instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: quit(Eina_Bool success, const char *msg)
{
ewk_shutdown();
elm_shutdown();
if (msg)
fputs(msg, (success) ? stdout : stderr);
if (!success)
return EXIT_FAILURE;
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: [EFL][WK2] Add --window-size command line option to EFL MiniBrowser
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100942
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-11-05
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Added window-size (-s) command line option to EFL MiniBrowser.
* MiniBrowser/efl/main.c:
(window_create):
(parse_window_size):
(elm_main):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@133450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int c_vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *fmt, va_list ap) {
int ch, i = 0, len_mod, flags, precision, field_width;
while ((ch = *fmt++) != '\0') {
if (ch != '%') {
C_SNPRINTF_APPEND_CHAR(ch);
} else {
/*
* Conversion specification:
* zero or more flags (one of: # 0 - <space> + ')
* an optional minimum field width (digits)
* an optional precision (. followed by digits, or *)
* an optional length modifier (one of: hh h l ll L q j z t)
* conversion specifier (one of: d i o u x X e E f F g G a A c s p n)
*/
flags = field_width = precision = len_mod = 0;
/* Flags. only zero-pad flag is supported. */
if (*fmt == '0') {
flags |= C_SNPRINTF_FLAG_ZERO;
}
/* Field width */
while (*fmt >= '0' && *fmt <= '9') {
field_width *= 10;
field_width += *fmt++ - '0';
}
/* Dynamic field width */
if (*fmt == '*') {
field_width = va_arg(ap, int);
fmt++;
}
/* Precision */
if (*fmt == '.') {
fmt++;
if (*fmt == '*') {
precision = va_arg(ap, int);
fmt++;
} else {
while (*fmt >= '0' && *fmt <= '9') {
precision *= 10;
precision += *fmt++ - '0';
}
}
}
/* Length modifier */
switch (*fmt) {
case 'h':
case 'l':
case 'L':
case 'I':
case 'q':
case 'j':
case 'z':
case 't':
len_mod = *fmt++;
if (*fmt == 'h') {
len_mod = 'H';
fmt++;
}
if (*fmt == 'l') {
len_mod = 'q';
fmt++;
}
break;
}
ch = *fmt++;
if (ch == 's') {
const char *s = va_arg(ap, const char *); /* Always fetch parameter */
int j;
int pad = field_width - (precision >= 0 ? c_strnlen(s, precision) : 0);
for (j = 0; j < pad; j++) {
C_SNPRINTF_APPEND_CHAR(' ');
}
/* `s` may be NULL in case of %.*s */
if (s != NULL) {
/* Ignore negative and 0 precisions */
for (j = 0; (precision <= 0 || j < precision) && s[j] != '\0'; j++) {
C_SNPRINTF_APPEND_CHAR(s[j]);
}
}
} else if (ch == 'c') {
ch = va_arg(ap, int); /* Always fetch parameter */
C_SNPRINTF_APPEND_CHAR(ch);
} else if (ch == 'd' && len_mod == 0) {
i += c_itoa(buf + i, buf_size - i, va_arg(ap, int), 10, flags,
field_width);
} else if (ch == 'd' && len_mod == 'l') {
i += c_itoa(buf + i, buf_size - i, va_arg(ap, long), 10, flags,
field_width);
#ifdef SSIZE_MAX
} else if (ch == 'd' && len_mod == 'z') {
i += c_itoa(buf + i, buf_size - i, va_arg(ap, ssize_t), 10, flags,
field_width);
#endif
} else if (ch == 'd' && len_mod == 'q') {
i += c_itoa(buf + i, buf_size - i, va_arg(ap, int64_t), 10, flags,
field_width);
} else if ((ch == 'x' || ch == 'u') && len_mod == 0) {
i += c_itoa(buf + i, buf_size - i, va_arg(ap, unsigned),
ch == 'x' ? 16 : 10, flags, field_width);
} else if ((ch == 'x' || ch == 'u') && len_mod == 'l') {
i += c_itoa(buf + i, buf_size - i, va_arg(ap, unsigned long),
ch == 'x' ? 16 : 10, flags, field_width);
} else if ((ch == 'x' || ch == 'u') && len_mod == 'z') {
i += c_itoa(buf + i, buf_size - i, va_arg(ap, size_t),
ch == 'x' ? 16 : 10, flags, field_width);
} else if (ch == 'p') {
unsigned long num = (unsigned long) (uintptr_t) va_arg(ap, void *);
C_SNPRINTF_APPEND_CHAR('0');
C_SNPRINTF_APPEND_CHAR('x');
i += c_itoa(buf + i, buf_size - i, num, 16, flags, 0);
} else {
#ifndef NO_LIBC
/*
* TODO(lsm): abort is not nice in a library, remove it
* Also, ESP8266 SDK doesn't have it
*/
abort();
#endif
}
}
}
/* Zero-terminate the result */
if (buf_size > 0) {
buf[i < (int) buf_size ? i : (int) buf_size - 1] = '\0';
}
return i;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-based overflow in parse_mqtt
PUBLISHED_FROM=3306592896298597fff5269634df0c1a1555113b
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 89,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBlock::insertIntoTrackedRendererMaps(RenderBox* descendant, TrackedDescendantsMap*& descendantsMap, TrackedContainerMap*& containerMap)
{
if (!descendantsMap) {
descendantsMap = new TrackedDescendantsMap;
containerMap = new TrackedContainerMap;
}
TrackedRendererListHashSet* descendantSet = descendantsMap->get(this);
if (!descendantSet) {
descendantSet = new TrackedRendererListHashSet;
descendantsMap->set(this, adoptPtr(descendantSet));
}
bool added = descendantSet->add(descendant).isNewEntry;
if (!added) {
ASSERT(containerMap->get(descendant));
ASSERT(containerMap->get(descendant)->contains(this));
return;
}
HashSet<RenderBlock*>* containerSet = containerMap->get(descendant);
if (!containerSet) {
containerSet = new HashSet<RenderBlock*>;
containerMap->set(descendant, adoptPtr(containerSet));
}
ASSERT(!containerSet->contains(this));
containerSet->add(this);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ALWAYS_INLINE void jslSingleChar() {
lex->tk = (unsigned char)lex->currCh;
jslGetNextCh();
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,545
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::MimeHandlerViewGuestCreatedCallback(
int element_instance_id,
int embedder_render_process_id,
int embedder_render_frame_id,
int32_t plugin_frame_routing_id,
const gfx::Size& element_size,
mime_handler::BeforeUnloadControlPtrInfo before_unload_control,
bool is_full_page_plugin,
WebContents* web_contents) {
auto* guest_view = MimeHandlerViewGuest::FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (!guest_view)
return;
guest_view->SetBeforeUnloadController(std::move(before_unload_control));
int guest_instance_id = guest_view->guest_instance_id();
auto* rfh = RenderFrameHost::FromID(embedder_render_process_id,
embedder_render_frame_id);
if (!rfh)
return;
guest_view->SetEmbedderFrame(embedder_render_process_id,
embedder_render_frame_id);
base::DictionaryValue attach_params;
attach_params.SetInteger(guest_view::kElementWidth, element_size.width());
attach_params.SetInteger(guest_view::kElementHeight, element_size.height());
auto* manager = GuestViewManager::FromBrowserContext(browser_context_);
if (!manager) {
guest_view::bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
this,
guest_view::bad_message::GVMF_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE_BEFORE_GVM_CREATION);
guest_view->Destroy(true);
return;
}
manager->AttachGuest(embedder_render_process_id, element_instance_id,
guest_instance_id, attach_params);
if (!content::MimeHandlerViewMode::UsesCrossProcessFrame()) {
rfh->Send(new ExtensionsGuestViewMsg_CreateMimeHandlerViewGuestACK(
element_instance_id));
return;
}
auto* plugin_rfh = RenderFrameHost::FromID(embedder_render_process_id,
plugin_frame_routing_id);
if (!plugin_rfh) {
plugin_rfh = RenderFrameHost::FromPlaceholderId(embedder_render_process_id,
plugin_frame_routing_id);
}
if (!plugin_rfh) {
guest_view->GetEmbedderFrame()->Send(
new ExtensionsGuestViewMsg_RetryCreatingMimeHandlerViewGuest(
element_instance_id));
guest_view->Destroy(true);
return;
}
if (guest_view->web_contents()->CanAttachToOuterContentsFrame(plugin_rfh)) {
guest_view->AttachToOuterWebContentsFrame(plugin_rfh, element_instance_id,
is_full_page_plugin);
} else {
frame_navigation_helpers_[element_instance_id] =
std::make_unique<FrameNavigationHelper>(
plugin_rfh, guest_view->guest_instance_id(), element_instance_id,
is_full_page_plugin, this);
}
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 173,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init run_dmi_scan(void)
{
dmi_scan_machine();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [IA64] Workaround for RSE issue
Problem: An application violating the architectural rules regarding
operation dependencies and having specific Register Stack Engine (RSE)
state at the time of the violation, may result in an illegal operation
fault and invalid RSE state. Such faults may initiate a cascade of
repeated illegal operation faults within OS interruption handlers.
The specific behavior is OS dependent.
Implication: An application causing an illegal operation fault with
specific RSE state may result in a series of illegal operation faults
and an eventual OS stack overflow condition.
Workaround: OS interruption handlers that switch to kernel backing
store implement a check for invalid RSE state to avoid the series
of illegal operation faults.
The core of the workaround is the RSE_WORKAROUND code sequence
inserted into each invocation of the SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER and
SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER_R19 macros. This sequence includes hard-coded
constants that depend on the number of stacked physical registers
being 96. The rest of this patch consists of code to disable this
workaround should this not be the case (with the presumption that
if a future Itanium processor increases the number of registers, it
would also remove the need for this patch).
Move the start of the RBS up to a mod32 boundary to avoid some
corner cases.
The dispatch_illegal_op_fault code outgrew the spot it was
squatting in when built with this patch and CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y
Move it out to the end of the ivt.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 74,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void twofish_xts_enc(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
{
glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv,
GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_enc_blk));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockDownloadFileManager::MockDownloadFileManager()
: DownloadFileManager(new MockDownloadFileFactory) {
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long klsi_105_status2linestate(const __u16 status)
{
unsigned long res = 0;
res = ((status & KL5KUSB105A_DSR) ? TIOCM_DSR : 0)
| ((status & KL5KUSB105A_CTS) ? TIOCM_CTS : 0)
;
return res;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix line-state error handling
The current implementation failed to detect short transfers when
attempting to read the line state, and also, to make things worse,
logged the content of the uninitialised heap transfer buffer.
