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stringclasses 1
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stringlengths 56
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
u32 i, tmp;
u32 maxNumPics = 0;
u8 *byteStrmStart;
u8 *imageData;
u8 *tmpImage = NULL;
u32 strmLen;
u32 picSize;
H264SwDecInst decInst;
H264SwDecRet ret;
H264SwDecInput decInput;
H264SwDecOutput decOutput;
H264SwDecPicture decPicture;
H264SwDecInfo decInfo;
H264SwDecApiVersion decVer;
u32 picDecodeNumber;
u32 picDisplayNumber;
u32 numErrors = 0;
u32 cropDisplay = 0;
u32 disableOutputReordering = 0;
FILE *finput;
char outFileName[256] = "";
/* Print API version number */
decVer = H264SwDecGetAPIVersion();
DEBUG(("H.264 Decoder API v%d.%d\n", decVer.major, decVer.minor));
/* Print tag name if '-T' argument present */
if ( argc > 1 && strcmp(argv[1], "-T") == 0 )
{
DEBUG(("%s\n", tagName));
return 0;
}
/* Check that enough command line arguments given, if not -> print usage
* information out */
if (argc < 2)
{
DEBUG((
"Usage: %s [-Nn] [-Ooutfile] [-P] [-U] [-C] [-R] [-T] file.h264\n",
argv[0]));
DEBUG(("\t-Nn forces decoding to stop after n pictures\n"));
#if defined(_NO_OUT)
DEBUG(("\t-Ooutfile output writing disabled at compile time\n"));
#else
DEBUG(("\t-Ooutfile write output to \"outfile\" (default out_wxxxhyyy.yuv)\n"));
DEBUG(("\t-Onone does not write output\n"));
#endif
DEBUG(("\t-P packet-by-packet mode\n"));
DEBUG(("\t-U NAL unit stream mode\n"));
DEBUG(("\t-C display cropped image (default decoded image)\n"));
DEBUG(("\t-R disable DPB output reordering\n"));
DEBUG(("\t-T to print tag name and exit\n"));
return 0;
}
/* read command line arguments */
for (i = 1; i < (u32)(argc-1); i++)
{
if ( strncmp(argv[i], "-N", 2) == 0 )
{
maxNumPics = (u32)atoi(argv[i]+2);
}
else if ( strncmp(argv[i], "-O", 2) == 0 )
{
strcpy(outFileName, argv[i]+2);
}
else if ( strcmp(argv[i], "-P") == 0 )
{
packetize = 1;
}
else if ( strcmp(argv[i], "-U") == 0 )
{
nalUnitStream = 1;
}
else if ( strcmp(argv[i], "-C") == 0 )
{
cropDisplay = 1;
}
else if ( strcmp(argv[i], "-R") == 0 )
{
disableOutputReordering = 1;
}
}
/* open input file for reading, file name given by user. If file open
* fails -> exit */
finput = fopen(argv[argc-1],"rb");
if (finput == NULL)
{
DEBUG(("UNABLE TO OPEN INPUT FILE\n"));
return -1;
}
/* check size of the input file -> length of the stream in bytes */
fseek(finput,0L,SEEK_END);
strmLen = (u32)ftell(finput);
rewind(finput);
/* allocate memory for stream buffer. if unsuccessful -> exit */
byteStrmStart = (u8 *)malloc(sizeof(u8)*strmLen);
if (byteStrmStart == NULL)
{
DEBUG(("UNABLE TO ALLOCATE MEMORY\n"));
return -1;
}
/* read input stream from file to buffer and close input file */
fread(byteStrmStart, sizeof(u8), strmLen, finput);
fclose(finput);
/* initialize decoder. If unsuccessful -> exit */
ret = H264SwDecInit(&decInst, disableOutputReordering);
if (ret != H264SWDEC_OK)
{
DEBUG(("DECODER INITIALIZATION FAILED\n"));
free(byteStrmStart);
return -1;
}
/* initialize H264SwDecDecode() input structure */
streamStop = byteStrmStart + strmLen;
decInput.pStream = byteStrmStart;
decInput.dataLen = strmLen;
decInput.intraConcealmentMethod = 0;
/* get pointer to next packet and the size of packet
* (for packetize or nalUnitStream modes) */
if ( (tmp = NextPacket(&decInput.pStream)) != 0 )
decInput.dataLen = tmp;
picDecodeNumber = picDisplayNumber = 1;
/* main decoding loop */
do
{
/* Picture ID is the picture number in decoding order */
decInput.picId = picDecodeNumber;
/* call API function to perform decoding */
ret = H264SwDecDecode(decInst, &decInput, &decOutput);
switch(ret)
{
case H264SWDEC_HDRS_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY:
/* Stream headers were successfully decoded
* -> stream information is available for query now */
ret = H264SwDecGetInfo(decInst, &decInfo);
if (ret != H264SWDEC_OK)
return -1;
DEBUG(("Profile %d\n", decInfo.profile));
DEBUG(("Width %d Height %d\n",
decInfo.picWidth, decInfo.picHeight));
if (cropDisplay && decInfo.croppingFlag)
{
DEBUG(("Cropping params: (%d, %d) %dx%d\n",
decInfo.cropParams.cropLeftOffset,
decInfo.cropParams.cropTopOffset,
decInfo.cropParams.cropOutWidth,
decInfo.cropParams.cropOutHeight));
/* Cropped frame size in planar YUV 4:2:0 */
picSize = decInfo.cropParams.cropOutWidth *
decInfo.cropParams.cropOutHeight;
picSize = (3 * picSize)/2;
tmpImage = malloc(picSize);
if (tmpImage == NULL)
return -1;
}
else
{
/* Decoder output frame size in planar YUV 4:2:0 */
picSize = decInfo.picWidth * decInfo.picHeight;
picSize = (3 * picSize)/2;
}
DEBUG(("videoRange %d, matrixCoefficients %d\n",
decInfo.videoRange, decInfo.matrixCoefficients));
/* update H264SwDecDecode() input structure, number of bytes
* "consumed" is computed as difference between the new stream
* pointer and old stream pointer */
decInput.dataLen -=
(u32)(decOutput.pStrmCurrPos - decInput.pStream);
decInput.pStream = decOutput.pStrmCurrPos;
/* If -O option not used, generate default file name */
if (outFileName[0] == 0)
sprintf(outFileName, "out_w%dh%d.yuv",
decInfo.picWidth, decInfo.picHeight);
break;
case H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY:
/* Picture is ready and more data remains in input buffer
* -> update H264SwDecDecode() input structure, number of bytes
* "consumed" is computed as difference between the new stream
* pointer and old stream pointer */
decInput.dataLen -=
(u32)(decOutput.pStrmCurrPos - decInput.pStream);
decInput.pStream = decOutput.pStrmCurrPos;
/* fall through */
case H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY:
/*lint -esym(644,tmpImage,picSize) variable initialized at
* H264SWDEC_HDRS_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY case */
if (ret == H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY)
decInput.dataLen = NextPacket(&decInput.pStream);
/* If enough pictures decoded -> force decoding to end
* by setting that no more stream is available */
if (maxNumPics && picDecodeNumber == maxNumPics)
decInput.dataLen = 0;
/* Increment decoding number for every decoded picture */
picDecodeNumber++;
/* use function H264SwDecNextPicture() to obtain next picture
* in display order. Function is called until no more images
* are ready for display */
while ( H264SwDecNextPicture(decInst, &decPicture, 0) ==
H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY )
{
DEBUG(("PIC %d, type %s", picDisplayNumber,
decPicture.isIdrPicture ? "IDR" : "NON-IDR"));
if (picDisplayNumber != decPicture.picId)
DEBUG((", decoded pic %d", decPicture.picId));
if (decPicture.nbrOfErrMBs)
{
DEBUG((", concealed %d\n", decPicture.nbrOfErrMBs));
}
else
DEBUG(("\n"));
fflush(stdout);
numErrors += decPicture.nbrOfErrMBs;
/* Increment display number for every displayed picture */
picDisplayNumber++;
/*lint -esym(644,decInfo) always initialized if pictures
* available for display */
/* Write output picture to file */
imageData = (u8*)decPicture.pOutputPicture;
if (cropDisplay && decInfo.croppingFlag)
{
tmp = CropPicture(tmpImage, imageData,
decInfo.picWidth, decInfo.picHeight,
&decInfo.cropParams);
if (tmp)
return -1;
WriteOutput(outFileName, tmpImage, picSize);
}
else
{
WriteOutput(outFileName, imageData, picSize);
}
}
break;
case H264SWDEC_STRM_PROCESSED:
case H264SWDEC_STRM_ERR:
/* Input stream was decoded but no picture is ready
* -> Get more data */
decInput.dataLen = NextPacket(&decInput.pStream);
break;
default:
DEBUG(("FATAL ERROR\n"));
return -1;
}
/* keep decoding until all data from input stream buffer consumed */
} while (decInput.dataLen > 0);
/* if output in display order is preferred, the decoder shall be forced
* to output pictures remaining in decoded picture buffer. Use function
* H264SwDecNextPicture() to obtain next picture in display order. Function
* is called until no more images are ready for display. Second parameter
* for the function is set to '1' to indicate that this is end of the
* stream and all pictures shall be output */
while (H264SwDecNextPicture(decInst, &decPicture, 1) == H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY)
{
DEBUG(("PIC %d, type %s", picDisplayNumber,
decPicture.isIdrPicture ? "IDR" : "NON-IDR"));
if (picDisplayNumber != decPicture.picId)
DEBUG((", decoded pic %d", decPicture.picId));
if (decPicture.nbrOfErrMBs)
{
DEBUG((", concealed %d\n", decPicture.nbrOfErrMBs));
}
else
DEBUG(("\n"));
fflush(stdout);
numErrors += decPicture.nbrOfErrMBs;
/* Increment display number for every displayed picture */
picDisplayNumber++;
/* Write output picture to file */
imageData = (u8*)decPicture.pOutputPicture;
if (cropDisplay && decInfo.croppingFlag)
{
tmp = CropPicture(tmpImage, imageData,
decInfo.picWidth, decInfo.picHeight,
&decInfo.cropParams);
if (tmp)
return -1;
WriteOutput(outFileName, tmpImage, picSize);
}
else
{
WriteOutput(outFileName, imageData, picSize);
}
}
/* release decoder instance */
H264SwDecRelease(decInst);
if (foutput)
fclose(foutput);
/* free allocated buffers */
free(byteStrmStart);
free(tmpImage);
DEBUG(("Output file: %s\n", outFileName));
DEBUG(("DECODING DONE\n"));
if (numErrors || picDecodeNumber == 1)
{
DEBUG(("ERRORS FOUND\n"));
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_invlpg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
ulong linear;
rc = linearize(ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem, 1, false, &linear);
if (rc == X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
ctxt->ops->invlpg(ctxt, linear);
/* Disable writeback. */
ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderProcessHostImpl::GetSpareRenderProcessHostForTesting() {
return g_spare_render_process_host_manager.Get().spare_render_process_host();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType ClampImage(Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
status=ClampImageChannel(image,DefaultChannels);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1609
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 89,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_sync_fs(struct super_block *sb, int wait)
{
int ret = 0;
tid_t target;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
trace_ext4_sync_fs(sb, wait);
flush_workqueue(sbi->dio_unwritten_wq);
if (jbd2_journal_start_commit(sbi->s_journal, &target)) {
if (wait)
jbd2_log_wait_commit(sbi->s_journal, target);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,529
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int tcp_dupack_heuristics(const struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
return tcp_is_fack(tp) ? tp->fackets_out : tp->sacked_out + 1;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 41,144
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: write_png(struct display *dp, png_infop ip, int transforms)
{
display_clean_write(dp); /* safety */
buffer_start_write(&dp->written_file);
dp->operation = "write";
dp->transforms = transforms;
dp->write_pp = png_create_write_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, dp,
display_error, display_warning);
if (dp->write_pp == NULL)
display_log(dp, APP_ERROR, "failed to create write png_struct");
png_set_write_fn(dp->write_pp, &dp->written_file, write_function,
NULL/*flush*/);
# ifdef PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
/* Remove the user limits, if any */
png_set_user_limits(dp->write_pp, 0x7fffffff, 0x7fffffff);
# endif
/* Certain transforms require the png_info to be zapped to allow the
* transform to work correctly.
