instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTServer::getPrimaryServices(
ScriptState* scriptState,
ExceptionState&) {
return getPrimaryServicesImpl(
scriptState, mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity::MULTIPLE);
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 129,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: views::View* BrowserView::GetInitiallyFocusedView() {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC_ALT(ossl_init_no_register_atexit,
ossl_init_register_atexit)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_no_register_atexit ok!\n");
#endif
/* Do nothing in this case */
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | 0 | 12,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: connection_ap_warn_and_unmark_if_pending_circ(entry_connection_t *entry_conn,
const char *where)
{
if (pending_entry_connections &&
smartlist_contains(pending_entry_connections, entry_conn)) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "What was %p doing in pending_entry_connections in %s?",
entry_conn, where);
connection_ap_mark_as_non_pending_circuit(entry_conn);
}
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 69,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DWORD CSoundFile::TransposeToFrequency(int transp, int ftune)
{
return (DWORD)(8363*pow(2.0, (transp*128+ftune)/(1536)));
#ifdef MSC_VER
const float _fbase = 8363;
const float _factor = 1.0f/(12.0f*128.0f);
int result;
DWORD freq;
transp = (transp << 7) + ftune;
_asm {
fild transp
fld _factor
fmulp st(1), st(0)
fist result
fisub result
f2xm1
fild result
fld _fbase
fscale
fstp st(1)
fmul st(1), st(0)
faddp st(1), st(0)
fistp freq
}
UINT derr = freq % 11025;
if (derr <= 8) freq -= derr;
if (derr >= 11015) freq += 11025-derr;
derr = freq % 1000;
if (derr <= 5) freq -= derr;
if (derr >= 995) freq += 1000-derr;
return freq;
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 8,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnGetFileCompleteForOpenFile(
const OpenFileCallback& callback,
const GetFileCompleteForOpenParams& entry_proto,
GDataFileError error,
const FilePath& file_path,
const std::string& mime_type,
GDataFileType file_type) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(error, FilePath());
return;
}
DCHECK_EQ(REGULAR_FILE, file_type);
cache_->MarkDirtyOnUIThread(
entry_proto.resource_id,
entry_proto.md5,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnMarkDirtyInCacheCompleteForOpenFile,
ui_weak_ptr_,
callback));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 116,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int armv8pmu_has_overflowed(u32 pmovsr)
{
return pmovsr & ARMV8_OVERFLOWED_MASK;
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 56,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ipv4_pktinfo_prepare(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct in_pktinfo *pktinfo = PKTINFO_SKB_CB(skb);
bool prepare = (inet_sk(sk)->cmsg_flags & IP_CMSG_PKTINFO) ||
ipv6_sk_rxinfo(sk);
if (prepare && skb_rtable(skb)) {
/* skb->cb is overloaded: prior to this point it is IP{6}CB
* which has interface index (iif) as the first member of the
* underlying inet{6}_skb_parm struct. This code then overlays
* PKTINFO_SKB_CB and in_pktinfo also has iif as the first
* element so the iif is picked up from the prior IPCB. If iif
* is the loopback interface, then return the sending interface
* (e.g., process binds socket to eth0 for Tx which is
* redirected to loopback in the rtable/dst).
*/
if (pktinfo->ipi_ifindex == LOOPBACK_IFINDEX)
pktinfo->ipi_ifindex = inet_iif(skb);
pktinfo->ipi_spec_dst.s_addr = fib_compute_spec_dst(skb);
} else {
pktinfo->ipi_ifindex = 0;
pktinfo->ipi_spec_dst.s_addr = 0;
}
/* We need to keep the dst for __ip_options_echo()
* We could restrict the test to opt.ts_needtime || opt.srr,
* but the following is good enough as IP options are not often used.
*/
if (unlikely(IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen))
skb_dst_force(skb);
else
skb_dst_drop(skb);
}
Commit Message: ip: fix IP_CHECKSUM handling
The skbs processed by ip_cmsg_recv() are not guaranteed to
be linear e.g. when sending UDP packets over loopback with
MSGMORE.
Using csum_partial() on [potentially] the whole skb len
is dangerous; instead be on the safe side and use skb_checksum().
Thanks to syzkaller team to detect the issue and provide the
reproducer.
v1 -> v2:
- move the variable declaration in a tighter scope
Fixes: ad6f939ab193 ("ip: Add offset parameter to ip_cmsg_recv")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CL_ServerStatus( char *serverAddress, char *serverStatusString, int maxLen ) {
int i;
netadr_t to;
serverStatus_t *serverStatus;
if ( !serverAddress ) {
for (i = 0; i < MAX_SERVERSTATUSREQUESTS; i++) {
cl_serverStatusList[i].address.port = 0;
cl_serverStatusList[i].retrieved = qtrue;
}
return qfalse;
}
if ( !NET_StringToAdr( serverAddress, &to, NA_UNSPEC) ) {
return qfalse;
}
serverStatus = CL_GetServerStatus( to );
if ( !serverStatusString ) {
serverStatus->retrieved = qtrue;
return qfalse;
}
if ( NET_CompareAdr( to, serverStatus->address) ) {
if (!serverStatus->pending) {
Q_strncpyz(serverStatusString, serverStatus->string, maxLen);
serverStatus->retrieved = qtrue;
serverStatus->startTime = 0;
return qtrue;
}
else if ( serverStatus->startTime < Com_Milliseconds() - cl_serverStatusResendTime->integer ) {
serverStatus->print = qfalse;
serverStatus->pending = qtrue;
serverStatus->retrieved = qfalse;
serverStatus->time = 0;
serverStatus->startTime = Com_Milliseconds();
NET_OutOfBandPrint( NS_CLIENT, to, "getstatus" );
return qfalse;
}
}
else if ( serverStatus->retrieved ) {
serverStatus->address = to;
serverStatus->print = qfalse;
serverStatus->pending = qtrue;
serverStatus->retrieved = qfalse;
serverStatus->startTime = Com_Milliseconds();
serverStatus->time = 0;
NET_OutOfBandPrint( NS_CLIENT, to, "getstatus" );
return qfalse;
}
return qfalse;
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ZSTD_CCtx_params ZSTD_assignParamsToCCtxParams(
ZSTD_CCtx_params cctxParams, ZSTD_parameters params)
{
ZSTD_CCtx_params ret = cctxParams;
ret.cParams = params.cParams;
ret.fParams = params.fParams;
ret.compressionLevel = ZSTD_CLEVEL_DEFAULT; /* should not matter, as all cParams are presumed properly defined */
assert(!ZSTD_checkCParams(params.cParams));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static SVGInfo *DestroySVGInfo(SVGInfo *svg_info)
{
if (svg_info->text != (char *) NULL)
svg_info->text=DestroyString(svg_info->text);
if (svg_info->scale != (double *) NULL)
svg_info->scale=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(svg_info->scale);
if (svg_info->title != (char *) NULL)
svg_info->title=DestroyString(svg_info->title);
if (svg_info->comment != (char *) NULL)
svg_info->comment=DestroyString(svg_info->comment);
return((SVGInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(svg_info));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void WaitForFirstSharedWorkerOnIOThread(
scoped_refptr<WorkerData> worker_data) {
std::vector<WorkerService::WorkerInfo> worker_info =
WorkerService::GetInstance()->GetWorkers();
if (!worker_info.empty()) {
worker_data->worker_process_id = worker_info[0].process_id;
worker_data->worker_route_id = worker_info[0].route_id;
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
MessageLoop::QuitClosure());
return;
}
WorkerService::GetInstance()->AddObserver(
new WorkerCreationObserver(worker_data.get()));
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShellSurface::AcknowledgeConfigure(uint32_t serial) {
TRACE_EVENT1("exo", "ShellSurface::AcknowledgeConfigure", "serial", serial);
while (!pending_configs_.empty()) {
auto config = pending_configs_.front();
pending_configs_.pop_front();
pending_origin_offset_ += config.origin_offset;
pending_resize_component_ = config.resize_component;
if (config.serial == serial)
break;
}
if (widget_)
UpdateWidgetBounds();
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SendNotifications(AppCacheEventID event_id) {
for (NotifyHostMap::iterator it = hosts_to_notify.begin();
it != hosts_to_notify.end(); ++it) {
AppCacheFrontend* frontend = it->first;
frontend->OnEventRaised(it->second, event_id);
}
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs3svc_decode_getaclargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_getaclargs *args)
{
p = nfs3svc_decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
args->mask = ntohl(*p); p++;
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <david@sinquin.eu>
[agreunba@redhat.com: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 55,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NetworkHandler::SetCookie(const std::string& name,
const std::string& value,
Maybe<std::string> url,
Maybe<std::string> domain,
Maybe<std::string> path,
Maybe<bool> secure,
Maybe<bool> http_only,
Maybe<std::string> same_site,
Maybe<double> expires,
std::unique_ptr<SetCookieCallback> callback) {
if (!process_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
if (!url.isJust() && !domain.isJust()) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams(
"At least one of the url and domain needs to be specified"));
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&SetCookieOnIO,
base::Unretained(
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetURLRequestContext()),
name, value, url.fromMaybe(""), domain.fromMaybe(""),
path.fromMaybe(""), secure.fromMaybe(false),
http_only.fromMaybe(false), same_site.fromMaybe(""),
expires.fromMaybe(-1),
base::BindOnce(&CookieSetOnIO, std::move(callback))));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _warc_read(struct archive_read *a, const void **buf, size_t *bsz, int64_t *off)
{
struct warc_s *w = a->format->data;
const char *rab;
ssize_t nrd;
if (w->cntoff >= w->cntlen) {
eof:
/* it's our lucky day, no work, we can leave early */
*buf = NULL;
*bsz = 0U;
*off = w->cntoff + 4U/*for \r\n\r\n separator*/;
w->unconsumed = 0U;
return (ARCHIVE_EOF);
}
rab = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1U, &nrd);
if (nrd < 0) {
*bsz = 0U;
/* big catastrophe */
return (int)nrd;
} else if (nrd == 0) {
goto eof;
} else if ((size_t)nrd > w->cntlen - w->cntoff) {
/* clamp to content-length */
nrd = w->cntlen - w->cntoff;
}
*off = w->cntoff;
*bsz = nrd;
*buf = rab;
w->cntoff += nrd;
w->unconsumed = (size_t)nrd;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: warc: consume data once read
The warc decoder only used read ahead, it wouldn't actually consume
data that had previously been printed. This means that if you specify
an invalid content length, it will just reprint the same data over
and over and over again until it hits the desired length.
