instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void recalc_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct vmcb_control_area *c, *h;
struct nested_state *g;
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
if (!is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu))
return;
c = &svm->vmcb->control;
h = &svm->nested.hsave->control;
g = &svm->nested;
c->intercept_cr = h->intercept_cr | g->intercept_cr;
c->intercept_dr = h->intercept_dr | g->intercept_dr;
c->intercept_exceptions = h->intercept_exceptions | g->intercept_exceptions;
c->intercept = h->intercept | g->intercept;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 37,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void igmp_start_timer(struct ip_mc_list *im, int max_delay)
{
int tv = net_random() % max_delay;
im->tm_running = 1;
if (!mod_timer(&im->timer, jiffies+tv+2))
atomic_inc(&im->refcnt);
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock() const
{
ASSERT(!needsLayout() || (node() && node()->isElementNode() && toElement(node())->shadowPseudoId() == "-webkit-input-placeholder"));
if (createsBlockFormattingContext())
return false;
if (logicalHeight() > 0
|| isTable() || borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight()
|| style()->logicalMinHeight().isPositive()
|| style()->marginBeforeCollapse() == MSEPARATE || style()->marginAfterCollapse() == MSEPARATE)
return false;
Length logicalHeightLength = style()->logicalHeight();
bool hasAutoHeight = logicalHeightLength.isAuto();
if (logicalHeightLength.isPercent() && !document().inQuirksMode()) {
hasAutoHeight = true;
for (RenderBlock* cb = containingBlock(); !cb->isRenderView(); cb = cb->containingBlock()) {
if (cb->style()->logicalHeight().isFixed() || cb->isTableCell())
hasAutoHeight = false;
}
}
if (hasAutoHeight || ((logicalHeightLength.isFixed() || logicalHeightLength.isPercent()) && logicalHeightLength.isZero())) {
if (childrenInline())
return !firstLineBox();
if (m_hasOnlySelfCollapsingChildren)
return true;
for (RenderBox* child = firstChildBox(); child; child = child->nextSiblingBox()) {
if (child->isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned())
continue;
if (!child->isSelfCollapsingBlock())
return false;
}
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void os9_to_unix_permissions(LHAFileHeader *header)
{
unsigned int or, ow, oe, pr, pw, pe, d;
or = (header->os9_perms & 0x01) != 0;
ow = (header->os9_perms & 0x02) != 0;
oe = (header->os9_perms & 0x04) != 0;
pr = (header->os9_perms & 0x08) != 0;
pw = (header->os9_perms & 0x10) != 0;
pe = (header->os9_perms & 0x20) != 0;
d = (header->os9_perms & 0x80) != 0;
header->extra_flags |= LHA_FILE_UNIX_PERMS;
header->unix_perms = (d << 14)
| (or << 8) | (ow << 7) | (oe << 6) // owner
| (pr << 5) | (pw << 4) | (pe << 3) // group
| (pr << 2) | (pw << 1) | (pe << 0); // everyone
}
Commit Message: Fix integer underflow vulnerability in L3 decode.
Marcin 'Icewall' Noga of Cisco TALOS discovered that the level 3 header
decoding routines were vulnerable to an integer underflow, if the 32-bit
header length was less than the base level 3 header length. This could
lead to an exploitable heap corruption condition.
Thanks go to Marcin Noga and Regina Wilson of Cisco TALOS for reporting
this vulnerability.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 73,932
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLInputElement::isDateField() const
{
return m_inputType->isDateField();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,912
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::Copy() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Copy"));
window()->Copy();
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SADTestBase(int width, int height) : width_(width), height_(height) {}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderViewImpl::~RenderViewImpl() {
DCHECK(!frame_widget_);
RenderThread::Get()->RemoveRoute(routing_id_);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
date_time_picker_client_.reset();
#endif
#ifndef NDEBUG
ViewMap* views = g_view_map.Pointer();
for (ViewMap::iterator it = views->begin(); it != views->end(); ++it)
DCHECK_NE(this, it->second) << "Failed to call Close?";
RoutingIDViewMap* routing_id_views = g_routing_id_view_map.Pointer();
for (RoutingIDViewMap::iterator it = routing_id_views->begin();
it != routing_id_views->end(); ++it)
DCHECK_NE(this, it->second) << "Failed to call Close?";
#endif
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.RenderViewGone();
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.OnDestruct();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL BrowserPpapiHostImpl::GetDocumentURLForInstance(PP_Instance instance) {
auto it = instance_map_.find(instance);
if (it == instance_map_.end())
return GURL();
return it->second->renderer_data.document_url;
}
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::RemoteCharacteristicWriteValue(
const std::string& characteristic_instance_id,
const std::vector<uint8_t>& value,
RemoteCharacteristicWriteValueCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (value.size() > 512) {
CrashRendererAndClosePipe(bad_message::BDH_INVALID_WRITE_VALUE_LENGTH);
return;
}
const CacheQueryResult query_result =
QueryCacheForCharacteristic(characteristic_instance_id);
if (query_result.outcome == CacheQueryOutcome::BAD_RENDERER) {
return;
}
if (query_result.outcome != CacheQueryOutcome::SUCCESS) {
RecordCharacteristicWriteValueOutcome(query_result.outcome);
std::move(callback).Run(query_result.GetWebResult());
return;
}
if (BluetoothBlocklist::Get().IsExcludedFromWrites(
query_result.characteristic->GetUUID())) {
RecordCharacteristicWriteValueOutcome(UMAGATTOperationOutcome::BLOCKLISTED);
std::move(callback).Run(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::BLOCKLISTED_WRITE);
return;
}
auto copyable_callback = base::AdaptCallbackForRepeating(std::move(callback));
query_result.characteristic->WriteRemoteCharacteristic(
value,
base::Bind(&WebBluetoothServiceImpl::OnCharacteristicWriteValueSuccess,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), copyable_callback),
base::Bind(&WebBluetoothServiceImpl::OnCharacteristicWriteValueFailed,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), copyable_callback));
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __meminit split_mem_range(struct map_range *mr, int nr_range,
unsigned long start,
unsigned long end)
{
unsigned long start_pfn, end_pfn, limit_pfn;
unsigned long pfn;
int i;
limit_pfn = PFN_DOWN(end);
/* head if not big page alignment ? */
pfn = start_pfn = PFN_DOWN(start);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Don't use a large page for the first 2/4MB of memory
* because there are often fixed size MTRRs in there
* and overlapping MTRRs into large pages can cause
* slowdowns.
*/
if (pfn == 0)
end_pfn = PFN_DOWN(PMD_SIZE);
else
end_pfn = round_up(pfn, PFN_DOWN(PMD_SIZE));
#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
end_pfn = round_up(pfn, PFN_DOWN(PMD_SIZE));
#endif
if (end_pfn > limit_pfn)
end_pfn = limit_pfn;
if (start_pfn < end_pfn) {
nr_range = save_mr(mr, nr_range, start_pfn, end_pfn, 0);
pfn = end_pfn;
}
/* big page (2M) range */
start_pfn = round_up(pfn, PFN_DOWN(PMD_SIZE));
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
end_pfn = round_down(limit_pfn, PFN_DOWN(PMD_SIZE));
#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
end_pfn = round_up(pfn, PFN_DOWN(PUD_SIZE));
if (end_pfn > round_down(limit_pfn, PFN_DOWN(PMD_SIZE)))
end_pfn = round_down(limit_pfn, PFN_DOWN(PMD_SIZE));
#endif
if (start_pfn < end_pfn) {
nr_range = save_mr(mr, nr_range, start_pfn, end_pfn,
page_size_mask & (1<<PG_LEVEL_2M));
pfn = end_pfn;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/* big page (1G) range */
start_pfn = round_up(pfn, PFN_DOWN(PUD_SIZE));
end_pfn = round_down(limit_pfn, PFN_DOWN(PUD_SIZE));
if (start_pfn < end_pfn) {
nr_range = save_mr(mr, nr_range, start_pfn, end_pfn,
page_size_mask &
((1<<PG_LEVEL_2M)|(1<<PG_LEVEL_1G)));
pfn = end_pfn;
}
/* tail is not big page (1G) alignment */
start_pfn = round_up(pfn, PFN_DOWN(PMD_SIZE));
end_pfn = round_down(limit_pfn, PFN_DOWN(PMD_SIZE));
if (start_pfn < end_pfn) {
nr_range = save_mr(mr, nr_range, start_pfn, end_pfn,
page_size_mask & (1<<PG_LEVEL_2M));
pfn = end_pfn;
}
#endif
/* tail is not big page (2M) alignment */
start_pfn = pfn;
end_pfn = limit_pfn;
nr_range = save_mr(mr, nr_range, start_pfn, end_pfn, 0);
if (!after_bootmem)
adjust_range_page_size_mask(mr, nr_range);
/* try to merge same page size and continuous */
for (i = 0; nr_range > 1 && i < nr_range - 1; i++) {
unsigned long old_start;
if (mr[i].end != mr[i+1].start ||
mr[i].page_size_mask != mr[i+1].page_size_mask)
continue;
/* move it */
old_start = mr[i].start;
memmove(&mr[i], &mr[i+1],
(nr_range - 1 - i) * sizeof(struct map_range));
mr[i--].start = old_start;
nr_range--;
}
for (i = 0; i < nr_range; i++)
pr_debug(" [mem %#010lx-%#010lx] page %s\n",
mr[i].start, mr[i].end - 1,
page_size_string(&mr[i]));
return nr_range;
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 66,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned getPaletteTranslucency(const unsigned char* palette, size_t palettesize)
{
size_t i;
unsigned key = 0;
unsigned r = 0, g = 0, b = 0; /*the value of the color with alpha 0, so long as color keying is possible*/
for(i = 0; i < palettesize; i++)
{
if(!key && palette[4 * i + 3] == 0)
{
r = palette[4 * i + 0]; g = palette[4 * i + 1]; b = palette[4 * i + 2];
key = 1;
i = (size_t)(-1); /*restart from beginning, to detect earlier opaque colors with key's value*/
}
else if(palette[4 * i + 3] != 255) return 2;
/*when key, no opaque RGB may have key's RGB*/
else if(key && r == palette[i * 4 + 0] && g == palette[i * 4 + 1] && b == palette[i * 4 + 2]) return 2;
}
return key;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: content::PreviewsState GetLastNavigationPreviewsState() {
NavigationRequest* navigation_request =
contents()->GetFrameTree()->root()->navigation_request();
CHECK(navigation_request);
return navigation_request->common_params().previews_state;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 144,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit ib_ucm_cleanup(void)
{
ib_unregister_client(&ucm_client);
class_remove_file(&cm_class, &class_attr_abi_version.attr);
unregister_chrdev_region(IB_UCM_BASE_DEV, IB_UCM_MAX_DEVICES);
if (overflow_maj)
unregister_chrdev_region(overflow_maj, IB_UCM_MAX_DEVICES);
idr_destroy(&ctx_id_table);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DownloadItemActivatedData(DownloadItem::DownloadType download_type,
uint32_t download_id,
std::string original_url,
std::string final_url,
std::string file_name,
DownloadDangerType danger_type,
int64_t start_offset,
bool has_user_gesture)
: download_type_(download_type),
download_id_(download_id),
original_url_(original_url),
final_url_(final_url),
file_name_(file_name),
danger_type_(danger_type),
start_offset_(start_offset),
has_user_gesture_(has_user_gesture) {}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hostap_disable_hostapd_sta(local_info_t *local, int rtnl_locked)
{
struct net_device *dev = local->dev;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: disabling hostapd mode\n", dev->name);
hostap_remove_interface(local->stadev, rtnl_locked, 1);
local->stadev = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int copy_mount_string(const void __user *data, char **where)
{
char *tmp;
if (!data) {
*where = NULL;
return 0;
}
tmp = strndup_user(data, PAGE_SIZE);
if (IS_ERR(tmp))
return PTR_ERR(tmp);
*where = tmp;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 32,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetShaderPrecisionFormat(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::GetShaderPrecisionFormat& c) {
GLenum shader_type = static_cast<GLenum>(c.shadertype);
GLenum precision_type = static_cast<GLenum>(c.precisiontype);
typedef gles2::GetShaderPrecisionFormat::Result Result;
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.result_shm_id, c.result_shm_offset, sizeof(*result));
if (!result) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (result->success != 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
if (!validators_->shader_type.IsValid(shader_type)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM,
"glGetShaderPrecisionFormat: shader_type GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->shader_precision.IsValid(precision_type)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM,
"glGetShaderPrecisionFormat: precision_type GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
result->success = 1; // true
switch (precision_type) {
case GL_LOW_INT:
case GL_MEDIUM_INT:
case GL_HIGH_INT:
result->min_range = 31;
result->max_range = 30;
result->precision = 0;
break;
case GL_LOW_FLOAT:
case GL_MEDIUM_FLOAT:
case GL_HIGH_FLOAT:
result->min_range = 127;
result->max_range = 127;
result->precision = 23;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int srv_set_message(char *buf,
int num_words,
int num_bytes,
bool zero)
{
if (zero && (num_words || num_bytes)) {
memset(buf + smb_size,'\0',num_words*2 + num_bytes);
}
SCVAL(buf,smb_wct,num_words);
SSVAL(buf,smb_vwv + num_words*SIZEOFWORD,num_bytes);
smb_setlen(buf,(smb_size + num_words*2 + num_bytes - 4));
return (smb_size + num_words*2 + num_bytes);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int process_backlog(struct napi_struct *napi, int quota)
{
int work = 0;
struct softnet_data *sd = container_of(napi, struct softnet_data, backlog);
/* Check if we have pending ipi, its better to send them now,
* not waiting net_rx_action() end.