Fixes: abf492e7b3ae ("USB: kl5kusb105: fix DMA buffers on stack")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-532
| 0
| 68,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vp9_swap_current_and_last_seg_map(VP9_COMMON *cm) {
const int tmp = cm->seg_map_idx;
cm->seg_map_idx = cm->prev_seg_map_idx;
cm->prev_seg_map_idx = tmp;
cm->current_frame_seg_map = cm->seg_map_array[cm->seg_map_idx];
cm->last_frame_seg_map = cm->seg_map_array[cm->prev_seg_map_idx];
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE libvpx: Cherry-pick 8b4c315 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9_alloc_context_buffers: clear cm->mi* on failure
this fixes a crash in vp9_dec_setup_mi() via
vp9_init_context_buffers() should decoding continue and the decoder
resyncs on a smaller frame
Bug: 30593752
Change-Id: Iafbf1c4114062bf796f51a6b03be71328f7bcc69
(cherry picked from commit 737c8493693243838128788fe9c3abc51f17338e)
(cherry picked from commit 3e88ffac8c80b76e15286ef8a7b3bd8fa246c761)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 157,765
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int memcpy_toiovecend(const struct iovec *iov, unsigned char *kdata,
int offset, int len)
{
int copy;
for (; len > 0; ++iov) {
/* Skip over the finished iovecs */
if (unlikely(offset >= iov->iov_len)) {
offset -= iov->iov_len;
continue;
}
copy = min_t(unsigned int, iov->iov_len - offset, len);
if (copy_to_user(iov->iov_base + offset, kdata, copy))
return -EFAULT;
offset = 0;
kdata += copy;
len -= copy;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static AVStream* mxf_get_opatom_stream(MXFContext *mxf)
{
int i;
if (mxf->op != OPAtom)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < mxf->fc->nb_streams; i++) {
if (mxf->fc->streams[i]->codecpar->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_DATA)
continue;
return mxf->fc->streams[i];
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawArraysInstancedANGLE(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::DrawArraysInstancedANGLE& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::DrawArraysInstancedANGLE*>(
cmd_data);
if (!features().angle_instanced_arrays)
return error::kUnknownCommand;
GLint first = static_cast<GLint>(c.first);
GLsizei count = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.count);
GLsizei primcount = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.primcount);
return DoMultiDrawArrays("glDrawArraysInstancedANGLE", true,
static_cast<GLenum>(c.mode), &first, &count,
&primcount, 1);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ForcedURLComparator(const MostVisitedURL& first,
const MostVisitedURL& second) {
DCHECK(!first.last_forced_time.is_null() &&
!second.last_forced_time.is_null());
return first.last_forced_time < second.last_forced_time;
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 147,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t mini_header_get_msg_size(SpiceDataHeaderOpaque *header)
{
return ((SpiceMiniDataHeader *)header->data)->size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutomationProviderBookmarkModelObserver::Loaded(BookmarkModel* model,
bool ids_reassigned) {
ReplyAndDelete(true);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,548
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int apf_put_user(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 val)
{
return kvm_write_guest_cached(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.apf.data, &val,
sizeof(val));
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GpuChannelHost::RemoveRoute(int route_id) {
scoped_refptr<base::MessageLoopProxy> io_loop = factory_->GetIOLoopProxy();
io_loop->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GpuChannelHost::MessageFilter::RemoveRoute,
channel_filter_.get(), route_id));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static netdev_features_t hns_nic_fix_features(
struct net_device *netdev, netdev_features_t features)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(netdev);
switch (priv->enet_ver) {
case AE_VERSION_1:
features &= ~(NETIF_F_TSO | NETIF_F_TSO6 |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER);
break;
default:
break;
}
return features;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 85,687
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: autofill::AddressNormalizer* PaymentRequestState::GetAddressNormalizer() {
return payment_request_delegate_->GetAddressNormalizer();
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 151,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_event_task(struct task_struct *task,
struct perf_event_context *task_ctx,
int new)
{
struct perf_task_event task_event;
if (!atomic_read(&nr_comm_events) &&
!atomic_read(&nr_mmap_events) &&
!atomic_read(&nr_task_events))
return;
task_event = (struct perf_task_event){
.task = task,
.task_ctx = task_ctx,
.event_id = {
.header = {
.type = new ? PERF_RECORD_FORK : PERF_RECORD_EXIT,
.misc = 0,
.size = sizeof(task_event.event_id),
},
/* .pid */
/* .ppid */
/* .tid */
/* .ptid */
/* .time */
},
};
perf_event_aux(perf_event_task_output,
&task_event,
task_ctx);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 56,104
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int clgi_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
if (nested_svm_check_permissions(svm))
return 1;
svm->next_rip = kvm_rip_read(&svm->vcpu) + 3;
skip_emulated_instruction(&svm->vcpu);
disable_gif(svm);
/* After a CLGI no interrupts should come */
svm_clear_vintr(svm);
svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_IRQ_MASK;
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTR);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 37,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_xdr_enc_lookup(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p, const struct nfs4_lookup_arg *args)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.nops = 4,
};
int status;
xdr_init_encode(&xdr, &req->rq_snd_buf, p);
encode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
if ((status = encode_putfh(&xdr, args->dir_fh)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = encode_lookup(&xdr, args->name)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = encode_getfh(&xdr)) != 0)
goto out;
status = encode_getfattr(&xdr, args->bitmask);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PlatformSensorProviderLinux::StartPollingThread() {
if (!polling_thread_)
polling_thread_.reset(new base::Thread("Sensor polling thread"));
if (!polling_thread_->IsRunning()) {
return polling_thread_->StartWithOptions(
base::Thread::Options(base::MessageLoop::TYPE_IO, 0));
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 149,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Luv24fromXYZ(LogLuvState* sp, uint8* op, tmsize_t n)
{
uint32* luv = (uint32*) sp->tbuf;
float* xyz = (float*) op;
while (n-- > 0) {
*luv++ = LogLuv24fromXYZ(xyz, sp->encode_meth);
xyz += 3;
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnClosePage() {
DCHECK(webview()->MainFrame()->IsWebLocalFrame());
webview()->MainFrame()->ToWebLocalFrame()->DispatchUnloadEvent();
Send(new ViewHostMsg_ClosePage_ACK(GetRoutingID()));
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int skb_csum_hwoffload_help(struct sk_buff *skb,
const netdev_features_t features)
{
if (unlikely(skb->csum_not_inet))
return !!(features & NETIF_F_SCTP_CRC) ? 0 :
skb_crc32c_csum_help(skb);
return !!(features & NETIF_F_CSUM_MASK) ? 0 : skb_checksum_help(skb);
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SettingLevelBubble::OnHideTimeout() {
if (view_) {
SettingLevelBubbleDelegateView* delegate =
static_cast<SettingLevelBubbleDelegateView*>
(view_->GetWidget()->widget_delegate());
delegate->StartFade(false);
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BasicFindMainInterceptResponseInWorkingSet() {
BasicFindMainInterceptResponse(false);
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PrintViewManager::BasicPrint(content::RenderFrameHost* rfh) {
PrintPreviewDialogController* dialog_controller =
PrintPreviewDialogController::GetInstance();
if (!dialog_controller)
return false;
content::WebContents* print_preview_dialog =
dialog_controller->GetPrintPreviewForContents(web_contents());
if (!print_preview_dialog)
return PrintNow(rfh);
return !!print_preview_dialog->GetWebUI();
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FromMojom(media::mojom::PowerLineFrequency input,
media::PowerLineFrequency* output) {
switch (input) {
case media::mojom::PowerLineFrequency::DEFAULT:
*output = media::PowerLineFrequency::FREQUENCY_DEFAULT;
return true;
case media::mojom::PowerLineFrequency::HZ_50:
*output = media::PowerLineFrequency::FREQUENCY_50HZ;
return true;
case media::mojom::PowerLineFrequency::HZ_60:
*output = media::PowerLineFrequency::FREQUENCY_60HZ;
return true;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Enable camera blob stream when needed"
This reverts commit 10f4b93635e12f9fa0cba1641a10938ca38ed448.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 601492 as the
culprit for failures in the build cycles as shown on:
https://findit-for-me.appspot.com/waterfall/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyRAsSDVdmU3VzcGVjdGVkQ0wiMWNocm9taXVtLzEwZjRiOTM2MzVlMTJmOWZhMGNiYTE2NDFhMTA5MzhjYTM4ZWQ0NDgM
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.memory/Linux%20ChromiumOS%20MSan%20Tests/9190
Sample Failed Step: capture_unittests
Original change's description:
> Enable camera blob stream when needed
>
> Since blob stream needs higher resolution, it causes higher cpu loading
> to require higher resolution and resize to smaller resolution.
> In hangout app, we don't need blob stream. Enabling blob stream when
> needed can save a lot of cpu usage.
>
> BUG=b:114676133
> TEST=manually test in apprtc and CCA. make sure picture taking still
> works in CCA.
