instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xdr_krb5_octet(XDR *xdrs, krb5_octet *objp)
{
if (!xdr_u_char(xdrs, objp))
return (FALSE);
return (TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
| 0
| 46,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsBeingDestroyed() const {
return is_being_destroyed_;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Ins_RTDG( INS_ARG )
{ (void)args;
CUR.GS.round_state = TT_Round_To_Double_Grid;
CUR.func_round = (TRound_Function)Round_To_Double_Grid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vnc_release_modifiers(VncState *vs)
{
static const int keycodes[] = {
/* shift, control, alt keys, both left & right */
0x2a, 0x36, 0x1d, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xb8,
};
int i, keycode;
if (!qemu_console_is_graphic(NULL)) {
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(keycodes); i++) {
keycode = keycodes[i];
if (!vs->modifiers_state[keycode]) {
continue;
}
qemu_input_event_send_key_number(vs->vd->dcl.con, keycode, false);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::ResumeBlockedRequestsForRoute(int child_id,
int route_id) {
ProcessBlockedRequestsForRoute(child_id, route_id, false);
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ProfileSyncService::OnSyncManagedPrefChange(bool is_sync_managed) {
NotifyObservers();
if (is_sync_managed) {
DisableForUser();
} else if (HasSyncSetupCompleted() &&
IsSyncEnabledAndLoggedIn() &&
IsSyncTokenAvailable()) {
StartUp();
}
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 104,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void megasas_release_mfi(struct megasas_instance *instance)
{
u32 reply_q_sz = sizeof(u32) *(instance->max_mfi_cmds + 1);
if (instance->reply_queue)
dma_free_coherent(&instance->pdev->dev, reply_q_sz,
instance->reply_queue, instance->reply_queue_h);
megasas_free_cmds(instance);
iounmap(instance->reg_set);
pci_release_selected_regions(instance->pdev, 1<<instance->bar);
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 90,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void netif_schedule_queue(struct netdev_queue *txq)
{
rcu_read_lock();
if (!(txq->state & QUEUE_STATE_ANY_XOFF)) {
struct Qdisc *q = rcu_dereference(txq->qdisc);
__netif_schedule(q);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: handle_queue_get_config_request(struct ofconn *ofconn,
const struct ofp_header *oh)
{
struct ofproto *ofproto = ofconn_get_ofproto(ofconn);
struct ovs_list replies;
struct ofport *port;
ofp_port_t req_port;
uint32_t req_queue;
enum ofperr error;
error = ofputil_decode_queue_get_config_request(oh, &req_port, &req_queue);
if (error) {
return error;
}
ofputil_start_queue_get_config_reply(oh, &replies);
if (req_port == OFPP_ANY) {
error = OFPERR_OFPQOFC_BAD_QUEUE;
HMAP_FOR_EACH (port, hmap_node, &ofproto->ports) {
if (!handle_queue_get_config_request_for_port(port, req_queue,
&replies)) {
error = 0;
}
}
} else {
port = ofproto_get_port(ofproto, req_port);
error = (port
? handle_queue_get_config_request_for_port(port, req_queue,
&replies)
: OFPERR_OFPQOFC_BAD_PORT);
}
if (!error) {
ofconn_send_replies(ofconn, &replies);
} else {
ofpbuf_list_delete(&replies);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit LayoutBlockFlow::adjustForUnsplittableChild(LayoutBox& child, LayoutUnit logicalOffset)
{
bool checkColumnBreaks = flowThreadContainingBlock();
bool checkPageBreaks = !checkColumnBreaks && view()->layoutState()->pageLogicalHeight();
bool isUnsplittable = child.isUnsplittableForPagination() || (checkColumnBreaks && child.style()->columnBreakInside() == PBAVOID)
|| (checkPageBreaks && child.style()->pageBreakInside() == PBAVOID);
if (!isUnsplittable)
return logicalOffset;
LayoutUnit childLogicalHeight = logicalHeightForChild(child);
if (child.isFloating())
childLogicalHeight += marginBeforeForChild(child) + marginAfterForChild(child);
LayoutUnit pageLogicalHeight = pageLogicalHeightForOffset(logicalOffset);
updateMinimumPageHeight(logicalOffset, childLogicalHeight);
if (!pageLogicalHeight)
return logicalOffset;
LayoutUnit remainingLogicalHeight = pageRemainingLogicalHeightForOffset(logicalOffset, AssociateWithLatterPage);
if (remainingLogicalHeight < childLogicalHeight && remainingLogicalHeight < pageLogicalHeight)
return logicalOffset + remainingLogicalHeight;
return logicalOffset;
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 122,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int crypto_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
req = crypto_rfc4106_crypt(req);
return crypto_aead_encrypt(req);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InputHandlerProxy::SynchronouslyZoomBy(float magnify_delta,
const gfx::Point& anchor) {
DCHECK(synchronous_input_handler_);
input_handler_->PinchGestureBegin();
input_handler_->PinchGestureUpdate(magnify_delta, anchor);
input_handler_->PinchGestureEnd(anchor, false);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures"
This reverts commit d9a56afcbdf9850bc39bb3edb56d07d11a1eb2b2.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 669086 as the
culprit for flakes in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/p/chromium/flake-portal/analysis/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyQwsSDEZsYWtlQ3VscHJpdCIxY2hyb21pdW0vZDlhNTZhZmNiZGY5ODUwYmMzOWJiM2VkYjU2ZDA3ZDExYTFlYjJiMgw
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.chromiumos/linux-chromeos-rel/25818
Sample Failed Step: content_browsertests on Ubuntu-16.04
Sample Flaky Test: ScrollLatencyScrollbarBrowserTest.ScrollbarThumbDragLatency
Original change's description:
> Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures
>
> The original change to enable scrollbar latency for the composited
> scrollbars incorrectly used an existing member to try and determine
> whether a GestureScrollUpdate was the first one in an injected sequence
> or not. is_first_gesture_scroll_update_ was incorrect because it is only
> updated when input is actually dispatched to InputHandlerProxy, and the
> flag is cleared for all GSUs before the location where it was being
> read.
>
> This bug was missed because of incorrect tests. The
> VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram method doesn't actually assert or
> expect anything - the return value must be inspected.
>
> As part of fixing up the tests, I made a few other changes to get them
> passing consistently across all platforms:
> - turn on main thread scrollbar injection feature (in case it's ever
> turned off we don't want the tests to start failing)
> - enable mock scrollbars
> - disable smooth scrolling
> - don't run scrollbar tests on Android
>
> The composited scrollbar button test is disabled due to a bug in how
> the mock theme reports its button sizes, which throws off the region
> detection in ScrollbarLayerImplBase::IdentifyScrollbarPart (filed
> crbug.com/974063 for this issue).
>
> Change-Id: Ie1a762a5f6ecc264d22f0256db68f141fc76b950
>
> Bug: 954007
> Change-Id: Ib258e08e083e79da90ba2e4e4216e4879cf00cf7
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1652741
> Commit-Queue: Daniel Libby <dlibby@microsoft.com>
> Reviewed-by: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669086}
Change-Id: Icc743e48fa740fe27f0cb0cfa21b209a696f518c
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 954007
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1660114
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669150}
CWE ID: CWE-281
| 0
| 137,990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __suspend_stratum(struct pool *pool)
{
clear_sockbuf(pool);
pool->stratum_active = pool->stratum_notify = false;
if (pool->sock)
CLOSESOCKET(pool->sock);
pool->sock = 0;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 36,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *AdaptiveThresholdImage(const Image *image,
const size_t width,const size_t height,const double bias,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define AdaptiveThresholdImageTag "AdaptiveThreshold/Image"
CacheView
*image_view,
*threshold_view;
Image
*threshold_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Initialize threshold image attributes.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
threshold_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (threshold_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
status=SetImageStorageClass(threshold_image,DirectClass,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
threshold_image=DestroyImage(threshold_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Threshold image.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) width*height;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
threshold_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(threshold_image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(progress,status) \
magick_number_threads(image,threshold_image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
double
channel_bias[MaxPixelChannels],
channel_sum[MaxPixelChannels];
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p,
*magick_restrict pixels;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
ssize_t
center,
u,
v;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,-((ssize_t) width/2L),y-(ssize_t)
(height/2L),image->columns+width,height,exception);
q=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(threshold_view,0,y,threshold_image->columns,
1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
center=(ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+width)*(height/2L)+
GetPixelChannels(image)*(width/2);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
PixelChannel channel = GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
PixelTrait traits = GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
PixelTrait threshold_traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(threshold_image,
channel);
if ((traits == UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(threshold_traits == UndefinedPixelTrait))
continue;
if ((threshold_traits & CopyPixelTrait) != 0)
{
SetPixelChannel(threshold_image,channel,p[center+i],q);
continue;
}
pixels=p;
channel_bias[channel]=0.0;
channel_sum[channel]=0.0;
for (v=0; v < (ssize_t) height; v++)
{
for (u=0; u < (ssize_t) width; u++)
{
if (u == (ssize_t) (width-1))
channel_bias[channel]+=pixels[i];
channel_sum[channel]+=pixels[i];
pixels+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
pixels+=GetPixelChannels(image)*image->columns;
}
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
double
mean;
PixelChannel channel = GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
PixelTrait traits = GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
PixelTrait threshold_traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(threshold_image,
channel);
if ((traits == UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(threshold_traits == UndefinedPixelTrait))
continue;
if ((threshold_traits & CopyPixelTrait) != 0)
{
SetPixelChannel(threshold_image,channel,p[center+i],q);
continue;
}
channel_sum[channel]-=channel_bias[channel];
channel_bias[channel]=0.0;
pixels=p;
for (v=0; v < (ssize_t) height; v++)
{
channel_bias[channel]+=pixels[i];
pixels+=(width-1)*GetPixelChannels(image);
channel_sum[channel]+=pixels[i];
pixels+=GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+1);
}
mean=(double) (channel_sum[channel]/number_pixels+bias);
SetPixelChannel(threshold_image,channel,(Quantum) ((double)
p[center+i] <= mean ? 0 : QuantumRange),q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(threshold_image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(threshold_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,AdaptiveThresholdImageTag,progress,
image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
threshold_image->type=image->type;
threshold_view=DestroyCacheView(threshold_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
if (status == MagickFalse)
threshold_image=DestroyImage(threshold_image);
return(threshold_image);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1608
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 169,605
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StreamTcpSessionPktFree (Packet *p)
{
SCEnter();
TcpSession *ssn = (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx;
if (ssn == NULL)
SCReturn;
StreamTcpReturnStreamSegments(&ssn->client);
StreamTcpReturnStreamSegments(&ssn->server);
SCReturn;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID:
| 0
| 79,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int mctime_update_needed(const struct inode *inode,
const struct timespec *now)
{
if (!timespec_equal(&inode->i_mtime, now) ||
!timespec_equal(&inode->i_ctime, now))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResetScreenHandler::Hide() {
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetUpdateEngineClient()->RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Rollback option put behind the flag.
