instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long long Segment::CreateInstance(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
Segment*& pSegment) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
pSegment = NULL;
long long total, available;
const long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (available < 0)
return -1;
if ((total >= 0) && (available > total))
return -1;
for (;;) {
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result) // error, or too few available bytes
return result;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > available)
return pos + len;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return id;
pos += len; // consume ID
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result) // error, or too few available bytes
return result;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > available)
return pos + len;
long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return size;
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (id == 0x08538067) { // Segment ID
if (size == unknown_size)
size = -1;
else if (total < 0)
size = -1;
else if ((pos + size) > total)
size = -1;
pSegment = new (std::nothrow) Segment(pReader, idpos,
pos, size);
if (pSegment == 0)
return -1; // generic error
return 0; // success
}
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + size) > total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + size) > available)
return pos + size;
pos += size; // consume payload
}
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 173,807
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: qboolean Com_FieldStringToPlayerName( char *name, int length, const char *rawname )
{
char hex[5];
int i;
int ch;
if( name == NULL || rawname == NULL )
return qfalse;
if( length <= 0 )
return qtrue;
for( i = 0; *rawname && i + 1 <= length; rawname++, i++ ) {
if( *rawname == '\\' ) {
Q_strncpyz( hex, rawname + 1, sizeof(hex) );
ch = Com_HexStrToInt( hex );
if( ch > -1 ) {
name[i] = ch;
rawname += 4; //hex string length, 0xXX
} else {
name[i] = *rawname;
}
} else {
name[i] = *rawname;
}
}
name[i] = '\0';
return qtrue;
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: views::View* FindFirstOrLastFocusableChild(views::View* root, bool reverse) {
views::FocusSearch search(root, reverse /*cycle*/,
false /*accessibility_mode*/);
views::FocusTraversable* dummy_focus_traversable;
views::View* dummy_focus_traversable_view;
return search.FindNextFocusableView(
root,
reverse ? views::FocusSearch::SearchDirection::kBackwards
: views::FocusSearch::SearchDirection::kForwards,
views::FocusSearch::TraversalDirection::kDown,
views::FocusSearch::StartingViewPolicy::kSkipStartingView,
views::FocusSearch::AnchoredDialogPolicy::kCanGoIntoAnchoredDialog,
&dummy_focus_traversable, &dummy_focus_traversable_view);
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int AppLayerProtoDetectPMRegisterPatternCI(uint8_t ipproto, AppProto alproto,
const char *pattern,
uint16_t depth, uint16_t offset,
uint8_t direction)
{
SCEnter();
int r = 0;
r = AppLayerProtoDetectPMRegisterPattern(ipproto, alproto,
pattern,
depth, offset,
direction,
0 /* !case-sensitive */);
SCReturnInt(r);
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 96,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_inet6addr_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long ev,
void *ptr)
{
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifa = (struct inet6_ifaddr *)ptr;
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *addr = NULL;
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *temp;
struct net *net = dev_net(ifa->idev->dev);
int found = 0;
switch (ev) {
case NETDEV_UP:
addr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sctp_sockaddr_entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (addr) {
addr->a.v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
addr->a.v6.sin6_port = 0;
addr->a.v6.sin6_addr = ifa->addr;
addr->a.v6.sin6_scope_id = ifa->idev->dev->ifindex;
addr->valid = 1;
spin_lock_bh(&net->sctp.local_addr_lock);
list_add_tail_rcu(&addr->list, &net->sctp.local_addr_list);
sctp_addr_wq_mgmt(net, addr, SCTP_ADDR_NEW);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->sctp.local_addr_lock);
}
break;
case NETDEV_DOWN:
spin_lock_bh(&net->sctp.local_addr_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(addr, temp,
&net->sctp.local_addr_list, list) {
if (addr->a.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&addr->a.v6.sin6_addr,
&ifa->addr)) {
sctp_addr_wq_mgmt(net, addr, SCTP_ADDR_DEL);
found = 1;
addr->valid = 0;
list_del_rcu(&addr->list);
break;
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&net->sctp.local_addr_lock);
if (found)
kfree_rcu(addr, rcu);
break;
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit
Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:
SCTP + IPv4:
22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):
SCTP + IPv6:
22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]
Moreover, Alan says:
This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.
In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):
...
0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000 ]p.......}.l....
0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000 ....plaintext...
Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.
SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.
SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.
Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:
SCTP + IPv6:
08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296
This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.
[1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
Reported-by: Alan Chester <alan.chester@tekelec.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 29,629
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tipc_send_stream(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, size_t dsz)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int ret;
lock_sock(sk);
ret = __tipc_send_stream(sock, m, dsz);
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 52,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GetReceiversAndActivitiesCallback(
const ash::CastConfigDelegate::ReceiversAndActivitesCallback& callback,
const base::Value* value) {
ash::CastConfigDelegate::ReceiversAndActivites receiver_activites;
const base::ListValue* ra_list = nullptr;
if (value->GetAsList(&ra_list)) {
for (auto i = ra_list->begin(); i != ra_list->end(); ++i) {
const base::DictionaryValue* ra_dict = nullptr;
if ((*i)->GetAsDictionary(&ra_dict)) {
const base::DictionaryValue* receiver_dict(nullptr),
*activity_dict(nullptr);
ash::CastConfigDelegate::ReceiverAndActivity receiver_activity;
if (ra_dict->GetDictionary("receiver", &receiver_dict)) {
receiver_dict->GetString("name", &receiver_activity.receiver.name);
receiver_dict->GetString("id", &receiver_activity.receiver.id);
}
if (ra_dict->GetDictionary("activity", &activity_dict) &&
!activity_dict->empty()) {
activity_dict->GetString("id", &receiver_activity.activity.id);
activity_dict->GetString("title", &receiver_activity.activity.title);
activity_dict->GetString("activityType",
&receiver_activity.activity.activity_type);
activity_dict->GetBoolean("allowStop",
&receiver_activity.activity.allow_stop);
activity_dict->GetInteger("tabId",
&receiver_activity.activity.tab_id);
}
receiver_activites[receiver_activity.receiver.id] = receiver_activity;
}
}
}
callback.Run(receiver_activites);
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 119,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseCharData(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int cdata) {
const xmlChar *in;
int nbchar = 0;
int line = ctxt->input->line;
int col = ctxt->input->col;
int ccol;
SHRINK;
GROW;
/*
* Accelerated common case where input don't need to be
* modified before passing it to the handler.
*/
if (!cdata) {
in = ctxt->input->cur;
do {
get_more_space:
while (*in == 0x20) { in++; ctxt->input->col++; }
if (*in == 0xA) {
do {
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
in++;
} while (*in == 0xA);
goto get_more_space;
}
if (*in == '<') {
nbchar = in - ctxt->input->cur;
if (nbchar > 0) {
const xmlChar *tmp = ctxt->input->cur;
ctxt->input->cur = in;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace !=
ctxt->sax->characters)) {
if (areBlanks(ctxt, tmp, nbchar, 1)) {
if (ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace != NULL)
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace(ctxt->userData,
tmp, nbchar);
} else {
if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
tmp, nbchar);
if (*ctxt->space == -1)
*ctxt->space = -2;
}
} else if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)) {
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
tmp, nbchar);
}
}
return;
}
get_more:
ccol = ctxt->input->col;
while (test_char_data[*in]) {
in++;
ccol++;
}
ctxt->input->col = ccol;
if (*in == 0xA) {
do {
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
in++;
} while (*in == 0xA);
goto get_more;
}
if (*in == ']') {
if ((in[1] == ']') && (in[2] == '>')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_MISPLACED_CDATA_END, NULL);
ctxt->input->cur = in;
return;
}
in++;
ctxt->input->col++;
goto get_more;
}
nbchar = in - ctxt->input->cur;
if (nbchar > 0) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace !=
ctxt->sax->characters) &&
(IS_BLANK_CH(*ctxt->input->cur))) {
const xmlChar *tmp = ctxt->input->cur;
ctxt->input->cur = in;
if (areBlanks(ctxt, tmp, nbchar, 0)) {
if (ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace != NULL)
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace(ctxt->userData,
tmp, nbchar);
} else {
if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
tmp, nbchar);
if (*ctxt->space == -1)
*ctxt->space = -2;
}
line = ctxt->input->line;
col = ctxt->input->col;
} else if (ctxt->sax != NULL) {
if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, nbchar);
line = ctxt->input->line;
col = ctxt->input->col;
}
/* something really bad happened in the SAX callback */
if (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_CONTENT)
return;
}
ctxt->input->cur = in;
if (*in == 0xD) {
in++;
if (*in == 0xA) {
ctxt->input->cur = in;
in++;
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
continue; /* while */
}
in--;
}
if (*in == '<') {
return;
}
if (*in == '&') {
return;
}
SHRINK;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
in = ctxt->input->cur;
} while (((*in >= 0x20) && (*in <= 0x7F)) || (*in == 0x09));
nbchar = 0;
}
ctxt->input->line = line;
ctxt->input->col = col;
xmlParseCharDataComplex(ctxt, cdata);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 163,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(mlockall, int, flags)
{
unsigned long lock_limit;
int ret = -EINVAL;
if (!flags || (flags & ~(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE)))
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
if (!can_do_mlock())
goto out;
if (flags & MCL_CURRENT)
lru_add_drain_all(); /* flush pagevec */
lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK);
lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
ret = -ENOMEM;
down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
if (!(flags & MCL_CURRENT) || (current->mm->total_vm <= lock_limit) ||
capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
ret = do_mlockall(flags);
up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
if (!ret && (flags & MCL_CURRENT))
mm_populate(0, TASK_SIZE);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 38,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MemStream::close() {
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_seq_scale_ext(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
UNUSED(ps_dec);
return IMPEG2D_SCALABILITIY_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
Commit Message: Fix for handling streams which resulted in negative num_mbs_left
Bug: 26070014
Change-Id: Id9f063a2c72a802d991b92abaf00ec687db5bb0f
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 161,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct page *get_new_data_page(struct inode *inode,
struct page *ipage, pgoff_t index, bool new_i_size)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct page *page;
struct dnode_of_data dn;
int err;
page = f2fs_grab_cache_page(mapping, index, true);
if (!page) {
/*
* before exiting, we should make sure ipage will be released
* if any error occur.