*/
if (sd_has_rps_ipi_waiting(sd)) {
local_irq_disable();
net_rps_action_and_irq_enable(sd);
}
napi->weight = weight_p;
local_irq_disable();
while (1) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&sd->process_queue))) {
rcu_read_lock();
local_irq_enable();
__netif_receive_skb(skb);
rcu_read_unlock();
local_irq_disable();
input_queue_head_incr(sd);
if (++work >= quota) {
local_irq_enable();
return work;
}
}
rps_lock(sd);
if (skb_queue_empty(&sd->input_pkt_queue)) {
/*
* Inline a custom version of __napi_complete().
* only current cpu owns and manipulates this napi,
* and NAPI_STATE_SCHED is the only possible flag set
* on backlog.
* We can use a plain write instead of clear_bit(),
* and we dont need an smp_mb() memory barrier.
*/
napi->state = 0;
rps_unlock(sd);
break;
}
skb_queue_splice_tail_init(&sd->input_pkt_queue,
&sd->process_queue);
rps_unlock(sd);
}
local_irq_enable();
return work;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvmppc_kvm_pv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int nr = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 11);
int r;
unsigned long __maybe_unused param1 = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 3);
unsigned long __maybe_unused param2 = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 4);
unsigned long __maybe_unused param3 = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 5);
unsigned long __maybe_unused param4 = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 6);
unsigned long r2 = 0;
if (!(kvmppc_get_msr(vcpu) & MSR_SF)) {
/* 32 bit mode */
param1 &= 0xffffffff;
param2 &= 0xffffffff;
param3 &= 0xffffffff;
param4 &= 0xffffffff;
}
switch (nr) {
case KVM_HCALL_TOKEN(KVM_HC_PPC_MAP_MAGIC_PAGE):
{
#if defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) && defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_PR_POSSIBLE)
/* Book3S can be little endian, find it out here */
int shared_big_endian = true;
if (vcpu->arch.intr_msr & MSR_LE)
shared_big_endian = false;
if (shared_big_endian != vcpu->arch.shared_big_endian)
kvmppc_swab_shared(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.shared_big_endian = shared_big_endian;
#endif
if (!(param2 & MAGIC_PAGE_FLAG_NOT_MAPPED_NX)) {
/*
* Older versions of the Linux magic page code had
* a bug where they would map their trampoline code
* NX. If that's the case, remove !PR NX capability.
*/
vcpu->arch.disable_kernel_nx = true;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
}
vcpu->arch.magic_page_pa = param1 & ~0xfffULL;
vcpu->arch.magic_page_ea = param2 & ~0xfffULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES
/*
* Make sure our 4k magic page is in the same window of a 64k
* page within the guest and within the host's page.
*/
if ((vcpu->arch.magic_page_pa & 0xf000) !=
((ulong)vcpu->arch.shared & 0xf000)) {
void *old_shared = vcpu->arch.shared;
ulong shared = (ulong)vcpu->arch.shared;
void *new_shared;
shared &= PAGE_MASK;
shared |= vcpu->arch.magic_page_pa & 0xf000;
new_shared = (void*)shared;
memcpy(new_shared, old_shared, 0x1000);
vcpu->arch.shared = new_shared;
}
#endif
r2 = KVM_MAGIC_FEAT_SR | KVM_MAGIC_FEAT_MAS0_TO_SPRG7;
r = EV_SUCCESS;
break;
}
case KVM_HCALL_TOKEN(KVM_HC_FEATURES):
r = EV_SUCCESS;
#if defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S) || defined(CONFIG_KVM_E500V2)
r2 |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_MAGIC_PAGE);
#endif
/* Second return value is in r4 */
break;
case EV_HCALL_TOKEN(EV_IDLE):
r = EV_SUCCESS;
kvm_vcpu_block(vcpu);
kvm_clear_request(KVM_REQ_UNHALT, vcpu);
break;
default:
r = EV_UNIMPLEMENTED;
break;
}
kvmppc_set_gpr(vcpu, 4, r2);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 60,553
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __packet_get_status(struct packet_sock *po, void *frame)
{
union tpacket_uhdr h;
smp_rmb();
h.raw = frame;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V1:
flush_dcache_page(pgv_to_page(&h.h1->tp_status));
return h.h1->tp_status;
case TPACKET_V2:
flush_dcache_page(pgv_to_page(&h.h2->tp_status));
return h.h2->tp_status;
case TPACKET_V3:
default:
WARN(1, "TPACKET version not supported.\n");
BUG();
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rb_set_commit_to_write(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
{
unsigned long max_count;
/*
* We only race with interrupts and NMIs on this CPU.
* If we own the commit event, then we can commit
* all others that interrupted us, since the interruptions
* are in stack format (they finish before they come
* back to us). This allows us to do a simple loop to
* assign the commit to the tail.
*/
again:
max_count = cpu_buffer->nr_pages * 100;
while (cpu_buffer->commit_page != READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->tail_page)) {
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, !(--max_count)))
return;
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer,
rb_is_reader_page(cpu_buffer->tail_page)))
return;
local_set(&cpu_buffer->commit_page->page->commit,
rb_page_write(cpu_buffer->commit_page));
rb_inc_page(cpu_buffer, &cpu_buffer->commit_page);
/* Only update the write stamp if the page has an event */
if (rb_page_write(cpu_buffer->commit_page))
cpu_buffer->write_stamp =
cpu_buffer->commit_page->page->time_stamp;
/* add barrier to keep gcc from optimizing too much */
barrier();
}
while (rb_commit_index(cpu_buffer) !=
rb_page_write(cpu_buffer->commit_page)) {
local_set(&cpu_buffer->commit_page->page->commit,
rb_page_write(cpu_buffer->commit_page));
RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer,
local_read(&cpu_buffer->commit_page->page->commit) &
~RB_WRITE_MASK);
barrier();
}
/* again, keep gcc from optimizing */
barrier();
/*
* If an interrupt came in just after the first while loop
* and pushed the tail page forward, we will be left with
* a dangling commit that will never go forward.