BUG=368860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/267393011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269753 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
{
int no_nice;
if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) {
error = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) {
error = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
if (no_nice) {
error = no_nice;
goto out;
}
if (error == -ESRCH)
error = 0;
set_user_nice(p, niceval);
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-16
| 0
| 21,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int _setEdgePixel(const gdImagePtr src, unsigned int x, unsigned int y, gdFixed coverage, const int bgColor)
{
const gdFixed f_127 = gd_itofx(127);
register int c = src->tpixels[y][x];
c = c | (( (int) (gd_fxtof(gd_mulfx(coverage, f_127)) + 50.5f)) << 24);
return _color_blend(bgColor, c);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #72227: imagescale out-of-bounds read
Ported from https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 170,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _WM_do_meta_trackname(struct _mdi *mdi, struct _event_data *data) {
/* placeholder function so we can record tempo in the event stream
* for conversion function _WM_Event2Midi */
#ifdef DEBUG_MIDI
uint8_t ch = data->channel;
MIDI_EVENT_SDEBUG(__FUNCTION__, ch, data->data.string);
#else
UNUSED(data);
#endif
UNUSED(mdi);
return;
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 63,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sidx_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_SegmentIndexBox *ptr = (GF_SegmentIndexBox *) s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
if (ptr->refs) gf_free(ptr->refs);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::AllowFormAction(
const KURL& url,
RedirectStatus redirect_status,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reporting_policy,
CheckHeaderType check_header_type) const {
if (ShouldBypassContentSecurityPolicy(url, execution_context_))
return true;
bool is_allowed = true;
for (const auto& policy : policies_) {
if (!CheckHeaderTypeMatches(check_header_type, policy->HeaderType()))
continue;
is_allowed &=
policy->AllowFormAction(url, redirect_status, reporting_policy);
}
return is_allowed;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 152,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnShutdownFinished() {
DCHECK(context_->network_task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
host_ = NULL;
ResetHost();
context_->ui_task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&HostProcess::ShutdownHostProcess,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in CreateAuthenticatorFactory().
CreateAuthenticatorFactory() is called asynchronously, but it didn't handle
the case when it's called after host object is destroyed.
BUG=150644
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11090036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161077 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long long Track::GetSeekPreRoll() const { return m_info.seekPreRoll; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 160,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool is_path_reachable(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
const struct path *root)
{
while (&mnt->mnt != root->mnt && mnt_has_parent(mnt)) {
dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
}
return &mnt->mnt == root->mnt && is_subdir(dentry, root->dentry);
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 32,362
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose )
{
int ret;
size_t i;
mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
mbedtls_ecp_point R, P;
mbedtls_mpi m;
unsigned long add_c_prev, dbl_c_prev, mul_c_prev;
/* exponents especially adapted for secp192r1 */
const char *exponents[] =
{
"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", /* one */
"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22830", /* N - 1 */
"5EA6F389A38B8BC81E767753B15AA5569E1782E30ABE7D25", /* random */
"400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", /* one and zeros */
"7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", /* all ones */
"555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555", /* 101010... */
};
mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &m );
/* Use secp192r1 if available, or any available curve */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 ) );
#else
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()->grp_id ) );
#endif
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( " ECP test #1 (constant op_count, base point G): " );
/* Do a dummy multiplication first to trigger precomputation */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &m, 2 ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) );
add_count = 0;
dbl_count = 0;
mul_count = 0;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[0] ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) );
for( i = 1; i < sizeof( exponents ) / sizeof( exponents[0] ); i++ )
{
add_c_prev = add_count;
dbl_c_prev = dbl_count;
mul_c_prev = mul_count;
add_count = 0;
dbl_count = 0;
mul_count = 0;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[i] ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) );
if( add_count != add_c_prev ||
dbl_count != dbl_c_prev ||
mul_count != mul_c_prev )
{
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i );
ret = 1;
goto cleanup;
}
}
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( " ECP test #2 (constant op_count, other point): " );
/* We computed P = 2G last time, use it */
add_count = 0;
dbl_count = 0;
mul_count = 0;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[0] ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &P, NULL, NULL ) );
for( i = 1; i < sizeof( exponents ) / sizeof( exponents[0] ); i++ )
{
add_c_prev = add_count;
dbl_c_prev = dbl_count;
mul_c_prev = mul_count;
add_count = 0;
dbl_count = 0;
mul_count = 0;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[i] ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &P, NULL, NULL ) );
if( add_count != add_c_prev ||
dbl_count != dbl_c_prev ||
mul_count != mul_c_prev )
{
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i );
ret = 1;
goto cleanup;
}
}
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
cleanup:
if( ret < 0 && verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", ret );
mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp );
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &m );
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 96,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LoginDisplayHostWebUI::ShowGaiaDialog(
bool can_close,
const base::Optional<AccountId>& prefilled_account) {
NOTREACHED();
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(sigprocmask, int, how, old_sigset_t __user *, nset,
old_sigset_t __user *, oset)
{
old_sigset_t old_set, new_set;
sigset_t new_blocked;
old_set = current->blocked.sig[0];
if (nset) {
if (copy_from_user(&new_set, nset, sizeof(*nset)))
return -EFAULT;
new_blocked = current->blocked;
switch (how) {
case SIG_BLOCK:
sigaddsetmask(&new_blocked, new_set);
break;
case SIG_UNBLOCK:
sigdelsetmask(&new_blocked, new_set);
break;
case SIG_SETMASK:
new_blocked.sig[0] = new_set;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
set_current_blocked(&new_blocked);
}
if (oset) {
if (copy_to_user(oset, &old_set, sizeof(*oset)))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 31,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void null_endofword(char *word)
{
while (*word && *word != ' ' && *word != '\t')
word++;
*word = '\0';
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GestureSequence::AppendTapDownGestureEvent(const GesturePoint& point,
Gestures* gestures) {
gestures->push_back(linked_ptr<GestureEvent>(new GestureEvent(
ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP_DOWN,
point.first_touch_position().x(),
point.first_touch_position().y(),
flags_,
base::Time::FromDoubleT(point.last_touch_time()),
0.f, 0.f)));
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 108,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void license_free(rdpLicense* license)
{
if (license)
{
free(license->Modulus);
certificate_free(license->certificate);
license_free_product_info(license->ProductInfo);
license_free_binary_blob(license->ErrorInfo);
license_free_binary_blob(license->KeyExchangeList);
license_free_binary_blob(license->ServerCertificate);
license_free_binary_blob(license->ClientUserName);
license_free_binary_blob(license->ClientMachineName);
license_free_binary_blob(license->PlatformChallenge);
license_free_binary_blob(license->EncryptedPlatformChallenge);
license_free_binary_blob(license->EncryptedPremasterSecret);
license_free_binary_blob(license->EncryptedHardwareId);
license_free_scope_list(license->ScopeList);
free(license);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix possible integer overflow in license_read_scope_list()
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 39,548
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int proto_register(struct proto *prot, int alloc_slab)
{
if (alloc_slab) {
prot->slab = kmem_cache_create(prot->name, prot->obj_size, 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | prot->slab_flags,
NULL);
if (prot->slab == NULL) {
printk(KERN_CRIT "%s: Can't create sock SLAB cache!\n",
prot->name);
goto out;
}
if (prot->rsk_prot != NULL) {
prot->rsk_prot->slab_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "request_sock_%s", prot->name);
if (prot->rsk_prot->slab_name == NULL)
goto out_free_sock_slab;
prot->rsk_prot->slab = kmem_cache_create(prot->rsk_prot->slab_name,
prot->rsk_prot->obj_size, 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN, NULL);
if (prot->rsk_prot->slab == NULL) {
printk(KERN_CRIT "%s: Can't create request sock SLAB cache!\n",
prot->name);
goto out_free_request_sock_slab_name;
}
}
if (prot->twsk_prot != NULL) {
prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "tw_sock_%s", prot->name);
if (prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab_name == NULL)
goto out_free_request_sock_slab;
prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab =
kmem_cache_create(prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab_name,
prot->twsk_prot->twsk_obj_size,
0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN |
prot->slab_flags,
NULL);
if (prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab == NULL)
goto out_free_timewait_sock_slab_name;
}
}
mutex_lock(&proto_list_mutex);
list_add(&prot->node, &proto_list);
assign_proto_idx(prot);
mutex_unlock(&proto_list_mutex);
return 0;
out_free_timewait_sock_slab_name:
kfree(prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab_name);
out_free_request_sock_slab:
if (prot->rsk_prot && prot->rsk_prot->slab) {
kmem_cache_destroy(prot->rsk_prot->slab);
prot->rsk_prot->slab = NULL;
}
out_free_request_sock_slab_name:
if (prot->rsk_prot)
kfree(prot->rsk_prot->slab_name);
out_free_sock_slab:
kmem_cache_destroy(prot->slab);
prot->slab = NULL;
out:
return -ENOBUFS;
}
Commit Message: net: cleanups in sock_setsockopt()
Use min_t()/max_t() macros, reformat two comments, use !!test_bit() to
match !!sock_flag()
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 58,679
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: n_tty_receive_buf_closing(struct tty_struct *tty, const unsigned char *cp,
char *fp, int count)
{
char flag = TTY_NORMAL;
while (count--) {
if (fp)
flag = *fp++;
if (likely(flag == TTY_NORMAL))
n_tty_receive_char_closing(tty, *cp++);
}
}
Commit Message: n_tty: fix EXTPROC vs ICANON interaction with TIOCINQ (aka FIONREAD)
We added support for EXTPROC back in 2010 in commit 26df6d13406d ("tty:
Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE") and the intent was to allow it to
override some (all?) ICANON behavior. Quoting from that original commit
message:
There is a new bit in the termios local flag word, EXTPROC.
When this bit is set, several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled. Input line editing, character echo, and mapping
of signals are all disabled. This allows the telnetd to turn
off these functions when in linemode, but still keep track of
what state the user wants the terminal to be in.
but the problem turns out that "several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled" is a bit ambiguous, and you can really confuse the n_tty
layer by setting EXTPROC and then causing some of the ICANON invariants
to no longer be maintained.
