NULL,
XML_FROM_PARSER, error, XML_ERR_ERROR,
NULL, 0, (const char *) val, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, msg,
val);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 163,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::writeInt64(int64_t val)
{
return writeAligned(val);
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int alloc_high_class_bfreg(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev,
struct mlx5_bfreg_info *bfregi)
{
int i;
for (i = first_hi_bfreg(dev, bfregi); i < max_bfregs(dev, bfregi); i++) {
if (!bfregi->count[i]) {
bfregi->count[i]++;
return i;
}
}
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlobURLRequestJob::DidCountSize(int error) {
DCHECK(!error_);
if (error != net::OK) {
NotifyFailure(error);
return;
}
if (!byte_range_.ComputeBounds(total_size_)) {
NotifyFailure(net::ERR_REQUEST_RANGE_NOT_SATISFIABLE);
return;
}
remaining_bytes_ = byte_range_.last_byte_position() -
byte_range_.first_byte_position() + 1;
DCHECK_GE(remaining_bytes_, 0);
if (byte_range_.first_byte_position())
Seek(byte_range_.first_byte_position());
NotifySuccess();
}
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 115,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::havePotentialSourceChild() {
HTMLSourceElement* currentSourceNode = m_currentSourceNode;
Node* nextNode = m_nextChildNodeToConsider;
KURL nextURL = selectNextSourceChild(0, DoNothing);
m_currentSourceNode = currentSourceNode;
m_nextChildNodeToConsider = nextNode;
return nextURL.isValid();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: arcStrokeCircle(const pointObj *p1, const pointObj *p2, const pointObj *p3,
double segment_angle, int include_first, pointArrayObj *pa)
{
pointObj center; /* Center of our circular arc */
double radius; /* Radius of our circular arc */
double sweep_angle_r; /* Total angular size of our circular arc in radians */
double segment_angle_r; /* Segment angle in radians */
double a1, /*a2,*/ a3; /* Angles represented by p1, p2, p3 relative to center */
int side = arcSegmentSide(p1, p3, p2); /* What side of p1,p3 is the middle point? */
int num_edges; /* How many edges we will be generating */
double current_angle_r; /* What angle are we generating now (radians)? */
int i; /* Counter */
pointObj p; /* Temporary point */
int is_closed = MS_FALSE;
/* We need to know if we're dealing with a circle early */
if ( FP_EQ(p1->x, p3->x) && FP_EQ(p1->y, p3->y) )
is_closed = MS_TRUE;
/* Check if the "arc" is actually straight */
if ( ! is_closed && side == FP_COLINEAR ) {
/* We just need to write in the end points */
if ( include_first )
pointArrayAddPoint(pa, p1);
pointArrayAddPoint(pa, p3);
return MS_SUCCESS;
}
/* We should always be able to find the center of a non-linear arc */
if ( arcCircleCenter(p1, p2, p3, ¢er, &radius) == MS_FAILURE )
return MS_FAILURE;
/* Calculate the angles that our three points represent */
a1 = atan2(p1->y - center.y, p1->x - center.x);
/* UNUSED
a2 = atan2(p2->y - center.y, p2->x - center.x);
*/
a3 = atan2(p3->y - center.y, p3->x - center.x);
segment_angle_r = M_PI * segment_angle / 180.0;
/* Closed-circle case, we sweep the whole circle! */
if ( is_closed ) {
sweep_angle_r = 2.0 * M_PI;
}
/* Clockwise sweep direction */
else if ( side == FP_LEFT ) {
if ( a3 > a1 ) /* Wrapping past 180? */
sweep_angle_r = a1 + (2.0 * M_PI - a3);
else
sweep_angle_r = a1 - a3;
}
/* Counter-clockwise sweep direction */
else if ( side == FP_RIGHT ) {
if ( a3 > a1 ) /* Wrapping past 180? */
sweep_angle_r = a3 - a1;
else
sweep_angle_r = a3 + (2.0 * M_PI - a1);
} else
sweep_angle_r = 0.0;
/* We don't have enough resolution, let's invert our strategy. */
if ( (sweep_angle_r / segment_angle_r) < SEGMENT_MINPOINTS ) {
segment_angle_r = sweep_angle_r / (SEGMENT_MINPOINTS + 1);
}
/* We don't have enough resolution to stroke this arc,
* so just join the start to the end. */
if ( sweep_angle_r < segment_angle_r ) {
if ( include_first )
pointArrayAddPoint(pa, p1);
