instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tst_QQuickWebView::loadProgress()
{
QCOMPARE(webView()->loadProgress(), 0);
webView()->setUrl(QUrl::fromLocalFile(QLatin1String(TESTS_SOURCE_DIR "/html/basic_page.html")));
QSignalSpy loadProgressChangedSpy(webView(), SIGNAL(loadProgressChanged()));
QVERIFY(waitForLoadSucceeded(webView()));
QVERIFY(loadProgressChangedSpy.count() >= 1);
QCOMPARE(webView()->loadProgress(), 100);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lzo_decompress(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *src,
unsigned int slen, u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen)
{
int err;
size_t tmp_len = *dlen; /* size_t(ulong) <-> uint on 64 bit */
err = lzo1x_decompress_safe(src, slen, dst, &tmp_len);
if (err != LZO_E_OK)
return -EINVAL;
*dlen = tmp_len;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionContextMenuModel::ExtensionUninstallAccepted() {
if (GetExtension())
profile_->GetExtensionService()->UninstallExtension(extension_id_, false,
NULL);
Release();
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long prune_dcache_sb(struct super_block *sb, struct shrink_control *sc)
{
LIST_HEAD(dispose);
long freed;
freed = list_lru_shrink_walk(&sb->s_dentry_lru, sc,
dentry_lru_isolate, &dispose);
shrink_dentry_list(&dispose);
return freed;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PanoramiXRenderInit (void)
{
int i;
XRT_PICTURE = CreateNewResourceType (XineramaDeleteResource,
"XineramaPicture");
if (RenderErrBase)
SetResourceTypeErrorValue(XRT_PICTURE, RenderErrBase + BadPicture);
for (i = 0; i < RenderNumberRequests; i++)
PanoramiXSaveRenderVector[i] = ProcRenderVector[i];
/*
* Stuff in Xinerama aware request processing hooks
*/
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderCreatePicture] = PanoramiXRenderCreatePicture;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderChangePicture] = PanoramiXRenderChangePicture;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderSetPictureTransform] = PanoramiXRenderSetPictureTransform;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderSetPictureFilter] = PanoramiXRenderSetPictureFilter;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderSetPictureClipRectangles] = PanoramiXRenderSetPictureClipRectangles;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderFreePicture] = PanoramiXRenderFreePicture;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderComposite] = PanoramiXRenderComposite;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderCompositeGlyphs8] = PanoramiXRenderCompositeGlyphs;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderCompositeGlyphs16] = PanoramiXRenderCompositeGlyphs;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderCompositeGlyphs32] = PanoramiXRenderCompositeGlyphs;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderFillRectangles] = PanoramiXRenderFillRectangles;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderTrapezoids] = PanoramiXRenderTrapezoids;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderTriangles] = PanoramiXRenderTriangles;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderTriStrip] = PanoramiXRenderTriStrip;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderTriFan] = PanoramiXRenderTriFan;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderAddTraps] = PanoramiXRenderAddTraps;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderCreateSolidFill] = PanoramiXRenderCreateSolidFill;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderCreateLinearGradient] = PanoramiXRenderCreateLinearGradient;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderCreateRadialGradient] = PanoramiXRenderCreateRadialGradient;
ProcRenderVector[X_RenderCreateConicalGradient] = PanoramiXRenderCreateConicalGradient;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XFixesDestroyRegion (Display *dpy, XserverRegion region)
{
XFixesExtDisplayInfo *info = XFixesFindDisplay (dpy);
xXFixesDestroyRegionReq *req;
XFixesSimpleCheckExtension (dpy, info);
LockDisplay (dpy);
GetReq (XFixesDestroyRegion, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->xfixesReqType = X_XFixesDestroyRegion;
req->region = region;
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 8,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void openpic_cpu_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t val,
unsigned len)