*/
if (unlikely(cpu_buffer->commit_page != READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->tail_page)))
goto again;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: auth_get_default_key(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_cardctl_default_key *data)
{
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_NO_DEFAULT_KEY);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: H264Picture* H264DPB::GetLowestFrameNumWrapShortRefPic() {
H264Picture* ret = NULL;
for (size_t i = 0; i < pics_.size(); ++i) {
H264Picture* pic = pics_[i];
if (pic->ref && !pic->long_term &&
(!ret || pic->frame_num_wrap < ret->frame_num_wrap))
ret = pic;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
TBR=posciak@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HFSBTreeIterator::HFSBTreeIterator()
: stream_(),
header_(),
leaf_records_read_(0),
current_leaf_records_read_(0),
current_leaf_number_(0),
read_current_leaf_(false),
leaf_data_(),
current_leaf_offset_(0),
current_leaf_() {
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageCopyResized (gdImagePtr dst, gdImagePtr src, int dstX, int dstY,
int srcX, int srcY, int dstW, int dstH, int srcW,
int srcH)
{
int c;
int x, y;
int tox, toy;
int ydest;
int i;
int colorMap[gdMaxColors];
/* Stretch vectors */
int *stx;
int *sty;
/* We only need to use floating point to determine the correct
stretch vector for one line's worth. */
if (overflow2(sizeof (int), srcW)) {
return;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof (int), srcH)) {
return;
}
stx = (int *) gdMalloc (sizeof (int) * srcW);
if (!stx) {
return;
}
sty = (int *) gdMalloc (sizeof (int) * srcH);
if (!sty) {
gdFree(stx);
return;
}
/* Fixed by Mao Morimoto 2.0.16 */
for (i = 0; (i < srcW); i++) {
stx[i] = dstW * (i + 1) / srcW - dstW * i / srcW;
}
for (i = 0; (i < srcH); i++) {
sty[i] = dstH * (i + 1) / srcH - dstH * i / srcH;
}
for (i = 0; (i < gdMaxColors); i++) {
colorMap[i] = (-1);
}
toy = dstY;
for (y = srcY; (y < (srcY + srcH)); y++) {
for (ydest = 0; (ydest < sty[y - srcY]); ydest++) {
tox = dstX;
for (x = srcX; (x < (srcX + srcW)); x++) {
int nc = 0;
int mapTo;
if (!stx[x - srcX]) {
continue;
}
if (dst->trueColor) {
/* 2.0.9: Thorben Kundinger: Maybe the source image is not
a truecolor image */
if (!src->trueColor) {
int tmp = gdImageGetPixel (src, x, y);
mapTo = gdImageGetTrueColorPixel (src, x, y);
if (gdImageGetTransparent (src) == tmp) {
/* 2.0.21, TK: not tox++ */
tox += stx[x - srcX];
continue;
}
} else {
/* TK: old code follows */
mapTo = gdImageGetTrueColorPixel (src, x, y);
/* Added 7/24/95: support transparent copies */
if (gdImageGetTransparent (src) == mapTo) {
/* 2.0.21, TK: not tox++ */
tox += stx[x - srcX];
continue;
}
}
} else {
c = gdImageGetPixel (src, x, y);
/* Added 7/24/95: support transparent copies */
if (gdImageGetTransparent (src) == c) {
tox += stx[x - srcX];
continue;
}
if (src->trueColor) {
/* Remap to the palette available in the
destination image. This is slow and
works badly. */
mapTo = gdImageColorResolveAlpha (dst,
gdTrueColorGetRed (c),
gdTrueColorGetGreen
(c),
gdTrueColorGetBlue
(c),
gdTrueColorGetAlpha
(c));
} else {
/* Have we established a mapping for this color? */
if (colorMap[c] == (-1)) {
/* If it's the same image, mapping is trivial */
if (dst == src) {
nc = c;
} else {
/* Find or create the best match */
/* 2.0.5: can't use gdTrueColorGetRed, etc with palette */
nc = gdImageColorResolveAlpha (dst,
gdImageRed (src,
c),
gdImageGreen
(src, c),
gdImageBlue (src,
c),
gdImageAlpha
(src, c));
}
colorMap[c] = nc;
}
mapTo = colorMap[c];
}
}
for (i = 0; (i < stx[x - srcX]); i++) {
gdImageSetPixel (dst, tox, toy, mapTo);
tox++;
}
}
toy++;
}
}
gdFree (stx);
gdFree (sty);
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 73,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::OnPurgePluginListCache(bool reload_pages) {
EnsureWebKitInitialized();
plugin_refresh_allowed_ = false;
WebKit::resetPluginCache(reload_pages);
plugin_refresh_allowed_ = true;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderProcessObserver, observers_, PluginListChanged());
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int add_get_index_long(zval *arg, ulong index, long l, void **dest) /* {{{ */
{
zval *tmp;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
ZVAL_LONG(tmp, l);
return zend_hash_index_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(arg), index, (void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), dest);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool CheckH264(const uint8* buffer, int buffer_size) {
RCHECK(buffer_size > 4);
int offset = 0;
int parameter_count = 0;
while (true) {
if (!AdvanceToStartCode(buffer, buffer_size, &offset, 4, 24, 1)) {
return parameter_count > 0;
}
BitReader reader(buffer + offset, 4);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 24) == 1);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 1) == 0);
int nal_ref_idc = ReadBits(&reader, 2);
int nal_unit_type = ReadBits(&reader, 5);
switch (nal_unit_type) {
case 5: // Coded slice of an IDR picture.
RCHECK(nal_ref_idc != 0);
break;
case 6: // Supplemental enhancement information (SEI).
case 9: // Access unit delimiter.
case 10: // End of sequence.
case 11: // End of stream.
case 12: // Filler data.
RCHECK(nal_ref_idc == 0);
break;
case 7: // Sequence parameter set.
case 8: // Picture parameter set.
++parameter_count;
break;
}
offset += 4;
}
}
Commit Message: Add extra checks to avoid integer overflow.
BUG=425980
TEST=no crash with ASAN
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/659743004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#301249}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 119,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SendCtrlKey(ui::KeyboardCode key) {
ui::test::EventGenerator event_generator(Shell::GetPrimaryRootWindow());
event_generator.PressKey(ui::VKEY_CONTROL, ui::EF_CONTROL_DOWN);
event_generator.PressKey(key, ui::EF_CONTROL_DOWN);
event_generator.ReleaseKey(key, ui::EF_CONTROL_DOWN);
event_generator.ReleaseKey(ui::VKEY_CONTROL, ui::EF_NONE);
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tipc_sock_accept_local(struct socket *sock, struct socket **newsock,
int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int ret;
ret = sock_create_lite(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
sk->sk_protocol, newsock);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
ret = accept(sock, *newsock, flags);
if (ret < 0) {
sock_release(*newsock);
return ret;
}
(*newsock)->ops = sock->ops;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int do_remount_sb(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data, int force)
{
int retval;
int remount_ro;
if (sb->s_writers.frozen != SB_UNFROZEN)
return -EBUSY;
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
if (!(flags & MS_RDONLY) && bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev))
return -EACCES;
#endif
if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
acct_auto_close(sb);
shrink_dcache_sb(sb);
sync_filesystem(sb);
remount_ro = (flags & MS_RDONLY) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY);
/* If we are remounting RDONLY and current sb is read/write,
make sure there are no rw files opened */
if (remount_ro) {
if (force) {
mark_files_ro(sb);
} else {
retval = sb_prepare_remount_readonly(sb);
if (retval)
return retval;
}
}
if (sb->s_op->remount_fs) {
retval = sb->s_op->remount_fs(sb, &flags, data);
if (retval) {
if (!force)
goto cancel_readonly;
/* If forced remount, go ahead despite any errors */
WARN(1, "forced remount of a %s fs returned %i\n",
sb->s_type->name, retval);
}
}
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_RMT_MASK) | (flags & MS_RMT_MASK);
/* Needs to be ordered wrt mnt_is_readonly() */
smp_wmb();
sb->s_readonly_remount = 0;
/*
* Some filesystems modify their metadata via some other path than the
* bdev buffer cache (eg. use a private mapping, or directories in
* pagecache, etc). Also file data modifications go via their own
* mappings. So If we try to mount readonly then copy the filesystem
* from bdev, we could get stale data, so invalidate it to give a best
* effort at coherency.
*/
if (remount_ro && sb->s_bdev)
invalidate_bdev(sb->s_bdev);
return 0;
cancel_readonly:
sb->s_readonly_remount = 0;
return retval;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 1
| 166,808
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TopSitesImpl::SetPageThumbnailInCache(
const GURL& url,
const base::RefCountedMemory* thumbnail_data,
const ThumbnailScore& score) {
DCHECK(cache_->IsKnownURL(url));
const MostVisitedURL& most_visited =
cache_->top_sites()[cache_->GetURLIndex(url)];
Images* image = cache_->GetImage(url);
ThumbnailScore new_score_with_redirects(score);
new_score_with_redirects.redirect_hops_from_dest =
GetRedirectDistanceForURL(most_visited, url);
if (image->thumbnail.get() &&
!ShouldReplaceThumbnailWith(image->thumbnail_score,
new_score_with_redirects)) {
return false; // The one we already have is better.
}
image->thumbnail = const_cast<base::RefCountedMemory*>(thumbnail_data);
image->thumbnail_score = new_score_with_redirects;
ResetThreadSafeImageCache();
return true;
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 147,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean webkitWebViewBaseButtonPressEvent(GtkWidget* widget, GdkEventButton* buttonEvent)
{
WebKitWebViewBase* webViewBase = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_BASE(widget);
WebKitWebViewBasePrivate* priv = webViewBase->priv;
gtk_widget_grab_focus(widget);
if (!priv->clickCounter.shouldProcessButtonEvent(buttonEvent))
return TRUE;
if (buttonEvent->button == 3)
priv->contextMenuEvent.set(gdk_event_copy(reinterpret_cast<GdkEvent*>(buttonEvent)));
priv->pageProxy->handleMouseEvent(NativeWebMouseEvent(reinterpret_cast<GdkEvent*>(buttonEvent),
priv->clickCounter.clickCountForGdkButtonEvent(widget, buttonEvent)));
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 108,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void lodepng_color_mode_init(LodePNGColorMode* info)
{
info->key_defined = 0;
info->key_r = info->key_g = info->key_b = 0;
info->colortype = LCT_RGBA;
info->bitdepth = 8;
info->palette = 0;
info->palettesize = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ResourceMultiBufferDataProvider::Available() const {
if (fifo_.empty())
return false;
if (fifo_.back()->end_of_stream())
return true;
if (fifo_.front()->data_size() == block_size())
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct posix_acl *orangefs_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct posix_acl *acl;
int ret;
char *key = NULL, *value = NULL;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
key = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
key = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
gossip_err("orangefs_get_acl: bogus value of type %d\n", type);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
/*
* Rather than incurring a network call just to determine the exact
* length of the attribute, I just allocate a max length to save on
* the network call. Conceivably, we could pass NULL to
* orangefs_inode_getxattr() to probe the length of the value, but
* I don't do that for now.
*/
value = kmalloc(ORANGEFS_MAX_XATTR_VALUELEN, GFP_KERNEL);
if (value == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
"inode %pU, key %s, type %d\n",
get_khandle_from_ino(inode),
key,
type);
ret = orangefs_inode_getxattr(inode, key, value,
ORANGEFS_MAX_XATTR_VALUELEN);
/* if the key exists, convert it to an in-memory rep */
if (ret > 0) {
acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, ret);
} else if (ret == -ENODATA || ret == -ENOSYS) {
acl = NULL;
} else {
gossip_err("inode %pU retrieving acl's failed with error %d\n",
get_khandle_from_ino(inode),
ret);
acl = ERR_PTR(ret);
}
/* kfree(NULL) is safe, so don't worry if value ever got used */
kfree(value);
return acl;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 50,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void arcmsr_hbaB_stop_bgrb(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
struct MessageUnit_B *reg = acb->pmuB;
acb->acb_flags &= ~ACB_F_MSG_START_BGRB;
writel(ARCMSR_MESSAGE_STOP_BGRB, reg->drv2iop_doorbell);
if (!arcmsr_hbaB_wait_msgint_ready(acb)) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE
"arcmsr%d: wait 'stop adapter background rebulid' timeout\n"
, acb->host->host_no);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,780
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ram_save_iterate(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque)
{
int ret;
int i;
int64_t t0;
int total_sent = 0;
qemu_mutex_lock_ramlist();
if (ram_list.version != last_version) {
reset_ram_globals();
}
ram_control_before_iterate(f, RAM_CONTROL_ROUND);
t0 = qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_REALTIME);
i = 0;
while ((ret = qemu_file_rate_limit(f)) == 0) {
int bytes_sent;
bytes_sent = ram_find_and_save_block(f, false);
/* no more blocks to sent */
if (bytes_sent == 0) {
break;
}
total_sent += bytes_sent;
acct_info.iterations++;
check_guest_throttling();
/* we want to check in the 1st loop, just in case it was the 1st time
and we had to sync the dirty bitmap.
qemu_get_clock_ns() is a bit expensive, so we only check each some
iterations
*/
if ((i & 63) == 0) {
uint64_t t1 = (qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_REALTIME) - t0) / 1000000;
if (t1 > MAX_WAIT) {
DPRINTF("big wait: %" PRIu64 " milliseconds, %d iterations\n",
t1, i);
break;
}
}
i++;
}
qemu_mutex_unlock_ramlist();
/*
* Must occur before EOS (or any QEMUFile operation)
* because of RDMA protocol.