*/
f2fs_put_page(ipage, 1);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
set_new_dnode(&dn, inode, ipage, NULL, 0);
err = f2fs_reserve_block(&dn, index);
if (err) {
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
if (!ipage)
f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
if (PageUptodate(page))
goto got_it;
if (dn.data_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR) {
zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!PageUptodate(page))
SetPageUptodate(page);
} else {
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
/* if ipage exists, blkaddr should be NEW_ADDR */
f2fs_bug_on(F2FS_I_SB(inode), ipage);
page = get_lock_data_page(inode, index, true);
if (IS_ERR(page))
return page;
}
got_it:
if (new_i_size && i_size_read(inode) <
((loff_t)(index + 1) << PAGE_SHIFT))
f2fs_i_size_write(inode, ((loff_t)(index + 1) << PAGE_SHIFT));
return page;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 85,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: format_NAT(const struct ofpact_nat *a, struct ds *ds)
{
ds_put_format(ds, "%snat%s", colors.paren, colors.end);
if (a->flags & (NX_NAT_F_SRC | NX_NAT_F_DST)) {
ds_put_format(ds, "%s(%s", colors.paren, colors.end);
ds_put_format(ds, a->flags & NX_NAT_F_SRC ? "%ssrc%s" : "%sdst%s",
colors.param, colors.end);
if (a->range_af != AF_UNSPEC) {
ds_put_format(ds, "%s=%s", colors.param, colors.end);
if (a->range_af == AF_INET) {
ds_put_format(ds, IP_FMT, IP_ARGS(a->range.addr.ipv4.min));
if (a->range.addr.ipv4.max
&& a->range.addr.ipv4.max != a->range.addr.ipv4.min) {
ds_put_format(ds, "-"IP_FMT,
IP_ARGS(a->range.addr.ipv4.max));
}
} else if (a->range_af == AF_INET6) {
ipv6_format_addr_bracket(&a->range.addr.ipv6.min, ds,
a->range.proto.min);
if (!ipv6_mask_is_any(&a->range.addr.ipv6.max)
&& memcmp(&a->range.addr.ipv6.max, &a->range.addr.ipv6.min,
sizeof(struct in6_addr)) != 0) {
ds_put_char(ds, '-');
ipv6_format_addr_bracket(&a->range.addr.ipv6.max, ds,
a->range.proto.min);
}
}
if (a->range.proto.min) {
ds_put_char(ds, ':');
ds_put_format(ds, "%"PRIu16, a->range.proto.min);
if (a->range.proto.max
&& a->range.proto.max != a->range.proto.min) {
ds_put_format(ds, "-%"PRIu16, a->range.proto.max);
}
}
ds_put_char(ds, ',');
if (a->flags & NX_NAT_F_PERSISTENT) {
ds_put_format(ds, "%spersistent%s,",
colors.value, colors.end);
}
if (a->flags & NX_NAT_F_PROTO_HASH) {
ds_put_format(ds, "%shash%s,", colors.value, colors.end);
}
if (a->flags & NX_NAT_F_PROTO_RANDOM) {
ds_put_format(ds, "%srandom%s,", colors.value, colors.end);
}
}
ds_chomp(ds, ',');
ds_put_format(ds, "%s)%s", colors.paren, colors.end);
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PermissionsData::HasAPIPermissionForTab(
int tab_id,
APIPermission::ID permission) const {
if (HasAPIPermission(permission))
return true;
scoped_refptr<const PermissionSet> tab_permissions =
GetTabSpecificPermissions(tab_id);
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
return tab_permissions.get() && tab_permissions->HasAPIPermission(permission);
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 120,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NetworkChangeNotifierMac::~NetworkChangeNotifierMac() {
config_watcher_.reset();
if (reachability_.get() && run_loop_.get()) {
SCNetworkReachabilityUnscheduleFromRunLoop(reachability_.get(),
run_loop_.get(),
kCFRunLoopCommonModes);
}
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 156,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t AMRExtractor::countTracks() {
return mInitCheck == OK ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 162,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::DispatchBeforeUnload(bool auto_cancel) {
auto before_unload_type =
auto_cancel ? RenderFrameHostImpl::BeforeUnloadType::DISCARD
: RenderFrameHostImpl::BeforeUnloadType::TAB_CLOSE;
GetMainFrame()->DispatchBeforeUnload(before_unload_type, false);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 144,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_hook_state *state,
struct xt_table *table)
{
unsigned int hook = state->hook;
static const char nulldevname[IFNAMSIZ] __attribute__((aligned(sizeof(long))));
/* Initializing verdict to NF_DROP keeps gcc happy. */
unsigned int verdict = NF_DROP;
const char *indev, *outdev;
const void *table_base;
struct ip6t_entry *e, **jumpstack;
unsigned int stackidx, cpu;
const struct xt_table_info *private;
struct xt_action_param acpar;
unsigned int addend;
/* Initialization */
stackidx = 0;
indev = state->in ? state->in->name : nulldevname;
outdev = state->out ? state->out->name : nulldevname;
/* We handle fragments by dealing with the first fragment as
* if it was a normal packet. All other fragments are treated
* normally, except that they will NEVER match rules that ask
* things we don't know, ie. tcp syn flag or ports). If the
* rule is also a fragment-specific rule, non-fragments won't
* match it. */
acpar.hotdrop = false;
acpar.state = state;
WARN_ON(!(table->valid_hooks & (1 << hook)));
local_bh_disable();
addend = xt_write_recseq_begin();
private = READ_ONCE(table->private); /* Address dependency. */
cpu = smp_processor_id();
table_base = private->entries;
jumpstack = (struct ip6t_entry **)private->jumpstack[cpu];
/* Switch to alternate jumpstack if we're being invoked via TEE.
* TEE issues XT_CONTINUE verdict on original skb so we must not
* clobber the jumpstack.
*
* For recursion via REJECT or SYNPROXY the stack will be clobbered
* but it is no problem since absolute verdict is issued by these.
*/
if (static_key_false(&xt_tee_enabled))
jumpstack += private->stacksize * __this_cpu_read(nf_skb_duplicated);
e = get_entry(table_base, private->hook_entry[hook]);
do {
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
const struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_counters *counter;
WARN_ON(!e);
acpar.thoff = 0;
if (!ip6_packet_match(skb, indev, outdev, &e->ipv6,
&acpar.thoff, &acpar.fragoff, &acpar.hotdrop)) {
no_match:
e = ip6t_next_entry(e);
continue;
}
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
acpar.match = ematch->u.kernel.match;
acpar.matchinfo = ematch->data;
if (!acpar.match->match(skb, &acpar))
goto no_match;
}
counter = xt_get_this_cpu_counter(&e->counters);
ADD_COUNTER(*counter, skb->len, 1);
t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
WARN_ON(!t->u.kernel.target);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_TRACE)
/* The packet is traced: log it */
if (unlikely(skb->nf_trace))
trace_packet(state->net, skb, hook, state->in,
state->out, table->name, private, e);
#endif
/* Standard target? */
if (!t->u.kernel.target->target) {
int v;
v = ((struct xt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
if (v < 0) {
/* Pop from stack? */
if (v != XT_RETURN) {
verdict = (unsigned int)(-v) - 1;
break;
}
if (stackidx == 0)
e = get_entry(table_base,
private->underflow[hook]);
else
e = ip6t_next_entry(jumpstack[--stackidx]);
continue;
}
if (table_base + v != ip6t_next_entry(e) &&
!(e->ipv6.flags & IP6T_F_GOTO)) {
jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
}
e = get_entry(table_base, v);
continue;
}
acpar.target = t->u.kernel.target;
acpar.targinfo = t->data;
verdict = t->u.kernel.target->target(skb, &acpar);
if (verdict == XT_CONTINUE)
e = ip6t_next_entry(e);
else
/* Verdict */
break;
} while (!acpar.hotdrop);
xt_write_recseq_end(addend);
local_bh_enable();
if (acpar.hotdrop)
return NF_DROP;
else return verdict;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 169,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CL_UpdateServerInfo( int n ) {
if ( !cl_pinglist[n].adr.port ) {
return;
}
CL_SetServerInfoByAddress( cl_pinglist[n].adr, cl_pinglist[n].info, cl_pinglist[n].time );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int has_file_name(git_index *index,
const git_index_entry *entry, size_t pos, int ok_to_replace)
{
int retval = 0;
size_t len = strlen(entry->path);
int stage = GIT_IDXENTRY_STAGE(entry);
const char *name = entry->path;
while (pos < index->entries.length) {
struct entry_internal *p = index->entries.contents[pos++];
if (len >= p->pathlen)
break;
if (memcmp(name, p->path, len))
break;
if (GIT_IDXENTRY_STAGE(&p->entry) != stage)
continue;
if (p->path[len] != '/')
continue;
retval = -1;
if (!ok_to_replace)
break;
if (index_remove_entry(index, --pos) < 0)
break;
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 83,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sysvipc_proc_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *it)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc = it;
struct ipc_proc_iter *iter = s->private;
struct ipc_proc_iface *iface = iter->iface;
struct ipc_ids *ids;
/* If we had a locked structure, release it */
if (ipc && ipc != SEQ_START_TOKEN)
ipc_unlock(ipc);
ids = &iter->ns->ids[iface->ids];
/* Release the lock we took in start() */
up_read(&ids->rw_mutex);
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,589
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_peer_addrs_num_old(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
sctp_assoc_t id;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct list_head *pos;
int cnt = 0;
if (len != sizeof(sctp_assoc_t))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&id, optval, sizeof(sctp_assoc_t)))
return -EFAULT;
/* For UDP-style sockets, id specifies the association to query. */
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, id);
if (!asoc)
return -EINVAL;
list_for_each(pos, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
cnt ++;
}
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 35,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Range* Editor::findStringAndScrollToVisible(const String& target,
Range* previousMatch,
FindOptions options) {
Range* nextMatch = findRangeOfString(
target, EphemeralRangeInFlatTree(previousMatch), options);
if (!nextMatch)
return nullptr;
Node* firstNode = nextMatch->firstNode();
firstNode->layoutObject()->scrollRectToVisible(
LayoutRect(nextMatch->boundingBox()),
ScrollAlignment::alignCenterIfNeeded,
ScrollAlignment::alignCenterIfNeeded, UserScroll);
firstNode->document().setSequentialFocusNavigationStartingPoint(firstNode);
return nextMatch;
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,144
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::RestoreCurrentFramebuffer() {
bindFramebuffer(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER, framebuffer_binding_.Get());
bindFramebuffer(GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER, read_framebuffer_binding_.Get());
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cmyk_to_rgb(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs, const float *cmyk, float *rgb)
{
#ifdef SLOWCMYK /* from poppler */
float c = cmyk[0], m = cmyk[1], y = cmyk[2], k = cmyk[3];
float r, g, b, x;
float cm = c * m;
float c1m = m - cm;
float cm1 = c - cm;
float c1m1 = 1 - m - cm1;
float c1m1y = c1m1 * y;
float c1m1y1 = c1m1 - c1m1y;
float c1my = c1m * y;
float c1my1 = c1m - c1my;
float cm1y = cm1 * y;
float cm1y1 = cm1 - cm1y;
float cmy = cm * y;
float cmy1 = cm - cmy;
/* this is a matrix multiplication, unrolled for performance */
x = c1m1y1 * k; /* 0 0 0 1 */
r = g = b = c1m1y1 - x; /* 0 0 0 0 */
r += 0.1373f * x;
g += 0.1216f * x;
b += 0.1255f * x;
x = c1m1y * k; /* 0 0 1 1 */
r += 0.1098f * x;
g += 0.1020f * x;
x = c1m1y - x; /* 0 0 1 0 */
r += x;
g += 0.9490f * x;
x = c1my1 * k; /* 0 1 0 1 */
r += 0.1412f * x;
x = c1my1 - x; /* 0 1 0 0 */
r += 0.9255f * x;
b += 0.5490f * x;
x = c1my * k; /* 0 1 1 1 */
r += 0.1333f * x;
x = c1my - x; /* 0 1 1 0 */
r += 0.9294f * x;
g += 0.1098f * x;
b += 0.1412f * x;
x = cm1y1 * k; /* 1 0 0 1 */
g += 0.0588f * x;
b += 0.1412f * x;
x = cm1y1 - x; /* 1 0 0 0 */
g += 0.6784f * x;
b += 0.9373f * x;
x = cm1y * k; /* 1 0 1 1 */
g += 0.0745f * x;
x = cm1y - x; /* 1 0 1 0 */
g += 0.6510f * x;
b += 0.3137f * x;