{
openpic_cpu_write_internal(opaque, addr, val, (addr & 0x1f000) >> 12);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline LineContribType * _gdContributionsAlloc(unsigned int line_length, unsigned int windows_size)
{
unsigned int u = 0;
LineContribType *res;
res = (LineContribType *) gdMalloc(sizeof(LineContribType));
if (!res) {
return NULL;
}
res->WindowSize = windows_size;
res->LineLength = line_length;
res->ContribRow = (ContributionType *) gdMalloc(line_length * sizeof(ContributionType));
for (u = 0 ; u < line_length ; u++) {
res->ContribRow[u].Weights = (double *) gdMalloc(windows_size * sizeof(double));
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #72227: imagescale out-of-bounds read
Ported from https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 95,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ec_mulm (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v, mpi_ec_t ctx)
{
mpi_mul (w, u, v);
ec_mod (w, ctx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_get_interlace_type(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr)
{
if (png_ptr != NULL && info_ptr != NULL)
return info_ptr->interlace_type;
return (0);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Guint JBIG2HuffmanDecoder::readBit() {
if (bufLen == 0) {
buf = str->getChar();
bufLen = 8;
}
--bufLen;
return (buf >> bufLen) & 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void hns_rcb_get_ring_regs(struct hnae_queue *queue, void *data)
{
u32 *regs = data;
struct ring_pair_cb *ring_pair
= container_of(queue, struct ring_pair_cb, q);
u32 i = 0;
/*rcb ring registers */
regs[0] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_BASEADDR_L_REG);
regs[1] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_BASEADDR_H_REG);
regs[2] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_BD_NUM_REG);
regs[3] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_BD_LEN_REG);
regs[4] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_PKTLINE_REG);
regs[5] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_TAIL_REG);
regs[6] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_HEAD_REG);
regs[7] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_FBDNUM_REG);
regs[8] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_RING_PKTNUM_RECORD_REG);
regs[9] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_BASEADDR_L_REG);
regs[10] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_BASEADDR_H_REG);
regs[11] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_BD_NUM_REG);
regs[12] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_BD_LEN_REG);
regs[13] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_PKTLINE_REG);
regs[15] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_TAIL_REG);
regs[16] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_HEAD_REG);
regs[17] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_FBDNUM_REG);
regs[18] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_OFFSET_REG);
regs[19] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_TX_RING_PKTNUM_RECORD_REG);
regs[20] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_PREFETCH_EN_REG);
regs[21] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_CFG_VF_NUM_REG);
regs[22] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_ASID_REG);
regs[23] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_RX_VM_REG);
regs[24] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_T0_BE_RST);
regs[25] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_COULD_BE_RST);
regs[26] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_WRR_WEIGHT_REG);
regs[27] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTMSK_RXWL_REG);
regs[28] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTSTS_RX_RING_REG);
regs[29] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTMSK_TXWL_REG);
regs[30] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTSTS_TX_RING_REG);
regs[31] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTMSK_RX_OVERTIME_REG);
regs[32] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTSTS_RX_OVERTIME_REG);
regs[33] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTMSK_TX_OVERTIME_REG);
regs[34] = dsaf_read_dev(queue, RCB_RING_INTSTS_TX_OVERTIME_REG);
/* mark end of ring regs */
for (i = 35; i < 40; i++)
regs[i] = 0xcccccc00 + ring_pair->index;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String TextCodecUTF8::Decode(const char* bytes,