This fixes at least one such case (TIOCINQ) becoming unhappy because of
the confusion over whether ICANON really means ICANON when EXTPROC is set.
This basically makes TIOCINQ match the case of read: if EXTPROC is set,
we ignore ICANON. Also, make sure to reset the ICANON state ie EXTPROC
changes, not just if ICANON changes.
Fixes: 26df6d13406d ("tty: Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 76,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ipmi_debug_msg(const char *title, unsigned char *data,
unsigned int len)
{ }
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::Close() {
if (worker_host_)
worker_host_->TerminateWorker();
return true;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool vmci_transport_stream_allow(u32 cid, u32 port)
{
static const u32 non_socket_contexts[] = {
VMADDR_CID_RESERVED,
};
int i;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(cid) != sizeof(*non_socket_contexts));
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(non_socket_contexts); i++) {
if (cid == non_socket_contexts[i])
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: brcmf_cfg80211_get_tx_power(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct wireless_dev *wdev,
s32 *dbm)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy);
struct net_device *ndev = cfg_to_ndev(cfg);
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
s32 qdbm = 0;
s32 err;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
if (!check_vif_up(ifp->vif))
return -EIO;
err = brcmf_fil_iovar_int_get(ifp, "qtxpower", &qdbm);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("error (%d)\n", err);
goto done;
}
*dbm = (qdbm & ~WL_TXPWR_OVERRIDE) / 4;
done:
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Exit (0x%x %d)\n", qdbm, *dbm);
return err;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,024
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InterstitialObserver(content::WebContents* web_contents,
const base::Closure& attach_callback,
const base::Closure& detach_callback)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
attach_callback_(attach_callback),
detach_callback_(detach_callback) {
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::IsCompressedTextureFormat(unsigned format) {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tcp_skb_mark_lost_uncond_verify(struct tcp_sock *tp,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
tcp_verify_retransmit_hint(tp, skb);
if (!(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & (TCPCB_LOST|TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED))) {
tp->lost_out += tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked |= TCPCB_LOST;
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 41,214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void crypto_ecb_free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
{
crypto_drop_spawn(crypto_instance_ctx(inst));
kfree(inst);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE OMXNodeInstance::OnFillBufferDone(
OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE /* hComponent */,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR pAppData,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* pBuffer) {
if (pAppData == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
OMXNodeInstance *instance = static_cast<OMXNodeInstance *>(pAppData);
if (instance->mDying) {
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
int fenceFd = instance->retrieveFenceFromMeta_l(pBuffer, kPortIndexOutput);
return instance->owner()->OnFillBufferDone(instance->nodeID(),
instance->findBufferID(pBuffer), pBuffer, fenceFd);
}
Commit Message: IOMX: allow configuration after going to loaded state
This was disallowed recently but we still use it as MediaCodcec.stop
only goes to loaded state, and does not free component.
Bug: 31450460
Change-Id: I72e092e4e55c9f23b1baee3e950d76e84a5ef28d
(cherry picked from commit e03b22839d78c841ce0a1a0a1ee1960932188b0b)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 157,709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL DevToolsWindow::GetDevToolsURL(Profile* profile,
const GURL& base_url,
bool shared_worker_frontend,
bool v8_only_frontend,
const std::string& remote_frontend,
bool can_dock) {
if (base_url.SchemeIs("data"))
return base_url;
std::string frontend_url(
!remote_frontend.empty() ?
remote_frontend :
base_url.is_empty() ? chrome::kChromeUIDevToolsURL : base_url.spec());
std::string url_string(
frontend_url +
((frontend_url.find("?") == std::string::npos) ? "?" : "&"));
if (shared_worker_frontend)
url_string += "&isSharedWorker=true";
if (v8_only_frontend)
url_string += "&v8only=true";
if (remote_frontend.size()) {
url_string += "&remoteFrontend=true";
} else {
url_string += "&remoteBase=" + DevToolsUI::GetRemoteBaseURL().spec();
}
if (can_dock)
url_string += "&can_dock=true";
return GURL(url_string);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Move sanitize url to devtools_ui.cc.
Compatibility script is not reliable enough.
BUG=653134
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2403633002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#425814}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 172,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::scheduleAnimationFrameEvent(PassRefPtr<Event> event)
{
ensureScriptedAnimationController().scheduleEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ip4_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_in *usin = (struct sockaddr_in *) uaddr;
struct flowi4 *fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
__be32 saddr;
int oif;
int err;
if (addr_len < sizeof(*usin))
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin_family != AF_INET)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
sk_dst_reset(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
saddr = inet->inet_saddr;
if (ipv4_is_multicast(usin->sin_addr.s_addr)) {
if (!oif)
oif = inet->mc_index;
if (!saddr)
saddr = inet->mc_addr;
}
fl4 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip4;
rt = ip_route_connect(fl4, usin->sin_addr.s_addr, saddr,
RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), oif,
sk->sk_protocol,
inet->inet_sport, usin->sin_port, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
if (err == -ENETUNREACH)
IP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
goto out;
}
if ((rt->rt_flags & RTCF_BROADCAST) && !sock_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST)) {
ip_rt_put(rt);
err = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
if (!inet->inet_saddr)
inet->inet_saddr = fl4->saddr; /* Update source address */
if (!inet->inet_rcv_saddr) {
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = fl4->saddr;
if (sk->sk_prot->rehash)
sk->sk_prot->rehash(sk);
}
inet->inet_daddr = fl4->daddr;
inet->inet_dport = usin->sin_port;
sk->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
inet->inet_id = jiffies;
sk_dst_set(sk, &rt->dst);
err = 0;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: fix a race in ip4_datagram_release_cb()
Alexey gave a AddressSanitizer[1] report that finally gave a good hint
at where was the origin of various problems already reported by Dormando
in the past [2]
Problem comes from the fact that UDP can have a lockless TX path, and
concurrent threads can manipulate sk_dst_cache, while another thread,
is holding socket lock and calls __sk_dst_set() in
ip4_datagram_release_cb() (this was added in linux-3.8)
It seems that all we need to do is to use sk_dst_check() and
sk_dst_set() so that all the writers hold same spinlock
(sk->sk_dst_lock) to prevent corruptions.
TCP stack do not need this protection, as all sk_dst_cache writers hold
the socket lock.
[1]
https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free in ipv4_dst_check
Read of size 2 by thread T15453:
[<ffffffff817daa3a>] ipv4_dst_check+0x1a/0x90 ./net/ipv4/route.c:1116
[<ffffffff8175b789>] __sk_dst_check+0x89/0xe0 ./net/core/sock.c:531
[<ffffffff81830a36>] ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x46/0x390 ??:0
[<ffffffff8175eaea>] release_sock+0x17a/0x230 ./net/core/sock.c:2413
[<ffffffff81830882>] ip4_datagram_connect+0x462/0x5d0 ??:0
[<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534
[<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701
[<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682
[<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629
Freed by thread T15455:
[<ffffffff8178d9b8>] dst_destroy+0xa8/0x160 ./net/core/dst.c:251
[<ffffffff8178de25>] dst_release+0x45/0x80 ./net/core/dst.c:280
[<ffffffff818304c1>] ip4_datagram_connect+0xa1/0x5d0 ??:0
[<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534
[<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701
[<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682
[<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629
Allocated by thread T15453:
[<ffffffff8178d291>] dst_alloc+0x81/0x2b0 ./net/core/dst.c:171
[<ffffffff817db3b7>] rt_dst_alloc+0x47/0x50 ./net/ipv4/route.c:1406
[< inlined >] __ip_route_output_key+0x3e8/0xf70
__mkroute_output ./net/ipv4/route.c:1939
[<ffffffff817dde08>] __ip_route_output_key+0x3e8/0xf70 ./net/ipv4/route.c:2161
[<ffffffff817deb34>] ip_route_output_flow+0x14/0x30 ./net/ipv4/route.c:2249
[<ffffffff81830737>] ip4_datagram_connect+0x317/0x5d0 ??:0
[<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534
[<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701
[<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682
[<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629
[2]
<4>[196727.311203] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
<4>[196727.311224] Modules linked in: xt_TEE xt_dscp xt_DSCP macvlan bridge coretemp crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel gpio_ich microcode ipmi_watchdog ipmi_devintf sb_edac edac_core lpc_ich mfd_core tpm_tis tpm tpm_bios ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler isci igb libsas i2c_algo_bit ixgbe ptp pps_core mdio
<4>[196727.311333] CPU: 17 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/17 Not tainted 3.10.26 #1
<4>[196727.311344] Hardware name: Supermicro X9DRi-LN4+/X9DR3-LN4+/X9DRi-LN4+/X9DR3-LN4+, BIOS 3.0 07/05/2013
<4>[196727.311364] task: ffff885e6f069700 ti: ffff885e6f072000 task.ti: ffff885e6f072000
<4>[196727.311377] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815f8c7f>] [<ffffffff815f8c7f>] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x4f/0x80
<4>[196727.311399] RSP: 0018:ffff885effd23a70 EFLAGS: 00010282
<4>[196727.311409] RAX: dead000000200200 RBX: ffff8854c398ecc0 RCX: 0000000000000040
<4>[196727.311423] RDX: dead000000100100 RSI: dead000000100100 RDI: dead000000200200
<4>[196727.311437] RBP: ffff885effd23a80 R08: ffffffff815fd9e0 R09: ffff885d5a590800
<4>[196727.311451] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
<4>[196727.311464] R13: ffffffff81c8c280 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880e85ee16ce
<4>[196727.311510] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff885effd20000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
<4>[196727.311554] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
<4>[196727.311581] CR2: 00007a46751eb000 CR3: 0000005e65688000 CR4: 00000000000407e0
<4>[196727.311625] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
<4>[196727.311669] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
<4>[196727.311713] Stack:
<4>[196727.311733] ffff8854c398ecc0 ffff8854c398ecc0 ffff885effd23ab0 ffffffff815b7f42
<4>[196727.311784] ffff88be6595bc00 ffff8854c398ecc0 0000000000000000 ffff8854c398ecc0
<4>[196727.311834] ffff885effd23ad0 ffffffff815b86c6 ffff885d5a590800 ffff8816827821c0
<4>[196727.311885] Call Trace:
<4>[196727.311907] <IRQ>
<4>[196727.311912] [<ffffffff815b7f42>] dst_destroy+0x32/0xe0
<4>[196727.311959] [<ffffffff815b86c6>] dst_release+0x56/0x80
<4>[196727.311986] [<ffffffff81620bd5>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2a5/0x4a0
<4>[196727.312013] [<ffffffff81622b5a>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x7da/0x820
<4>[196727.312041] [<ffffffff815fd9e0>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x360/0x360
<4>[196727.312070] [<ffffffff815de02d>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x7d/0x150
<4>[196727.312097] [<ffffffff815fd9e0>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x360/0x360
<4>[196727.312125] [<ffffffff815fda92>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb2/0x230
<4>[196727.312154] [<ffffffff815fdd9a>] ip_local_deliver+0x4a/0x90