x = cmy1 * k; /* 1 1 0 1 */
b += 0.0078f * x;
x = cmy1 - x; /* 1 1 0 0 */
r += 0.1804f * x;
g += 0.1922f * x;
b += 0.5725f * x;
x = cmy * (1-k); /* 1 1 1 0 */
r += 0.2118f * x;
g += 0.2119f * x;
b += 0.2235f * x;
rgb[0] = fz_clamp(r, 0, 1);
rgb[1] = fz_clamp(g, 0, 1);
rgb[2] = fz_clamp(b, 0, 1);
#else
rgb[0] = 1 - fz_min(1, cmyk[0] + cmyk[3]);
rgb[1] = 1 - fz_min(1, cmyk[1] + cmyk[3]);
rgb[2] = 1 - fz_min(1, cmyk[2] + cmyk[3]);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::TestInterfaceOrLongMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_testInterfaceOrLongMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::TestInterfaceOrLongMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
const char __user *, _description,
const void __user *, _payload,
size_t, plen,
key_serial_t, ringid)
{
key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
char type[32], *description;
void *payload;
long ret;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
goto error;
/* draw all the data into kernel space */
ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
description = NULL;
if (_description) {
description = strndup_user(_description, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE);
if (IS_ERR(description)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(description);
goto error;
}
if (!*description) {
kfree(description);
description = NULL;
} else if ((description[0] == '.') &&
(strncmp(type, "keyring", 7) == 0)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto error2;
}
}
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
payload = NULL;
if (_payload) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload)
goto error2;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
goto error3;
}
/* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error3;
}
/* create or update the requested key and add it to the target
* keyring */
key_ref = key_create_or_update(keyring_ref, type, description,
payload, plen, KEY_PERM_UNDEF,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
key_ref_put(key_ref);
}
else {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
}
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
error3:
kvfree(payload);
error2:
kfree(description);
error:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length
sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a
NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's
->preparse(), ->instantiate(), and/or ->update() methods. Various key
types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did
not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a
NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was
present. Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero
rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail
with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 167,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Response InspectorNetworkAgent::canClearBrowserCookies(bool* result) {
*result = true;
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sycc444_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
int *d0, *d1, *d2, *r, *g, *b;
const int *y, *cb, *cr;
size_t maxw, maxh, max, i;
int offset, upb;
upb = (int)img->comps[0].prec;
offset = 1<<(upb - 1); upb = (1<<upb)-1;
maxw = (size_t)img->comps[0].w; maxh = (size_t)img->comps[0].h;
max = maxw * maxh;
y = img->comps[0].data;
cb = img->comps[1].data;
cr = img->comps[2].data;
d0 = r = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d1 = g = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d2 = b = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
if(r == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) goto fails;
for(i = 0U; i < max; ++i)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++cb; ++cr; ++r; ++g; ++b;
}
free(img->comps[0].data); img->comps[0].data = d0;
free(img->comps[1].data); img->comps[1].data = d1;
free(img->comps[2].data); img->comps[2].data = d2;
img->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
return;
fails:
free(r);
free(g);
free(b);
}/* sycc444_to_rgb() */
Commit Message: Fix Heap Buffer Overflow in function color_cmyk_to_rgb
Fix uclouvain/openjpeg#774
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserCommandController::OnTabStripModelChanged(
TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
const TabStripModelChange& change,
const TabStripSelectionChange& selection) {
if (change.type() != TabStripModelChange::kInserted &&
change.type() != TabStripModelChange::kReplaced &&
change.type() != TabStripModelChange::kRemoved)
return;
for (const auto& delta : change.deltas()) {
content::WebContents* new_contents = nullptr;
content::WebContents* old_contents = nullptr;
if (change.type() == TabStripModelChange::kInserted) {
new_contents = delta.insert.contents;
} else if (change.type() == TabStripModelChange::kReplaced) {
new_contents = delta.replace.new_contents;
old_contents = delta.replace.old_contents;
} else {
old_contents = delta.remove.contents;
}
if (old_contents)
RemoveInterstitialObservers(old_contents);
if (new_contents)
AddInterstitialObservers(new_contents);
}
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 153,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport size_t GetImageDepth(const Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
return(GetImageChannelDepth(image,CompositeChannels,exception));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/281
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 73,377
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VideoCaptureManager::RequestRefreshFrameForClient(
VideoCaptureController* controller) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (IsControllerPointerValid(controller)) {
if (!controller->IsDeviceAlive())
return;
controller->RequestRefreshFrame();
}
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: build_principal_va(krb5_context context, krb5_principal princ,
unsigned int rlen, const char *realm, va_list ap)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
char *r = NULL;
krb5_data *data = NULL;
krb5_int32 count = 0;
krb5_int32 size = 2; /* initial guess at needed space */
char *component = NULL;
data = malloc(size * sizeof(krb5_data));
if (!data) { retval = ENOMEM; }
if (!retval) {
r = strdup(realm);
if (!r) { retval = ENOMEM; }
}
while (!retval && (component = va_arg(ap, char *))) {
if (count == size) {
krb5_data *new_data = NULL;
size *= 2;
new_data = realloc(data, size * sizeof(krb5_data));
if (new_data) {
data = new_data;
} else {
retval = ENOMEM;
}
}
if (!retval) {
data[count].length = strlen(component);
data[count].data = strdup(component);
if (!data[count].data) { retval = ENOMEM; }
count++;
}
}
if (!retval) {
princ->type = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
princ->magic = KV5M_PRINCIPAL;
princ->realm = make_data(r, rlen);
princ->data = data;
princ->length = count;
r = NULL; /* take ownership */
data = NULL; /* take ownership */
}
if (data) {
while (--count >= 0) {
free(data[count].data);
}
free(data);
}
free(r);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fix build_principal memory bug [CVE-2015-2697]
In build_principal_va(), use k5memdup0() instead of strdup() to make a
copy of the realm, to ensure that we allocate the correct number of
bytes and do not read past the end of the input string. This bug
affects krb5_build_principal(), krb5_build_principal_va(), and
krb5_build_principal_alloc_va(). krb5_build_principal_ext() is not
affected.
CVE-2015-2697:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker may be able to
cause a KDC to crash using a TGS request with a large realm field
beginning with a null byte. If the KDC attempts to find a referral to
answer the request, it constructs a principal name for lookup using
krb5_build_principal() with the requested realm. Due to a bug in this
function, the null byte causes only one byte be allocated for the
realm field of the constructed principal, far less than its length.
Subsequent operations on the lookup principal may cause a read beyond
the end of the mapped memory region, causing the KDC process to crash.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8252 (new)
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 166,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderBlock::blockDirectionOffset(const LayoutSize& offsetFromBlock) const
{
return isHorizontalWritingMode() ? offsetFromBlock.height() : offsetFromBlock.width();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,154
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AddDefaultBrowserStrings(content::WebUIDataSource* html_source) {
LocalizedString localized_strings[] = {
{"defaultBrowser", IDS_SETTINGS_DEFAULT_BROWSER},
{"defaultBrowserDefault", IDS_SETTINGS_DEFAULT_BROWSER_DEFAULT},
{"defaultBrowserMakeDefault", IDS_SETTINGS_DEFAULT_BROWSER_MAKE_DEFAULT},
{"defaultBrowserMakeDefaultButton",
IDS_SETTINGS_DEFAULT_BROWSER_MAKE_DEFAULT_BUTTON},
{"defaultBrowserError", IDS_SETTINGS_DEFAULT_BROWSER_ERROR},
{"defaultBrowserSecondary", IDS_SETTINGS_DEFAULT_BROWSER_SECONDARY},
};
AddLocalizedStringsBulk(html_source, localized_strings,
arraysize(localized_strings));
}
Commit Message: [md-settings] Clarify Password Saving and Autofill Toggles
This change clarifies the wording around the password saving and
autofill toggles.
Bug: 822465
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I91b31fe61cd0754239f7908e8c04c7e69b72f670
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/970541
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544661}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 148,760
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 layout_types)
{
__be32 *p;
unsigned long i = hweight_long(layout_types);
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4 + 4 * i);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(i);
for (i = LAYOUT_NFSV4_1_FILES; i < LAYOUT_TYPE_MAX; ++i)
if (layout_types & (1 << i))
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(i);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,808
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_class_real(struct RClass* cl)
{
if (cl == 0)
return NULL;
while ((cl->tt == MRB_TT_SCLASS) || (cl->tt == MRB_TT_ICLASS)) {
cl = cl->super;
}
return cl;
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 169,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DECLAREreadFunc(readSeparateTilesIntoBuffer)
{
int status = 1;
uint32 imagew = TIFFRasterScanlineSize(in);
uint32 tilew = TIFFTileRowSize(in);
int iskew = imagew - tilew*spp;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(in);
tdata_t tilebuf;
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
uint32 tw, tl;
uint32 row;
uint16 bps = 0, bytes_per_sample;
tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tilesize);
if (tilebuf == 0)
return 0;
_TIFFmemset(tilebuf, 0, tilesize);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl);
(void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps);
if( bps == 0 )
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in), "Error, cannot read BitsPerSample");
status = 0;
goto done;
}
if( (bps % 8) != 0 )
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in), "Error, cannot handle BitsPerSample that is not a multiple of 8");
status = 0;
goto done;
}
bytes_per_sample = bps/8;
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl) {
uint32 nrow = (row+tl > imagelength) ? imagelength-row : tl;
uint32 colb = 0;
uint32 col;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw) {
tsample_t s;
for (s = 0; s < spp; s++) {
if (TIFFReadTile(in, tilebuf, col, row, 0, s) < 0
&& !ignore) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read tile at %lu %lu, "
"sample %lu",
(unsigned long) col,
(unsigned long) row,
(unsigned long) s);
status = 0;
goto done;
}
/*
* Tile is clipped horizontally. Calculate
* visible portion and skewing factors.