This means that a WARC resource with e.g.
Content-Length: 666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666665
but only a few hundred bytes of data, causes a quasi-infinite loop.
Consume data in subsequent calls to _warc_read.
Found with an AFL + afl-rb + qsym setup.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 1 | 168,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FrameFetchContext::UpdateTimingInfoForIFrameNavigation(
ResourceTimingInfo* info) {
if (IsDetached())
return false;
if (!GetFrame()->Owner())
return false;
if (!GetFrame()->should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent())
return false;
if (MasterDocumentLoader()->LoadType() == WebFrameLoadType::kBackForward)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 172,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_lock_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_lockdata *data = calldata;
dprintk("%s: begin!\n", __func__);
if (!nfs4_sequence_done(task, &data->res.seq_res))
return;
data->rpc_status = task->tk_status;
if (data->arg.new_lock_owner != 0) {
if (data->rpc_status == 0)
nfs_confirm_seqid(&data->lsp->ls_seqid, 0);
else
goto out;
}
if (data->rpc_status == 0) {
nfs4_stateid_copy(&data->lsp->ls_stateid, &data->res.stateid);
set_bit(NFS_LOCK_INITIALIZED, &data->lsp->ls_flags);
renew_lease(NFS_SERVER(data->ctx->dentry->d_inode), data->timestamp);
}
out:
dprintk("%s: done, ret = %d!\n", __func__, data->rpc_status);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void didNavigateWithinPage(WebFrame*, bool)
{
EXPECT_TRUE(false);
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TraceManyInstantEvents(int thread_id, int num_events,
WaitableEvent* task_complete_event) {
for (int i = 0; i < num_events; i++) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT2("all", "multi thread event",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD,
"thread", thread_id,
"event", i);
}
if (task_complete_event)
task_complete_event->Signal();
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CheckSuggestionsAvailableIfScreenReaderRunning() {
EXPECT_EQ(has_active_screen_reader_,
external_delegate_->has_suggestions_available_on_field_focus());
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderViewImpl::MaybeLoadAlternateErrorPage(WebFrame* frame,
const WebURLError& error,
bool replace) {
if (frame->parent())
return false;
int ec = error.reason;
if (ec != net::ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED &&
ec != net::ERR_CONNECTION_FAILED &&
ec != net::ERR_CONNECTION_REFUSED &&
ec != net::ERR_ADDRESS_UNREACHABLE &&
ec != net::ERR_CONNECTION_TIMED_OUT) {
return false;
}
const GURL& error_page_url = GetAlternateErrorPageURL(error.unreachableURL,
ec == net::ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED ? DNS_ERROR : CONNECTION_ERROR);
if (!error_page_url.is_valid())
return false;
frame->loadHTMLString(std::string(),
GURL(kUnreachableWebDataURL),
error.unreachableURL,
replace);
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->provisionalDataSource());
document_state->set_alt_error_page_fetcher(
new AltErrorPageResourceFetcher(
error_page_url, frame, error,
base::Bind(&RenderViewImpl::AltErrorPageFinished,
base::Unretained(this))));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParamTraits<gfx::Transform>::Write(base::Pickle* m, const param_type& p) {
#ifdef SK_MSCALAR_IS_FLOAT
float column_major_data[16];
p.matrix().asColMajorf(column_major_data);
#else
double column_major_data[16];
p.matrix().asColMajord(column_major_data);
#endif
m->WriteBytes(&column_major_data, sizeof(SkMScalar) * 16);
}
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 149,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pngquant_error rwpng_write_image24(FILE *outfile, const png24_image *mainprog_ptr)
{
png_structp png_ptr;
png_infop info_ptr;
pngquant_error retval = rwpng_write_image_init((rwpng_png_image*)mainprog_ptr, &png_ptr, &info_ptr, 0);
if (retval) return retval;
png_init_io(png_ptr, outfile);
rwpng_set_gamma(info_ptr, png_ptr, mainprog_ptr->gamma, mainprog_ptr->output_color);
png_set_IHDR(png_ptr, info_ptr, mainprog_ptr->width, mainprog_ptr->height,
8, PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA,
0, PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_DEFAULT,
PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE);
png_bytepp row_pointers = rwpng_create_row_pointers(info_ptr, png_ptr, mainprog_ptr->rgba_data, mainprog_ptr->height, 0);
rwpng_write_end(&info_ptr, &png_ptr, row_pointers);
free(row_pointers);
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in rwpng.h (CVE-2016-5735)
Reported by Choi Jaeseung
Found with Sparrow (http://ropas.snu.ac.kr/sparrow)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 73,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rawsock_exit(void)
{
nfc_proto_unregister(&rawsock_nfc_proto);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: idr_init(struct iso9660 *iso9660, struct vdd *vdd, struct idr *idr)
{
idr->idrent_pool = NULL;
idr->pool_size = 0;
if (vdd->vdd_type != VDD_JOLIET) {
if (iso9660->opt.iso_level <= 3) {
memcpy(idr->char_map, d_characters_map,
sizeof(idr->char_map));
} else {
memcpy(idr->char_map, d1_characters_map,
sizeof(idr->char_map));
idr_relaxed_filenames(idr->char_map);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 50,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int media_device_close(struct file *filp)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] media-device: fix infoleak in ioctl media_enum_entities()
This fixes CVE-2014-1739.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Acked-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 39,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoPopGroupMarkerEXT(void) {
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int conv_a8_blend(int blend_factor)
{
if (blend_factor == PIPE_BLENDFACTOR_DST_ALPHA)
return PIPE_BLENDFACTOR_DST_COLOR;
if (blend_factor == PIPE_BLENDFACTOR_INV_DST_ALPHA)
return PIPE_BLENDFACTOR_INV_DST_COLOR;
return blend_factor;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::TypeMismatch() const {
return willValidate() && input_type_->TypeMismatch();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_SCVTCI( INS_ARG )
{
CUR.GS.control_value_cutin = (TT_F26Dot6)args[0];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void flush_disk(struct block_device *bdev, bool kill_dirty)
{
if (__invalidate_device(bdev, kill_dirty)) {
char name[BDEVNAME_SIZE] = "";
if (bdev->bd_disk)
disk_name(bdev->bd_disk, 0, name);
printk(KERN_WARNING "VFS: busy inodes on changed media or "
"resized disk %s\n", name);
}
if (!bdev->bd_disk)
return;
if (disk_part_scan_enabled(bdev->bd_disk))
bdev->bd_invalidated = 1;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string BrowserView::GetWindowName() const {
return chrome::GetWindowPlacementKey(browser_.get());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_proc_pathconf(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
struct nfs_pathconf *pathconf)
{
struct nfs4_pathconf_arg args = {
.fh = fhandle,
.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_PATHCONF],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = pathconf,
};
/* None of the pathconf attributes are mandatory to implement */
if ((args.bitmask[0] & nfs4_pathconf_bitmap[0]) == 0) {
memset(pathconf, 0, sizeof(*pathconf));
return 0;
}
nfs_fattr_init(pathconf->fattr);
return rpc_call_sync(server->client, &msg, 0);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err sbgp_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i;
GF_SampleGroupBox *ptr = (GF_SampleGroupBox*) a;
if (!a) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "SampleGroupBox", trace);
if (ptr->grouping_type)
fprintf(trace, "grouping_type=\"%s\"", gf_4cc_to_str(ptr->grouping_type) );
if (ptr->version==1) {
if (isalnum(ptr->grouping_type_parameter&0xFF)) {
fprintf(trace, " grouping_type_parameter=\"%s\"", gf_4cc_to_str(ptr->grouping_type_parameter) );
} else {
fprintf(trace, " grouping_type_parameter=\"%d\"", ptr->grouping_type_parameter);
}
}
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
for (i=0; i<ptr->entry_count; i++) {
fprintf(trace, "<SampleGroupBoxEntry sample_count=\"%d\" group_description_index=\"%d\"/>\n", ptr->sample_entries[i].sample_count, ptr->sample_entries[i].group_description_index );
}
if (!ptr->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<SampleGroupBoxEntry sample_count=\"\" group_description_index=\"\"/>\n");
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("SampleGroupBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rtnl_af_register(struct rtnl_af_ops *ops)
{
int err;
rtnl_lock();
err = __rtnl_af_register(ops);
rtnl_unlock();
return err;
}
Commit Message: rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void print_stats(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring)
{
pr_info("(%s): oo %3llu | rd %4llu | wr %4llu | f %4llu"
" | ds %4llu | pg: %4u/%4d\n",
current->comm, ring->st_oo_req,
ring->st_rd_req, ring->st_wr_req,
ring->st_f_req, ring->st_ds_req,
ring->persistent_gnt_c,
xen_blkif_max_pgrants);
ring->st_print = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(10 * 1000);
ring->st_rd_req = 0;
ring->st_wr_req = 0;
ring->st_oo_req = 0;
ring->st_ds_req = 0;
}
Commit Message: xen-blkback: don't leak stack data via response ring
Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do.
Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually
identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
This is XSA-216.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 63,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcm_loop_new_cmd_map(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
{
struct tcm_loop_cmd *tl_cmd = container_of(se_cmd,
struct tcm_loop_cmd, tl_se_cmd);
struct scsi_cmnd *sc = tl_cmd->sc;
struct scatterlist *sgl_bidi = NULL;
u32 sgl_bidi_count = 0;
int ret;
/*
* Allocate the necessary tasks to complete the received CDB+data
*/
ret = transport_generic_allocate_tasks(se_cmd, sc->cmnd);
if (ret == -ENOMEM) {
/* Out of Resources */
return PYX_TRANSPORT_LU_COMM_FAILURE;
} else if (ret == -EINVAL) {
/*
* Handle case for SAM_STAT_RESERVATION_CONFLICT
*/
if (se_cmd->se_cmd_flags & SCF_SCSI_RESERVATION_CONFLICT)
return PYX_TRANSPORT_RESERVATION_CONFLICT;
/*
* Otherwise, return SAM_STAT_CHECK_CONDITION and return
* sense data.
*/
return PYX_TRANSPORT_USE_SENSE_REASON;
}
/*
* For BIDI commands, pass in the extra READ buffer
* to transport_generic_map_mem_to_cmd() below..
*/
if (se_cmd->t_tasks_bidi) {
struct scsi_data_buffer *sdb = scsi_in(sc);
sgl_bidi = sdb->table.sgl;
sgl_bidi_count = sdb->table.nents;
}
/*
* Map the SG memory into struct se_mem->page linked list using the same
* physical memory at sg->page_link.
*/
ret = transport_generic_map_mem_to_cmd(se_cmd, scsi_sglist(sc),
scsi_sg_count(sc), sgl_bidi, sgl_bidi_count);
if (ret < 0)
return PYX_TRANSPORT_LU_COMM_FAILURE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int mailimf_quoted_pair_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, char * result)
{
size_t cur_token;
cur_token = * indx;
if (cur_token + 1 >= length)
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
if (message[cur_token] != '\\')
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
cur_token ++;
* result = message[cur_token];
cur_token ++;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 66,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dev_close_many(struct list_head *head, bool unlink)
{
struct net_device *dev, *tmp;
/* Remove the devices that don't need to be closed */
list_for_each_entry_safe(dev, tmp, head, close_list)
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_UP))
list_del_init(&dev->close_list);
__dev_close_many(head);
list_for_each_entry_safe(dev, tmp, head, close_list) {
rtmsg_ifinfo(RTM_NEWLINK, dev, IFF_UP|IFF_RUNNING, GFP_KERNEL);
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_DOWN, dev);
if (unlink)
list_del_init(&dev->close_list);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response NetworkHandler::SetBypassServiceWorker(bool bypass) {
bypass_service_worker_ = bypass;
return Response::FallThrough();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __exit rose_loopback_clear(void)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
del_timer(&loopback_timer);
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&loopback_queue)) != NULL) {
skb->sk = NULL;
kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::StringPiece ShellContentClient::GetDataResource(int resource_id) const {
return ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetRawDataResource(resource_id);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t pcnet_csr_readw(PCNetState *s, uint32_t rap)
{
uint32_t val;
switch (rap) {
case 0:
pcnet_update_irq(s);
val = s->csr[0];
val |= (val & 0x7800) ? 0x8000 : 0;
break;
case 16:
return pcnet_csr_readw(s,1);
case 17:
return pcnet_csr_readw(s,2);
case 58:
return pcnet_bcr_readw(s,BCR_SWS);
case 88:
val = s->csr[89];
val <<= 16;
val |= s->csr[88];
break;
default:
val = s->csr[rap];
}
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_CSR
printf("pcnet_csr_readw rap=%d val=0x%04x\n", rap, val);
#endif
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_metadata_track_or_disc_number(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb,
unsigned len, const char *key)
{
char buf[16];
short current, total = 0;
avio_rb16(pb); // unknown
current = avio_rb16(pb);
if (len >= 6)
total = avio_rb16(pb);
if (!total)
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", current);
else
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d/%d", current, total);
av_dict_set(&c->fc->metadata, key, buf, 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::CloseDevice(MediaStreamType type, int session_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DVLOG(1) << "CloseDevice("
<< "{type = " << type << "} "
<< "{session_id = " << session_id << "})";
GetDeviceManager(type)->Close(session_id);
for (const LabeledDeviceRequest& labeled_request : requests_) {
DeviceRequest* const request = labeled_request.second;
for (const MediaStreamDevice& device : request->devices) {
if (device.session_id == session_id && device.type == type) {
request->SetState(type, MEDIA_REQUEST_STATE_CLOSING);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::updateViewportDescription()
{
if (frame() && frame()->isMainFrame()) {
frameHost()->chrome().dispatchViewportPropertiesDidChange(m_viewportDescription);
}
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const std::string& GetRequestContent() { return request_content_; }
Commit Message: Allow origin lock for WebUI pages.
Returning true for WebUI pages in DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess helps
to keep enforcing a SiteInstance swap during chrome://foo ->
chrome://bar navigation, even after relaxing
BrowsingInstance::GetSiteInstanceForURL to consider RPH::IsSuitableHost
(see https://crrev.com/c/783470 for that fixes process sharing in
isolated(b(c),d(c)) scenario).