>
> Change-Id: I9144461bc76627903d0b3b359ce9cf962ff3628c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1261242
> Commit-Queue: Heng-ruey Hsu <henryhsu@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601492}
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
BUG=b:114676133
Change-Id: If173ffe9259f7eca849b184806bd56e2a9fbaac4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1292256
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601538}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 140,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mxf_get_stream_index(AVFormatContext *s, KLVPacket *klv)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
MXFTrack *track = s->streams[i]->priv_data;
/* SMPTE 379M 7.3 */
if (track && !memcmp(klv->key + sizeof(mxf_essence_element_key), track->track_number, sizeof(track->track_number)))
return i;
}
/* return 0 if only one stream, for OP Atom files with 0 as track number */
return s->nb_streams == 1 ? 0 : -1;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,578
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WaitForExtensionViewsToLoad() {
content::NotificationRegistrar registrar;
registrar.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_HOST_DID_STOP_LOADING,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
base::CancelableClosure timeout(
base::Bind(&TimeoutCallback, "Extension host load timed out."));
MessageLoop::current()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE, timeout.callback(), base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(4));
ExtensionProcessManager* manager =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(browser()->profile())->
process_manager();
ExtensionProcessManager::ViewSet all_views = manager->GetAllViews();
for (ExtensionProcessManager::ViewSet::const_iterator iter =
all_views.begin();
iter != all_views.end();) {
if (!(*iter)->IsLoading())
++iter;
else
content::RunMessageLoop();
}
timeout.Cancel();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_lookup_root(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
struct nfs_fsinfo *info)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = _nfs4_lookup_root(server, fhandle, info);
switch (err) {
case 0:
case -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC:
break;
default:
err = nfs4_handle_exception(server, err, &exception);
}
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,938
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline gfp_t alloc_hugepage_gfpmask(int defrag, gfp_t extra_gfp)
{
return (GFP_TRANSHUGE & ~(defrag ? 0 : __GFP_WAIT)) | extra_gfp;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <bugs@casparzhang.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool jsvIsFloat(const JsVar *v) { return v && (v->flags&JSV_VARTYPEMASK)==JSV_FLOAT; }
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PasswordAutofillAgent::TryToShowTouchToFill(
const WebFormControlElement& control_element) {
const WebInputElement* element = ToWebInputElement(&control_element);
if (!element || (!base::Contains(web_input_to_password_info_, *element) &&
!base::Contains(password_to_username_, *element))) {
return false;
}
if (was_touch_to_fill_ui_shown_)
return false;
was_touch_to_fill_ui_shown_ = true;
GetPasswordManagerDriver()->ShowTouchToFill();
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 172,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnMsgGetWindowRect(gfx::Rect* results) {
if (view_)
*results = view_->GetViewBounds();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,655
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int gettoalign (size_t len, Header *h, int opt, size_t size) {
if (size == 0 || opt == 'c') return 0;
if (size > (size_t)h->align)
size = h->align; /* respect max. alignment */
return (size - (len & (size - 1))) & (size - 1);
}
Commit Message: Security: fix Lua struct package offset handling.
After the first fix to the struct package I found another similar
problem, which is fixed by this patch. It could be reproduced easily by
running the following script:
return struct.unpack('f', "xxxxxxxxxxxxx",-3)
The above will access bytes before the 'data' pointer.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 83,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EasyUnlockService* UserSelectionScreen::GetEasyUnlockServiceForUser(
const AccountId& account_id) const {
if (GetScreenType() == OTHER_SCREEN)
return nullptr;
const user_manager::User* unlock_user = nullptr;
for (const user_manager::User* user : users_) {
if (user->GetAccountId() == account_id) {
unlock_user = user;
break;
}
}
if (!unlock_user)
return nullptr;
ProfileHelper* profile_helper = ProfileHelper::Get();
Profile* profile = profile_helper->GetProfileByUser(unlock_user);
DCHECK_EQ(!!profile, GetScreenType() == LOCK_SCREEN);
if (!profile)
profile = profile_helper->GetSigninProfile();
return EasyUnlockService::Get(profile);
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,571
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InputDispatcher::resumeAfterTargetsNotReadyTimeoutLocked(nsecs_t newTimeout,
const sp<InputChannel>& inputChannel) {
if (newTimeout > 0) {
mInputTargetWaitTimeoutTime = now() + newTimeout;
} else {
mInputTargetWaitTimeoutExpired = true;
if (inputChannel.get()) {
ssize_t connectionIndex = getConnectionIndexLocked(inputChannel);
if (connectionIndex >= 0) {
sp<Connection> connection = mConnectionsByFd.valueAt(connectionIndex);
sp<InputWindowHandle> windowHandle = connection->inputWindowHandle;
if (windowHandle != NULL) {
const InputWindowInfo* info = windowHandle->getInfo();
if (info) {
ssize_t stateIndex = mTouchStatesByDisplay.indexOfKey(info->displayId);
if (stateIndex >= 0) {
mTouchStatesByDisplay.editValueAt(stateIndex).removeWindow(
windowHandle);
}
}
}
if (connection->status == Connection::STATUS_NORMAL) {
CancelationOptions options(CancelationOptions::CANCEL_ALL_EVENTS,
"application not responding");
synthesizeCancelationEventsForConnectionLocked(connection, options);
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 163,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static LocalFrame* TargetFrame(LocalFrame& frame, Event* event) {
if (!event)
return &frame;
Node* node = event->target()->ToNode();
if (!node)
return &frame;
return node->GetDocument().GetFrame();
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,663
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ManifestCallbackAndRun(const base::Closure& continuation,
const GURL&,
const content::Manifest&) {
continuation.Run();
}
Commit Message: Skip Service workers in requests for mime handler plugins
BUG=808838
TEST=./browser_tests --gtest_filter=*/ServiceWorkerTest.MimeHandlerView*
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I82e75c200091babbab648a04232db47e2938d914
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914150
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Istiaque Ahmed <lazyboy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#537386}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(pgsql)
{
char buf[256];
php_info_print_table_start();
php_info_print_table_header(2, "PostgreSQL Support", "enabled");
#if HAVE_PG_CONFIG_H
php_info_print_table_row(2, "PostgreSQL(libpq) Version", PG_VERSION);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "PostgreSQL(libpq) ", PG_VERSION_STR);
#ifdef HAVE_PGSQL_WITH_MULTIBYTE_SUPPORT
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Multibyte character support", "enabled");
#else
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Multibyte character support", "disabled");
#endif
#ifdef USE_SSL
php_info_print_table_row(2, "SSL support", "enabled");
#else
php_info_print_table_row(2, "SSL support", "disabled");
#endif
#endif /* HAVE_PG_CONFIG_H */
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%ld", PGG(num_persistent));
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Active Persistent Links", buf);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%ld", PGG(num_links));
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Active Links", buf);
php_info_print_table_end();
DISPLAY_INI_ENTRIES();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,767
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImplTest::SetUpSkiaOutputSurfaceImpl() {
const char enable_features[] = "VizDisplayCompositor,UseSkiaRenderer";
const char disable_features[] = "";
scoped_feature_list_ = std::make_unique<base::test::ScopedFeatureList>();
scoped_feature_list_->InitFromCommandLine(enable_features, disable_features);
gpu_service_holder_ = TestGpuServiceHolder::GetInstance();
gpu::SurfaceHandle surface_handle_ = gpu::kNullSurfaceHandle;
if (on_screen_) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_VULKAN) && defined(USE_X11)
surface_handle_ = gpu::CreateNativeWindow(kSurfaceRect);
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif
}
output_surface_ = SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::Create(
std::make_unique<SkiaOutputSurfaceDependencyImpl>(gpu_service(),
surface_handle_),
RendererSettings());
output_surface_->BindToClient(output_surface_client_.get());
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 136,006
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t WritePSDChannels(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
MagickOffsetType size_offset,const MagickBooleanType separate,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*mask;
MagickOffsetType
rows_offset;
size_t
channels,
count,
length,
offset_length;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
count=0;
offset_length=0;
rows_offset=0;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
compact_pixels=AcquireCompactPixels(image,exception);
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(0);
}
channels=1;
if (separate == MagickFalse)
{
if (next_image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
if (IsImageGray(next_image) == MagickFalse)
channels=next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace ? 4 : 3;
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
channels++;
}
rows_offset=TellBlob(image)+2;
count+=WriteCompressionStart(psd_info,image,next_image,channels);
offset_length=(next_image->rows*(psd_info->version == 1 ? 2 : 4));
}
size_offset+=2;
if (next_image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
IndexQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
else
{
if (IsImageGray(next_image) != MagickFalse)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
GrayQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
else
{
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
RedQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
GreenQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
BlueQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
BlackQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
}
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
AlphaQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
{
const char
*property;
property=GetImageArtifact(next_image,"psd:opacity-mask");
if (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
mask=(Image *) GetImageRegistry(ImageRegistryType,property,
exception);
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (mask->compression == RLECompression)
{
compact_pixels=AcquireCompactPixels(mask,exception);
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(0);
}
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,mask,
RedQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,MagickTrue,exception);
(void) WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset);
count+=length;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compact_pixels);
}
}
}
return(count);
}
Commit Message: Fix improper cast that could cause an overflow as demonstrated in #347.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 69,056
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::RemoveFromEvictedList(
WebGLRenderingContextBase* context) {
ForciblyEvictedContexts().erase(context);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::HandleMessageFromDevToolsFrontend(
const std::string& message) {
if (!web_contents_->GetURL().SchemeIs(content::kChromeDevToolsScheme))
return;
std::string method;
base::ListValue empty_params;
base::ListValue* params = &empty_params;
base::DictionaryValue* dict = NULL;
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> parsed_message = base::JSONReader::Read(message);
if (!parsed_message ||
!parsed_message->GetAsDictionary(&dict) ||
!dict->GetString(kFrontendHostMethod, &method) ||
(dict->HasKey(kFrontendHostParams) &&
!dict->GetList(kFrontendHostParams, ¶ms))) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid message was sent to embedder: " << message;
return;
}
int id = 0;
dict->GetInteger(kFrontendHostId, &id);
embedder_message_dispatcher_->Dispatch(
base::Bind(&DevToolsUIBindings::SendMessageAck,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
id),
method,
params);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 138,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IDNSpoofChecker::SetAllowedUnicodeSet(UErrorCode* status) {
if (U_FAILURE(*status))
return;
const icu::UnicodeSet* recommended_set =
uspoof_getRecommendedUnicodeSet(status);
icu::UnicodeSet allowed_set;
allowed_set.addAll(*recommended_set);
const icu::UnicodeSet* inclusion_set = uspoof_getInclusionUnicodeSet(status);
allowed_set.addAll(*inclusion_set);
#if U_ICU_VERSION_MAJOR_NUM < 60
const icu::UnicodeSet aspirational_scripts(
icu::UnicodeString(
"[\\u1401-\\u166C\\u166F-\\u167F"
"\\u1810-\\u1819\\u1820-\\u1877\\u1880-\\u18AA"
"\\u18B0-\\u18F5"
"\\u2D30-\\u2D67\\u2D7F"
"\\uA000-\\uA48C"
"\\U00016F00-\\U00016F44\\U00016F50-\\U00016F7E"
"\\U00016F8F-\\U00016F9F]",
-1, US_INV),
*status);
allowed_set.addAll(aspirational_scripts);
#else
#error "Update aspirational_scripts per Unicode 10.0"
#endif
allowed_set.remove(0x338u);
allowed_set.remove(0x58au); // Armenian Hyphen
allowed_set.remove(0x2010u);
allowed_set.remove(0x2019u); // Right Single Quotation Mark
allowed_set.remove(0x2027u);
allowed_set.remove(0x30a0u); // Katakana-Hiragana Double Hyphen
allowed_set.remove(0x2bbu); // Modifier Letter Turned Comma
allowed_set.remove(0x2bcu); // Modifier Letter Apostrophe
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
allowed_set.remove(0x0620u);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Cu);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Du);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Eu);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Fu);
#endif
uspoof_setAllowedUnicodeSet(checker_, &allowed_set, status);
}
Commit Message: Disallow Arabic/Hebrew NSMs to come after an unrelated base char.
