instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ipmi_get_my_LUN(struct ipmi_user *user,
unsigned int channel,
unsigned char *address)
{
int index, rv = 0;
user = acquire_ipmi_user(user, &index);
if (!user)
return -ENODEV;
if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS) {
rv = -EINVAL;
} else {
channel = array_index_nospec(channel, IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS);
*address = user->intf->addrinfo[channel].lun;
}
release_ipmi_user(user, index);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP: {
if (vgic_present)
return kvm_vgic_create(kvm);
else
return -ENXIO;
}
case KVM_ARM_SET_DEVICE_ADDR: {
struct kvm_arm_device_addr dev_addr;
if (copy_from_user(&dev_addr, argp, sizeof(dev_addr)))
return -EFAULT;
return kvm_vm_ioctl_set_device_addr(kvm, &dev_addr);
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GSList *nicklist_getnicks(CHANNEL_REC *channel)
{
GSList *list;
g_return_val_if_fail(IS_CHANNEL(channel), NULL);
list = NULL;
g_hash_table_foreach(channel->nicks, (GHFunc) get_nicks_hash, &list);
return list;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 63,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int entersafe_init(sc_card_t *card)
{
unsigned int flags;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
card->name = "entersafe";
card->cla = 0x00;
card->drv_data = NULL;
flags =SC_ALGORITHM_ONBOARD_KEY_GEN
| SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_RAW
| SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_NONE;
_sc_card_add_rsa_alg(card, 512, flags, 0);
_sc_card_add_rsa_alg(card, 768, flags, 0);
_sc_card_add_rsa_alg(card,1024, flags, 0);
_sc_card_add_rsa_alg(card,2048, flags, 0);
card->caps = SC_CARD_CAP_RNG;
/* we need read_binary&friends with max 224 bytes per read */
card->max_send_size = 224;
card->max_recv_size = 224;
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tty_device_create_release(struct device *dev)
{
dev_dbg(dev, "releasing...\n");
kfree(dev);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 55,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int parsecreateargs(struct dlist **extargs)
{
int c;
static struct buf arg, val;
struct dlist *res;
struct dlist *sub;
char *p;
const char *name;
res = dlist_newkvlist(NULL, "CREATE");
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c == '(') {
/* new style RFC4466 arguments */
do {
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg);
name = ucase(arg.s);
if (c != ' ') goto fail;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c == '(') {
/* fun - more lists! */
sub = dlist_newlist(res, name);
do {
c = getword(imapd_in, &val);
dlist_setatom(sub, name, val.s);
} while (c == ' ');
if (c != ')') goto fail;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
}
else {
prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
c = getword(imapd_in, &val);
dlist_setatom(res, name, val.s);
}
} while (c == ' ');
if (c != ')') goto fail;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
}
else {
prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg);
if (c == EOF) goto fail;
p = strchr(arg.s, '!');
if (p) {
/* with a server */
*p = '\0';
dlist_setatom(res, "SERVER", arg.s);
dlist_setatom(res, "PARTITION", p+1);
}
else {
dlist_setatom(res, "PARTITION", arg.s);
}
}
*extargs = res;
return c;
fail:
dlist_free(&res);
return EOF;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 95,243
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static irqreturn_t armv7pmu_handle_irq(int irq_num, void *dev)
{
unsigned long pmnc;
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct pt_regs *regs;
int idx;
/*
* Get and reset the IRQ flags
*/
pmnc = armv7_pmnc_getreset_flags();
/*
* Did an overflow occur?
*/
if (!armv7_pmnc_has_overflowed(pmnc))
return IRQ_NONE;
/*
* Handle the counter(s) overflow(s)
*/
regs = get_irq_regs();
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
for (idx = 0; idx <= armpmu->num_events; ++idx) {
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[idx];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask))
continue;
/*
* We have a single interrupt for all counters. Check that
* each counter has overflowed before we process it.
*/
if (!armv7_pmnc_counter_has_overflowed(pmnc, idx))
continue;
hwc = &event->hw;
armpmu_event_update(event, hwc, idx, 1);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!armpmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 0, &data, regs))
armpmu->disable(hwc, idx);
}
/*
* Handle the pending perf events.
*
* Note: this call *must* be run with interrupts disabled. For
* platforms that can have the PMU interrupts raised as an NMI, this
* will not work.
*/
irq_work_run();
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 165,774
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintRenderFrameHelper::OnPrintingDone(bool success) {
if (ipc_nesting_level_ > 1)
return;
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false;
if (!success)
LOG(ERROR) << "Failure in OnPrintingDone";
DidFinishPrinting(success ? OK : FAIL_PRINT);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Stop() { animation_.Stop(); }
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 142,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _dbus_win_free_error_string (char *string)
{
LocalFree (string);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LocalDOMWindow::offscreenBuffering() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_init_channel_attrs(struct nfs41_create_session_args *args)
{
struct nfs4_session *session = args->client->cl_session;
unsigned int mxrqst_sz = session->fc_attrs.max_rqst_sz,
mxresp_sz = session->fc_attrs.max_resp_sz;
if (mxrqst_sz == 0)
mxrqst_sz = NFS_MAX_FILE_IO_SIZE;
if (mxresp_sz == 0)
mxresp_sz = NFS_MAX_FILE_IO_SIZE;
/* Fore channel attributes */
args->fc_attrs.max_rqst_sz = mxrqst_sz;
args->fc_attrs.max_resp_sz = mxresp_sz;
args->fc_attrs.max_ops = NFS4_MAX_OPS;
args->fc_attrs.max_reqs = session->clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_xprt->max_reqs;
dprintk("%s: Fore Channel : max_rqst_sz=%u max_resp_sz=%u "
"max_ops=%u max_reqs=%u\n",
__func__,
args->fc_attrs.max_rqst_sz, args->fc_attrs.max_resp_sz,
args->fc_attrs.max_ops, args->fc_attrs.max_reqs);
/* Back channel attributes */
args->bc_attrs.max_rqst_sz = PAGE_SIZE;
args->bc_attrs.max_resp_sz = PAGE_SIZE;
args->bc_attrs.max_resp_sz_cached = 0;
args->bc_attrs.max_ops = NFS4_MAX_BACK_CHANNEL_OPS;
args->bc_attrs.max_reqs = 1;
dprintk("%s: Back Channel : max_rqst_sz=%u max_resp_sz=%u "
"max_resp_sz_cached=%u max_ops=%u max_reqs=%u\n",
__func__,
args->bc_attrs.max_rqst_sz, args->bc_attrs.max_resp_sz,
args->bc_attrs.max_resp_sz_cached, args->bc_attrs.max_ops,
args->bc_attrs.max_reqs);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void floatAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::floatAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::PrepForSetUniformByLocation(
GLint fake_location,
const char* function_name,
Program::UniformApiType api_type,
GLint* real_location,
GLenum* type,
GLsizei* count) {
DCHECK(type);
DCHECK(count);
DCHECK(real_location);
if (!CheckCurrentProgramForUniform(fake_location, function_name)) {
return false;
}
GLint array_index = -1;
const Program::UniformInfo* info =
state_.current_program->GetUniformInfoByFakeLocation(
fake_location, real_location, &array_index);
if (!info) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name, "unknown location");
return false;
}
if ((api_type & info->accepts_api_type) == 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"wrong uniform function for type");
return false;
}
if (*count > 1 && !info->is_array) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name, "count > 1 for non-array");
return false;
}
*count = std::min(info->size - array_index, *count);
if (*count <= 0) {
return false;
}
*type = info->type;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 121,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
unsigned long a;
#endif
int i;
/* I/O */
vmcs_write64(IO_BITMAP_A, __pa(vmx_io_bitmap_a));
vmcs_write64(IO_BITMAP_B, __pa(vmx_io_bitmap_b));
if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
vmcs_write64(VMREAD_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_vmread_bitmap));
vmcs_write64(VMWRITE_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_vmwrite_bitmap));
}
if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy));
vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, -1ull); /* 22.3.1.5 */
/* Control */
vmcs_write32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(vmx));
vmcs_write32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, vmx_exec_control(vmx));
if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
if (vmx_cpu_uses_apicv(&vmx->vcpu)) {
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, 0);
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, 0);
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, 0);
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, 0);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, 0);
vmcs_write64(POSTED_INTR_NV, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
vmcs_write64(POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR, __pa((&vmx->pi_desc)));
}
if (ple_gap) {
vmcs_write32(PLE_GAP, ple_gap);
vmx->ple_window = ple_window;
vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
}
vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, 0);
vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, 0);
vmcs_write32(CR3_TARGET_COUNT, 0); /* 22.2.1 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
vmx_set_constant_host_state(vmx);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, a);
vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, a); /* 22.2.4 */
rdmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, a);
vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, a); /* 22.2.4 */
#else
vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
#endif
vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, 0);
vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
vmcs_write64(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.host));
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
vmcs_write64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.guest));
if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmx->vcpu.arch.pat);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_msr_index); ++i) {
u32 index = vmx_msr_index[i];
u32 data_low, data_high;
int j = vmx->nmsrs;
if (rdmsr_safe(index, &data_low, &data_high) < 0)
continue;
if (wrmsr_safe(index, data_low, data_high) < 0)
continue;
vmx->guest_msrs[j].index = i;
vmx->guest_msrs[j].data = 0;
vmx->guest_msrs[j].mask = -1ull;
++vmx->nmsrs;
}
vm_exit_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl);
/* 22.2.1, 20.8.1 */
vm_entry_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl);
vmcs_writel(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~0UL);
set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
if (vmx_xsaves_supported())
vmcs_write64(XSS_EXIT_BITMAP, VMX_XSS_EXIT_BITMAP);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hash_foreach (gpointer key, gpointer val, gpointer user_data)
{
const char *keystr = key;
const char *valstr = val;
guint *count = user_data;
*count += (strlen (keystr) + strlen (valstr));
g_print ("%s -> %s\n", keystr, valstr);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 165,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dump_cfg_oct(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s 0%o\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 72,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ptaAddPt(PTA *pta,
l_float32 x,
l_float32 y)
{
l_int32 n;
PROCNAME("ptaAddPt");
if (!pta)
return ERROR_INT("pta not defined", procName, 1);
n = pta->n;
if (n >= pta->nalloc)
ptaExtendArrays(pta);
pta->x[n] = x;
pta->y[n] = y;
pta->n++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,162
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::LostMouseLock() {
fullscreen_controller_->LostMouseLock();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cuse_process_init_reply(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_req *req)
{
struct cuse_conn *cc = fc_to_cc(fc), *pos;
struct cuse_init_out *arg = req->out.args[0].value;
struct page *page = req->pages[0];
struct cuse_devinfo devinfo = { };
struct device *dev;
struct cdev *cdev;
dev_t devt;
int rc, i;
if (req->out.h.error ||
arg->major != FUSE_KERNEL_VERSION || arg->minor < 11) {
goto err;
}
fc->minor = arg->minor;
fc->max_read = max_t(unsigned, arg->max_read, 4096);
fc->max_write = max_t(unsigned, arg->max_write, 4096);
/* parse init reply */
cc->unrestricted_ioctl = arg->flags & CUSE_UNRESTRICTED_IOCTL;
rc = cuse_parse_devinfo(page_address(page), req->out.args[1].size,
&devinfo);
if (rc)
goto err;
/* determine and reserve devt */
devt = MKDEV(arg->dev_major, arg->dev_minor);
if (!MAJOR(devt))
rc = alloc_chrdev_region(&devt, MINOR(devt), 1, devinfo.name);
else
rc = register_chrdev_region(devt, 1, devinfo.name);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "CUSE: failed to register chrdev region\n");
goto err;
}
/* devt determined, create device */
rc = -ENOMEM;
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev)
goto err_region;
device_initialize(dev);
dev_set_uevent_suppress(dev, 1);
dev->class = cuse_class;
dev->devt = devt;
dev->release = cuse_gendev_release;
dev_set_drvdata(dev, cc);
dev_set_name(dev, "%s", devinfo.name);
mutex_lock(&cuse_lock);
/* make sure the device-name is unique */
for (i = 0; i < CUSE_CONNTBL_LEN; ++i) {
list_for_each_entry(pos, &cuse_conntbl[i], list)
if (!strcmp(dev_name(pos->dev), dev_name(dev)))
goto err_unlock;
}
rc = device_add(dev);
if (rc)
goto err_unlock;
/* register cdev */
rc = -ENOMEM;
cdev = cdev_alloc();
if (!cdev)
goto err_unlock;
cdev->owner = THIS_MODULE;
cdev->ops = &cuse_frontend_fops;
rc = cdev_add(cdev, devt, 1);
if (rc)
goto err_cdev;
cc->dev = dev;
cc->cdev = cdev;
/* make the device available */
list_add(&cc->list, cuse_conntbl_head(devt));
mutex_unlock(&cuse_lock);
/* announce device availability */
dev_set_uevent_suppress(dev, 0);
kobject_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
out:
kfree(arg);
__free_page(page);
return;
err_cdev:
cdev_del(cdev);
err_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&cuse_lock);
put_device(dev);
err_region:
unregister_chrdev_region(devt, 1);
err:
fuse_abort_conn(fc);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: cuse: fix memory leak
The problem is that fuse_dev_alloc() acquires an extra reference to cc.fc,
and the original ref count is never dropped.