*/
ram_control_after_iterate(f, RAM_CONTROL_ROUND);
bytes_transferred += total_sent;
/*
* Do not count these 8 bytes into total_sent, so that we can
* return 0 if no page had been dirtied.
*/
qemu_put_be64(f, RAM_SAVE_FLAG_EOS);
bytes_transferred += 8;
ret = qemu_file_get_error(f);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
return total_sent;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,870
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileReaderLoader::OnCalculatedSize(uint64_t total_size,
uint64_t expected_content_size) {
OnStartLoading(expected_content_size);
if (expected_content_size == 0) {
received_all_data_ = true;
return;
}
if (IsSyncLoad()) {
OnDataPipeReadable(MOJO_RESULT_OK);
} else {
handle_watcher_.Watch(
consumer_handle_.get(), MOJO_HANDLE_SIGNAL_READABLE,
WTF::BindRepeating(&FileReaderLoader::OnDataPipeReadable,
WTF::Unretained(this)));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in FileReaderLoader.
Anything that calls out to client_ can cause FileReaderLoader to be
destroyed, so make sure to check for that situation.
Bug: 835639
Change-Id: I57533d41b7118c06da17abec28bbf301e1f50646
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1024450
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552807}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 173,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sector_t bmap(struct inode *inode, sector_t block)
{
sector_t res = 0;
if (inode->i_mapping->a_ops->bmap)
res = inode->i_mapping->a_ops->bmap(inode->i_mapping, block);
return res;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String WebGLRenderingContextBase::getProgramInfoLog(WebGLProgram* program) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateWebGLObject("getProgramInfoLog", program))
return String();
GLStringQuery query(ContextGL());
return query.Run<GLStringQuery::ProgramInfoLog>(ObjectNonZero(program));
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: onig_region_new(void)
{
OnigRegion* r;
r = (OnigRegion* )xmalloc(sizeof(OnigRegion));
onig_region_init(r);
return r;
}
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,679
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_group_exit(int exit_code)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = current->signal;
BUG_ON(exit_code & 0x80); /* core dumps don't get here */
if (signal_group_exit(sig))
exit_code = sig->group_exit_code;
else if (!thread_group_empty(current)) {
struct sighand_struct *const sighand = current->sighand;
spin_lock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
if (signal_group_exit(sig))
/* Another thread got here before we took the lock. */
exit_code = sig->group_exit_code;
else {
sig->group_exit_code = exit_code;
sig->flags = SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT;
zap_other_threads(current);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
}
do_exit(exit_code);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void realmode_lgdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 limit, unsigned long base)
{
struct desc_ptr dt = { limit, base };
kvm_x86_ops->set_gdt(vcpu, &dt);
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 41,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void wait_for_snapshot_creation(struct btrfs_root *root)
{
while (true) {
int ret;
ret = btrfs_start_write_no_snapshoting(root);
if (ret)
break;
wait_on_atomic_t(&root->will_be_snapshoted,
wait_snapshoting_atomic_t,
TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
}
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 41,733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataReductionProxyManaged() {
return spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.IsManaged();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 172,555
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA2_10_10_10,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoPremultiply,
float,
uint32_t>(const float* source,
uint32_t* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
uint32_t r = static_cast<uint32_t>(source[0] * source[3] * 1023.0f);
uint32_t g = static_cast<uint32_t>(source[1] * source[3] * 1023.0f);
uint32_t b = static_cast<uint32_t>(source[2] * source[3] * 1023.0f);
uint32_t a = static_cast<uint32_t>(source[3] * 3.0f);
destination[0] = (a << 30) | (b << 20) | (g << 10) | r;
source += 4;
destination += 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 146,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool pipe_buf_can_merge(struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
return buf->ops == &anon_pipe_buf_ops;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PrintDialogGtk::UpdateSettings(const DictionaryValue& settings,
const printing::PageRanges& ranges) {
bool collate;
int color;
bool landscape;
bool print_to_pdf;
int copies;
int duplex_mode;
std::string device_name;
if (!settings.GetBoolean(printing::kSettingLandscape, &landscape) ||
!settings.GetBoolean(printing::kSettingCollate, &collate) ||
!settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingColor, &color) ||
!settings.GetBoolean(printing::kSettingPrintToPDF, &print_to_pdf) ||
!settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingDuplexMode, &duplex_mode) ||
!settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingCopies, &copies) ||
!settings.GetString(printing::kSettingDeviceName, &device_name)) {
return false;
}
if (!print_to_pdf) {
scoped_ptr<GtkPrinterList> printer_list(new GtkPrinterList);
printer_ = printer_list->GetPrinterWithName(device_name.c_str());
if (printer_) {
g_object_ref(printer_);
gtk_print_settings_set_printer(gtk_settings_,
gtk_printer_get_name(printer_));
}
gtk_print_settings_set_n_copies(gtk_settings_, copies);
gtk_print_settings_set_collate(gtk_settings_, collate);
const char* color_mode;
switch (color) {
case printing::COLOR:
color_mode = kColor;
break;
case printing::CMYK:
color_mode = kCMYK;
break;
default:
color_mode = kGrayscale;
break;
}
gtk_print_settings_set(gtk_settings_, kCUPSColorModel, color_mode);
if (duplex_mode != printing::UNKNOWN_DUPLEX_MODE) {
const char* cups_duplex_mode = NULL;
switch (duplex_mode) {
case printing::LONG_EDGE:
cups_duplex_mode = kDuplexNoTumble;
break;
case printing::SHORT_EDGE:
cups_duplex_mode = kDuplexTumble;
break;
case printing::SIMPLEX:
cups_duplex_mode = kDuplexNone;
break;
default: // UNKNOWN_DUPLEX_MODE
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
gtk_print_settings_set(gtk_settings_, kCUPSDuplex, cups_duplex_mode);
}
}
gtk_print_settings_set_orientation(
gtk_settings_,
landscape ? GTK_PAGE_ORIENTATION_LANDSCAPE :
GTK_PAGE_ORIENTATION_PORTRAIT);
InitPrintSettings(ranges);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 170,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Font* SubsetterImpl::FindFont(const char* font_name,
const FontArray& font_array) {
if (font_array.empty() || font_array[0] == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (font_name && strlen(font_name)) {
for (FontArray::const_iterator b = font_array.begin(), e = font_array.end();
b != e; ++b) {
if (HasName(font_name, (*b).p_)) {
return (*b).p_;
}
}
}
return font_array[0].p_;
}
Commit Message: Fix compile warning.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7572039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@95563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcRenderCompositeGlyphs(ClientPtr client)
{
GlyphSetPtr glyphSet;
GlyphSet gs;
PicturePtr pSrc, pDst;
PictFormatPtr pFormat;
GlyphListRec listsLocal[NLOCALDELTA];
GlyphListPtr lists, listsBase;
GlyphPtr glyphsLocal[NLOCALGLYPH];
Glyph glyph;
GlyphPtr *glyphs, *glyphsBase;
xGlyphElt *elt;
CARD8 *buffer, *end;
int nglyph;
int nlist;
int space;
int size;
int rc, n;
REQUEST(xRenderCompositeGlyphsReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderCompositeGlyphsReq);
switch (stuff->renderReqType) {
default:
size = 1;
break;
case X_RenderCompositeGlyphs16:
size = 2;
break;
case X_RenderCompositeGlyphs32:
size = 4;
break;
}
if (!PictOpValid(stuff->op)) {
client->errorValue = stuff->op;
return BadValue;
}
VERIFY_PICTURE(pSrc, stuff->src, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_PICTURE(pDst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (!pDst->pDrawable)
return BadDrawable;
if (pSrc->pDrawable && pSrc->pDrawable->pScreen != pDst->pDrawable->pScreen)
return BadMatch;
if (stuff->maskFormat) {
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pFormat, stuff->maskFormat,
PictFormatType, client, DixReadAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
}
else
pFormat = 0;
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &glyphSet, stuff->glyphset,
GlyphSetType, client, DixUseAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
buffer = (CARD8 *) (stuff + 1);
end = (CARD8 *) stuff + (client->req_len << 2);
nglyph = 0;
nlist = 0;
while (buffer + sizeof(xGlyphElt) < end) {
elt = (xGlyphElt *) buffer;
buffer += sizeof(xGlyphElt);
if (elt->len == 0xff) {
buffer += 4;
}
else {
nlist++;
nglyph += elt->len;
space = size * elt->len;
if (space & 3)
space += 4 - (space & 3);
buffer += space;
}
}
if (nglyph <= NLOCALGLYPH)
glyphsBase = glyphsLocal;
else {
glyphsBase = xallocarray(nglyph, sizeof(GlyphPtr));
if (!glyphsBase)
return BadAlloc;
}
if (nlist <= NLOCALDELTA)
listsBase = listsLocal;
else {
listsBase = xallocarray(nlist, sizeof(GlyphListRec));
if (!listsBase) {
rc = BadAlloc;
goto bail;
}
}
buffer = (CARD8 *) (stuff + 1);
glyphs = glyphsBase;
lists = listsBase;
while (buffer + sizeof(xGlyphElt) < end) {
elt = (xGlyphElt *) buffer;
buffer += sizeof(xGlyphElt);
if (elt->len == 0xff) {
if (buffer + sizeof(GlyphSet) < end) {
memcpy(&gs, buffer, sizeof(GlyphSet));
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &glyphSet, gs,
GlyphSetType, client,
DixUseAccess);
if (rc != Success)
goto bail;
}
buffer += 4;
}
else {
lists->xOff = elt->deltax;
lists->yOff = elt->deltay;
lists->format = glyphSet->format;
lists->len = 0;
n = elt->len;
while (n--) {
if (buffer + size <= end) {
switch (size) {
case 1:
glyph = *((CARD8 *) buffer);
break;
case 2:
glyph = *((CARD16 *) buffer);
break;
case 4:
default:
glyph = *((CARD32 *) buffer);
break;
}
if ((*glyphs = FindGlyph(glyphSet, glyph))) {
lists->len++;
glyphs++;
}
}
buffer += size;
}
space = size * elt->len;
if (space & 3)
buffer += 4 - (space & 3);
lists++;
}
}
if (buffer > end) {
rc = BadLength;
goto bail;
}
CompositeGlyphs(stuff->op,
pSrc,
pDst,
pFormat,
stuff->xSrc, stuff->ySrc, nlist, listsBase, glyphsBase);
rc = Success;
bail:
if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal)
free(glyphsBase);
if (listsBase != listsLocal)
free(listsBase);
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::Reattach(const DispatchCallback& callback) {
if (agent_host_.get()) {
agent_host_->DetachClient(this);
agent_host_->AttachClient(this);
}
callback.Run(nullptr);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 138,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hfsplus_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{
return hfsplus_mknod(dir, dentry, mode | S_IFDIR, 0);
}
Commit Message: hfsplus: Fix potential buffer overflows
Commit ec81aecb2966 ("hfs: fix a potential buffer overflow") fixed a few
potential buffer overflows in the hfs filesystem. But as Timo Warns
pointed out, these changes also need to be made on the hfsplus
filesystem as well.