I've manually tested this CL by visiting the following URLs:
- chrome://welcome/
- chrome://settings
- chrome://extensions
- chrome://history
- chrome://help and chrome://chrome (both redirect to chrome://settings/help)
Bug: 510588, 847127
Change-Id: I55073bce00f32cb8bc5c1c91034438ff9a3f8971
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1237392
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595259}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataDirectoryService::ClearRoot() {
root_->RemoveChildren();
RemoveEntryFromResourceMap(root_.get());
DCHECK(resource_map_.empty());
resource_map_.clear();
root_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int arch_init_sched_domains(const struct cpumask *cpu_map)
{
int err;
arch_update_cpu_topology();
ndoms_cur = 1;
doms_cur = alloc_sched_domains(ndoms_cur);
if (!doms_cur)
doms_cur = &fallback_doms;
cpumask_andnot(doms_cur[0], cpu_map, cpu_isolated_map);
dattr_cur = NULL;
err = build_sched_domains(doms_cur[0]);
register_sched_domain_sysctl();
return err;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,340 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~ErrorResilienceTestLarge() {}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,424 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillPopupViewViews::DrawAutofillEntry(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
int index,
const gfx::Rect& entry_rect) {
canvas->FillRect(
entry_rect,
GetNativeTheme()->GetSystemColor(
controller_->GetBackgroundColorIDForRow(index)));
const bool is_rtl = controller_->IsRTL();
const int text_align =
is_rtl ? gfx::Canvas::TEXT_ALIGN_RIGHT : gfx::Canvas::TEXT_ALIGN_LEFT;
gfx::Rect value_rect = entry_rect;
value_rect.Inset(AutofillPopupLayoutModel::kEndPadding, 0);
bool icon_on_the_right = !is_rtl;
int x_align_left = icon_on_the_right ? value_rect.right() : value_rect.x();
int row_height = controller_->layout_model().GetRowBounds(index).height();
const gfx::ImageSkia image = controller_->layout_model().GetIconImage(index);
if (!image.isNull()) {
int icon_y = entry_rect.y() + (row_height - image.height()) / 2;
int icon_x_align_left =
icon_on_the_right ? x_align_left - image.width() : x_align_left;
canvas->DrawImageInt(image, icon_x_align_left, icon_y);
x_align_left =
icon_x_align_left +
(is_rtl ? image.width() + AutofillPopupLayoutModel::kIconPadding
: -AutofillPopupLayoutModel::kIconPadding);
}
const int value_width = gfx::GetStringWidth(
controller_->GetElidedValueAt(index),
controller_->layout_model().GetValueFontListForRow(index));
int value_x_align_left =
is_rtl ? value_rect.right() - value_width : value_rect.x();
canvas->DrawStringRectWithFlags(
controller_->GetElidedValueAt(index),
controller_->layout_model().GetValueFontListForRow(index),
GetNativeTheme()->GetSystemColor(
controller_->layout_model().GetValueFontColorIDForRow(index)),
gfx::Rect(value_x_align_left, value_rect.y(), value_width,
value_rect.height()),
text_align);
if (!controller_->GetSuggestionAt(index).label.empty()) {
const int label_width = gfx::GetStringWidth(
controller_->GetElidedLabelAt(index),
controller_->layout_model().GetLabelFontListForRow(index));
int label_x_align_left = x_align_left + (is_rtl ? 0 : -label_width);
canvas->DrawStringRectWithFlags(
controller_->GetElidedLabelAt(index),
controller_->layout_model().GetLabelFontListForRow(index),
GetNativeTheme()->GetSystemColor(
ui::NativeTheme::kColorId_ResultsTableDimmedText),
gfx::Rect(label_x_align_left, entry_rect.y(), label_width,
entry_rect.height()),
text_align);
}
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Element* Document::createElementNS(const AtomicString& namespace_uri,
const AtomicString& qualified_name,
const StringOrDictionary& string_or_options,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
QualifiedName q_name(
CreateQualifiedName(namespace_uri, qualified_name, exception_state));
if (q_name == QualifiedName::Null())
return nullptr;
bool is_v1 = string_or_options.isDictionary() || !RegistrationContext();
bool create_v1_builtin =
string_or_options.isDictionary() &&
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::CustomElementsBuiltinEnabled();
bool should_create_builtin =
create_v1_builtin || string_or_options.isString();
const AtomicString& is =
AtomicString(GetTypeExtension(this, string_or_options, exception_state));
const AtomicString& name = should_create_builtin ? is : qualified_name;
if (!IsValidElementName(this, qualified_name)) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidCharacterError, "The tag name provided ('" + qualified_name +
"') is not a valid name.");
return nullptr;
}
CustomElementDefinition* definition = nullptr;
if (is_v1) {
const CustomElementDescriptor desc =
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::CustomElementsBuiltinEnabled()
? CustomElementDescriptor(name, qualified_name)
: CustomElementDescriptor(qualified_name, qualified_name);
if (CustomElementRegistry* registry = CustomElement::Registry(*this))
definition = registry->DefinitionFor(desc);
if (!definition && create_v1_builtin) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kNotFoundError,
"Custom element definition not found.");
return nullptr;
}
}
Element* element;
if (CustomElement::ShouldCreateCustomElement(q_name) || create_v1_builtin) {
element = CustomElement::CreateCustomElementSync(*this, q_name, definition);
} else if (V0CustomElement::IsValidName(q_name.LocalName()) &&
RegistrationContext()) {
element = RegistrationContext()->CreateCustomTagElement(*this, q_name);
} else {
element = createElement(q_name, kCreatedByCreateElement);
}
if (!is.IsEmpty()) {
if (element->GetCustomElementState() != CustomElementState::kCustom) {
V0CustomElementRegistrationContext::SetIsAttributeAndTypeExtension(
element, is);
} else if (string_or_options.isDictionary()) {
element->setAttribute(HTMLNames::isAttr, is);
}
}
return element;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void customGetterImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "customGetterImplementedAsLongAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setImplementedAsNameWithCustomGetter(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType GetImageChannelMean(const Image *image,
const ChannelType channel,double *mean,double *standard_deviation,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
ChannelStatistics
*channel_statistics;
size_t
channels;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
channel_statistics=GetImageChannelStatistics(image,exception);
if (channel_statistics == (ChannelStatistics *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
channels=0;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].mean=0.0;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].standard_deviation=0.0;
if ((channel & RedChannel) != 0)
{
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].mean+=
channel_statistics[RedChannel].mean;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].standard_deviation+=
channel_statistics[RedChannel].standard_deviation;
channels++;
}
if ((channel & GreenChannel) != 0)
{
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].mean+=
channel_statistics[GreenChannel].mean;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].standard_deviation+=
channel_statistics[GreenChannel].standard_deviation;
channels++;
}
if ((channel & BlueChannel) != 0)
{
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].mean+=
channel_statistics[BlueChannel].mean;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].standard_deviation+=
channel_statistics[BlueChannel].standard_deviation;
channels++;
}
if (((channel & OpacityChannel) != 0) && (image->matte != MagickFalse))
{
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].mean+=
(QuantumRange-channel_statistics[OpacityChannel].mean);
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].standard_deviation+=
channel_statistics[OpacityChannel].standard_deviation;
channels++;
}
if (((channel & IndexChannel) != 0) && (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace))
{
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].mean+=
channel_statistics[BlackChannel].mean;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].standard_deviation+=
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].standard_deviation;
channels++;
}
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].mean/=channels;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].standard_deviation/=channels;
*mean=channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].mean;
*standard_deviation=channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].standard_deviation;
channel_statistics=(ChannelStatistics *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
channel_statistics);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_valid_extent(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_extent *ext)
{
ext4_fsblk_t block = ext_pblock(ext);
int len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ext);
return ext4_data_block_valid(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb), block, len);
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
enum bpf_access_type t)
{
switch (env->prog->type) {
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT:
/* dst_input() and dst_output() can't write for now */
if (t == BPF_WRITE)
return false;
/* fallthrough */
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT:
if (meta)
return meta->pkt_access;
env->seen_direct_write = true;
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
The patch fixes two things at once:
1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 65,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int may_delete(struct inode *dir,struct dentry *victim,int isdir)
{
int error;
if (!victim->d_inode)
return -ENOENT;
BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir);
audit_inode_child(victim->d_name.name, victim, dir);
error = inode_permission(dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
if (error)
return error;
if (IS_APPEND(dir))
return -EPERM;
if (check_sticky(dir, victim->d_inode)||IS_APPEND(victim->d_inode)||
IS_IMMUTABLE(victim->d_inode) || IS_SWAPFILE(victim->d_inode))
return -EPERM;
if (isdir) {
if (!S_ISDIR(victim->d_inode->i_mode))
return -ENOTDIR;
if (IS_ROOT(victim))
return -EBUSY;
} else if (S_ISDIR(victim->d_inode->i_mode))
return -EISDIR;
if (IS_DEADDIR(dir))
return -ENOENT;
if (victim->d_flags & DCACHE_NFSFS_RENAMED)
return -EBUSY;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::DoIsTexture(GLuint client_id) {
const TextureManager::TextureInfo* info = GetTextureInfo(client_id);
return info && info->IsValid();
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: generate_trivial_inner (DBusMessageDataIter *iter,
DBusMessage **message_p)
{
DBusMessage *message;
switch (iter_get_sequence (iter))
{
case 0:
message = dbus_message_new_method_call ("org.freedesktop.TextEditor",
"/foo/bar",
"org.freedesktop.DocumentFactory",
"Create");
break;
case 1:
message = dbus_message_new (DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_METHOD_RETURN);
set_reply_serial (message);
break;
case 2:
message = dbus_message_new_signal ("/foo/bar",
"org.freedesktop.DocumentFactory",
"Created");
break;
case 3:
message = dbus_message_new (DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_ERROR);
if (!dbus_message_set_error_name (message,
"org.freedesktop.TestErrorName"))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
{
DBusMessageIter iter;
const char *v_STRING = "This is an error";
dbus_message_iter_init_append (message, &iter);
if (!dbus_message_iter_append_basic (&iter,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&v_STRING))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
}
set_reply_serial (message);
break;
default:
return FALSE;
}
if (message == NULL)
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
*message_p = message;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void TIFFReadDirEntryOutputErr(TIFF* tif, enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr err, const char* module, const char* tagname, int recover)
{
if (!recover) {
switch (err) {
case TIFFReadDirEntryErrCount:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Incorrect count for \"%s\"",
tagname);
break;
case TIFFReadDirEntryErrType:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Incompatible type for \"%s\"",
tagname);
break;
case TIFFReadDirEntryErrIo:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"IO error during reading of \"%s\"",
tagname);
break;
case TIFFReadDirEntryErrRange:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Incorrect value for \"%s\"",
tagname);
break;
case TIFFReadDirEntryErrPsdif:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Cannot handle different values per sample for \"%s\"",
tagname);
break;
case TIFFReadDirEntryErrSizesan:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Sanity check on size of \"%s\" value failed",
tagname);
break;
case TIFFReadDirEntryErrAlloc:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Out of memory reading of \"%s\"",
tagname);
break;
default:
assert(0); /* we should never get here */
break;
}
} else {
switch (err) {
case TIFFReadDirEntryErrCount:
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Incorrect count for \"%s\"; tag ignored",
tagname);
break;
case TIFFReadDirEntryErrType:
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Incompatible type for \"%s\"; tag ignored",
tagname);
break;
case TIFFReadDirEntryErrIo:
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"IO error during reading of \"%s\"; tag ignored",
tagname);
break;
case TIFFReadDirEntryErrRange:
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Incorrect value for \"%s\"; tag ignored",
tagname);
break;
case TIFFReadDirEntryErrPsdif:
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Cannot handle different values per sample for \"%s\"; tag ignored",
tagname);
break;
case TIFFReadDirEntryErrSizesan:
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Sanity check on size of \"%s\" value failed; tag ignored",
tagname);
break;
case TIFFReadDirEntryErrAlloc:
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Out of memory reading of \"%s\"; tag ignored",
tagname);
break;
default:
assert(0); /* we should never get here */
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kex_alg_list(char sep)
{
char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
const struct kexalg *k;
for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
if (ret != NULL)
ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(k->name);
if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret = tmp;
memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1);
rlen += nlen;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 17,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_imagefontsize(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int arg)
{
long SIZE;
gdFontPtr font;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &SIZE) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
font = php_find_gd_font(SIZE TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_LONG(arg ? font->h : font->w);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs41_sequence_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_sequence_data *calldata = data;
struct nfs_client *clp = calldata->clp;
struct nfs4_sequence_args *args;
struct nfs4_sequence_res *res;
args = task->tk_msg.rpc_argp;
res = task->tk_msg.rpc_resp;
if (nfs41_setup_sequence(clp->cl_session, args, res, task))
return;
rpc_call_start(task);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<WebMediaPlayer> LocalFrameClientImpl::CreateWebMediaPlayer(
HTMLMediaElement& html_media_element,
const WebMediaPlayerSource& source,
WebMediaPlayerClient* client,
WebLayerTreeView* layer_tree_view) {
WebLocalFrameImpl* web_frame =
WebLocalFrameImpl::FromFrame(html_media_element.GetDocument().GetFrame());
if (!web_frame || !web_frame->Client())
return nullptr;
return CoreInitializer::GetInstance().CreateWebMediaPlayer(
web_frame->Client(), html_media_element, source, client, layer_tree_view);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniform4fv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
const FlexibleFloat32ArrayView& v,
GLuint src_offset,
GLuint src_length) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateUniformParameters<WTF::Float32Array>("uniform4fv", location, v,
4, src_offset, src_length))
return;
ContextGL()->Uniform4fv(
location->Location(),
(src_length ? src_length : (v.length() - src_offset)) >> 2,
v.DataMaybeOnStack() + src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int opfldenv(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY ) {
data[l++] = 0xd9;
data[l++] = 0x20 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 75,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LoadStartedCatcher(QQuickWebView* webView)
: m_webView(webView)
{
connect(m_webView, SIGNAL(loadingChanged(QWebLoadRequest*)), this, SLOT(onLoadingChanged(QWebLoadRequest*)));
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NavigationControllerImpl::NavigationControllerImpl(
WebContentsImpl* web_contents,
BrowserContext* browser_context)
: browser_context_(browser_context),
pending_entry_(NULL),
last_committed_entry_index_(-1),
pending_entry_index_(-1),
transient_entry_index_(-1),
web_contents_(web_contents),
max_restored_page_id_(-1),
ssl_manager_(this),
needs_reload_(false),
is_initial_navigation_(true),
pending_reload_(NO_RELOAD),
get_timestamp_callback_(base::Bind(&base::Time::Now)),
screenshot_manager_(new WebContentsScreenshotManager(this)) {
DCHECK(browser_context_);
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GfxGouraudTriangleShading::~GfxGouraudTriangleShading() {
int i;
gfree(vertices);
gfree(triangles);
for (i = 0; i < nFuncs; ++i) {
delete funcs[i];
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataCache::AssertOnSequencedWorkerPool() {
DCHECK(!pool_ || pool_->IsRunningSequenceOnCurrentThread(sequence_token_));
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 105,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XineramaGetCursorScreen(DeviceIntPtr pDev)
{
if (!noPanoramiXExtension) {
return pDev->spriteInfo->sprite->screen->myNum;
}
else {
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::BindMediaInterfaceFactoryRequest(
media::mojom::InterfaceFactoryRequest request) {
DCHECK(!media_interface_proxy_);
media_interface_proxy_.reset(new MediaInterfaceProxy(
this, std::move(request),
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::OnMediaInterfaceFactoryConnectionError,
base::Unretained(this))));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int core_cmd0_wrapper(void *core, const char *cmd) {
return r_core_cmd0 ((RCore *)core, cmd);
}
Commit Message: Fix #14990 - multiple quoted command parsing issue ##core
> "?e hello""?e world"
hello
world"
> "?e hello";"?e world"
hello
world
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 87,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadHDRImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
format[MagickPathExtent],
keyword[MagickPathExtent],
tag[MagickPathExtent],
value[MagickPathExtent];
double
gamma;
Image
*image;
int
c;
MagickBooleanType
status,
value_expected;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*end,
pixel[4],
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Decode image header.
*/
image->columns=0;
image->rows=0;
*format='\0';
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
while (isgraph(c) && (image->columns == 0) && (image->rows == 0))
{
if (c == (int) '#')
{
char
*comment;
register char
*p;
size_t
length;
/*
Read comment-- any text between # and end-of-line.
*/
length=MagickPathExtent;
comment=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (p=comment; comment != (char *) NULL; p++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((c == EOF) || (c == (int) '\n'))
break;
if ((size_t) (p-comment+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
comment=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(comment,length+
MagickPathExtent,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=comment+strlen(comment);
}
*p=(char) c;
}
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
*p='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment,exception);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
if (isalnum(c) == MagickFalse)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
{
register char
*p;
/*
Determine a keyword and its value.
*/
p=keyword;
do
{
if ((size_t) (p-keyword) < (MagickPathExtent-1))
*p++=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (isalnum(c) || (c == '_'));
*p='\0';
value_expected=MagickFalse;
while ((isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0) || (c == '='))
{
if (c == '=')
value_expected=MagickTrue;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"Y") == 0)
value_expected=MagickTrue;
if (value_expected == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=value;
while ((c != '\n') && (c != '\0') && (c != EOF))
{
if ((size_t) (p-value) < (MagickPathExtent-1))
*p++=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
*p='\0';
/*
Assign a value to the specified keyword.
*/
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"format") == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(format,value,MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MagickPathExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gamma") == 0)
{
image->gamma=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MagickPathExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
case 'P':
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"primaries") == 0)
{
float
chromaticity[6],
white_point[2];
int
count;
count=sscanf(value,"%g %g %g %g %g %g %g %g",&chromaticity[0],
&chromaticity[1],&chromaticity[2],&chromaticity[3],
&chromaticity[4],&chromaticity[5],&white_point[0],
&white_point[1]);
if (count == 8)
{
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=chromaticity[1];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=chromaticity[2];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=chromaticity[3];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=chromaticity[4];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=chromaticity[5];
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=white_point[0],
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=white_point[1];
}
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MagickPathExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
char
target[] = "Y";
if (strcmp(keyword,target) == 0)
{
int
height,
width;
if (sscanf(value,"%d +X %d",&height,&width) == 2)
{
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
}
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MagickPathExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MagickPathExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
}
}
if ((image->columns == 0) && (image->rows == 0))
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
if ((LocaleCompare(format,"32-bit_rle_rgbe") != 0) &&
(LocaleCompare(format,"32-bit_rle_xyze") != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace,exception);
if (LocaleCompare(format,"32-bit_rle_xyze") == 0)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,XYZColorspace,exception);
image->compression=(image->columns < 8) || (image->columns > 0x7ffff) ?
NoCompression : RLECompression;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Read RGBE (red+green+blue+exponent) pixels.