*/
if (transforms & (PNG_TRANSFORM_PACKING|
PNG_TRANSFORM_STRIP_FILLER|
PNG_TRANSFORM_STRIP_FILLER_BEFORE))
{
int ct = dp->color_type;
if (transforms & (PNG_TRANSFORM_STRIP_FILLER|
PNG_TRANSFORM_STRIP_FILLER_BEFORE))
ct &= ~PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA;
png_set_IHDR(dp->write_pp, ip, dp->width, dp->height, dp->bit_depth, ct,
dp->interlace_method, dp->compression_method, dp->filter_method);
}
png_write_png(dp->write_pp, ip, transforms, NULL/*params*/);
/* Clean it on the way out - if control returns to the caller then the
* written_file contains the required data.
*/
display_clean_write(dp);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fmov_idx_reg(struct sh_fpu_soft_struct *fregs, struct pt_regs *regs, int m,
int n)
{
if (FPSCR_SZ) {
FMOV_EXT(n);
READ(FRn, Rm + R0 + 4);
n++;
READ(FRn, Rm + R0);
} else {
READ(FRn, Rm + R0);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayerTreeHostTestDeferCommits()
: num_will_begin_impl_frame_(0), num_send_begin_main_frame_(0) {}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,432
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HistoryQuickProvider::HistoryQuickProvider(ACProviderListener* listener,
Profile* profile)
: HistoryProvider(listener, profile, "HistoryQuickProvider"),
languages_(profile_->GetPrefs()->GetString(prefs::kAcceptLanguages)) {
enum InliningOption {
INLINING_PROHIBITED = 0,
INLINING_ALLOWED = 1,
INLINING_AUTO_BUT_NOT_IN_FIELD_TRIAL = 2,
INLINING_FIELD_TRIAL_DEFAULT_GROUP = 3,
INLINING_FIELD_TRIAL_EXPERIMENT_GROUP = 4,
NUM_OPTIONS = 5
};
InliningOption inlining_option = NUM_OPTIONS;
const std::string switch_value = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->
GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kOmniboxInlineHistoryQuickProvider);
if (switch_value == switches::kOmniboxInlineHistoryQuickProviderAllowed) {
inlining_option = INLINING_ALLOWED;
always_prevent_inline_autocomplete_ = false;
} else if (switch_value ==
switches::kOmniboxInlineHistoryQuickProviderProhibited) {
inlining_option = INLINING_PROHIBITED;
always_prevent_inline_autocomplete_ = true;
} else {
DCHECK(!content::BrowserThread::IsWellKnownThread(
content::BrowserThread::UI) ||
content::BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(content::BrowserThread::UI));
if (AutocompleteFieldTrial::InDisallowInlineHQPFieldTrial()) {
if (AutocompleteFieldTrial::
InDisallowInlineHQPFieldTrialExperimentGroup()) {
always_prevent_inline_autocomplete_ = true;
inlining_option = INLINING_FIELD_TRIAL_EXPERIMENT_GROUP;
} else {
always_prevent_inline_autocomplete_ = false;
inlining_option = INLINING_FIELD_TRIAL_DEFAULT_GROUP;
}
} else {
always_prevent_inline_autocomplete_ = false;
inlining_option = INLINING_AUTO_BUT_NOT_IN_FIELD_TRIAL;
}
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
"Omnibox.InlineHistoryQuickProviderFieldTrialBeacon",
inlining_option, NUM_OPTIONS);
}
Commit Message: Fix icon returned for HQP matches; the two icons were reversed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9695022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126296 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptPromise ReadableStreamReader::cancel(ScriptState* scriptState)
{
return cancel(scriptState, ScriptValue(scriptState, v8::Undefined(scriptState->isolate())));
}
Commit Message: Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,348
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OnNaClCreateTemporaryFile(
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
pnacl_file_host::CreateTemporaryFile(this, reply_msg);
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int handle_revision_arg(const char *arg_, struct rev_info *revs, int flags, unsigned revarg_opt)
{
struct object_context oc;
char *dotdot;
struct object *object;
unsigned char sha1[20];
int local_flags;
const char *arg = arg_;
int cant_be_filename = revarg_opt & REVARG_CANNOT_BE_FILENAME;
unsigned get_sha1_flags = 0;
flags = flags & UNINTERESTING ? flags | BOTTOM : flags & ~BOTTOM;
dotdot = strstr(arg, "..");
if (dotdot) {
unsigned char from_sha1[20];
const char *next = dotdot + 2;
const char *this = arg;
int symmetric = *next == '.';
unsigned int flags_exclude = flags ^ (UNINTERESTING | BOTTOM);
static const char head_by_default[] = "HEAD";
unsigned int a_flags;
*dotdot = 0;
next += symmetric;
if (!*next)
next = head_by_default;
if (dotdot == arg)
this = head_by_default;
if (this == head_by_default && next == head_by_default &&
!symmetric) {
/*
* Just ".."? That is not a range but the
* pathspec for the parent directory.
*/
if (!cant_be_filename) {
*dotdot = '.';
return -1;
}
}
if (!get_sha1_committish(this, from_sha1) &&
!get_sha1_committish(next, sha1)) {
struct object *a_obj, *b_obj;
if (!cant_be_filename) {
*dotdot = '.';
verify_non_filename(revs->prefix, arg);
}
a_obj = parse_object(from_sha1);
b_obj = parse_object(sha1);
if (!a_obj || !b_obj) {
missing:
if (revs->ignore_missing)
return 0;
die(symmetric
? "Invalid symmetric difference expression %s"
: "Invalid revision range %s", arg);
}
if (!symmetric) {
/* just A..B */
a_flags = flags_exclude;
} else {
/* A...B -- find merge bases between the two */
struct commit *a, *b;
struct commit_list *exclude;
a = (a_obj->type == OBJ_COMMIT
? (struct commit *)a_obj
: lookup_commit_reference(a_obj->oid.hash));
b = (b_obj->type == OBJ_COMMIT
? (struct commit *)b_obj
: lookup_commit_reference(b_obj->oid.hash));
if (!a || !b)
goto missing;
exclude = get_merge_bases(a, b);
add_rev_cmdline_list(revs, exclude,
REV_CMD_MERGE_BASE,
flags_exclude);
add_pending_commit_list(revs, exclude,
flags_exclude);
free_commit_list(exclude);
a_flags = flags | SYMMETRIC_LEFT;
}
a_obj->flags |= a_flags;
b_obj->flags |= flags;
add_rev_cmdline(revs, a_obj, this,
REV_CMD_LEFT, a_flags);
add_rev_cmdline(revs, b_obj, next,
REV_CMD_RIGHT, flags);
add_pending_object(revs, a_obj, this);
add_pending_object(revs, b_obj, next);
return 0;
}
*dotdot = '.';
}
dotdot = strstr(arg, "^@");
if (dotdot && !dotdot[2]) {
*dotdot = 0;
if (add_parents_only(revs, arg, flags))
return 0;
*dotdot = '^';
}
dotdot = strstr(arg, "^!");
if (dotdot && !dotdot[2]) {
*dotdot = 0;
if (!add_parents_only(revs, arg, flags ^ (UNINTERESTING | BOTTOM)))
*dotdot = '^';
}
local_flags = 0;
if (*arg == '^') {
local_flags = UNINTERESTING | BOTTOM;
arg++;
}
if (revarg_opt & REVARG_COMMITTISH)
get_sha1_flags = GET_SHA1_COMMITTISH;
if (get_sha1_with_context(arg, get_sha1_flags, sha1, &oc))
return revs->ignore_missing ? 0 : -1;
if (!cant_be_filename)
verify_non_filename(revs->prefix, arg);
object = get_reference(revs, arg, sha1, flags ^ local_flags);
add_rev_cmdline(revs, object, arg_, REV_CMD_REV, flags ^ local_flags);
add_pending_object_with_mode(revs, object, arg, oc.mode);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,006
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned lodepng_encode_file(const char* filename, const unsigned char* image, unsigned w, unsigned h,
LodePNGColorType colortype, unsigned bitdepth)
{
unsigned char* buffer = NULL;
size_t buffersize = 0;
unsigned error = lodepng_encode_memory(&buffer, &buffersize, image, w, h, colortype, bitdepth);
if(!error) error = lodepng_save_file(buffer, buffersize, filename);
free(buffer);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentRendererClient::DidDestroyScriptContext(WebFrame* frame) {
EventBindings::HandleContextDestroyed(frame);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->src_reg);
else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM) {
verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%x\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
} else {
verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
verbose("(%02x) call %d\n", insn->code, insn->imm);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->off);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->imm, insn->off);
}
} else {
verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
}
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 53,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::OnNavigationRequestWillBeSent(
const NavigationRequest& navigation_request) {
DispatchToAgents(navigation_request.frame_tree_node(),
&protocol::NetworkHandler::NavigationRequestWillBeSent,
navigation_request);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit lz4_mod_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_alg(&alg_lz4);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int opfimul(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY ) {
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_DWORD ) {
data[l++] = 0xda;
data[l++] = 0x08 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_WORD ) {
data[l++] = 0xde;
data[l++] = 0x08 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
return -1;
}
} else {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: peek_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr, addr_t data)
{
addr_t tmp, mask;
/*
* Stupid gdb peeks/pokes the access registers in 64 bit with
* an alignment of 4. Programmers from hell...
*/
mask = __ADDR_MASK;
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
if (addr >= (addr_t) &((struct user *) NULL)->regs.acrs &&
addr < (addr_t) &((struct user *) NULL)->regs.orig_gpr2)
mask = 3;
#endif
if ((addr & mask) || addr > sizeof(struct user) - __ADDR_MASK)
return -EIO;
tmp = __peek_user(child, addr);
return put_user(tmp, (addr_t __user *) data);
}
Commit Message: s390/ptrace: fix PSW mask check
The PSW mask check of the PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA command is incorrect.
The PSW_MASK_USER define contains the PSW_MASK_ASC bits, the ptrace
interface accepts all combinations for the address-space-control
bits. To protect the kernel space the PSW mask check in ptrace needs
to reject the address-space-control bit combination for home space.
Fixes CVE-2014-3534
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 38,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void base_audio_entry_dump(GF_AudioSampleEntryBox *p, FILE * trace)
{
fprintf(trace, " DataReferenceIndex=\"%d\" SampleRate=\"%d\"", p->dataReferenceIndex, p->samplerate_hi);
fprintf(trace, " Channels=\"%d\" BitsPerSample=\"%d\"", p->channel_count, p->bitspersample);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SecurityOrigin* DocumentThreadableLoader::getSecurityOrigin() const
{
return m_securityOrigin ? m_securityOrigin.get() : document().getSecurityOrigin();
}
Commit Message: DocumentThreadableLoader: Add guards for sync notifyFinished() in setResource()
In loadRequest(), setResource() can call clear() synchronously:
DocumentThreadableLoader::clear()
DocumentThreadableLoader::handleError()
Resource::didAddClient()
RawResource::didAddClient()
and thus |m_client| can be null while resource() isn't null after setResource(),
causing crashes (Issue 595964).
This CL checks whether |*this| is destructed and
whether |m_client| is null after setResource().
BUG=595964
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1902683002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391001}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 119,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err pasp_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_PixelAspectRatioBox *ptr = (GF_PixelAspectRatioBox*)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "PixelAspectRatioBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "hSpacing=\"%d\" vSpacing=\"%d\" >\n", ptr->hSpacing, ptr->vSpacing);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("PixelAspectRatioBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,814
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppListController::AppListClosing() {
FreeAnyKeepAliveForView();
current_view_ = NULL;
view_delegate_ = NULL;
SetProfile(NULL);
timer_.Stop();
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 113,605
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jbd2_journal_stop(handle_t *handle)
{
transaction_t *transaction = handle->h_transaction;
journal_t *journal = transaction->t_journal;
int err, wait_for_commit = 0;
tid_t tid;
pid_t pid;
J_ASSERT(journal_current_handle() == handle);
if (is_handle_aborted(handle))
err = -EIO;
else {
J_ASSERT(atomic_read(&transaction->t_updates) > 0);
err = 0;
}
if (--handle->h_ref > 0) {
jbd_debug(4, "h_ref %d -> %d\n", handle->h_ref + 1,
handle->h_ref);
return err;
}
jbd_debug(4, "Handle %p going down\n", handle);
/*
* Implement synchronous transaction batching. If the handle
* was synchronous, don't force a commit immediately. Let's
* yield and let another thread piggyback onto this
* transaction. Keep doing that while new threads continue to
* arrive. It doesn't cost much - we're about to run a commit
* and sleep on IO anyway. Speeds up many-threaded, many-dir
* operations by 30x or more...
*
* We try and optimize the sleep time against what the
* underlying disk can do, instead of having a static sleep
* time. This is useful for the case where our storage is so
* fast that it is more optimal to go ahead and force a flush
* and wait for the transaction to be committed than it is to
* wait for an arbitrary amount of time for new writers to
* join the transaction. We achieve this by measuring how
* long it takes to commit a transaction, and compare it with
* how long this transaction has been running, and if run time
* < commit time then we sleep for the delta and commit. This
* greatly helps super fast disks that would see slowdowns as
* more threads started doing fsyncs.
