instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void *host_from_stream_offset(QEMUFile *f,
ram_addr_t offset,
int flags)
{
static RAMBlock *block = NULL;
char id[256];
uint8_t len;
if (flags & RAM_SAVE_FLAG_CONTINUE) {
if (!block) {
error_report("Ack, bad migration stream!");
return NULL;
}
return memory_region_get_ram_ptr(block->mr) + offset;
}
len = qemu_get_byte(f);
qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)id, len);
id[len] = 0;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(block, &ram_list.blocks, next) {
if (!strncmp(id, block->idstr, sizeof(id)))
return memory_region_get_ram_ptr(block->mr) + offset;
}
error_report("Can't find block %s!", id);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 164,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dbus_g_proxy_manager_unregister (DBusGProxyManager *manager,
DBusGProxy *proxy)
{
DBusGProxyList *list;
DBusGProxyPrivate *priv = DBUS_G_PROXY_GET_PRIVATE(proxy);
char *tri;
LOCK_MANAGER (manager);
#ifndef G_DISABLE_CHECKS
if (manager->proxy_lists == NULL)
{
g_warning ("Trying to unregister a proxy but there aren't any registered");
return;
}
#endif
tri = tristring_from_proxy (proxy);
list = g_hash_table_lookup (manager->proxy_lists, tri);
#ifndef G_DISABLE_CHECKS
if (list == NULL)
{
g_warning ("Trying to unregister a proxy but it isn't registered");
return;
}
#endif
g_assert (g_slist_find (list->proxies, proxy) != NULL);
list->proxies = g_slist_remove (list->proxies, proxy);
g_assert (g_slist_find (list->proxies, proxy) == NULL);
if (!priv->for_owner)
{
if (!priv->associated)
{
GSList *link;
if (priv->name_call != 0)
{
dbus_g_proxy_cancel_call (manager->bus_proxy, priv->name_call);
priv->name_call = 0;
}
else
{
link = g_slist_find (manager->unassociated_proxies, proxy);
if (link != NULL)
{
manager->unassociated_proxies = g_slist_delete_link (
manager->unassociated_proxies, link);
}
}
}
else
{
g_assert (priv->name_call == 0);
dbus_g_proxy_manager_unmonitor_name_owner (manager, priv->name);
}
}
if (list->proxies == NULL)
{
char *rule;
g_hash_table_remove (manager->proxy_lists,
tri);
rule = g_proxy_get_signal_match_rule (proxy);
dbus_bus_remove_match (manager->connection,
rule, NULL);
g_free (rule);
if (priv->name)
{
guint *refcount;
refcount = g_hash_table_lookup (manager->owner_match_rules, priv->name);
(*refcount)--;
if (*refcount == 0)
{
rule = get_owner_match_rule (priv->name);
dbus_bus_remove_match (manager->connection,
rule, NULL);
g_free (rule);
g_hash_table_remove (manager->owner_match_rules, priv->name);
}
}
}
if (g_hash_table_size (manager->proxy_lists) == 0)
{
g_hash_table_destroy (manager->proxy_lists);
manager->proxy_lists = NULL;
}
if (manager->owner_match_rules != NULL &&
g_hash_table_size (manager->owner_match_rules) == 0)
{
g_hash_table_destroy (manager->owner_match_rules);
manager->owner_match_rules = NULL;
}
g_free (tri);
UNLOCK_MANAGER (manager);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __cpuinit memcg_cpu_hotplug_callback(struct notifier_block *nb,
unsigned long action,
void *hcpu)
{
int cpu = (unsigned long)hcpu;
struct memcg_stock_pcp *stock;
struct mem_cgroup *iter;
if ((action == CPU_ONLINE)) {
for_each_mem_cgroup(iter)
synchronize_mem_cgroup_on_move(iter, cpu);
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
if ((action != CPU_DEAD) || action != CPU_DEAD_FROZEN)
return NOTIFY_OK;
for_each_mem_cgroup(iter)
mem_cgroup_drain_pcp_counter(iter, cpu);
stock = &per_cpu(memcg_stock, cpu);
drain_stock(stock);
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType RenderX11(Image *image,const DrawInfo *draw_info,
const PointInfo *offset,TypeMetric *metrics,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
if (annotate_semaphore == (SemaphoreInfo *) NULL)
ActivateSemaphoreInfo(&annotate_semaphore);
LockSemaphoreInfo(annotate_semaphore);
status=XRenderImage(image,draw_info,offset,metrics,exception);
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(annotate_semaphore);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1589
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 88,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline const KURL& Location::Url() const {
const KURL& url = GetDocument()->Url();
if (!url.IsValid()) {
return BlankURL();
}
return url;
}
Commit Message: Check the source browsing context's CSP in Location::SetLocation prior to dispatching a navigation to a `javascript:` URL.
Makes `javascript:` navigations via window.location.href compliant with
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate, which states that the source
browsing context must be checked (rather than the current browsing
context).
Bug: 909865
Change-Id: Id6aef6eef56865e164816c67eb9fe07ea1cb1b4e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1359823
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrew Comminos <acomminos@fb.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#614451}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool HasAccessorsImpl(JSObject* holder,
FixedArrayBase* backing_store) {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int* jsArrayToIntArray(v8::Handle<v8::Array> array, uint32_t len)
{
int* data = 0;
if (len > std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max() / sizeof(int)
|| !tryFastMalloc(len * sizeof(int)).getValue(data))
return 0;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> val = array->Get(i);
bool ok;
int ival = toInt32(val, ok);
if (!ok) {
fastFree(data);
return 0;
}
data[i] = ival;
}
return data;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void XPathNSResolverMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8SetReturnValue(info, impl->xPathNSResolverMethod());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ib_uverbs_cq_event_handler(struct ib_event *event, void *context_ptr)
{
struct ib_ucq_object *uobj = container_of(event->element.cq->uobject,
struct ib_ucq_object, uobject);
ib_uverbs_async_handler(uobj->uobject.ufile, uobj->uobject.user_handle,
event->event, &uobj->async_list,
&uobj->async_events_reported);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction TabsDiscardFunction::Run() {
std::unique_ptr<tabs::Discard::Params> params(
tabs::Discard::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params);
WebContents* contents = nullptr;
if (params->tab_id) {
int tab_id = *params->tab_id;
std::string error;
if (!GetTabById(tab_id, browser_context(), include_incognito(), nullptr,
nullptr, &contents, nullptr, &error)) {
return RespondNow(Error(error));
}
}
contents =
g_browser_process->GetTabManager()->DiscardTabByExtension(contents);
if (contents) {
return RespondNow(ArgumentList(
tabs::Discard::Results::Create(*ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabObject(
contents, ExtensionTabUtil::kScrubTab, extension()))));
}
return RespondNow(Error(
params->tab_id
? ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(keys::kCannotDiscardTab,
base::IntToString(*params->tab_id))
: keys::kCannotFindTabToDiscard));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JPEGImageDecoder::~JPEGImageDecoder()
{
}
Commit Message: Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
R=pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void var_push(php_unserialize_data_t *var_hashx, zval **rval)
{
var_entries *var_hash = (*var_hashx)->last;
#if VAR_ENTRIES_DBG
fprintf(stderr, "var_push(%ld): %d\n", var_hash?var_hash->used_slots:-1L, Z_TYPE_PP(rval));
#endif
if (!var_hash || var_hash->used_slots == VAR_ENTRIES_MAX) {
var_hash = emalloc(sizeof(var_entries));
var_hash->used_slots = 0;
var_hash->next = 0;
if (!(*var_hashx)->first) {
(*var_hashx)->first = var_hash;
} else {
((var_entries *) (*var_hashx)->last)->next = var_hash;
}
(*var_hashx)->last = var_hash;
}
var_hash->data[var_hash->used_slots++] = *rval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void drop_privileges(char *username) {
struct passwd *user = (struct passwd *) getpwnam(username);
if (user == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Failed dropping privileges. The user %s is not a valid username on local system.\n"), username);
exit(1);
}
if (getuid() == 0) {
/* process is running as root, drop privileges */
if (setgid(user->pw_gid) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, _("setgid: Error dropping group privileges\n"));
exit(1);
}
if (setuid(user->pw_uid) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, _("setuid: Error dropping user privileges\n"));
exit(1);
}
/* Verify if the privileges were developed. */
if (setuid(0) != -1) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Failed to drop privileges\n"));
exit(1);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pty_line_name(struct tty_driver *driver, int index, char *p)
{
int i = index + driver->name_base;
/* ->name is initialized to "ttyp", but "tty" is expected */
sprintf(p, "%s%c%x",
driver->subtype == PTY_TYPE_SLAVE ? "tty" : driver->name,
ptychar[i >> 4 & 0xf], i & 0xf);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __always_inline u32 vmcs_read32(unsigned long field)
{
vmcs_check32(field);
if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
return evmcs_read32(field);
return __vmcs_readl(field);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 81,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int khugepaged_scan_mm_slot(unsigned int pages,
struct page **hpage)
{
struct mm_slot *mm_slot;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int progress = 0;
VM_BUG_ON(!pages);
VM_BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(&khugepaged_mm_lock));
if (khugepaged_scan.mm_slot)
mm_slot = khugepaged_scan.mm_slot;
else {
mm_slot = list_entry(khugepaged_scan.mm_head.next,
struct mm_slot, mm_node);
khugepaged_scan.address = 0;
khugepaged_scan.mm_slot = mm_slot;
}
spin_unlock(&khugepaged_mm_lock);
mm = mm_slot->mm;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (unlikely(khugepaged_test_exit(mm)))
vma = NULL;
else
vma = find_vma(mm, khugepaged_scan.address);
progress++;
for (; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
unsigned long hstart, hend;
cond_resched();
if (unlikely(khugepaged_test_exit(mm))) {
progress++;
break;
}
if ((!(vma->vm_flags & VM_HUGEPAGE) &&
!khugepaged_always()) ||
(vma->vm_flags & VM_NOHUGEPAGE)) {
skip:
progress++;
continue;
}
/* VM_PFNMAP vmas may have vm_ops null but vm_file set */
if (!vma->anon_vma || vma->vm_ops || vma->vm_file)
goto skip;
if (is_vma_temporary_stack(vma))
goto skip;
VM_BUG_ON(is_linear_pfn_mapping(vma) || is_pfn_mapping(vma));
hstart = (vma->vm_start + ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK) & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
hend = vma->vm_end & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
if (hstart >= hend)
goto skip;
if (khugepaged_scan.address > hend)
goto skip;
if (khugepaged_scan.address < hstart)
khugepaged_scan.address = hstart;
VM_BUG_ON(khugepaged_scan.address & ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK);
while (khugepaged_scan.address < hend) {
int ret;
cond_resched();
if (unlikely(khugepaged_test_exit(mm)))
goto breakouterloop;
VM_BUG_ON(khugepaged_scan.address < hstart ||
khugepaged_scan.address + HPAGE_PMD_SIZE >
hend);
ret = khugepaged_scan_pmd(mm, vma,
khugepaged_scan.address,
hpage);
/* move to next address */
khugepaged_scan.address += HPAGE_PMD_SIZE;
progress += HPAGE_PMD_NR;
if (ret)
/* we released mmap_sem so break loop */
goto breakouterloop_mmap_sem;
if (progress >= pages)
goto breakouterloop;
}
}
breakouterloop:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); /* exit_mmap will destroy ptes after this */
breakouterloop_mmap_sem:
spin_lock(&khugepaged_mm_lock);
VM_BUG_ON(khugepaged_scan.mm_slot != mm_slot);
/*
* Release the current mm_slot if this mm is about to die, or
* if we scanned all vmas of this mm.