Reported-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PaintArtifactCompositor::CompositedLayerForPendingLayer(
const PaintArtifact& paint_artifact,
const PendingLayer& pending_layer,
gfx::Vector2dF& layer_offset,
Vector<std::unique_ptr<ContentLayerClientImpl>>& new_content_layer_clients,
Vector<scoped_refptr<cc::Layer>>& new_scroll_hit_test_layers) {
auto paint_chunks =
paint_artifact.GetPaintChunkSubset(pending_layer.paint_chunk_indices);
DCHECK(paint_chunks.size());
const PaintChunk& first_paint_chunk = paint_chunks[0];
DCHECK(first_paint_chunk.size());
if (scoped_refptr<cc::Layer> foreign_layer = ForeignLayerForPaintChunk(
paint_artifact, first_paint_chunk, layer_offset)) {
DCHECK_EQ(paint_chunks.size(), 1u);
if (extra_data_for_testing_enabled_)
extra_data_for_testing_->content_layers.push_back(foreign_layer);
return foreign_layer;
}
if (scoped_refptr<cc::Layer> scroll_layer = ScrollHitTestLayerForPendingLayer(
paint_artifact, pending_layer, layer_offset)) {
new_scroll_hit_test_layers.push_back(scroll_layer);
if (extra_data_for_testing_enabled_)
extra_data_for_testing_->scroll_hit_test_layers.push_back(scroll_layer);
return scroll_layer;
}
std::unique_ptr<ContentLayerClientImpl> content_layer_client =
ClientForPaintChunk(first_paint_chunk);
gfx::Rect cc_combined_bounds(EnclosingIntRect(pending_layer.bounds));
layer_offset = cc_combined_bounds.OffsetFromOrigin();
auto cc_layer = content_layer_client->UpdateCcPictureLayer(
paint_artifact, paint_chunks, cc_combined_bounds,
pending_layer.property_tree_state);
new_content_layer_clients.push_back(std::move(content_layer_client));
if (extra_data_for_testing_enabled_)
extra_data_for_testing_->content_layers.push_back(cc_layer);
cc_layer->SetContentsOpaque(pending_layer.rect_known_to_be_opaque.Contains(
FloatRect(EnclosingIntRect(pending_layer.bounds))));
return cc_layer;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_qtdemux_clip_buffer (GstQTDemux * qtdemux, QtDemuxStream * stream,
GstBuffer * buf)
{
gint64 start, stop, cstart, cstop, diff;
GstClockTime timestamp = GST_CLOCK_TIME_NONE, duration = GST_CLOCK_TIME_NONE;
guint8 *data;
guint size;
gint num_rate, denom_rate;
gint frame_size;
gboolean clip_data;
data = GST_BUFFER_DATA (buf);
size = GST_BUFFER_SIZE (buf);
/* depending on the type, setup the clip parameters */
if (stream->subtype == FOURCC_soun) {
frame_size = stream->bytes_per_frame;
num_rate = GST_SECOND;
denom_rate = (gint) stream->rate;
clip_data = TRUE;
} else if (stream->subtype == FOURCC_vide) {
frame_size = size;
num_rate = stream->fps_n;
denom_rate = stream->fps_d;
clip_data = FALSE;
} else
goto wrong_type;
/* we can only clip if we have a valid timestamp */
timestamp = GST_BUFFER_TIMESTAMP (buf);
if (!GST_CLOCK_TIME_IS_VALID (timestamp))
goto no_timestamp;
if (GST_BUFFER_DURATION_IS_VALID (buf)) {
duration = GST_BUFFER_DURATION (buf);
} else {
duration =
gst_util_uint64_scale_int (size / frame_size, num_rate, denom_rate);
}
start = timestamp;
stop = start + duration;
if (!gst_segment_clip (&stream->segment, GST_FORMAT_TIME,
start, stop, &cstart, &cstop))
goto clipped;
/* see if some clipping happened */
diff = cstart - start;
if (diff > 0) {
timestamp = cstart;
duration -= diff;
if (clip_data) {
/* bring clipped time to samples and to bytes */
diff = gst_util_uint64_scale_int (diff, denom_rate, num_rate);
diff *= frame_size;
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "clipping start to %" GST_TIME_FORMAT " %"
G_GUINT64_FORMAT " bytes", GST_TIME_ARGS (cstart), diff);
data += diff;
size -= diff;
}
}
diff = stop - cstop;
if (diff > 0) {
duration -= diff;
if (clip_data) {
/* bring clipped time to samples and then to bytes */
diff = gst_util_uint64_scale_int (diff, denom_rate, num_rate);
diff *= frame_size;
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "clipping stop to %" GST_TIME_FORMAT " %"
G_GUINT64_FORMAT " bytes", GST_TIME_ARGS (cstop), diff);
size -= diff;
}
}
GST_BUFFER_TIMESTAMP (buf) = timestamp;
GST_BUFFER_DURATION (buf) = duration;
GST_BUFFER_SIZE (buf) = size;
GST_BUFFER_DATA (buf) = data;
return buf;
/* dropped buffer */
wrong_type:
{
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "unknown stream type");
return buf;
}
no_timestamp:
{
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "no timestamp on buffer");
return buf;
}
clipped:
{
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "clipped buffer");
gst_buffer_unref (buf);
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fuse_req_init_context(struct fuse_req *req)
{
req->in.h.uid = current_fsuid();
req->in.h.gid = current_fsgid();
req->in.h.pid = current->pid;
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlobData::appendFile(const String& path, long long offset, long long length, double expectedModificationTime)
{
m_items.append(BlobDataItem(path, offset, length, expectedModificationTime));
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gboolean lxterminal_socket_initialize(LXTermWindow * lxtermwin, gint argc, gchar * * argv)
{
/* Normally, LXTerminal uses one process to control all of its windows.
* The first process to start will create a Unix domain socket in /tmp.
* It will then bind and listen on this socket.
* The subsequent processes will connect to the controller that owns the Unix domain socket.
* They will pass their command line over the socket and exit.
*
* If for any reason both the connect and bind fail, we will fall back to having that
* process be standalone; it will not be either the controller or a user of the controller.
* This behavior was introduced in response to a problem report (2973537).
*
* This function returns TRUE if this process should keep running and FALSE if it should exit. */
/* Formulate the path for the Unix domain socket. */
gchar * socket_path = g_strdup_printf("/tmp/.lxterminal-socket%s-%s", gdk_display_get_name(gdk_display_get_default()), g_get_user_name());
/* Create socket. */
int fd = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
{
g_warning("Socket create failed: %s\n", g_strerror(errno));
g_free(socket_path);
return TRUE;
}
/* Initialize socket address for Unix domain socket. */
struct sockaddr_un sock_addr;
memset(&sock_addr, 0, sizeof(sock_addr));
sock_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
snprintf(sock_addr.sun_path, sizeof(sock_addr.sun_path), "%s", socket_path);
/* Try to connect to an existing LXTerminal process. */
if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &sock_addr, sizeof(sock_addr)) < 0)
{
/* Connect failed. We are the controller, unless something fails. */
unlink(socket_path);
g_free(socket_path);
/* Bind to socket. */
if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &sock_addr, sizeof(sock_addr)) < 0)
{
g_warning("Bind on socket failed: %s\n", g_strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return TRUE;
}
/* Listen on socket. */
if (listen(fd, 5) < 0)
{
g_warning("Listen on socket failed: %s\n", g_strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return TRUE;
}
/* Create a glib I/O channel. */
GIOChannel * gio = g_io_channel_unix_new(fd);
if (gio == NULL)
{
g_warning("Cannot create GIOChannel\n");
close(fd);
return TRUE;
}
/* Set up GIOChannel. */
g_io_channel_set_encoding(gio, NULL, NULL);
g_io_channel_set_buffered(gio, FALSE);
g_io_channel_set_close_on_unref(gio, TRUE);
/* Add I/O channel to the main event loop. */
if ( ! g_io_add_watch(gio, G_IO_IN | G_IO_HUP, (GIOFunc) lxterminal_socket_accept_client, lxtermwin))
{
g_warning("Cannot add watch on GIOChannel\n");
close(fd);
g_io_channel_unref(gio);
return TRUE;
}
/* Channel will automatically shut down when the watch returns FALSE. */
g_io_channel_set_close_on_unref(gio, TRUE);
g_io_channel_unref(gio);
return TRUE;
}
else
{
g_free(socket_path);
/* Create a glib I/O channel. */
GIOChannel * gio = g_io_channel_unix_new(fd);
g_io_channel_set_encoding(gio, NULL, NULL);
/* Push current dir in case it is needed later */
gchar * cur_dir = g_get_current_dir();
g_io_channel_write_chars(gio, cur_dir, -1, NULL, NULL);
/* Use "" as a pointer to '\0' since g_io_channel_write_chars() won't accept NULL */
g_io_channel_write_chars(gio, "", 1, NULL, NULL);
g_free(cur_dir);
/* push all of argv. */
gint i;
for (i = 0; i < argc; i ++)
{
g_io_channel_write_chars(gio, argv[i], -1, NULL, NULL);
g_io_channel_write_chars(gio, "", 1, NULL, NULL);
}
g_io_channel_flush(gio, NULL);
g_io_channel_unref(gio);
return FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 165,232
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PlatformSensorLinux::CheckSensorConfiguration(
const PlatformSensorConfiguration& configuration) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
return configuration.frequency() > 0 &&
configuration.frequency() <= default_configuration_.frequency();
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 148,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DetachOffloadGPU(ScreenPtr slave)
{
assert(slave->isGPU);
assert(slave->is_offload_slave);
slave->is_offload_slave = FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GestureSequence::Click(const TouchEvent& event,
const GesturePoint& point, Gestures* gestures) {
DCHECK(state_ == GS_PENDING_SYNTHETIC_CLICK);
if (point.IsInClickWindow(event)) {
AppendClickGestureEvent(point, gestures);
if (point.IsInDoubleClickWindow(event))
AppendDoubleClickGestureEvent(point, gestures);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 108,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: onig_region_free(OnigRegion* r, int free_self)
{
if (r) {
if (r->allocated > 0) {
if (r->beg) xfree(r->beg);
if (r->end) xfree(r->end);
r->allocated = 0;
}
#ifdef USE_CAPTURE_HISTORY
history_root_free(r);
#endif
if (free_self) xfree(r);
}
}
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sc_asn1_decode_integer(const u8 * inbuf, size_t inlen, int *out)
{
int a = 0;
size_t i;
if (inlen > sizeof(int) || inlen == 0)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
if (inbuf[0] & 0x80)
a = -1;
for (i = 0; i < inlen; i++) {
a <<= 8;
a |= *inbuf++;
}
*out = a;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int udp_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct udp_seq_afinfo *afinfo = PDE_DATA(inode);
struct udp_iter_state *s;
int err;
err = seq_open_net(inode, file, &afinfo->seq_ops,
sizeof(struct udp_iter_state));
if (err < 0)
return err;
s = ((struct seq_file *)file->private_data)->private;
s->family = afinfo->family;
s->udp_table = afinfo->udp_table;
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: call udp_push_pending_frames when uncorking a socket with AF_INET pending data
We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>] [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS: 00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
[<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
[<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
[<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
[<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>
This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.