wtf_size_t length,
FlushBehavior flush,
bool stop_on_error,
bool& saw_error) {
const bool do_flush = flush != FlushBehavior::kDoNotFlush;
StringBuffer<LChar> buffer(partial_sequence_size_ + length);
const uint8_t* source = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(bytes);
const uint8_t* end = source + length;
const uint8_t* aligned_end = AlignToMachineWord(end);
LChar* destination = buffer.Characters();
do {
if (partial_sequence_size_) {
LChar* destination_for_handle_partial_sequence = destination;
const uint8_t* source_for_handle_partial_sequence = source;
if (HandlePartialSequence(destination_for_handle_partial_sequence,
source_for_handle_partial_sequence, end,
do_flush, stop_on_error, saw_error)) {
source = source_for_handle_partial_sequence;
goto upConvertTo16Bit;
}
destination = destination_for_handle_partial_sequence;
source = source_for_handle_partial_sequence;
if (partial_sequence_size_)
break;
}
while (source < end) {
if (IsASCII(*source)) {
if (IsAlignedToMachineWord(source)) {
while (source < aligned_end) {
MachineWord chunk =
*reinterpret_cast_ptr<const MachineWord*>(source);
if (!IsAllASCII<LChar>(chunk))
break;
CopyASCIIMachineWord(destination, source);
source += sizeof(MachineWord);
destination += sizeof(MachineWord);
}
if (source == end)
break;
if (!IsASCII(*source))
continue;
}
*destination++ = *source++;
continue;
}
int count = NonASCIISequenceLength(*source);
int character;
if (count == 0) {
character = kNonCharacter1;
} else {
if (count > end - source) {
SECURITY_DCHECK(end - source <
static_cast<ptrdiff_t>(sizeof(partial_sequence_)));
DCHECK(!partial_sequence_size_);
partial_sequence_size_ = static_cast<wtf_size_t>(end - source);
memcpy(partial_sequence_, source, partial_sequence_size_);
source = end;
break;
}
character = DecodeNonASCIISequence(source, count);
}
if (IsNonCharacter(character)) {
saw_error = true;
if (stop_on_error)
break;
goto upConvertTo16Bit;
}
if (character > 0xff)
goto upConvertTo16Bit;
source += count;
*destination++ = static_cast<LChar>(character);
}
} while (do_flush && partial_sequence_size_);
buffer.Shrink(static_cast<wtf_size_t>(destination - buffer.Characters()));
return String::Adopt(buffer);
upConvertTo16Bit:
StringBuffer<UChar> buffer16(partial_sequence_size_ + length);
UChar* destination16 = buffer16.Characters();
for (LChar* converted8 = buffer.Characters(); converted8 < destination;)
*destination16++ = *converted8++;
do {
if (partial_sequence_size_) {
UChar* destination_for_handle_partial_sequence = destination16;
const uint8_t* source_for_handle_partial_sequence = source;
HandlePartialSequence(destination_for_handle_partial_sequence,
source_for_handle_partial_sequence, end, do_flush,
stop_on_error, saw_error);
destination16 = destination_for_handle_partial_sequence;
source = source_for_handle_partial_sequence;
if (partial_sequence_size_)
break;
}
while (source < end) {
if (IsASCII(*source)) {
if (IsAlignedToMachineWord(source)) {
while (source < aligned_end) {
MachineWord chunk =
*reinterpret_cast_ptr<const MachineWord*>(source);
if (!IsAllASCII<LChar>(chunk))
break;
CopyASCIIMachineWord(destination16, source);
source += sizeof(MachineWord);
destination16 += sizeof(MachineWord);
}
if (source == end)
break;
if (!IsASCII(*source))
continue;
}
*destination16++ = *source++;
continue;
}
int count = NonASCIISequenceLength(*source);
int character;
if (count == 0) {
character = kNonCharacter1;
} else {
if (count > end - source) {
SECURITY_DCHECK(end - source <
static_cast<ptrdiff_t>(sizeof(partial_sequence_)));
DCHECK(!partial_sequence_size_);
partial_sequence_size_ = static_cast<wtf_size_t>(end - source);
memcpy(partial_sequence_, source, partial_sequence_size_);
source = end;
break;
}
character = DecodeNonASCIISequence(source, count);
}
if (IsNonCharacter(character)) {
saw_error = true;
if (stop_on_error)
break;
*destination16++ = kReplacementCharacter;
source -= character;
continue;
}
source += count;
destination16 = AppendCharacter(destination16, character);
}
} while (do_flush && partial_sequence_size_);
buffer16.Shrink(
static_cast<wtf_size_t>(destination16 - buffer16.Characters()));
return String::Adopt(buffer16);
}
Commit Message: Add bounds CHECK to UTF-8 decoder memory allocation.
Avoid integer overflow when computing a total buffer size from a base
buffer and small partial sequence buffer.