Arabic NSM(non-spacing mark)s and Hebrew NSMs are allowed to mix with
Latin with the current 'moderately restrictive script mixing policy'.
They're not blocked by BiDi check either because both LTR and RTL labels
can have an NSM.
Block them from coming after an unrelated script (e.g. Latin + Arabic
NSM).
Bug: chromium:729979
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDNToUni*
Change-Id: I5b93fbcf76d17121bf1baaa480ef3624424b3317
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/528348
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478205}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,480
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err padb_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_PaddingBitsBox *p;
u32 i;
p = (GF_PaddingBitsBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "PaddingBitsBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "EntryCount=\"%d\">\n", p->SampleCount);
for (i=0; i<p->SampleCount; i+=1) {
fprintf(trace, "<PaddingBitsEntry PaddingBits=\"%d\"/>\n", p->padbits[i]);
}
if (!p->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<PaddingBitsEntry PaddingBits=\"\"/>\n");
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("PaddingBitsBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::OnRemoveReceiverPlanB(uintptr_t receiver_id) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
TRACE_EVENT0("webrtc", "RTCPeerConnectionHandler::OnRemoveReceiverPlanB");
auto it = FindReceiver(receiver_id);
DCHECK(it != rtp_receivers_.end());
auto receiver = std::make_unique<RTCRtpReceiver>(*(*it));
track_metrics_.RemoveTrack(MediaStreamTrackMetrics::Direction::kReceive,
MediaStreamTrackMetricsKind(receiver->Track()),
receiver->Track().Id().Utf8());
if (peer_connection_tracker_) {
auto receiver_only_transceiver =
std::make_unique<RTCRtpReceiverOnlyTransceiver>(
std::make_unique<RTCRtpReceiver>(*receiver));
size_t receiver_index = GetTransceiverIndex(*receiver_only_transceiver);
peer_connection_tracker_->TrackRemoveTransceiver(
this,
PeerConnectionTracker::TransceiverUpdatedReason::kSetRemoteDescription,
*receiver_only_transceiver.get(), receiver_index);
}
rtp_receivers_.erase(it);
for (const auto& stream_id : receiver->state().stream_ids()) {
if (!IsRemoteStream(rtp_receivers_, stream_id))
PerSessionWebRTCAPIMetrics::GetInstance()->IncrementStreamCounter();
}
if (!is_closed_)
client_->DidRemoveReceiverPlanB(std::move(receiver));
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
{
int i, n;
unsigned int b;
*outl = 0;
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
i = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
if (i < 0)
return 0;
else
*outl = i;
return 1;
}
b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) {
if (ctx->buf_len) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX,
EVP_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
*outl = 0;
return 1;
}
if (b > 1) {
if (ctx->buf_len || !ctx->final_used) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH);
return (0);
}
OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->final);
/*
* The following assumes that the ciphertext has been authenticated.
* Otherwise it provides a padding oracle.
*/
n = ctx->final[b - 1];
if (n == 0 || n > (int)b) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return (0);
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (ctx->final[--b] != n) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return (0);
}
}
n = ctx->cipher->block_size - n;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
out[i] = ctx->final[i];
*outl = n;
} else
*outl = 0;
return (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::ModifyEventForEdgeDragging(
GtkWidget* widget, GdkEventMotion* event) {
int new_dragged_at_horizontal_edge = 0;
int new_dragged_at_vertical_edge = 0;
CR_DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(gfx::Size, drag_monitor_size, ());
if (event->state & GDK_BUTTON1_MASK) {
if (drag_monitor_size.IsEmpty()) {
GdkScreen* screen = gtk_widget_get_screen(widget);
int monitor =
gdk_screen_get_monitor_at_point(screen, event->x_root, event->y_root);
GdkRectangle geometry;
gdk_screen_get_monitor_geometry(screen, monitor, &geometry);
drag_monitor_size.SetSize(geometry.width, geometry.height);
}
GtkAllocation allocation;
gtk_widget_get_allocation(widget, &allocation);
if (event->x == 0 && event->x_root == 0) {
new_dragged_at_horizontal_edge = dragged_at_horizontal_edge_ - 1;
} else if (allocation.width - 1 == static_cast<gint>(event->x) &&
drag_monitor_size.width() - 1 == static_cast<gint>(event->x_root)) {
new_dragged_at_horizontal_edge = dragged_at_horizontal_edge_ + 1;
}
if (event->y == 0 && event->y_root == 0) {
new_dragged_at_vertical_edge = dragged_at_vertical_edge_ - 1;
} else if (allocation.height - 1 == static_cast<gint>(event->y) &&
drag_monitor_size.height() - 1 == static_cast<gint>(event->y_root)) {
new_dragged_at_vertical_edge = dragged_at_vertical_edge_ + 1;
}
event->x_root += new_dragged_at_horizontal_edge;
event->x += new_dragged_at_horizontal_edge;
event->y_root += new_dragged_at_vertical_edge;
event->y += new_dragged_at_vertical_edge;
} else {
drag_monitor_size.SetSize(0, 0);
}
dragged_at_horizontal_edge_ = new_dragged_at_horizontal_edge;
dragged_at_vertical_edge_ = new_dragged_at_vertical_edge;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: V8WindowShell* ScriptController::existingWindowShell(DOMWrapperWorld* world)
{
ASSERT(world);
if (world->isMainWorld())
return m_windowShell->isContextInitialized() ? m_windowShell.get() : 0;
if (world == existingWindowShellWorkaroundWorld())
return m_windowShell.get();
IsolatedWorldMap::iterator iter = m_isolatedWorlds.find(world->worldId());
if (iter == m_isolatedWorlds.end())
return 0;
return iter->value->isContextInitialized() ? iter->value.get() : 0;
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 111,227
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::DetachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (state_ == WORKER_READY && sessions().empty()) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SetDevToolsAttachedOnIO,
context_weak_, version_id_, false));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: update_stats_enqueue(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se, int flags)
{
if (!schedstat_enabled())
return;
/*
* Are we enqueueing a waiting task? (for current tasks
* a dequeue/enqueue event is a NOP)
*/
if (se != cfs_rq->curr)
update_stats_wait_start(cfs_rq, se);
if (flags & ENQUEUE_WAKEUP)
update_stats_enqueue_sleeper(cfs_rq, se);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,775
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: url::Origin GetOriginForURLLoaderFactory(
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params) {
GURL target_url = common_params.url;
if (target_url.SchemeIs(url::kAboutScheme))
return common_params.initiator_origin.value_or(url::Origin());
return url::Origin::Create(target_url);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsClient::sendDebuggerCommandToAgent(const WebString& command) {
SendToAgent(DevToolsAgentMsg_DebuggerCommand(MSG_ROUTING_NONE,
command.utf8()));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_read_dvc1(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
uint8_t profile_level;
int ret;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
if (atom.size >= (1<<28) || atom.size < 7)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
profile_level = avio_r8(pb);
if ((profile_level & 0xf0) != 0xc0)
return 0;
avio_seek(pb, 6, SEEK_CUR);
av_freep(&st->codecpar->extradata);
ret = ff_get_extradata(c->fc, st->codecpar, pb, atom.size - 7);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetCookieOnIO(net::URLRequestContextGetter* context_getter,
const std::string& name,
const std::string& value,
const std::string& url_spec,
const std::string& domain,
const std::string& path,
bool secure,
bool http_only,
const std::string& same_site,
double expires,
base::OnceCallback<void(bool)> callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
net::URLRequestContext* request_context =
context_getter->GetURLRequestContext();
if (url_spec.empty() && domain.empty()) {
std::move(callback).Run(false);
return;
}
std::string normalized_domain = domain;
if (!url_spec.empty()) {
GURL source_url = GURL(url_spec);
if (!source_url.SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS()) {
std::move(callback).Run(false);
return;
}
secure = secure || source_url.SchemeIsCryptographic();
if (normalized_domain.empty())
normalized_domain = source_url.host();
}
GURL url = GURL((secure ? "https://" : "http://") + normalized_domain);
if (!normalized_domain.empty() && normalized_domain[0] != '.')
normalized_domain = "";
base::Time expiration_date;
if (expires >= 0) {
expiration_date =
expires ? base::Time::FromDoubleT(expires) : base::Time::UnixEpoch();
}
net::CookieSameSite css = net::CookieSameSite::NO_RESTRICTION;
if (same_site == Network::CookieSameSiteEnum::Lax)
css = net::CookieSameSite::LAX_MODE;
if (same_site == Network::CookieSameSiteEnum::Strict)
css = net::CookieSameSite::STRICT_MODE;
std::unique_ptr<net::CanonicalCookie> cc(
net::CanonicalCookie::CreateSanitizedCookie(
url, name, value, normalized_domain, path, base::Time(),
expiration_date, base::Time(), secure, http_only, css,
net::COOKIE_PRIORITY_DEFAULT));
if (!cc) {
std::move(callback).Run(false);
return;
}
request_context->cookie_store()->SetCanonicalCookieAsync(
std::move(cc), secure, true /*modify_http_only*/, std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void update_max_used_slots(struct b43_dmaring *ring, int current_used_slots)
{
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int open_user_core(uid_t uid, uid_t fsuid, gid_t fsgid, pid_t pid, char **percent_values)
{
proc_cwd = open_cwd(pid);
if (proc_cwd == NULL)
return -1;
/* http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.selinux/21842 */
security_context_t newcon;
if (compute_selinux_con_for_new_file(pid, dirfd(proc_cwd), &newcon) < 0)
{
log_notice("Not going to create a user core due to SELinux errors");
return -1;
}
if (strcmp(core_basename, "core") == 0)
{
/* Mimic "core.PID" if requested */
char buf[] = "0\n";
int fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/core_uses_pid", O_RDONLY);
if (fd >= 0)
{
IGNORE_RESULT(read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)));
close(fd);
}
if (strcmp(buf, "1\n") == 0)
{
core_basename = xasprintf("%s.%lu", core_basename, (long)pid);
}
}
else
{
/* Expand old core pattern, put expanded name in core_basename */
core_basename = xstrdup(core_basename);
unsigned idx = 0;
while (1)
{
char c = core_basename[idx];
if (!c)
break;
idx++;
if (c != '%')
continue;
/* We just copied %, look at following char and expand %c */
c = core_basename[idx];
unsigned specifier_num = strchrnul(percent_specifiers, c) - percent_specifiers;
if (percent_specifiers[specifier_num] != '\0') /* valid %c (might be %% too) */
{
const char *val = "%";
if (specifier_num > 0) /* not %% */
val = percent_values[specifier_num - 1];
/* Replace %c at core_basename[idx] by its value */
idx--;
char *old = core_basename;
core_basename = xasprintf("%.*s%s%s", idx, core_basename, val, core_basename + idx + 2);
free(old);
idx += strlen(val);
}
/* else: invalid %c, % is already copied verbatim,
* next loop iteration will copy c */
}
}
if (g_need_nonrelative && core_basename[0] != '/')
{
error_msg("Current suid_dumpable policy prevents from saving core dumps according to relative core_pattern");
return -1;
}
/* Open (create) compat core file.