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: cc080e9e9be1 ("fuse: introduce per-instance fuse_dev structure")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 58,065
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int svc_rpcb_setup(struct svc_serv *serv, struct net *net)
{
int err;
err = rpcb_create_local(net);
if (err)
return err;
/* Remove any stale portmap registrations */
svc_unregister(serv, net);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,953
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::AddCertificate(
net::URLRequest* request,
net::CertificateMimeType cert_type,
const void* cert_data,
size_t cert_size,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id) {
chrome::SSLAddCertificate(request, cert_type, cert_data, cert_size,
render_process_id, render_view_id);
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewDataService::RemoveEntry(
const std::string& preview_ui_addr_str) {
PreviewDataStoreMap::iterator it = data_store_map_.find(preview_ui_addr_str);
if (it != data_store_map_.end())
data_store_map_.erase(it);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 170,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::CreateNetworkContext(
content::BrowserContext* context,
bool in_memory,
const base::FilePath& relative_partition_path) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(context);
return profile->CreateNetworkContext(in_memory, relative_partition_path);
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int aa_read_seek(AVFormatContext *s,
int stream_index, int64_t timestamp, int flags)
{
AADemuxContext *c = s->priv_data;
AVChapter *ch;
int64_t chapter_pos, chapter_start, chapter_size;
int chapter_idx = 0;
if (timestamp < 0)
timestamp = 0;
while (chapter_idx < s->nb_chapters && timestamp >= s->chapters[chapter_idx]->end) {
++chapter_idx;
}
if (chapter_idx >= s->nb_chapters) {
chapter_idx = s->nb_chapters - 1;
if (chapter_idx < 0) return -1; // there is no chapter.
timestamp = s->chapters[chapter_idx]->end;
}
ch = s->chapters[chapter_idx];
chapter_size = ch->end / TIMEPREC - ch->start / TIMEPREC;
chapter_pos = av_rescale_rnd((timestamp - ch->start) / TIMEPREC,
1, c->codec_second_size,
(flags & AVSEEK_FLAG_BACKWARD) ? AV_ROUND_DOWN : AV_ROUND_UP)
* c->codec_second_size;
if (chapter_pos >= chapter_size)
chapter_pos = chapter_size;
chapter_start = c->content_start + (ch->start / TIMEPREC) + CHAPTER_HEADER_SIZE * (1 + chapter_idx);
avio_seek(s->pb, chapter_start + chapter_pos, SEEK_SET);
c->current_codec_second_size = c->codec_second_size;
c->current_chapter_size = chapter_size - chapter_pos;
c->chapter_idx = 1 + chapter_idx;
if (s->streams[0]->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MP3) {
c->seek_offset = (MP3_FRAME_SIZE - chapter_pos % MP3_FRAME_SIZE) % MP3_FRAME_SIZE;
}
ff_update_cur_dts(s, s->streams[0], ch->start + (chapter_pos + c->seek_offset) * TIMEPREC);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: avformat/aadec: Check for scanf() failure
Fixes: use of uninitialized variables
Fixes: blank.aa
Found-by: Chamal De Silva <chamal.desilva@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-665
| 0
| 89,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AMRExtractor::~AMRExtractor() {
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 162,411
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: brcmf_cfg80211_reconfigure_wep(struct brcmf_if *ifp)
{
s32 err;
u8 key_idx;
struct brcmf_wsec_key *key;
s32 wsec;
for (key_idx = 0; key_idx < BRCMF_MAX_DEFAULT_KEYS; key_idx++) {
key = &ifp->vif->profile.key[key_idx];
if ((key->algo == CRYPTO_ALGO_WEP1) ||
(key->algo == CRYPTO_ALGO_WEP128))
break;
}
if (key_idx == BRCMF_MAX_DEFAULT_KEYS)
return;
err = send_key_to_dongle(ifp, key);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("Setting WEP key failed (%d)\n", err);
return;
}
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_get(ifp, "wsec", &wsec);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("get wsec error (%d)\n", err);
return;
}
wsec |= WEP_ENABLED;
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_set(ifp, "wsec", wsec);
if (err)
brcmf_err("set wsec error (%d)\n", err);
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::releaseLayerResourcesCompositingThread()
{
m_compositor->releaseLayerResources();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,348
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static NDIS_STATUS SetupDPCTarget(PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext)
{
ULONG i;
#if NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS620
NDIS_STATUS status;
PROCESSOR_NUMBER procNumber;
#endif
for (i = 0; i < pContext->nPathBundles; i++)
{
#if NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS620
status = KeGetProcessorNumberFromIndex(i, &procNumber);
if (status != NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] - KeGetProcessorNumberFromIndex failed for index %lu - %d\n", __FUNCTION__, i, status));
return status;
}
ParaNdis_ProcessorNumberToGroupAffinity(&pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxPath.DPCAffinity, &procNumber);
pContext->pPathBundles[i].txPath.DPCAffinity = pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxPath.DPCAffinity;
#elif NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS6
pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxPath.DPCTargetProcessor = 1i64 << i;
pContext->pPathBundles[i].txPath.DPCTargetProcessor = pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxPath.DPCTargetProcessor;
#else
#error not supported
#endif
}
#if NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS620
pContext->CXPath.DPCAffinity = pContext->pPathBundles[0].rxPath.DPCAffinity;
#elif NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS6
pContext->CXPath.DPCTargetProcessor = pContext->pPathBundles[0].rxPath.DPCTargetProcessor;
#else
#error not yet defined
#endif
return NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: create_response(const char *nurl, const char *method, unsigned int *rp_code)
{
char *page, *fpath;
struct MHD_Response *resp = NULL;
if (!strncmp(nurl, URL_BASE_API_1_1, strlen(URL_BASE_API_1_1))) {
resp = create_response_api(nurl, method, rp_code);
} else {
fpath = get_path(nurl, server_data.www_dir);
resp = create_response_file(nurl, method, rp_code, fpath);
free(fpath);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 1
| 165,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int exec_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
pid_t old_pid, old_vpid;
int ret;
/* Need to fetch pid before load_binary changes it */
old_pid = current->pid;
rcu_read_lock();
old_vpid = task_pid_nr_ns(current, task_active_pid_ns(current->parent));
rcu_read_unlock();
ret = search_binary_handler(bprm);
if (ret >= 0) {
audit_bprm(bprm);
trace_sched_process_exec(current, old_pid, bprm);
ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC, old_vpid);
proc_exec_connector(current);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables
This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a
setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid
root.