*
* But don't do this if this process was the most recent one
* to perform a synchronous write. We do this to detect the
* case where a single process is doing a stream of sync
* writes. No point in waiting for joiners in that case.
*/
pid = current->pid;
if (handle->h_sync && journal->j_last_sync_writer != pid) {
u64 commit_time, trans_time;
journal->j_last_sync_writer = pid;
read_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
commit_time = journal->j_average_commit_time;
read_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
trans_time = ktime_to_ns(ktime_sub(ktime_get(),
transaction->t_start_time));
commit_time = max_t(u64, commit_time,
1000*journal->j_min_batch_time);
commit_time = min_t(u64, commit_time,
1000*journal->j_max_batch_time);
if (trans_time < commit_time) {
ktime_t expires = ktime_add_ns(ktime_get(),
commit_time);
set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
schedule_hrtimeout(&expires, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
}
}
if (handle->h_sync)
transaction->t_synchronous_commit = 1;
current->journal_info = NULL;
atomic_sub(handle->h_buffer_credits,
&transaction->t_outstanding_credits);
/*
* If the handle is marked SYNC, we need to set another commit
* going! We also want to force a commit if the current
* transaction is occupying too much of the log, or if the
* transaction is too old now.
*/
if (handle->h_sync ||
(atomic_read(&transaction->t_outstanding_credits) >
journal->j_max_transaction_buffers) ||
time_after_eq(jiffies, transaction->t_expires)) {
/* Do this even for aborted journals: an abort still
* completes the commit thread, it just doesn't write
* anything to disk. */
jbd_debug(2, "transaction too old, requesting commit for "
"handle %p\n", handle);
/* This is non-blocking */
jbd2_log_start_commit(journal, transaction->t_tid);
/*
* Special case: JBD2_SYNC synchronous updates require us
* to wait for the commit to complete.
*/
if (handle->h_sync && !(current->flags & PF_MEMALLOC))
wait_for_commit = 1;
}
/*
* Once we drop t_updates, if it goes to zero the transaction
* could start committing on us and eventually disappear. So
* once we do this, we must not dereference transaction
* pointer again.
*/
tid = transaction->t_tid;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&transaction->t_updates)) {
wake_up(&journal->j_wait_updates);
if (journal->j_barrier_count)
wake_up(&journal->j_wait_transaction_locked);
}
if (wait_for_commit)
err = jbd2_log_wait_commit(journal, tid);
lock_map_release(&handle->h_lockdep_map);
jbd2_free_handle(handle);
return err;
}
Commit Message: jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a buffer marked unwritten or delay, then it's
a live one. Perhaps those spots should check whether it is mapped
as well, but if jbd2 is going to tear down a buffer, let's really
tear it down completely.
Without this I get some fsx failures on sub-page-block filesystems
up until v3.2, at which point 4e96b2dbbf1d7e81f22047a50f862555a6cb87cb
and 189e868fa8fdca702eb9db9d8afc46b5cb9144c9 make the failures go
away, because buried within that large change is some more flag
clearing. I still think it's worth doing in jbd2, since
->invalidatepage leads here directly, and it's the right place
to clear away these flags.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bgp_vpn_ip_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, u_int addr_length)
{
/* worst case string is s fully formatted v6 address */
static char addr[sizeof("1234:5678:89ab:cdef:1234:5678:89ab:cdef")];
char *pos = addr;
switch(addr_length) {
case (sizeof(struct in_addr) << 3): /* 32 */
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
snprintf(pos, sizeof(addr), "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, pptr));
break;
case (sizeof(struct in6_addr) << 3): /* 128 */
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
snprintf(pos, sizeof(addr), "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, pptr));
break;
default:
snprintf(pos, sizeof(addr), "bogus address length %u", addr_length);
break;
}
pos += strlen(pos);
trunc:
*(pos) = '\0';
return (addr);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13053/BGP: fix VPN route target bounds checks
decode_rt_routing_info() didn't check bounds before fetching 4 octets of
the origin AS field and could over-read the input buffer, put it right.
It also fetched the varying number of octets of the route target field
from 4 octets lower than the correct offset, put it right.
It also used the same temporary buffer explicitly through as_printf()
and implicitly through bgp_vpn_rd_print() so the end result of snprintf()
was not what was originally intended.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,252
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::initEncoder() {
CHECK(!mStarted);
OMX_ERRORTYPE errType = OMX_ErrorNone;
if (OMX_ErrorNone != (errType = initEncParams())) {
ALOGE("Failed to initialized encoder params");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return errType;
}
if (!PVInitVideoEncoder(mHandle, mEncParams)) {
ALOGE("Failed to initialize the encoder");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumInputFrames = -1; // 1st buffer for codec specific data
mStarted = true;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: SoftMPEG4: Check the buffer size before writing the reference frame.
Also prevent overflow in SoftMPEG4 and division by zero in SoftMPEG4Encoder.
Bug: 30033990
Change-Id: I7701f5fc54c2670587d122330e5dc851f64ed3c2
(cherry picked from commit 695123195034402ca76169b195069c28c30342d3)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 158,110
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: brcmf_bss_roaming_done(struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg,
struct net_device *ndev,
const struct brcmf_event_msg *e)
{
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
struct brcmf_cfg80211_profile *profile = &ifp->vif->profile;
struct brcmf_cfg80211_connect_info *conn_info = cfg_to_conn(cfg);
struct wiphy *wiphy = cfg_to_wiphy(cfg);
struct ieee80211_channel *notify_channel = NULL;
struct ieee80211_supported_band *band;
struct brcmf_bss_info_le *bi;
struct brcmu_chan ch;
struct cfg80211_roam_info roam_info = {};
u32 freq;
s32 err = 0;
u8 *buf;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
brcmf_get_assoc_ies(cfg, ifp);
memcpy(profile->bssid, e->addr, ETH_ALEN);
brcmf_update_bss_info(cfg, ifp);
buf = kzalloc(WL_BSS_INFO_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
if (buf == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto done;
}
/* data sent to dongle has to be little endian */
*(__le32 *)buf = cpu_to_le32(WL_BSS_INFO_MAX);
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_data_get(ifp, BRCMF_C_GET_BSS_INFO,
buf, WL_BSS_INFO_MAX);
if (err)
goto done;
bi = (struct brcmf_bss_info_le *)(buf + 4);
ch.chspec = le16_to_cpu(bi->chanspec);
cfg->d11inf.decchspec(&ch);
if (ch.band == BRCMU_CHAN_BAND_2G)
band = wiphy->bands[NL80211_BAND_2GHZ];
else
band = wiphy->bands[NL80211_BAND_5GHZ];
freq = ieee80211_channel_to_frequency(ch.control_ch_num, band->band);
notify_channel = ieee80211_get_channel(wiphy, freq);
done:
kfree(buf);
roam_info.channel = notify_channel;
roam_info.bssid = profile->bssid;
roam_info.req_ie = conn_info->req_ie;
roam_info.req_ie_len = conn_info->req_ie_len;
roam_info.resp_ie = conn_info->resp_ie;
roam_info.resp_ie_len = conn_info->resp_ie_len;
cfg80211_roamed(ndev, &roam_info, GFP_KERNEL);
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "Report roaming result\n");
set_bit(BRCMF_VIF_STATUS_CONNECTED, &ifp->vif->sme_state);
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Exit\n");
return err;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()
The lower level nl80211 code in cfg80211 ensures that "len" is between
25 and NL80211_ATTR_FRAME (2304). We subtract DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN (24) from
"len" so thats's max of 2280. However, the action_frame->data[] buffer is
only BRCMF_FIL_ACTION_FRAME_SIZE (1800) bytes long so this memcpy() can
overflow.
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9.x
Fixes: 18e2f61db3b70 ("brcmfmac: P2P action frame tx.")
Reported-by: "freenerguo(郭大兴)" <freenerguo@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 67,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::OnFirstMeaningfulPaint() {
TRACE_EVENT0(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("renderer.scheduler"),
"RendererSchedulerImpl::OnFirstMeaningfulPaint");
base::AutoLock lock(any_thread_lock_);
any_thread().waiting_for_meaningful_paint = false;
UpdatePolicyLocked(UpdateType::kMayEarlyOutIfPolicyUnchanged);
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 143,438
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::DrawRangeElements(GLenum mode,
GLuint start,
GLuint end,
GLsizei count,
GLenum type,
const void* indices) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glDrawRangeElements("
<< GLES2Util::GetStringDrawMode(mode) << ", " << start
<< ", " << end << ", " << count << ", "
<< GLES2Util::GetStringIndexType(type) << ", "
<< static_cast<const void*>(indices) << ")");
if (end < start) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawRangeElements", "end < start");
return;
}
DrawElementsImpl(mode, count, type, indices, "glDrawRangeElements");
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,944
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void prb_init_ft_ops(struct tpacket_kbdq_core *p1,
union tpacket_req_u *req_u)
{
p1->feature_req_word = req_u->req3.tp_feature_req_word;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcPolyArc(ClientPtr client)
{
int narcs;
GC *pGC;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
REQUEST(xPolyArcReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xPolyArcReq);
VALIDATE_DRAWABLE_AND_GC(stuff->drawable, pDraw, DixWriteAccess);
narcs = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xPolyArcReq);
if (narcs % sizeof(xArc))
return BadLength;
narcs /= sizeof(xArc);
if (narcs)
(*pGC->ops->PolyArc) (pDraw, pGC, narcs, (xArc *) &stuff[1]);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 14,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ExecuteInsertBacktab(LocalFrame& frame,
Event* event,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
return TargetFrame(frame, event)
->GetEventHandler()
.HandleTextInputEvent("\t", event);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct hlist_head *rds_conn_bucket(__be32 laddr, __be32 faddr)
{
static u32 rds_hash_secret __read_mostly;
unsigned long hash;
net_get_random_once(&rds_hash_secret, sizeof(rds_hash_secret));
/* Pass NULL, don't need struct net for hash */
hash = __inet_ehashfn(be32_to_cpu(laddr), 0,
be32_to_cpu(faddr), 0,
rds_hash_secret);
return &rds_conn_hash[hash & RDS_CONNECTION_HASH_MASK];
}
Commit Message: RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on unbound socket
Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when
sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused
by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks
the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a
race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not
in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to
dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create().
Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if
you're interested.
I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer
with this patch, whereas I could without.
Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937:
74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection")
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 41,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_write_indirect_mbox(struct tg3 *tp, u32 off, u32 val)
{
unsigned long flags;
if (off == (MAILBOX_RCVRET_CON_IDX_0 + TG3_64BIT_REG_LOW)) {
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_RCV_RET_RING_CON_IDX +
TG3_64BIT_REG_LOW, val);
return;
}
if (off == TG3_RX_STD_PROD_IDX_REG) {
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_STD_RING_PROD_IDX +
TG3_64BIT_REG_LOW, val);
return;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->indirect_lock, flags);
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_REG_BASE_ADDR, off + 0x5600);
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_REG_DATA, val);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->indirect_lock, flags);
/* In indirect mode when disabling interrupts, we also need
* to clear the interrupt bit in the GRC local ctrl register.