This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.
(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ip_vs_genl_del_daemon(struct net *net, struct nlattr **attrs)
{
if (!attrs[IPVS_DAEMON_ATTR_STATE])
return -EINVAL;
return stop_sync_thread(net,
nla_get_u32(attrs[IPVS_DAEMON_ATTR_STATE]));
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void XMPChunk::changesAndSize( RIFF_MetaHandler* handler )
{
XMP_Enforce( &handler->xmpPacket != 0 );
XMP_Enforce( handler->xmpPacket.size() > 0 );
this->newSize = 8 + handler->xmpPacket.size();
XMP_Validate( this->newSize <= 0xFFFFFFFFLL, "no single chunk may be above 4 GB", kXMPErr_InternalFailure );
this->hasChange = true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tmp_proc_mount(struct lxc_conf *lxc_conf)
{
int mounted;
mounted = mount_proc_if_needed(lxc_conf->rootfs.path ? lxc_conf->rootfs.mount : "");
if (mounted == -1) {
SYSERROR("failed to mount /proc in the container.");
/* continue only if there is no rootfs */
if (lxc_conf->rootfs.path)
return -1;
} else if (mounted == 1) {
lxc_conf->tmp_umount_proc = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,658
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mm_create(struct mm_master *mmalloc, size_t size)
{
void *address;
struct mm_master *mm;
if (mmalloc == NULL)
mm = xcalloc(1, sizeof(struct mm_master));
else
mm = mm_xmalloc(mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_master));
/*
* If the memory map has a mm_master it can be completely
* shared including authentication between the child
* and the client.
*/
mm->mmalloc = mmalloc;
address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_ANON|MAP_SHARED,
-1, 0);
if (address == MAP_FAILED)
fatal("mmap(%zu): %s", size, strerror(errno));
mm->address = address;
mm->size = size;
RB_INIT(&mm->rb_free);
RB_INIT(&mm->rb_allocated);
mm_make_entry(mm, &mm->rb_free, address, size);
return (mm);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 72,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pseudo_register_mpi_master_info( ClassAd* ad )
{
char *addr = NULL;
if( ! ad->LookupString(ATTR_MPI_MASTER_ADDR, &addr) ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS,
"ERROR: mpi_master_info ClassAd doesn't contain %s\n",
ATTR_MPI_MASTER_ADDR );
return -1;
}
if( ! Shadow->setMpiMasterInfo(addr) ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "ERROR: recieved "
"pseudo_register_mpi_master_info for a non-MPI job!\n" );
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _notifier_call_chain(struct regulator_dev *rdev,
unsigned long event, void *data)
{
/* call rdev chain first */
return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&rdev->notifier, event, data);
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 74,446
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void set_reg_data_seg(struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg *dseg,
struct mlx5_ib_mr *mr,
struct mlx5_ib_pd *pd)
{
int bcount = mr->desc_size * mr->ndescs;
dseg->addr = cpu_to_be64(mr->desc_map);
dseg->byte_count = cpu_to_be32(ALIGN(bcount, 64));
dseg->lkey = cpu_to_be32(pd->ibpd.local_dma_lkey);
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int set_user_rq_size(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev,
struct ib_wq_init_attr *wq_init_attr,
struct mlx5_ib_create_wq *ucmd,
struct mlx5_ib_rwq *rwq)
{
/* Sanity check RQ size before proceeding */
if (wq_init_attr->max_wr > (1 << MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, log_max_wq_sz)))
return -EINVAL;
if (!ucmd->rq_wqe_count)
return -EINVAL;
rwq->wqe_count = ucmd->rq_wqe_count;
rwq->wqe_shift = ucmd->rq_wqe_shift;
if (check_shl_overflow(rwq->wqe_count, rwq->wqe_shift, &rwq->buf_size))
return -EINVAL;
rwq->log_rq_stride = rwq->wqe_shift;
rwq->log_rq_size = ilog2(rwq->wqe_count);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void t1_close_font_file(const char *close_name_suffix)
{
t1_log(close_name_suffix);
t1_close();
cur_file_name = NULL;
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 76,651
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const KURL Document::SiteForCookies() const {
if (IsHTMLImport())
return ImportsController()->Master()->SiteForCookies();
if (!GetFrame())
return NullURL();
Frame& top = GetFrame()->Tree().Top();
KURL top_document_url;
if (top.IsLocalFrame()) {
top_document_url = ToLocalFrame(top).GetDocument()->Url();
} else {
const SecurityOrigin* origin =
top.GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin();
if (origin)
top_document_url = KURL(NullURL(), origin->ToString());
else
top_document_url = NullURL();
}
if (SchemeRegistry::ShouldTreatURLSchemeAsFirstPartyWhenTopLevel(
top_document_url.Protocol()))
return top_document_url;
base::Optional<OriginAccessEntry> remote_entry;
if (!top.IsLocalFrame()) {
remote_entry.emplace(
top_document_url.Protocol(), top_document_url.Host(),
network::mojom::CorsOriginAccessMatchMode::kAllowRegisterableDomains);
}
const OriginAccessEntry& access_entry =
remote_entry ? *remote_entry
: ToLocalFrame(top).GetDocument()->AccessEntryFromURL();
const Frame* current_frame = GetFrame();
while (current_frame) {
while (current_frame->IsLocalFrame() &&
ToLocalFrame(current_frame)->GetDocument()->IsSrcdocDocument())
current_frame = current_frame->Tree().Parent();
DCHECK(current_frame);
if (access_entry.MatchesDomain(
*current_frame->GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin()) ==
network::cors::OriginAccessEntry::kDoesNotMatchOrigin) {
return NullURL();
}
current_frame = current_frame->Tree().Parent();
}
return top_document_url;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 152,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pagemap_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct mm_walk *walk)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct pagemapread *pm = walk->private;
pte_t *pte;
int err = 0;
split_huge_page_pmd(walk->mm, pmd);
/* find the first VMA at or above 'addr' */
vma = find_vma(walk->mm, addr);
for (; addr != end; addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
u64 pfn = PM_NOT_PRESENT;
/* check to see if we've left 'vma' behind
* and need a new, higher one */
if (vma && (addr >= vma->vm_end))
vma = find_vma(walk->mm, addr);
/* check that 'vma' actually covers this address,
* and that it isn't a huge page vma */
if (vma && (vma->vm_start <= addr) &&
!is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, addr);
pfn = pte_to_pagemap_entry(*pte);
/* unmap before userspace copy */
pte_unmap(pte);
}
err = add_to_pagemap(addr, pfn, pm);
if (err)
return err;
}
cond_resched();
return err;
}
Commit Message: proc: fix oops on invalid /proc/<pid>/maps access
When m_start returns an error, the seq_file logic will still call m_stop
with that error entry, so we'd better make sure that we check it before
using it as a vma.
Introduced by commit ec6fd8a4355c ("report errors in /proc/*/*map*
sanely"), which replaced NULL with various ERR_PTR() cases.