This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 43,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mb_regex_set_options)
{
OnigOptionType opt;
OnigSyntaxType *syntax;
char *string = NULL;
int string_len;
char buf[16];
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|s",
&string, &string_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (string != NULL) {
opt = 0;
syntax = NULL;
_php_mb_regex_init_options(string, string_len, &opt, &syntax, NULL);
_php_mb_regex_set_options(opt, syntax, NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
opt = MBREX(regex_default_options);
syntax = MBREX(regex_default_syntax);
}
_php_mb_regex_get_option_string(buf, sizeof(buf), opt, syntax);
RETVAL_STRING(buf, 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 51,388
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8XMLHttpRequest::responseAccessorGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.XMLHttpRequest.response._get");
XMLHttpRequest* xmlHttpRequest = V8XMLHttpRequest::toNative(info.Holder());
switch (xmlHttpRequest->responseTypeCode()) {
case XMLHttpRequest::ResponseTypeDefault:
case XMLHttpRequest::ResponseTypeText:
return responseTextAccessorGetter(name, info);
case XMLHttpRequest::ResponseTypeDocument:
{
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
Document* document = xmlHttpRequest->responseXML(ec);
if (ec) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, info.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
return toV8(document, info.GetIsolate());
}
case XMLHttpRequest::ResponseTypeBlob:
#if ENABLE(XHR_RESPONSE_BLOB)
{
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
Blob* blob = xmlHttpRequest->responseBlob(ec);
if (ec) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, info.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
return toV8(blob, info.GetIsolate());
}
#else
return v8::Undefined();
#endif
case XMLHttpRequest::ResponseTypeArrayBuffer:
{
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
ArrayBuffer* arrayBuffer = xmlHttpRequest->responseArrayBuffer(ec);
if (ec) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, info.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
return toV8(arrayBuffer, info.GetIsolate());
}
}
return v8::Undefined();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int smp_execute_task_sg(struct domain_device *dev,
struct scatterlist *req, struct scatterlist *resp)
{
int res, retry;
struct sas_task *task = NULL;
struct sas_internal *i =
to_sas_internal(dev->port->ha->core.shost->transportt);
mutex_lock(&dev->ex_dev.cmd_mutex);
for (retry = 0; retry < 3; retry++) {
if (test_bit(SAS_DEV_GONE, &dev->state)) {
res = -ECOMM;
break;
}
task = sas_alloc_slow_task(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!task) {
res = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
task->dev = dev;
task->task_proto = dev->tproto;
task->smp_task.smp_req = *req;
task->smp_task.smp_resp = *resp;
task->task_done = smp_task_done;
task->slow_task->timer.function = smp_task_timedout;
task->slow_task->timer.expires = jiffies + SMP_TIMEOUT*HZ;
add_timer(&task->slow_task->timer);
res = i->dft->lldd_execute_task(task, GFP_KERNEL);
if (res) {
del_timer(&task->slow_task->timer);
SAS_DPRINTK("executing SMP task failed:%d\n", res);
break;
}
wait_for_completion(&task->slow_task->completion);
res = -ECOMM;
if ((task->task_state_flags & SAS_TASK_STATE_ABORTED)) {
SAS_DPRINTK("smp task timed out or aborted\n");
i->dft->lldd_abort_task(task);
if (!(task->task_state_flags & SAS_TASK_STATE_DONE)) {
SAS_DPRINTK("SMP task aborted and not done\n");
break;
}
}
if (task->task_status.resp == SAS_TASK_COMPLETE &&
task->task_status.stat == SAM_STAT_GOOD) {
res = 0;
break;
}
if (task->task_status.resp == SAS_TASK_COMPLETE &&
task->task_status.stat == SAS_DATA_UNDERRUN) {
/* no error, but return the number of bytes of
* underrun */
res = task->task_status.residual;
break;
}
if (task->task_status.resp == SAS_TASK_COMPLETE &&
task->task_status.stat == SAS_DATA_OVERRUN) {
res = -EMSGSIZE;
break;
}
if (task->task_status.resp == SAS_TASK_UNDELIVERED &&
task->task_status.stat == SAS_DEVICE_UNKNOWN)
break;
else {
SAS_DPRINTK("%s: task to dev %016llx response: 0x%x "
"status 0x%x\n", __func__,
SAS_ADDR(dev->sas_addr),
task->task_status.resp,
task->task_status.stat);
sas_free_task(task);
task = NULL;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&dev->ex_dev.cmd_mutex);
BUG_ON(retry == 3 && task != NULL);
sas_free_task(task);
return res;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: fix memory leak in sas_smp_get_phy_events()
We've got a memory leak with the following producer:
while true;
do cat /sys/class/sas_phy/phy-1:0:12/invalid_dword_count >/dev/null;
done
The buffer req is allocated and not freed after we return. Fix it.
Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: chenqilin <chenqilin2@huawei.com>
CC: chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 83,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoReleaseTexImage2DCHROMIUM(
GLenum target, GLint image_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::DoReleaseTexImage2DCHROMIUM");
TextureRef* texture_ref =
texture_manager()->GetTextureInfoForTargetUnlessDefault(&state_, target);
if (!texture_ref) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glReleaseTexImage2DCHROMIUM", "no texture bound");
return;
}
gfx::GLImage* gl_image = image_manager()->LookupImage(image_id);
if (!gl_image) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glReleaseTexImage2DCHROMIUM", "no image found with the given ID");
return;
}
if (texture_ref->texture()->GetLevelImage(target, 0) != gl_image)
return;
{
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(
"GLES2DecoderImpl::DoReleaseTexImage2DCHROMIUM", GetErrorState());
gl_image->ReleaseTexImage(target);
}
texture_manager()->SetLevelInfo(
texture_ref, target, 0, GL_RGBA, 0, 0, 1, 0,
GL_RGBA, GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, false);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t encode_block(char *str, char *buf, size_t buflen, const char *fromcode,
const char *tocode, encoder_t encoder)
{
if (!fromcode)
{
return (*encoder)(str, buf, buflen, tocode);
}
const iconv_t cd = mutt_ch_iconv_open(tocode, fromcode, 0);
assert(cd != (iconv_t)(-1));
const char *ib = buf;
size_t ibl = buflen;
char tmp[ENCWORD_LEN_MAX - ENCWORD_LEN_MIN + 1];
char *ob = tmp;
size_t obl = sizeof(tmp) - strlen(tocode);
const size_t n1 = iconv(cd, (ICONV_CONST char **) &ib, &ibl, &ob, &obl);
const size_t n2 = iconv(cd, NULL, NULL, &ob, &obl);
assert(n1 != (size_t)(-1) && n2 != (size_t)(-1));
iconv_close(cd);
return (*encoder)(str, tmp, ob - tmp, tocode);
}
Commit Message: Check outbuf length in mutt_to_base64()
The obuf can be overflowed in auth_cram.c, and possibly auth_gss.c.
Thanks to Jeriko One for the bug report.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 79,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: onig_get_encoding(regex_t* reg)
{
return reg->enc;
}
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int usb_lock_device_for_reset(struct usb_device *udev,
const struct usb_interface *iface)
{
unsigned long jiffies_expire = jiffies + HZ;
if (udev->state == USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED)
return -ENODEV;
if (udev->state == USB_STATE_SUSPENDED)
return -EHOSTUNREACH;
if (iface && (iface->condition == USB_INTERFACE_UNBINDING ||
iface->condition == USB_INTERFACE_UNBOUND))
return -EINTR;
while (!usb_trylock_device(udev)) {
/* If we can't acquire the lock after waiting one second,
* we're probably deadlocked */
if (time_after(jiffies, jiffies_expire))
return -EBUSY;
msleep(15);
if (udev->state == USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED)
return -ENODEV;
if (udev->state == USB_STATE_SUSPENDED)
return -EHOSTUNREACH;
if (iface && (iface->condition == USB_INTERFACE_UNBINDING ||
iface->condition == USB_INTERFACE_UNBOUND))
return -EINTR;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 75,566
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PreconnectRequest::PreconnectRequest(
const GURL& origin,
int num_sockets,
const net::NetworkIsolationKey& network_isolation_key)
: origin(origin),
num_sockets(num_sockets),
network_isolation_key(network_isolation_key) {
DCHECK_GE(num_sockets, 0);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 172,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string MixedContentTypeToProtocolMixedContentType(
blink::WebMixedContentContextType mixed_content_type) {
switch (mixed_content_type) {
case blink::WebMixedContentContextType::kNotMixedContent:
return Security::MixedContentTypeEnum::None;
case blink::WebMixedContentContextType::kBlockable:
return Security::MixedContentTypeEnum::Blockable;
case blink::WebMixedContentContextType::kOptionallyBlockable:
return Security::MixedContentTypeEnum::OptionallyBlockable;
case blink::WebMixedContentContextType::kShouldBeBlockable:
NOTREACHED();
return Security::MixedContentTypeEnum::OptionallyBlockable;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return Security::MixedContentTypeEnum::None;
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(zlib)
{
php_register_url_stream_wrapper("compress.zlib", &php_stream_gzip_wrapper TSRMLS_CC);
php_stream_filter_register_factory("zlib.*", &php_zlib_filter_factory TSRMLS_CC);
php_output_handler_alias_register(ZEND_STRL("ob_gzhandler"), php_zlib_output_handler_init TSRMLS_CC);
php_output_handler_conflict_register(ZEND_STRL("ob_gzhandler"), php_zlib_output_conflict_check TSRMLS_CC);
php_output_handler_conflict_register(ZEND_STRL(PHP_ZLIB_OUTPUT_HANDLER_NAME), php_zlib_output_conflict_check TSRMLS_CC);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("FORCE_GZIP", PHP_ZLIB_ENCODING_GZIP, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("FORCE_DEFLATE", PHP_ZLIB_ENCODING_DEFLATE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ZLIB_ENCODING_RAW", PHP_ZLIB_ENCODING_RAW, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ZLIB_ENCODING_GZIP", PHP_ZLIB_ENCODING_GZIP, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ZLIB_ENCODING_DEFLATE", PHP_ZLIB_ENCODING_DEFLATE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_INI_ENTRIES();
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,348
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::NotifyFindReply(int request_id,
int number_of_matches,
const gfx::Rect& selection_rect,
int active_match_ordinal,
bool final_update) {
if (delegate_ && !is_being_destroyed_ &&
!GetMainFrame()->GetProcess()->FastShutdownStarted()) {
delegate_->FindReply(this, request_id, number_of_matches, selection_rect,
active_match_ordinal, final_update);
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void armv8pmu_pmcr_write(u32 val)
{
val &= ARMV8_PMCR_MASK;
isb();
asm volatile("msr pmcr_el0, %0" :: "r" (val));
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 56,214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseElementContentDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *name,
xmlElementContentPtr *result) {
xmlElementContentPtr tree = NULL;
int inputid = ctxt->input->id;
int res;
*result = NULL;
if (RAW != '(') {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_STARTED,
"xmlParseElementContentDecl : %s '(' expected\n", name);
return(-1);
}
NEXT;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(-1);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CMP7(CUR_PTR, '#', 'P', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A')) {
tree = xmlParseElementMixedContentDecl(ctxt, inputid);
res = XML_ELEMENT_TYPE_MIXED;
} else {
tree = xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv(ctxt, inputid, 1);
res = XML_ELEMENT_TYPE_ELEMENT;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