Bug: 901030
Change-Id: Ic82db2c6af770bd748fb1ec881999d0dfaac30f0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1313833
Reviewed-by: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605011}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 172,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sha256_ssse3_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int partial = sctx->count % SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE;
int res;
/* Handle the fast case right here */
if (partial + len < SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) {
sctx->count += len;
memcpy(sctx->buf + partial, data, len);
return 0;
}
if (!irq_fpu_usable()) {
res = crypto_sha256_update(desc, data, len);
} else {
kernel_fpu_begin();
res = __sha256_ssse3_update(desc, data, len, partial);
kernel_fpu_end();
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool NavigationController::CanViewSource() const {
bool is_supported_mime_type = net::IsSupportedNonImageMimeType(
tab_contents_->contents_mime_type().c_str());
NavigationEntry* active_entry = GetActiveEntry();
return active_entry && !active_entry->IsViewSourceMode() &&
is_supported_mime_type;
}
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 99,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: certauth_dbmatch_initvt(krb5_context context, int maj_ver, int min_ver,
krb5_plugin_vtable vtable)
{
krb5_certauth_vtable vt;
if (maj_ver != 1)
return KRB5_PLUGIN_VER_NOTSUPP;
vt = (krb5_certauth_vtable)vtable;
vt->name = "dbmatch";
vt->authorize = dbmatch_authorize;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix certauth built-in module returns
The PKINIT certauth eku module should never authoritatively authorize
a certificate, because an extended key usage does not establish a
relationship between the certificate and any specific user; it only
establishes that the certificate was created for PKINIT client
authentication. Therefore, pkinit_eku_authorize() should return
KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE on success, not 0.
The certauth san module should pass if it does not find any SANs of
the types it can match against; the presence of other types of SANs
should not cause it to explicitly deny a certificate. Check for an
empty result from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() in verify_client_san(),
instead of returning ENOENT from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() when
there are no SANs at all.
ticket: 8561
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 96,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool sas_ata_qc_fill_rtf(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
{
struct domain_device *dev = qc->ap->private_data;
ata_tf_from_fis(dev->sata_dev.fis, &qc->result_tf);
return true;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 85,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VASNPRINTF (DCHAR_T *resultbuf, size_t *lengthp,
const FCHAR_T *format, va_list args)
{
DIRECTIVES d;
arguments a;
if (PRINTF_PARSE (format, &d, &a) < 0)
/* errno is already set. */
return NULL;
#define CLEANUP() \
if (d.dir != d.direct_alloc_dir) \
free (d.dir); \
if (a.arg != a.direct_alloc_arg) \
free (a.arg);
if (PRINTF_FETCHARGS (args, &a) < 0)
{
CLEANUP ();
errno = EINVAL;
return NULL;
}
{
size_t buf_neededlength;
TCHAR_T *buf;
TCHAR_T *buf_malloced;
const FCHAR_T *cp;
size_t i;
DIRECTIVE *dp;
/* Output string accumulator. */
DCHAR_T *result;
size_t allocated;
size_t length;
/* Allocate a small buffer that will hold a directive passed to
sprintf or snprintf. */
buf_neededlength =
xsum4 (7, d.max_width_length, d.max_precision_length, 6);
#if HAVE_ALLOCA
if (buf_neededlength < 4000 / sizeof (TCHAR_T))
{
buf = (TCHAR_T *) alloca (buf_neededlength * sizeof (TCHAR_T));
buf_malloced = NULL;
}
else
#endif
{
size_t buf_memsize = xtimes (buf_neededlength, sizeof (TCHAR_T));
if (size_overflow_p (buf_memsize))
goto out_of_memory_1;
buf = (TCHAR_T *) malloc (buf_memsize);
if (buf == NULL)
goto out_of_memory_1;
buf_malloced = buf;
}
if (resultbuf != NULL)
{
result = resultbuf;
allocated = *lengthp;
}
else
{
result = NULL;
allocated = 0;
}
length = 0;
/* Invariants:
result is either == resultbuf or == NULL or malloc-allocated.