*/
if (khugepaged_test_exit(mm) || !vma) {
/*
* Make sure that if mm_users is reaching zero while
* khugepaged runs here, khugepaged_exit will find
* mm_slot not pointing to the exiting mm.
*/
if (mm_slot->mm_node.next != &khugepaged_scan.mm_head) {
khugepaged_scan.mm_slot = list_entry(
mm_slot->mm_node.next,
struct mm_slot, mm_node);
khugepaged_scan.address = 0;
} else {
khugepaged_scan.mm_slot = NULL;
khugepaged_full_scans++;
}
collect_mm_slot(mm_slot);
}
return progress;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <bugs@casparzhang.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 166,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestLoadTimingReused(const net::LoadTimingInfo& load_timing_info) {
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.socket_reused);
EXPECT_NE(net::NetLog::Source::kInvalidId, load_timing_info.socket_log_id);
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.proxy_resolve_start.is_null());
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.proxy_resolve_end.is_null());
net::ExpectConnectTimingHasNoTimes(load_timing_info.connect_timing);
EXPECT_FALSE(load_timing_info.send_start.is_null());
EXPECT_LE(load_timing_info.send_start, load_timing_info.send_end);
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.request_start_time.is_null());
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.request_start.is_null());
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.receive_headers_end.is_null());
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sd_resume(struct device *dev)
{
struct scsi_disk *sdkp = scsi_disk_get_from_dev(dev);
int ret = 0;
if (!sdkp->device->manage_start_stop)
goto done;
sd_printk(KERN_NOTICE, sdkp, "Starting disk\n");
ret = sd_start_stop_device(sdkp, 1);
done:
scsi_disk_put(sdkp);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 94,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuChannel::CreateViewCommandBuffer(
const gfx::GLSurfaceHandle& window,
int32 surface_id,
const GPUCreateCommandBufferConfig& init_params,
int32* route_id) {
*route_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
content::GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(init_params.active_url);
#if defined(ENABLE_GPU)
WillCreateCommandBuffer(init_params.gpu_preference);
GpuCommandBufferStub* share_group = stubs_.Lookup(init_params.share_group_id);
*route_id = GenerateRouteID();
scoped_ptr<GpuCommandBufferStub> stub(new GpuCommandBufferStub(
this,
share_group,
window,
gfx::Size(),
disallowed_features_,
init_params.allowed_extensions,
init_params.attribs,
init_params.gpu_preference,
*route_id,
surface_id,
watchdog_,
software_));
router_.AddRoute(*route_id, stub.get());
stubs_.AddWithID(stub.release(), *route_id);
#endif // ENABLE_GPU
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t stream_write_cb(RedsStream *s, const void *buf, size_t size)
{
return write(s->socket, buf, size);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool isHexadecimal(char ch) {
return ((ch>='0') && (ch<='9')) ||
((ch>='a') && (ch<='f')) ||
((ch>='A') && (ch<='F'));
}
Commit Message: Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 82,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: compute_object_path (const char *native_path)
{
const gchar *basename;
GString *s;
guint n;
g_return_val_if_fail (native_path != NULL, NULL);
basename = strrchr (native_path, '/');
if (basename != NULL)
{
basename++;
}
else
{
basename = native_path;
}
s = g_string_new ("/org/freedesktop/UDisks/devices/");
for (n = 0; basename[n] != '\0'; n++)
{
gint c = basename[n];
/* D-Bus spec sez:
*
* Each element must only contain the ASCII characters "[A-Z][a-z][0-9]_"
*/
if ((c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= '0' && c <= '9'))
{
g_string_append_c (s, c);
}
else
{
/* Escape bytes not in [A-Z][a-z][0-9] as _<hex-with-two-digits> */
g_string_append_printf (s, "_%02x", c);
}
}
return g_string_free (s, FALSE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_pcomp_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_comp rpcomp;
snprintf(rpcomp.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "pcomp");
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_COMPRESS,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_comp), &rpcomp))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 1 | 166,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_opnum_in_range(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_op *op)
{
if (op->opnum < FIRST_NFS4_OP)
return false;
else if (argp->minorversion == 0 && op->opnum > LAST_NFS40_OP)
return false;
else if (argp->minorversion == 1 && op->opnum > LAST_NFS41_OP)
return false;
else if (argp->minorversion == 2 && op->opnum > LAST_NFS42_OP)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,840 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLES2DecoderRGBBackbufferTest() { }
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const RendererCapabilities& LayerTreeHost::GetRendererCapabilities() const {
return proxy_->GetRendererCapabilities();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,971 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_nr_threads(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
unsigned long flags;
int count = 0;
if (lock_task_sighand(tsk, &flags)) {
count = atomic_read(&tsk->signal->count);
unlock_task_sighand(tsk, &flags);
}
return count;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && kvm_x86_ops->check_nested_events)
kvm_x86_ops->check_nested_events(vcpu, false);
return (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE &&
!vcpu->arch.apf.halted)
|| !list_empty_careful(&vcpu->async_pf.done)
|| kvm_apic_has_events(vcpu)
|| vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted
|| atomic_read(&vcpu->arch.nmi_queued) ||
(kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(vcpu) &&
kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(vcpu));
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 35,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void unload_nls(struct nls_table *nls)
{
if (nls)
module_put(nls->owner);
}
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 33,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int convert_context(u32 key,
struct context *c,
void *p)
{
struct convert_context_args *args;
struct context oldc;
struct ocontext *oc;
struct mls_range *range;
struct role_datum *role;
struct type_datum *typdatum;
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
char *s;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
if (key <= SECINITSID_NUM)
goto out;
args = p;
if (c->str) {
struct context ctx;
rc = -ENOMEM;
s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!s)
goto out;
rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
kfree(s);
if (!rc) {
printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
c->str);
/* Replace string with mapped representation. */
kfree(c->str);
memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
goto out;
} else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
/* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
rc = 0;
goto out;
} else {
/* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
c->str, -rc);
goto out;
}
}
rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
if (rc)
goto out;
/* Convert the user. */
rc = -EINVAL;
usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, c->user - 1));
if (!usrdatum)
goto bad;
c->user = usrdatum->value;
/* Convert the role. */
rc = -EINVAL;
role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, c->role - 1));
if (!role)
goto bad;
c->role = role->value;
/* Convert the type. */
rc = -EINVAL;
typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, c->type - 1));
if (!typdatum)
goto bad;
c->type = typdatum->value;
/* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
if (rc)
goto bad;
} else if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && !args->newp->mls_enabled) {
/*
* Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
* free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
* context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
*/
mls_context_destroy(c);
} else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
/*
* Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
* ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
* existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
* suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
* initial SIDs.