* man core:
* There are various circumstances in which a core dump file
* is not produced:
*
* [skipped obvious ones]
* The process does not have permission to write the core file.
* ...if a file with the same name exists and is not writable
* or is not a regular file (e.g., it is a directory or a symbolic link).
*
* A file with the same name already exists, but there is more
* than one hard link to that file.
*
* The file system where the core dump file would be created is full;
* or has run out of inodes; or is mounted read-only;
* or the user has reached their quota for the file system.
*
* The RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_FSIZE resource limits for the process
* are set to zero.
* [we check RLIMIT_CORE, but how can we check RLIMIT_FSIZE?]
*
* The binary being executed by the process does not have
* read permission enabled. [how we can check it here?]
*
* The process is executing a set-user-ID (set-group-ID) program
* that is owned by a user (group) other than the real
* user (group) ID of the process. [TODO?]
* (However, see the description of the prctl(2) PR_SET_DUMPABLE operation,
* and the description of the /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable file in proc(5).)
*/
int user_core_fd = -1;
int selinux_fail = 1;
/*
* These calls must be reverted as soon as possible.
*/
xsetegid(fsgid);
xseteuid(fsuid);
/* Set SELinux context like kernel when creating core dump file.
* This condition is TRUE if */
if (/* SELinux is disabled */ newcon == NULL
|| /* or the call succeeds */ setfscreatecon_raw(newcon) >= 0)
{
/* Do not O_TRUNC: if later checks fail, we do not want to have file already modified here */
user_core_fd = openat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_NOFOLLOW | g_user_core_flags, 0600); /* kernel makes 0600 too */
/* Do the error check here and print the error message in order to
* avoid interference in 'errno' usage caused by SELinux functions */
if (user_core_fd < 0)
perror_msg("Can't open '%s' at '%s'", core_basename, user_pwd);
/* Fail if SELinux is enabled and the call fails */
if (newcon != NULL && setfscreatecon_raw(NULL) < 0)
perror_msg("setfscreatecon_raw(NULL)");
else
selinux_fail = 0;
}
else
perror_msg("setfscreatecon_raw(%s)", newcon);
/*
* DON'T JUMP OVER THIS REVERT OF THE UID/GID CHANGES
*/
xsetegid(0);
xseteuid(0);
if (user_core_fd < 0 || selinux_fail)
goto user_core_fail;
struct stat sb;
if (fstat(user_core_fd, &sb) != 0
|| !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)
|| sb.st_nlink != 1
|| sb.st_uid != fsuid
) {
perror_msg("'%s' at '%s' is not a regular file with link count 1 owned by UID(%d)", core_basename, user_pwd, fsuid);
goto user_core_fail;
}
if (ftruncate(user_core_fd, 0) != 0) {
/* perror first, otherwise unlink may trash errno */
perror_msg("Can't truncate '%s' at '%s' to size 0", core_basename, user_pwd);
goto user_core_fail;
}
return user_core_fd;
user_core_fail:
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
close(user_core_fd);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: ccpp: save abrt core files only to new files
Prior this commit abrt-hook-ccpp saved a core file generated by a
process running a program whose name starts with "abrt" in
DUMP_LOCATION/$(basename program)-coredump. If the file was a symlink,
the hook followed and wrote core file to the symlink's target.
Addresses CVE-2015-5287
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 42,898
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb(char *md5_hash, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key,
const struct sock *sk,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp;
struct ahash_request *req;
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
__be32 saddr, daddr;
if (sk) { /* valid for establish/request sockets */
saddr = sk->sk_rcv_saddr;
daddr = sk->sk_daddr;
} else {
const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
saddr = iph->saddr;
daddr = iph->daddr;
}
hp = tcp_get_md5sig_pool();
if (!hp)
goto clear_hash_noput;
req = hp->md5_req;
if (crypto_ahash_init(req))
goto clear_hash;
if (tcp_v4_md5_hash_headers(hp, daddr, saddr, th, skb->len))
goto clear_hash;
if (tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(hp, skb, th->doff << 2))
goto clear_hash;
if (tcp_md5_hash_key(hp, key))
goto clear_hash;
ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, md5_hash, 0);
if (crypto_ahash_final(req))
goto clear_hash;
tcp_put_md5sig_pool();
return 0;
clear_hash:
tcp_put_md5sig_pool();
clear_hash_noput:
memset(md5_hash, 0, 16);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 49,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_uptime_read(char *buf, size_t size, off_t offset,
struct fuse_file_info *fi)
{
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
struct file_info *d = (struct file_info *)fi->fh;
long int reaperage = getreaperage(fc->pid);;
unsigned long int busytime = get_reaper_busy(fc->pid), idletime;
char *cache = d->buf;
size_t total_len = 0;
if (offset){
if (offset > d->size)
return -EINVAL;
if (!d->cached)
return 0;
int left = d->size - offset;
total_len = left > size ? size: left;
memcpy(buf, cache + offset, total_len);
return total_len;
}
idletime = reaperage - busytime;
if (idletime > reaperage)
idletime = reaperage;
total_len = snprintf(d->buf, d->size, "%ld.0 %lu.0\n", reaperage, idletime);
if (total_len < 0){
perror("Error writing to cache");
return 0;
}
d->size = (int)total_len;
d->cached = 1;
if (total_len > size) total_len = size;
memcpy(buf, d->buf, total_len);
return total_len;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,439
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rsvg_acquire_data_data (const char *uri,
const char *base_uri,
char **out_mime_type,
gsize *out_len,
GError **error)
{
const char *comma, *start, *end;
char *mime_type;
char *data;
gsize data_len;
gboolean base64 = FALSE;
g_assert (out_len != NULL);
g_assert (strncmp (uri, "data:", 5) == 0);
mime_type = NULL;
start = uri + 5;
comma = strchr (start, ',');
if (comma && comma != start) {
/* Deal with MIME type / params */
if (comma > start + BASE64_INDICATOR_LEN &&
!g_ascii_strncasecmp (comma - BASE64_INDICATOR_LEN, BASE64_INDICATOR, BASE64_INDICATOR_LEN)) {
end = comma - BASE64_INDICATOR_LEN;
base64 = TRUE;
} else {
end = comma;
}
if (end != start) {
mime_type = uri_decoded_copy (start, end - start);
}
}
if (comma)
start = comma + 1;
if (*start) {
data = uri_decoded_copy (start, strlen (start));
if (base64)
data = (char *) g_base64_decode_inplace (data, &data_len);
else
data_len = strlen (data);
} else {
data = NULL;
data_len = 0;
}
if (out_mime_type)
*out_mime_type = mime_type;
else
g_free (mime_type);
*out_len = data_len;
return data;
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible credentials leaking reported by Alex Birsan.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 96,421
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaStreamDevicesController::Deny(bool update_content_setting) {
if (content_settings_) {
content_settings_->OnContentBlocked(CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM,
std::string());
}
NotifyUIRequestDenied();
if (update_content_setting)
SetPermission(false);
content::MediaResponseCallback cb = callback_;
callback_.Reset();
cb.Run(content::MediaStreamDevices(), scoped_ptr<content::MediaStreamUI>());
}
Commit Message: Make the content setting for webcam/mic sticky for Pepper requests.
This makes the content setting sticky for webcam/mic requests from Pepper from non-https origins.