pointArrayAddPoint(pa, p3);
return MS_SUCCESS;
}
/* How many edges to generate (we add the final edge
* by sticking on the last point */
num_edges = floor(sweep_angle_r / fabs(segment_angle_r));
/* Go backwards (negative angular steps) if we are stroking clockwise */
if ( side == FP_LEFT )
segment_angle_r *= -1;
/* What point should we start with? */
if( include_first ) {
current_angle_r = a1;
} else {
current_angle_r = a1 + segment_angle_r;
num_edges--;
}
/* For each edge, increment or decrement by our segment angle */
for( i = 0; i < num_edges; i++ ) {
if (segment_angle_r > 0.0 && current_angle_r > M_PI)
current_angle_r -= 2*M_PI;
if (segment_angle_r < 0.0 && current_angle_r < -1*M_PI)
current_angle_r -= 2*M_PI;
p.x = center.x + radius*cos(current_angle_r);
p.y = center.y + radius*sin(current_angle_r);
pointArrayAddPoint(pa, &p);
current_angle_r += segment_angle_r;
}
/* Add the last point */
pointArrayAddPoint(pa, p3);
return MS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential SQL Injection with postgis TIME filters (#4834)
CWE ID: CWE-89
| 0
| 40,801
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mtrr_lookup_var_next(struct mtrr_iter *iter)
{
__mtrr_lookup_var_next(iter);
}
Commit Message: KVM: MTRR: remove MSR 0x2f8
MSR 0x2f8 accessed the 124th Variable Range MTRR ever since MTRR support
was introduced by 9ba075a664df ("KVM: MTRR support").
0x2f8 became harmful when 910a6aae4e2e ("KVM: MTRR: exactly define the
size of variable MTRRs") shrinked the array of VR MTRRs from 256 to 8,
which made access to index 124 out of bounds. The surrounding code only
WARNs in this situation, thus the guest gained a limited read/write
access to struct kvm_arch_vcpu.
0x2f8 is not a valid VR MTRR MSR, because KVM has/advertises only 16 VR
MTRR MSRs, 0x200-0x20f. Every VR MTRR is set up using two MSRs, 0x2f8
was treated as a PHYSBASE and 0x2f9 would be its PHYSMASK, but 0x2f9 was
not implemented in KVM, therefore 0x2f8 could never do anything useful
and getting rid of it is safe.
This fixes CVE-2016-3713.
Fixes: 910a6aae4e2e ("KVM: MTRR: exactly define the size of variable MTRRs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 53,773
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void arcmsr_request_device_map(unsigned long pacb)
{
struct AdapterControlBlock *acb = (struct AdapterControlBlock *)pacb;
switch (acb->adapter_type) {
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_A: {
arcmsr_hbaA_request_device_map(acb);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_B: {
arcmsr_hbaB_request_device_map(acb);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_C: {
arcmsr_hbaC_request_device_map(acb);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_D:
arcmsr_hbaD_request_device_map(acb);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,828
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataDirectory::AddEntry(GDataEntry* entry) {
entry->SetFileNameFromTitle();
int max_modifier = 1;
FilePath full_file_name(entry->file_name());
const std::string extension = full_file_name.Extension();
const std::string file_name = full_file_name.RemoveExtension().value();
while (FindChild(full_file_name.value())) {
if (!extension.empty()) {
full_file_name = FilePath(base::StringPrintf("%s (%d)%s",
file_name.c_str(),
++max_modifier,
extension.c_str()));
} else {
full_file_name = FilePath(base::StringPrintf("%s (%d)",
file_name.c_str(),
++max_modifier));
}
}
entry->set_file_name(full_file_name.value());
DVLOG(1) << "AddEntry: dir = " << GetFilePath().value()
<< ", file = " + entry->file_name()
<< ", parent resource = " << entry->parent_resource_id()
<< ", resource = " + entry->resource_id();
if (root_)
root_->AddEntryToResourceMap(entry);
AddChild(entry);
entry->SetParent(this);
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,671
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int samldb_first_step(struct samldb_ctx *ac)
{
if (ac->steps == NULL) {
return ldb_operr(ldb_module_get_ctx(ac->module));