*/
if (colb + tilew*spp > imagew) {
uint32 width = imagew - colb;
int oskew = tilew*spp - width;
cpSeparateBufToContigBuf(
bufp+colb+s*bytes_per_sample,
tilebuf, nrow,
width/(spp*bytes_per_sample),
oskew + iskew,
oskew/spp, spp,
bytes_per_sample);
} else
cpSeparateBufToContigBuf(
bufp+colb+s*bytes_per_sample,
tilebuf, nrow, tw,
iskew, 0, spp,
bytes_per_sample);
}
colb += tilew*spp;
}
bufp += imagew * nrow;
}
done:
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: error out cleanly in cpContig2SeparateByRow and
cpSeparate2ContigByRow if BitsPerSample != 8 to avoid heap based overflow.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2656 and
http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2657
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 69,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int iwch_resume_tid(struct iwch_ep *ep)
{
struct cpl_set_tcb_field *req;
struct sk_buff *skb = get_skb(NULL, sizeof(*req), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
return -ENOMEM;
req = (struct cpl_set_tcb_field *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*req));
req->wr.wr_hi = htonl(V_WR_OP(FW_WROPCODE_FORWARD));
req->wr.wr_lo = htonl(V_WR_TID(ep->hwtid));
OPCODE_TID(req) = htonl(MK_OPCODE_TID(CPL_SET_TCB_FIELD, ep->hwtid));
req->reply = 0;
req->cpu_idx = 0;
req->word = htons(W_TCB_RX_QUIESCE);
req->mask = cpu_to_be64(1ULL << S_TCB_RX_QUIESCE);
req->val = 0;
skb->priority = CPL_PRIORITY_DATA;
return iwch_cxgb3_ofld_send(ep->com.tdev, skb);
}
Commit Message: iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CloseInspectedTab() {
browser()->tab_strip_model()->CloseWebContentsAt(0,
TabStripModel::CLOSE_NONE);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 113,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum test_return test_binary_flush(void) {
return test_binary_flush_impl("test_binary_flush",
PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_FLUSH);
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 94,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppListControllerDelegate::ViewClosing() {}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static av_always_inline void hl_decode_mb_idct_luma(H264Context *h, int mb_type,
int is_h264, int simple,
int transform_bypass,
int pixel_shift,
int *block_offset,
int linesize,
uint8_t *dest_y, int p)
{
void (*idct_add)(uint8_t *dst, int16_t *block, int stride);
int i;
block_offset += 16 * p;
if (!IS_INTRA4x4(mb_type)) {
if (is_h264) {
if (IS_INTRA16x16(mb_type)) {
if (transform_bypass) {
if (h->sps.profile_idc == 244 &&
(h->intra16x16_pred_mode == VERT_PRED8x8 ||
h->intra16x16_pred_mode == HOR_PRED8x8)) {
h->hpc.pred16x16_add[h->intra16x16_pred_mode](dest_y, block_offset,
h->mb + (p * 256 << pixel_shift),
linesize);
} else {
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
if (h->non_zero_count_cache[scan8[i + p * 16]] ||
dctcoef_get(h->mb, pixel_shift, i * 16 + p * 256))
h->h264dsp.h264_add_pixels4_clear(dest_y + block_offset[i],
h->mb + (i * 16 + p * 256 << pixel_shift),
linesize);
}
} else {
h->h264dsp.h264_idct_add16intra(dest_y, block_offset,
h->mb + (p * 256 << pixel_shift),
linesize,
h->non_zero_count_cache + p * 5 * 8);
}
} else if (h->cbp & 15) {
if (transform_bypass) {
const int di = IS_8x8DCT(mb_type) ? 4 : 1;
idct_add = IS_8x8DCT(mb_type) ? h->h264dsp.h264_add_pixels8_clear
: h->h264dsp.h264_add_pixels4_clear;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i += di)
if (h->non_zero_count_cache[scan8[i + p * 16]])
idct_add(dest_y + block_offset[i],
h->mb + (i * 16 + p * 256 << pixel_shift),
linesize);
} else {
if (IS_8x8DCT(mb_type))
h->h264dsp.h264_idct8_add4(dest_y, block_offset,
h->mb + (p * 256 << pixel_shift),
linesize,
h->non_zero_count_cache + p * 5 * 8);
else
h->h264dsp.h264_idct_add16(dest_y, block_offset,
h->mb + (p * 256 << pixel_shift),
linesize,
h->non_zero_count_cache + p * 5 * 8);
}
}
} else if (CONFIG_SVQ3_DECODER) {
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
if (h->non_zero_count_cache[scan8[i + p * 16]] || h->mb[i * 16 + p * 256]) {
uint8_t *const ptr = dest_y + block_offset[i];
ff_svq3_add_idct_c(ptr, h->mb + i * 16 + p * 256, linesize,
h->qscale, IS_INTRA(mb_type) ? 1 : 0);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void mpol_rebind_task(struct task_struct *tsk, const nodemask_t *new,
enum mpol_rebind_step step)
{
mpol_rebind_policy(tsk->mempolicy, new, step);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnSelectWordAroundCaret() {
bool did_select = false;
int start_adjust = 0;
int end_adjust = 0;
if (webview()) {
WebLocalFrame* focused_frame = GetWebView()->FocusedFrame();
if (focused_frame) {
GetWidget()->SetHandlingInputEvent(true);
blink::WebRange initial_range = focused_frame->SelectionRange();
if (!initial_range.IsNull())
did_select = focused_frame->SelectWordAroundCaret();
if (did_select) {
blink::WebRange adjusted_range = focused_frame->SelectionRange();
start_adjust =
adjusted_range.StartOffset() - initial_range.StartOffset();
end_adjust = adjusted_range.EndOffset() - initial_range.EndOffset();
}
GetWidget()->SetHandlingInputEvent(false);
}
}
Send(new ViewHostMsg_SelectWordAroundCaretAck(
GetWidget()->routing_id(), did_select, start_adjust, end_adjust));
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irc_server_search (const char *server_name)
{
struct t_irc_server *ptr_server;
if (!server_name)
return NULL;
for (ptr_server = irc_servers; ptr_server;
ptr_server = ptr_server->next_server)
{
if (strcmp (ptr_server->name, server_name) == 0)
return ptr_server;
}
/* server not found */
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int skcipher_encrypt_blkcipher(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_skcipher_tfm(skcipher);
struct blkcipher_alg *alg = &tfm->__crt_alg->cra_blkcipher;
return skcipher_crypt_blkcipher(req, alg->encrypt);
}
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,791
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void Run() {
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, task_);
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mlx5_ib_modify_dct(struct ib_qp *ibqp, struct ib_qp_attr *attr,
int attr_mask, struct ib_udata *udata)
{
struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp = to_mqp(ibqp);
struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev = to_mdev(ibqp->device);
enum ib_qp_state cur_state, new_state;
int err = 0;
int required = IB_QP_STATE;
void *dctc;
if (!(attr_mask & IB_QP_STATE))
return -EINVAL;
cur_state = qp->state;
new_state = attr->qp_state;
dctc = MLX5_ADDR_OF(create_dct_in, qp->dct.in, dct_context_entry);
if (cur_state == IB_QPS_RESET && new_state == IB_QPS_INIT) {
required |= IB_QP_ACCESS_FLAGS | IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX | IB_QP_PORT;
if (!is_valid_mask(attr_mask, required, 0))
return -EINVAL;
if (attr->port_num == 0 ||
attr->port_num > MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, num_ports)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "invalid port number %d. number of ports is %d\n",
attr->port_num, dev->num_ports);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (attr->qp_access_flags & IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_READ)
MLX5_SET(dctc, dctc, rre, 1);
if (attr->qp_access_flags & IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_WRITE)
MLX5_SET(dctc, dctc, rwe, 1);
if (attr->qp_access_flags & IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_ATOMIC) {
if (!mlx5_ib_dc_atomic_is_supported(dev))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
MLX5_SET(dctc, dctc, rae, 1);
MLX5_SET(dctc, dctc, atomic_mode, MLX5_ATOMIC_MODE_DCT_CX);
}
MLX5_SET(dctc, dctc, pkey_index, attr->pkey_index);
MLX5_SET(dctc, dctc, port, attr->port_num);
MLX5_SET(dctc, dctc, counter_set_id, dev->port[attr->port_num - 1].cnts.set_id);
} else if (cur_state == IB_QPS_INIT && new_state == IB_QPS_RTR) {
struct mlx5_ib_modify_qp_resp resp = {};
u32 min_resp_len = offsetof(typeof(resp), dctn) +
sizeof(resp.dctn);
if (udata->outlen < min_resp_len)
return -EINVAL;
resp.response_length = min_resp_len;
required |= IB_QP_MIN_RNR_TIMER | IB_QP_AV | IB_QP_PATH_MTU;
if (!is_valid_mask(attr_mask, required, 0))
return -EINVAL;
MLX5_SET(dctc, dctc, min_rnr_nak, attr->min_rnr_timer);
MLX5_SET(dctc, dctc, tclass, attr->ah_attr.grh.traffic_class);
MLX5_SET(dctc, dctc, flow_label, attr->ah_attr.grh.flow_label);
MLX5_SET(dctc, dctc, mtu, attr->path_mtu);
MLX5_SET(dctc, dctc, my_addr_index, attr->ah_attr.grh.sgid_index);
MLX5_SET(dctc, dctc, hop_limit, attr->ah_attr.grh.hop_limit);
err = mlx5_core_create_dct(dev->mdev, &qp->dct.mdct, qp->dct.in,
MLX5_ST_SZ_BYTES(create_dct_in));
if (err)
return err;
resp.dctn = qp->dct.mdct.mqp.qpn;
err = ib_copy_to_udata(udata, &resp, resp.response_length);
if (err) {
mlx5_core_destroy_dct(dev->mdev, &qp->dct.mdct);
return err;
}
} else {
mlx5_ib_warn(dev, "Modify DCT: Invalid transition from %d to %d\n", cur_state, new_state);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (err)
qp->state = IB_QPS_ERR;
else
qp->state = new_state;
return err;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_repair_obj_stm(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, int stm_num)
{
pdf_obj *obj;
fz_stream *stm = NULL;
pdf_token tok;
int i, n, count;
pdf_lexbuf buf;
fz_var(stm);
pdf_lexbuf_init(ctx, &buf, PDF_LEXBUF_SMALL);
fz_try(ctx)
{
obj = pdf_load_object(ctx, doc, stm_num);
count = pdf_to_int(ctx, pdf_dict_get(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_N));
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, obj);
stm = pdf_open_stream_number(ctx, doc, stm_num);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
pdf_xref_entry *entry;
tok = pdf_lex(ctx, stm, &buf);
if (tok != PDF_TOK_INT)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "corrupt object stream (%d 0 R)", stm_num);
n = buf.i;
if (n < 0)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "ignoring object with invalid object number (%d %d R)", n, i);
continue;
}
else if (n >= pdf_xref_len(ctx, doc))
{
fz_warn(ctx, "ignoring object with invalid object number (%d %d R)", n, i);
continue;
}
entry = pdf_get_populating_xref_entry(ctx, doc, n);
entry->ofs = stm_num;
entry->gen = i;
entry->num = n;
entry->stm_ofs = 0;
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, entry->obj);
entry->obj = NULL;
entry->type = 'o';
tok = pdf_lex(ctx, stm, &buf);
if (tok != PDF_TOK_INT)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "corrupt object stream (%d 0 R)", stm_num);
}
}
fz_always(ctx)
{
fz_drop_stream(ctx, stm);
pdf_lexbuf_fin(ctx, &buf);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,898
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::StopFinding(StopFindAction action) {
if (FindRequestManager* manager = GetFindRequestManager())
manager->StopFinding(action);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RootWindow::AddRootWindowObserver(RootWindowObserver* observer) {
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void igmp_group_dropped(struct ip_mc_list *im)
{
struct in_device *in_dev = im->interface;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST
int reporter;
#endif
if (im->loaded) {
im->loaded = 0;
ip_mc_filter_del(in_dev, im->multiaddr);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST
if (im->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS)
return;
reporter = im->reporter;
igmp_stop_timer(im);
if (!in_dev->dead) {
if (IGMP_V1_SEEN(in_dev))
return;
if (IGMP_V2_SEEN(in_dev)) {
if (reporter)
igmp_send_report(in_dev, im, IGMP_HOST_LEAVE_MESSAGE);
return;
}
/* IGMPv3 */
igmpv3_add_delrec(in_dev, im);
igmp_ifc_event(in_dev);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,589
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::messageHandler_clear(
QQmlListProperty<OxideQQuickScriptMessageHandler>* prop) {
OxideQQuickWebView* web_view =
static_cast<OxideQQuickWebView *>(prop->object);
OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate* p =
OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::get(web_view);
while (p->messageHandlers().size() > 0) {
web_view->removeMessageHandler(
qobject_cast<OxideQQuickScriptMessageHandler*>(
p->messageHandlers().at(0)));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,135
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::uniform4f(const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
GLfloat x,
GLfloat y,
GLfloat z,
GLfloat w) {
if (isContextLost() || !location)
return;
if (location->Program() != current_program_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "uniform4f",
"location not for current program");
return;
}
ContextGL()->Uniform4f(location->Location(), x, y, z, w);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tcp_v4_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
tcp_clear_xmit_timers(sk);
tcp_cleanup_congestion_control(sk);
/* Cleanup up the write buffer. */
tcp_write_queue_purge(sk);
/* Cleans up our, hopefully empty, out_of_order_queue. */
__skb_queue_purge(&tp->out_of_order_queue);
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
/* Clean up the MD5 key list, if any */
if (tp->md5sig_info) {
tcp_v4_clear_md5_list(sk);
kfree(tp->md5sig_info);
tp->md5sig_info = NULL;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_DMA
/* Cleans up our sk_async_wait_queue */
__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_async_wait_queue);
#endif
/* Clean prequeue, it must be empty really */
__skb_queue_purge(&tp->ucopy.prequeue);
/* Clean up a referenced TCP bind bucket. */
if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_bind_hash)
inet_put_port(sk);
/*
* If sendmsg cached page exists, toss it.