*/
oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
oc = oc->next;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!oc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to look up"
" the initial SIDs list\n");
goto bad;
}
range = &oc->context[0].range;
rc = mls_range_set(c, range);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
/* Check the validity of the new context. */
if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
context_destroy(&oldc);
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
bad:
/* Map old representation to string and save it. */
rc = context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
if (rc)
return rc;
context_destroy(&oldc);
context_destroy(c);
c->str = s;
c->len = len;
printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
c->str);
rc = 0;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t disableAsyncBuffer() {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferConsumer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
status_t result = remote()->transact(DISABLE_ASYNC_BUFFER, data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 160,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LogLuvSetupEncode(TIFF* tif)
{
static const char module[] = "LogLuvSetupEncode";
LogLuvState* sp = EncoderState(tif);
TIFFDirectory* td = &tif->tif_dir;
switch (td->td_photometric) {
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV:
if (!LogLuvInitState(tif))
break;
if (td->td_compression == COMPRESSION_SGILOG24) {
tif->tif_encoderow = LogLuvEncode24;
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case SGILOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
sp->tfunc = Luv24fromXYZ;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
sp->tfunc = Luv24fromLuv48;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_RAW:
break;
default:
goto notsupported;
}
} else {
tif->tif_encoderow = LogLuvEncode32;
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case SGILOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
sp->tfunc = Luv32fromXYZ;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
sp->tfunc = Luv32fromLuv48;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_RAW:
break;
default:
goto notsupported;
}
}
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL:
if (!LogL16InitState(tif))
break;
tif->tif_encoderow = LogL16Encode;
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case SGILOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
sp->tfunc = L16fromY;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
break;
default:
goto notsupported;
}
break;
default:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Inappropriate photometric interpretation %d for SGILog compression; %s",
td->td_photometric, "must be either LogLUV or LogL");
break;
}
return (1);
notsupported:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"SGILog compression supported only for %s, or raw data",
td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL ? "Y, L" : "XYZ, Luv");
return (0);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 168,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnRequestResource(
int routing_id,
int request_id,
const ResourceHostMsg_Request& request_data) {
tracked_objects::ScopedTracker tracking_profile(
FROM_HERE_WITH_EXPLICIT_FUNCTION(
"477117 ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnRequestResource"));
if (request_data.resource_type == RESOURCE_TYPE_MAIN_FRAME &&
request_data.transferred_request_request_id == -1 &&
!IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled()) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&LogResourceRequestTimeOnUI,
TimeTicks::Now(),
filter_->child_id(),
request_data.render_frame_id,
request_data.url));
}
BeginRequest(request_id, request_data, NULL, routing_id);
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 132,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nvmet_fc_free_fcp_iod(struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue *queue,
struct nvmet_fc_fcp_iod *fod)
{
struct nvmefc_tgt_fcp_req *fcpreq = fod->fcpreq;
struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport = fod->tgtport;
struct nvmet_fc_defer_fcp_req *deferfcp;
unsigned long flags;
fc_dma_sync_single_for_cpu(tgtport->dev, fod->rspdma,
sizeof(fod->rspiubuf), DMA_TO_DEVICE);
fcpreq->nvmet_fc_private = NULL;
fod->active = false;
fod->abort = false;
fod->aborted = false;
fod->writedataactive = false;
fod->fcpreq = NULL;
tgtport->ops->fcp_req_release(&tgtport->fc_target_port, fcpreq);
spin_lock_irqsave(&queue->qlock, flags);
deferfcp = list_first_entry_or_null(&queue->pending_cmd_list,
struct nvmet_fc_defer_fcp_req, req_list);
if (!deferfcp) {
list_add_tail(&fod->fcp_list, &fod->queue->fod_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->qlock, flags);
/* Release reference taken at queue lookup and fod allocation */
nvmet_fc_tgt_q_put(queue);
return;
}
/* Re-use the fod for the next pending cmd that was deferred */
list_del(&deferfcp->req_list);
fcpreq = deferfcp->fcp_req;
/* deferfcp can be reused for another IO at a later date */
list_add_tail(&deferfcp->req_list, &queue->avail_defer_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->qlock, flags);
/* Save NVME CMD IO in fod */
memcpy(&fod->cmdiubuf, fcpreq->rspaddr, fcpreq->rsplen);
/* Setup new fcpreq to be processed */
fcpreq->rspaddr = NULL;
fcpreq->rsplen = 0;
fcpreq->nvmet_fc_private = fod;
fod->fcpreq = fcpreq;
fod->active = true;
/* inform LLDD IO is now being processed */
tgtport->ops->defer_rcv(&tgtport->fc_target_port, fcpreq);
/* Submit deferred IO for processing */
nvmet_fc_queue_fcp_req(tgtport, queue, fcpreq);
/*
* Leave the queue lookup get reference taken when
* fod was originally allocated.
*/
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void EnterLayerOneSandbox(LinuxSandbox* linux_sandbox,
const bool using_layer1_sandbox,
base::Closure* post_fork_parent_callback) {
DCHECK(linux_sandbox);
ZygotePreSandboxInit();
#if !defined(THREAD_SANITIZER)
CHECK(sandbox::ThreadHelpers::IsSingleThreaded());
#endif
sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient* setuid_sandbox =
linux_sandbox->setuid_sandbox_client();
if (setuid_sandbox->IsSuidSandboxChild()) {
CHECK(EnterSuidSandbox(setuid_sandbox, post_fork_parent_callback))
<< "Failed to enter setuid sandbox";
} else if (sandbox::NamespaceSandbox::InNewUserNamespace()) {
EnterNamespaceSandbox(linux_sandbox, post_fork_parent_callback);
} else {
CHECK(!using_layer1_sandbox);
}
}
Commit Message: Serialize struct tm in a safe way.
BUG=765512
Change-Id: If235b8677eb527be2ac0fe621fc210e4116a7566
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/679441
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 150,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_FLIPPT( INS_ARG )
{
FT_UShort point;
FT_UNUSED_ARG;
if ( CUR.top < CUR.GS.loop )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Too_Few_Arguments;
return;
}
while ( CUR.GS.loop > 0 )
{
CUR.args--;
point = (FT_UShort)CUR.stack[CUR.args];
if ( BOUNDS( point, CUR.pts.n_points ) )
{
if ( CUR.pedantic_hinting )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
}
else
CUR.pts.tags[point] ^= FT_CURVE_TAG_ON;
CUR.GS.loop--;
}
CUR.GS.loop = 1;
CUR.new_top = CUR.args;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void virtio_register_types(void)
{
type_register_static(&virtio_device_info);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool IsUnknownMimeType(const std::string& mime_type) {
static const char* const kUnknownMimeTypes[] = {
"",
"unknown/unknown",
"application/unknown",
"*/*",
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kUnknownMimeTypes); ++i) {
if (mime_type == kUnknownMimeTypes[i])
return true;
}
if (mime_type.find('/') == std::string::npos) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol"
This reverts commit 3519e867dc606437f804561f889d7ed95b95876a.
Reason for revert: crbug.com/786150. Application compatibility for Android WebView applications means we need to allow sniffing on that platform.
Original change's description:
> Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol
>
> To reduce attack surface, Chrome should not MIME-sniff to text/html for
> any document delivered via the file protocol. This change only impacts
> the file protocol (documents served via HTTP/HTTPS/etc are unaffected).