(On ia64, you happen to get a unaligned fault instead of a page fault,
since the address used is generally some random error code like -EPERM)
Reported-by: Anca Emanuel <anca.emanuel@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Américo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int stop_audio_datapath(struct a2dp_stream_common *common)
{
int oldstate = common->state;
INFO("state %d", common->state);
if (common->ctrl_fd == AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED)
return -1;
/* prevent any stray output writes from autostarting the stream
while stopping audiopath */
common->state = AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPING;
if (a2dp_command(common, A2DP_CTRL_CMD_STOP) < 0)
{
ERROR("audiopath stop failed");
common->state = oldstate;
return -1;
}
common->state = AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPED;
/* disconnect audio path */
skt_disconnect(common->audio_fd);
common->audio_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PluginChannel::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
base::ProcessHandle handle;
if (!base::OpenProcessHandle(peer_pid, &handle)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
renderer_handle_ = handle;
NPChannelBase::OnChannelConnected(peer_pid);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 1
| 170,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int socket_shutdown(int fd, int how)
{
return shutdown(fd, how);
}
Commit Message: common: [security fix] Make sure sockets only listen locally
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 52,144
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __usbnet_read_cmd(struct usbnet *dev, u8 cmd, u8 reqtype,
u16 value, u16 index, void *data, u16 size)
{
void *buf = NULL;
int err = -ENOMEM;
netdev_dbg(dev->net, "usbnet_read_cmd cmd=0x%02x reqtype=%02x"
" value=0x%04x index=0x%04x size=%d\n",
cmd, reqtype, value, index, size);
if (data) {
buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
goto out;
}
err = usb_control_msg(dev->udev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev->udev, 0),
cmd, reqtype, value, index, buf, size,
USB_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT);
if (err > 0 && err <= size)
memcpy(data, buf, err);
kfree(buf);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 94,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameHostImpl* RenderFrameHostManager::GetFrameHostForNavigation(
const NavigationRequest& request) {
CHECK(IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled());
SiteInstance* current_site_instance = render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance();
SiteInstance* candidate_site_instance =
speculative_render_frame_host_
? speculative_render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance()
: nullptr;
bool was_server_redirect = request.navigation_handle() &&
request.navigation_handle()->WasServerRedirect();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> dest_site_instance = GetSiteInstanceForNavigation(
request.common_params().url, request.source_site_instance(),
request.dest_site_instance(), candidate_site_instance,
request.common_params().transition,
request.restore_type() != RestoreType::NONE, request.is_view_source(),
was_server_redirect);
RenderFrameHostImpl* navigation_rfh = nullptr;
bool no_renderer_swap = current_site_instance == dest_site_instance.get();
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
bool can_renderer_initiate_transfer =
render_frame_host_->IsRenderFrameLive() &&
ShouldMakeNetworkRequestForURL(request.common_params().url) &&
IsRendererTransferNeededForNavigation(render_frame_host_.get(),
request.common_params().url);
no_renderer_swap |=
!request.may_transfer() && !can_renderer_initiate_transfer;
} else {
no_renderer_swap |= !CanSubframeSwapProcess(
request.common_params().url, request.source_site_instance(),
request.dest_site_instance(), was_server_redirect);
}
bool notify_webui_of_rf_creation = false;
if (no_renderer_swap) {
if (speculative_render_frame_host_)
DiscardUnusedFrame(UnsetSpeculativeRenderFrameHost());
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
UpdatePendingWebUIOnCurrentFrameHost(request.common_params().url,
request.bindings());
}
navigation_rfh = render_frame_host_.get();
DCHECK(!speculative_render_frame_host_);
} else {
if (!speculative_render_frame_host_ ||
speculative_render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance() !=
dest_site_instance.get()) {
CleanUpNavigation();
bool success = CreateSpeculativeRenderFrameHost(current_site_instance,
dest_site_instance.get());
DCHECK(success);
}
DCHECK(speculative_render_frame_host_);
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
bool changed_web_ui = speculative_render_frame_host_->UpdatePendingWebUI(
request.common_params().url, request.bindings());
speculative_render_frame_host_->CommitPendingWebUI();
DCHECK_EQ(GetNavigatingWebUI(), speculative_render_frame_host_->web_ui());
notify_webui_of_rf_creation =
changed_web_ui && speculative_render_frame_host_->web_ui();
}
navigation_rfh = speculative_render_frame_host_.get();
if (!render_frame_host_->IsRenderFrameLive()) {
if (GetRenderFrameProxyHost(dest_site_instance.get())) {
navigation_rfh->Send(
new FrameMsg_SwapIn(navigation_rfh->GetRoutingID()));
}
CommitPending();
if (notify_webui_of_rf_creation && render_frame_host_->web_ui()) {
render_frame_host_->web_ui()->RenderFrameCreated(
render_frame_host_.get());
notify_webui_of_rf_creation = false;
}
}
}
DCHECK(navigation_rfh &&
(navigation_rfh == render_frame_host_.get() ||
navigation_rfh == speculative_render_frame_host_.get()));
if (!navigation_rfh->IsRenderFrameLive()) {
if (!ReinitializeRenderFrame(navigation_rfh))
return nullptr;
notify_webui_of_rf_creation = true;
if (navigation_rfh == render_frame_host_.get()) {
delegate_->NotifyMainFrameSwappedFromRenderManager(
nullptr, render_frame_host_->render_view_host());
}
}
if (notify_webui_of_rf_creation && GetNavigatingWebUI() &&
frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
GetNavigatingWebUI()->RenderFrameCreated(navigation_rfh);
}
return navigation_rfh;
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ElementData::ElementData()
: m_isUnique(true)
, m_arraySize(0)
, m_presentationAttributeStyleIsDirty(false)
, m_styleAttributeIsDirty(false)
, m_animatedSVGAttributesAreDirty(false)
{
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InputDispatcherThread::~InputDispatcherThread() {
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 163,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate(OxideQQuickWebView* view)
: q_ptr(view),
contents_view_(new oxide::qquick::ContentsView(view)),
load_progress_(0),
security_status_(OxideQSecurityStatusPrivate::Create()),
find_controller_(OxideQFindControllerPrivate::Create()),
constructed_(false),
navigation_history_(view),
alert_dialog_(nullptr),
confirm_dialog_(nullptr),
prompt_dialog_(nullptr),
before_unload_dialog_(nullptr),
file_picker_(nullptr),
using_old_load_event_signal_(false),
construct_props_(new ConstructProps()) {}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(TIFF* tif, uint32 strip, void* data, tmsize_t cc)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFWriteEncodedStrip";
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
uint16 sample;
if (!WRITECHECKSTRIPS(tif, module))
return ((tmsize_t) -1);
/*
* Check strip array to make sure there's space.
* We don't support dynamically growing files that
* have data organized in separate bitplanes because
* it's too painful. In that case we require that
* the imagelength be set properly before the first
* write (so that the strips array will be fully
* allocated above).
*/
if (strip >= td->td_nstrips) {
if (td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Can not grow image by strips when using separate planes");
return ((tmsize_t) -1);
}
if (!TIFFGrowStrips(tif, 1, module))
return ((tmsize_t) -1);
td->td_stripsperimage =
TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, td->td_rowsperstrip);
}
/*
* Handle delayed allocation of data buffer. This
* permits it to be sized according to the directory
* info.
*/
if (!BUFFERCHECK(tif))
return ((tmsize_t) -1);
tif->tif_flags |= TIFF_BUF4WRITE;
tif->tif_curstrip = strip;
if (td->td_stripsperimage == 0) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "Zero strips per image");
return ((tmsize_t) -1);
}
tif->tif_row = (strip % td->td_stripsperimage) * td->td_rowsperstrip;
if ((tif->tif_flags & TIFF_CODERSETUP) == 0) {
if (!(*tif->tif_setupencode)(tif))
return ((tmsize_t) -1);
tif->tif_flags |= TIFF_CODERSETUP;
}
if( td->td_stripbytecount[strip] > 0 )
{
/* Make sure that at the first attempt of rewriting the tile, we will have */
/* more bytes available in the output buffer than the previous byte count, */
/* so that TIFFAppendToStrip() will detect the overflow when it is called the first */
/* time if the new compressed tile is bigger than the older one. (GDAL #4771) */
if( tif->tif_rawdatasize <= (tmsize_t)td->td_stripbytecount[strip] )
{
if( !(TIFFWriteBufferSetup(tif, NULL,
(tmsize_t)TIFFroundup_64((uint64)(td->td_stripbytecount[strip] + 1), 1024))) )
return ((tmsize_t)(-1));
}
/* Force TIFFAppendToStrip() to consider placing data at end
of file. */
tif->tif_curoff = 0;
}
tif->tif_rawcc = 0;
tif->tif_rawcp = tif->tif_rawdata;
tif->tif_flags &= ~TIFF_POSTENCODE;
/* shortcut to avoid an extra memcpy() */
if( td->td_compression == COMPRESSION_NONE )
{
/* swab if needed - note that source buffer will be altered */
tif->tif_postdecode( tif, (uint8*) data, cc );
if (!isFillOrder(tif, td->td_fillorder) &&
(tif->tif_flags & TIFF_NOBITREV) == 0)
TIFFReverseBits((uint8*) data, cc);
if (cc > 0 &&
!TIFFAppendToStrip(tif, strip, (uint8*) data, cc))
return ((tmsize_t) -1);
return (cc);
}
sample = (uint16)(strip / td->td_stripsperimage);
if (!(*tif->tif_preencode)(tif, sample))
return ((tmsize_t) -1);
/* swab if needed - note that source buffer will be altered */
tif->tif_postdecode( tif, (uint8*) data, cc );
if (!(*tif->tif_encodestrip)(tif, (uint8*) data, cc, sample))
return ((tmsize_t) -1);
if (!(*tif->tif_postencode)(tif))
return ((tmsize_t) -1);
if (!isFillOrder(tif, td->td_fillorder) &&
(tif->tif_flags & TIFF_NOBITREV) == 0)
TIFFReverseBits(tif->tif_rawdata, tif->tif_rawcc);
if (tif->tif_rawcc > 0 &&
!TIFFAppendToStrip(tif, strip, tif->tif_rawdata, tif->tif_rawcc))
return ((tmsize_t) -1);
tif->tif_rawcc = 0;
tif->tif_rawcp = tif->tif_rawdata;
return (cc);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 48,326
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int uverbs_dealloc_mw(struct ib_mw *mw)
{
struct ib_pd *pd = mw->pd;
int ret;
ret = mw->device->ops.dealloc_mw(mw);
if (!ret)
atomic_dec(&pd->usecnt);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OnOpenChannelToExtension(
int routing_id, const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& target_extension_id,
const std::string& channel_name, int* port_id) {
int port2_id;
ExtensionMessageService::AllocatePortIdPair(port_id, &port2_id);
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OpenChannelToExtensionOnUIThread,
this, render_process_id_, routing_id, port2_id,
source_extension_id, target_extension_id, channel_name));
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __do_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmd,
pgoff_t pgoff, unsigned int flags, pte_t orig_pte)
{
pte_t *page_table;
spinlock_t *ptl;
struct page *page;
struct page *cow_page;
pte_t entry;
int anon = 0;
struct page *dirty_page = NULL;
struct vm_fault vmf;
int ret;
int page_mkwrite = 0;
/*
* If we do COW later, allocate page befor taking lock_page()
* on the file cache page. This will reduce lock holding time.
*/
if ((flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
return VM_FAULT_OOM;
cow_page = alloc_page_vma(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE, vma, address);
if (!cow_page)
return VM_FAULT_OOM;
if (mem_cgroup_newpage_charge(cow_page, mm, GFP_KERNEL)) {
page_cache_release(cow_page);
return VM_FAULT_OOM;
}
} else
cow_page = NULL;
vmf.virtual_address = (void __user *)(address & PAGE_MASK);
vmf.pgoff = pgoff;
vmf.flags = flags;
vmf.page = NULL;
ret = vma->vm_ops->fault(vma, &vmf);
if (unlikely(ret & (VM_FAULT_ERROR | VM_FAULT_NOPAGE |
VM_FAULT_RETRY)))
goto uncharge_out;
if (unlikely(PageHWPoison(vmf.page))) {
if (ret & VM_FAULT_LOCKED)
unlock_page(vmf.page);
ret = VM_FAULT_HWPOISON;
goto uncharge_out;
}
/*
* For consistency in subsequent calls, make the faulted page always
* locked.
*/
if (unlikely(!(ret & VM_FAULT_LOCKED)))
lock_page(vmf.page);
else
VM_BUG_ON(!PageLocked(vmf.page));
/*
* Should we do an early C-O-W break?