*result = tree;
return(res);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 59,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JBIG2Bitmap *getBitmap(Guint idx) { return (idx < size) ? bitmaps[idx] : NULL; }
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestFormFillFunctions(const char* html,
bool unowned,
const char* url_override,
const AutofillFieldCase* field_cases,
size_t number_of_field_cases,
FillFormFunction fill_form_function,
GetValueFunction get_value_function) {
if (url_override)
LoadHTMLWithUrlOverride(html, url_override);
else
LoadHTML(html);
WebLocalFrame* web_frame = GetMainFrame();
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, web_frame);
FormCache form_cache(web_frame);
std::vector<FormData> forms = form_cache.ExtractNewForms();
ASSERT_EQ(1U, forms.size());
WebInputElement input_element = GetInputElementById("firstname");
FormData form_data;
FormFieldData field;
EXPECT_TRUE(FindFormAndFieldForFormControlElement(input_element, &form_data,
&field));
if (!unowned) {
EXPECT_EQ(ASCIIToUTF16("TestForm"), form_data.name);
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://abc.com"), form_data.action);
}
const std::vector<FormFieldData>& fields = form_data.fields;
ASSERT_EQ(number_of_field_cases, fields.size());
FormFieldData expected;
for (size_t i = 0; i < number_of_field_cases; ++i) {
SCOPED_TRACE(base::StringPrintf("Verify initial value for field %s",
field_cases[i].id_attribute));
expected.form_control_type = field_cases[i].form_control_type;
expected.max_length = expected.form_control_type == "text"
? WebInputElement::DefaultMaxLength()
: 0;
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16(field_cases[i].id_attribute);
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
expected.value = ASCIIToUTF16(field_cases[i].initial_value);
if (expected.form_control_type == "text" ||
expected.form_control_type == "month") {
expected.label = ASCIIToUTF16(field_cases[i].initial_value);
} else {
expected.label.clear();
}
expected.autocomplete_attribute = field_cases[i].autocomplete_attribute;
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields[i]);
form_data.fields[i].value = ASCIIToUTF16(field_cases[i].autofill_value);
form_data.fields[i].is_autofilled = field_cases[i].should_be_autofilled;
}
fill_form_function(form_data, input_element);
for (size_t i = 0; i < number_of_field_cases; ++i) {
ValidateFilledField(field_cases[i], get_value_function);
}
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Pin preview font-family to a system font
Bug: 916838
Change-Id: I4e874105262f2e15a11a7a18a7afd204e5827400
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1423109
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Koji Ishii <kojii@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640884}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoRenderbufferStorageMultisampleAdvancedAMD(
GLenum target,
GLsizei samples,
GLsizei storageSamples,
GLenum internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height) {
DCHECK(feature_info_->feature_flags().amd_framebuffer_multisample_advanced);
api()->glRenderbufferStorageMultisampleAdvancedAMDFn(
target, samples, storageSamples, internalformat, width, height);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LoadURL() {
const GURL data_url(kTouchActionDataURL);
NavigateToURL(shell(), data_url);
RenderWidgetHostImpl* host = GetWidgetHost();
scoped_refptr<FrameWatcher> frame_watcher(new FrameWatcher());
frame_watcher->AttachTo(shell()->web_contents());
host->GetView()->SetSize(gfx::Size(400, 400));
base::string16 ready_title(base::ASCIIToUTF16("ready"));
TitleWatcher watcher(shell()->web_contents(), ready_title);
ignore_result(watcher.WaitAndGetTitle());
frame_watcher->WaitFrames(1);
}
Commit Message: Drive out additional flakiness of TouchAction browser test.
It is relatively stable but it has flaked a couple of times specifically
with this:
Actual: 44
Expected: distance.y()
Which is: 45
I presume that the failure is either we aren't waiting for the additional
frame or a subpixel scrolling problem. As a speculative fix wait for the
pixel item we are waiting to scroll for.
BUG=376668
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2281613002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#414525}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 119,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void qemu_spice_display_switch(SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd,
DisplaySurface *surface)
{
SimpleSpiceUpdate *update;
bool need_destroy;
dprint(1, "%s/%d:\n", __func__, ssd->qxl.id);
memset(&ssd->dirty, 0, sizeof(ssd->dirty));
if (ssd->surface) {
pixman_image_unref(ssd->surface);
ssd->surface = NULL;
pixman_image_unref(ssd->mirror);
ssd->mirror = NULL;
}
qemu_mutex_lock(&ssd->lock);
need_destroy = (ssd->ds != NULL);
ssd->ds = surface;
while ((update = QTAILQ_FIRST(&ssd->updates)) != NULL) {
QTAILQ_REMOVE(&ssd->updates, update, next);
qemu_spice_destroy_update(ssd, update);
}
qemu_mutex_unlock(&ssd->lock);
if (need_destroy) {
qemu_spice_destroy_host_primary(ssd);
}
if (ssd->ds) {
qemu_spice_create_host_primary(ssd);
}
memset(&ssd->dirty, 0, sizeof(ssd->dirty));
ssd->notify++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 12,193
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::CurrentFrameKnownToBeOpaque() {
return texture_holder_->CurrentFrameKnownToBeOpaque();
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 143,350
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SparseHistogram::SparseHistogram(const std::string& name)
: HistogramBase(name),
samples_(new SampleMap(HashMetricName(name))),
logged_samples_(new SampleMap(samples_->id())) {}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 140,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: av_cold void ff_mpegvideodsp_init_x86(MpegVideoDSPContext *c)
{
#if HAVE_INLINE_ASM
int cpu_flags = av_get_cpu_flags();
if (INLINE_MMX(cpu_flags))
c->gmc = gmc_mmx;
#endif /* HAVE_INLINE_ASM */
}
Commit Message: avcodec/x86/mpegvideodsp: Fix signedness bug in need_emu
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: 3516/attachment-311488.dat
Found-by: Insu Yun, Georgia Tech.
Tested-by: wuninsu@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 59,251
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CachedFileStream::moveStart(int delta)
{
start += delta;
bufPtr = bufEnd = buf;
bufPos = start;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _tiffUnmapProc(thandle_t fd, void* base, toff_t size)
{
(void) fd;
(void) munmap(base, (off_t) size);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 86,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void SaveCardCallback() {}
Commit Message: [autofill] Avoid duplicate instances of the SaveCardBubble.
autofill::SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubble() expects
(via DCHECK) to only be called when the save card bubble is
not already visible. This constraint is violated if the user
clicks multiple times on a submit button.
If the underlying page goes away, the last SaveCardBubbleView
created by the controller will be automatically cleaned up,
but any others are left visible on the screen... holding a
refence to a possibly-deleted controller.
This CL early exits the ShowBubbleFor*** and ReshowBubble logic
if the bubble is already visible.
BUG=708819
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2862933002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469768}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 137,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: getCPS2(struct rx_call *call, afs_int32 aid, afs_uint32 ahost, prlist *alist,
afs_int32 *over, afs_int32 *cid)
{
afs_int32 code;
struct ubik_trans *tt;
afs_int32 temp;
struct prentry tentry;
struct prentry host_tentry;
afs_int32 hostid;
int host_list = 0;
struct in_addr iaddr;
char hoststr[16];
*over = 0;
iaddr.s_addr = ntohl(ahost);
alist->prlist_len = 0;
alist->prlist_val = NULL;
code = Initdb();
if (code != PRSUCCESS)
return code;
code = ubik_BeginTransReadAny(dbase, UBIK_READTRANS, &tt);
if (code)
return code;
code = ubik_SetLock(tt, 1, 1, LOCKREAD);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = read_DbHeader(tt);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
if (aid != PRBADID) {
temp = FindByID(tt, aid);
if (!temp)
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRNOENT);
code = pr_ReadEntry(tt, 0, temp, &tentry);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
/* afs does authenticate now */
code = WhoIsThis(call, tt, cid);
if (code
|| !AccessOK(tt, *cid, &tentry, PRP_MEMBER_MEM, PRP_MEMBER_ANY))
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
}
code = NameToID(tt, afs_inet_ntoa_r(iaddr.s_addr, hoststr), &hostid);
if (code == PRSUCCESS && hostid != 0) {
temp = FindByID(tt, hostid);
if (temp) {
code = pr_ReadEntry(tt, 0, temp, &host_tentry);
if (code == PRSUCCESS)
host_list = 1;
else
fprintf(stderr, "pr_ReadEntry returned %d\n", code);
} else
fprintf(stderr, "FindByID Failed -- Not found\n");
}
if (host_list)
code = GetList2(tt, &tentry, &host_tentry, alist, 1);
else
code = GetList(tt, &tentry, alist, 1);
if (!code)
code = addWildCards(tt, alist, ntohl(ahost));
if (code != PRSUCCESS)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = ubik_EndTrans(tt);
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 12,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char* get_rootdir(pid_t pid)
{
char buf[sizeof("/proc/%lu/root") + sizeof(long)*3];
sprintf(buf, "/proc/%lu/root", (long)pid);
return malloc_readlink(buf);
}
Commit Message: ccpp: stop reading hs_error.log from /tmp
The file might contain anything and there is no way to verify its
contents.
Related: #1211835
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 74,345
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserTabStripController::IsCommandEnabledForTab(
TabStripModel::ContextMenuCommand command_id,
BaseTab* tab) const {
int model_index = tabstrip_->GetModelIndexOfBaseTab(tab);
return model_->ContainsIndex(model_index) ?
model_->IsContextMenuCommandEnabled(model_index, command_id) : false;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_obj_class(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value obj)
{
return mrb_class_real(mrb_class(mrb, obj));
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CameraService::isValidCameraId(int cameraId) {
int facing;
int deviceVersion = getDeviceVersion(cameraId, &facing);
switch(deviceVersion) {
case CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_1_0:
case CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_2_0:
case CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_2_1:
case CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_3_0:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void smtp_get_message(char *buffer, char **outptr)
{
size_t len = strlen(buffer);
char *message = NULL;
if(len > 4) {
/* Find the start of the message */
len -= 4;
for(message = buffer + 4; *message == ' ' || *message == '\t';
message++, len--)
;
/* Find the end of the message */
for(; len--;)
if(message[len] != '\r' && message[len] != '\n' && message[len] != ' ' &&
message[len] != '\t')
break;
/* Terminate the message */
if(++len) {
message[len] = '\0';
}
}
else
/* junk input => zero length output */
message = &buffer[len];
*outptr = message;
}
Commit Message: smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 85,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool doCommand(JNIEnv* env, jstring javaCommand,
char* reply, size_t reply_len) {
ScopedUtfChars command(env, javaCommand);
if (command.c_str() == NULL) {
return false; // ScopedUtfChars already threw on error.