*/
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,4*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if (image->compression != RLECompression)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4*image->columns*sizeof(*pixels),pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) (4*image->columns*sizeof(*pixels)))
break;
}
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4*sizeof(*pixel),pixel);
if (count != 4)
break;
if ((size_t) ((((size_t) pixel[2]) << 8) | pixel[3]) != image->columns)
{
(void) memcpy(pixels,pixel,4*sizeof(*pixel));
count=ReadBlob(image,4*(image->columns-1)*sizeof(*pixels),pixels+4);
image->compression=NoCompression;
}
else
{
p=pixels;
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
end=&pixels[(i+1)*image->columns];
while (p < end)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,2*sizeof(*pixel),pixel);
if (count < 1)
break;
if (pixel[0] > 128)
{
count=(ssize_t) pixel[0]-128;
if ((count == 0) || (count > (ssize_t) (end-p)))
break;
while (count-- > 0)
*p++=pixel[1];
}
else
{
count=(ssize_t) pixel[0];
if ((count == 0) || (count > (ssize_t) (end-p)))
break;
*p++=pixel[1];
if (--count > 0)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) count*sizeof(*p),p);
if (count < 1)
break;
p+=count;
}
}
}
}
}
}
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
i=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
pixel[0]=pixels[x];
pixel[1]=pixels[x+image->columns];
pixel[2]=pixels[x+2*image->columns];
pixel[3]=pixels[x+3*image->columns];
}
else
{
pixel[0]=pixels[i++];
pixel[1]=pixels[i++];
pixel[2]=pixels[i++];
pixel[3]=pixels[i++];
}
SetPixelRed(image,0,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,0,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,0,q);
if (pixel[3] != 0)
{
gamma=pow(2.0,pixel[3]-(128.0+8.0));
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*gamma*pixel[0]),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*gamma*pixel[1]),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*gamma*pixel[2]),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/imagemagick/+bug/1537213
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 73,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillManager::ParseForms(const std::vector<FormData>& forms) {
std::vector<FormStructure*> non_queryable_forms;
for (std::vector<FormData>::const_iterator iter = forms.begin();
iter != forms.end(); ++iter) {
scoped_ptr<FormStructure> form_structure(new FormStructure(*iter));
if (!form_structure->ShouldBeParsed(false))
continue;
form_structure->DetermineHeuristicTypes();
if (form_structure->ShouldBeParsed(true))
form_structures_.push_back(form_structure.release());
else
non_queryable_forms.push_back(form_structure.release());
}
if (!form_structures_.empty() && !disable_download_manager_requests_)
download_manager_.StartQueryRequest(form_structures_, *metric_logger_);
for (std::vector<FormStructure*>::const_iterator iter =
non_queryable_forms.begin();
iter != non_queryable_forms.end(); ++iter) {
form_structures_.push_back(*iter);
}
}
Commit Message: Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder2::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(formatParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
formatParams->eEncoding =
(formatParams->nPortIndex == 0)
? OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM : OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(aacParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
aacParams->nBitRate = mBitRate;
aacParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
aacParams->nAACtools = 0;
aacParams->nAACERtools = 0;
aacParams->eAACProfile = (OMX_AUDIO_AACPROFILETYPE) mAACProfile;
aacParams->eAACStreamFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
aacParams->eChannelMode = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeStereo;
aacParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
aacParams->nSampleRate = mSampleRate;
aacParams->nFrameLength = 0;
switch (mSBRMode) {
case 1: // sbr on
switch (mSBRRatio) {
case 0:
aacParams->nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
aacParams->nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
case 1:
aacParams->nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
aacParams->nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
case 2:
aacParams->nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
aacParams->nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
default:
ALOGE("invalid SBR ratio %d", mSBRRatio);
TRESPASS();
}
break;
case 0: // sbr off
case -1: // sbr undefined
aacParams->nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
aacParams->nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
default:
ALOGE("invalid SBR mode %d", mSBRMode);
TRESPASS();
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gdImageJpegCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quality)
{
struct jpeg_compress_struct cinfo;
struct jpeg_error_mgr jerr;
int i, j, jidx;
/* volatile so we can gdFree it on return from longjmp */
volatile JSAMPROW row = 0;
JSAMPROW rowptr[1];
jmpbuf_wrapper jmpbufw;
JDIMENSION nlines;
char comment[255];
memset (&cinfo, 0, sizeof (cinfo));
memset (&jerr, 0, sizeof (jerr));
cinfo.err = jpeg_std_error (&jerr);
cinfo.client_data = &jmpbufw;
if (setjmp (jmpbufw.jmpbuf) != 0) {
/* we're here courtesy of longjmp */
if (row) {
gdFree (row);
}
return;
}
cinfo.err->error_exit = fatal_jpeg_error;
jpeg_create_compress (&cinfo);
cinfo.image_width = im->sx;
cinfo.image_height = im->sy;
cinfo.input_components = 3; /* # of color components per pixel */
cinfo.in_color_space = JCS_RGB; /* colorspace of input image */
jpeg_set_defaults (&cinfo);
cinfo.density_unit = 1;
cinfo.X_density = im->res_x;
cinfo.Y_density = im->res_y;
if (quality >= 0) {
jpeg_set_quality (&cinfo, quality, TRUE);
}
/* If user requests interlace, translate that to progressive JPEG */
if (gdImageGetInterlaced (im)) {
jpeg_simple_progression (&cinfo);
}
jpeg_gdIOCtx_dest (&cinfo, outfile);
row = (JSAMPROW) safe_emalloc(cinfo.image_width * cinfo.input_components, sizeof(JSAMPLE), 0);
memset(row, 0, cinfo.image_width * cinfo.input_components * sizeof(JSAMPLE));
rowptr[0] = row;
jpeg_start_compress (&cinfo, TRUE);
if (quality >= 0) {
snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment)-1, "CREATOR: gd-jpeg v%s (using IJG JPEG v%d), quality = %d\n", GD_JPEG_VERSION, JPEG_LIB_VERSION, quality);
} else {
snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment)-1, "CREATOR: gd-jpeg v%s (using IJG JPEG v%d), default quality\n", GD_JPEG_VERSION, JPEG_LIB_VERSION);
}
jpeg_write_marker (&cinfo, JPEG_COM, (unsigned char *) comment, (unsigned int) strlen (comment));
if (im->trueColor) {
#if BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 12
gd_error("gd-jpeg: error: jpeg library was compiled for 12-bit precision. This is mostly useless, because JPEGs on the web are 8-bit and such versions of the jpeg library won't read or write them. GD doesn't support these unusual images. Edit your jmorecfg.h file to specify the correct precision and completely 'make clean' and 'make install' libjpeg again. Sorry");
goto error;
#endif /* BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 12 */
for (i = 0; i < im->sy; i++) {
for (jidx = 0, j = 0; j < im->sx; j++) {
int val = im->tpixels[i][j];
row[jidx++] = gdTrueColorGetRed (val);
row[jidx++] = gdTrueColorGetGreen (val);
row[jidx++] = gdTrueColorGetBlue (val);
}
nlines = jpeg_write_scanlines (&cinfo, rowptr, 1);
if (nlines != 1) {
gd_error_ex(GD_WARNING, "gd_jpeg: warning: jpeg_write_scanlines returns %u -- expected 1", nlines);
}
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < im->sy; i++) {
for (jidx = 0, j = 0; j < im->sx; j++) {
int idx = im->pixels[i][j];
/* NB: Although gd RGB values are ints, their max value is
* 255 (see the documentation for gdImageColorAllocate())
* -- perfect for 8-bit JPEG encoding (which is the norm)
*/
#if BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 8
row[jidx++] = im->red[idx];
row[jidx++] = im->green[idx];
row[jidx++] = im->blue[idx];
#elif BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 12
row[jidx++] = im->red[idx] << 4;
row[jidx++] = im->green[idx] << 4;
row[jidx++] = im->blue[idx] << 4;
#else
#error IJG JPEG library BITS_IN_JSAMPLE value must be 8 or 12
#endif
}
nlines = jpeg_write_scanlines (&cinfo, rowptr, 1);
if (nlines != 1) {
gd_error_ex(GD_WARNING, "gd_jpeg: warning: jpeg_write_scanlines returns %u -- expected 1", nlines);
}
}
}
jpeg_finish_compress (&cinfo);
jpeg_destroy_compress (&cinfo);
gdFree (row);
}
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 1 | 169,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ar6000_destroy(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int unregister)
{
struct ar6_softc *ar;
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO,("+ar6000_destroy \n"));
if((dev == NULL) || ((ar = ar6k_priv(dev)) == NULL))
{
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,("%s(): Failed to get device structure.\n", __func__));
return;
}
ar->bIsDestroyProgress = true;
if (down_interruptible(&ar->arSem)) {
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,("%s(): down_interruptible failed \n", __func__));
return;
}
if (ar->arWlanPowerState != WLAN_POWER_STATE_CUT_PWR) {
/* only stop endpoint if we are not stop it in suspend_ev */
ar6000_stop_endpoint(dev, false, true);
}
ar->arWlanState = WLAN_DISABLED;
if (ar->arHtcTarget != NULL) {
/* destroy HTC */
HTCDestroy(ar->arHtcTarget);
}
if (ar->arHifDevice != NULL) {
/*release the device so we do not get called back on remove incase we
* we're explicity destroyed by module unload */
HIFReleaseDevice(ar->arHifDevice);
HIFShutDownDevice(ar->arHifDevice);
}
aggr_module_destroy(ar->aggr_cntxt);
/* Done with cookies */
ar6000_cookie_cleanup(ar);
/* cleanup any allocated AMSDU buffers */
ar6000_cleanup_amsdu_rxbufs(ar);
ar6000_sysfs_bmi_deinit(ar);
/* Cleanup BMI */
BMICleanup();
/* Clear the tx counters */
memset(tx_attempt, 0, sizeof(tx_attempt));
memset(tx_post, 0, sizeof(tx_post));
memset(tx_complete, 0, sizeof(tx_complete));
#ifdef HTC_RAW_INTERFACE
if (ar->arRawHtc) {
kfree(ar->arRawHtc);
ar->arRawHtc = NULL;
}
#endif
/* Free up the device data structure */
if (unregister && is_netdev_registered) {
unregister_netdev(dev);
is_netdev_registered = 0;
}
free_netdev(dev);
ar6k_cfg80211_deinit(ar);
#ifdef CONFIG_AP_VIRTUL_ADAPTER_SUPPORT
ar6000_remove_ap_interface();
#endif /*CONFIG_AP_VIRTUAL_ADAPTER_SUPPORT */
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO,("-ar6000_destroy \n"));
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: linux_md_expand_completed_cb (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
gboolean job_was_cancelled,
int status,
const char *stderr,
const char *stdout,
gpointer user_data)
{
if (WEXITSTATUS (status) == 0 && !job_was_cancelled)
{
/* the kernel side of md currently doesn't emit a 'changed' event so
* generate one since state may have changed (e.g. rebuild started etc.)