*/
if (sk->sk_sndmsg_page) {
__free_page(sk->sk_sndmsg_page);
sk->sk_sndmsg_page = NULL;
}
/* TCP Cookie Transactions */
if (tp->cookie_values != NULL) {
kref_put(&tp->cookie_values->kref,
tcp_cookie_values_release);
tp->cookie_values = NULL;
}
percpu_counter_dec(&tcp_sockets_allocated);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserPolicyConnector::InitializeUserPolicy(const std::string& user_name,
const FilePath& policy_dir,
TokenService* token_service) {
user_cloud_policy_subsystem_.reset();
user_policy_token_cache_.reset();
user_data_store_.reset();
registrar_.RemoveAll();
CommandLine* command_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDeviceManagementUrl)) {
token_service_ = token_service;
if (token_service_) {
registrar_.Add(this,
chrome::NOTIFICATION_TOKEN_AVAILABLE,
Source<TokenService>(token_service_));
}
FilePath policy_cache_dir = policy_dir.Append(kPolicyDir);
UserPolicyCache* user_policy_cache =
new UserPolicyCache(policy_cache_dir.Append(kPolicyCacheFile));
user_data_store_.reset(CloudPolicyDataStore::CreateForUserPolicies());
user_policy_token_cache_.reset(
new UserPolicyTokenCache(user_data_store_.get(),
policy_cache_dir.Append(kTokenCacheFile)));
managed_cloud_provider_->PrependCache(user_policy_cache);
recommended_cloud_provider_->PrependCache(user_policy_cache);
user_cloud_policy_subsystem_.reset(new CloudPolicySubsystem(
user_data_store_.get(),
user_policy_cache));
user_policy_token_cache_->Load();
user_data_store_->set_user_name(user_name);
if (token_service_ &&
token_service_->HasTokenForService(
GaiaConstants::kDeviceManagementService)) {
user_data_store_->SetGaiaToken(token_service_->GetTokenForService(
GaiaConstants::kDeviceManagementService));
}
user_cloud_policy_subsystem_->CompleteInitialization(
prefs::kUserPolicyRefreshRate,
kServiceInitializationStartupDelay);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 97,737
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _cancel_step_mem_limit(uint32_t job_id, uint32_t step_id)
{
slurm_msg_t msg;
job_notify_msg_t notify_req;
job_step_kill_msg_t kill_req;
/* NOTE: Batch jobs may have no srun to get this message */
slurm_msg_t_init(&msg);
notify_req.job_id = job_id;
notify_req.job_step_id = step_id;
notify_req.message = "Exceeded job memory limit";
msg.msg_type = REQUEST_JOB_NOTIFY;
msg.data = ¬ify_req;
slurm_send_only_controller_msg(&msg);
memset(&kill_req, 0, sizeof(job_step_kill_msg_t));
kill_req.job_id = job_id;
kill_req.job_step_id = step_id;
kill_req.signal = SIGKILL;
kill_req.flags = (uint16_t) 0;
msg.msg_type = REQUEST_CANCEL_JOB_STEP;
msg.data = &kill_req;
slurm_send_only_controller_msg(&msg);
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 72,054
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SoftMPEG4Encoder::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mSawInputEOS) {
return;
}
if (!mStarted) {
if (OMX_ErrorNone != initEncoder()) {
return;
}
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!mSawInputEOS && !inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
uint8_t *outPtr = (uint8_t *) outHeader->pBuffer;
int32_t dataLength = outHeader->nAllocLen;
if (mNumInputFrames < 0) {
if (!PVGetVolHeader(mHandle, outPtr, &dataLength, 0)) {
ALOGE("Failed to get VOL header");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
}
ALOGV("Output VOL header: %d bytes", dataLength);
++mNumInputFrames;
outHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG;
outHeader->nFilledLen = dataLength;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
InputBufferInfo info;
info.mTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
info.mFlags = inHeader->nFlags;
mInputBufferInfoVec.push(info);
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mSawInputEOS = true;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > 0) {
const uint8_t *inputData = NULL;
if (mInputDataIsMeta) {
if (inHeader->nFilledLen != 8) {
ALOGE("MetaData buffer is wrong size! "
"(got %u bytes, expected 8)", inHeader->nFilledLen);
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
}
inputData =
extractGraphicBuffer(
mInputFrameData, (mWidth * mHeight * 3) >> 1,
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset, inHeader->nFilledLen,
mWidth, mHeight);
if (inputData == NULL) {
ALOGE("Unable to extract gralloc buffer in metadata mode");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
}
} else {
inputData = (const uint8_t *)inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
if (mColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar) {
ConvertYUV420SemiPlanarToYUV420Planar(
inputData, mInputFrameData, mWidth, mHeight);
inputData = mInputFrameData;
}
}
CHECK(inputData != NULL);
VideoEncFrameIO vin, vout;
memset(&vin, 0, sizeof(vin));
memset(&vout, 0, sizeof(vout));
vin.height = align(mHeight, 16);
vin.pitch = align(mWidth, 16);
vin.timestamp = (inHeader->nTimeStamp + 500) / 1000; // in ms
vin.yChan = (uint8_t *)inputData;
vin.uChan = vin.yChan + vin.height * vin.pitch;
vin.vChan = vin.uChan + ((vin.height * vin.pitch) >> 2);
ULong modTimeMs = 0;
int32_t nLayer = 0;
MP4HintTrack hintTrack;
if (!PVEncodeVideoFrame(mHandle, &vin, &vout,
&modTimeMs, outPtr, &dataLength, &nLayer) ||
!PVGetHintTrack(mHandle, &hintTrack)) {
ALOGE("Failed to encode frame or get hink track at frame %" PRId64,
mNumInputFrames);
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
}
CHECK(NULL == PVGetOverrunBuffer(mHandle));
if (hintTrack.CodeType == 0) { // I-frame serves as sync frame
outHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_SYNCFRAME;
}
++mNumInputFrames;
} else {
dataLength = 0;
}
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
CHECK(!mInputBufferInfoVec.empty());
InputBufferInfo *inputBufInfo = mInputBufferInfoVec.begin();
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inputBufInfo->mTimeUs;
outHeader->nFlags |= (inputBufInfo->mFlags | OMX_BUFFERFLAG_ENDOFFRAME);
outHeader->nFilledLen = dataLength;
mInputBufferInfoVec.erase(mInputBufferInfoVec.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE - libstagefright: check requested memory size before allocation for SoftMPEG4Encoder and SoftVPXEncoder.
Bug: 25812794
Change-Id: I96dc74734380d462583f6efa33d09946f9532809
(cherry picked from commit 87f8cbb223ee516803dbb99699320c2484cbf3ba)
(cherry picked from commit 0462975291796e414891e04bcec9da993914e458)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 162,012
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::SetGLError(GLenum error, const char* msg) {
if (msg) {
last_error_ = msg;
LOG(ERROR) << last_error_;
}
error_bits_ |= GLES2Util::GLErrorToErrorBit(error);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UsbTabHelper::UsbTabHelper(WebContents* web_contents)
: content::WebContentsObserver(web_contents) {}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 155,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sg_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int mode)
{
Sg_device *sdp;
Sg_fd *sfp;
if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp)))
return -ENXIO;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
"sg_fasync: mode=%d\n", mode));
return fasync_helper(fd, filp, mode, &sfp->async_qp);
}
Commit Message: sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of
overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() -
we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the
first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating
too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in
the second loop.
X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # way, way back
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 42,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct inet_peer *tcp_v4_get_peer(struct sock *sk, bool *release_it)
{
struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *) __sk_dst_get(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct inet_peer *peer;
if (!rt || rt->rt_dst != inet->inet_daddr) {
peer = inet_getpeer_v4(inet->inet_daddr, 1);
*release_it = true;
} else {
if (!rt->peer)
rt_bind_peer(rt, 1);
peer = rt->peer;
*release_it = false;
}
return peer;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,023
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sd2_write_rsrc_fork (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int UNUSED (calc_length))
{ SD2_RSRC rsrc ;
STR_RSRC str_rsrc [] =
{ { RSRC_STR, 1000, "_sample-size", "", 0 },
{ RSRC_STR, 1001, "_sample-rate", "", 0 },
{ RSRC_STR, 1002, "_channels", "", 0 },
{ RSRC_BIN, 1000, "_Markers", "", 8 }
} ;
int k, str_offset, data_offset, next_str ;
psf_use_rsrc (psf, SF_TRUE) ;
memset (&rsrc, 0, sizeof (rsrc)) ;
rsrc.sample_rate = psf->sf.samplerate ;
rsrc.sample_size = psf->bytewidth ;
rsrc.channels = psf->sf.channels ;
rsrc.rsrc_data = psf->header ;
rsrc.rsrc_len = sizeof (psf->header) ;
memset (rsrc.rsrc_data, 0xea, rsrc.rsrc_len) ;
snprintf (str_rsrc [0].value, sizeof (str_rsrc [0].value), "_%d", rsrc.sample_size) ;
snprintf (str_rsrc [1].value, sizeof (str_rsrc [1].value), "_%d.000000", rsrc.sample_rate) ;
snprintf (str_rsrc [2].value, sizeof (str_rsrc [2].value), "_%d", rsrc.channels) ;
for (k = 0 ; k < ARRAY_LEN (str_rsrc) ; k++)
{ if (str_rsrc [k].value_len == 0)
{ str_rsrc [k].value_len = strlen (str_rsrc [k].value) ;
str_rsrc [k].value [0] = str_rsrc [k].value_len - 1 ;
} ;
/* Turn name string into a pascal string. */
str_rsrc [k].name [0] = strlen (str_rsrc [k].name) - 1 ;
} ;
rsrc.data_offset = 0x100 ;