<4>[196727.312183] [<ffffffff815fd799>] ip_rcv_finish+0x119/0x360
<4>[196727.312212] [<ffffffff815fe00b>] ip_rcv+0x22b/0x340
<4>[196727.312242] [<ffffffffa0339680>] ? macvlan_broadcast+0x160/0x160 [macvlan]
<4>[196727.312275] [<ffffffff815b0c62>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x512/0x640
<4>[196727.312308] [<ffffffff811427fb>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x13b/0x150
<4>[196727.312338] [<ffffffff815b0db1>] __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0x70
<4>[196727.312368] [<ffffffff815b0fa1>] netif_receive_skb+0x31/0xa0
<4>[196727.312397] [<ffffffff815b1ae8>] napi_gro_receive+0xe8/0x140
<4>[196727.312433] [<ffffffffa00274f1>] ixgbe_poll+0x551/0x11f0 [ixgbe]
<4>[196727.312463] [<ffffffff815fe00b>] ? ip_rcv+0x22b/0x340
<4>[196727.312491] [<ffffffff815b1691>] net_rx_action+0x111/0x210
<4>[196727.312521] [<ffffffff815b0db1>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0x70
<4>[196727.312552] [<ffffffff810519d0>] __do_softirq+0xd0/0x270
<4>[196727.312583] [<ffffffff816cef3c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
<4>[196727.312613] [<ffffffff81004205>] do_softirq+0x55/0x90
<4>[196727.312640] [<ffffffff81051c85>] irq_exit+0x55/0x60
<4>[196727.312668] [<ffffffff816cf5c3>] do_IRQ+0x63/0xe0
<4>[196727.312696] [<ffffffff816c5aaa>] common_interrupt+0x6a/0x6a
<4>[196727.312722] <EOI>
<1>[196727.313071] RIP [<ffffffff815f8c7f>] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x4f/0x80
<4>[196727.313100] RSP <ffff885effd23a70>
<4>[196727.313377] ---[ end trace 64b3f14fae0f2e29 ]---
<0>[196727.380908] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Reported-by: Alexey Preobrazhensky <preobr@google.com>
Reported-by: dormando <dormando@rydia.ne>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: 8141ed9fcedb2 ("ipv4: Add a socket release callback for datagram sockets")
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 74,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_proc_rename_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct inode *old_dir,
struct inode *new_dir)
{
struct nfs_renameres *res = task->tk_msg.rpc_resp;
if (!nfs4_sequence_done(task, &res->seq_res))
return 0;
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, res->server, NULL) == -EAGAIN)
return 0;
update_changeattr(old_dir, &res->old_cinfo);
nfs_post_op_update_inode(old_dir, res->old_fattr);
update_changeattr(new_dir, &res->new_cinfo);
nfs_post_op_update_inode(new_dir, res->new_fattr);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,988
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rfcomm_dev_data_ready(struct rfcomm_dlc *dlc, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rfcomm_dev *dev = dlc->owner;
struct tty_struct *tty;
if (!dev) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return;
}
tty = dev->port.tty;
if (!tty || !skb_queue_empty(&dev->pending)) {
skb_queue_tail(&dev->pending, skb);
return;
}
BT_DBG("dlc %p tty %p len %d", dlc, tty, skb->len);
tty_insert_flip_string(tty, skb->data, skb->len);
tty_flip_buffer_push(tty);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.
Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 94,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebRTCTransportImpl::~WebRTCTransportImpl() {}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int bdrv_open(BlockDriverState **pbs, const char *filename,
const char *reference, QDict *options, int flags,
BlockDriver *drv, Error **errp)
{
int ret;
/* TODO: extra byte is a hack to ensure MAX_PATH space on Windows. */
char tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 1];
BlockDriverState *file = NULL, *bs;
const char *drvname;
Error *local_err = NULL;
assert(pbs);
if (reference) {
bool options_non_empty = options ? qdict_size(options) : false;
QDECREF(options);
if (*pbs) {
error_setg(errp, "Cannot reuse an existing BDS when referencing "
"another block device");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (filename || options_non_empty) {
error_setg(errp, "Cannot reference an existing block device with "
"additional options or a new filename");
return -EINVAL;
}
bs = bdrv_lookup_bs(reference, reference, errp);
if (!bs) {
return -ENODEV;
}
bdrv_ref(bs);
*pbs = bs;
return 0;
}
if (*pbs) {
bs = *pbs;
} else {
bs = bdrv_new("");
}
/* NULL means an empty set of options */
if (options == NULL) {
options = qdict_new();
}
bs->options = options;
options = qdict_clone_shallow(options);
if (flags & BDRV_O_PROTOCOL) {
assert(!drv);
ret = bdrv_file_open(bs, filename, &options, flags & ~BDRV_O_PROTOCOL,
&local_err);
if (!ret) {
drv = bs->drv;
goto done;
} else if (bs->drv) {
goto close_and_fail;
} else {
goto fail;
}
}
/* For snapshot=on, create a temporary qcow2 overlay */
if (flags & BDRV_O_SNAPSHOT) {
BlockDriverState *bs1;
int64_t total_size;
BlockDriver *bdrv_qcow2;
QEMUOptionParameter *create_options;
QDict *snapshot_options;
/* if snapshot, we create a temporary backing file and open it
instead of opening 'filename' directly */
/* Get the required size from the image */
QINCREF(options);
bs1 = NULL;
ret = bdrv_open(&bs1, filename, NULL, options, BDRV_O_NO_BACKING,
drv, &local_err);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
total_size = bdrv_getlength(bs1) & BDRV_SECTOR_MASK;
bdrv_unref(bs1);
/* Create the temporary image */
ret = get_tmp_filename(tmp_filename, sizeof(tmp_filename));
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not get temporary filename");
goto fail;
}
bdrv_qcow2 = bdrv_find_format("qcow2");
create_options = parse_option_parameters("", bdrv_qcow2->create_options,
NULL);
set_option_parameter_int(create_options, BLOCK_OPT_SIZE, total_size);
ret = bdrv_create(bdrv_qcow2, tmp_filename, create_options, &local_err);
free_option_parameters(create_options);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not create temporary overlay "
"'%s': %s", tmp_filename,
error_get_pretty(local_err));
error_free(local_err);
local_err = NULL;
goto fail;
}
/* Prepare a new options QDict for the temporary file, where user
* options refer to the backing file */
if (filename) {
qdict_put(options, "file.filename", qstring_from_str(filename));
}
if (drv) {
qdict_put(options, "driver", qstring_from_str(drv->format_name));
}
snapshot_options = qdict_new();
qdict_put(snapshot_options, "backing", options);
qdict_flatten(snapshot_options);
bs->options = snapshot_options;
options = qdict_clone_shallow(bs->options);
filename = tmp_filename;
drv = bdrv_qcow2;
bs->is_temporary = 1;
}
/* Open image file without format layer */
if (flags & BDRV_O_RDWR) {
flags |= BDRV_O_ALLOW_RDWR;
}
assert(file == NULL);
ret = bdrv_open_image(&file, filename, options, "file",
bdrv_open_flags(bs, flags | BDRV_O_UNMAP) |
BDRV_O_PROTOCOL, true, &local_err);
if (ret < 0) {
goto unlink_and_fail;
}
/* Find the right image format driver */
drvname = qdict_get_try_str(options, "driver");
if (drvname) {
drv = bdrv_find_format(drvname);
qdict_del(options, "driver");
if (!drv) {
error_setg(errp, "Invalid driver: '%s'", drvname);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto unlink_and_fail;
}
}
if (!drv) {
if (file) {
ret = find_image_format(file, filename, &drv, &local_err);
} else {
error_setg(errp, "Must specify either driver or file");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto unlink_and_fail;
}
}
if (!drv) {
goto unlink_and_fail;
}
/* Open the image */
ret = bdrv_open_common(bs, file, options, flags, drv, &local_err);
if (ret < 0) {
goto unlink_and_fail;
}
if (file && (bs->file != file)) {
bdrv_unref(file);
file = NULL;
}
/* If there is a backing file, use it */
if ((flags & BDRV_O_NO_BACKING) == 0) {
QDict *backing_options;
qdict_extract_subqdict(options, &backing_options, "backing.");
ret = bdrv_open_backing_file(bs, backing_options, &local_err);
if (ret < 0) {
goto close_and_fail;
}
}
done:
/* Check if any unknown options were used */
if (options && (qdict_size(options) != 0)) {
const QDictEntry *entry = qdict_first(options);
if (flags & BDRV_O_PROTOCOL) {
error_setg(errp, "Block protocol '%s' doesn't support the option "
"'%s'", drv->format_name, entry->key);
} else {
error_setg(errp, "Block format '%s' used by device '%s' doesn't "
"support the option '%s'", drv->format_name,
bs->device_name, entry->key);
}
ret = -EINVAL;
goto close_and_fail;
}
if (!bdrv_key_required(bs)) {
bdrv_dev_change_media_cb(bs, true);
} else if (!runstate_check(RUN_STATE_PRELAUNCH)
&& !runstate_check(RUN_STATE_INMIGRATE)
&& !runstate_check(RUN_STATE_PAUSED)) { /* HACK */
error_setg(errp,
"Guest must be stopped for opening of encrypted image");
ret = -EBUSY;
goto close_and_fail;
}
QDECREF(options);
*pbs = bs;
return 0;
unlink_and_fail:
if (file != NULL) {
bdrv_unref(file);
}
if (bs->is_temporary) {
unlink(filename);
}
fail:
QDECREF(bs->options);
QDECREF(options);
bs->options = NULL;
if (!*pbs) {
/* If *pbs is NULL, a new BDS has been created in this function and
needs to be freed now. Otherwise, it does not need to be closed,
since it has not really been opened yet. */
bdrv_unref(bs);
}
if (local_err) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
}
return ret;
close_and_fail:
/* See fail path, but now the BDS has to be always closed */
if (*pbs) {
bdrv_close(bs);
} else {
bdrv_unref(bs);
}
QDECREF(options);
if (local_err) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnRegisterAgent(
const base::Closure& callback,
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback) {
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Agent registered, now pairing";
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->
Pair(object_path_,
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPair,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
callback, error_callback),
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPairError,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
error_callback));
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EditingBehavior Editor::Behavior() const {
if (!GetFrame().GetSettings())
return EditingBehavior(kEditingMacBehavior);
return EditingBehavior(GetFrame().GetSettings()->GetEditingBehaviorType());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void NameAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V0CustomElementProcessingStack::CallbackDeliveryScope delivery_scope;
V8StringResource<> cpp_value = v8_value;
if (!cpp_value.Prepare())
return;
impl->setAttribute(html_names::kNameAttr, cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionUnloadNotificationObserver::~ExtensionUnloadNotificationObserver() {
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::TimeTicks RendererSchedulerImpl::EnableVirtualTime() {
if (main_thread_only().use_virtual_time)
return main_thread_only().initial_virtual_time;
main_thread_only().use_virtual_time = true;
DCHECK(!virtual_time_domain_);
main_thread_only().initial_virtual_time = tick_clock()->NowTicks();
virtual_time_domain_.reset(new AutoAdvancingVirtualTimeDomain(
main_thread_only().initial_virtual_time, &helper_));
RegisterTimeDomain(virtual_time_domain_.get());
virtual_time_domain_->SetObserver(this);
DCHECK(!virtual_time_control_task_queue_);
virtual_time_control_task_queue_ =
helper_.NewTaskQueue(MainThreadTaskQueue::QueueCreationParams(
MainThreadTaskQueue::QueueType::kControl));
virtual_time_control_task_queue_->SetQueuePriority(
TaskQueue::kControlPriority);
virtual_time_control_task_queue_->SetTimeDomain(virtual_time_domain_.get());
main_thread_only().use_virtual_time = true;
ForceUpdatePolicy();
virtual_time_domain_->SetCanAdvanceVirtualTime(
!main_thread_only().virtual_time_stopped);
if (main_thread_only().virtual_time_stopped)
VirtualTimePaused();
return main_thread_only().initial_virtual_time;
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 143,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebLocalFrame* FrameReference::GetFrame() {
if (view_ == nullptr || frame_ == nullptr)
return nullptr;
for (blink::WebFrame* frame = view_->MainFrame(); frame != nullptr;
frame = frame->TraverseNext()) {
if (frame == frame_)
return frame_;
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionWindowLastFocusedTest::ActivateBrowserWindow(Browser* browser) {
BrowserView* view = BrowserView::GetBrowserViewForBrowser(browser);
EXPECT_NE(nullptr, view);
views::Widget* widget = view->frame();
EXPECT_NE(nullptr, widget);
WidgetActivatedWaiter waiter(widget);
waiter.ActivateAndWait();
}
Commit Message: Change TemporaryAddressSpoof test to not depend on PDF OpenActions.