}
if (DBG) {
ALOGD("doCommand: %s", command.c_str());
}
--reply_len; // Ensure we have room to add NUL termination.
if (::wifi_command(command.c_str(), reply, &reply_len) != 0) {
return false;
}
if (reply_len > 0 && reply[reply_len-1] == '\n') {
reply[reply_len-1] = '\0';
} else {
reply[reply_len] = '\0';
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: stringprep_strerror (Stringprep_rc rc)
{
const char *p;
bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
switch (rc)
{
case STRINGPREP_OK:
p = _("Success");
break;
case STRINGPREP_CONTAINS_UNASSIGNED:
p = _("Forbidden unassigned code points in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_CONTAINS_PROHIBITED:
p = _("Prohibited code points in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_BIDI_BOTH_L_AND_RAL:
p = _("Conflicting bidirectional properties in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_BIDI_LEADTRAIL_NOT_RAL:
p = _("Malformed bidirectional string");
break;
case STRINGPREP_BIDI_CONTAINS_PROHIBITED:
p = _("Prohibited bidirectional code points in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_TOO_SMALL_BUFFER:
p = _("Output would exceed the buffer space provided");
break;
case STRINGPREP_PROFILE_ERROR:
p = _("Error in stringprep profile definition");
break;
case STRINGPREP_FLAG_ERROR:
p = _("Flag conflict with profile");
break;
case STRINGPREP_UNKNOWN_PROFILE:
case STRINGPREP_UNKNOWN_PROFILE:
p = _("Unknown profile");
break;
case STRINGPREP_NFKC_FAILED:
p = _("Unicode normalization failed (internal error)");
break;
default:
p = _("Unknown error");
break;
}
return p;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 164,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit IncrementalMarkingScopeBase(ThreadState* thread_state)
: thread_state_(thread_state), heap_(thread_state_->Heap()) {
heap_.CommitCallbackStacks();
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 153,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StyleResolver::initWatchedSelectorRules(const Vector<RefPtr<StyleRule> >& watchedSelectors)
{
if (!watchedSelectors.size())
return;
m_watchedSelectorsRules = RuleSet::create();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < watchedSelectors.size(); ++i)
m_watchedSelectorsRules->addStyleRule(watchedSelectors[i].get(), RuleHasNoSpecialState);
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindUniformLocationCHROMIUM(GLuint program_id,
GLint location,
const std::string& name) {
if (!StringIsValidForGLES(name)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glBindUniformLocationCHROMIUM", "Invalid character");
return;
}
if (ProgramManager::HasBuiltInPrefix(name)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glBindUniformLocationCHROMIUM", "reserved prefix");
return;
}
if (location < 0 ||
static_cast<uint32_t>(location) >=
(group_->max_fragment_uniform_vectors() +
group_->max_vertex_uniform_vectors()) *
4) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glBindUniformLocationCHROMIUM", "location out of range");
return;
}
Program* program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program_id, "glBindUniformLocationCHROMIUM");
if (!program) {
return;
}
if (!program->SetUniformLocationBinding(name, location)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glBindUniformLocationCHROMIUM", "location out of range");
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t DestroyEdge(PolygonInfo *polygon_info,
const size_t edge)
{
assert(edge < polygon_info->number_edges);
polygon_info->edges[edge].points=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
polygon_info->edges[edge].points);
polygon_info->number_edges--;
if (edge < polygon_info->number_edges)
(void) memmove(polygon_info->edges+edge,polygon_info->edges+edge+1,
(size_t) (polygon_info->number_edges-edge)*sizeof(*polygon_info->edges));
return(polygon_info->number_edges);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID:
| 0
| 87,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: another_hunk (enum diff difftype, bool rev)
{
char *s;
lin context = 0;
size_t chars_read;
char numbuf0[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
char numbuf2[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
char numbuf3[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
while (p_end >= 0) {
if (p_end == p_efake)
p_end = p_bfake; /* don't free twice */
free(p_line[p_end]);
p_end--;
}
assert(p_end == -1);
p_efake = -1;
if (p_c_function)
{
free (p_c_function);
p_c_function = NULL;
}
p_max = hunkmax; /* gets reduced when --- found */
if (difftype == CONTEXT_DIFF || difftype == NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF) {
file_offset line_beginning = file_tell (pfp);
/* file pos of the current line */
lin repl_beginning = 0; /* index of --- line */
lin fillcnt = 0; /* #lines of missing ptrn or repl */
lin fillsrc; /* index of first line to copy */
lin filldst; /* index of first missing line */
bool ptrn_spaces_eaten = false; /* ptrn was slightly misformed */
bool some_context = false; /* (perhaps internal) context seen */
bool repl_could_be_missing = true;
bool ptrn_missing = false; /* The pattern was missing. */
bool repl_missing = false; /* Likewise for replacement. */
file_offset repl_backtrack_position = 0;
/* file pos of first repl line */
lin repl_patch_line; /* input line number for same */
lin repl_context; /* context for same */
lin ptrn_prefix_context = -1; /* lines in pattern prefix context */
lin ptrn_suffix_context = -1; /* lines in pattern suffix context */
lin repl_prefix_context = -1; /* lines in replac. prefix context */
lin ptrn_copiable = 0; /* # of copiable lines in ptrn */
lin repl_copiable = 0; /* Likewise for replacement. */
/* Pacify 'gcc -Wall'. */
fillsrc = filldst = repl_patch_line = repl_context = 0;
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1
|| chars_read <= 8
|| strncmp (buf, "********", 8) != 0) {
next_intuit_at(line_beginning,p_input_line);
return chars_read == (size_t) -1 ? -1 : 0;
}
s = buf;
while (*s == '*')
s++;
if (*s == ' ')
{
p_c_function = s;
while (*s != '\n')
s++;
*s = '\0';
p_c_function = savestr (p_c_function);
if (! p_c_function)
return -1;
}
p_hunk_beg = p_input_line + 1;
while (p_end < p_max) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
return -1;
if (!chars_read) {
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
if (p_max - p_end < 4) {
strcpy (buf, " \n"); /* assume blank lines got chopped */
chars_read = 3;
} else {
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch");
}
}
p_end++;
if (p_end == hunkmax)
fatal ("unterminated hunk starting at line %s; giving up at line %s: %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, pch_hunk_beg ()),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_input_line), buf);
assert(p_end < hunkmax);
p_Char[p_end] = *buf;
p_len[p_end] = 0;
p_line[p_end] = 0;
switch (*buf) {
case '*':
if (strnEQ(buf, "********", 8)) {
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
else
fatal ("unexpected end of hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
}
if (p_end != 0) {
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
fatal ("unexpected '***' at line %s: %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line), buf);
}
context = 0;
p_len[p_end] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[p_end] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
for (s = buf; *s && !ISDIGIT (*s); s++)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (strnEQ(s,"0,0",3))
remove_prefix (s, 2);
s = scan_linenum (s, &p_first);
if (*s == ',') {
while (*s && !ISDIGIT (*s))
s++;
scan_linenum (s, &p_ptrn_lines);
p_ptrn_lines += 1 - p_first;
if (p_ptrn_lines < 0)
malformed ();
}
else if (p_first)
p_ptrn_lines = 1;
else {
p_ptrn_lines = 0;
p_first = 1;
}
if (p_first >= LINENUM_MAX - p_ptrn_lines ||
p_ptrn_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - 6)
malformed ();
p_max = p_ptrn_lines + 6; /* we need this much at least */
while (p_max + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
return -1;
p_max = hunkmax;
break;
case '-':
if (buf[1] != '-')
goto change_line;
if (ptrn_prefix_context == -1)
ptrn_prefix_context = context;
ptrn_suffix_context = context;
if (repl_beginning
|| (p_end
!= p_ptrn_lines + 1 + (p_Char[p_end - 1] == '\n')))
{
if (p_end == 1)
{
/* 'Old' lines were omitted. Set up to fill
them in from 'new' context lines. */
ptrn_missing = true;
p_end = p_ptrn_lines + 1;
ptrn_prefix_context = ptrn_suffix_context = -1;
fillsrc = p_end + 1;
filldst = 1;
fillcnt = p_ptrn_lines;
}
else if (! repl_beginning)
fatal ("%s '---' at line %s; check line numbers at line %s",
(p_end <= p_ptrn_lines
? "Premature"
: "Overdue"),
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_hunk_beg));
else if (! repl_could_be_missing)
fatal ("duplicate '---' at line %s; check line numbers at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line),
format_linenum (numbuf1,
p_hunk_beg + repl_beginning));
else
{
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
}
repl_beginning = p_end;
repl_backtrack_position = file_tell (pfp);
repl_patch_line = p_input_line;
repl_context = context;
p_len[p_end] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[p_end] = savestr (buf)))
{
p_end--;
return -1;
}
p_Char[p_end] = '=';
for (s = buf; *s && ! ISDIGIT (*s); s++)
/* do nothing */ ;
s = scan_linenum (s, &p_newfirst);
if (*s == ',')
{
do
{
if (!*++s)
malformed ();
}
while (! ISDIGIT (*s));
scan_linenum (s, &p_repl_lines);
p_repl_lines += 1 - p_newfirst;
if (p_repl_lines < 0)
malformed ();
}
else if (p_newfirst)
p_repl_lines = 1;
else
{
p_repl_lines = 0;
p_newfirst = 1;
}
if (p_newfirst >= LINENUM_MAX - p_repl_lines ||
p_repl_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - p_end)
malformed ();
p_max = p_repl_lines + p_end;
while (p_max + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
return -1;
if (p_repl_lines != ptrn_copiable
&& (p_prefix_context != 0
|| context != 0
|| p_repl_lines != 1))
repl_could_be_missing = false;
context = 0;
break;
case '+': case '!':
repl_could_be_missing = false;
change_line:
s = buf + 1;
chars_read--;
if (*s == '\n' && canonicalize) {
strcpy (s, " \n");
chars_read = 2;
}
if (*s == ' ' || *s == '\t') {
s++;
chars_read--;
} else if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
if (! repl_beginning)
{
if (ptrn_prefix_context == -1)
ptrn_prefix_context = context;
}
else
{
if (repl_prefix_context == -1)
repl_prefix_context = context;
}
chars_read -=
(1 < chars_read
&& p_end == (repl_beginning ? p_max : p_ptrn_lines)
&& incomplete_line ());
p_len[p_end] = chars_read;
p_line[p_end] = savebuf (s, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[p_end]) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
context = 0;
break;
case '\t': case '\n': /* assume spaces got eaten */
s = buf;
if (*buf == '\t') {
s++;
chars_read--;
}
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing &&
(!ptrn_spaces_eaten || difftype == NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF) ) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
chars_read -=
(1 < chars_read
&& p_end == (repl_beginning ? p_max : p_ptrn_lines)
&& incomplete_line ());
p_len[p_end] = chars_read;
p_line[p_end] = savebuf (buf, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[p_end]) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
if (p_end != p_ptrn_lines + 1) {
ptrn_spaces_eaten |= (repl_beginning != 0);
some_context = true;
context++;
if (repl_beginning)
repl_copiable++;
else
ptrn_copiable++;
p_Char[p_end] = ' ';
}
break;
case ' ':
s = buf + 1;
chars_read--;
if (*s == '\n' && canonicalize) {
strcpy (s, "\n");
chars_read = 2;
}