*/
if ((off == (MAILBOX_INTERRUPT_0 + TG3_64BIT_REG_LOW)) &&
(val == 0x1)) {
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_MISC_LOCAL_CTRL,
tp->grc_local_ctrl|GRC_LCLCTRL_CLEARINT);
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StackDumpSignalHandler(int signal, siginfo_t* info, void* void_context) {
in_signal_handler = 1;
if (BeingDebugged())
BreakDebugger();
PrintToStderr("Received signal ");
char buf[1024] = { 0 };
internal::itoa_r(signal, buf, sizeof(buf), 10, 0);
PrintToStderr(buf);
if (signal == SIGBUS) {
if (info->si_code == BUS_ADRALN)
PrintToStderr(" BUS_ADRALN ");
else if (info->si_code == BUS_ADRERR)
PrintToStderr(" BUS_ADRERR ");
else if (info->si_code == BUS_OBJERR)
PrintToStderr(" BUS_OBJERR ");
else
PrintToStderr(" <unknown> ");
} else if (signal == SIGFPE) {
if (info->si_code == FPE_FLTDIV)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_FLTDIV ");
else if (info->si_code == FPE_FLTINV)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_FLTINV ");
else if (info->si_code == FPE_FLTOVF)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_FLTOVF ");
else if (info->si_code == FPE_FLTRES)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_FLTRES ");
else if (info->si_code == FPE_FLTSUB)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_FLTSUB ");
else if (info->si_code == FPE_FLTUND)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_FLTUND ");
else if (info->si_code == FPE_INTDIV)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_INTDIV ");
else if (info->si_code == FPE_INTOVF)
PrintToStderr(" FPE_INTOVF ");
else
PrintToStderr(" <unknown> ");
} else if (signal == SIGILL) {
if (info->si_code == ILL_BADSTK)
PrintToStderr(" ILL_BADSTK ");
else if (info->si_code == ILL_COPROC)
PrintToStderr(" ILL_COPROC ");
else if (info->si_code == ILL_ILLOPN)
PrintToStderr(" ILL_ILLOPN ");
else if (info->si_code == ILL_ILLADR)
PrintToStderr(" ILL_ILLADR ");
else if (info->si_code == ILL_ILLTRP)
PrintToStderr(" ILL_ILLTRP ");
else if (info->si_code == ILL_PRVOPC)
PrintToStderr(" ILL_PRVOPC ");
else if (info->si_code == ILL_PRVREG)
PrintToStderr(" ILL_PRVREG ");
else
PrintToStderr(" <unknown> ");
} else if (signal == SIGSEGV) {
if (info->si_code == SEGV_MAPERR)
PrintToStderr(" SEGV_MAPERR ");
else if (info->si_code == SEGV_ACCERR)
PrintToStderr(" SEGV_ACCERR ");
else
PrintToStderr(" <unknown> ");
}
if (signal == SIGBUS || signal == SIGFPE ||
signal == SIGILL || signal == SIGSEGV) {
internal::itoa_r(reinterpret_cast<intptr_t>(info->si_addr),
buf, sizeof(buf), 16, 12);
PrintToStderr(buf);
}
PrintToStderr("\n");
debug::StackTrace().Print();
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
#if ARCH_CPU_X86_FAMILY
ucontext_t* context = reinterpret_cast<ucontext_t*>(void_context);
const struct {
const char* label;
greg_t value;
} registers[] = {
#if ARCH_CPU_32_BITS
{ " gs: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_GS] },
{ " fs: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_FS] },
{ " es: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ES] },
{ " ds: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_DS] },
{ " edi: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EDI] },
{ " esi: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ESI] },
{ " ebp: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EBP] },
{ " esp: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ESP] },
{ " ebx: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EBX] },
{ " edx: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EDX] },
{ " ecx: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ECX] },
{ " eax: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EAX] },
{ " trp: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO] },
{ " err: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ERR] },
{ " ip: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EIP] },
{ " cs: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_CS] },
{ " efl: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EFL] },
{ " usp: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_UESP] },
{ " ss: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SS] },
#elif ARCH_CPU_64_BITS
{ " r8: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R8] },
{ " r9: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R9] },
{ " r10: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R10] },
{ " r11: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R11] },
{ " r12: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R12] },
{ " r13: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R13] },
{ " r14: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R14] },
{ " r15: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R15] },
{ " di: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RDI] },
{ " si: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RSI] },
{ " bp: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RBP] },
{ " bx: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RBX] },
{ " dx: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RDX] },
{ " ax: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RAX] },
{ " cx: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RCX] },
{ " sp: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RSP] },
{ " ip: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP] },
{ " efl: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EFL] },
{ " cgf: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_CSGSFS] },
{ " erf: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ERR] },
{ " trp: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO] },
{ " msk: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_OLDMASK] },
{ " cr2: ", context->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_CR2] },
#endif
};
#if ARCH_CPU_32_BITS
const int kRegisterPadding = 8;
#elif ARCH_CPU_64_BITS
const int kRegisterPadding = 16;
#endif
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE(registers); i++) {
PrintToStderr(registers[i].label);
internal::itoa_r(registers[i].value, buf, sizeof(buf),
16, kRegisterPadding);
PrintToStderr(buf);
if ((i + 1) % 4 == 0)
PrintToStderr("\n");
}
PrintToStderr("\n");
#endif
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
#if ARCH_CPU_X86_FAMILY && ARCH_CPU_32_BITS
ucontext_t* context = reinterpret_cast<ucontext_t*>(void_context);
size_t len;
len = static_cast<size_t>(
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"ax: %x, bx: %x, cx: %x, dx: %x\n",
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__eax,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__ebx,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__ecx,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__edx));
write(STDERR_FILENO, buf, std::min(len, sizeof(buf) - 1));
len = static_cast<size_t>(
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"di: %x, si: %x, bp: %x, sp: %x, ss: %x, flags: %x\n",
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__edi,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__esi,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__ebp,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__esp,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__ss,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__eflags));
write(STDERR_FILENO, buf, std::min(len, sizeof(buf) - 1));
len = static_cast<size_t>(
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"ip: %x, cs: %x, ds: %x, es: %x, fs: %x, gs: %x\n",
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__eip,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__cs,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__ds,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__es,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__fs,
context->uc_mcontext->__ss.__gs));
write(STDERR_FILENO, buf, std::min(len, sizeof(buf) - 1));
#endif // ARCH_CPU_32_BITS
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
_exit(1);
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 171,162
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_read_stsc(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
MOVStreamContext *sc;
unsigned int i, entries;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
sc = st->priv_data;
avio_r8(pb); /* version */
avio_rb24(pb); /* flags */
entries = avio_rb32(pb);
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_TRACE, "track[%u].stsc.entries = %u\n", c->fc->nb_streams - 1, entries);
if (!entries)
return 0;
if (sc->stsc_data)
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Duplicated STSC atom\n");
av_free(sc->stsc_data);
sc->stsc_count = 0;
sc->stsc_data = av_malloc_array(entries, sizeof(*sc->stsc_data));
if (!sc->stsc_data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
for (i = 0; i < entries && !pb->eof_reached; i++) {
sc->stsc_data[i].first = avio_rb32(pb);
sc->stsc_data[i].count = avio_rb32(pb);
sc->stsc_data[i].id = avio_rb32(pb);
}
sc->stsc_count = i;
if (pb->eof_reached)
return AVERROR_EOF;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool JSTestEventTarget::getOwnPropertySlotByIndex(JSCell* cell, ExecState* exec, unsigned propertyName, PropertySlot& slot)
{
JSTestEventTarget* thisObject = jsCast<JSTestEventTarget*>(cell);
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(thisObject, &s_info);
if (propertyName < static_cast<TestEventTarget*>(thisObject->impl())->length()) {
slot.setCustomIndex(thisObject, propertyName, thisObject->indexGetter);
return true;
}
return thisObject->methodTable()->getOwnPropertySlot(thisObject, exec, Identifier::from(exec, propertyName), slot);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static EVP_PKEY * php_openssl_generate_private_key(struct php_x509_request * req)
{
char * randfile = NULL;
int egdsocket, seeded;
EVP_PKEY * return_val = NULL;
if (req->priv_key_bits < MIN_KEY_LENGTH) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "private key length is too short; it needs to be at least %d bits, not %d",
MIN_KEY_LENGTH, req->priv_key_bits);
return NULL;
}
randfile = CONF_get_string(req->req_config, req->section_name, "RANDFILE");
php_openssl_load_rand_file(randfile, &egdsocket, &seeded);
if ((req->priv_key = EVP_PKEY_new()) != NULL) {
switch(req->priv_key_type) {
case OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_RSA:
{
RSA* rsaparam;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000L
/* OpenSSL 1.0.2 deprecates RSA_generate_key */
PHP_OPENSSL_RAND_ADD_TIME();
rsaparam = (RSA*)RSA_generate_key(req->priv_key_bits, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
#else
{
BIGNUM *bne = (BIGNUM *)BN_new();
if (BN_set_word(bne, RSA_F4) != 1) {
BN_free(bne);
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "failed setting exponent");
return NULL;
}
rsaparam = RSA_new();
PHP_OPENSSL_RAND_ADD_TIME();
RSA_generate_key_ex(rsaparam, req->priv_key_bits, bne, NULL);
BN_free(bne);
}
#endif
if (rsaparam && EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(req->priv_key, rsaparam)) {
return_val = req->priv_key;
}
}
break;
#if !defined(NO_DSA)
case OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DSA:
PHP_OPENSSL_RAND_ADD_TIME();
{
DSA *dsaparam = DSA_new();
if (dsaparam && DSA_generate_parameters_ex(dsaparam, req->priv_key_bits, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
DSA_set_method(dsaparam, DSA_get_default_method());
if (DSA_generate_key(dsaparam)) {
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(req->priv_key, dsaparam)) {
return_val = req->priv_key;
}
} else {
DSA_free(dsaparam);
}
}
}
break;
#endif
#if !defined(NO_DH)
case OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DH:
PHP_OPENSSL_RAND_ADD_TIME();
{
int codes = 0;
DH *dhparam = DH_new();
if (dhparam && DH_generate_parameters_ex(dhparam, req->priv_key_bits, 2, NULL)) {
DH_set_method(dhparam, DH_get_default_method());
if (DH_check(dhparam, &codes) && codes == 0 && DH_generate_key(dhparam)) {
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(req->priv_key, dhparam)) {
return_val = req->priv_key;
}
} else {
DH_free(dhparam);
}
}
}
break;
#endif
default:
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unsupported private key type");
}
}
php_openssl_write_rand_file(randfile, egdsocket, seeded);
if (return_val == NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(req->priv_key);
req->priv_key = NULL;
return NULL;
}
return return_val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 4,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int init_user_reserve(void)
{
unsigned long free_kbytes;
free_kbytes = global_zone_page_state(NR_FREE_PAGES) << (PAGE_SHIFT - 10);
sysctl_user_reserve_kbytes = min(free_kbytes / 32, 1UL << 17);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,572
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UNCURL_EXPORT int32_t uncurl_connect(struct uncurl_tls_ctx *uc_tls, struct uncurl_conn *ucc,
int32_t scheme, char *host, uint16_t port)
{
int32_t e;
ucc->host = strdup(host);
ucc->port = port;
char ip4[LEN_IP4];
e = net_getip4(ucc->host, ip4, LEN_IP4);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
e = net_connect(&ucc->net, ip4, ucc->port, &ucc->nopts);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
uncurl_attach_net(ucc);
if (scheme == UNCURL_HTTPS || scheme == UNCURL_WSS) {
if (!uc_tls) return UNCURL_TLS_ERR_CONTEXT;
e = tls_connect(&ucc->tls, uc_tls->tlss, ucc->net, ucc->host, &ucc->topts);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
uncurl_attach_tls(ucc);
}
return UNCURL_OK;
}
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
CWE ID: CWE-352
| 0
| 84,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
int ret;
uint16_t extracted_ethertype;
u_int dlci;
u_int addr_len;
uint16_t nlpid;
u_int hdr_len;
uint8_t flags[4];
ret = parse_q922_addr(ndo, p, &dlci, &addr_len, flags, length);
if (ret == -1)
goto trunc;
if (ret == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Q.922, invalid address"));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK(p[addr_len]);
if (length < addr_len + 1)
goto trunc;
if (p[addr_len] != LLC_UI && dlci != 0) {
/*
* Let's figure out if we have Cisco-style encapsulation,
* with an Ethernet type (Cisco HDLC type?) following the
* address.
*/
if (!ND_TTEST2(p[addr_len], 2) || length < addr_len + 2) {
/* no Ethertype */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "UI %02x! ", p[addr_len]));
} else {
extracted_ethertype = EXTRACT_16BITS(p+addr_len);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
fr_hdr_print(ndo, length, addr_len, dlci,
flags, extracted_ethertype);
if (ethertype_print(ndo, extracted_ethertype,
p+addr_len+ETHERTYPE_LEN,
length-addr_len-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
ndo->ndo_snapend-p-addr_len-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
NULL, NULL) == 0)
/* ether_type not known, probably it wasn't one */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "UI %02x! ", p[addr_len]));
else
return addr_len + 2;
}
}
ND_TCHECK(p[addr_len+1]);
if (length < addr_len + 2)
goto trunc;
if (p[addr_len + 1] == 0) {
/*
* Assume a pad byte after the control (UI) byte.
* A pad byte should only be used with 3-byte Q.922.
*/
if (addr_len != 3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Pad! "));
hdr_len = addr_len + 1 /* UI */ + 1 /* pad */ + 1 /* NLPID */;
} else {
/*
* Not a pad byte.
* A pad byte should be used with 3-byte Q.922.