BUG=249335
R=xians@chromium.org, yzshen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/17060006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@206479 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 113,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline int web_client_api_request_v1_alarm_log(RRDHOST *host, struct web_client *w, char *url) {
uint32_t after = 0;
while(url) {
char *value = mystrsep(&url, "?&");
if (!value || !*value) continue;
char *name = mystrsep(&value, "=");
if(!name || !*name) continue;
if(!value || !*value) continue;
if(!strcmp(name, "after")) after = (uint32_t)strtoul(value, NULL, 0);
}
buffer_flush(w->response.data);
w->response.data->contenttype = CT_APPLICATION_JSON;
health_alarm_log2json(host, w->response.data, after);
return 200;
}
Commit Message: fixed vulnerabilities identified by red4sec.com (#4521)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 93,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void __dget_dlock(struct dentry *dentry)
{
dentry->d_lockref.count++;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 67,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jpc_dec_process_siz(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
int compno;
int tileno;
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int htileno;
int vtileno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
dec->xstart = siz->xoff;
dec->ystart = siz->yoff;
dec->xend = siz->width;
dec->yend = siz->height;
dec->tilewidth = siz->tilewidth;
dec->tileheight = siz->tileheight;
dec->tilexoff = siz->tilexoff;
dec->tileyoff = siz->tileyoff;
dec->numcomps = siz->numcomps;
if (!(dec->cp = jpc_dec_cp_create(dec->numcomps))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(dec->cmpts = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_dec_cmpt_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno,
++cmpt) {
cmpt->prec = siz->comps[compno].prec;
cmpt->sgnd = siz->comps[compno].sgnd;
cmpt->hstep = siz->comps[compno].hsamp;
cmpt->vstep = siz->comps[compno].vsamp;
cmpt->width = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend, cmpt->hstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
cmpt->height = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend, cmpt->vstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
cmpt->hsubstep = 0;
cmpt->vsubstep = 0;
}
dec->image = 0;
dec->numhtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend - dec->tilexoff, dec->tilewidth);
dec->numvtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend - dec->tileyoff, dec->tileheight);
dec->numtiles = dec->numhtiles * dec->numvtiles;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("numtiles = %d; numhtiles = %d; numvtiles = %d;\n",
dec->numtiles, dec->numhtiles, dec->numvtiles));
if (!(dec->tiles = jas_alloc2(dec->numtiles, sizeof(jpc_dec_tile_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (tileno = 0, tile = dec->tiles; tileno < dec->numtiles; ++tileno,
++tile) {
htileno = tileno % dec->numhtiles;
vtileno = tileno / dec->numhtiles;
tile->realmode = 0;
tile->state = JPC_TILE_INIT;
tile->xstart = JAS_MAX(dec->tilexoff + htileno * dec->tilewidth,
dec->xstart);
tile->ystart = JAS_MAX(dec->tileyoff + vtileno * dec->tileheight,
dec->ystart);
tile->xend = JAS_MIN(dec->tilexoff + (htileno + 1) *
dec->tilewidth, dec->xend);
tile->yend = JAS_MIN(dec->tileyoff + (vtileno + 1) *
dec->tileheight, dec->yend);
tile->numparts = 0;
tile->partno = 0;
tile->pkthdrstream = 0;
tile->pkthdrstreampos = 0;
tile->pptstab = 0;
tile->cp = 0;
tile->pi = 0;
if (!(tile->tcomps = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps,
sizeof(jpc_dec_tcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts, tcomp = tile->tcomps;
compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++cmpt, ++tcomp) {
tcomp->rlvls = 0;
tcomp->numrlvls = 0;
tcomp->data = 0;
tcomp->xstart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->ystart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->xend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->yend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->tsfb = 0;
}
}
dec->pkthdrstreams = 0;
/* We should expect to encounter other main header marker segments
or an SOT marker segment next. */
dec->state = JPC_MH;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed another integer overflow problem.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 168,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Chapters::Edition::~Edition() {}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 160,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cm_sidr_rep_handler(struct cm_work *work)
{
struct cm_sidr_rep_msg *sidr_rep_msg;
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv;
sidr_rep_msg = (struct cm_sidr_rep_msg *)
work->mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.mad;
cm_id_priv = cm_acquire_id(sidr_rep_msg->request_id, 0);
if (!cm_id_priv)
return -EINVAL; /* Unmatched reply. */
spin_lock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
if (cm_id_priv->id.state != IB_CM_SIDR_REQ_SENT) {
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
goto out;
}
cm_id_priv->id.state = IB_CM_IDLE;
ib_cancel_mad(cm_id_priv->av.port->mad_agent, cm_id_priv->msg);
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
cm_format_sidr_rep_event(work);
cm_process_work(cm_id_priv, work);
return 0;
out:
cm_deref_id(cm_id_priv);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlNsErr(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserErrors error,
const char *msg,
const xmlChar * info1, const xmlChar * info2,
const xmlChar * info3)
{
if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->disableSAX != 0) &&
(ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF))
return;
if (ctxt != NULL)
ctxt->errNo = error;
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, NULL, XML_FROM_NAMESPACE, error,
XML_ERR_ERROR, NULL, 0, (const char *) info1,
(const char *) info2, (const char *) info3, 0, 0, msg,
info1, info2, info3);
if (ctxt != NULL)
ctxt->nsWellFormed = 0;
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 59,446
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t ucma_query_gid(struct ucma_context *ctx,
void __user *response, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_query_addr_resp resp;
struct sockaddr_ib *addr;
int ret = 0;
if (out_len < sizeof(resp))
return -ENOSPC;
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof resp);
ucma_query_device_addr(ctx->cm_id, &resp);
addr = (struct sockaddr_ib *) &resp.src_addr;
resp.src_size = sizeof(*addr);
if (ctx->cm_id->route.addr.src_addr.ss_family == AF_IB) {
memcpy(addr, &ctx->cm_id->route.addr.src_addr, resp.src_size);
} else {
addr->sib_family = AF_IB;
addr->sib_pkey = (__force __be16) resp.pkey;
rdma_addr_get_sgid(&ctx->cm_id->route.addr.dev_addr,
(union ib_gid *) &addr->sib_addr);
addr->sib_sid = rdma_get_service_id(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)
&ctx->cm_id->route.addr.src_addr);
}
addr = (struct sockaddr_ib *) &resp.dst_addr;
resp.dst_size = sizeof(*addr);
if (ctx->cm_id->route.addr.dst_addr.ss_family == AF_IB) {
memcpy(addr, &ctx->cm_id->route.addr.dst_addr, resp.dst_size);
} else {
addr->sib_family = AF_IB;
addr->sib_pkey = (__force __be16) resp.pkey;
rdma_addr_get_dgid(&ctx->cm_id->route.addr.dev_addr,
(union ib_gid *) &addr->sib_addr);
addr->sib_sid = rdma_get_service_id(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)
&ctx->cm_id->route.addr.dst_addr);
}
if (copy_to_user(response, &resp, sizeof(resp)))
ret = -EFAULT;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool skcipher_writable(struct sock *sk)
{
return PAGE_SIZE <= skcipher_sndbuf(sk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: algif - suppress sending source address information in recvmsg
The current code does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local sockaddr_storage variable to userland
-- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.38
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnSignalModalDialogEvent(gfx::NativeViewId containing_window) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(modal_dialog_event_map_lock_);
if (modal_dialog_event_map_.count(containing_window))
modal_dialog_event_map_[containing_window].event->Signal();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,023
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void iscsi_dump_conn_ops(struct iscsi_conn_ops *conn_ops)
{
pr_debug("HeaderDigest: %s\n", (conn_ops->HeaderDigest) ?
"CRC32C" : "None");
pr_debug("DataDigest: %s\n", (conn_ops->DataDigest) ?
"CRC32C" : "None");
pr_debug("MaxRecvDataSegmentLength: %u\n",
conn_ops->MaxRecvDataSegmentLength);
pr_debug("OFMarker: %s\n", (conn_ops->OFMarker) ? "Yes" : "No");
pr_debug("IFMarker: %s\n", (conn_ops->IFMarker) ? "Yes" : "No");
if (conn_ops->OFMarker)
pr_debug("OFMarkInt: %u\n", conn_ops->OFMarkInt);
if (conn_ops->IFMarker)
pr_debug("IFMarkInt: %u\n", conn_ops->IFMarkInt);
}
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 30,976
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DECLAREcpFunc(cpDecodedStrips)
{
tsize_t stripsize = TIFFStripSize(in);
tdata_t buf = _TIFFmalloc(stripsize);
(void) imagewidth; (void) spp;
if (buf) {
tstrip_t s, ns = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in);
uint32 row = 0;
_TIFFmemset(buf, 0, stripsize);
for (s = 0; s < ns && row < imagelength; s++) {
tsize_t cc = (row + rowsperstrip > imagelength) ?
TIFFVStripSize(in, imagelength - row) : stripsize;
if (TIFFReadEncodedStrip(in, s, buf, cc) < 0
&& !ignore) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read strip %lu",
(unsigned long) s);
goto bad;
}
if (TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(out, s, buf, cc) < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, can't write strip %lu",
(unsigned long) s);
goto bad;
}
row += rowsperstrip;
}
_TIFFfree(buf);
return 1;
} else {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't allocate memory buffer of size %lu "
"to read strips", (unsigned long) stripsize);
return 0;
}
bad:
_TIFFfree(buf);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: error out cleanly in cpContig2SeparateByRow and
cpSeparate2ContigByRow if BitsPerSample != 8 to avoid heap based overflow.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2656 and
http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2657
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 69,244
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::RequestMediaAccessPermission(
OxideQMediaAccessPermissionRequest* request) {
Q_Q(OxideQQuickWebView);
QQmlEngine* engine = qmlEngine(q);
if (!engine) {
delete request;
return;
}
{
QJSValue val = engine->newQObject(request);
if (!val.isQObject()) {
delete request;
return;
}
emit q->mediaAccessPermissionRequested(val);
}
engine->collectGarbage();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,054
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Tab::GetHitTestMask(SkPath* mask) const {
*mask = tab_style()->GetPath(
TabStyle::PathType::kHitTest,
GetWidget()->GetCompositor()->device_scale_factor(),
/* force_active */ false, TabStyle::RenderUnits::kDips);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ActivityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "activityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute");
int32_t cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setActivityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,475
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int netif_set_real_num_tx_queues(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int txq)
{
int rc;
if (txq < 1 || txq > dev->num_tx_queues)
return -EINVAL;
if (dev->reg_state == NETREG_REGISTERED) {
ASSERT_RTNL();
rc = netdev_queue_update_kobjects(dev, dev->real_num_tx_queues,
txq);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (txq < dev->real_num_tx_queues)
qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt(dev, txq);
}
dev->real_num_tx_queues = txq;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int chmd_init_decomp(struct mschm_decompressor_p *self,
struct mschmd_file *file)
{
int window_size, window_bits, reset_interval, entry, err;
struct mspack_system *sys = self->system;
struct mschmd_sec_mscompressed *sec;
unsigned char *data;
off_t length, offset;
sec = (struct mschmd_sec_mscompressed *) file->section;
/* ensure we have a mscompressed content section */
err = find_sys_file(self, sec, &sec->content, content_name);
if (err) return self->error = err;
/* ensure we have a ControlData file */
err = find_sys_file(self, sec, &sec->control, control_name);
if (err) return self->error = err;
/* read ControlData */
if (sec->control->length < lzxcd_SIZEOF) {
D(("ControlData file is too short"))
return self->error = MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if (!(data = read_sys_file(self, sec->control))) {
D(("can't read mscompressed control data file"))
return self->error;
}
/* check LZXC signature */
if (EndGetI32(&data[lzxcd_Signature]) != 0x43585A4C) {
sys->free(data);
return self->error = MSPACK_ERR_SIGNATURE;
}
/* read reset_interval and window_size and validate version number */
switch (EndGetI32(&data[lzxcd_Version])) {
case 1:
reset_interval = EndGetI32(&data[lzxcd_ResetInterval]);
window_size = EndGetI32(&data[lzxcd_WindowSize]);
break;
case 2:
reset_interval = EndGetI32(&data[lzxcd_ResetInterval]) * LZX_FRAME_SIZE;
window_size = EndGetI32(&data[lzxcd_WindowSize]) * LZX_FRAME_SIZE;
break;
default:
D(("bad controldata version"))
sys->free(data);
return self->error = MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* free ControlData */
sys->free(data);
/* find window_bits from window_size */
switch (window_size) {
case 0x008000: window_bits = 15; break;
case 0x010000: window_bits = 16; break;
case 0x020000: window_bits = 17; break;
case 0x040000: window_bits = 18; break;
case 0x080000: window_bits = 19; break;
case 0x100000: window_bits = 20; break;
case 0x200000: window_bits = 21; break;
default:
D(("bad controldata window size"))
return self->error = MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* validate reset_interval */
if (reset_interval == 0 || reset_interval % LZX_FRAME_SIZE) {
D(("bad controldata reset interval"))
return self->error = MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* which reset table entry would we like? */
entry = file->offset / reset_interval;
/* convert from reset interval multiple (usually 64k) to 32k frames */
entry *= reset_interval / LZX_FRAME_SIZE;
/* read the reset table entry */
if (read_reset_table(self, sec, entry, &length, &offset)) {
/* the uncompressed length given in the reset table is dishonest.