if (*s == ' ' || *s == '\t') {
s++;
chars_read--;
} else if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
some_context = true;
context++;
if (repl_beginning)
repl_copiable++;
else
ptrn_copiable++;
chars_read -=
(1 < chars_read
&& p_end == (repl_beginning ? p_max : p_ptrn_lines)
&& incomplete_line ());
p_len[p_end] = chars_read;
p_line[p_end] = savebuf (s, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[p_end]) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
break;
default:
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
malformed ();
}
}
hunk_done:
if (p_end >=0 && !repl_beginning)
fatal ("no '---' found in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, pch_hunk_beg ()));
if (repl_missing) {
/* reset state back to just after --- */
p_input_line = repl_patch_line;
context = repl_context;
for (p_end--; p_end > repl_beginning; p_end--)
free(p_line[p_end]);
Fseek (pfp, repl_backtrack_position, SEEK_SET);
/* redundant 'new' context lines were omitted - set */
/* up to fill them in from the old file context */
fillsrc = 1;
filldst = repl_beginning+1;
fillcnt = p_repl_lines;
p_end = p_max;
}
else if (! ptrn_missing && ptrn_copiable != repl_copiable)
fatal ("context mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
else if (!some_context && fillcnt == 1) {
/* the first hunk was a null hunk with no context */
/* and we were expecting one line -- fix it up. */
while (filldst < p_end) {
p_line[filldst] = p_line[filldst+1];
p_Char[filldst] = p_Char[filldst+1];
p_len[filldst] = p_len[filldst+1];
filldst++;
}
#if 0
repl_beginning--; /* this doesn't need to be fixed */
#endif
p_end--;
p_first++; /* do append rather than insert */
fillcnt = 0;
p_ptrn_lines = 0;
}
p_prefix_context = ((repl_prefix_context == -1
|| (ptrn_prefix_context != -1
&& ptrn_prefix_context < repl_prefix_context))
? ptrn_prefix_context : repl_prefix_context);
p_suffix_context = ((ptrn_suffix_context != -1
&& ptrn_suffix_context < context)
? ptrn_suffix_context : context);
if (p_prefix_context == -1 || p_suffix_context == -1)
fatal ("replacement text or line numbers mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
if (difftype == CONTEXT_DIFF
&& (fillcnt
|| (p_first > 1
&& p_prefix_context + p_suffix_context < ptrn_copiable))) {
if (verbosity == VERBOSE)
say ("%s\n%s\n%s\n",
"(Fascinating -- this is really a new-style context diff but without",
"the telltale extra asterisks on the *** line that usually indicate",
"the new style...)");
diff_type = difftype = NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF;
}
/* if there were omitted context lines, fill them in now */
if (fillcnt) {
p_bfake = filldst; /* remember where not to free() */
p_efake = filldst + fillcnt - 1;
while (fillcnt-- > 0) {
while (fillsrc <= p_end && fillsrc != repl_beginning
&& p_Char[fillsrc] != ' ')
fillsrc++;
if (p_end < fillsrc || fillsrc == repl_beginning)
{
fatal ("replacement text or line numbers mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
}
p_line[filldst] = p_line[fillsrc];
p_Char[filldst] = p_Char[fillsrc];
p_len[filldst] = p_len[fillsrc];
fillsrc++; filldst++;
}
while (fillsrc <= p_end && fillsrc != repl_beginning)
{
if (p_Char[fillsrc] == ' ')
fatal ("replacement text or line numbers mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
fillsrc++;
}
if (debug & 64)
printf ("fillsrc %s, filldst %s, rb %s, e+1 %s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, fillsrc),
format_linenum (numbuf1, filldst),
format_linenum (numbuf2, repl_beginning),
format_linenum (numbuf3, p_end + 1));
assert(fillsrc==p_end+1 || fillsrc==repl_beginning);
assert(filldst==p_end+1 || filldst==repl_beginning);
}
}
else if (difftype == UNI_DIFF) {
file_offset line_beginning = file_tell (pfp); /* file pos of the current line */
lin fillsrc; /* index of old lines */
lin filldst; /* index of new lines */
char ch = '\0';
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1
|| chars_read <= 4
|| strncmp (buf, "@@ -", 4) != 0) {
next_intuit_at(line_beginning,p_input_line);
return chars_read == (size_t) -1 ? -1 : 0;
}
s = scan_linenum (buf + 4, &p_first);
if (*s == ',')
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_ptrn_lines);
else
p_ptrn_lines = 1;
if (p_first >= LINENUM_MAX - p_ptrn_lines)
malformed ();
if (*s == ' ') s++;
if (*s != '+')
malformed ();
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_newfirst);
if (*s == ',')
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_repl_lines);
else
p_repl_lines = 1;
if (p_newfirst >= LINENUM_MAX - p_repl_lines)
malformed ();
if (*s == ' ') s++;
if (*s++ != '@')
malformed ();
if (*s++ == '@' && *s == ' ')
{
p_c_function = s;
while (*s != '\n')
s++;
*s = '\0';
p_c_function = savestr (p_c_function);
if (! p_c_function)
return -1;
}
if (!p_ptrn_lines)
p_first++; /* do append rather than insert */
if (!p_repl_lines)
p_newfirst++;
if (p_ptrn_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - (p_repl_lines + 1))
malformed ();
p_max = p_ptrn_lines + p_repl_lines + 1;
while (p_max + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
return -1;
fillsrc = 1;
filldst = fillsrc + p_ptrn_lines;
p_end = filldst + p_repl_lines;
sprintf (buf, "*** %s,%s ****\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_first),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_first + p_ptrn_lines - 1));
p_len[0] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[0] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = -1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[0] = '*';
sprintf (buf, "--- %s,%s ----\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_newfirst),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_newfirst + p_repl_lines - 1));
p_len[filldst] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[filldst] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = 0;
return -1;
}
p_Char[filldst++] = '=';
p_prefix_context = -1;
p_hunk_beg = p_input_line + 1;
while (fillsrc <= p_ptrn_lines || filldst <= p_end) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (!chars_read) {
if (p_max - filldst < 3) {
strcpy (buf, " \n"); /* assume blank lines got chopped */
chars_read = 2;
} else {
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch");
}
}
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
s = 0;
else if (*buf == '\t' || *buf == '\n') {
ch = ' '; /* assume the space got eaten */
s = savebuf (buf, chars_read);
}
else {
ch = *buf;
s = savebuf (buf+1, --chars_read);
}
if (chars_read && ! s)
{
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
return -1;
}
switch (ch) {
case '-':
if (fillsrc > p_ptrn_lines) {
free(s);
p_end = filldst-1;
malformed ();
}
chars_read -= fillsrc == p_ptrn_lines && incomplete_line ();
p_Char[fillsrc] = ch;
p_line[fillsrc] = s;
p_len[fillsrc++] = chars_read;
break;
case '=':
ch = ' ';
/* FALL THROUGH */
case ' ':
if (fillsrc > p_ptrn_lines) {
free(s);
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
malformed ();
}
context++;
chars_read -= fillsrc == p_ptrn_lines && incomplete_line ();
p_Char[fillsrc] = ch;
p_line[fillsrc] = s;
p_len[fillsrc++] = chars_read;
s = savebuf (s, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! s) {
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
return -1;
}
/* FALL THROUGH */
case '+':
if (filldst > p_end) {
free(s);
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
malformed ();
}
chars_read -= filldst == p_end && incomplete_line ();
p_Char[filldst] = ch;
p_line[filldst] = s;
p_len[filldst++] = chars_read;
break;
default:
p_end = filldst;
malformed ();
}
if (ch != ' ') {
if (p_prefix_context == -1)
p_prefix_context = context;
context = 0;
}
}/* while */
if (p_prefix_context == -1)
malformed ();
p_suffix_context = context;
}
else { /* normal diff--fake it up */
char hunk_type;
int i;
lin min, max;
file_offset line_beginning = file_tell (pfp);
p_prefix_context = p_suffix_context = 0;
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1 || !chars_read || !ISDIGIT (*buf)) {
next_intuit_at(line_beginning,p_input_line);
return chars_read == (size_t) -1 ? -1 : 0;
}
s = scan_linenum (buf, &p_first);
if (*s == ',') {
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_ptrn_lines);
p_ptrn_lines += 1 - p_first;
}
else
p_ptrn_lines = (*s != 'a');
if (p_first >= LINENUM_MAX - p_ptrn_lines)
malformed ();
hunk_type = *s;
if (hunk_type == 'a')
p_first++; /* do append rather than insert */
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &min);
if (*s == ',')
scan_linenum (s + 1, &max);
else
max = min;
if (min > max || max - min == LINENUM_MAX)
malformed ();
if (hunk_type == 'd')
min++;
p_newfirst = min;
p_repl_lines = max - min + 1;
if (p_newfirst >= LINENUM_MAX - p_repl_lines)
malformed ();
if (p_ptrn_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - (p_repl_lines + 1))
malformed ();
p_end = p_ptrn_lines + p_repl_lines + 1;
while (p_end + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
{
p_end = -1;
return -1;
}
sprintf (buf, "*** %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_first),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_first + p_ptrn_lines - 1));
p_len[0] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[0] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = -1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[0] = '*';
for (i=1; i<=p_ptrn_lines; i++) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
{
p_end = i - 1;
return -1;
}
if (!chars_read)
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
if (buf[0] != '<' || (buf[1] != ' ' && buf[1] != '\t'))
fatal ("'<' expected at line %s of patch",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
chars_read -= 2 + (i == p_ptrn_lines && incomplete_line ());
p_len[i] = chars_read;
p_line[i] = savebuf (buf + 2, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[i]) {
p_end = i-1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[i] = '-';
}
if (hunk_type == 'c') {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
{
p_end = i - 1;
return -1;
}
if (! chars_read)
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
if (*buf != '-')
fatal ("'---' expected at line %s of patch",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
}
sprintf (buf, "--- %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, min),
format_linenum (numbuf1, max));
p_len[i] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[i] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = i-1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[i] = '=';
for (i++; i<=p_end; i++) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
{
p_end = i - 1;
return -1;
}
if (!chars_read)
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
if (buf[0] != '>' || (buf[1] != ' ' && buf[1] != '\t'))
fatal ("'>' expected at line %s of patch",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
chars_read -= 2 + (i == p_end && incomplete_line ());
p_len[i] = chars_read;
p_line[i] = savebuf (buf + 2, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[i]) {
p_end = i-1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[i] = '+';
}
}
if (rev) /* backwards patch? */
if (!pch_swap())
say ("Not enough memory to swap next hunk!\n");
assert (p_end + 1 < hunkmax);
p_Char[p_end + 1] = '^'; /* add a stopper for apply_hunk */
if (debug & 2) {
lin i;
for (i = 0; i <= p_end + 1; i++) {
fprintf (stderr, "%s %c",
format_linenum (numbuf0, i),
p_Char[i]);
if (p_Char[i] == '*')
fprintf (stderr, " %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_first),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_ptrn_lines));
else if (p_Char[i] == '=')
fprintf (stderr, " %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_newfirst),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_repl_lines));