If length > 0, then result != NULL. */
/* Ensures that allocated >= needed. Aborts through a jump to
out_of_memory if needed is SIZE_MAX or otherwise too big. */
#define ENSURE_ALLOCATION(needed) \
if ((needed) > allocated) \
{ \
size_t memory_size; \
DCHAR_T *memory; \
\
allocated = (allocated > 0 ? xtimes (allocated, 2) : 12); \
if ((needed) > allocated) \
allocated = (needed); \
memory_size = xtimes (allocated, sizeof (DCHAR_T)); \
if (size_overflow_p (memory_size)) \
goto out_of_memory; \
if (result == resultbuf || result == NULL) \
memory = (DCHAR_T *) malloc (memory_size); \
else \
memory = (DCHAR_T *) realloc (result, memory_size); \
if (memory == NULL) \
goto out_of_memory; \
if (result == resultbuf && length > 0) \
DCHAR_CPY (memory, result, length); \
result = memory; \
}
for (cp = format, i = 0, dp = &d.dir[0]; ; cp = dp->dir_end, i++, dp++)
{
if (cp != dp->dir_start)
{
size_t n = dp->dir_start - cp;
size_t augmented_length = xsum (length, n);
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (augmented_length);
/* This copies a piece of FCHAR_T[] into a DCHAR_T[]. Here we
need that the format string contains only ASCII characters
if FCHAR_T and DCHAR_T are not the same type. */
if (sizeof (FCHAR_T) == sizeof (DCHAR_T))
{
DCHAR_CPY (result + length, (const DCHAR_T *) cp, n);
length = augmented_length;
}
else
{
do
result[length++] = *cp++;
while (--n > 0);
}
}
if (i == d.count)
break;
/* Execute a single directive. */
if (dp->conversion == '%')
{
size_t augmented_length;
if (!(dp->arg_index == ARG_NONE))
abort ();
augmented_length = xsum (length, 1);
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (augmented_length);
result[length] = '%';
length = augmented_length;
}
else
{
if (!(dp->arg_index != ARG_NONE))
abort ();
if (dp->conversion == 'n')
{
switch (a.arg[dp->arg_index].type)
{
case TYPE_COUNT_SCHAR_POINTER:
*a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_count_schar_pointer = length;
break;
case TYPE_COUNT_SHORT_POINTER:
*a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_count_short_pointer = length;
break;
case TYPE_COUNT_INT_POINTER:
*a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_count_int_pointer = length;
break;
case TYPE_COUNT_LONGINT_POINTER:
*a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_count_longint_pointer = length;
break;
#if HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT
case TYPE_COUNT_LONGLONGINT_POINTER:
*a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_count_longlongint_pointer = length;
break;
#endif
default:
abort ();
}
}
#if ENABLE_UNISTDIO
/* The unistdio extensions. */
else if (dp->conversion == 'U')
{
arg_type type = a.arg[dp->arg_index].type;
int flags = dp->flags;
int has_width;
size_t width;
int has_precision;
size_t precision;
has_width = 0;
width = 0;
if (dp->width_start != dp->width_end)
{
if (dp->width_arg_index != ARG_NONE)
{
int arg;
if (!(a.arg[dp->width_arg_index].type == TYPE_INT))
abort ();
arg = a.arg[dp->width_arg_index].a.a_int;
width = arg;
if (arg < 0)
{
/* "A negative field width is taken as a '-' flag
followed by a positive field width." */
flags |= FLAG_LEFT;
width = -width;
}
}
else
{
const FCHAR_T *digitp = dp->width_start;
do
width = xsum (xtimes (width, 10), *digitp++ - '0');
while (digitp != dp->width_end);
}
has_width = 1;
}
has_precision = 0;
precision = 0;
if (dp->precision_start != dp->precision_end)
{
if (dp->precision_arg_index != ARG_NONE)
{
int arg;
if (!(a.arg[dp->precision_arg_index].type == TYPE_INT))
abort ();
arg = a.arg[dp->precision_arg_index].a.a_int;
/* "A negative precision is taken as if the precision
were omitted." */
if (arg >= 0)
{
precision = arg;
has_precision = 1;
}
}
else
{
const FCHAR_T *digitp = dp->precision_start + 1;
precision = 0;
while (digitp != dp->precision_end)