* the uncompressed data is always padded out from the given
* uncompressed length up to the next reset interval */
length += reset_interval - 1;
length &= -reset_interval;
}
else {
/* if we can't read the reset table entry, just start from
* the beginning. Use spaninfo to get the uncompressed length */
entry = 0;
offset = 0;
err = read_spaninfo(self, sec, &length);
}
if (err) return self->error = err;
/* get offset of compressed data stream:
* = offset of uncompressed section from start of file
* + offset of compressed stream from start of uncompressed section
* + offset of chosen reset interval from start of compressed stream */
self->d->inoffset = file->section->chm->sec0.offset + sec->content->offset + offset;
/* set start offset and overall remaining stream length */
self->d->offset = entry * LZX_FRAME_SIZE;
length -= self->d->offset;
/* initialise LZX stream */
self->d->state = lzxd_init(&self->d->sys, self->d->infh,
(struct mspack_file *) self, window_bits,
reset_interval / LZX_FRAME_SIZE,
4096, length, 0);
if (!self->d->state) self->error = MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
return self->error;
}
Commit Message: length checks when looking for control files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,819
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_append_ofp11_group_desc_reply(const struct ofputil_group_desc *gds,
const struct ovs_list *buckets,
struct ovs_list *replies,
enum ofp_version version)
{
struct ofpbuf *reply = ofpbuf_from_list(ovs_list_back(replies));
struct ofp11_group_desc_stats *ogds;
struct ofputil_bucket *bucket;
size_t start_ogds;
start_ogds = reply->size;
ofpbuf_put_zeros(reply, sizeof *ogds);
LIST_FOR_EACH (bucket, list_node, buckets) {
ofputil_put_ofp11_bucket(bucket, reply, version);
}
ogds = ofpbuf_at_assert(reply, start_ogds, sizeof *ogds);
ogds->length = htons(reply->size - start_ogds);
ogds->type = gds->type;
ogds->group_id = htonl(gds->group_id);
ofpmp_postappend(replies, start_ogds);
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: search_state_decref(struct search_state *const state) {
if (!state) return;
state->refcount--;
if (!state->refcount) {
struct search_domain *next, *dom;
for (dom = state->head; dom; dom = next) {
next = dom->next;
mm_free(dom);
}
mm_free(state);
}
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string TemplateURLRef::GetURL() const {
switch (type_) {
case SEARCH: return owner_->url();
case SUGGEST: return owner_->suggestions_url();
case INSTANT: return owner_->instant_url();
case IMAGE: return owner_->image_url();
case NEW_TAB: return owner_->new_tab_url();
case CONTEXTUAL_SEARCH: return owner_->contextual_search_url();
case INDEXED: return owner_->alternate_urls()[index_in_owner_];
default: NOTREACHED(); return std::string(); // NOLINT
}
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OutOfProcessInstance::UpdateTickMarks(
const std::vector<pp::Rect>& tickmarks) {
float inverse_scale = 1.0f / device_scale_;
std::vector<pp::Rect> scaled_tickmarks = tickmarks;
for (size_t i = 0; i < scaled_tickmarks.size(); i++)
ScaleRect(inverse_scale, &scaled_tickmarks[i]);
tickmarks_ = scaled_tickmarks;
}
Commit Message: Prevent leaking PDF data cross-origin
BUG=520422
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1311973002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#345267}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 129,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void end_write(TsHashTable *ht)
{
#ifdef ZTS
tsrm_mutex_unlock(ht->mx_writer);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_release_lockowner(struct xdr_stream *xdr)
{
return decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_RELEASE_LOCKOWNER);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GfxColorSpace *GfxLabColorSpace::copy() {
GfxLabColorSpace *cs;
cs = new GfxLabColorSpace();
cs->whiteX = whiteX;
cs->whiteY = whiteY;
cs->whiteZ = whiteZ;
cs->blackX = blackX;
cs->blackY = blackY;
cs->blackZ = blackZ;
cs->aMin = aMin;
cs->aMax = aMax;
cs->bMin = bMin;
cs->bMax = bMax;
cs->kr = kr;
cs->kg = kg;
cs->kb = kb;
return cs;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum bp_state reserve_additional_memory(void)
{
long credit;
struct resource *resource;
int nid, rc;
unsigned long balloon_hotplug;
credit = balloon_stats.target_pages + balloon_stats.target_unpopulated
- balloon_stats.total_pages;
/*
* Already hotplugged enough pages? Wait for them to be
* onlined.
*/
if (credit <= 0)
return BP_WAIT;
balloon_hotplug = round_up(credit, PAGES_PER_SECTION);
resource = additional_memory_resource(balloon_hotplug * PAGE_SIZE);
if (!resource)
goto err;
nid = memory_add_physaddr_to_nid(resource->start);
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_HAVE_PVMMU
/*
* We don't support PV MMU when Linux and Xen is using
* different page granularity.
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(XEN_PAGE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE);
/*
* add_memory() will build page tables for the new memory so
* the p2m must contain invalid entries so the correct
* non-present PTEs will be written.
*
* If a failure occurs, the original (identity) p2m entries
* are not restored since this region is now known not to
* conflict with any devices.
*/
if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap)) {
unsigned long pfn, i;
pfn = PFN_DOWN(resource->start);
for (i = 0; i < balloon_hotplug; i++) {
if (!set_phys_to_machine(pfn + i, INVALID_P2M_ENTRY)) {
pr_warn("set_phys_to_machine() failed, no memory added\n");
goto err;
}
}
}
#endif
/*
* add_memory_resource() will call online_pages() which in its turn
* will call xen_online_page() callback causing deadlock if we don't
* release balloon_mutex here. Unlocking here is safe because the
* callers drop the mutex before trying again.
*/
mutex_unlock(&balloon_mutex);
/* add_memory_resource() requires the device_hotplug lock */
lock_device_hotplug();
rc = add_memory_resource(nid, resource);
unlock_device_hotplug();
mutex_lock(&balloon_mutex);
if (rc) {
pr_warn("Cannot add additional memory (%i)\n", rc);
goto err;
}
balloon_stats.total_pages += balloon_hotplug;
return BP_WAIT;
err:
release_memory_resource(resource);
return BP_ECANCELED;
}
Commit Message: xen: let alloc_xenballooned_pages() fail if not enough memory free
commit a1078e821b605813b63bf6bca414a85f804d5c66 upstream.
Instead of trying to allocate pages with GFP_USER in
add_ballooned_pages() check the available free memory via
si_mem_available(). GFP_USER is far less limiting memory exhaustion
than the test via si_mem_available().
This will avoid dom0 running out of memory due to excessive foreign
page mappings especially on ARM and on x86 in PVH mode, as those don't
have a pre-ballooned area which can be used for foreign mappings.
As the normal ballooning suffers from the same problem don't balloon
down more than si_mem_available() pages in one iteration. At the same
time limit the default maximum number of retries.
This is part of XSA-300.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 87,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void fillWidgetStates(AXObject& axObject,
protocol::Array<AXProperty>& properties) {
AccessibilityRole role = axObject.roleValue();
if (roleAllowsChecked(role)) {
AccessibilityButtonState checked = axObject.checkboxOrRadioValue();
switch (checked) {
case ButtonStateOff:
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Checked,
createValue("false", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
break;
case ButtonStateOn:
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Checked,
createValue("true", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
break;
case ButtonStateMixed:
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Checked,
createValue("mixed", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
break;
}
}
AccessibilityExpanded expanded = axObject.isExpanded();
switch (expanded) {
case ExpandedUndefined:
break;
case ExpandedCollapsed:
properties.addItem(createProperty(
AXWidgetStatesEnum::Expanded,
createBooleanValue(false, AXValueTypeEnum::BooleanOrUndefined)));
break;
case ExpandedExpanded:
properties.addItem(createProperty(
AXWidgetStatesEnum::Expanded,
createBooleanValue(true, AXValueTypeEnum::BooleanOrUndefined)));
break;
}
if (role == ToggleButtonRole) {
if (!axObject.isPressed()) {
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Pressed,
createValue("false", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
} else {
const AtomicString& pressedAttr =
axObject.getAttribute(HTMLNames::aria_pressedAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(pressedAttr, "mixed"))
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Pressed,
createValue("mixed", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
else
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Pressed,
createValue("true", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
}
}
if (roleAllowsSelected(role)) {
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Selected,
createBooleanValue(axObject.isSelected())));
}
if (roleAllowsModal(role)) {
properties.addItem(createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Modal,
createBooleanValue(axObject.isModal())));
}
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 1
| 171,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_match_from_ofp10_match(const struct ofp10_match *ofmatch,
struct match *match)
{
uint32_t ofpfw = ntohl(ofmatch->wildcards) & OFPFW10_ALL;
/* Initialize match->wc. */
memset(&match->flow, 0, sizeof match->flow);
ofputil_wildcard_from_ofpfw10(ofpfw, &match->wc);
memset(&match->tun_md, 0, sizeof match->tun_md);
/* Initialize most of match->flow. */
match->flow.nw_src = ofmatch->nw_src;
match->flow.nw_dst = ofmatch->nw_dst;
match->flow.in_port.ofp_port = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(ofmatch->in_port));
match->flow.dl_type = ofputil_dl_type_from_openflow(ofmatch->dl_type);
match->flow.tp_src = ofmatch->tp_src;
match->flow.tp_dst = ofmatch->tp_dst;
match->flow.dl_src = ofmatch->dl_src;
match->flow.dl_dst = ofmatch->dl_dst;
match->flow.nw_tos = ofmatch->nw_tos & IP_DSCP_MASK;
match->flow.nw_proto = ofmatch->nw_proto;
/* Translate VLANs. */
if (!(ofpfw & OFPFW10_DL_VLAN) &&
ofmatch->dl_vlan == htons(OFP10_VLAN_NONE)) {
/* Match only packets without 802.1Q header.