*/
page = vmf.page;
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
page = cow_page;
anon = 1;
copy_user_highpage(page, vmf.page, address, vma);
__SetPageUptodate(page);
} else {
/*
* If the page will be shareable, see if the backing
* address space wants to know that the page is about
* to become writable
*/
if (vma->vm_ops->page_mkwrite) {
int tmp;
unlock_page(page);
vmf.flags = FAULT_FLAG_WRITE|FAULT_FLAG_MKWRITE;
tmp = vma->vm_ops->page_mkwrite(vma, &vmf);
if (unlikely(tmp &
(VM_FAULT_ERROR | VM_FAULT_NOPAGE))) {
ret = tmp;
goto unwritable_page;
}
if (unlikely(!(tmp & VM_FAULT_LOCKED))) {
lock_page(page);
if (!page->mapping) {
ret = 0; /* retry the fault */
unlock_page(page);
goto unwritable_page;
}
} else
VM_BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
page_mkwrite = 1;
}
}
}
page_table = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
/*
* This silly early PAGE_DIRTY setting removes a race
* due to the bad i386 page protection. But it's valid
* for other architectures too.
*
* Note that if FAULT_FLAG_WRITE is set, we either now have
* an exclusive copy of the page, or this is a shared mapping,
* so we can make it writable and dirty to avoid having to
* handle that later.
*/
/* Only go through if we didn't race with anybody else... */
if (likely(pte_same(*page_table, orig_pte))) {
flush_icache_page(vma, page);
entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE)
entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
if (anon) {
inc_mm_counter_fast(mm, MM_ANONPAGES);
page_add_new_anon_rmap(page, vma, address);
} else {
inc_mm_counter_fast(mm, MM_FILEPAGES);
page_add_file_rmap(page);
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) {
dirty_page = page;
get_page(dirty_page);
}
}
set_pte_at(mm, address, page_table, entry);
/* no need to invalidate: a not-present page won't be cached */
update_mmu_cache(vma, address, page_table);
} else {
if (cow_page)
mem_cgroup_uncharge_page(cow_page);
if (anon)
page_cache_release(page);
else
anon = 1; /* no anon but release faulted_page */
}
pte_unmap_unlock(page_table, ptl);
if (dirty_page) {
struct address_space *mapping = page->mapping;
int dirtied = 0;
if (set_page_dirty(dirty_page))
dirtied = 1;
unlock_page(dirty_page);
put_page(dirty_page);
if ((dirtied || page_mkwrite) && mapping) {
/*
* Some device drivers do not set page.mapping but still
* dirty their pages
*/
balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited(mapping);
}
/* file_update_time outside page_lock */
if (vma->vm_file && !page_mkwrite)
file_update_time(vma->vm_file);
} else {
unlock_page(vmf.page);
if (anon)
page_cache_release(vmf.page);
}
return ret;
unwritable_page:
page_cache_release(page);
return ret;
uncharge_out:
/* fs's fault handler get error */
if (cow_page) {
mem_cgroup_uncharge_page(cow_page);
page_cache_release(cow_page);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: vm: add vm_iomap_memory() helper function
Various drivers end up replicating the code to mmap() their memory
buffers into user space, and our core memory remapping function may be
very flexible but it is unnecessarily complicated for the common cases
to use.
Our internal VM uses pfn's ("page frame numbers") which simplifies
things for the VM, and allows us to pass physical addresses around in a
denser and more efficient format than passing a "phys_addr_t" around,
and having to shift it up and down by the page size. But it just means
that drivers end up doing that shifting instead at the interface level.
It also means that drivers end up mucking around with internal VM things
like the vma details (vm_pgoff, vm_start/end) way more than they really
need to.
So this just exports a function to map a certain physical memory range
into user space (using a phys_addr_t based interface that is much more
natural for a driver) and hides all the complexity from the driver.
Some drivers will still end up tweaking the vm_page_prot details for
things like prefetching or cacheability etc, but that's actually
relevant to the driver, rather than caring about what the page offset of
the mapping is into the particular IO memory region.
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 94,438
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InitialLoadObserver::InitialLoadObserver(size_t tab_count,
AutomationProvider* automation)
: automation_(automation->AsWeakPtr()),
crashed_tab_count_(0),
outstanding_tab_count_(tab_count),
init_time_(base::TimeTicks::Now()) {
if (outstanding_tab_count_ > 0) {
registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_START,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_STOP,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_CLOSED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,545
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int32_t InputHandler::setComposingText(spannable_string_t* spannableString, int32_t relativeCursorPosition)
{
if (!isActiveTextEdit())
return -1;
if (!spannableString)
return -1;
InputLog(LogLevelInfo, "InputHandler::setComposingText at relativeCursorPosition: %d", relativeCursorPosition);
setInputModeEnabled();
return setSpannableTextAndRelativeCursor(spannableString, relativeCursorPosition, true /* markTextAsComposing */) ? 0 : -1;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AutofillDialogViews::NotificationArea::~NotificationArea() {}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 110,085
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int vb2_dqbuf(struct vb2_queue *q, struct v4l2_buffer *b, bool nonblocking)
{
if (vb2_fileio_is_active(q)) {
dprintk(1, "file io in progress\n");
return -EBUSY;
}
return vb2_internal_dqbuf(q, b, nonblocking);
}
Commit Message: [media] videobuf2-v4l2: Verify planes array in buffer dequeueing
When a buffer is being dequeued using VIDIOC_DQBUF IOCTL, the exact buffer
which will be dequeued is not known until the buffer has been removed from
the queue. The number of planes is specific to a buffer, not to the queue.
This does lead to the situation where multi-plane buffers may be requested
and queued with n planes, but VIDIOC_DQBUF IOCTL may be passed an argument
struct with fewer planes.
__fill_v4l2_buffer() however uses the number of planes from the dequeued
videobuf2 buffer, overwriting kernel memory (the m.planes array allocated
in video_usercopy() in v4l2-ioctl.c) if the user provided fewer
planes than the dequeued buffer had. Oops!
Fixes: b0e0e1f83de3 ("[media] media: videobuf2: Prepare to divide videobuf2")
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # for v4.4 and later
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 52,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
ASN1_TLC *ctx)
{
int flags, aclass;
int ret;
const unsigned char *p, *q;
if (!val)
return 0;
flags = tt->flags;
aclass = flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS;
p = *in;
q = p;
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) {
/* SET OF, SEQUENCE OF */
int sktag, skaclass;
char sk_eoc;
/* First work out expected inner tag value */
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG) {
sktag = tt->tag;
skaclass = aclass;
} else {
skaclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF)
sktag = V_ASN1_SET;
else
sktag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
}
/* Get the tag */
ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &sk_eoc, NULL,
&p, len, sktag, skaclass, opt, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
return 0;
} else if (ret == -1)
return -1;
if (!*val)
*val = (ASN1_VALUE *)sk_new_null();
else {
/*
* We've got a valid STACK: free up any items present
*/
STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sktmp = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*val;
ASN1_VALUE *vtmp;
while (sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sktmp) > 0) {
vtmp = sk_ASN1_VALUE_pop(sktmp);
ASN1_item_ex_free(&vtmp, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item));
}
}
if (!*val) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Read as many items as we can */
while (len > 0) {
ASN1_VALUE *skfield;
q = p;
/* See if EOC found */
if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
if (!sk_eoc) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I,
ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC);
goto err;
}
len -= p - q;
sk_eoc = 0;
break;
}
skfield = NULL;
if (!ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&skfield, &p, len,
ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, 0, 0, ctx)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I,
ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
len -= p - q;
if (!sk_ASN1_VALUE_push((STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*val, skfield)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (sk_eoc) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
goto err;
}
} else if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG) {
/* IMPLICIT tagging */
ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len,
ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), tt->tag, aclass, opt,
ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
} else if (ret == -1)
return -1;
} else {
/* Nothing special */
ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
-1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
} else if (ret == -1)
return -1;
}
*in = p;
return 1;
err:
ASN1_template_free(val, tt);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int muscle_card_verified_pins(sc_card_t *card, sc_cardctl_muscle_verified_pins_info_t *info)
{
muscle_private_t* priv = MUSCLE_DATA(card);
info->verifiedPins = priv->verifiedPins;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_readlink(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct rpc_rqst *req)
{
struct xdr_buf *rcvbuf = &req->rq_rcv_buf;
struct kvec *iov = rcvbuf->head;
size_t hdrlen;
u32 len, recvd;
__be32 *p;
int status;
status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_READLINK);
if (status)
return status;
/* Convert length of symlink */
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
len = be32_to_cpup(p);
if (len >= rcvbuf->page_len || len <= 0) {
dprintk("nfs: server returned giant symlink!\n");
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
}
hdrlen = (char *) xdr->p - (char *) iov->iov_base;
recvd = req->rq_rcv_buf.len - hdrlen;
if (recvd < len) {
dprintk("NFS: server cheating in readlink reply: "
"count %u > recvd %u\n", len, recvd);
return -EIO;
}
xdr_read_pages(xdr, len);
/*
* The XDR encode routine has set things up so that
* the link text will be copied directly into the
* buffer. We just have to do overflow-checking,
* and and null-terminate the text (the VFS expects
* null-termination).
*/
xdr_terminate_string(rcvbuf, len);
return 0;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sock *vsock_find_bound_socket(struct sockaddr_vm *addr)
{
struct sock *sk;
spin_lock_bh(&vsock_table_lock);
sk = __vsock_find_bound_socket(addr);
if (sk)
sock_hold(sk);
spin_unlock_bh(&vsock_table_lock);
return sk;
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: Fix missing msg_namelen update in vsock_stream_recvmsg()
The code misses to update the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage
variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::DidChangeVisibilityState() {
DispatchEvent(*Event::CreateBubble(event_type_names::kVisibilitychange));
DispatchEvent(
*Event::CreateBubble(event_type_names::kWebkitvisibilitychange));
if (IsPageVisible())
Timeline().SetAllCompositorPending();
if (hidden() && canvas_font_cache_)
canvas_font_cache_->PruneAll();
InteractiveDetector* interactive_detector = InteractiveDetector::From(*this);
if (interactive_detector) {
interactive_detector->OnPageHiddenChanged(hidden());
}
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,649
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: in_upper_context(int depth, int context, xmlNode * xml_node)
{
if (context == 0) {
return 0;
}
if (xml_node->properties) {
return depth;
} else if (depth < context) {
xmlNode *child = NULL;
for (child = __xml_first_child(xml_node); child != NULL; child = __xml_next(child)) {
if (in_upper_context(depth + 1, context, child)) {
return depth;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InterstitialPageImpl::Disable() {
enabled_ = false;
static_cast<InterstitialPageNavigatorImpl*>(frame_tree_->root()->navigator())
->Disable();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,088
|
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