/*
** Calculate data length :
** length of strings, plus the length of the sdML chunk.
*/
rsrc.data_length = 0 ;
for (k = 0 ; k < ARRAY_LEN (str_rsrc) ; k++)
rsrc.data_length += str_rsrc [k].value_len + 4 ;
rsrc.map_offset = rsrc.data_offset + rsrc.data_length ;
/* Very start of resource fork. */
write_int (rsrc.rsrc_data, 0, rsrc.data_offset) ;
write_int (rsrc.rsrc_data, 4, rsrc.map_offset) ;
write_int (rsrc.rsrc_data, 8, rsrc.data_length) ;
write_char (rsrc.rsrc_data, 0x30, strlen (psf->file.name.c)) ;
write_str (rsrc.rsrc_data, 0x31, psf->file.name.c, strlen (psf->file.name.c)) ;
write_short (rsrc.rsrc_data, 0x50, 0) ;
write_marker (rsrc.rsrc_data, 0x52, Sd2f_MARKER) ;
write_marker (rsrc.rsrc_data, 0x56, lsf1_MARKER) ;
/* Very start of resource map. */
write_int (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.map_offset + 0, rsrc.data_offset) ;
write_int (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.map_offset + 4, rsrc.map_offset) ;
write_int (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.map_offset + 8, rsrc.data_length) ;
/* These I don't currently understand. */
if (1)
{ write_char (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.map_offset+ 16, 1) ;
/* Next resource map. */
write_int (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.map_offset + 17, 0x12345678) ;
/* File ref number. */
write_short (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.map_offset + 21, 0xabcd) ;
/* Fork attributes. */
write_short (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.map_offset + 23, 0) ;
} ;
/* Resource type offset. */
rsrc.type_offset = rsrc.map_offset + 30 ;
write_short (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.map_offset + 24, rsrc.type_offset - rsrc.map_offset - 2) ;
/* Type index max. */
rsrc.type_count = 2 ;
write_short (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.map_offset + 28, rsrc.type_count - 1) ;
rsrc.item_offset = rsrc.type_offset + rsrc.type_count * 8 ;
rsrc.str_count = ARRAY_LEN (str_rsrc) ;
rsrc.string_offset = rsrc.item_offset + (rsrc.str_count + 1) * 12 - rsrc.map_offset ;
write_short (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.map_offset + 26, rsrc.string_offset) ;
/* Write 'STR ' resource type. */
rsrc.str_count = 3 ;
write_marker (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.type_offset, STR_MARKER) ;
write_short (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.type_offset + 4, rsrc.str_count - 1) ;
write_short (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.type_offset + 6, 0x12) ;
/* Write 'sdML' resource type. */
write_marker (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.type_offset + 8, sdML_MARKER) ;
write_short (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.type_offset + 12, 0) ;
write_short (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.type_offset + 14, 0x36) ;
str_offset = rsrc.map_offset + rsrc.string_offset ;
next_str = 0 ;
data_offset = rsrc.data_offset ;
for (k = 0 ; k < ARRAY_LEN (str_rsrc) ; k++)
{ write_str (rsrc.rsrc_data, str_offset, str_rsrc [k].name, strlen (str_rsrc [k].name)) ;
write_short (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.item_offset + k * 12, str_rsrc [k].id) ;
write_short (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.item_offset + k * 12 + 2, next_str) ;
str_offset += strlen (str_rsrc [k].name) ;
next_str += strlen (str_rsrc [k].name) ;
write_int (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.item_offset + k * 12 + 4, data_offset - rsrc.data_offset) ;
write_int (rsrc.rsrc_data, data_offset, str_rsrc [k].value_len) ;
write_str (rsrc.rsrc_data, data_offset + 4, str_rsrc [k].value, str_rsrc [k].value_len) ;
data_offset += 4 + str_rsrc [k].value_len ;
} ;
/* Finally, calculate and set map length. */
rsrc.map_length = str_offset - rsrc.map_offset ;
write_int (rsrc.rsrc_data, 12, rsrc.map_length) ;
write_int (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.map_offset + 12, rsrc.map_length) ;
rsrc.rsrc_len = rsrc.map_offset + rsrc.map_length ;
psf_fwrite (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.rsrc_len, 1, psf) ;
psf_use_rsrc (psf, SF_FALSE) ;
if (psf->error)
return psf->error ;
return 0 ;
} /* sd2_write_rsrc_fork */
Commit Message: src/sd2.c : Fix two potential buffer read overflows.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/93
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 45,995
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::NotifyContextMenuClosed(
const CustomContextMenuContext& context) {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->Send(new FrameMsg_ContextMenuClosed(
focused_frame->GetRoutingID(), context));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderBlockFlow::marginOffsetForSelfCollapsingBlock()
{
ASSERT(isSelfCollapsingBlock());
RenderBlockFlow* parentBlock = toRenderBlockFlow(parent());
if (parentBlock && style()->clear() && parentBlock->getClearDelta(this, logicalHeight()))
return marginValuesForChild(this).positiveMarginBefore();
return LayoutUnit();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API void r_config_visual_hit_i(RConfig *cfg, const char *name, int delta) {
RConfigNode *node = r_config_node_get (cfg, name);
if (node && (node->flags & CN_INT || node->flags & CN_OFFT)) {
(void)r_config_set_i (cfg, name, r_config_get_i (cfg, name) + delta);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t curl_write_header(char *data, size_t size, size_t nmemb, void *ctx)
{
php_curl *ch = (php_curl *) ctx;
php_curl_write *t = ch->handlers->write_header;
size_t length = size * nmemb;
switch (t->method) {
case PHP_CURL_STDOUT:
/* Handle special case write when we're returning the entire transfer
*/
if (ch->handlers->write->method == PHP_CURL_RETURN && length > 0) {
smart_str_appendl(&ch->handlers->write->buf, data, (int) length);
} else {
PHPWRITE(data, length);
}
break;
case PHP_CURL_FILE:
return fwrite(data, size, nmemb, t->fp);
case PHP_CURL_USER: {
zval argv[2];
zval retval;
int error;
zend_fcall_info fci;
ZVAL_RES(&argv[0], ch->res);
Z_ADDREF(argv[0]);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&argv[1], data, length);
fci.size = sizeof(fci);
fci.function_table = EG(function_table);
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&fci.function_name, &t->func_name);
fci.symbol_table = NULL;
fci.object = NULL;
fci.retval = &retval;
fci.param_count = 2;
fci.params = argv;
fci.no_separation = 0;
ch->in_callback = 1;
error = zend_call_function(&fci, &t->fci_cache);
ch->in_callback = 0;
if (error == FAILURE) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Could not call the CURLOPT_HEADERFUNCTION");
length = -1;
} else if (!Z_ISUNDEF(retval)) {
_php_curl_verify_handlers(ch, 1);
length = zval_get_long(&retval);
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[0]);
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[1]);
break;
}
case PHP_CURL_IGNORE:
return length;
default:
return -1;
}
return length;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72674 - check both curl_escape and curl_unescape
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 50,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::SetEditCommandForNextKeyEvent(const std::string& name,
const std::string& value) {
EditCommands edit_commands;
edit_commands.push_back(EditCommand(name, value));
OnSetEditCommandsForNextKeyEvent(edit_commands);
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,590
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> InspectorAnimationEvent::Data(
const Animation& animation) {
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value = TracedValue::Create();
value->SetString("id", String::Number(animation.SequenceNumber()));
value->SetString("state", animation.playState());
if (const AnimationEffectReadOnly* effect = animation.effect()) {
value->SetString("name", animation.id());
if (effect->IsKeyframeEffectReadOnly()) {
if (Element* target = ToKeyframeEffectReadOnly(effect)->Target())
SetNodeInfo(value.get(), target, "nodeId", "nodeName");
}
}
return value;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,655
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, seek)
{
long opos, position;
zval *object = getThis();
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
HashTable *aht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
int result;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &position) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!aht) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Array was modified outside object and is no longer an array");
return;
}
opos = position;
if (position >= 0) { /* negative values are not supported */
spl_array_rewind(intern TSRMLS_CC);
result = SUCCESS;
while (position-- > 0 && (result = spl_array_next(intern TSRMLS_CC)) == SUCCESS);
if (result == SUCCESS && zend_hash_has_more_elements_ex(aht, &intern->pos) == SUCCESS) {
return; /* ok */
}
}
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_OutOfBoundsException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Seek position %ld is out of range", opos);
} /* }}} */
int static spl_array_object_count_elements_helper(spl_array_object *intern, long *count TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AppProto AppLayerProtoDetectGetProto(AppLayerProtoDetectThreadCtx *tctx,
Flow *f,
uint8_t *buf, uint32_t buflen,
uint8_t ipproto, uint8_t direction)
{
SCEnter();
SCLogDebug("buflen %u for %s direction", buflen,
(direction & STREAM_TOSERVER) ? "toserver" : "toclient");
AppProto alproto = ALPROTO_UNKNOWN;
if (!FLOW_IS_PM_DONE(f, direction)) {
AppProto pm_results[ALPROTO_MAX];
uint16_t pm_matches = AppLayerProtoDetectPMGetProto(tctx, f,
buf, buflen,
direction,
ipproto,
pm_results);
if (pm_matches > 0) {
alproto = pm_results[0];
goto end;
}
}
if (!FLOW_IS_PP_DONE(f, direction)) {
alproto = AppLayerProtoDetectPPGetProto(f, buf, buflen,
ipproto, direction);
if (alproto != ALPROTO_UNKNOWN)
goto end;
}
/* Look if flow can be found in expectation list */
if (!FLOW_IS_PE_DONE(f, direction)) {
alproto = AppLayerProtoDetectPEGetProto(f, ipproto, direction);
}
end:
SCReturnUInt(alproto);
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 170,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void re_yyset_column (int _column_no , yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
/* column is only valid if an input buffer exists. */
if (! YY_CURRENT_BUFFER )
YY_FATAL_ERROR( "re_yyset_column called with no buffer" );
yycolumn = _column_no;
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 70,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void RunWork() {
if (!base::GetPlatformFileInfo(file_, &file_info_))
set_error_code(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_FAILED);
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 97,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: net::BackoffEntry::Policy GetBackoffPolicy() {
net::BackoffEntry::Policy policy = kDefaultBackoffPolicy;
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kDataReductionProxyAggressiveConfigFetch)) {
policy.num_errors_to_ignore = 2;
policy.always_use_initial_delay = false;
}
return policy;
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 137,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::GrantFileAccessFromDropData(DropData* drop_data) {
DCHECK_EQ(GetRoutingID(), drop_data->view_id);
RenderProcessHost* process = GetProcess();
PrepareDropDataForChildProcess(
drop_data, ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance(),
process->GetID(), process->GetStoragePartition()->GetFileSystemContext());
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFlexibleBox::hasAutoMarginsInCrossAxis(RenderBox* child) const
{
if (isHorizontalFlow())
return child->style()->marginTop().isAuto() || child->style()->marginBottom().isAuto();
return child->style()->marginLeft().isAuto() || child->style()->marginRight().isAuto();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLElement::collectStyleForAttribute(const Attribute& attribute, StylePropertySet* style)
{
if (attribute.name() == alignAttr) {
if (equalIgnoringCase(attribute.value(), "middle"))
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyTextAlign, CSSValueCenter);
else
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyTextAlign, attribute.value());
} else if (attribute.name() == contenteditableAttr) {
if (attribute.isEmpty() || equalIgnoringCase(attribute.value(), "true")) {
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyWebkitUserModify, CSSValueReadWrite);
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyWordWrap, CSSValueBreakWord);
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyWebkitNbspMode, CSSValueSpace);
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyWebkitLineBreak, CSSValueAfterWhiteSpace);
} else if (equalIgnoringCase(attribute.value(), "plaintext-only")) {
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyWebkitUserModify, CSSValueReadWritePlaintextOnly);
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyWordWrap, CSSValueBreakWord);
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyWebkitNbspMode, CSSValueSpace);
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyWebkitLineBreak, CSSValueAfterWhiteSpace);
} else if (equalIgnoringCase(attribute.value(), "false"))
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyWebkitUserModify, CSSValueReadOnly);
} else if (attribute.name() == hiddenAttr) {
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyDisplay, CSSValueNone);
} else if (attribute.name() == draggableAttr) {
if (equalIgnoringCase(attribute.value(), "true")) {
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyWebkitUserDrag, CSSValueElement);
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyWebkitUserSelect, CSSValueNone);
} else if (equalIgnoringCase(attribute.value(), "false"))
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyWebkitUserDrag, CSSValueNone);
} else if (attribute.name() == dirAttr) {
if (equalIgnoringCase(attribute.value(), "auto"))
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyUnicodeBidi, unicodeBidiAttributeForDirAuto(this));
else {
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyDirection, attribute.value());
if (!hasTagName(bdiTag) && !hasTagName(bdoTag) && !hasTagName(outputTag))
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyUnicodeBidi, CSSValueEmbed);
}
} else if (attribute.name().matches(XMLNames::langAttr)) {
mapLanguageAttributeToLocale(attribute, style);
} else if (attribute.name() == langAttr) {
if (!fastHasAttribute(XMLNames::langAttr))
mapLanguageAttributeToLocale(attribute, style);
} else
StyledElement::collectStyleForAttribute(attribute, style);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: crm_attr_dirty(xmlAttr *a)
{
xmlNode *parent = a->parent;
xml_private_t *p = NULL;
p = a->_private;
p->flags |= (xpf_dirty|xpf_modified);
p->flags = (p->flags & ~xpf_deleted);
/* crm_trace("Setting flag %x due to %s[@id=%s, @%s=%s]", */
/* xpf_dirty, parent?parent->name:NULL, ID(parent), a->name, a->children->content); */
__xml_node_dirty(parent);
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabletModeWindowManager::RemoveWindowCreationObservers() {
for (aura::Window* window : observed_container_windows_)
window->RemoveObserver(this);
observed_container_windows_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Fix the crash after clamshell -> tablet transition in overview mode.
This CL just reverted some changes that were made in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1658955. In
that CL, we changed the clamshell <-> tablet transition when clamshell
split view mode is enabled, however, we should keep the old behavior
unchanged if the feature is not enabled, i.e., overview should be ended
if it's active before the transition. Otherwise, it will cause a nullptr
dereference crash since |split_view_drag_indicators_| is not created in
clamshell overview and will be used in tablet overview.