*/
device_generate_kernel_change_event (device);
dbus_g_method_return (context);
}
else
{
if (job_was_cancelled)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_CANCELLED, "Job was cancelled");
}
else
{
throw_error (context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error expanding array: helper script exited with exit code %d: %s",
WEXITSTATUS (status),
stderr);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::GetType() {
if (web_contents() &&
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(web_contents())->GetOuterWebContents()) {
return kTypeGuest;
}
if (IsChildFrame())
return kTypeFrame;
DevToolsManager* manager = DevToolsManager::GetInstance();
if (manager->delegate() && web_contents()) {
std::string type = manager->delegate()->GetTargetType(web_contents());
if (!type.empty())
return type;
}
return kTypePage;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,664 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hns_rcb_set_port_timeout(
struct rcb_common_cb *rcb_common, u32 port_idx, u32 timeout)
{
if (AE_IS_VER1(rcb_common->dsaf_dev->dsaf_ver)) {
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common, RCB_CFG_OVERTIME_REG,
timeout * HNS_RCB_CLK_FREQ_MHZ);
} else if (!HNS_DSAF_IS_DEBUG(rcb_common->dsaf_dev)) {
if (timeout > HNS_RCB_DEF_GAP_TIME_USECS)
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common,
RCB_PORT_INT_GAPTIME_REG + port_idx * 4,
HNS_RCB_DEF_GAP_TIME_USECS);
else
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common,
RCB_PORT_INT_GAPTIME_REG + port_idx * 4,
timeout);
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common,
RCB_PORT_CFG_OVERTIME_REG + port_idx * 4,
timeout);
} else {
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common,
RCB_PORT_CFG_OVERTIME_REG + port_idx * 4,
timeout);
}
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void v9fs_getattr(void *opaque)
{
int32_t fid;
size_t offset = 7;
ssize_t retval = 0;
struct stat stbuf;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
uint64_t request_mask;
V9fsStatDotl v9stat_dotl;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
retval = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dq", &fid, &request_mask);
if (retval < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_getattr(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, request_mask);
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
retval = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
/*
* Currently we only support BASIC fields in stat, so there is no
* need to look at request_mask.
*/
retval = v9fs_co_lstat(pdu, &fidp->path, &stbuf);
if (retval < 0) {
goto out;
}
stat_to_v9stat_dotl(s, &stbuf, &v9stat_dotl);
/* fill st_gen if requested and supported by underlying fs */
if (request_mask & P9_STATS_GEN) {
retval = v9fs_co_st_gen(pdu, &fidp->path, stbuf.st_mode, &v9stat_dotl);
switch (retval) {
case 0:
/* we have valid st_gen: update result mask */
v9stat_dotl.st_result_mask |= P9_STATS_GEN;
break;
case -EINTR:
/* request cancelled, e.g. by Tflush */
goto out;
default:
/* failed to get st_gen: not fatal, ignore */
break;
}
}
retval = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "A", &v9stat_dotl);
if (retval < 0) {
goto out;
}
retval += offset;
trace_v9fs_getattr_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id, v9stat_dotl.st_result_mask,
v9stat_dotl.st_mode, v9stat_dotl.st_uid,
v9stat_dotl.st_gid);
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, retval);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentRendererClient::OverrideCreatePlugin(
content::RenderView* render_view,
WebFrame* frame,
const WebPluginParams& params,
WebPlugin** plugin) {
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status status;
webkit::WebPluginInfo plugin_info;
std::string actual_mime_type;
render_view->Send(new ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo(
render_view->GetRoutingID(), GURL(params.url),
frame->top()->document().url(), params.mimeType.utf8(),
&status, &plugin_info, &actual_mime_type));
*plugin = CreatePlugin(render_view, frame, params,
status, plugin_info, actual_mime_type);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Do not require DevTools extension resources to be white-listed in manifest.
Currently, resources used by DevTools extensions need to be white-listed as web_accessible_resources in manifest. This is quite inconvenitent and appears to be an overkill, given the fact that DevTools front-end is
(a) trusted and
(b) picky on the frames it loads.
This change adds resources that belong to DevTools extensions and are being loaded into a DevTools front-end page to the list of exceptions from web_accessible_resources check.
BUG=none
TEST=DevToolsExtensionTest.*
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9663076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 108,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void hsr_handle_sup_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, struct hsr_node *node_curr,
struct hsr_port *port_rcv)
{
struct ethhdr *ethhdr;
struct hsr_node *node_real;
struct hsr_sup_payload *hsr_sp;
struct list_head *node_db;
int i;
ethhdr = (struct ethhdr *) skb_mac_header(skb);
/* Leave the ethernet header. */
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ethhdr));
/* And leave the HSR tag. */
if (ethhdr->h_proto == htons(ETH_P_HSR))
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct hsr_tag));
/* And leave the HSR sup tag. */
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct hsr_sup_tag));
hsr_sp = (struct hsr_sup_payload *) skb->data;
/* Merge node_curr (registered on MacAddressB) into node_real */
node_db = &port_rcv->hsr->node_db;
node_real = find_node_by_AddrA(node_db, hsr_sp->MacAddressA);
if (!node_real)
/* No frame received from AddrA of this node yet */
node_real = hsr_add_node(node_db, hsr_sp->MacAddressA,
HSR_SEQNR_START - 1);
if (!node_real)
goto done; /* No mem */
if (node_real == node_curr)
/* Node has already been merged */
goto done;
ether_addr_copy(node_real->MacAddressB, ethhdr->h_source);
for (i = 0; i < HSR_PT_PORTS; i++) {
if (!node_curr->time_in_stale[i] &&
time_after(node_curr->time_in[i], node_real->time_in[i])) {
node_real->time_in[i] = node_curr->time_in[i];
node_real->time_in_stale[i] = node_curr->time_in_stale[i];
}
if (seq_nr_after(node_curr->seq_out[i], node_real->seq_out[i]))
node_real->seq_out[i] = node_curr->seq_out[i];
}
node_real->AddrB_port = port_rcv->type;
list_del_rcu(&node_curr->mac_list);
kfree_rcu(node_curr, rcu_head);
done:
skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct hsrv1_ethhdr_sp));
}
Commit Message: net: hsr: fix memory leak in hsr_dev_finalize()
If hsr_add_port(hsr, hsr_dev, HSR_PT_MASTER) failed to
add port, it directly returns res and forgets to free the node
that allocated in hsr_create_self_node(), and forgets to delete
the node->mac_list linked in hsr->self_node_db.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881cfa0c780 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor.0", pid 2077, jiffies 4294717969 (age 2415.377s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
e0 c7 a0 cf 81 88 ff ff 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de ................
00 e6 49 cd 81 88 ff ff c0 9b 87 d0 81 88 ff ff ..I.............
backtrace:
[<00000000e2ff5070>] hsr_dev_finalize+0x736/0x960 [hsr]
[<000000003ed2e597>] hsr_newlink+0x2b2/0x3e0 [hsr]
[<000000003fa8c6b6>] __rtnl_newlink+0xf1f/0x1600 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3182
[<000000001247a7ad>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3240
[<00000000e7d1b61d>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x54e/0xb90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5130
[<000000005556bd3a>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x129/0x340 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast+0x49a/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
[<000000009d56f9b7>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xdf0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg+0xc3/0x100 net/socket.c:631
[<00000000d208adc9>] __sys_sendto+0x33e/0x560 net/socket.c:1786
[<00000000b582837a>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1798 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1794 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1794
[<00000000c866801d>] do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000fea382d9>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<00000000e01dacb3>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Fixes: c5a759117210 ("net/hsr: Use list_head (and rcu) instead of array for slave devices.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vnc_disconnect_start(VncState *vs)
{
if (vs->csock == -1)
return;
vnc_set_share_mode(vs, VNC_SHARE_MODE_DISCONNECTED);
qemu_set_fd_handler2(vs->csock, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
closesocket(vs->csock);
vs->csock = -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_ccm_auth(struct aead_request *req, struct scatterlist *plain,
unsigned int cryptlen)
{
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx(req);
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_ccm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACK(ahreq, ctx->mac);
unsigned int assoclen = req->assoclen;
struct scatterlist sg[3];
u8 odata[16];
u8 idata[16];
int ilen, err;
/* format control data for input */
err = format_input(odata, req, cryptlen);
if (err)
goto out;
sg_init_table(sg, 3);
sg_set_buf(&sg[0], odata, 16);
/* format associated data and compute into mac */
if (assoclen) {
ilen = format_adata(idata, assoclen);
sg_set_buf(&sg[1], idata, ilen);
sg_chain(sg, 3, req->src);
} else {
ilen = 0;
sg_chain(sg, 2, req->src);
}
ahash_request_set_tfm(ahreq, ctx->mac);
ahash_request_set_callback(ahreq, pctx->flags, NULL, NULL);
ahash_request_set_crypt(ahreq, sg, NULL, assoclen + ilen + 16);
err = crypto_ahash_init(ahreq);
if (err)
goto out;
err = crypto_ahash_update(ahreq);
if (err)
goto out;
/* we need to pad the MAC input to a round multiple of the block size */
ilen = 16 - (assoclen + ilen) % 16;
if (ilen < 16) {
memset(idata, 0, ilen);
sg_init_table(sg, 2);
sg_set_buf(&sg[0], idata, ilen);
if (plain)
sg_chain(sg, 2, plain);
plain = sg;
cryptlen += ilen;
}
ahash_request_set_crypt(ahreq, plain, pctx->odata, cryptlen);
err = crypto_ahash_finup(ahreq);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: ccm - move cbcmac input off the stack
Commit f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
refactored the CCM driver to allow separate implementations of the
underlying MAC to be provided by a platform. However, in doing so, it
moved some data from the linear region to the stack, which violates the
SG constraints when the stack is virtually mapped.