>
> Bug: 777737
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
> Change-Id: I7086454356b8d2d092be9e1bca0f5ff6dd3b62c0
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/751402
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Achuith Bhandarkar <achuith@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Asanka Herath <asanka@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514372}
TBR=achuith@chromium.org,benwells@chromium.org,mmenke@chromium.org,sdefresne@chromium.org,asanka@chromium.org,elawrence@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 777737
Change-Id: I864ae060ce3277d41ea257ae75e0b80c51f3ea98
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/790790
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519347}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType IsPCD(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 2052)
return(MagickFalse);
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) magick+2048,"PCD_",4) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jpc_pi_destroy(jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
jpc_picomp_t *picomp;
int compno;
if (pi->picomps) {
for (compno = 0, picomp = pi->picomps; compno < pi->numcomps;
++compno, ++picomp) {
jpc_picomp_destroy(picomp);
}
jas_free(pi->picomps);
}
if (pi->pchglist) {
jpc_pchglist_destroy(pi->pchglist);
}
jas_free(pi);
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem in the JPC codec that later resulted
in the use of uninitialized data.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 70,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::EnqueueUniqueAnimationFrameEvent(Event* event) {
EnsureScriptedAnimationController().EnqueuePerFrameEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double RenderFrameImpl::GetZoomLevel() {
return render_view_->page_zoom_level();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::SetNotifyRepaintTask(const base::Closure& task) {
notify_repaint_task_ = task;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: follow_huge_pud(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address,
pud_t *pud, int write)
{
BUG();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
{
*is_next_epoch = 0;
/* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
if (rr->epoch == s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
return &s->rlayer.d->bitmap;
/*
* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we
* have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last
* epoch
*/
else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1) &&
s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch &&
(rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
*is_next_epoch = 1;
return &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 13,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageSetTile (gdImagePtr im, gdImagePtr tile)
{
int i;
im->tile = tile;
if ((!im->trueColor) && (!im->tile->trueColor)) {
for (i = 0; (i < gdImageColorsTotal (tile)); i++) {
int index;
index = gdImageColorResolveAlpha (im,
gdImageRed (tile, i),
gdImageGreen (tile, i),
gdImageBlue (tile, i),
gdImageAlpha (tile, i));
im->tileColorMap[i] = index;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkcs7_decrypt)
{
zval ** recipcert, ** recipkey = NULL;
X509 * cert = NULL;
EVP_PKEY * key = NULL;
long certresval, keyresval;
BIO * in = NULL, * out = NULL, * datain = NULL;
PKCS7 * p7 = NULL;
char * infilename; int infilename_len;
char * outfilename; int outfilename_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ppZ|Z", &infilename, &infilename_len,
&outfilename, &outfilename_len, &recipcert, &recipkey) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(recipcert, 0, &certresval TSRMLS_CC);
if (cert == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "unable to coerce parameter 3 to x509 cert");
goto clean_exit;
}
key = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(recipkey ? recipkey : recipcert, 0, "", 0, &keyresval TSRMLS_CC);
if (key == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "unable to get private key");
goto clean_exit;
}
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(infilename TSRMLS_CC) || php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(outfilename TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto clean_exit;
}
in = BIO_new_file(infilename, "r");
if (in == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
out = BIO_new_file(outfilename, "w");
if (out == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, &datain);
if (p7 == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
if (PKCS7_decrypt(p7, key, cert, out, PKCS7_DETACHED)) {
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
clean_exit:
PKCS7_free(p7);
BIO_free(datain);
BIO_free(in);
BIO_free(out);
if (cert && certresval == -1) {
X509_free(cert);
}
if (key && keyresval == -1) {
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 14,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_syscall(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct desc_struct cs, ss;
u64 msr_data;
u16 cs_sel, ss_sel;
u64 efer = 0;
/* syscall is not available in real mode */
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL ||
ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86)
return emulate_ud(ctxt);
if (!(em_syscall_is_enabled(ctxt)))
return emulate_ud(ctxt);
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
setup_syscalls_segments(ctxt, &cs, &ss);
if (!(efer & EFER_SCE))
return emulate_ud(ctxt);
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_STAR, &msr_data);
msr_data >>= 32;
cs_sel = (u16)(msr_data & 0xfffc);
ss_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 8);
if (efer & EFER_LMA) {
cs.d = 0;
cs.l = 1;
}
ops->set_segment(ctxt, cs_sel, &cs, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS);
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = ctxt->_eip;
if (efer & EFER_LMA) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_R11) = ctxt->eflags;
ops->get_msr(ctxt,
ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 ?
MSR_LSTAR : MSR_CSTAR, &msr_data);
ctxt->_eip = msr_data;
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, &msr_data);
ctxt->eflags &= ~msr_data;
ctxt->eflags |= EFLG_RESERVED_ONE_MASK;
#endif
} else {
/* legacy mode */
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_STAR, &msr_data);
ctxt->_eip = (u32)msr_data;
ctxt->eflags &= ~(EFLG_VM | EFLG_IF);
}
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: SYSENTER emulation is broken
SYSENTER emulation is broken in several ways:
1. It misses the case of 16-bit code segments completely (CVE-2015-0239).
2. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS is checked in 64-bit mode incorrectly (bits 0 and 1 can
still be set without causing #GP).
3. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP and MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP are not masked in
legacy-mode.
4. There is some unneeded code.
Fix it.
Cc: stable@vger.linux.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 45,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_eat_data_fast_4_4(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
int error;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
SCTP_NULL());
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_data_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
error = sctp_eat_data(asoc, chunk, commands);
switch (error) {
case SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR:
case SCTP_IERROR_HIGH_TSN:
case SCTP_IERROR_DUP_TSN:
case SCTP_IERROR_IGNORE_TSN:
case SCTP_IERROR_BAD_STREAM:
break;
case SCTP_IERROR_NO_DATA:
goto consume;
case SCTP_IERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION:
return sctp_sf_abort_violation(net, ep, asoc, chunk, commands,
(u8 *)chunk->subh.data_hdr, sizeof(sctp_datahdr_t));
default:
BUG();
}
/* Go a head and force a SACK, since we are shutting down. */
/* Implementor's Guide.
*
* While in SHUTDOWN-SENT state, the SHUTDOWN sender MUST immediately
* respond to each received packet containing one or more DATA chunk(s)
* with a SACK, a SHUTDOWN chunk, and restart the T2-shutdown timer
*/
if (chunk->end_of_packet) {
/* We must delay the chunk creation since the cumulative
* TSN has not been updated yet.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_GEN_SHUTDOWN, SCTP_NULL());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_GEN_SACK, SCTP_FORCE());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_RESTART,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T2_SHUTDOWN));
}
consume:
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void claim_allocations(int cpu, struct sched_domain *sd)
{
struct sd_data *sdd = sd->private;
WARN_ON_ONCE(*per_cpu_ptr(sdd->sd, cpu) != sd);
*per_cpu_ptr(sdd->sd, cpu) = NULL;
if (atomic_read(&(*per_cpu_ptr(sdd->sg, cpu))->ref))
*per_cpu_ptr(sdd->sg, cpu) = NULL;
if (atomic_read(&(*per_cpu_ptr(sdd->sgc, cpu))->ref))
*per_cpu_ptr(sdd->sgc, cpu) = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormElement::setDemoted(bool demoted)
{
if (demoted)
UseCounter::count(&document(), UseCounter::DemotedFormElement);
m_wasDemoted = demoted;
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash in HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission.
BUG=297478
TEST=automated with ASAN.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24910003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158428 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t IPCThreadState::talkWithDriver(bool doReceive)
{
if (mProcess->mDriverFD <= 0) {
return -EBADF;
}
binder_write_read bwr;
const bool needRead = mIn.dataPosition() >= mIn.dataSize();
const size_t outAvail = (!doReceive || needRead) ? mOut.dataSize() : 0;
bwr.write_size = outAvail;
bwr.write_buffer = (uintptr_t)mOut.data();
if (doReceive && needRead) {
bwr.read_size = mIn.dataCapacity();
bwr.read_buffer = (uintptr_t)mIn.data();
} else {
bwr.read_size = 0;
bwr.read_buffer = 0;
}
IF_LOG_COMMANDS() {
TextOutput::Bundle _b(alog);
if (outAvail != 0) {
alog << "Sending commands to driver: " << indent;
const void* cmds = (const void*)bwr.write_buffer;
const void* end = ((const uint8_t*)cmds)+bwr.write_size;
alog << HexDump(cmds, bwr.write_size) << endl;
while (cmds < end) cmds = printCommand(alog, cmds);
alog << dedent;
}
alog << "Size of receive buffer: " << bwr.read_size
<< ", needRead: " << needRead << ", doReceive: " << doReceive << endl;
}
if ((bwr.write_size == 0) && (bwr.read_size == 0)) return NO_ERROR;
bwr.write_consumed = 0;
bwr.read_consumed = 0;
status_t err;
do {
IF_LOG_COMMANDS() {
alog << "About to read/write, write size = " << mOut.dataSize() << endl;
}
#if defined(HAVE_ANDROID_OS)
if (ioctl(mProcess->mDriverFD, BINDER_WRITE_READ, &bwr) >= 0)
err = NO_ERROR;
else
err = -errno;
#else
err = INVALID_OPERATION;
#endif
if (mProcess->mDriverFD <= 0) {
err = -EBADF;
}
IF_LOG_COMMANDS() {
alog << "Finished read/write, write size = " << mOut.dataSize() << endl;
}
} while (err == -EINTR);
IF_LOG_COMMANDS() {
alog << "Our err: " << (void*)(intptr_t)err << ", write consumed: "
<< bwr.write_consumed << " (of " << mOut.dataSize()
<< "), read consumed: " << bwr.read_consumed << endl;
}
if (err >= NO_ERROR) {
if (bwr.write_consumed > 0) {
if (bwr.write_consumed < mOut.dataSize())
mOut.remove(0, bwr.write_consumed);
else
mOut.setDataSize(0);
}
if (bwr.read_consumed > 0) {
mIn.setDataSize(bwr.read_consumed);
mIn.setDataPosition(0);
}
IF_LOG_COMMANDS() {
TextOutput::Bundle _b(alog);
alog << "Remaining data size: " << mOut.dataSize() << endl;
alog << "Received commands from driver: " << indent;
const void* cmds = mIn.data();
const void* end = mIn.data() + mIn.dataSize();
alog << HexDump(cmds, mIn.dataSize()) << endl;
while (cmds < end) cmds = printReturnCommand(alog, cmds);
alog << dedent;
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #27252896: Security Vulnerability -- weak binder
Sending transaction to freed BBinder through weak handle
can cause use of a (mostly) freed object. We need to try to
safely promote to a strong reference first.