*
* When OFPFW10_DL_VLAN_PCP is wildcarded, this is obviously correct.
*
* If OFPFW10_DL_VLAN_PCP is matched, the flow match is contradictory,
* because we can't have a specific PCP without an 802.1Q header.
* However, older versions of OVS treated this as matching packets
* withut an 802.1Q header, so we do here too. */
match->flow.vlan_tci = htons(0);
match->wc.masks.vlan_tci = htons(0xffff);
} else {
ovs_be16 vid, pcp, tci;
uint16_t hpcp;
vid = ofmatch->dl_vlan & htons(VLAN_VID_MASK);
hpcp = (ofmatch->dl_vlan_pcp << VLAN_PCP_SHIFT) & VLAN_PCP_MASK;
pcp = htons(hpcp);
tci = vid | pcp | htons(VLAN_CFI);
match->flow.vlan_tci = tci & match->wc.masks.vlan_tci;
}
/* Clean up. */
match_zero_wildcarded_fields(match);
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int forget_pending(struct fuse_iqueue *fiq)
{
return fiq->forget_list_head.next != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ::Cursor ImageCursorFromNative(gfx::NativeCursor native_cursor) {
DCHECK(cursors_.find(native_cursor.native_type()) != cursors_.end());
return cursors_[native_cursor.native_type()];
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: qboolean FS_Initialized( void ) {
return ( fs_searchpaths != NULL );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fetch_escaped_value(UChar** src, UChar* end, ScanEnv* env, OnigCodePoint* val)
{
int v;
OnigCodePoint c;
OnigEncoding enc = env->enc;
UChar* p = *src;
if (PEND) return ONIGERR_END_PATTERN_AT_ESCAPE;
PFETCH_S(c);
switch (c) {
case 'M':
if (IS_SYNTAX_OP2(env->syntax, ONIG_SYN_OP2_ESC_CAPITAL_M_BAR_META)) {
if (PEND) return ONIGERR_END_PATTERN_AT_META;
PFETCH_S(c);
if (c != '-') return ONIGERR_META_CODE_SYNTAX;
if (PEND) return ONIGERR_END_PATTERN_AT_META;
PFETCH_S(c);
if (c == MC_ESC(env->syntax)) {
v = fetch_escaped_value(&p, end, env, &c);
if (v < 0) return v;
}
c = ((c & 0xff) | 0x80);
}
else
goto backslash;
break;
case 'C':
if (IS_SYNTAX_OP2(env->syntax, ONIG_SYN_OP2_ESC_CAPITAL_C_BAR_CONTROL)) {
if (PEND) return ONIGERR_END_PATTERN_AT_CONTROL;
PFETCH_S(c);
if (c != '-') return ONIGERR_CONTROL_CODE_SYNTAX;
goto control;
}
else
goto backslash;
case 'c':
if (IS_SYNTAX_OP(env->syntax, ONIG_SYN_OP_ESC_C_CONTROL)) {
control:
if (PEND) return ONIGERR_END_PATTERN_AT_CONTROL;
PFETCH_S(c);
if (c == '?') {
c = 0177;
}
else {
if (c == MC_ESC(env->syntax)) {
v = fetch_escaped_value(&p, end, env, &c);
if (v < 0) return v;
}
c &= 0x9f;
}
break;
}
/* fall through */
default:
{
backslash:
c = conv_backslash_value(c, env);
}
break;
}
*src = p;
*val = c;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #134 from k-takata/fix-segv-in-error-str
Fix SEGV in onig_error_code_to_str() (Fix #132)
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 87,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __sched_fork(struct task_struct *p)
{
p->se.exec_start = 0;
p->se.sum_exec_runtime = 0;
p->se.prev_sum_exec_runtime = 0;
p->se.nr_migrations = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
memset(&p->se.statistics, 0, sizeof(p->se.statistics));
#endif
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->rt.run_list);
p->se.on_rq = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->se.group_node);
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_NOTIFIERS
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&p->preempt_notifiers);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,308
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip,
unsigned long new_sp,
unsigned int _cs, unsigned int _ss, unsigned int _ds)
{
loadsegment(fs, 0);
loadsegment(es, _ds);
loadsegment(ds, _ds);
load_gs_index(0);
current->thread.usersp = new_sp;
regs->ip = new_ip;
regs->sp = new_sp;
this_cpu_write(old_rsp, new_sp);
regs->cs = _cs;
regs->ss = _ss;
regs->flags = X86_EFLAGS_IF;
}
Commit Message: x86_64, switch_to(): Load TLS descriptors before switching DS and ES
Otherwise, if buggy user code points DS or ES into the TLS
array, they would be corrupted after a context switch.
This also significantly improves the comments and documents some
gotchas in the code.
Before this patch, the both tests below failed. With this
patch, the es test passes, although the gsbase test still fails.
----- begin es test -----
/*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
* GPL v2
*/
static unsigned short GDT3(int idx)
{
return (idx << 3) | 3;
}
static int create_tls(int idx, unsigned int base)
{
struct user_desc desc = {
.entry_number = idx,
.base_addr = base,
.limit = 0xfffff,
.seg_32bit = 1,
.contents = 0, /* Data, grow-up */
.read_exec_only = 0,
.limit_in_pages = 1,
.seg_not_present = 0,
.useable = 0,
};
if (syscall(SYS_set_thread_area, &desc) != 0)
err(1, "set_thread_area");
return desc.entry_number;
}
int main()
{
int idx = create_tls(-1, 0);
printf("Allocated GDT index %d\n", idx);
unsigned short orig_es;
asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (orig_es));
int errors = 0;
int total = 1000;
for (int i = 0; i < total; i++) {
asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (GDT3(idx)));
usleep(100);
unsigned short es;
asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (es));
asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (orig_es));
if (es != GDT3(idx)) {
if (errors == 0)
printf("[FAIL]\tES changed from 0x%hx to 0x%hx\n",
GDT3(idx), es);
errors++;
}
}
if (errors) {
printf("[FAIL]\tES was corrupted %d/%d times\n", errors, total);
return 1;
} else {
printf("[OK]\tES was preserved\n");
return 0;
}
}
----- end es test -----
----- begin gsbase test -----
/*
* gsbase.c, a gsbase test
* Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
* GPL v2
*/
static unsigned char *testptr, *testptr2;
static unsigned char read_gs_testvals(void)
{
unsigned char ret;
asm volatile ("movb %%gs:%1, %0" : "=r" (ret) : "m" (*testptr));
return ret;
}
int main()
{
int errors = 0;
testptr = mmap((void *)0x200000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
if (testptr == MAP_FAILED)
err(1, "mmap");
testptr2 = mmap((void *)0x300000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
if (testptr2 == MAP_FAILED)
err(1, "mmap");
*testptr = 0;
*testptr2 = 1;
if (syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_SET_GS,
(unsigned long)testptr2 - (unsigned long)testptr) != 0)
err(1, "ARCH_SET_GS");
usleep(100);
if (read_gs_testvals() == 1) {
printf("[OK]\tARCH_SET_GS worked\n");
} else {
printf("[FAIL]\tARCH_SET_GS failed\n");
errors++;
}
asm volatile ("mov %0,%%gs" : : "r" (0));
if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
printf("[OK]\tWriting 0 to gs worked\n");
} else {
printf("[FAIL]\tWriting 0 to gs failed\n");
errors++;
}
usleep(100);
if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
printf("[OK]\tgsbase is still zero\n");
} else {
printf("[FAIL]\tgsbase was corrupted\n");
errors++;
}
return errors == 0 ? 0 : 1;
}
----- end gsbase test -----
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/509d27c9fec78217691c3dad91cec87e1006b34a.1418075657.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 35,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PopupContainer::handleKeyEvent(const PlatformKeyboardEvent& event)
{
UserGestureIndicator gestureIndicator(DefinitelyProcessingUserGesture);
return m_listBox->handleKeyEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: [REGRESSION] Refreshed autofill popup renders garbage
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=83255
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=118374
The code used to update only the PopupContainer coordinates as if they were the coordinates relative
to the root view. Instead, a WebWidget positioned relative to the screen origin holds the PopupContainer,
so it is the WebWidget that should be positioned in PopupContainer::refresh(), and the PopupContainer's
location should be (0, 0) (and their sizes should always be equal).
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
No new tests, as the popup appearance is not testable in WebKit.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.cpp:
(WebCore::PopupContainer::layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect): Variable renamed.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showPopup): Use m_originalFrameRect rather than frameRect()
for passing into chromeClient.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showInRect): Set up the correct frameRect() for the container.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::refresh): Resize the container and position the WebWidget correctly.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.h:
(PopupContainer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@113418 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 108,568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ShouldEnableQuic(base::StringPiece quic_trial_group,
const VariationParameters& quic_trial_params,
bool is_quic_force_disabled,
bool is_quic_force_enabled) {
if (is_quic_force_disabled)
return false;
if (is_quic_force_enabled)
return true;
return quic_trial_group.starts_with(kQuicFieldTrialEnabledGroupName) ||
quic_trial_group.starts_with(kQuicFieldTrialHttpsEnabledGroupName) ||
base::LowerCaseEqualsASCII(
GetVariationParam(quic_trial_params, "enable_quic"), "true");
}
Commit Message: Fix a bug in network_session_configurator.cc in which support for HTTPS URLS in QUIC proxies was always set to false.
BUG=914497
Change-Id: I56ad16088168302598bb448553ba32795eee3756
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1417356
Auto-Submit: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623763}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 152,712
|
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