OpenActions that navigate to URIs are going to be blocked when
https://pdfium-review.googlesource.com/c/pdfium/+/42731 relands.
It was reverted because this test was breaking and blocking the
pdfium roll into chromium.
The test will now click on a link in the PDF that navigates to the
URI.
Bug: 851821
Change-Id: I49853e99de7b989858b1962ad4a92a4168d4c2db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1244367
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <hnakashima@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#596011}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bta_av_rc_vendor_rsp(tBTA_AV_CB* p_cb, tBTA_AV_DATA* p_data) {
tBTA_AV_RCB* p_rcb;
if ((p_cb->features & (BTA_AV_FEAT_RCTG | BTA_AV_FEAT_VENDOR)) ==
(BTA_AV_FEAT_RCTG | BTA_AV_FEAT_VENDOR)) {
if (p_data->hdr.layer_specific < BTA_AV_NUM_RCB) {
p_rcb = &p_cb->rcb[p_data->hdr.layer_specific];
AVRC_VendorRsp(p_rcb->handle, p_data->api_vendor.label,
&p_data->api_vendor.msg);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Check packet length in bta_av_proc_meta_cmd
Bug: 111893951
Test: manual - connect A2DP
Change-Id: Ibbf347863dfd29ea3385312e9dde1082bc90d2f3
(cherry picked from commit ed51887f921263219bcd2fbf6650ead5ec8d334e)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void atl2_init_pcie(struct atl2_hw *hw)
{
u32 value;
value = LTSSM_TEST_MODE_DEF;
ATL2_WRITE_REG(hw, REG_LTSSM_TEST_MODE, value);
value = PCIE_DLL_TX_CTRL1_DEF;
ATL2_WRITE_REG(hw, REG_PCIE_DLL_TX_CTRL1, value);
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sctp_write_space(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct list_head *pos;
/* Wake up the tasks in each wait queue. */
list_for_each(pos, &((sctp_sk(sk))->ep->asocs)) {
asoc = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_association, asocs);
__sctp_write_space(asoc);
}
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 35,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AXObject::isMultiline() const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!node)
return false;
if (isHTMLTextAreaElement(*node))
return true;
if (hasEditableStyle(*node))
return true;
if (!isNativeTextControl() && !isNonNativeTextControl())
return false;
return equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_multilineAttr), "true");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 1
| 171,928
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proxy_utimensat(FsContext *s, V9fsPath *fs_path,
const struct timespec *buf)
{
int retval;
retval = v9fs_request(s->private, T_UTIME, NULL, fs_path,
buf[0].tv_sec, buf[0].tv_nsec,
buf[1].tv_sec, buf[1].tv_nsec);
if (retval < 0) {
errno = -retval;
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 7,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CompositorImpl::OnFatalOrSurfaceContextCreationFailure(
gpu::ContextResult context_result) {
DCHECK(gpu::IsFatalOrSurfaceFailure(context_result));
LOG_IF(FATAL, context_result == gpu::ContextResult::kFatalFailure)
<< "Fatal error making Gpu context";
if (context_result == gpu::ContextResult::kSurfaceFailure) {
SetSurface(nullptr);
client_->RecreateSurface();
}
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 130,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct rds_message *rds_send_get_message(struct rds_connection *conn,
struct rm_rdma_op *op)
{
struct rds_message *rm, *tmp, *found = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&conn->c_lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry_safe(rm, tmp, &conn->c_retrans, m_conn_item) {
if (&rm->rdma == op) {
atomic_inc(&rm->m_refcount);
found = rm;
goto out;
}
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(rm, tmp, &conn->c_send_queue, m_conn_item) {
if (&rm->rdma == op) {
atomic_inc(&rm->m_refcount);
found = rm;
break;
}
}
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&conn->c_lock, flags);
return found;
}
Commit Message: RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on unbound socket
Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when
sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused
by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks
the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a
race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not
in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to
dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create().
Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if
you're interested.
I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer
with this patch, whereas I could without.
Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937:
74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection")
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 41,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DatabaseImpl::IDBThreadHelper::Put(
int64_t transaction_id,
int64_t object_store_id,
::indexed_db::mojom::ValuePtr mojo_value,
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<storage::BlobDataHandle>> handles,
std::vector<IndexedDBBlobInfo> blob_info,
const IndexedDBKey& key,
blink::WebIDBPutMode mode,
const std::vector<IndexedDBIndexKeys>& index_keys,
scoped_refptr<IndexedDBCallbacks> callbacks) {
DCHECK(idb_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!connection_->IsConnected())
return;
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction =
connection_->GetTransaction(transaction_id);
if (!transaction)
return;
uint64_t commit_size = mojo_value->bits.size();
IndexedDBValue value;
swap(value.bits, mojo_value->bits);
swap(value.blob_info, blob_info);
connection_->database()->Put(transaction, object_store_id, &value, &handles,
base::MakeUnique<IndexedDBKey>(key), mode,
std::move(callbacks), index_keys);
transaction->set_size(transaction->size() + commit_size);
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 136,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
TestObj* objArg(toTestObj(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
size_t argsCount = exec->argumentCount();
if (argsCount <= 1) {
impl->overloadedMethod(objArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
int intArg(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->overloadedMethod(objArg, intArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 170,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int multipath_end_io(struct dm_target *ti, struct request *clone,
int error, union map_info *map_context)
{
struct multipath *m = ti->private;
struct dm_mpath_io *mpio = map_context->ptr;
struct pgpath *pgpath = mpio->pgpath;
struct path_selector *ps;
int r;
r = do_end_io(m, clone, error, mpio);
if (pgpath) {
ps = &pgpath->pg->ps;
if (ps->type->end_io)
ps->type->end_io(ps, &pgpath->path, mpio->nr_bytes);
}
mempool_free(mpio, m->mpio_pool);
return r;
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __dentry_kill(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct dentry *parent = NULL;
bool can_free = true;
if (!IS_ROOT(dentry))
parent = dentry->d_parent;
/*
* The dentry is now unrecoverably dead to the world.
*/
lockref_mark_dead(&dentry->d_lockref);
/*
* inform the fs via d_prune that this dentry is about to be
* unhashed and destroyed.
*/
if (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_PRUNE)
dentry->d_op->d_prune(dentry);
if (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_LRU_LIST) {
if (!(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_SHRINK_LIST))
d_lru_del(dentry);
}
/* if it was on the hash then remove it */
__d_drop(dentry);
dentry_unlist(dentry, parent);
if (parent)
spin_unlock(&parent->d_lock);
if (dentry->d_inode)
dentry_unlink_inode(dentry);
else
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
this_cpu_dec(nr_dentry);
if (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_release)
dentry->d_op->d_release(dentry);
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
if (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_SHRINK_LIST) {
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_MAY_FREE;
can_free = false;
}
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
if (likely(can_free))
dentry_free(dentry);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 67,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256 *key = data(ctx);
unsigned int l;
size_t plen = key->payload_length, iv = 0, /* explicit IV in TLS 1.1 and
* later */
sha_off = 0;
# if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
size_t aes_off = 0, blocks;
sha_off = SHA256_CBLOCK - key->md.num;
# endif
key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
if (len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
return 0;
if (ctx->encrypt) {
if (plen == NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH)
plen = len;
else if (len !=
((plen + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH +
AES_BLOCK_SIZE) & -AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
return 0;
else if (key->aux.tls_ver >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
iv = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
# if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
/*
* Assembly stitch handles AVX-capable processors, but its
* performance is not optimal on AMD Jaguar, ~40% worse, for
* unknown reasons. Incidentally processor in question supports
* AVX, but not AMD-specific XOP extension, which can be used
* to identify it and avoid stitch invocation. So that after we
* establish that current CPU supports AVX, we even see if it's
* either even XOP-capable Bulldozer-based or GenuineIntel one.