Change-Id: Ic9c6940fa824980472e94ed2dfeca52a6b0fd342
(cherry picked from commit c11146106f94e07016e8e26e4f8628f9a0c73199)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cdio_is_device_quiet_generic(const char *source_name)
{
struct stat buf;
if (0 != stat(source_name, &buf)) {
return false;
}
return (S_ISBLK(buf.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(buf.st_mode));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 16,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_sigreturn_64_address(unsigned long nip, unsigned long fp)
{
if (nip == fp + offsetof(struct signal_frame_64, tramp))
return 1;
if (vdso64_rt_sigtramp && current->mm->context.vdso_base &&
nip == current->mm->context.vdso_base + vdso64_rt_sigtramp)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/perf: Cap 64bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
We cap 32bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
(currently 127), but we forgot to do the same for 64bit backtraces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const cc::TransformNode& GetTransformNode(const cc::Layer* layer) {
return *GetPropertyTrees().transform_tree.Node(
layer->transform_tree_index());
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *parse_hier(struct parse_state *state)
{
if (*state->ptr == '/') {
if (state->end - state->ptr > 1) {
if (*(state->ptr + 1) == '/') {
state->ptr += 2;
if (!(state->ptr = parse_authority(state))) {
return NULL;
}
}
}
}
return parse_path(state);
}
Commit Message: fix bug #71719 (Buffer overflow in HTTP url parsing functions)
The parser's offset was not reset when we softfail in scheme
parsing and continue to parse a path.
Thanks to hlt99 at blinkenshell dot org for the report.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_contents(struct inode *ecryptfs_inode,
char *virt, size_t virt_len)
{
int rc;
rc = ecryptfs_write_lower(ecryptfs_inode, virt,
0, virt_len);
if (rc < 0)
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error attempting to write header "
"information to lower file; rc = [%d]\n", __func__, rc);
else
rc = 0;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 45,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_translatef(struct iw_context *ctx, unsigned int flags,
char *dst, size_t dstlen, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
iw_translatev(ctx,flags,dst,dstlen,fmt,ap);
va_end(ap);
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 65,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spannable_string_t* InputHandler::selectedText(int32_t flags)
{
if (!isActiveTextEdit())
return 0;
return spannableTextInRange(selectionStart(), selectionEnd(), flags);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t LargeObjectPage::objectPayloadSizeForTesting() {
markAsSwept();
return payloadSize();
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 147,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ff_set_dimensions(AVCodecContext *s, int width, int height)
{
int ret = av_image_check_size2(width, height, s->max_pixels, AV_PIX_FMT_NONE, 0, s);
if (ret < 0)
width = height = 0;
s->coded_width = width;
s->coded_height = height;
s->width = AV_CEIL_RSHIFT(width, s->lowres);
s->height = AV_CEIL_RSHIFT(height, s->lowres);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 67,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_wfree(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
struct sock *sk;
/* Get the saved chunk pointer. */
chunk = *((struct sctp_chunk **)(skb->cb));
asoc = chunk->asoc;
sk = asoc->base.sk;
asoc->sndbuf_used -= SCTP_DATA_SNDSIZE(chunk) +
sizeof(struct sk_buff) +
sizeof(struct sctp_chunk);
atomic_sub(sizeof(struct sctp_chunk), &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
sock_wfree(skb);
__sctp_write_space(asoc);
sctp_association_put(asoc);
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 35,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void to_rdma_ah_attr(struct mlx5_ib_dev *ibdev,
struct rdma_ah_attr *ah_attr,
struct mlx5_qp_path *path)
{
memset(ah_attr, 0, sizeof(*ah_attr));
if (!path->port || path->port > ibdev->num_ports)
return;
ah_attr->type = rdma_ah_find_type(&ibdev->ib_dev, path->port);
rdma_ah_set_port_num(ah_attr, path->port);
rdma_ah_set_sl(ah_attr, path->dci_cfi_prio_sl & 0xf);
rdma_ah_set_dlid(ah_attr, be16_to_cpu(path->rlid));
rdma_ah_set_path_bits(ah_attr, path->grh_mlid & 0x7f);
rdma_ah_set_static_rate(ah_attr,
path->static_rate ? path->static_rate - 5 : 0);
if (path->grh_mlid & (1 << 7)) {
u32 tc_fl = be32_to_cpu(path->tclass_flowlabel);
rdma_ah_set_grh(ah_attr, NULL,
tc_fl & 0xfffff,
path->mgid_index,
path->hop_limit,
(tc_fl >> 20) & 0xff);
rdma_ah_set_dgid_raw(ah_attr, path->rgid);
}
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::SimulateAttrib0(GLuint max_vertex_accessed) {
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2)
return false;
const VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_.GetVertexAttribInfo(0);
bool attrib_0_used = current_program_->GetAttribInfoByLocation(0) != NULL;
if (info->enabled() && attrib_0_used) {
return false;
}
typedef VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo::Vec4 Vec4;
glBindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, attrib_0_buffer_id_);
GLsizei num_vertices = max_vertex_accessed + 1;
GLsizei size_needed = num_vertices * sizeof(Vec4); // NOLINT
if (size_needed > attrib_0_size_) {
glBufferData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, size_needed, NULL, GL_DYNAMIC_DRAW);
attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ = false;
}
if (attrib_0_used &&
(!attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ ||
(info->value().v[0] != attrib_0_value_.v[0] ||
info->value().v[1] != attrib_0_value_.v[1] ||
info->value().v[2] != attrib_0_value_.v[2] ||
info->value().v[3] != attrib_0_value_.v[3]))) {
std::vector<Vec4> temp(num_vertices, info->value());
glBufferSubData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0, size_needed, &temp[0].v[0]);
attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ = true;
attrib_0_value_ = info->value();
attrib_0_size_ = size_needed;
}
glVertexAttribPointer(0, 4, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0, NULL);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void megasas_encode_lba(uint8_t *cdb, uint64_t lba,
uint32_t len, bool is_write)
{
memset(cdb, 0x0, 16);
if (is_write) {
cdb[0] = WRITE_16;
} else {
cdb[0] = READ_16;
}
cdb[2] = (lba >> 56) & 0xff;
cdb[3] = (lba >> 48) & 0xff;
cdb[4] = (lba >> 40) & 0xff;
cdb[5] = (lba >> 32) & 0xff;
cdb[6] = (lba >> 24) & 0xff;
cdb[7] = (lba >> 16) & 0xff;
cdb[8] = (lba >> 8) & 0xff;
cdb[9] = (lba) & 0xff;
cdb[10] = (len >> 24) & 0xff;
cdb[11] = (len >> 16) & 0xff;
cdb[12] = (len >> 8) & 0xff;
cdb[13] = (len) & 0xff;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pmcraid_set_timestamp(struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd)
{
struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance = cmd->drv_inst;
struct pmcraid_ioarcb *ioarcb = &cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb;
__be32 time_stamp_len = cpu_to_be32(PMCRAID_TIMESTAMP_LEN);
struct pmcraid_ioadl_desc *ioadl = ioarcb->add_data.u.ioadl;
struct timeval tv;
__le64 timestamp;
do_gettimeofday(&tv);
timestamp = tv.tv_sec * 1000;
pinstance->timestamp_data->timestamp[0] = (__u8)(timestamp);
pinstance->timestamp_data->timestamp[1] = (__u8)((timestamp) >> 8);
pinstance->timestamp_data->timestamp[2] = (__u8)((timestamp) >> 16);
pinstance->timestamp_data->timestamp[3] = (__u8)((timestamp) >> 24);
pinstance->timestamp_data->timestamp[4] = (__u8)((timestamp) >> 32);
pinstance->timestamp_data->timestamp[5] = (__u8)((timestamp) >> 40);
pmcraid_reinit_cmdblk(cmd);
ioarcb->request_type = REQ_TYPE_SCSI;
ioarcb->resource_handle = cpu_to_le32(PMCRAID_IOA_RES_HANDLE);
ioarcb->cdb[0] = PMCRAID_SCSI_SET_TIMESTAMP;
ioarcb->cdb[1] = PMCRAID_SCSI_SERVICE_ACTION;
memcpy(&(ioarcb->cdb[6]), &time_stamp_len, sizeof(time_stamp_len));
ioarcb->ioadl_bus_addr = cpu_to_le64((cmd->ioa_cb_bus_addr) +
offsetof(struct pmcraid_ioarcb,
add_data.u.ioadl[0]));
ioarcb->ioadl_length = cpu_to_le32(sizeof(struct pmcraid_ioadl_desc));
ioarcb->ioarcb_bus_addr &= ~(0x1FULL);
ioarcb->request_flags0 |= NO_LINK_DESCS;
ioarcb->request_flags0 |= TRANSFER_DIR_WRITE;
ioarcb->data_transfer_length =
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(struct pmcraid_timestamp_data));
ioadl = &(ioarcb->add_data.u.ioadl[0]);
ioadl->flags = IOADL_FLAGS_LAST_DESC;
ioadl->address = cpu_to_le64(pinstance->timestamp_data_baddr);
ioadl->data_len = cpu_to_le32(sizeof(struct pmcraid_timestamp_data));
if (!pinstance->timestamp_error) {
pinstance->timestamp_error = 0;
pmcraid_send_cmd(cmd, pmcraid_set_supported_devs,
PMCRAID_INTERNAL_TIMEOUT, pmcraid_timeout_handler);
} else {
pmcraid_send_cmd(cmd, pmcraid_return_cmd,
PMCRAID_INTERNAL_TIMEOUT, pmcraid_timeout_handler);
return;
}
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int airspy_enum_freq_bands(struct file *file, void *priv,
struct v4l2_frequency_band *band)
{
int ret;
if (band->tuner == 0) {
if (band->index >= ARRAY_SIZE(bands)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
} else {
*band = bands[band->index];
ret = 0;
}
} else if (band->tuner == 1) {
if (band->index >= ARRAY_SIZE(bands_rf)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
} else {
*band = bands_rf[band->index];
ret = 0;
}
} else {
ret = -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: media: fix airspy usb probe error path
Fix a memory leak on probe error of the airspy usb device driver.