}
ac->curstep = ac->steps;
return ac->curstep->fn(ac);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 12
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BytesPerElement(int type) {
switch (type) {
case GL_FLOAT_32_UNSIGNED_INT_24_8_REV:
return 8;
case GL_FLOAT:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_24_8_OES:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT:
case GL_INT:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_2_10_10_10_REV:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_10F_11F_11F_REV:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_5_9_9_9_REV:
return 4;
case GL_HALF_FLOAT:
case GL_HALF_FLOAT_OES:
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT:
case GL_SHORT:
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT_5_6_5:
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT_4_4_4_4:
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT_5_5_5_1:
return 2;
case GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE:
case GL_BYTE:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Validate glClearBuffer*v function |buffer| param on the client side
Otherwise we could read out-of-bounds even if an invalid |buffer| is passed
in and in theory we should not read the buffer at all.
BUG=908749
TEST=gl_tests in ASAN build
R=piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I94b69b56ce3358ff9bfc0e21f0618aec4371d1ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1354571
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#612023}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 153,334
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: brcmf_cfg80211_set_rekey_data(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *ndev,
struct cfg80211_gtk_rekey_data *gtk)
{
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
struct brcmf_gtk_keyinfo_le gtk_le;
int ret;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter, bssidx=%d\n", ifp->bsscfgidx);
memcpy(gtk_le.kck, gtk->kck, sizeof(gtk_le.kck));
memcpy(gtk_le.kek, gtk->kek, sizeof(gtk_le.kek));
memcpy(gtk_le.replay_counter, gtk->replay_ctr,
sizeof(gtk_le.replay_counter));
ret = brcmf_fil_iovar_data_set(ifp, "gtk_key_info", >k_le,
sizeof(gtk_le));
if (ret < 0)
brcmf_err("gtk_key_info iovar failed: ret=%d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _PUBLIC_ ssize_t push_codepoint(char *str, codepoint_t c)
{
return push_codepoint_handle(get_iconv_handle(), str, c);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 2,282
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::ProcessGestureEvent(
const blink::WebGestureEvent& event,
const ui::LatencyInfo& latency) {
host_->ForwardGestureEventWithLatencyInfo(event, latency);
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 132,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Compute_Point_Displacement( EXEC_OP_ FT_F26Dot6* x,
FT_F26Dot6* y,
TT_GlyphZone zone,
FT_UShort* refp )
{
TT_GlyphZoneRec zp;
FT_UShort p;
FT_F26Dot6 d;
if ( CUR.opcode & 1 )
{
zp = CUR.zp0;
p = CUR.GS.rp1;
}
else
{
zp = CUR.zp1;
p = CUR.GS.rp2;
}
if ( BOUNDS( p, zp.n_points ) )
{
if ( CUR.pedantic_hinting )
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
*refp = 0;
return FAILURE;
}
*zone = zp;
*refp = p;
d = CUR_Func_project( zp.cur + p, zp.org + p );
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_UNPATENTED_HINTING
if ( CUR.face->unpatented_hinting )
{
if ( CUR.GS.both_x_axis )
{
*x = d;
*y = 0;
}
else
{
*x = 0;
*y = d;
}
}
else
#endif
{
*x = TT_MULDIV( d,
(FT_Long)CUR.GS.freeVector.x * 0x10000L,
CUR.F_dot_P );
*y = TT_MULDIV( d,
(FT_Long)CUR.GS.freeVector.y * 0x10000L,
CUR.F_dot_P );
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: archive_write_set_bytes_in_last_block(struct archive *_a, int bytes)
{
struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_ANY, "archive_write_set_bytes_in_last_block");
a->bytes_in_last_block = bytes;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Limit write requests to at most INT_MAX.