Bug: 982507
Change-Id: I238fe9472648a446cff4ab992150658c228714dd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1705474
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima (Slow - on/off site) <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679306}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,542
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_parse_pu_mvp(codec_t *ps_codec, pu_t *ps_pu)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
WORD32 value;
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr;
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm;
cab_ctxt_t *ps_cabac = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_cabac;
WORD32 inter_pred_idc;
ps_slice_hdr = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr;
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type == BSLICE)
{
WORD32 pu_w_plus_pu_h;
WORD32 ctxt_idx;
/* required to check if w+h==12 case */
pu_w_plus_pu_h = ((ps_pu->b4_wd + 1) << 2) + ((ps_pu->b4_ht + 1) << 2);
if(12 == pu_w_plus_pu_h)
{
ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_INTER_PRED_IDC + 4;
TRACE_CABAC_CTXT("inter_pred_idc", ps_cabac->u4_range, ctxt_idx);
inter_pred_idc = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm,
ctxt_idx);
}
else
{
/* larger PUs can be encoded as bi_pred/l0/l1 inter_pred_idc */
WORD32 is_bipred;
ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_INTER_PRED_IDC + ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ct_depth;
TRACE_CABAC_CTXT("inter_pred_idc", ps_cabac->u4_range, ctxt_idx);
is_bipred = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, ctxt_idx);
inter_pred_idc = PRED_BI;
if(!is_bipred)
{
ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_INTER_PRED_IDC + 4;
inter_pred_idc = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm,
ctxt_idx);
}
}
AEV_TRACE("inter_pred_idc", inter_pred_idc, ps_cabac->u4_range);
}
else
inter_pred_idc = PRED_L0;
ps_pu->mv.i1_l0_ref_idx = 0;
ps_pu->mv.i1_l1_ref_idx = 0;
/* Decode MVD for L0 for PRED_L0 or PRED_BI */
if(inter_pred_idc != PRED_L1)
{
WORD32 active_refs = ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active;
WORD32 ref_idx = 0;
WORD32 ctxt_idx;
if(active_refs > 1)
{
ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_INTER_REF_IDX;
/* encode the context modelled first bin */
TRACE_CABAC_CTXT("ref_idx", ps_cabac->u4_range, ctxt_idx);
ref_idx = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, ctxt_idx);
if((active_refs > 2) && ref_idx)
{
WORD32 value;
/* encode the context modelled second bin */
ctxt_idx++;
value = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, ctxt_idx);
ref_idx += value;
if((active_refs > 3) && value)
{
/* encode remaining bypass bins */
ref_idx = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bypass_bins_tunary(ps_cabac,
ps_bitstrm,
(active_refs - 3)
);
ref_idx += 2;
}
}
AEV_TRACE("ref_idx", ref_idx, ps_cabac->u4_range);
}
ref_idx = CLIP3(ref_idx, 0, MAX_DPB_SIZE - 1);
ps_pu->mv.i1_l0_ref_idx = ref_idx;
ihevcd_parse_mvd(ps_codec, &ps_pu->mv.s_l0_mv);
ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_MVP_L0L1;
value = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac,
ps_bitstrm,
ctxt_idx);
AEV_TRACE("mvp_l0/l1_flag", value, ps_cabac->u4_range);
ps_pu->b1_l0_mvp_idx = value;
}
/* Decode MVD for L1 for PRED_L1 or PRED_BI */
if(inter_pred_idc != PRED_L0)
{
WORD32 active_refs = ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active;
WORD32 ref_idx = 0;
WORD32 ctxt_idx;
if(active_refs > 1)
{
ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_INTER_REF_IDX;
TRACE_CABAC_CTXT("ref_idx", ps_cabac->u4_range, ctxt_idx);
/* encode the context modelled first bin */
ref_idx = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, ctxt_idx);
if((active_refs > 2) && ref_idx)
{
WORD32 value;
/* encode the context modelled second bin */
ctxt_idx++;
value = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, ctxt_idx);
ref_idx += value;
if((active_refs > 3) && value)
{
/* encode remaining bypass bins */
ref_idx = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bypass_bins_tunary(ps_cabac,
ps_bitstrm,
(active_refs - 3)
);
ref_idx += 2;
}
}
AEV_TRACE("ref_idx", ref_idx, ps_cabac->u4_range);
}
ref_idx = CLIP3(ref_idx, 0, MAX_DPB_SIZE - 1);
ps_pu->mv.i1_l1_ref_idx = ref_idx;
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_mvd_l1_zero_flag && inter_pred_idc == PRED_BI)
{
ps_pu->mv.s_l1_mv.i2_mvx = 0;
ps_pu->mv.s_l1_mv.i2_mvy = 0;
}
else
{
ihevcd_parse_mvd(ps_codec, &ps_pu->mv.s_l1_mv);
}
ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_MVP_L0L1;
value = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac,
ps_bitstrm,
ctxt_idx);
AEV_TRACE("mvp_l0/l1_flag", value, ps_cabac->u4_range);
ps_pu->b1_l1_mvp_idx = value;
}
ps_pu->b2_pred_mode = inter_pred_idc;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Return error from cabac init if offset is greater than range
When the offset was greater than range, the bitstream was read
more than the valid range in leaf-level cabac parsing modules.
Error check was added to cabac init to fix this issue. Additionally
end of slice and slice error were signalled to suppress further
parsing of current slice.
Bug: 34897036
Change-Id: I1263f1d1219684ffa6e952c76e5a08e9a933c9d2
(cherry picked from commit 3b175da88a1807d19cdd248b74bce60e57f05c6a)
(cherry picked from commit b92314c860d01d754ef579eafe55d7377962b3ba)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 162,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBlockFlow::setStaticInlinePositionForChild(RenderBox* child, LayoutUnit blockOffset, LayoutUnit inlinePosition)
{
child->layer()->setStaticInlinePosition(inlinePosition);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,432
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: router_dir_info_changed(void)
{
need_to_update_have_min_dir_info = 1;
rend_hsdir_routers_changed();
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 69,827
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void ReleaseTransportDIB(TransportDIB* memory) {}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadItemImpl::Start(
std::unique_ptr<DownloadFile> file,
std::unique_ptr<DownloadRequestHandleInterface> req_handle,
const DownloadCreateInfo& new_create_info) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(!download_file_.get());
DVLOG(20) << __func__ << "() this=" << DebugString(true);
RecordDownloadCount(START_COUNT);
download_file_ = std::move(file);
job_ = DownloadJobFactory::CreateJob(this, std::move(req_handle),
new_create_info, false);
if (job_->IsParallelizable()) {
RecordParallelizableDownloadCount(START_COUNT, IsParallelDownloadEnabled());
}
deferred_interrupt_reason_ = DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE;
if (state_ == CANCELLED_INTERNAL) {
ReleaseDownloadFile(true);
job_->Cancel(true);
return;
}
DCHECK(state_ == INITIAL_INTERNAL || state_ == RESUMING_INTERNAL);
DCHECK(state_ != INITIAL_INTERNAL || GetTargetFilePath().empty());
if (new_create_info.result != DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE) {
DCHECK(!download_file_.get());
DCHECK(new_create_info.save_info);
int64_t offset = new_create_info.save_info->offset;
std::unique_ptr<crypto::SecureHash> hash_state =
new_create_info.save_info->hash_state
? new_create_info.save_info->hash_state->Clone()
: nullptr;
destination_info_.received_bytes = offset;
hash_state_ = std::move(hash_state);
destination_info_.hash.clear();
deferred_interrupt_reason_ = new_create_info.result;
received_slices_.clear();
TransitionTo(INTERRUPTED_TARGET_PENDING_INTERNAL);
DetermineDownloadTarget();
return;
}
if (state_ == INITIAL_INTERNAL) {
RecordDownloadCount(NEW_DOWNLOAD_COUNT);
if (job_->IsParallelizable()) {
RecordParallelizableDownloadCount(NEW_DOWNLOAD_COUNT,
IsParallelDownloadEnabled());
}
RecordDownloadMimeType(mime_type_);
if (!GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord()) {
RecordDownloadCount(NEW_DOWNLOAD_COUNT_NORMAL_PROFILE);
RecordDownloadMimeTypeForNormalProfile(mime_type_);
}
}
DCHECK(download_file_);
DCHECK(job_);
if (state_ == RESUMING_INTERNAL)
UpdateValidatorsOnResumption(new_create_info);
if (!job_->IsParallelizable() && !received_slices_.empty()) {
destination_info_.received_bytes =
GetMaxContiguousDataBlockSizeFromBeginning(received_slices_);
received_slices_.clear();
}
TransitionTo(TARGET_PENDING_INTERNAL);
job_->Start(download_file_.get(),
base::Bind(&DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadFileInitialized,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
GetReceivedSlices());
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __init iriap_init(void)
{
struct ias_object *obj;
struct iriap_cb *server;
__u8 oct_seq[6];
__u16 hints;
/* Allocate master array */
iriap = hashbin_new(HB_LOCK);
if (!iriap)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Object repository - defined in irias_object.c */
irias_objects = hashbin_new(HB_LOCK);
if (!irias_objects) {
IRDA_WARNING("%s: Can't allocate irias_objects hashbin!\n",
__func__);
hashbin_delete(iriap, NULL);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/*
* Register some default services for IrLMP
*/
hints = irlmp_service_to_hint(S_COMPUTER);
service_handle = irlmp_register_service(hints);
/* Register the Device object with LM-IAS */
obj = irias_new_object("Device", IAS_DEVICE_ID);
irias_add_string_attrib(obj, "DeviceName", "Linux", IAS_KERNEL_ATTR);
oct_seq[0] = 0x01; /* Version 1 */
oct_seq[1] = 0x00; /* IAS support bits */
oct_seq[2] = 0x00; /* LM-MUX support bits */
#ifdef CONFIG_IRDA_ULTRA
oct_seq[2] |= 0x04; /* Connectionless Data support */
#endif
irias_add_octseq_attrib(obj, "IrLMPSupport", oct_seq, 3,
IAS_KERNEL_ATTR);
irias_insert_object(obj);
/*
* Register server support with IrLMP so we can accept incoming
* connections
*/
server = iriap_open(LSAP_IAS, IAS_SERVER, NULL, NULL);
if (!server) {
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(), unable to open server\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
iriap_register_lsap(server, LSAP_IAS, IAS_SERVER);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: irda: validate peer name and attribute lengths
Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 35,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_guest_time_update(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct kvm_vcpu_arch *vcpu = &v->arch;
void *shared_kaddr;
unsigned long this_tsc_khz;
s64 kernel_ns, max_kernel_ns;
u64 tsc_timestamp;
/* Keep irq disabled to prevent changes to the clock */
local_irq_save(flags);
kvm_get_msr(v, MSR_IA32_TSC, &tsc_timestamp);
kernel_ns = get_kernel_ns();
this_tsc_khz = __get_cpu_var(cpu_tsc_khz);
if (unlikely(this_tsc_khz == 0)) {
local_irq_restore(flags);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, v);
return 1;
}
/*
* We may have to catch up the TSC to match elapsed wall clock
* time for two reasons, even if kvmclock is used.
* 1) CPU could have been running below the maximum TSC rate
* 2) Broken TSC compensation resets the base at each VCPU
* entry to avoid unknown leaps of TSC even when running
* again on the same CPU. This may cause apparent elapsed
* time to disappear, and the guest to stand still or run
* very slowly.