The problem is triggered when more than 64 usb devices register with
v4l2 of type VFL_TYPE_SDR or VFL_TYPE_SUBDEV.
The memory leak is caused by the probe function of the airspy driver
mishandeling errors and not freeing the corresponding control structures
when an error occours registering the device to v4l2 core.
A badusb device can emulate 64 of these devices, and then through
continual emulated connect/disconnect of the 65th device, cause the
kernel to run out of RAM and crash the kernel, thus causing a local DOS
vulnerability.
Fixes CVE-2016-5400
Signed-off-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_zip_entry_compressionmethod)
{
php_zip_entry_get_info(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 3);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 51,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int skb_append_datato_frags(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
int (*getfrag)(void *from, char *to, int offset,
int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length)
{
int frg_cnt = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
int copy;
int offset = 0;
int ret;
struct page_frag *pfrag = ¤t->task_frag;
do {
/* Return error if we don't have space for new frag */
if (frg_cnt >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (!sk_page_frag_refill(sk, pfrag))
return -ENOMEM;
/* copy the user data to page */
copy = min_t(int, length, pfrag->size - pfrag->offset);
ret = getfrag(from, page_address(pfrag->page) + pfrag->offset,
offset, copy, 0, skb);
if (ret < 0)
return -EFAULT;
/* copy was successful so update the size parameters */
skb_fill_page_desc(skb, frg_cnt, pfrag->page, pfrag->offset,
copy);
frg_cnt++;
pfrag->offset += copy;
get_page(pfrag->page);
skb->truesize += copy;
atomic_add(copy, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
skb->len += copy;
skb->data_len += copy;
offset += copy;
length -= copy;
} while (length > 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 39,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ReopenDatabase() {
session_helper_.set_service(NULL);
profile()->set_session_service(NULL);
SessionService* service = new SessionService(profile());
profile()->set_session_service(service);
session_helper_.set_service(service);
}
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 99,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init crypto_pcbc_module_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_template(&crypto_pcbc_tmpl);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: config_unpeers(
config_tree *ptree
)
{
sockaddr_u peeraddr;
struct addrinfo hints;
unpeer_node * curr_unpeer;
struct peer * p;
const char * name;
int rc;
curr_unpeer = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->unpeers);
for (; curr_unpeer != NULL; curr_unpeer = curr_unpeer->link) {
/*
* Either AssocID will be zero, and we unpeer by name/
* address addr, or it is nonzero and addr NULL.
*/
if (curr_unpeer->assocID) {
p = findpeerbyassoc(curr_unpeer->assocID);
if (p != NULL) {
msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "unpeered %s",
stoa(&p->srcadr));
peer_clear(p, "GONE");
unpeer(p);
}
continue;
}
memset(&peeraddr, 0, sizeof(peeraddr));
AF(&peeraddr) = curr_unpeer->addr->type;
name = curr_unpeer->addr->address;
rc = getnetnum(name, &peeraddr, 0, t_UNK);
/* Do we have a numeric address? */
if (rc > 0) {
DPRINTF(1, ("unpeer: searching for %s\n",
stoa(&peeraddr)));
p = findexistingpeer(&peeraddr, NULL, NULL, -1);
if (p != NULL) {
msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "unpeered %s",
stoa(&peeraddr));
peer_clear(p, "GONE");
unpeer(p);
}
continue;
}
/*
* It's not a numeric IP address, it's a hostname.
* Check for associations with a matching hostname.
*/
for (p = peer_list; p != NULL; p = p->p_link)
if (p->hostname != NULL)
if (!strcasecmp(p->hostname, name))
break;
if (p != NULL) {
msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "unpeered %s", name);
peer_clear(p, "GONE");
unpeer(p);
}
/* Resolve the hostname to address(es). */
# ifdef WORKER
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = curr_unpeer->addr->type;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
getaddrinfo_sometime(name, "ntp", &hints,
INITIAL_DNS_RETRY,
&unpeer_name_resolved, NULL);
# else /* !WORKER follows */
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"hostname %s can not be used, please use IP address instead.\n",
name);
# endif
}
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::RequestScanningStart(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothScanClientAssociatedPtrInfo client_info,
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRequestLEScanOptionsPtr options,
RequestScanningStartCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothScanClientAssociatedPtr client;
client.Bind(std::move(client_info));
if (!GetAdapter()) {
if (BluetoothAdapterFactoryWrapper::Get().IsLowEnergySupported()) {
BluetoothAdapterFactoryWrapper::Get().AcquireAdapter(
this,
base::BindOnce(&WebBluetoothServiceImpl::RequestScanningStartImpl,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), std::move(client),
std::move(options), std::move(callback)));
return;
}
auto result = blink::mojom::RequestScanningStartResult::NewErrorResult(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::BLUETOOTH_LOW_ENERGY_NOT_AVAILABLE);
std::move(callback).Run(std::move(result));
return;
}
RequestScanningStartImpl(std::move(client), std::move(options),
std::move(callback), GetAdapter());
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FileTransfer::ReceiveTransferGoAhead(
Stream *s,
char const *fname,
bool downloading,
bool &go_ahead_always)
{
bool try_again = true;
int hold_code = 0;
int hold_subcode = 0;
MyString error_desc;
bool result;
int alive_interval;
int old_timeout;
const int slop_time = 20; // extra time to wait when alive_interval expires
const int min_alive_interval = 300;
alive_interval = clientSockTimeout;
if( alive_interval < min_alive_interval ) {
alive_interval = min_alive_interval;
}
old_timeout = s->timeout(alive_interval + slop_time);
result = DoReceiveTransferGoAhead(s,fname,downloading,go_ahead_always,try_again,hold_code,hold_subcode,error_desc,alive_interval);
s->timeout( old_timeout );
if( !result ) {
SaveTransferInfo(false,try_again,hold_code,hold_subcode,error_desc.Value());
if( error_desc.Length() ) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"%s\n",error_desc.Value());
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smb_sendv(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct kvec *iov, int n_vec)
{
struct smb_rqst rqst = { .rq_iov = iov,
.rq_nvec = n_vec };
return smb_send_rqst(server, &rqst);
}
Commit Message: cifs: move check for NULL socket into smb_send_rqst
Cai reported this oops:
[90701.616664] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000028
[90701.625438] IP: [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.632167] PGD fea319067 PUD 103fda4067 PMD 0
[90701.637255] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[90701.640878] Modules linked in: des_generic md4 nls_utf8 cifs dns_resolver binfmt_misc tun sg igb iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support lpc_ich pcspkr i2c_i801 i2c_core i7core_edac edac_core ioatdma dca mfd_core coretemp kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel microcode sr_mod cdrom ata_generic sd_mod pata_acpi crc_t10dif ata_piix libata megaraid_sas dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[90701.677655] CPU 10
[90701.679808] Pid: 9627, comm: ls Tainted: G W 3.7.1+ #10 QCI QSSC-S4R/QSSC-S4R
[90701.688950] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814a343e>] [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.698383] RSP: 0018:ffff88177b431bb8 EFLAGS: 00010206
[90701.704309] RAX: ffff88177b431fd8 RBX: 00007ffffffff000 RCX: ffff88177b431bec
[90701.712271] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000000
[90701.720223] RBP: ffff88177b431bc8 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000
[90701.728185] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
[90701.736147] R13: ffff88184ef92000 R14: 0000000000000023 R15: ffff88177b431c88
[90701.744109] FS: 00007fd56a1a47c0(0000) GS:ffff88105fc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[90701.753137] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[90701.759550] CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 000000104f15f000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
[90701.767512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[90701.775465] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[90701.783428] Process ls (pid: 9627, threadinfo ffff88177b430000, task ffff88185ca4cb60)
[90701.792261] Stack:
[90701.794505] 0000000000000023 ffff88177b431c50 ffff88177b431c38 ffffffffa014fcb1
[90701.802809] ffff88184ef921bc 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ffff88184ef921c0
[90701.811123] ffff88177b431c08 ffffffff815ca3d9 ffff88177b431c18 ffff880857758000
[90701.819433] Call Trace:
[90701.822183] [<ffffffffa014fcb1>] smb_send_rqst+0x71/0x1f0 [cifs]
[90701.828991] [<ffffffff815ca3d9>] ? schedule+0x29/0x70
[90701.834736] [<ffffffffa014fe6d>] smb_sendv+0x3d/0x40 [cifs]
[90701.841062] [<ffffffffa014fe96>] smb_send+0x26/0x30 [cifs]
[90701.847291] [<ffffffffa015801f>] send_nt_cancel+0x6f/0xd0 [cifs]
[90701.854102] [<ffffffffa015075e>] SendReceive+0x18e/0x360 [cifs]
[90701.860814] [<ffffffffa0134a78>] CIFSFindFirst+0x1a8/0x3f0 [cifs]
[90701.867724] [<ffffffffa013f731>] ? build_path_from_dentry+0xf1/0x260 [cifs]
[90701.875601] [<ffffffffa013f731>] ? build_path_from_dentry+0xf1/0x260 [cifs]
[90701.883477] [<ffffffffa01578e6>] cifs_query_dir_first+0x26/0x30 [cifs]
[90701.890869] [<ffffffffa015480d>] initiate_cifs_search+0xed/0x250 [cifs]
[90701.898354] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.904486] [<ffffffffa01554cb>] cifs_readdir+0x45b/0x8f0 [cifs]
[90701.911288] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.917410] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.923533] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.929657] [<ffffffff81195848>] vfs_readdir+0xb8/0xe0
[90701.935490] [<ffffffff81195b9f>] sys_getdents+0x8f/0x110
[90701.941521] [<ffffffff815d3b99>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[90701.948222] Code: 66 90 55 65 48 8b 04 25 f0 c6 00 00 48 89 e5 53 48 83 ec 08 83 fe 01 48 8b 98 48 e0 ff ff 48 c7 80 48 e0 ff ff ff ff ff ff 74 22 <48> 8b 47 28 ff 50 68 65 48 8b 14 25 f0 c6 00 00 48 89 9a 48 e0
[90701.970313] RIP [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.977125] RSP <ffff88177b431bb8>
[90701.981018] CR2: 0000000000000028
[90701.984809] ---[ end trace 24bd602971110a43 ]---
This is likely due to a race vs. a reconnection event.