*/
if (addr_len == 3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "No pad! "));
hdr_len = addr_len + 1 /* UI */ + 1 /* NLPID */;
}
ND_TCHECK(p[hdr_len - 1]);
if (length < hdr_len)
goto trunc;
nlpid = p[hdr_len - 1];
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
fr_hdr_print(ndo, length, addr_len, dlci, flags, nlpid);
p += hdr_len;
length -= hdr_len;
switch (nlpid) {
case NLPID_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case NLPID_IP6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case NLPID_CLNP:
case NLPID_ESIS:
case NLPID_ISIS:
isoclns_print(ndo, p - 1, length + 1); /* OSI printers need the NLPID field */
break;
case NLPID_SNAP:
if (snap_print(ndo, p, length, ndo->ndo_snapend - p, NULL, NULL, 0) == 0) {
/* ether_type not known, print raw packet */
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
fr_hdr_print(ndo, length + hdr_len, hdr_len,
dlci, flags, nlpid);
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p - hdr_len, length + hdr_len);
}
break;
case NLPID_Q933:
q933_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case NLPID_MFR:
frf15_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case NLPID_PPP:
ppp_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
fr_hdr_print(ndo, length + hdr_len, addr_len,
dlci, flags, nlpid);
if (!ndo->ndo_xflag)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, length);
}
return hdr_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|fr]"));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14468/FRF.16: Add a missing length check.
The specification says in a well-formed Magic Number information element
the data is exactly 4 bytes long. In mfr_print() check this before trying
to read those 4 bytes.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_fflags(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
struct fixup_entry *le;
unsigned long set, clear;
int r;
int critical_flags;
mode_t mode = archive_entry_mode(a->entry);
/*
* Make 'critical_flags' hold all file flags that can't be
* immediately restored. For example, on BSD systems,
* SF_IMMUTABLE prevents hardlinks from being created, so
* should not be set until after any hardlinks are created. To
* preserve some semblance of portability, this uses #ifdef
* extensively. Ugly, but it works.
*
* Yes, Virginia, this does create a security race. It's mitigated
* somewhat by the practice of creating dirs 0700 until the extract
* is done, but it would be nice if we could do more than that.
* People restoring critical file systems should be wary of
* other programs that might try to muck with files as they're
* being restored.
*/
/* Hopefully, the compiler will optimize this mess into a constant. */
critical_flags = 0;
#ifdef SF_IMMUTABLE
critical_flags |= SF_IMMUTABLE;
#endif
#ifdef UF_IMMUTABLE
critical_flags |= UF_IMMUTABLE;
#endif
#ifdef SF_APPEND
critical_flags |= SF_APPEND;
#endif
#ifdef UF_APPEND
critical_flags |= UF_APPEND;
#endif
#ifdef EXT2_APPEND_FL
critical_flags |= EXT2_APPEND_FL;
#endif
#ifdef EXT2_IMMUTABLE_FL
critical_flags |= EXT2_IMMUTABLE_FL;
#endif
if (a->todo & TODO_FFLAGS) {
archive_entry_fflags(a->entry, &set, &clear);
/*
* The first test encourages the compiler to eliminate
* all of this if it's not necessary.
*/
if ((critical_flags != 0) && (set & critical_flags)) {
le = current_fixup(a, a->name);
if (le == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
le->fixup |= TODO_FFLAGS;
le->fflags_set = set;
/* Store the mode if it's not already there. */
if ((le->fixup & TODO_MODE) == 0)
le->mode = mode;
} else {
r = set_fflags_platform(a, a->fd,
a->name, mode, set, clear);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
}
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 43,928
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::initEncoder() {
IV_STATUS_T status;
WORD32 level;
uint32_t displaySizeY;
CHECK(!mStarted);
OMX_ERRORTYPE errType = OMX_ErrorNone;
displaySizeY = mWidth * mHeight;
if (displaySizeY > (1920 * 1088)) {
level = 50;
} else if (displaySizeY > (1280 * 720)) {
level = 40;
} else if (displaySizeY > (720 * 576)) {
level = 31;
} else if (displaySizeY > (624 * 320)) {
level = 30;
} else if (displaySizeY > (352 * 288)) {
level = 21;
} else {
level = 20;
}
mAVCEncLevel = MAX(level, mAVCEncLevel);
mStride = mWidth;
if (mInputDataIsMeta) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < MAX_CONVERSION_BUFFERS; i++) {
if (mConversionBuffers[i] != NULL) {
free(mConversionBuffers[i]);
mConversionBuffers[i] = 0;
}
if (((uint64_t)mStride * mHeight) > ((uint64_t)INT32_MAX / 3)) {
ALOGE("Buffer size is too big.");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mConversionBuffers[i] = (uint8_t *)malloc(mStride * mHeight * 3 / 2);
if (mConversionBuffers[i] == NULL) {
ALOGE("Allocating conversion buffer failed.");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mConversionBuffersFree[i] = 1;
}
}
switch (mColorFormat) {
case OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar:
mIvVideoColorFormat = IV_YUV_420SP_UV;
ALOGV("colorFormat YUV_420SP");
break;
default:
case OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar:
mIvVideoColorFormat = IV_YUV_420P;
ALOGV("colorFormat YUV_420P");
break;
}
ALOGD("Params width %d height %d level %d colorFormat %d", mWidth,
mHeight, mAVCEncLevel, mIvVideoColorFormat);
/* Getting Number of MemRecords */
{
iv_num_mem_rec_ip_t s_num_mem_rec_ip;
iv_num_mem_rec_op_t s_num_mem_rec_op;
s_num_mem_rec_ip.u4_size = sizeof(iv_num_mem_rec_ip_t);
s_num_mem_rec_op.u4_size = sizeof(iv_num_mem_rec_op_t);
s_num_mem_rec_ip.e_cmd = IV_CMD_GET_NUM_MEM_REC;
status = ive_api_function(0, &s_num_mem_rec_ip, &s_num_mem_rec_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Get number of memory records failed = 0x%x\n",
s_num_mem_rec_op.u4_error_code);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumMemRecords = s_num_mem_rec_op.u4_num_mem_rec;
}
/* Allocate array to hold memory records */
if (mNumMemRecords > SIZE_MAX / sizeof(iv_mem_rec_t)) {
ALOGE("requested memory size is too big.");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mMemRecords = (iv_mem_rec_t *)malloc(mNumMemRecords * sizeof(iv_mem_rec_t));
if (NULL == mMemRecords) {
ALOGE("Unable to allocate memory for hold memory records: Size %zu",
mNumMemRecords * sizeof(iv_mem_rec_t));
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
{
iv_mem_rec_t *ps_mem_rec;
ps_mem_rec = mMemRecords;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mNumMemRecords; i++) {
ps_mem_rec->u4_size = sizeof(iv_mem_rec_t);
ps_mem_rec->pv_base = NULL;
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = 0;
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_alignment = 0;
ps_mem_rec->e_mem_type = IV_NA_MEM_TYPE;
ps_mem_rec++;
}
}
/* Getting MemRecords Attributes */
{
iv_fill_mem_rec_ip_t s_fill_mem_rec_ip;
iv_fill_mem_rec_op_t s_fill_mem_rec_op;
s_fill_mem_rec_ip.u4_size = sizeof(iv_fill_mem_rec_ip_t);
s_fill_mem_rec_op.u4_size = sizeof(iv_fill_mem_rec_op_t);
s_fill_mem_rec_ip.e_cmd = IV_CMD_FILL_NUM_MEM_REC;
s_fill_mem_rec_ip.ps_mem_rec = mMemRecords;
s_fill_mem_rec_ip.u4_num_mem_rec = mNumMemRecords;
s_fill_mem_rec_ip.u4_max_wd = mWidth;
s_fill_mem_rec_ip.u4_max_ht = mHeight;
s_fill_mem_rec_ip.u4_max_level = mAVCEncLevel;
s_fill_mem_rec_ip.e_color_format = DEFAULT_INP_COLOR_FORMAT;
s_fill_mem_rec_ip.u4_max_ref_cnt = DEFAULT_MAX_REF_FRM;
s_fill_mem_rec_ip.u4_max_reorder_cnt = DEFAULT_MAX_REORDER_FRM;
s_fill_mem_rec_ip.u4_max_srch_rng_x = DEFAULT_MAX_SRCH_RANGE_X;
s_fill_mem_rec_ip.u4_max_srch_rng_y = DEFAULT_MAX_SRCH_RANGE_Y;
status = ive_api_function(0, &s_fill_mem_rec_ip, &s_fill_mem_rec_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Fill memory records failed = 0x%x\n",
s_fill_mem_rec_op.u4_error_code);
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
}
/* Allocating Memory for Mem Records */
{
WORD32 total_size;
iv_mem_rec_t *ps_mem_rec;
total_size = 0;
ps_mem_rec = mMemRecords;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mNumMemRecords; i++) {
ps_mem_rec->pv_base = ive_aligned_malloc(
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_alignment, ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size);
if (ps_mem_rec->pv_base == NULL) {
ALOGE("Allocation failure for mem record id %zu size %u\n", i,
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size);
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
total_size += ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size;
ps_mem_rec++;
}
}
/* Codec Instance Creation */
{
ive_init_ip_t s_init_ip;
ive_init_op_t s_init_op;
mCodecCtx = (iv_obj_t *)mMemRecords[0].pv_base;
mCodecCtx->u4_size = sizeof(iv_obj_t);
mCodecCtx->pv_fxns = (void *)ive_api_function;
s_init_ip.u4_size = sizeof(ive_init_ip_t);
s_init_op.u4_size = sizeof(ive_init_op_t);
s_init_ip.e_cmd = IV_CMD_INIT;
s_init_ip.u4_num_mem_rec = mNumMemRecords;
s_init_ip.ps_mem_rec = mMemRecords;
s_init_ip.u4_max_wd = mWidth;
s_init_ip.u4_max_ht = mHeight;
s_init_ip.u4_max_ref_cnt = DEFAULT_MAX_REF_FRM;
s_init_ip.u4_max_reorder_cnt = DEFAULT_MAX_REORDER_FRM;
s_init_ip.u4_max_level = mAVCEncLevel;
s_init_ip.e_inp_color_fmt = mIvVideoColorFormat;
if (mReconEnable || mPSNREnable) {
s_init_ip.u4_enable_recon = 1;
} else {
s_init_ip.u4_enable_recon = 0;
}
s_init_ip.e_recon_color_fmt = DEFAULT_RECON_COLOR_FORMAT;
s_init_ip.e_rc_mode = DEFAULT_RC_MODE;
s_init_ip.u4_max_framerate = DEFAULT_MAX_FRAMERATE;
s_init_ip.u4_max_bitrate = DEFAULT_MAX_BITRATE;
s_init_ip.u4_num_bframes = mBframes;
s_init_ip.e_content_type = IV_PROGRESSIVE;
s_init_ip.u4_max_srch_rng_x = DEFAULT_MAX_SRCH_RANGE_X;
s_init_ip.u4_max_srch_rng_y = DEFAULT_MAX_SRCH_RANGE_Y;
s_init_ip.e_slice_mode = mSliceMode;
s_init_ip.u4_slice_param = mSliceParam;
s_init_ip.e_arch = mArch;
s_init_ip.e_soc = DEFAULT_SOC;
status = ive_api_function(mCodecCtx, &s_init_ip, &s_init_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Init memory records failed = 0x%x\n",
s_init_op.u4_error_code);
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0 /* arg2 */, NULL /* data */);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
}
/* Get Codec Version */
logVersion();
/* set processor details */
setNumCores();
/* Video control Set Frame dimensions */
setDimensions();
/* Video control Set Frame rates */
setFrameRate();
/* Video control Set IPE Params */
setIpeParams();
/* Video control Set Bitrate */
setBitRate();
/* Video control Set QP */
setQp();
/* Video control Set AIR params */
setAirParams();
/* Video control Set VBV params */
setVbvParams();
/* Video control Set Motion estimation params */
setMeParams();
/* Video control Set GOP params */
setGopParams();
/* Video control Set Deblock params */
setDeblockParams();
/* Video control Set Profile params */
setProfileParams();
/* Video control Set in Encode header mode */
setEncMode(IVE_ENC_MODE_HEADER);
ALOGV("init_codec successfull");
mSpsPpsHeaderReceived = false;
mStarted = true;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::OnMemoryPressure(
base::MemoryPressureListener::MemoryPressureLevel memory_pressure_level) {
base::allocator::ReleaseFreeMemory();
if (webkit_platform_support_ && blink::mainThreadIsolate()) {
blink::mainThreadIsolate()->LowMemoryNotification();
}
if (memory_pressure_level ==
base::MemoryPressureListener::MEMORY_PRESSURE_CRITICAL) {
if (webkit_platform_support_) {
blink::WebImageCache::clear();
}
size_t font_cache_limit = SkGraphics::SetFontCacheLimit(0);
SkGraphics::SetFontCacheLimit(font_cache_limit);
}
}
Commit Message: Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler
Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler to avoid some
regressions which it has introduced.