*/
if (vcpu->tsc_catchup) {
u64 tsc = compute_guest_tsc(v, kernel_ns);
if (tsc > tsc_timestamp) {
kvm_x86_ops->adjust_tsc_offset(v, tsc - tsc_timestamp);
tsc_timestamp = tsc;
}
}
local_irq_restore(flags);
if (!vcpu->time_page)
return 0;
/*
* Time as measured by the TSC may go backwards when resetting the base
* tsc_timestamp. The reason for this is that the TSC resolution is
* higher than the resolution of the other clock scales. Thus, many
* possible measurments of the TSC correspond to one measurement of any
* other clock, and so a spread of values is possible. This is not a
* problem for the computation of the nanosecond clock; with TSC rates
* around 1GHZ, there can only be a few cycles which correspond to one
* nanosecond value, and any path through this code will inevitably
* take longer than that. However, with the kernel_ns value itself,
* the precision may be much lower, down to HZ granularity. If the
* first sampling of TSC against kernel_ns ends in the low part of the
* range, and the second in the high end of the range, we can get:
*
* (TSC - offset_low) * S + kns_old > (TSC - offset_high) * S + kns_new
*
* As the sampling errors potentially range in the thousands of cycles,
* it is possible such a time value has already been observed by the
* guest. To protect against this, we must compute the system time as
* observed by the guest and ensure the new system time is greater.
*/
max_kernel_ns = 0;
if (vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_timestamp && vcpu->last_guest_tsc) {
max_kernel_ns = vcpu->last_guest_tsc -
vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_timestamp;
max_kernel_ns = pvclock_scale_delta(max_kernel_ns,
vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_to_system_mul,
vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_shift);
max_kernel_ns += vcpu->last_kernel_ns;
}
if (unlikely(vcpu->hw_tsc_khz != this_tsc_khz)) {
kvm_get_time_scale(NSEC_PER_SEC / 1000, this_tsc_khz,
&vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_shift,
&vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_to_system_mul);
vcpu->hw_tsc_khz = this_tsc_khz;
}
if (max_kernel_ns > kernel_ns)
kernel_ns = max_kernel_ns;
/* With all the info we got, fill in the values */
vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_timestamp = tsc_timestamp;
vcpu->hv_clock.system_time = kernel_ns + v->kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset;
vcpu->last_kernel_ns = kernel_ns;
vcpu->last_guest_tsc = tsc_timestamp;
vcpu->hv_clock.flags = 0;
/*
* The interface expects us to write an even number signaling that the
* update is finished. Since the guest won't see the intermediate
* state, we just increase by 2 at the end.
*/
vcpu->hv_clock.version += 2;
shared_kaddr = kmap_atomic(vcpu->time_page, KM_USER0);
memcpy(shared_kaddr + vcpu->time_offset, &vcpu->hv_clock,
sizeof(vcpu->hv_clock));
kunmap_atomic(shared_kaddr, KM_USER0);
mark_page_dirty(v->kvm, vcpu->time >> PAGE_SHIFT);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 41,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QuotaManager::DidGetPersistentHostQuota(const HostQuotaCallback& callback,
const std::string& host,
const int64* quota,
bool success) {
DidDatabaseWork(success);
callback.Run(kQuotaStatusOk, host, kStorageTypePersistent, *quota);
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SendKeyEvent(base::char16 ch, int flags) {
if (ch < 0x80) {
ui::KeyboardCode code =
ch == ' ' ? ui::VKEY_SPACE :
static_cast<ui::KeyboardCode>(ui::VKEY_A + ch - 'a');
SendKeyPress(code, flags);
} else {
ui::KeyEvent event(ch, ui::VKEY_UNKNOWN, flags);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
event_generator_->Dispatch(&event);
#else
input_method_->DispatchKeyEvent(&event);
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void gro_pull_from_frag0(struct sk_buff *skb, int grow)
{
struct skb_shared_info *pinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
BUG_ON(skb->end - skb->tail < grow);
memcpy(skb_tail_pointer(skb), NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->frag0, grow);
skb->data_len -= grow;
skb->tail += grow;
pinfo->frags[0].page_offset += grow;
skb_frag_size_sub(&pinfo->frags[0], grow);
if (unlikely(!skb_frag_size(&pinfo->frags[0]))) {
skb_frag_unref(skb, 0);
memmove(pinfo->frags, pinfo->frags + 1,
--pinfo->nr_frags * sizeof(pinfo->frags[0]));
}
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Burr(IRCView* o, Burr* prev, QTextBlock b, int objFormat)
: m_block(b), m_format(objFormat), m_prev(prev), m_next(0),
m_owner(o)
{
if (m_prev)
m_prev->m_next = this;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int grab_super(struct super_block *s) __releases(sb_lock)
{
s->s_count++;
spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
down_write(&s->s_umount);
if ((s->s_flags & MS_BORN) && atomic_inc_not_zero(&s->s_active)) {
put_super(s);
return 1;
}
up_write(&s->s_umount);
put_super(s);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 46,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Field_CompleteFilename( const char *dir,
const char *ext, qboolean stripExt, qboolean allowNonPureFilesOnDisk )
{
matchCount = 0;
shortestMatch[ 0 ] = 0;
FS_FilenameCompletion( dir, ext, stripExt, FindMatches, allowNonPureFilesOnDisk );
if( !Field_Complete( ) )
FS_FilenameCompletion( dir, ext, stripExt, PrintMatches, allowNonPureFilesOnDisk );
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CL_StartHunkUsers( qboolean rendererOnly ) {
if (!com_cl_running) {
return;
}
if ( !com_cl_running->integer ) {
return;
}
if ( !cls.rendererStarted ) {
cls.rendererStarted = qtrue;
CL_InitRenderer();
}
if ( rendererOnly ) {
return;
}
if ( !cls.soundStarted ) {
cls.soundStarted = qtrue;
S_Init();
}
if ( !cls.soundRegistered ) {
cls.soundRegistered = qtrue;
S_BeginRegistration();
}
if( com_dedicated->integer ) {
return;
}
if ( !cls.uiStarted ) {
cls.uiStarted = qtrue;
CL_InitUI();
}
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bdt_enable(void)
{
bdt_log("ENABLE BT");
if (bt_enabled) {
bdt_log("Bluetooth is already enabled");
return;
}
status = sBtInterface->enable();
check_return_status(status);
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 173,555
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool start_new_rx_buffer(int offset, unsigned long size, int head)
{
/* simple case: we have completely filled the current buffer. */
if (offset == MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET)
return true;
/*
* complex case: start a fresh buffer if the current frag
* would overflow the current buffer but only if:
* (i) this frag would fit completely in the next buffer
* and (ii) there is already some data in the current buffer
* and (iii) this is not the head buffer.
*
* Where:
* - (i) stops us splitting a frag into two copies
* unless the frag is too large for a single buffer.
* - (ii) stops us from leaving a buffer pointlessly empty.
* - (iii) stops us leaving the first buffer
* empty. Strictly speaking this is already covered
* by (ii) but is explicitly checked because
* netfront relies on the first buffer being
* non-empty and can crash otherwise.
*
* This means we will effectively linearise small
* frags but do not needlessly split large buffers
* into multiple copies tend to give large frags their
* own buffers as before.
*/
if ((offset + size > MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET) &&
(size <= MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET) && offset && !head)
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StartExplicitSync(const StartSyncArgs& args,
content::WebContents* contents,
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::StartSyncMode start_mode,
ConfirmEmailDialogDelegate::Action action) {
if (action == ConfirmEmailDialogDelegate::START_SYNC) {
StartSync(args, start_mode);
RedirectToNtpOrAppsPageIfNecessary(contents, args.source);
} else {
if (signin::IsContinueUrlForWebBasedSigninFlow(
contents->GetVisibleURL())) {
base::MessageLoopProxy::current()->PostNonNestableTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(RedirectToNtpOrAppsPageWithIds,
contents->GetRenderProcessHost()->GetID(),
contents->GetRoutingID(),
args.source));
}
if (action == ConfirmEmailDialogDelegate::CREATE_NEW_USER) {
chrome::ShowSettingsSubPage(args.browser,
std::string(chrome::kSearchUsersSubPage));
}
}
}
Commit Message: During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 109,844
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_setup_track_ids(MOVMuxContext *mov, AVFormatContext *s)
{
int i;
if (mov->track_ids_ok)
return 0;
if (mov->use_stream_ids_as_track_ids) {
int next_generated_track_id = 0;
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
if (s->streams[i]->id > next_generated_track_id)
next_generated_track_id = s->streams[i]->id;
}
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++) {
if (mov->tracks[i].entry <= 0 && !(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_FRAGMENT))
continue;
mov->tracks[i].track_id = i >= s->nb_streams ? ++next_generated_track_id : s->streams[i]->id;
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++) {
if (mov->tracks[i].entry <= 0 && !(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_FRAGMENT))
continue;
mov->tracks[i].track_id = i + 1;
}
}
mov->track_ids_ok = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 79,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int register_netdevice(struct net_device *dev)
{
int ret;
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
BUG_ON(dev_boot_phase);
ASSERT_RTNL();
might_sleep();
/* When net_device's are persistent, this will be fatal. */
BUG_ON(dev->reg_state != NETREG_UNINITIALIZED);
BUG_ON(!net);
spin_lock_init(&dev->addr_list_lock);
netdev_set_addr_lockdep_class(dev);
dev->iflink = -1;
/* Init, if this function is available */
if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_init) {
ret = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_init(dev);
if (ret) {
if (ret > 0)
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
}
ret = dev_get_valid_name(dev, dev->name, 0);
if (ret)
goto err_uninit;
dev->ifindex = dev_new_index(net);
if (dev->iflink == -1)
dev->iflink = dev->ifindex;
/* Fix illegal checksum combinations */
if ((dev->features & NETIF_F_HW_CSUM) &&
(dev->features & (NETIF_F_IP_CSUM|NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM))) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: mixed HW and IP checksum settings.\n",
dev->name);
dev->features &= ~(NETIF_F_IP_CSUM|NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM);
}
if ((dev->features & NETIF_F_NO_CSUM) &&
(dev->features & (NETIF_F_HW_CSUM|NETIF_F_IP_CSUM|NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM))) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: mixed no checksumming and other settings.\n",
dev->name);
dev->features &= ~(NETIF_F_IP_CSUM|NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM|NETIF_F_HW_CSUM);
}
dev->features = netdev_fix_features(dev->features, dev->name);
/* Enable software GSO if SG is supported. */
if (dev->features & NETIF_F_SG)
dev->features |= NETIF_F_GSO;
/* Enable GRO and NETIF_F_HIGHDMA for vlans by default,
* vlan_dev_init() will do the dev->features check, so these features
* are enabled only if supported by underlying device.
*/
dev->vlan_features |= (NETIF_F_GRO | NETIF_F_HIGHDMA);
ret = call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_POST_INIT, dev);
ret = notifier_to_errno(ret);
if (ret)
goto err_uninit;
ret = netdev_register_kobject(dev);
if (ret)
goto err_uninit;
dev->reg_state = NETREG_REGISTERED;
/*
* Default initial state at registry is that the
* device is present.
*/
set_bit(__LINK_STATE_PRESENT, &dev->state);
dev_init_scheduler(dev);
dev_hold(dev);
list_netdevice(dev);
/* Notify protocols, that a new device appeared. */
ret = call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_REGISTER, dev);
ret = notifier_to_errno(ret);
if (ret) {
rollback_registered(dev);
dev->reg_state = NETREG_UNREGISTERED;
}
/*
* Prevent userspace races by waiting until the network
* device is fully setup before sending notifications.
*/
if (!dev->rtnl_link_ops ||
dev->rtnl_link_state == RTNL_LINK_INITIALIZED)
rtmsg_ifinfo(RTM_NEWLINK, dev, ~0U);
out:
return ret;
err_uninit:
if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_uninit)
dev->netdev_ops->ndo_uninit(dev);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator::LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator(PageSerializer* serializer, Document* document, Vector<Node*>* nodes, LinkLocalPathMap* links, String directoryName)
: SerializerMarkupAccumulator(serializer, document, nodes)
, m_replaceLinks(links)
, m_directoryName(directoryName)
{
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 171,562
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.