The current code checks for a NULL socket in smb_send_kvec, but that's
too late. By the time that check is done, the socket will already have
been passed to kernel_setsockopt. Move the check into smb_send_rqst, so
that it's checked earlier.
In truth, this is a bit of a half-assed fix. The -ENOTSOCK error
return here looks like it could bubble back up to userspace. The locking
rules around the ssocket pointer are really unclear as well. There are
cases where the ssocket pointer is changed without holding the srv_mutex,
but I'm not clear whether there's a potential race here yet or not.
This code seems like it could benefit from some fundamental re-think of
how the socket handling should behave. Until then though, this patch
should at least fix the above oops in most cases.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.7+
Reported-and-Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 30,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean delayed_cache_free(gpointer data)
{
Cache* cache = data;
int i;
if(g_source_is_destroyed(g_main_current_source()))
return FALSE;
g_hash_table_remove( hash, cache->md5 );
/* DEBUG("menu cache freed"); */
for(i = 0; i < cache->n_files; ++i)
{
g_file_monitor_cancel( cache->mons[i] );
g_object_unref( cache->mons[i] );
}
/*
g_file_monitor_cancel(cache->cache_mon);
g_object_unref(cache->cache_mon);
*/
g_free( cache->mons );
g_free(cache->menu_name);
g_free(cache->lang_name);
g_free(cache->cache_file);
g_strfreev( cache->env );
g_strfreev( cache->files );
if( cache->delayed_reload_handler )
g_source_remove( cache->delayed_reload_handler );
g_slice_free( Cache, cache );
if(g_hash_table_size(hash) == 0)
g_main_loop_quit(main_loop);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_cdtext_generic (void *p_user_data)
{
generic_img_private_t *p_env = p_user_data;
uint8_t *p_cdtext_data = NULL;
size_t len;
if (!p_env) return NULL;
if (p_env->b_cdtext_error) return NULL;
if (NULL == p_env->cdtext) {
p_cdtext_data = read_cdtext_generic (p_env);
if (NULL != p_cdtext_data) {
len = CDIO_MMC_GET_LEN16(p_cdtext_data)-2;
p_env->cdtext = cdtext_init();
if(len <= 0 || 0 != cdtext_data_init (p_env->cdtext, &p_cdtext_data[4], len)) {
p_env->b_cdtext_error = true;
cdtext_destroy (p_env->cdtext);
free(p_env->cdtext);
p_env->cdtext = NULL;
}
}
free(p_cdtext_data);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 1 | 165,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setTimeToSampleParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mTimeToSample != NULL || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mTimeToSampleCount = U32_AT(&header[4]);
uint64_t allocSize = mTimeToSampleCount * 2 * (uint64_t)sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mTimeToSample = new uint32_t[mTimeToSampleCount * 2];
size_t size = sizeof(uint32_t) * mTimeToSampleCount * 2;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, mTimeToSample, size) < (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mTimeToSampleCount * 2; ++i) {
mTimeToSample[i] = ntohl(mTimeToSample[i]);
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow during MP4 atom processing
A few sample table related FourCC values are handled by the
setSampleToChunkParams function. An integer overflow exists within this
function. Validate that mNumSampleToChunkOffets will not cause an integer
overflow.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit c24607c29c96f939aed9e33bfa702b1dd79da4b7)
Change-Id: I49086952451b09a234d8b82669251ab9f1ef58d9
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int omninet_attach(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
/* The second bulk-out endpoint is used for writing. */
if (serial->num_bulk_out < 2) {
dev_err(&serial->interface->dev, "missing endpoints\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: omninet: fix reference leaks at open
This driver needlessly took another reference to the tty on open, a
reference which was then never released on close. This lead to not just
a leak of the tty, but also a driver reference leak that prevented the
driver from being unloaded after a port had once been opened.
Fixes: 4a90f09b20f4 ("tty: usb-serial krefs")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.28
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 66,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void perf_pmu_unregister(struct pmu *pmu)
{
int remove_device;
mutex_lock(&pmus_lock);
remove_device = pmu_bus_running;
list_del_rcu(&pmu->entry);
mutex_unlock(&pmus_lock);
/*
* We dereference the pmu list under both SRCU and regular RCU, so
* synchronize against both of those.
*/
synchronize_srcu(&pmus_srcu);
synchronize_rcu();
free_percpu(pmu->pmu_disable_count);
if (pmu->type >= PERF_TYPE_MAX)
idr_remove(&pmu_idr, pmu->type);
if (remove_device) {
if (pmu->nr_addr_filters)
device_remove_file(pmu->dev, &dev_attr_nr_addr_filters);
device_del(pmu->dev);
put_device(pmu->dev);
}
free_pmu_context(pmu);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::Initialize() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
task_sequence_ = dependency_->CreateSequence();
weak_ptr_ = weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
base::WaitableEvent event(base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::MANUAL,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::NOT_SIGNALED);
bool result = false;
auto callback = base::BindOnce(&SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::InitializeOnGpuThread,
base::Unretained(this), &event, &result);
ScheduleGpuTask(std::move(callback), std::vector<gpu::SyncToken>());
event.Wait();
return result;
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 135,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InitializePredictor() {
loading_predictor_->StartInitialization();
db_task_runner_->RunUntilIdle();
profile_->BlockUntilHistoryProcessesPendingRequests();
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FrameView::scrollbarsCanBeActive() const
{
if (m_frame->view() != this)
return false;
return !!m_frame->document();
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_cpu_hotplug(struct notifier_block *notifier, unsigned long val,
void *v)
{
int cpu = (long)v;
if (!kvm_usage_count)
return NOTIFY_OK;
val &= ~CPU_TASKS_FROZEN;
switch (val) {
case CPU_DYING:
printk(KERN_INFO "kvm: disabling virtualization on CPU%d\n",
cpu);
hardware_disable(NULL);
break;
case CPU_STARTING:
printk(KERN_INFO "kvm: enabling virtualization on CPU%d\n",
cpu);
hardware_enable(NULL);
break;
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<Range> BackwardsCharacterIterator::range() const
{
RefPtr<Range> r = m_textIterator.range();
if (!m_textIterator.atEnd()) {
if (m_textIterator.length() <= 1)
ASSERT(m_runOffset == 0);
else {
Node* n = r->startContainer();
ASSERT(n == r->endContainer());
int offset = r->endOffset() - m_runOffset;
r->setStart(n, offset - 1, ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
r->setEnd(n, offset, ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
}
}
return r.release();
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ppp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
u_int proto,ppp_header;
u_int olen = length; /* _o_riginal length */
u_int hdr_len = 0;
/*
* Here, we assume that p points to the Address and Control
* field (if they present).
*/
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
ppp_header = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
switch(ppp_header) {
case (PPP_WITHDIRECTION_IN << 8 | PPP_CONTROL):
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) ND_PRINT((ndo, "In "));
p += 2;
length -= 2;
hdr_len += 2;
break;
case (PPP_WITHDIRECTION_OUT << 8 | PPP_CONTROL):
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) ND_PRINT((ndo, "Out "));
p += 2;
length -= 2;
hdr_len += 2;
break;
case (PPP_ADDRESS << 8 | PPP_CONTROL):
p += 2; /* ACFC not used */
length -= 2;
hdr_len += 2;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
if (*p % 2) {
proto = *p; /* PFC is used */
p++;
length--;
hdr_len++;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
length -= 2;
hdr_len += 2;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (0x%04x), length %u: ",
tok2str(ppptype2str, "unknown", proto),
proto,
olen));
handle_ppp(ndo, proto, p, length);
return (hdr_len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ppp]"));
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Do bounds checking when unescaping PPP.