This prevents a certain common programming error (passing -1 to write)
from leading to other problems deeper in the library.
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 34,065
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: store_read_reset(png_store *ps)
{
# ifdef PNG_READ_SUPPORTED
if (ps->pread != NULL)
{
anon_context(ps);
Try
png_destroy_read_struct(&ps->pread, &ps->piread, NULL);
Catch_anonymous
{
/* error already output: continue */
}
ps->pread = NULL;
ps->piread = NULL;
}
# endif
# ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
/* Always do this to be safe. */
store_pool_delete(ps, &ps->read_memory_pool);
# endif
ps->current = NULL;
ps->next = NULL;
ps->readpos = 0;
ps->validated = 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,071
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const InputTypeFactoryMap* FactoryMap() {
static const InputTypeFactoryMap* factory_map =
CreateInputTypeFactoryMap().release();
return factory_map;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,193
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoFrontFace(GLenum mode) {
api()->glFrontFaceFn(mode);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: android::SoftOMXComponent *createSoftOMXComponent(
const char *name, const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData, OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component) {
return new android::SoftAVCEncoder(name, callbacks, appData, component);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::OnLearnMoreClicked() {
OpenUrl(GURL(kHelpURL));
AutofillMetrics::LogSaveCardPromptMetric(
AutofillMetrics::SAVE_CARD_PROMPT_DISMISS_CLICK_LEARN_MORE, is_uploading_,
is_reshow_,
pref_service_->GetInteger(
prefs::kAutofillAcceptSaveCreditCardPromptState));
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Avoid duplicate instances of the SaveCardBubble.
autofill::SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubble() expects
(via DCHECK) to only be called when the save card bubble is
not already visible. This constraint is violated if the user
clicks multiple times on a submit button.
If the underlying page goes away, the last SaveCardBubbleView
created by the controller will be automatically cleaned up,
but any others are left visible on the screen... holding a
refence to a possibly-deleted controller.
This CL early exits the ShowBubbleFor*** and ReshowBubble logic
if the bubble is already visible.
BUG=708819
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2862933002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469768}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 137,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int expand_inode_data(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset,
loff_t len, int mode)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(inode->i_sb);
pgoff_t index, pg_start, pg_end;
loff_t new_size = i_size_read(inode);
loff_t off_start, off_end;
int ret = 0;
ret = inode_newsize_ok(inode, (len + offset));
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = f2fs_convert_inline_data(inode, offset + len);
if (ret)
return ret;
pg_start = ((unsigned long long) offset) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
pg_end = ((unsigned long long) offset + len) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
off_start = offset & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
off_end = (offset + len) & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
for (index = pg_start; index <= pg_end; index++) {
struct dnode_of_data dn;
f2fs_lock_op(sbi);
set_new_dnode(&dn, inode, NULL, NULL, 0);
ret = f2fs_reserve_block(&dn, index);
f2fs_unlock_op(sbi);
if (ret)
break;
if (pg_start == pg_end)
new_size = offset + len;
else if (index == pg_start && off_start)
new_size = (index + 1) << PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
else if (index == pg_end)
new_size = (index << PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT) + off_end;
else
new_size += PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
}
if (!(mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE) &&
i_size_read(inode) < new_size) {
i_size_write(inode, new_size);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::OnChannelConnected(int32_t peer_pid) {
channel_connected_ = true;
if (IsReady()) {
DCHECK(!sent_render_process_ready_);
sent_render_process_ready_ = true;
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.RenderProcessReady(this);
}
#if defined(IPC_MESSAGE_LOG_ENABLED)
Send(new ChildProcessMsg_SetIPCLoggingEnabled(
IPC::Logging::GetInstance()->Enabled()));
#endif
tracked_objects::ThreadData::Status status =
tracked_objects::ThreadData::status();
Send(new ChildProcessMsg_SetProfilerStatus(status));
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&AudioInputRendererHost::set_renderer_pid,
audio_input_renderer_host_, peer_pid));
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,284
|
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