BUG=391005,415758,415478,412714,416362,416827,417608
TBR=jamesr@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/609483002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#296916}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void provideLocalFileSystemTo(LocalFrame& frame, PassOwnPtr<FileSystemClient> client)
{
frame.provideSupplement(LocalFileSystem::supplementName(), LocalFileSystem::create(client));
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 115,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_layoutcommit_release(void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_layoutcommit_data *data = calldata;
struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg, *tmp;
unsigned long *bitlock = &NFS_I(data->args.inode)->flags;
pnfs_cleanup_layoutcommit(data);
/* Matched by references in pnfs_set_layoutcommit */
list_for_each_entry_safe(lseg, tmp, &data->lseg_list, pls_lc_list) {
list_del_init(&lseg->pls_lc_list);
if (test_and_clear_bit(NFS_LSEG_LAYOUTCOMMIT,
&lseg->pls_flags))
put_lseg(lseg);
}
clear_bit_unlock(NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMITTING, bitlock);
smp_mb__after_clear_bit();
wake_up_bit(bitlock, NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMITTING);
put_rpccred(data->cred);
kfree(data);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PPB_URLLoader_Impl::RunCallback(int32_t result) {
if (!pending_callback_.get()) {
CHECK(main_document_loader_);
return;
}
TrackedCallback::ClearAndRun(&pending_callback_, result);
}
Commit Message: Remove possibility of stale user_buffer_ member in PPB_URLLoader_Impl when FinishedLoading() is called.
BUG=137778
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10797037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@147914 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 170,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_get_result)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
int id = -1;
PGconn *pgsql;
PGresult *pgsql_result;
pgsql_result_handle *pg_result;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &pgsql_link) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
pgsql_result = PQgetResult(pgsql);
if (!pgsql_result) {
/* no result */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
pg_result = (pgsql_result_handle *) emalloc(sizeof(pgsql_result_handle));
pg_result->conn = pgsql;
pg_result->result = pgsql_result;
pg_result->row = 0;
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, pg_result, le_result);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rewrite_shorthand_url (const char *url)
{
const char *p;
char *ret;
if (url_scheme (url) != SCHEME_INVALID)
return NULL;
/* Look for a ':' or '/'. The former signifies NcFTP syntax, the
latter Netscape. */
p = strpbrk (url, ":/");
if (p == url)
return NULL;
/* If we're looking at "://", it means the URL uses a scheme we
don't support, which may include "https" when compiled without
SSL support. Don't bogusly rewrite such URLs. */
if (p && p[0] == ':' && p[1] == '/' && p[2] == '/')
return NULL;
if (p && *p == ':')
{
/* Colon indicates ftp, as in foo.bar.com:path. Check for
special case of http port number ("localhost:10000"). */
int digits = strspn (p + 1, "0123456789");
if (digits && (p[1 + digits] == '/' || p[1 + digits] == '\0'))
goto http;
/* Turn "foo.bar.com:path" to "ftp://foo.bar.com/path". */
if ((ret = aprintf ("ftp://%s", url)) != NULL)
ret[6 + (p - url)] = '/';
}
else
{
http:
/* Just prepend "http://" to URL. */
ret = aprintf ("http://%s", url);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-93
| 0
| 8,692
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_read_sidx(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
int64_t offset = avio_tell(pb) + atom.size, pts;
uint8_t version;
unsigned i, track_id;
AVStream *st = NULL;
AVStream *ref_st = NULL;
MOVStreamContext *sc, *ref_sc = NULL;
MOVFragmentIndex *index = NULL;
MOVFragmentIndex **tmp;
AVRational timescale;
version = avio_r8(pb);
if (version > 1) {
avpriv_request_sample(c->fc, "sidx version %u", version);
return 0;
}
avio_rb24(pb); // flags
track_id = avio_rb32(pb); // Reference ID
for (i = 0; i < c->fc->nb_streams; i++) {
if (c->fc->streams[i]->id == track_id) {
st = c->fc->streams[i];
break;
}
}
if (!st) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "could not find corresponding track id %d\n", track_id);
return 0;
}
sc = st->priv_data;
timescale = av_make_q(1, avio_rb32(pb));
if (timescale.den <= 0) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid sidx timescale 1/%d\n", timescale.den);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (version == 0) {
pts = avio_rb32(pb);
offset += avio_rb32(pb);
} else {
pts = avio_rb64(pb);
offset += avio_rb64(pb);
}
avio_rb16(pb); // reserved
index = av_mallocz(sizeof(MOVFragmentIndex));
if (!index)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
index->track_id = track_id;
index->item_count = avio_rb16(pb);
index->items = av_mallocz_array(index->item_count, sizeof(MOVFragmentIndexItem));
if (!index->items) {
av_freep(&index);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = 0; i < index->item_count; i++) {
uint32_t size = avio_rb32(pb);
uint32_t duration = avio_rb32(pb);
if (size & 0x80000000) {
avpriv_request_sample(c->fc, "sidx reference_type 1");
av_freep(&index->items);
av_freep(&index);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
avio_rb32(pb); // sap_flags
index->items[i].moof_offset = offset;
index->items[i].time = av_rescale_q(pts, st->time_base, timescale);
offset += size;
pts += duration;
}
st->duration = sc->track_end = pts;
tmp = av_realloc_array(c->fragment_index_data,
c->fragment_index_count + 1,
sizeof(MOVFragmentIndex*));
if (!tmp) {
av_freep(&index->items);
av_freep(&index);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
c->fragment_index_data = tmp;
c->fragment_index_data[c->fragment_index_count++] = index;
sc->has_sidx = 1;
if (offset == avio_size(pb)) {
for (i = 0; i < c->fc->nb_streams; i++) {
if (c->fc->streams[i]->id == c->fragment_index_data[0]->track_id) {
ref_st = c->fc->streams[i];
ref_sc = ref_st->priv_data;
break;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < c->fc->nb_streams; i++) {
st = c->fc->streams[i];
sc = st->priv_data;
if (!sc->has_sidx) {
st->duration = sc->track_end = av_rescale(ref_st->duration, sc->time_scale, ref_sc->time_scale);
}
}
c->fragment_index_complete = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadFileManager::CompleteDownload(DownloadId global_id) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
if (!ContainsKey(downloads_, global_id))
return;
DownloadFile* download_file = downloads_[global_id];
VLOG(20) << " " << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " id = " << global_id
<< " download_file = " << download_file->DebugString();
download_file->Detach();
EraseDownload(global_id);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 170,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool megasas_is_jbod(MegasasState *s)
{
return s->flags & MEGASAS_MASK_USE_JBOD;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 10,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContainerNode::removeDetachedChildrenInContainer(ContainerNode& container)
{
Node* head = nullptr;
Node* tail = nullptr;
addChildNodesToDeletionQueue(head, tail, container);
Node* n;
Node* next;
while (head) {
n = head;
ASSERT_WITH_SECURITY_IMPLICATION(n->m_deletionHasBegun);
next = n->nextSibling();
n->setNextSibling(nullptr);
head = next;
if (!next)
tail = nullptr;
if (n->hasChildren())
addChildNodesToDeletionQueue(head, tail, toContainerNode(*n));
delete n;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix an optimisation in ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal
R=tkent@chromium.org
BUG=544020
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1420653003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355240}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,102
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: new_device (u2fh_devs * devs)
{
struct u2fdevice *new = malloc (sizeof (struct u2fdevice));
if (new == NULL)
{
return NULL;
}
memset (new, 0, sizeof (struct u2fdevice));
new->id = devs->max_id++;
if (devs->first == NULL)
{
devs->first = new;
}
else
{
struct u2fdevice *dev;
for (dev = devs->first; dev != NULL; dev = dev->next)
{
if (dev->next == NULL)
{
break;
}
}
dev->next = new;
}
return new;
}
Commit Message: fix filling out of initresp
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 91,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsGroupStored(const GURL& manifest_url) {
return mock_storage()->IsGroupForManifestStored(manifest_url);
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int sock_recvfrom(php_netstream_data_t *sock, char *buf, size_t buflen, int flags,
zend_string **textaddr,
struct sockaddr **addr, socklen_t *addrlen
)
{
int ret;
int want_addr = textaddr || addr;
if (want_addr) {
php_sockaddr_storage sa;
socklen_t sl = sizeof(sa);
ret = recvfrom(sock->socket, buf, XP_SOCK_BUF_SIZE(buflen), flags, (struct sockaddr*)&sa, &sl);
ret = (ret == SOCK_CONN_ERR) ? -1 : ret;
if (sl) {
php_network_populate_name_from_sockaddr((struct sockaddr*)&sa, sl,
textaddr, addr, addrlen);
} else {
if (textaddr) {
*textaddr = ZSTR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
}
if (addr) {
*addr = NULL;
*addrlen = 0;
}
}
} else {
ret = recv(sock->socket, buf, XP_SOCK_BUF_SIZE(buflen), flags);
ret = (ret == SOCK_CONN_ERR) ? -1 : ret;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Detect invalid port in xp_socket parse ip address
For historical reasons, fsockopen() accepts the port and hostname
separately: fsockopen('127.0.0.1', 80)
However, with the introdcution of stream transports in PHP 4.3,
it became possible to include the port in the hostname specifier:
fsockopen('127.0.0.1:80')
Or more formally: fsockopen('tcp://127.0.0.1:80')
Confusing results when these two forms are combined, however.
fsockopen('127.0.0.1:80', 443) results in fsockopen() attempting
to connect to '127.0.0.1:80:443' which any reasonable stack would
consider invalid.
Unfortunately, PHP parses the address looking for the first colon
(with special handling for IPv6, don't worry) and calls atoi()
from there. atoi() in turn, simply stops parsing at the first
non-numeric character and returns the value so far.
The end result is that the explicitly supplied port is treated
as ignored garbage, rather than producing an error.
This diff replaces atoi() with strtol() and inspects the
stop character. If additional "garbage" of any kind is found,
it fails and returns an error.
CWE ID: CWE-918
| 0
| 67,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CairoOutputDev::drawChar(GfxState *state, double x, double y,
double dx, double dy,
double originX, double originY,
CharCode code, int nBytes, Unicode *u, int uLen)
{
if (currentFont) {
glyphs[glyphCount].index = currentFont->getGlyph (code, u, uLen);
glyphs[glyphCount].x = x - originX;
glyphs[glyphCount].y = y - originY;
glyphCount++;
}
if (!text)
return;
actualText->addChar (state, x, y, dx, dy, code, nBytes, u, uLen);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool set_pool(PgSocket *client, const char *dbname, const char *username, const char *password, bool takeover)
{
/* find database */
client->db = find_database(dbname);
if (!client->db) {
client->db = register_auto_database(dbname);
if (!client->db) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "No such database: %s", dbname);
if (cf_log_connections)
slog_info(client, "login failed: db=%s user=%s", dbname, username);
return false;
} else {
slog_info(client, "registered new auto-database: db = %s", dbname );
}
}
/* are new connections allowed? */
if (client->db->db_disabled) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "database does not allow connections: %s", dbname);
return false;
}
if (client->db->admin) {
if (admin_pre_login(client, username))
return finish_set_pool(client, takeover);
}
/* find user */
if (cf_auth_type == AUTH_ANY) {
/* ignore requested user */
if (client->db->forced_user == NULL) {
slog_error(client, "auth_type=any requires forced user");
disconnect_client(client, true, "bouncer config error");
return false;
}
client->auth_user = client->db->forced_user;
} else {
/* the user clients wants to log in as */
client->auth_user = find_user(username);
if (!client->auth_user && client->db->auth_user) {
if (takeover) {
client->auth_user = add_db_user(client->db, username, password);
return finish_set_pool(client, takeover);
}
start_auth_request(client, username);
return false;
}
if (!client->auth_user) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "No such user: %s", username);
if (cf_log_connections)
slog_info(client, "login failed: db=%s user=%s", dbname, username);
return false;
}
}
return finish_set_pool(client, takeover);
}
Commit Message: Remove too early set of auth_user
When query returns 0 rows (user not found),
this user stays as login user...
Should fix #69.