*/
if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (60 - 32)) && /* AVX? */
((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (43 - 32))) /* XOP? */
| (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1<<30))) && /* "Intel CPU"? */
plen > (sha_off + iv) &&
(blocks = (plen - (sha_off + iv)) / SHA256_CBLOCK)) {
SHA256_Update(&key->md, in + iv, sha_off);
(void)aesni_cbc_sha256_enc(in, out, blocks, &key->ks,
ctx->iv, &key->md, in + iv + sha_off);
blocks *= SHA256_CBLOCK;
aes_off += blocks;
sha_off += blocks;
key->md.Nh += blocks >> 29;
key->md.Nl += blocks <<= 3;
if (key->md.Nl < (unsigned int)blocks)
key->md.Nh++;
} else {
sha_off = 0;
}
# endif
sha_off += iv;
SHA256_Update(&key->md, in + sha_off, plen - sha_off);
if (plen != len) { /* "TLS" mode of operation */
if (in != out)
memcpy(out + aes_off, in + aes_off, plen - aes_off);
/* calculate HMAC and append it to payload */
SHA256_Final(out + plen, &key->md);
key->md = key->tail;
SHA256_Update(&key->md, out + plen, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
SHA256_Final(out + plen, &key->md);
/* pad the payload|hmac */
plen += SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
for (l = len - plen - 1; plen < len; plen++)
out[plen] = l;
/* encrypt HMAC|padding at once */
aesni_cbc_encrypt(out + aes_off, out + aes_off, len - aes_off,
&key->ks, ctx->iv, 1);
} else {
aesni_cbc_encrypt(in + aes_off, out + aes_off, len - aes_off,
&key->ks, ctx->iv, 1);
}
} else {
union {
unsigned int u[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH / sizeof(unsigned int)];
unsigned char c[64 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
} mac, *pmac;
/* arrange cache line alignment */
pmac = (void *)(((size_t)mac.c + 63) & ((size_t)0 - 64));
/* decrypt HMAC|padding at once */
aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &key->ks, ctx->iv, 0);
if (plen != NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) { /* "TLS" mode of operation */
size_t inp_len, mask, j, i;
unsigned int res, maxpad, pad, bitlen;
int ret = 1;
union {
unsigned int u[SHA_LBLOCK];
unsigned char c[SHA256_CBLOCK];
} *data = (void *)key->md.data;
if ((key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 4] << 8 | key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 3])
>= TLS1_1_VERSION)
iv = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
if (len < (iv + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1))
return 0;
/* omit explicit iv */
out += iv;
len -= iv;
/* figure out payload length */
pad = out[len - 1];
maxpad = len - (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1);
maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8);
maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8);
maxpad &= 255;
inp_len = len - (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1);
mask = (0 - ((inp_len - len) >> (sizeof(inp_len) * 8 - 1)));
inp_len &= mask;
key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 1] = inp_len;
/* calculate HMAC */
key->md = key->head;
SHA256_Update(&key->md, key->aux.tls_aad, plen);
# if 1
len -= SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; /* amend mac */
if (len >= (256 + SHA256_CBLOCK)) {
j = (len - (256 + SHA256_CBLOCK)) & (0 - SHA256_CBLOCK);
j += SHA256_CBLOCK - key->md.num;
SHA256_Update(&key->md, out, j);
out += j;
len -= j;
inp_len -= j;
}
/* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */
bitlen = key->md.Nl + (inp_len << 3); /* at most 18 bits */
# ifdef BSWAP4
bitlen = BSWAP4(bitlen);
# else
mac.c[0] = 0;
mac.c[1] = (unsigned char)(bitlen >> 16);
mac.c[2] = (unsigned char)(bitlen >> 8);
mac.c[3] = (unsigned char)bitlen;
bitlen = mac.u[0];
# endif
pmac->u[0] = 0;
pmac->u[1] = 0;
pmac->u[2] = 0;
pmac->u[3] = 0;
pmac->u[4] = 0;
pmac->u[5] = 0;
pmac->u[6] = 0;
pmac->u[7] = 0;
for (res = key->md.num, j = 0; j < len; j++) {
size_t c = out[j];
mask = (j - inp_len) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 8);
c &= mask;
c |= 0x80 & ~mask & ~((inp_len - j) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 8));
data->c[res++] = (unsigned char)c;
if (res != SHA256_CBLOCK)
continue;
/* j is not incremented yet */
mask = 0 - ((inp_len + 7 - j) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1));
data->u[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] |= bitlen & mask;
sha256_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1);
mask &= 0 - ((j - inp_len - 72) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1));
pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h[0] & mask;
pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h[1] & mask;
pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h[2] & mask;
pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h[3] & mask;
pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h[4] & mask;
pmac->u[5] |= key->md.h[5] & mask;
pmac->u[6] |= key->md.h[6] & mask;
pmac->u[7] |= key->md.h[7] & mask;
res = 0;
}
for (i = res; i < SHA256_CBLOCK; i++, j++)
data->c[i] = 0;
if (res > SHA256_CBLOCK - 8) {
mask = 0 - ((inp_len + 8 - j) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1));
data->u[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] |= bitlen & mask;
sha256_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1);
mask &= 0 - ((j - inp_len - 73) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1));
pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h[0] & mask;
pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h[1] & mask;
pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h[2] & mask;
pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h[3] & mask;
pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h[4] & mask;
pmac->u[5] |= key->md.h[5] & mask;
pmac->u[6] |= key->md.h[6] & mask;
pmac->u[7] |= key->md.h[7] & mask;
memset(data, 0, SHA256_CBLOCK);
j += 64;
}
data->u[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] = bitlen;
sha256_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1);
mask = 0 - ((j - inp_len - 73) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1));
pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h[0] & mask;
pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h[1] & mask;
pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h[2] & mask;
pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h[3] & mask;
pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h[4] & mask;
pmac->u[5] |= key->md.h[5] & mask;
pmac->u[6] |= key->md.h[6] & mask;
pmac->u[7] |= key->md.h[7] & mask;
# ifdef BSWAP4
pmac->u[0] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[0]);
pmac->u[1] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[1]);
pmac->u[2] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[2]);
pmac->u[3] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[3]);
pmac->u[4] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[4]);
pmac->u[5] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[5]);
pmac->u[6] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[6]);
pmac->u[7] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[7]);
# else
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
res = pmac->u[i];
pmac->c[4 * i + 0] = (unsigned char)(res >> 24);
pmac->c[4 * i + 1] = (unsigned char)(res >> 16);
pmac->c[4 * i + 2] = (unsigned char)(res >> 8);
pmac->c[4 * i + 3] = (unsigned char)res;
}
# endif
len += SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
# else
SHA256_Update(&key->md, out, inp_len);
res = key->md.num;
SHA256_Final(pmac->c, &key->md);
{
unsigned int inp_blocks, pad_blocks;
/* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */
inp_blocks =
1 + ((SHA256_CBLOCK - 9 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1));
res += (unsigned int)(len - inp_len);
pad_blocks = res / SHA256_CBLOCK;
res %= SHA256_CBLOCK;
pad_blocks +=
1 + ((SHA256_CBLOCK - 9 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1));
for (; inp_blocks < pad_blocks; inp_blocks++)
sha1_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1);
}
# endif
key->md = key->tail;
SHA256_Update(&key->md, pmac->c, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
SHA256_Final(pmac->c, &key->md);
/* verify HMAC */
out += inp_len;
len -= inp_len;
# if 1
{
unsigned char *p =
out + len - 1 - maxpad - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
size_t off = out - p;
unsigned int c, cmask;
maxpad += SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
for (res = 0, i = 0, j = 0; j < maxpad; j++) {
c = p[j];
cmask =
((int)(j - off - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) >>
(sizeof(int) * 8 - 1);
res |= (c ^ pad) & ~cmask; /* ... and padding */
cmask &= ((int)(off - 1 - j)) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1);
res |= (c ^ pmac->c[i]) & cmask;
i += 1 & cmask;
}
maxpad -= SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
res = 0 - ((0 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1));
ret &= (int)~res;
}
# else
for (res = 0, i = 0; i < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
res |= out[i] ^ pmac->c[i];
res = 0 - ((0 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1));
ret &= (int)~res;
/* verify padding */
pad = (pad & ~res) | (maxpad & res);
out = out + len - 1 - pad;
for (res = 0, i = 0; i < pad; i++)
res |= out[i] ^ pad;
res = (0 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1);
ret &= (int)~res;
# endif
return ret;
} else {
SHA256_Update(&key->md, out, len);
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 1
| 165,215
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: local void gf2_matrix_square(unsigned long *square, unsigned long *mat)
{
int n;
for (n = 0; n < 32; n++)
square[n] = gf2_matrix_times(mat, mat[n]);
}
Commit Message: When decompressing with -N or -NT, strip any path from header name.