Clean up a const issue while we're at it.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 35,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fst_enable_intr(struct fst_card_info *card)
{
if (card->family == FST_FAMILY_TXU) {
outl(0x0f0c0900, card->pci_conf + INTCSR_9054);
} else {
outw(0x0543, card->pci_conf + INTCSR_9052);
}
}
Commit Message: farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 39,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __dev_addr_discard(struct dev_addr_list **list)
{
struct dev_addr_list *tmp;
while (*list != NULL) {
tmp = *list;
*list = tmp->next;
if (tmp->da_users > tmp->da_gusers)
printk("__dev_addr_discard: address leakage! "
"da_users=%d\n", tmp->da_users);
kfree(tmp);
}
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void WarnPatented(gs_font_type42 *pfont, ttfFont *ttf, const char *txt)
{
if (!ttf->design_grid) {
char buf[gs_font_name_max + 1];
int l;
gs_font_type42 *base_font = pfont;
while ((gs_font_type42 *)base_font->base != base_font)
base_font = (gs_font_type42 *)base_font->base;
if (!base_font->data.warning_patented) {
l = min(sizeof(buf) - 1, base_font->font_name.size);
memcpy(buf, base_font->font_name.chars, l);
buf[l] = 0;
emprintf2(pfont->memory,
"%s %s requires a patented True Type interpreter.\n",
txt,
buf);
base_font->data.warning_patented = true;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cxusb_gpio_tuner(struct dvb_usb_device *d, int onoff)
{
struct cxusb_state *st = d->priv;
u8 o[2], i;
if (st->gpio_write_state[GPIO_TUNER] == onoff)
return;
o[0] = GPIO_TUNER;
o[1] = onoff;
cxusb_ctrl_msg(d, CMD_GPIO_WRITE, o, 2, &i, 1);
if (i != 0x01)
deb_info("gpio_write failed.\n");
st->gpio_write_state[GPIO_TUNER] = onoff;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _rpc_step_complete(slurm_msg_t *msg)
{
step_complete_msg_t *req = (step_complete_msg_t *)msg->data;
int rc = SLURM_SUCCESS;
int fd;
uid_t req_uid;
uint16_t protocol_version;
debug3("Entering _rpc_step_complete");
fd = stepd_connect(conf->spooldir, conf->node_name,
req->job_id, req->job_step_id, &protocol_version);
if (fd == -1) {
error("stepd_connect to %u.%u failed: %m",
req->job_id, req->job_step_id);
rc = ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
goto done;
}
/* step completion messages are only allowed from other slurmstepd,
so only root or SlurmUser is allowed here */
req_uid = g_slurm_auth_get_uid(msg->auth_cred, conf->auth_info);
if (!_slurm_authorized_user(req_uid)) {
debug("step completion from uid %ld for job %u.%u",
(long) req_uid, req->job_id, req->job_step_id);
rc = ESLURM_USER_ID_MISSING; /* or bad in this case */
goto done2;
}
rc = stepd_completion(fd, protocol_version, req);
if (rc == -1)
rc = ESLURMD_JOB_NOTRUNNING;
done2:
close(fd);
done:
slurm_send_rc_msg(msg, rc);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Error* Automation::CheckVersion(int client_build_no,
int client_patch_no,
const std::string& error_msg) {
bool version_is_ok = false;
Error* error = CompareVersion(
client_build_no, client_patch_no, &version_is_ok);
if (error)
return error;
if (!version_is_ok)
return new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_splay(cmap_splay *tree, unsigned int node, int depth)
{
if (node == EMPTY)
return;
assert(tree[node].parent == EMPTY);
walk_splay(tree, node, do_check, tree);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void perf_event_task_tick(void)
{
struct list_head *head = this_cpu_ptr(&rotation_list);
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx, *tmp;
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
int throttled;
WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
__this_cpu_inc(perf_throttled_seq);
throttled = __this_cpu_xchg(perf_throttled_count, 0);
list_for_each_entry_safe(cpuctx, tmp, head, rotation_list) {
ctx = &cpuctx->ctx;
perf_adjust_freq_unthr_context(ctx, throttled);
ctx = cpuctx->task_ctx;
if (ctx)
perf_adjust_freq_unthr_context(ctx, throttled);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 50,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLSurfaceEGLOzoneX11::GLSurfaceEGLOzoneX11(EGLNativeWindowType window)
: NativeViewGLSurfaceEGL(window) {}
Commit Message: Add ThreadChecker for Ozone X11 GPU.
Ensure Ozone X11 tests the same thread constraints we have in Ozone GBM.
BUG=none
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2366643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421817}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 119,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evutil_socket_(int domain, int type, int protocol)
{
evutil_socket_t r;
#if defined(SOCK_NONBLOCK) && defined(SOCK_CLOEXEC)
r = socket(domain, type, protocol);
if (r >= 0)
return r;
else if ((type & (SOCK_NONBLOCK|SOCK_CLOEXEC)) == 0)
return -1;
#endif
#define SOCKET_TYPE_MASK (~(EVUTIL_SOCK_NONBLOCK|EVUTIL_SOCK_CLOEXEC))
r = socket(domain, type & SOCKET_TYPE_MASK, protocol);
if (r < 0)
return -1;
if (type & EVUTIL_SOCK_NONBLOCK) {
if (evutil_fast_socket_nonblocking(r) < 0) {
evutil_closesocket(r);
return -1;
}
}
if (type & EVUTIL_SOCK_CLOEXEC) {
if (evutil_fast_socket_closeonexec(r) < 0) {
evutil_closesocket(r);
return -1;
}
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: perf_install_in_context(struct perf_event_context *ctx,
struct perf_event *event,
int cpu)
{
struct task_struct *task = ctx->task;
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->mutex);
event->ctx = ctx;
if (event->cpu != -1)
event->cpu = cpu;
if (!task) {
/*
* Per cpu events are installed via an smp call and
* the install is always successful.
*/
cpu_function_call(cpu, __perf_install_in_context, event);
return;
}
retry:
if (!task_function_call(task, __perf_install_in_context, event))
return;
raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
/*
* If we failed to find a running task, but find the context active now
* that we've acquired the ctx->lock, retry.
*/
if (ctx->is_active) {
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
goto retry;
}
/*
* Since the task isn't running, its safe to add the event, us holding
* the ctx->lock ensures the task won't get scheduled in.
*/
add_event_to_ctx(event, ctx);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltFreeStylesheet(xsltStylesheetPtr style)
{
if (style == NULL)
return;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
/*
* Start with a cleanup of the main stylesheet's doc.
*/
if ((style->principal == style) && (style->doc))
xsltCleanupStylesheetTree(style->doc,
xmlDocGetRootElement(style->doc));
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED_XSLT_NSCOMP
/*
* Restore changed ns-decls before freeing the document.
*/
if ((style->doc != NULL) &&
XSLT_HAS_INTERNAL_NSMAP(style))
{
xsltRestoreDocumentNamespaces(XSLT_GET_INTERNAL_NSMAP(style),
style->doc);
}
#endif /* XSLT_REFACTORED_XSLT_NSCOMP */
#else
/*
* Start with a cleanup of the main stylesheet's doc.
*/
if ((style->parent == NULL) && (style->doc))
xsltCleanupStylesheetTree(style->doc,
xmlDocGetRootElement(style->doc));
#endif /* XSLT_REFACTORED */
xsltFreeKeys(style);
xsltFreeExts(style);
xsltFreeTemplateHashes(style);
xsltFreeDecimalFormatList(style);
xsltFreeTemplateList(style->templates);
xsltFreeAttributeSetsHashes(style);
xsltFreeNamespaceAliasHashes(style);
xsltFreeStylePreComps(style);
/*
* Free documents of all included stylsheet modules of this
* stylesheet level.
*/
xsltFreeStyleDocuments(style);
/*
* TODO: Best time to shutdown extension stuff?
*/
xsltShutdownExts(style);
if (style->variables != NULL)
xsltFreeStackElemList(style->variables);
if (style->cdataSection != NULL)
xmlHashFree(style->cdataSection, NULL);
if (style->stripSpaces != NULL)
xmlHashFree(style->stripSpaces, NULL);
if (style->nsHash != NULL)
xmlHashFree(style->nsHash, NULL);
if (style->exclPrefixTab != NULL)
xmlFree(style->exclPrefixTab);
if (style->method != NULL)
xmlFree(style->method);
if (style->methodURI != NULL)
xmlFree(style->methodURI);
if (style->version != NULL)
xmlFree(style->version);
if (style->encoding != NULL)
xmlFree(style->encoding);
if (style->doctypePublic != NULL)
xmlFree(style->doctypePublic);
if (style->doctypeSystem != NULL)
xmlFree(style->doctypeSystem);
if (style->mediaType != NULL)
xmlFree(style->mediaType);
if (style->attVTs)
xsltFreeAVTList(style->attVTs);
if (style->imports != NULL)
xsltFreeStylesheetList(style->imports);
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
/*
* If this is the principal stylesheet, then
* free its internal data.
*/
if (style->principal == style) {
if (style->principalData) {
xsltFreePrincipalStylesheetData(style->principalData);
style->principalData = NULL;
}
}
#endif
/*
* Better to free the main document of this stylesheet level
* at the end - so here.
*/
if (style->doc != NULL) {
xmlFreeDoc(style->doc);
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"freeing dictionary from stylesheet\n");
#endif
xmlDictFree(style->dict);
memset(style, -1, sizeof(xsltStylesheet));
xmlFree(style);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HeadlessWebContents::Builder::MojoService::MojoService() {}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickPrivate void InitializeExceptionInfo(ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(exception,0,sizeof(*exception));
exception->severity=UndefinedException;
exception->exceptions=(void *) NewLinkedList(0);
exception->semaphore=AllocateSemaphoreInfo();
exception->signature=MagickSignature;
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,414 |
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