So move idata/odata back to the request ctx struct, of which we can
reasonably expect that it has been allocated using kmalloc() et al.
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Fixes: f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: init_ports(struct ofproto *p)
{
struct ofproto_port_dump dump;
struct ofproto_port ofproto_port;
struct shash_node *node, *next;
OFPROTO_PORT_FOR_EACH (&ofproto_port, &dump, p) {
const char *name = ofproto_port.name;
if (shash_find(&p->port_by_name, name)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "%s: ignoring duplicate device %s in datapath",
p->name, name);
} else {
struct ofputil_phy_port pp;
struct netdev *netdev;
/* Check if an OpenFlow port number had been requested. */
node = shash_find(&init_ofp_ports, name);
if (node) {
const struct iface_hint *iface_hint = node->data;
simap_put(&p->ofp_requests, name,
ofp_to_u16(iface_hint->ofp_port));
}
netdev = ofport_open(p, &ofproto_port, &pp);
if (netdev) {
ofport_install(p, netdev, &pp);
if (ofp_to_u16(ofproto_port.ofp_port) < p->max_ports) {
p->alloc_port_no = MAX(p->alloc_port_no,
ofp_to_u16(ofproto_port.ofp_port));
}
}
}
}
SHASH_FOR_EACH_SAFE(node, next, &init_ofp_ports) {
struct iface_hint *iface_hint = node->data;
if (!strcmp(iface_hint->br_name, p->name)) {
free(iface_hint->br_name);
free(iface_hint->br_type);
free(iface_hint);
shash_delete(&init_ofp_ports, node);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptValue WebGL2RenderingContextBase::getSyncParameter(
ScriptState* script_state,
WebGLSync* sync,
GLenum pname) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateWebGLObject("getSyncParameter", sync))
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
switch (pname) {
case GL_OBJECT_TYPE:
case GL_SYNC_STATUS:
case GL_SYNC_CONDITION:
case GL_SYNC_FLAGS: {
GLint value = 0;
GLsizei length = -1;
ContextGL()->GetSynciv(SyncObjectOrZero(sync), pname, 1, &length, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<unsigned>(value));
}
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getSyncParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionAppItem::OnExtensionPreferenceChanged() {
if (has_overlay_ != NeedsOverlay())
UpdateIcon();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btrfs_comp_cpu_keys(struct btrfs_key *k1, struct btrfs_key *k2)
{
if (k1->objectid > k2->objectid)
return 1;
if (k1->objectid < k2->objectid)
return -1;
if (k1->type > k2->type)
return 1;
if (k1->type < k2->type)
return -1;
if (k1->offset > k2->offset)
return 1;
if (k1->offset < k2->offset)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 45,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vcc_def_wakeup(struct sock *sk)
{
struct socket_wq *wq;
rcu_read_lock();
wq = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_wq);
if (wq_has_sleeper(wq))
wake_up(&wq->wait);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: atm: update msg_namelen in vcc_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about vcc_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void update_params(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct illinois *ca = inet_csk_ca(sk);
if (tp->snd_cwnd < win_thresh) {
ca->alpha = ALPHA_BASE;
ca->beta = BETA_BASE;
} else if (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) {
u32 dm = max_delay(ca);
u32 da = avg_delay(ca);
ca->alpha = alpha(ca, da, dm);
ca->beta = beta(da, dm);
}
rtt_reset(sk);
}
Commit Message: net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinois
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 18,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DevtoolsInterceptionWithAuthProxyTest()
: proxy_server_(net::SpawnedTestServer::TYPE_BASIC_AUTH_PROXY,
base::FilePath(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("headless/test/data"))) {
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataDirectoryService::AddEntryToResourceMap(GDataEntry* entry) {
DVLOG(1) << "AddEntryToResourceMap " << entry->resource_id();
resource_map_.insert(std::make_pair(entry->resource_id(), entry));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GfxImageColorMap::GfxImageColorMap(GfxImageColorMap *colorMap) {
int n, i, k;
colorSpace = colorMap->colorSpace->copy();
bits = colorMap->bits;
nComps = colorMap->nComps;
nComps2 = colorMap->nComps2;
colorSpace2 = NULL;
for (k = 0; k < gfxColorMaxComps; ++k) {
lookup[k] = NULL;
}
n = 1 << bits;
if (colorSpace->getMode() == csIndexed) {
colorSpace2 = ((GfxIndexedColorSpace *)colorSpace)->getBase();
for (k = 0; k < nComps2; ++k) {
lookup[k] = (GfxColorComp *)gmallocn(n, sizeof(GfxColorComp));
memcpy(lookup[k], colorMap->lookup[k], n * sizeof(GfxColorComp));
}
} else if (colorSpace->getMode() == csSeparation) {
colorSpace2 = ((GfxSeparationColorSpace *)colorSpace)->getAlt();
for (k = 0; k < nComps2; ++k) {
lookup[k] = (GfxColorComp *)gmallocn(n, sizeof(GfxColorComp));
memcpy(lookup[k], colorMap->lookup[k], n * sizeof(GfxColorComp));
}
} else {
for (k = 0; k < nComps; ++k) {
lookup[k] = (GfxColorComp *)gmallocn(n, sizeof(GfxColorComp));
memcpy(lookup[k], colorMap->lookup[k], n * sizeof(GfxColorComp));
}
}
for (i = 0; i < nComps; ++i) {
decodeLow[i] = colorMap->decodeLow[i];
decodeRange[i] = colorMap->decodeRange[i];
}
ok = gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Condor_Auth_SSL :: server_receive_message( int /* server_status */, char *buf, BIO *conn_in, BIO * /* conn_out */)
{
int client_status;
int len;
int rv;
int written;
if( receive_message( client_status, len, buf ) == AUTH_SSL_ERROR ) {
return AUTH_SSL_ERROR;
}
if( len > 0 ) {
written = 0;
while( written < len ) {
rv = BIO_write( conn_in, buf, len );
if( rv <= 0 ) {
ouch( "Couldn't write connection data into bio\n" );
return AUTH_SSL_ERROR;
break;
}
written += rv;
}
}
return client_status;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int lh_table_delete_entry(struct lh_table *t, struct lh_entry *e)
{
ptrdiff_t n = (ptrdiff_t)(e - t->table); /* CAW: fixed to be 64bit nice, still need the crazy negative case... */
/* CAW: this is bad, really bad, maybe stack goes other direction on this machine... */
if(n < 0) { return -2; }
if(t->table[n].k == LH_EMPTY || t->table[n].k == LH_FREED) return -1;
t->count--;
if(t->free_fn) t->free_fn(e);
t->table[n].v = NULL;
t->table[n].k = LH_FREED;
if(t->tail == &t->table[n] && t->head == &t->table[n]) {
t->head = t->tail = NULL;
} else if (t->head == &t->table[n]) {
t->head->next->prev = NULL;
t->head = t->head->next;
} else if (t->tail == &t->table[n]) {
t->tail->prev->next = NULL;
t->tail = t->tail->prev;
} else {
t->table[n].prev->next = t->table[n].next;
t->table[n].next->prev = t->table[n].prev;
}
t->table[n].next = t->table[n].prev = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Patch to address the following issues:
* CVE-2013-6371: hash collision denial of service
* CVE-2013-6370: buffer overflow if size_t is larger than int
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 40,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int rds_send_is_acked(struct rds_message *rm, u64 ack,
is_acked_func is_acked)
{
if (is_acked)
return is_acked(rm, ack);
return be64_to_cpu(rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_sequence) <= ack;
}
Commit Message: RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on unbound socket
Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when
sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused
by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks
the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a
race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not
in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to
dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create().
Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if
you're interested.
I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer
with this patch, whereas I could without.
Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937:
74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection")
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 41,952 |
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