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 74,110
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::ClearLoginDelegateForRequest(
net::URLRequest* request) {
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(request);
if (info)
info->set_login_delegate(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: entry_guard_chan_failed(channel_t *chan)
{
if (!chan)
return;
smartlist_t *pending = smartlist_new();
circuit_get_all_pending_on_channel(pending, chan);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(pending, circuit_t *, circ) {
if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
continue;
origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
if (origin_circ->guard_state) {
/* We might have no guard state if we didn't use a guard on this
* circuit (eg it's for a fallback directory). */
entry_guard_failed(&origin_circ->guard_state);
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
smartlist_free(pending);
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 69,665
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::~ExtensionDevToolsClientHost() {
registrar_.RemoveAll();
if (infobar_) {
static_cast<ExtensionDevToolsInfoBarDelegate*>(
infobar_->delegate())->set_client_host(NULL);
InfoBarService* infobar_service = InfoBarService::FromWebContents(
WebContents::FromRenderViewHost(agent_host_->GetRenderViewHost()));
infobar_service->RemoveInfoBar(infobar_);
}
AttachedClientHosts::GetInstance()->Remove(this);
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 120,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> GetOrCreateChrome(ScriptContext* context) {
v8::Local<v8::String> chrome_string(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(context->isolate(), "chrome"));
v8::Local<v8::Object> global(context->v8_context()->Global());
v8::Local<v8::Value> chrome(global->Get(chrome_string));
if (chrome->IsUndefined()) {
chrome = v8::Object::New(context->isolate());
global->Set(chrome_string, chrome);
}
return chrome;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BluetoothSocketListenUsingL2capFunction::CreateResults() {
return bluetooth_socket::ListenUsingL2cap::Results::Create();
}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 154,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LockScreenMediaControlsView::MediaControllerImageChanged(
media_session::mojom::MediaSessionImageType type,
const SkBitmap& bitmap) {
if (hide_controls_timer_->IsRunning())
return;
SkBitmap converted_bitmap;
if (bitmap.colorType() == kN32_SkColorType) {
converted_bitmap = bitmap;
} else {
SkImageInfo info = bitmap.info().makeColorType(kN32_SkColorType);
if (converted_bitmap.tryAllocPixels(info)) {
bitmap.readPixels(info, converted_bitmap.getPixels(),
converted_bitmap.rowBytes(), 0, 0);
}
}
switch (type) {
case media_session::mojom::MediaSessionImageType::kArtwork: {
base::Optional<gfx::ImageSkia> session_artwork =
gfx::ImageSkia::CreateFrom1xBitmap(converted_bitmap);
SetArtwork(session_artwork);
break;
}
case media_session::mojom::MediaSessionImageType::kSourceIcon: {
gfx::ImageSkia session_icon =
gfx::ImageSkia::CreateFrom1xBitmap(converted_bitmap);
if (session_icon.isNull()) {
session_icon = gfx::CreateVectorIcon(message_center::kProductIcon,
kIconSize, gfx::kChromeIconGrey);
}
header_row_->SetAppIcon(session_icon);
}
}
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 136,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int proc_dostring(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
return _proc_do_string(table->data, table->maxlen, write,
buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void mnt_set_mountpoint(struct mount *mnt,
struct mountpoint *mp,
struct mount *child_mnt)
{
mp->m_count++;
mnt_add_count(mnt, 1); /* essentially, that's mntget */
child_mnt->mnt_mountpoint = dget(mp->m_dentry);
child_mnt->mnt_parent = mnt;
child_mnt->mnt_mp = mp;
hlist_add_head(&child_mnt->mnt_mp_list, &mp->m_list);
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 50,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs;
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs;
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
int err;
if (opcode > BPF_JSLE) {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP opcode %x\n", opcode);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg];
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
int pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode);
if (pred == 1) {
/* only follow the goto, ignore fall-through */
*insn_idx += insn->off;
return 0;
} else if (pred == 0) {
/* only follow fall-through branch, since
* that's where the program will go
*/
return 0;
}
}
other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx,
false);
if (!other_branch)
return -EFAULT;
other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs;
/* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust
* our min/max values for our dst register.
* this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same
* object, I suppose, but we don't support that right now), because
* otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't
* comparable.
*/
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
if (tnum_is_const(regs[insn->src_reg].var_off))
reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
dst_reg, regs[insn->src_reg].var_off.value,
opcode);
else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off))
reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg],
®s[insn->src_reg],
dst_reg->var_off.value, opcode);
else if (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE)
/* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */
reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg],
&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
®s[insn->src_reg],
®s[insn->dst_reg], opcode);
}
} else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode);
}
/* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
reg_type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) {
/* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either
* safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional.
*/
mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg,
opcode == BPF_JNE);
mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg,
opcode == BPF_JEQ);
} else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg],
this_branch, other_branch) &&
is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
if (env->log.level)
print_verifier_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 91,404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static jboolean Bitmap_hasAlpha(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jlong bitmapHandle) {
SkBitmap* bitmap = reinterpret_cast<SkBitmap*>(bitmapHandle);
return !bitmap->isOpaque() ? JNI_TRUE : JNI_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Make Bitmap_createFromParcel check the color count. DO NOT MERGE
When reading from the parcel, if the number of colors is invalid, early
exit.
Add two more checks: setInfo must return true, and Parcel::readInplace
must return non-NULL. The former ensures that the previously read values
(width, height, etc) were valid, and the latter checks that the Parcel
had enough data even if the number of colors was reasonable.
Also use an auto-deleter to handle deletion of the SkBitmap.
Cherry pick from change-Id: Icbd562d6d1f131a723724883fd31822d337cf5a6
BUG=19666945
Change-Id: Iab0d218c41ae0c39606e333e44cda078eef32291
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,638
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::OnMainWindowDestroy(GtkWidget* widget) {
extension_keybinding_registry_.reset();
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&base::DeletePointer<BrowserWindowGtk>, this));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BackendIO::GetAvailableRange(EntryImpl* entry,
int64_t offset,
int len,
int64_t* start) {
operation_ = OP_GET_RANGE;
entry_ = entry;
offset64_ = offset;
buf_len_ = len;
start_ = start;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cpu_shares_write_u64(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct cftype *cftype,
u64 shareval)
{
return sched_group_set_shares(cgroup_tg(cgrp), scale_load(shareval));
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,273
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SoftOpus::onPortFlushCompleted(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
if (portIndex == 0 && mDecoder != NULL) {
mNumFramesOutput = 0;
opus_multistream_decoder_ctl(mDecoder, OPUS_RESET_STATE);
mAnchorTimeUs = 0;
mSamplesToDiscard = mSeekPreRoll;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (vorbis|opus)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I1ccdd16a00741da072527a6d13e87fd7c7fe8c54
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 160,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LookupMatchInTopDomains(base::StringPiece skeleton) {
DCHECK_NE(skeleton.back(), '.');
auto labels = base::SplitStringPiece(skeleton, ".", base::KEEP_WHITESPACE,
base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
if (labels.size() > kNumberOfLabelsToCheck) {
labels.erase(labels.begin(),
labels.begin() + labels.size() - kNumberOfLabelsToCheck);
}
while (labels.size() > 1) {
std::string partial_skeleton = base::JoinString(labels, ".");
if (net::LookupStringInFixedSet(
g_graph, g_graph_length, partial_skeleton.data(),
partial_skeleton.length()) != net::kDafsaNotFound)
return true;
labels.erase(labels.begin());
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add more entries to the confusability mapping
U+014B (ŋ) => n
U+1004 (င) => c
U+100c (ဌ) => g
U+1042 (၂) => j
U+1054 (ၔ) => e
Bug: 811117,808316
Test: components_unittests -gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I29f73c48d665bd9070050bd7f0080563635b9c63
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/919423
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536955}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,240
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int set_reg_profile(RAnal *anal) {
char *p =
"=PC pc\n"
"=SP sp\n"
"gpr a .8 0 0\n"
"gpr x .8 1 0\n"
"gpr y .8 2 0\n"
"gpr flags .8 3 0\n"
"gpr C .1 .24 0\n"
"gpr Z .1 .25 0\n"
"gpr I .1 .26 0\n"
"gpr D .1 .27 0\n"
"gpr V .1 .30 0\n"
"gpr N .1 .31 0\n"
"gpr sp .8 4 0\n"
"gpr pc .16 5 0\n";
return r_reg_set_profile_string (anal->reg, p);
}
Commit Message: Fix #10294 - crash in r2_hoobr__6502_op
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nntp_post(const char *msg)
{
struct NntpData *nntp_data, nntp_tmp;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
if (Context && Context->magic == MUTT_NNTP)
nntp_data = Context->data;
else
{
CurrentNewsSrv = nntp_select_server(NewsServer, false);
if (!CurrentNewsSrv)
return -1;
nntp_data = &nntp_tmp;
nntp_data->nserv = CurrentNewsSrv;
nntp_data->group = NULL;
}
FILE *fp = mutt_file_fopen(msg, "r");
if (!fp)
{
mutt_perror(msg);
return -1;
}
mutt_str_strfcpy(buf, "POST\r\n", sizeof(buf));
if (nntp_query(nntp_data, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0)
{
mutt_file_fclose(&fp);
return -1;
}
if (buf[0] != '3')
{
mutt_error(_("Can't post article: %s"), buf);
mutt_file_fclose(&fp);
return -1;
}
buf[0] = '.';
buf[1] = '\0';
while (fgets(buf + 1, sizeof(buf) - 2, fp))
{
size_t len = strlen(buf);
if (buf[len - 1] == '\n')
{
buf[len - 1] = '\r';
buf[len] = '\n';
len++;
buf[len] = '\0';
}
if (mutt_socket_send_d(nntp_data->nserv->conn,
buf[1] == '.' ? buf : buf + 1, MUTT_SOCK_LOG_HDR) < 0)
{
mutt_file_fclose(&fp);
return nntp_connect_error(nntp_data->nserv);
}
}
mutt_file_fclose(&fp);
if ((buf[strlen(buf) - 1] != '\n' &&
mutt_socket_send_d(nntp_data->nserv->conn, "\r\n", MUTT_SOCK_LOG_HDR) < 0) ||
mutt_socket_send_d(nntp_data->nserv->conn, ".\r\n", MUTT_SOCK_LOG_HDR) < 0 ||
mutt_socket_readln(buf, sizeof(buf), nntp_data->nserv->conn) < 0)
{
return nntp_connect_error(nntp_data->nserv);
}
if (buf[0] != '2')
{
mutt_error(_("Can't post article: %s"), buf);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Add alloc fail check in nntp_fetch_headers
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 79,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fpm_child_link(struct fpm_child_s *child) /* {{{ */
{
struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp = child->wp;
++wp->running_children;
++fpm_globals.running_children;
child->next = wp->children;
if (child->next) {
child->next->prev = child;
}
child->prev = 0;
wp->children = child;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 86,607
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_thread_slot(int h)
{
if(0 <= h && h < MAX_THREAD)
{
close_cmd_fd(h);
ts[h].used = 0;
}
else APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid thread handle:%d", h);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,907
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void SetLengthImpl(Isolate* isolate, Handle<JSArray> array,
uint32_t length,
Handle<FixedArrayBase> backing_store) {
Handle<SeededNumberDictionary> dict =
Handle<SeededNumberDictionary>::cast(backing_store);
int capacity = dict->Capacity();
uint32_t old_length = 0;
CHECK(array->length()->ToArrayLength(&old_length));
if (length < old_length) {
if (dict->requires_slow_elements()) {
for (int entry = 0; entry < capacity; entry++) {
DisallowHeapAllocation no_gc;
Object* index = dict->KeyAt(entry);
if (index->IsNumber()) {
uint32_t number = static_cast<uint32_t>(index->Number());
if (length <= number && number < old_length) {
PropertyDetails details = dict->DetailsAt(entry);
if (!details.IsConfigurable()) length = number + 1;
}
}
}
}
if (length == 0) {
JSObject::ResetElements(array);
} else {
DisallowHeapAllocation no_gc;
int removed_entries = 0;
Handle<Object> the_hole_value = isolate->factory()->the_hole_value();
for (int entry = 0; entry < capacity; entry++) {
Object* index = dict->KeyAt(entry);
if (index->IsNumber()) {
uint32_t number = static_cast<uint32_t>(index->Number());
if (length <= number && number < old_length) {
dict->SetEntry(entry, the_hole_value, the_hole_value);
removed_entries++;
}
}
}
dict->ElementsRemoved(removed_entries);
}
}
Handle<Object> length_obj = isolate->factory()->NewNumberFromUint(length);
array->set_length(*length_obj);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 163,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::Redo() {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->GetFrameInputHandler()->Redo();
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Redo"));
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,844
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ext4_init_journal_params(struct super_block *sb, journal_t *journal)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
journal->j_commit_interval = sbi->s_commit_interval;
journal->j_min_batch_time = sbi->s_min_batch_time;
journal->j_max_batch_time = sbi->s_max_batch_time;
spin_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
if (test_opt(sb, BARRIER))
journal->j_flags |= JBD2_BARRIER;
else
journal->j_flags &= ~JBD2_BARRIER;
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_ERR_ABORT))
journal->j_flags |= JBD2_ABORT_ON_SYNCDATA_ERR;
else
journal->j_flags &= ~JBD2_ABORT_ON_SYNCDATA_ERR;
spin_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,572
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::StringFrozenArrayAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_stringFrozenArrayAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::StringFrozenArrayAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long __snd_timer_user_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int __user *p = argp;