else if (p_Char[i] != '^')
{
fputs(" |", stderr);
pch_write_line (i, stderr);
}
else
fputc('\n', stderr);
}
fflush (stderr);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 165,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderView::show(WebNavigationPolicy policy) {
DCHECK(!did_show_) << "received extraneous Show call";
DCHECK(opener_id_ != MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
if (did_show_)
return;
did_show_ = true;
if (content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->AllowPopup(creator_url_))
opened_by_user_gesture_ = true;
if (!opened_by_user_gesture_) {
if (policy != WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab)
policy = WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyNewPopup;
}
Send(new ViewHostMsg_ShowView(opener_id_, routing_id_,
NavigationPolicyToDisposition(policy), initial_pos_,
opened_by_user_gesture_));
SetPendingWindowRect(initial_pos_);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestWebContentsDelegate() : renderer_unresponsive_received_(false) {}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FrameTree* InterstitialPageImpl::GetFrameTree() {
return frame_tree_.get();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::requestStorageQuota(
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
blink::WebStorageQuotaType type,
unsigned long long requested_size,
blink::WebStorageQuotaCallbacks callbacks) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
WebSecurityOrigin origin = frame->document().securityOrigin();
if (origin.isUnique()) {
callbacks.didFail(blink::WebStorageQuotaErrorAbort);
return;
}
ChildThreadImpl::current()->quota_dispatcher()->RequestStorageQuota(
render_view_->GetRoutingID(),
GURL(origin.toString()),
static_cast<storage::StorageType>(type),
requested_size,
QuotaDispatcher::CreateWebStorageQuotaCallbacksWrapper(callbacks));
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static UINT dvcman_get_configuration(IWTSListener* pListener,
void** ppPropertyBag)
{
*ppPropertyBag = NULL;
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID:
| 0
| 74,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::SetGetOffset(int32 get_offset) {
NOTREACHED();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int netif_skb_features(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__be16 protocol = skb->protocol;
int features = skb->dev->features;
if (protocol == htons(ETH_P_8021Q)) {
struct vlan_ethhdr *veh = (struct vlan_ethhdr *)skb->data;
protocol = veh->h_vlan_encapsulated_proto;
} else if (!vlan_tx_tag_present(skb)) {
return harmonize_features(skb, protocol, features);
}
features &= (skb->dev->vlan_features | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_TX);
if (protocol != htons(ETH_P_8021Q)) {
return harmonize_features(skb, protocol, features);
} else {
features &= NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_HIGHDMA | NETIF_F_FRAGLIST |
NETIF_F_GEN_CSUM | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_TX;
return harmonize_features(skb, protocol, features);
}
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tun_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
tun->owner = INVALID_UID;
tun->group = INVALID_GID;
dev->ethtool_ops = &tun_ethtool_ops;
dev->needs_free_netdev = true;
dev->priv_destructor = tun_free_netdev;
/* We prefer our own queue length */
dev->tx_queue_len = TUN_READQ_SIZE;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init crypto_ctr_module_init(void)
{
int err;
err = crypto_register_template(&crypto_ctr_tmpl);
if (err)
goto out;
err = crypto_register_template(&crypto_rfc3686_tmpl);
if (err)
goto out_drop_ctr;
out:
return err;
out_drop_ctr:
crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_ctr_tmpl);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_pgsql_add_quotes(zval *src, zend_bool should_free TSRMLS_DC)
{
smart_str str = {0};
assert(Z_TYPE_P(src) == IS_STRING);
assert(should_free == 1 || should_free == 0);
smart_str_appendc(&str, 'E');
smart_str_appendc(&str, '\'');
smart_str_appendl(&str, Z_STRVAL_P(src), Z_STRLEN_P(src));
smart_str_appendc(&str, '\'');
smart_str_0(&str);
if (should_free) {
efree(Z_STRVAL_P(src));
}
Z_STRVAL_P(src) = str.c;
Z_STRLEN_P(src) = str.len;
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct rb_entry *__lookup_rb_tree_ret(struct rb_root *root,
struct rb_entry *cached_re,
unsigned int ofs,
struct rb_entry **prev_entry,
struct rb_entry **next_entry,
struct rb_node ***insert_p,
struct rb_node **insert_parent,
bool force)
{
struct rb_node **pnode = &root->rb_node;
struct rb_node *parent = NULL, *tmp_node;
struct rb_entry *re = cached_re;
*insert_p = NULL;
*insert_parent = NULL;
*prev_entry = NULL;
*next_entry = NULL;
if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(root))
return NULL;
if (re) {
if (re->ofs <= ofs && re->ofs + re->len > ofs)
goto lookup_neighbors;
}
while (*pnode) {
parent = *pnode;
re = rb_entry(*pnode, struct rb_entry, rb_node);
if (ofs < re->ofs)
pnode = &(*pnode)->rb_left;
else if (ofs >= re->ofs + re->len)
pnode = &(*pnode)->rb_right;
else
goto lookup_neighbors;
}
*insert_p = pnode;
*insert_parent = parent;
re = rb_entry(parent, struct rb_entry, rb_node);
tmp_node = parent;
if (parent && ofs > re->ofs)
tmp_node = rb_next(parent);
*next_entry = rb_entry_safe(tmp_node, struct rb_entry, rb_node);
tmp_node = parent;
if (parent && ofs < re->ofs)
tmp_node = rb_prev(parent);
*prev_entry = rb_entry_safe(tmp_node, struct rb_entry, rb_node);
return NULL;
lookup_neighbors:
if (ofs == re->ofs || force) {
/* lookup prev node for merging backward later */
tmp_node = rb_prev(&re->rb_node);
*prev_entry = rb_entry_safe(tmp_node, struct rb_entry, rb_node);
}
if (ofs == re->ofs + re->len - 1 || force) {
/* lookup next node for merging frontward later */
tmp_node = rb_next(&re->rb_node);
*next_entry = rb_entry_safe(tmp_node, struct rb_entry, rb_node);
}
return re;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a bug caused by NULL extent tree
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount
-sbi->mount_opt.opt = 0;
<--- -f2fs_iget
-do_read_inode
-f2fs_init_extent_tree
-F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree is NULL
-default_options && parse_options
-remount return
<--- -f2fs_map_blocks
-f2fs_lookup_extent_tree
-f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !et);
The same problem with f2fs_new_inode.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::ShowOneClickSigninBubble(
const StartSyncCallback& start_sync_callback) {
new OneClickSigninBubbleGtk(this, start_sync_callback);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::HandleUrlFetchCompleted(URLFetcher* fetcher,
int net_error) {
DCHECK(internal_state_ == DOWNLOADING);
UpdateURLLoaderRequest* request = fetcher->request();
const GURL& url = request->GetURL();
pending_url_fetches_.erase(url);
NotifyAllProgress(url);
++url_fetches_completed_;
int response_code = net_error == net::OK ? request->GetResponseCode()
: fetcher->redirect_response_code();
AppCacheEntry& entry = url_file_list_.find(url)->second;
if (response_code / 100 == 2) {
DCHECK(fetcher->response_writer());
entry.set_response_id(fetcher->response_writer()->response_id());
entry.set_response_size(fetcher->response_writer()->amount_written());
if (!inprogress_cache_->AddOrModifyEntry(url, entry))
duplicate_response_ids_.push_back(entry.response_id());
} else {
VLOG(1) << "Request error: " << net_error
<< " response code: " << response_code;
if (entry.IsExplicit() || entry.IsFallback() || entry.IsIntercept()) {
if (response_code == 304 && fetcher->existing_entry().has_response_id()) {
entry.set_response_id(fetcher->existing_entry().response_id());
entry.set_response_size(fetcher->existing_entry().response_size());
inprogress_cache_->AddOrModifyEntry(url, entry);
} else {
const char kFormatString[] = "Resource fetch failed (%d) %s";
std::string message = FormatUrlErrorMessage(
kFormatString, url, fetcher->result(), response_code);
ResultType result = fetcher->result();
bool is_cross_origin = url.GetOrigin() != manifest_url_.GetOrigin();
switch (result) {
case DISKCACHE_ERROR:
HandleCacheFailure(
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails(
message,
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_UNKNOWN_ERROR,
GURL(), 0, is_cross_origin),
result, url);
break;
case NETWORK_ERROR:
HandleCacheFailure(
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails(
message,
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_RESOURCE_ERROR,
url, 0, is_cross_origin),
result, url);
break;
default:
HandleCacheFailure(
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails(
message,
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_RESOURCE_ERROR,
url, response_code, is_cross_origin),
result, url);
break;
}
return;
}
} else if (response_code == 404 || response_code == 410) {
} else if (update_type_ == UPGRADE_ATTEMPT &&
fetcher->existing_entry().has_response_id()) {
entry.set_response_id(fetcher->existing_entry().response_id());
entry.set_response_size(fetcher->existing_entry().response_size());
inprogress_cache_->AddOrModifyEntry(url, entry);
}
}
DCHECK(internal_state_ != CACHE_FAILURE);
FetchUrls();
MaybeCompleteUpdate();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 172,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline size_t ColorToNodeId(const CubeInfo *cube_info,
const DoublePixelPacket *pixel,size_t index)
{
size_t
id;
id=(size_t) (((ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampPixel(GetPixelRed(pixel))) >> index) &
0x01) | ((ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampPixel(GetPixelGreen(pixel))) >> index) &
0x01) << 1 | ((ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampPixel(GetPixelBlue(pixel))) >>
index) & 0x01) << 2);
if (cube_info->associate_alpha != MagickFalse)
id|=((ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampPixel(GetPixelOpacity(pixel))) >> index) &
0x1) << 3;
return(id);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/574
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 62,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int l2tp_ip6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *lsa = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *) uaddr;
struct sockaddr_in6 *usin = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) uaddr;
struct in6_addr *daddr;
int addr_type;
int rc;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)) /* Must bind first - autobinding does not work */
return -EINVAL;
if (addr_len < sizeof(*lsa))
return -EINVAL;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&usin->sin6_addr);
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)
return -EINVAL;
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
daddr = &usin->sin6_addr;
if (ipv4_is_multicast(daddr->s6_addr32[3]))
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = ip6_datagram_connect(sk, uaddr, addr_len);
lock_sock(sk);
l2tp_ip6_sk(sk)->peer_conn_id = lsa->l2tp_conn_id;
write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
hlist_del_init(&sk->sk_bind_node);
sk_add_bind_node(sk, &l2tp_ip6_bind_table);
write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
release_sock(sk);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: l2tp: fix info leak in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg()
The L2TP code for IPv6 fails to initialize the l2tp_conn_id member of
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 and therefore leaks four bytes kernel stack
in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg() in case msg_name is set.