This uses the path of the compressed file combined with the name
from the header as the name of the decompressed output file. Any
path information in the header name is stripped. This avoids a
possible vulnerability where absolute or descending paths are put
in the gzip header.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 44,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_lo_import)
{
zval *pgsql_link = NULL, *oid = NULL;
char *file_in;
int id = -1;
size_t name_len;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
PGconn *pgsql;
Oid returned_oid;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, argc,
"rp|z", &pgsql_link, &file_in, &name_len, &oid) == SUCCESS) {
;
}
else if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, argc,
"p|z", &file_in, &name_len, &oid) == SUCCESS) {
id = FETCH_DEFAULT_LINK();
CHECK_DEFAULT_LINK(id);
}
/* old calling convention, deprecated since PHP 4.2 */
else if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, argc,
"pr", &file_in, &name_len, &pgsql_link ) == SUCCESS) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "Old API is used");
}
else {
WRONG_PARAM_COUNT;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(file_in)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (oid) {
#ifndef HAVE_PG_LO_IMPORT_WITH_OID
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "OID value passing not supported");
#else
Oid wanted_oid;
switch (Z_TYPE_P(oid)) {
case IS_STRING:
{
char *end_ptr;
wanted_oid = (Oid)strtoul(Z_STRVAL_P(oid), &end_ptr, 10);
if ((Z_STRVAL_P(oid)+Z_STRLEN_P(oid)) != end_ptr) {
/* wrong integer format */
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "invalid OID value passed");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
break;
case IS_LONG:
if (Z_LVAL_P(oid) < (zend_long)InvalidOid) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "invalid OID value passed");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
wanted_oid = (Oid)Z_LVAL_P(oid);
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "invalid OID value passed");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
returned_oid = lo_import_with_oid(pgsql, file_in, wanted_oid);
if (returned_oid == InvalidOid) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PGSQL_RETURN_OID(returned_oid);
#endif
}
returned_oid = lo_import(pgsql, file_in);
if (returned_oid == InvalidOid) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PGSQL_RETURN_OID(returned_oid);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
u32 intr_info, ex_no, error_code;
unsigned long cr2, rip, dr6;
u32 vect_info;
enum emulation_result er;
vect_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
intr_info = vmx->exit_intr_info;
if (is_machine_check(intr_info))
return handle_machine_check(vcpu);
if (is_nmi(intr_info))
return 1; /* already handled by vmx_vcpu_run() */
if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info))
return handle_ud(vcpu);
error_code = 0;
if (intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
if (!vmx->rmode.vm86_active && is_gp_fault(intr_info)) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vmware_backdoor);
er = emulate_instruction(vcpu,
EMULTYPE_VMWARE | EMULTYPE_NO_UD_ON_FAIL);
if (er == EMULATE_USER_EXIT)
return 0;
else if (er != EMULATE_DONE)
kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
return 1;
}
/*
* The #PF with PFEC.RSVD = 1 indicates the guest is accessing
* MMIO, it is better to report an internal error.
* See the comments in vmx_handle_exit.
*/
if ((vect_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
!(is_page_fault(intr_info) && !(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK))) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_SIMUL_EX;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 3;
vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vect_info;
vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = intr_info;
vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = error_code;
return 0;
}
if (is_page_fault(intr_info)) {
cr2 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
/* EPT won't cause page fault directly */
WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_reason && enable_ept);
return kvm_handle_page_fault(vcpu, error_code, cr2, NULL, 0);
}
ex_no = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no))
return handle_rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no, error_code);
switch (ex_no) {
case AC_VECTOR:
kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, error_code);
return 1;
case DB_VECTOR:
dr6 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
if (!(vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))) {
vcpu->arch.dr6 &= ~15;
vcpu->arch.dr6 |= dr6 | DR6_RTM;
if (is_icebp(intr_info))
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
kvm_run->debug.arch.dr6 = dr6 | DR6_FIXED_1;
kvm_run->debug.arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
/* fall through */
case BP_VECTOR:
/*
* Update instruction length as we may reinject #BP from
* user space while in guest debugging mode. Reading it for
* #DB as well causes no harm, it is not used in that case.
*/
vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CS_BASE) + rip;
kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = ex_no;
break;
default:
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION;
kvm_run->ex.exception = ex_no;
kvm_run->ex.error_code = error_code;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 80,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BookmarksFunction::EditBookmarksEnabled() {
PrefService* prefs = PrefServiceFromBrowserContext(profile_);
if (prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kEditBookmarksEnabled))
return true;
error_ = keys::kEditBookmarksDisabled;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free in BookmarksIOFunction::ShowSelectFileDialog.
BUG=177410
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12326086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 115,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void drm_connector_init(struct drm_device *dev,
struct drm_connector *connector,
const struct drm_connector_funcs *funcs,
int connector_type)
{
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
connector->dev = dev;
connector->funcs = funcs;
drm_mode_object_get(dev, &connector->base, DRM_MODE_OBJECT_CONNECTOR);
connector->connector_type = connector_type;
connector->connector_type_id =
++drm_connector_enum_list[connector_type].count; /* TODO */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&connector->user_modes);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&connector->probed_modes);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&connector->modes);
connector->edid_blob_ptr = NULL;
list_add_tail(&connector->head, &dev->mode_config.connector_list);
dev->mode_config.num_connector++;
if (connector_type != DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_VIRTUAL)
drm_connector_attach_property(connector,
dev->mode_config.edid_property,
0);
drm_connector_attach_property(connector,
dev->mode_config.dpms_property, 0);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
}
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 21,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct inode *btrfs_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct btrfs_inode *ei;
struct inode *inode;
ei = kmem_cache_alloc(btrfs_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ei)
return NULL;
ei->root = NULL;
ei->generation = 0;
ei->last_trans = 0;
ei->last_sub_trans = 0;
ei->logged_trans = 0;
ei->delalloc_bytes = 0;
ei->defrag_bytes = 0;
ei->disk_i_size = 0;
ei->flags = 0;
ei->csum_bytes = 0;
ei->index_cnt = (u64)-1;
ei->dir_index = 0;
ei->last_unlink_trans = 0;
ei->last_log_commit = 0;
spin_lock_init(&ei->lock);
ei->outstanding_extents = 0;
ei->reserved_extents = 0;
ei->runtime_flags = 0;
ei->force_compress = BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE;
ei->delayed_node = NULL;
ei->i_otime.tv_sec = 0;
ei->i_otime.tv_nsec = 0;
inode = &ei->vfs_inode;
extent_map_tree_init(&ei->extent_tree);
extent_io_tree_init(&ei->io_tree, &inode->i_data);
extent_io_tree_init(&ei->io_failure_tree, &inode->i_data);
ei->io_tree.track_uptodate = 1;
ei->io_failure_tree.track_uptodate = 1;
atomic_set(&ei->sync_writers, 0);
mutex_init(&ei->log_mutex);
mutex_init(&ei->delalloc_mutex);
btrfs_ordered_inode_tree_init(&ei->ordered_tree);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->delalloc_inodes);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&ei->rb_node);
return inode;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 41,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VisualsEqual(VisualPtr a, ScreenPtr pScreenB, VisualPtr b)
{
return ((a->class == b->class) &&
(a->ColormapEntries == b->ColormapEntries) &&
(a->nplanes == b->nplanes) &&
(a->redMask == b->redMask) &&
(a->greenMask == b->greenMask) &&
(a->blueMask == b->blueMask) &&
(a->offsetRed == b->offsetRed) &&
(a->offsetGreen == b->offsetGreen) &&
(a->offsetBlue == b->offsetBlue));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SharedMemoryHandleProvider::OnHandleDestroyed() {
base::AutoLock lock(mapping_lock_);
DCHECK_GT(map_ref_count_, 0);
--map_ref_count_;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool checkAcceptChild(ContainerNode* newParent, Node* newChild, Node* oldChild, ExceptionState& es)
{
if (!newChild) {
es.throwUninformativeAndGenericDOMException(NotFoundError);
return false;
}
if ((newChild->isElementNode() || newChild->isTextNode()) && newParent->isElementNode()) {
ASSERT(!newParent->isDocumentTypeNode());
ASSERT(isChildTypeAllowed(newParent, newChild));
if (containsConsideringHostElements(newChild, newParent)) {
es.throwUninformativeAndGenericDOMException(HierarchyRequestError);
return false;
}
return true;
}
ASSERT(!newChild->isPseudoElement());
if (newChild->isPseudoElement()) {
es.throwUninformativeAndGenericDOMException(HierarchyRequestError);
return false;
}
if (containsConsideringHostElements(newChild, newParent)) {
es.throwUninformativeAndGenericDOMException(HierarchyRequestError);
return false;
}
if (oldChild && newParent->isDocumentNode()) {
if (!toDocument(newParent)->canReplaceChild(newChild, oldChild)) {
es.throwUninformativeAndGenericDOMException(HierarchyRequestError);
return false;
}
} else if (!isChildTypeAllowed(newParent, newChild)) {
es.throwUninformativeAndGenericDOMException(HierarchyRequestError);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Notify nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event
This patch changes notifying nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event. In willRemoveChildren(), like willRemoveChild(); r115686 did same change, although it didn't change willRemoveChildren().
The issue 295010, use-after-free, is caused by setting removed node to Selection in mutation event handler.
BUG=295010
TEST=LayoutTests/fast/dom/Range/range-created-during-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-mutation-event-by-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-blur-event-by-remove-children.html
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25389004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::Shutdown() {
download_prefs_.reset();
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
extension_event_router_.reset();
#endif
}
Commit Message: For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebKitTestResultPrinter::PrintAudioBlock(
const std::vector<unsigned char>& audio_data) {
if (state_ != IN_AUDIO_BLOCK || capture_text_only_)
return;
if (encode_binary_data_) {
PrintEncodedBinaryData(audio_data);
return;
}
*output_ << "Content-Length: " << audio_data.size() << "\n";
output_->write(
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&audio_data[0]), audio_data.size());
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,516
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintRenderFrameHelper::ComputePageLayoutInPointsForCss(
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
int page_index,
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& page_params,
bool ignore_css_margins,
double* scale_factor,
PageSizeMargins* page_layout_in_points) {
double input_scale_factor = *scale_factor;
PrintMsg_Print_Params params = CalculatePrintParamsForCss(
frame, page_index, page_params, ignore_css_margins,
IsWebPrintScalingOptionFitToPage(page_params), scale_factor);
CalculatePageLayoutFromPrintParams(params, input_scale_factor,
page_layout_in_points);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __fanout_link(struct sock *sk, struct packet_sock *po)
{
struct packet_fanout *f = po->fanout;
spin_lock(&f->lock);
f->arr[f->num_members] = sk;
smp_wmb();
f->num_members++;
if (f->num_members == 1)
dev_add_pack(&f->prot_hook);
spin_unlock(&f->lock);
}
Commit Message: packet: in packet_do_bind, test fanout with bind_lock held
Once a socket has po->fanout set, it remains a member of the group
until it is destroyed. The prot_hook must be constant and identical
across sockets in the group.
If fanout_add races with packet_do_bind between the test of po->fanout
and taking the lock, the bind call may make type or dev inconsistent
with that of the fanout group.
Hold po->bind_lock when testing po->fanout to avoid this race.