tu = file->private_data;
switch (cmd) {
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PVERSION:
return put_user(SNDRV_TIMER_VERSION, p) ? -EFAULT : 0;
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_NEXT_DEVICE:
return snd_timer_user_next_device(argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_TREAD:
{
int xarg;
if (tu->timeri) /* too late */
return -EBUSY;
if (get_user(xarg, p))
return -EFAULT;
tu->tread = xarg ? 1 : 0;
return 0;
}
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_GINFO:
return snd_timer_user_ginfo(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_GPARAMS:
return snd_timer_user_gparams(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_GSTATUS:
return snd_timer_user_gstatus(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT:
return snd_timer_user_tselect(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_INFO:
return snd_timer_user_info(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS:
return snd_timer_user_params(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_STATUS:
return snd_timer_user_status(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_START:
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_START_OLD:
return snd_timer_user_start(file);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_STOP:
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_STOP_OLD:
return snd_timer_user_stop(file);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CONTINUE:
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CONTINUE_OLD:
return snd_timer_user_continue(file);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PAUSE:
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PAUSE_OLD:
return snd_timer_user_pause(file);
}
return -ENOTTY;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 52,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vnc_abort_display_jobs(VncDisplay *vd)
{
VncState *vs;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_lock_output(vs);
vs->abort = true;
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
}
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_jobs_join(vs);
}
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_lock_output(vs);
vs->abort = false;
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 7,988
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void label_destroy(struct pxe_label *label)
{
if (label->name)
free(label->name);
if (label->kernel)
free(label->kernel);
if (label->config)
free(label->config);
if (label->append)
free(label->append);
if (label->initrd)
free(label->initrd);
if (label->fdt)
free(label->fdt);
if (label->fdtdir)
free(label->fdtdir);
free(label);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 89,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GetDataSaverEnabledPref(const PrefService* prefs) {
return prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kDataSaverEnabled) &&
base::FieldTrialList::FindFullName("SaveDataHeader")
.compare("Disabled");
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 152,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen )
{
int ret;
size_t len;
unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end;
mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2;
memset( &sig_params1, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) );
memset( &sig_params2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) );
memset( &sig_oid2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) );
/*
* Check for valid input
*/
if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
p = (unsigned char*) buf;
len = buflen;
end = p + len;
/*
* Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
* tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
* signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* signatureValue BIT STRING }
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT );
}
if( len > (size_t) ( end - p ) )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );
}
crt_end = p + len;
crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf;
crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, crt->raw.len );
if( p == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );
memcpy( p, buf, crt->raw.len );
p += crt->raw.len - len;
end = crt_end = p + len;
/*
* TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
*/
crt->tbs.p = p;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret );
}
end = p + len;
crt->tbs.len = end - crt->tbs.p;
/*
* Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
*
* CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
*
* signature AlgorithmIdentifier
*/
if( ( ret = x509_get_version( &p, end, &crt->version ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial( &p, end, &crt->serial ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &crt->sig_oid,
&sig_params1 ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( ret );
}
crt->version++;
if( crt->version > 3 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( &crt->sig_oid, &sig_params1,
&crt->sig_md, &crt->sig_pk,
&crt->sig_opts ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( ret );
}
/*
* issuer Name
*/
crt->issuer_raw.p = p;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->issuer ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( ret );
}
crt->issuer_raw.len = p - crt->issuer_raw.p;
/*
* Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
* notBefore Time,
* notAfter Time }
*
*/
if( ( ret = x509_get_dates( &p, end, &crt->valid_from,
&crt->valid_to ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( ret );
}
/*
* subject Name
*/
crt->subject_raw.p = p;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret );
}
if( len && ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->subject ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( ret );
}
crt->subject_raw.len = p - crt->subject_raw.p;
/*
* SubjectPublicKeyInfo
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, end, &crt->pk ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( ret );
}
/*
* issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3
* subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3
* extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
* -- If present, version shall be v3
*/
if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 )
{
ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->issuer_id, 1 );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( ret );
}
}
if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 )
{
ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->subject_id, 2 );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( ret );
}
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3)
if( crt->version == 3 )
#endif
{
ret = x509_get_crt_ext( &p, end, crt );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( ret );
}
}
if( p != end )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );
}
end = crt_end;
/*
* }
* -- end of TBSCertificate
*
* signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* signatureValue BIT STRING
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2 ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( ret );
}
if( crt->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len ||
memcmp( crt->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crt->sig_oid.len ) != 0 ||
sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len ||
( sig_params1.len != 0 &&
memcmp( sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len ) != 0 ) )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig( &p, end, &crt->sig ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( ret );
}
if( p != end )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );
}
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Improve behaviour on fatal errors
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 61,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isRenderbuffer(
WebGLRenderbuffer* renderbuffer) {
if (!renderbuffer || isContextLost())
return 0;
if (!renderbuffer->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
if (renderbuffer->IsDeleted())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsRenderbuffer(renderbuffer->Object());
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 173,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err tims_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
s->size += 4;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MockDownloadController::AcquireFileAccessPermission(
content::WebContents* web_contents,
const DownloadControllerBase::AcquireFileAccessPermissionCallback& cb) {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(cb, approve_file_access_request_));
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 126,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fb_set_logo(struct fb_info *info,
const struct linux_logo *logo, u8 *dst,
int depth)
{
int i, j, k;
const u8 *src = logo->data;
u8 xor = (info->fix.visual == FB_VISUAL_MONO01) ? 0xff : 0;
u8 fg = 1, d;
switch (fb_get_color_depth(&info->var, &info->fix)) {
case 1:
fg = 1;
break;
case 2:
fg = 3;
break;
default:
fg = 7;
break;
}
if (info->fix.visual == FB_VISUAL_MONO01 ||
info->fix.visual == FB_VISUAL_MONO10)
fg = ~((u8) (0xfff << info->var.green.length));
switch (depth) {
case 4:
for (i = 0; i < logo->height; i++)
for (j = 0; j < logo->width; src++) {
*dst++ = *src >> 4;
j++;
if (j < logo->width) {
*dst++ = *src & 0x0f;
j++;
}
}
break;
case 1:
for (i = 0; i < logo->height; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < logo->width; src++) {
d = *src ^ xor;
for (k = 7; k >= 0; k--) {
*dst++ = ((d >> k) & 1) ? fg : 0;
j++;
}
}
}
break;
}
}
Commit Message: vm: convert fb_mmap to vm_iomap_memory() helper
This is my example conversion of a few existing mmap users. The
fb_mmap() case is a good example because it is a bit more complicated
than some: fb_mmap() mmaps one of two different memory areas depending
on the page offset of the mmap (but happily there is never any mixing of
the two, so the helper function still works).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 31,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void stringArrayAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::stringArrayAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,675
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PaintLayerScrollableArea::HitTestResizerInFragments(
const PaintLayerFragments& layer_fragments,
const HitTestLocation& hit_test_location) const {
if (!GetLayoutBox()->CanResize())
return false;
if (layer_fragments.IsEmpty())
return false;
for (int i = layer_fragments.size() - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
const PaintLayerFragment& fragment = layer_fragments.at(i);
if (fragment.background_rect.Intersects(hit_test_location) &&
ResizerCornerRect(PixelSnappedIntRect(fragment.layer_bounds),
kResizerForPointer)
.Contains(hit_test_location.RoundedPoint()))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Ins_DELTAP( INS_ARG )
{
Int k;
Long A, B, C, nump;
nump = args[0];
for ( k = 1; k <= nump; k++ )
{
if ( CUR.args < 2 )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Too_Few_Arguments;
return;
}
CUR.args -= 2;
A = CUR.stack[CUR.args + 1];
B = CUR.stack[CUR.args];
#if 0
if ( BOUNDS( A, CUR.zp0.n_points ) )
#else
/* igorm changed : allow phantom points (Altona.Page_3.2002-09-27.pdf). */
if ( BOUNDS( A, CUR.zp0.n_points + 2 ) )
#endif
{
/* CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;*/
return;
}
C = (B & 0xF0) >> 4;
switch ( CUR.opcode )
{
case 0x5d:
break;
case 0x71:
C += 16;
break;
case 0x72:
C += 32;
break;
}
C += CUR.GS.delta_base;
if ( CURRENT_Ppem() == C )
{
B = (B & 0xF) - 8;
if ( B >= 0 )
B++;
B = B * 64 / (1L << CUR.GS.delta_shift);
CUR_Func_move( &CUR.zp0, (Int)A, (Int)B );
}
}
CUR.new_top = CUR.args;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,372
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::PerWorldBindingsRuntimeEnabledVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_perWorldBindingsRuntimeEnabledVoidMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::PerWorldBindingsRuntimeEnabledVoidMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nextScaffoldPart(XML_Parser parser) {
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
CONTENT_SCAFFOLD *me;
int next;
if (! dtd->scaffIndex) {
dtd->scaffIndex = (int *)MALLOC(parser, parser->m_groupSize * sizeof(int));
if (! dtd->scaffIndex)
return -1;
dtd->scaffIndex[0] = 0;
}
if (dtd->scaffCount >= dtd->scaffSize) {
CONTENT_SCAFFOLD *temp;
if (dtd->scaffold) {
temp = (CONTENT_SCAFFOLD *)REALLOC(
parser, dtd->scaffold, dtd->scaffSize * 2 * sizeof(CONTENT_SCAFFOLD));
if (temp == NULL)
return -1;
dtd->scaffSize *= 2;
} else {
temp = (CONTENT_SCAFFOLD *)MALLOC(parser, INIT_SCAFFOLD_ELEMENTS
* sizeof(CONTENT_SCAFFOLD));
if (temp == NULL)
return -1;
dtd->scaffSize = INIT_SCAFFOLD_ELEMENTS;
}
dtd->scaffold = temp;
}
next = dtd->scaffCount++;
me = &dtd->scaffold[next];
if (dtd->scaffLevel) {
CONTENT_SCAFFOLD *parent
= &dtd->scaffold[dtd->scaffIndex[dtd->scaffLevel - 1]];
if (parent->lastchild) {
dtd->scaffold[parent->lastchild].nextsib = next;
}
if (! parent->childcnt)
parent->firstchild = next;
parent->lastchild = next;
parent->childcnt++;
}
me->firstchild = me->lastchild = me->childcnt = me->nextsib = 0;
return next;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 88,286
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void account_numa_dequeue(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p)
{
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::SetContentIsSuitableForGpuRasterization(bool flag) {
if (content_is_suitable_for_gpu_rasterization_ != flag) {
content_is_suitable_for_gpu_rasterization_ = flag;
need_update_gpu_rasterization_status_ = true;
}
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,352
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InterstitialObserver(Browser* browser, content::WebContents* web_contents)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
browser_(browser) {
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 139,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_io_s_pipe(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value klass)
{
mrb_value r = mrb_nil_value();
mrb_value w = mrb_nil_value();
struct mrb_io *fptr_r;
struct mrb_io *fptr_w;
int pipes[2];
if (mrb_pipe(mrb, pipes) == -1) {
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, "pipe");
}
r = mrb_obj_value(mrb_data_object_alloc(mrb, mrb_class_ptr(klass), NULL, &mrb_io_type));
mrb_iv_set(mrb, r, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "@buf"), mrb_str_new_cstr(mrb, ""));
fptr_r = mrb_io_alloc(mrb);
fptr_r->fd = pipes[0];
fptr_r->readable = 1;
fptr_r->writable = 0;
fptr_r->sync = 0;
DATA_TYPE(r) = &mrb_io_type;
DATA_PTR(r) = fptr_r;
w = mrb_obj_value(mrb_data_object_alloc(mrb, mrb_class_ptr(klass), NULL, &mrb_io_type));
mrb_iv_set(mrb, w, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "@buf"), mrb_str_new_cstr(mrb, ""));
fptr_w = mrb_io_alloc(mrb);
fptr_w->fd = pipes[1];
fptr_w->readable = 0;
fptr_w->writable = 1;
fptr_w->sync = 1;
DATA_TYPE(w) = &mrb_io_type;
DATA_PTR(w) = fptr_w;
return mrb_assoc_new(mrb, r, w);
}
Commit Message: Fix `use after free in File#initilialize_copy`; fix #4001
The bug and the fix were reported by https://hackerone.com/pnoltof
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 83,151
|
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