Initialize l2tp_conn_id with 0 to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabStrip::AddMessageLoopObserver() {
if (!mouse_watcher_) {
constexpr int kTabStripAnimationVSlop = 40;
mouse_watcher_ = std::make_unique<views::MouseWatcher>(
std::make_unique<views::MouseWatcherViewHost>(
this, gfx::Insets(0, 0, kTabStripAnimationVSlop, 0)),
this);
}
mouse_watcher_->Start(GetWidget()->GetNativeWindow());
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _eXosip_is_public_address (const char *c_address)
{
return (0 != strncmp (c_address, "192.168", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "10.", 3)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.16.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.17.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.18.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.19.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.20.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.21.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.22.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.23.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.24.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.25.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.26.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.27.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.28.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.29.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.30.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "172.31.", 7)
&& 0 != strncmp (c_address, "169.254", 7));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 17,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *append_path(const char *path, char *pos, const char *name)
{
int namelen;
namelen = strlen(name);
if (((pos - path) + namelen + 2) >= PATH_MAX)
return NULL;
memcpy(pos, name, namelen);
pos[namelen] = '/';
pos[namelen + 1] = '\0';
pos += namelen + 1;
return pos;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 48,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::DidInitiatePaint() {
pepper_delegate_.ViewInitiatedPaint();
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ParamTraits<gfx::Point>::Log(const gfx::Point& p, std::string* l) {
l->append(base::StringPrintf("(%d, %d)", p.x(), p.y()));
}
Commit Message: Beware of print-read inconsistency when serializing GURLs.
BUG=165622
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11576038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173583 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 117,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
enum integrity_status evm_status;
if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
return 0;
evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
(evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
return 0;
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0);
return -EPERM;
}
Commit Message: EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 55,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned long copy_shminfo_to_user(void __user *buf, struct shminfo64 *in, int version)
{
switch(version) {
case IPC_64:
return copy_to_user(buf, in, sizeof(*in));
case IPC_OLD:
{
struct shminfo out;
if(in->shmmax > INT_MAX)
out.shmmax = INT_MAX;
else
out.shmmax = (int)in->shmmax;
out.shmmin = in->shmmin;
out.shmmni = in->shmmni;
out.shmseg = in->shmseg;
out.shmall = in->shmall;
return copy_to_user(buf, &out, sizeof(out));
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 27,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit dm_exit(void)
{
int i = ARRAY_SIZE(_exits);
while (i--)
_exits[i]();
/*
* Should be empty by this point.
*/
idr_destroy(&_minor_idr);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void copy_rtnl_link_stats(struct rtnl_link_stats *a,
const struct rtnl_link_stats64 *b)
{
a->rx_packets = b->rx_packets;
a->tx_packets = b->tx_packets;
a->rx_bytes = b->rx_bytes;
a->tx_bytes = b->tx_bytes;
a->rx_errors = b->rx_errors;
a->tx_errors = b->tx_errors;
a->rx_dropped = b->rx_dropped;
a->tx_dropped = b->tx_dropped;
a->multicast = b->multicast;
a->collisions = b->collisions;
a->rx_length_errors = b->rx_length_errors;
a->rx_over_errors = b->rx_over_errors;
a->rx_crc_errors = b->rx_crc_errors;
a->rx_frame_errors = b->rx_frame_errors;
a->rx_fifo_errors = b->rx_fifo_errors;
a->rx_missed_errors = b->rx_missed_errors;
a->tx_aborted_errors = b->tx_aborted_errors;
a->tx_carrier_errors = b->tx_carrier_errors;
a->tx_fifo_errors = b->tx_fifo_errors;
a->tx_heartbeat_errors = b->tx_heartbeat_errors;
a->tx_window_errors = b->tx_window_errors;
a->rx_compressed = b->rx_compressed;
a->tx_compressed = b->tx_compressed;
a->rx_nohandler = b->rx_nohandler;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 53,116
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline HTMLLinkElement::HTMLLinkElement(Document& document,
const CreateElementFlags flags)
: HTMLElement(linkTag, document),
link_loader_(LinkLoader::Create(this)),
referrer_policy_(kReferrerPolicyDefault),
sizes_(DOMTokenList::Create(*this, HTMLNames::sizesAttr)),
rel_list_(RelList::Create(this)),
created_by_parser_(flags.IsCreatedByParser()) {}
Commit Message: Avoid crash when setting rel=stylesheet on <link> in shadow root.
Link elements in shadow roots without rel=stylesheet are currently not
added as stylesheet candidates upon insertion. This causes a crash if
rel=stylesheet is set (and then loaded) later.
R=futhark@chromium.org
Bug: 886753
Change-Id: Ia0de2c1edf43407950f973982ee1c262a909d220
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1242463
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#593907}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 143,320
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockAutocompleteHistoryManager* RecreateMockAutocompleteHistoryManager() {
MockAutocompleteHistoryManager* manager =
new MockAutocompleteHistoryManager(autofill_driver_.get(),
autofill_manager_->client());
autofill_manager_->autocomplete_history_manager_.reset(manager);
return manager;
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 155,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void freeClientArgv(client *c) {
int j;
for (j = 0; j < c->argc; j++)
decrRefCount(c->argv[j]);
c->argc = 0;
c->cmd = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 69,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NavigationPolicy GetNavigationPolicy(const WebInputEvent* current_event,
const WebWindowFeatures& features) {
bool as_popup = !features.tool_bar_visible || !features.status_bar_visible ||
!features.scrollbars_visible || !features.menu_bar_visible ||
!features.resizable;
NavigationPolicy policy =
as_popup ? kNavigationPolicyNewPopup : kNavigationPolicyNewForegroundTab;
UpdatePolicyForEvent(current_event, &policy);
return policy;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodClampUnsignedLongArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "voidMethodClampUnsignedLongArg", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
unsigned clampUnsignedLongArg = 0;
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(double, clampUnsignedLongArgNativeValue, info[0]->NumberValue());
if (!std::isnan(clampUnsignedLongArgNativeValue))
clampUnsignedLongArg = clampTo<unsigned long>(clampUnsignedLongArgNativeValue);
imp->voidMethodClampUnsignedLongArg(clampUnsignedLongArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
{
int ret;
ret = wait_on_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT,
intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (ret)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
smp_rmb();
return key->type_data.reject_error;
}
return key_validate(key);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull key handling fixes from David Howells:
"Here are two patches, the first of which at least should go upstream
immediately:
(1) Prevent a user-triggerable crash in the keyrings destructor when a
negatively instantiated keyring is garbage collected. I have also
seen this triggered for user type keys.
(2) Prevent the user from using requesting that a keyring be created
and instantiated through an upcall. Doing so is probably safe
since the keyring type ignores the arguments to its instantiation
function - but we probably shouldn't let keyrings be created in
this manner"
* 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring
KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyring
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 41,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int gdGuessBackgroundColorFromCorners(gdImagePtr im, int *color)
{
const int tl = gdImageGetPixel(im, 0, 0);
const int tr = gdImageGetPixel(im, gdImageSX(im) - 1, 0);
const int bl = gdImageGetPixel(im, 0, gdImageSY(im) -1);
const int br = gdImageGetPixel(im, gdImageSX(im) - 1, gdImageSY(im) -1);
if (tr == bl && tr == br) {
*color = tr;
return 3;
} else if (tl == bl && tl == br) {
*color = tl;
return 3;
} else if (tl == tr && tl == br) {
*color = tl;
return 3;
} else if (tl == tr && tl == bl) {
*color = tl;
return 3;
} else if (tl == tr || tl == bl || tl == br) {
*color = tl;
return 2;
} else if (tr == bl) {
*color = tr;
return 2;
} else if (br == bl) {
*color = bl;
return 2;
} else {
register int r,b,g,a;
r = (int)(0.5f + (gdImageRed(im, tl) + gdImageRed(im, tr) + gdImageRed(im, bl) + gdImageRed(im, br)) / 4);
g = (int)(0.5f + (gdImageGreen(im, tl) + gdImageGreen(im, tr) + gdImageGreen(im, bl) + gdImageGreen(im, br)) / 4);
b = (int)(0.5f + (gdImageBlue(im, tl) + gdImageBlue(im, tr) + gdImageBlue(im, bl) + gdImageBlue(im, br)) / 4);
a = (int)(0.5f + (gdImageAlpha(im, tl) + gdImageAlpha(im, tr) + gdImageAlpha(im, bl) + gdImageAlpha(im, br)) / 4);
*color = gdImageColorClosestAlpha(im, r, g, b, a);
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: fix php 72494, invalid color index not handled, can lead to crash
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 94,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long file_seek(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, long offset, int origin)
{
jas_stream_fileobj_t *fileobj = JAS_CAST(jas_stream_fileobj_t *, obj);
return lseek(fileobj->fd, offset, origin);
}
Commit Message: The memory stream interface allows for a buffer size of zero.
The case of a zero-sized buffer was not handled correctly, as it could
lead to a double free.
This problem has now been fixed (hopefully).
One might ask whether a zero-sized buffer should be allowed at all,
but this is a question for another day.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 73,200
|
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