I had to introduce artificial delay (local_bh_enable) to actually
observe the race.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 60,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void pdo_dbstmt_free_storage(pdo_stmt_t *stmt TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_pdo_stmt_delref(stmt TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 72,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ocfs2_zero_extend(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *di_bh,
loff_t zero_to_size)
{
int ret = 0;
u64 zero_start, range_start = 0, range_end = 0;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
zero_start = ocfs2_align_bytes_to_blocks(sb, i_size_read(inode));
trace_ocfs2_zero_extend((unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno,
(unsigned long long)zero_start,
(unsigned long long)i_size_read(inode));
while (zero_start < zero_to_size) {
ret = ocfs2_zero_extend_get_range(inode, di_bh, zero_start,
zero_to_size,
&range_start,
&range_end);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
break;
}
if (!range_end)
break;
/* Trim the ends */
if (range_start < zero_start)
range_start = zero_start;
if (range_end > zero_to_size)
range_end = zero_to_size;
ret = ocfs2_zero_extend_range(inode, range_start,
range_end, di_bh);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
break;
}
zero_start = range_end;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 85,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SpoolssGetPrinterDriverDirectory_q(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
guint32 level;
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_ndr_str_pointer_item(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, NDR_POINTER_UNIQUE,
"Name", hf_servername, 0);
offset = dissect_ndr_str_pointer_item(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, NDR_POINTER_UNIQUE,
"Environment", hf_environment, 0);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_level, &level);
offset = dissect_spoolss_buffer(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_offered, NULL);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 51,966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sha256_ssse3_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
{
struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
memcpy(sctx, in, sizeof(*sctx));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::RenderWidgetWillHandleMouseEvent() {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
pepper_last_mouse_event_target_ = nullptr;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __sock_recv_ts_and_drops(struct msghdr *msg, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
sock_recv_drops(msg, sk, skb);
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lease_file_add(unsigned short eport,
const char * iaddr,
unsigned short iport,
int proto,
const char * desc,
unsigned int timestamp)
{
FILE * fd;
if (lease_file == NULL) return 0;
fd = fopen( lease_file, "a");
if (fd==NULL) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "could not open lease file: %s", lease_file);
return -1;
}
/* convert our time to unix time
* if LEASEFILE_USE_REMAINING_TIME is defined, only the remaining time is stored */
if (timestamp != 0) {
timestamp -= upnp_time();
#ifndef LEASEFILE_USE_REMAINING_TIME
timestamp += time(NULL);
#endif
}
fprintf(fd, "%s:%hu:%s:%hu:%u:%s\n",
proto_itoa(proto), eport, iaddr, iport,
timestamp, desc);
fclose(fd);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: upnp_redirect(): accept NULL desc argument
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,832
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long __peek_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr)
{
struct user *dummy = NULL;
addr_t offset, tmp;
if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs) {
/*
* psw and gprs are stored on the stack
*/
tmp = *(addr_t *)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->psw + addr);
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.psw.mask) {
/* Return a clean psw mask. */
tmp &= PSW_MASK_USER | PSW_MASK_RI;
tmp |= PSW_USER_BITS;
}
} else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.orig_gpr2) {
/*
* access registers are stored in the thread structure
*/
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs;
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
/*
* Very special case: old & broken 64 bit gdb reading
* from acrs[15]. Result is a 64 bit value. Read the
* 32 bit acrs[15] value and shift it by 32. Sick...
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs[15])
tmp = ((unsigned long) child->thread.acrs[15]) << 32;
else
#endif
tmp = *(addr_t *)((addr_t) &child->thread.acrs + offset);
} else if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.orig_gpr2) {
/*
* orig_gpr2 is stored on the kernel stack
*/
tmp = (addr_t) task_pt_regs(child)->orig_gpr2;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs) {
/*
* prevent reads of padding hole between
* orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390.
*/
tmp = 0;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.fp_regs + 1)) {
/*
* floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure
*/
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs;
tmp = *(addr_t *)((addr_t) &child->thread.fp_regs + offset);
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs.fpc)
tmp <<= BITS_PER_LONG - 32;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.per_info + 1)) {
/*
* Handle access to the per_info structure.
*/
addr -= (addr_t) &dummy->regs.per_info;
tmp = __peek_user_per(child, addr);
} else
tmp = 0;
return tmp;
}
Commit Message: s390/ptrace: fix PSW mask check
The PSW mask check of the PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA command is incorrect.
The PSW_MASK_USER define contains the PSW_MASK_ASC bits, the ptrace
interface accepts all combinations for the address-space-control
bits. To protect the kernel space the PSW mask check in ptrace needs
to reject the address-space-control bit combination for home space.
Fixes CVE-2014-3534
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 38,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderBox::nodeAtPoint(const HitTestRequest& request, HitTestResult& result, const LayoutPoint& pointInContainer, const LayoutPoint& accumulatedOffset, HitTestAction action)
{
LayoutPoint adjustedLocation = accumulatedOffset + location();
for (RenderObject* child = lastChild(); child; child = child->previousSibling()) {
if (!child->hasLayer() && child->nodeAtPoint(request, result, pointInContainer, adjustedLocation, action)) {
updateHitTestResult(result, pointInContainer - toLayoutSize(adjustedLocation));
return true;
}
}
LayoutRect boundsRect(adjustedLocation, size());
if (visibleToHitTesting() && action == HitTestForeground && boundsRect.intersects(result.rectForPoint(pointInContainer))) {
updateHitTestResult(result, pointInContainer - toLayoutSize(adjustedLocation));
if (!result.addNodeToRectBasedTestResult(node(), pointInContainer, boundsRect))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::isFrameSet() const
{
if (!isHTMLDocument())
return false;
return isHTMLFrameSetElement(body());
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost(
SharedWorkerHost* worker_host,
const base::UnguessableToken& devtools_worker_token)
: DevToolsAgentHostImpl(devtools_worker_token.ToString()),
state_(WORKER_NOT_READY),
worker_host_(worker_host),
devtools_worker_token_(devtools_worker_token),
instance_(new SharedWorkerInstance(*worker_host->instance())) {
NotifyCreated();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,736
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_set_read_user_transform_fn(png_structp png_ptr, png_user_transform_ptr
read_user_transform_fn)
{
png_debug(1, "in png_set_read_user_transform_fn");
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
#ifdef PNG_READ_USER_TRANSFORM_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->transformations |= PNG_USER_TRANSFORM;
png_ptr->read_user_transform_fn = read_user_transform_fn;
#endif
#ifdef PNG_LEGACY_SUPPORTED
if (read_user_transform_fn)
png_warning(png_ptr,
"This version of libpng does not support user transforms");
#endif
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 131,380
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::DoRequestConfig(
syncable::ModelTypeSet types_to_config,
sync_api::ConfigureReason reason) {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), sync_loop_);
sync_manager_->RequestConfig(types_to_config, reason);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 104,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OmniboxViewViews::AppendDropFormats(
int* formats,
std::set<ui::Clipboard::FormatType>* format_types) {
*formats = *formats | ui::OSExchangeData::URL;
}
Commit Message: Strip JavaScript schemas on Linux text drop
When dropping text onto the Omnibox, any leading JavaScript schemes
should be stripped to avoid a "self-XSS" attack. This stripping already
occurs in all cases except when plaintext is dropped on Linux. This CL
corrects that oversight.
Bug: 768910
Change-Id: I43af24ace4a13cf61d15a32eb9382dcdd498a062
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/685638
Reviewed-by: Justin Donnelly <jdonnelly@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504695}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 150,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, offsetGet)
{
zval *obj;
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element;
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = (spl_SplObjectStorage*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char *hash;
int hash_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "o", &obj) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
hash = spl_object_storage_get_hash(intern, getThis(), obj, &hash_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (!hash) {
return;
}
element = spl_object_storage_get(intern, hash, hash_len TSRMLS_CC);
spl_object_storage_free_hash(intern, hash);
if (!element) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Object not found");
} else {
RETURN_ZVAL(element->inf,1, 0);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool SplObjectStorage::addAll(SplObjectStorage $os)
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virDomainGetInfo(virDomainPtr domain, virDomainInfoPtr info)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "info=%p", info);
virResetLastError();
if (info)
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(info, error);
conn = domain->conn;
if (conn->driver->domainGetInfo) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainGetInfo(domain, info);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 93,807
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_vm_releasepage(
struct page *page,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
int delalloc, unwritten;
trace_xfs_releasepage(page->mapping->host, page, 0, 0);
/*
* mm accommodates an old ext3 case where clean pages might not have had
* the dirty bit cleared. Thus, it can send actual dirty pages to
* ->releasepage() via shrink_active_list(). Conversely,
* block_invalidatepage() can send pages that are still marked dirty
* but otherwise have invalidated buffers.
*
* We've historically freed buffers on the latter. Instead, quietly
* filter out all dirty pages to avoid spurious buffer state warnings.
* This can likely be removed once shrink_active_list() is fixed.
*/
if (PageDirty(page))
return 0;
xfs_count_page_state(page, &delalloc, &unwritten);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(delalloc))
return 0;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(unwritten))
return 0;
return try_to_free_buffers(page);
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't BUG() on mixed direct and mapped I/O
We've had reports of generic/095 causing XFS to BUG() in
__xfs_get_blocks() due to the existence of delalloc blocks on a
direct I/O read. generic/095 issues a mix of various types of I/O,
including direct and memory mapped I/O to a single file. This is
clearly not supported behavior and is known to lead to such
problems. E.g., the lack of exclusion between the direct I/O and
write fault paths means that a write fault can allocate delalloc
blocks in a region of a file that was previously a hole after the
direct read has attempted to flush/inval the file range, but before
it actually reads the block mapping. In turn, the direct read
discovers a delalloc extent and cannot proceed.
While the appropriate solution here is to not mix direct and memory
mapped I/O to the same regions of the same file, the current
BUG_ON() behavior is probably overkill as it can crash the entire
system. Instead, localize the failure to the I/O in question by
returning an error for a direct I/O that cannot be handled safely
due to delalloc blocks. Be careful to allow the case of a direct
write to post-eof delalloc blocks. This can occur due to speculative
preallocation and is safe as post-eof blocks are not accompanied by
dirty pages in pagecache (conversely, preallocation within eof must
have been zeroed, and thus dirtied, before the inode size could have
been increased beyond said blocks).
Finally, provide an additional warning if a direct I/O write occurs
while the file is memory mapped. This may not catch all problematic
scenarios, but provides a hint that some known-to-be-problematic I/O
methods are in use.
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 93,973
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GPMF_ERR GPMF_Init(GPMF_stream *ms, uint32_t *buffer, int datasize)
{
if(ms)
{
ms->buffer = buffer;
ms->buffer_size_longs = datasize >>2;
GPMF_ResetState(ms);
return GPMF_OK;
}
return GPMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
}
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 88,438
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: net::SSLConfigService* IOThread::GetSSLConfigService() {
return ssl_config_service_manager_->Get();
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,509
|
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