precision = xsum (xtimes (precision, 10), *digitp++ - '0');
has_precision = 1;
}
}
switch (type)
{
case TYPE_U8_STRING:
{
const uint8_t *arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_u8_string;
const uint8_t *arg_end;
size_t characters;
if (has_precision)
{
/* Use only PRECISION characters, from the left. */
arg_end = arg;
characters = 0;
for (; precision > 0; precision--)
{
int count = u8_strmblen (arg_end);
if (count == 0)
break;
if (count < 0)
{
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = EILSEQ;
return NULL;
}
arg_end += count;
characters++;
}
}
else if (has_width)
{
/* Use the entire string, and count the number of
characters. */
arg_end = arg;
characters = 0;
for (;;)
{
int count = u8_strmblen (arg_end);
if (count == 0)
break;
if (count < 0)
{
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = EILSEQ;
return NULL;
}
arg_end += count;
characters++;
}
}
else
{
/* Use the entire string. */
arg_end = arg + u8_strlen (arg);
/* The number of characters doesn't matter. */
characters = 0;
}
if (characters < width && !(dp->flags & FLAG_LEFT))
{
size_t n = width - characters;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, n));
DCHAR_SET (result + length, ' ', n);
length += n;
}
# if DCHAR_IS_UINT8_T
{
size_t n = arg_end - arg;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, n));
DCHAR_CPY (result + length, arg, n);
length += n;
}
# else
{ /* Convert. */
DCHAR_T *converted = result + length;
size_t converted_len = allocated - length;
# if DCHAR_IS_TCHAR
/* Convert from UTF-8 to locale encoding. */
converted =
u8_conv_to_encoding (locale_charset (),
iconveh_question_mark,
arg, arg_end - arg, NULL,
converted, &converted_len);
# else
/* Convert from UTF-8 to UTF-16/UTF-32. */
converted =
U8_TO_DCHAR (arg, arg_end - arg,
converted, &converted_len);
# endif
if (converted == NULL)
{
int saved_errno = errno;
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = saved_errno;
return NULL;
}
if (converted != result + length)
{
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, converted_len));
DCHAR_CPY (result + length, converted, converted_len);
free (converted);
}
length += converted_len;
}
# endif
if (characters < width && (dp->flags & FLAG_LEFT))
{
size_t n = width - characters;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, n));
DCHAR_SET (result + length, ' ', n);
length += n;
}
}
break;
case TYPE_U16_STRING:
{
const uint16_t *arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_u16_string;
const uint16_t *arg_end;
size_t characters;
if (has_precision)
{
/* Use only PRECISION characters, from the left. */
arg_end = arg;
characters = 0;
for (; precision > 0; precision--)
{
int count = u16_strmblen (arg_end);
if (count == 0)
break;
if (count < 0)
{
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = EILSEQ;
return NULL;
}
arg_end += count;
characters++;
}
}
else if (has_width)
{
/* Use the entire string, and count the number of
characters. */
arg_end = arg;
characters = 0;
for (;;)
{
int count = u16_strmblen (arg_end);
if (count == 0)
break;
if (count < 0)
{
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = EILSEQ;
return NULL;
}
arg_end += count;
characters++;
}
}
else
{
/* Use the entire string. */
arg_end = arg + u16_strlen (arg);
/* The number of characters doesn't matter. */
characters = 0;
}
if (characters < width && !(dp->flags & FLAG_LEFT))
{
size_t n = width - characters;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, n));
DCHAR_SET (result + length, ' ', n);
length += n;
}
# if DCHAR_IS_UINT16_T
{
size_t n = arg_end - arg;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, n));
DCHAR_CPY (result + length, arg, n);
length += n;
}
# else
{ /* Convert. */
DCHAR_T *converted = result + length;
size_t converted_len = allocated - length;
# if DCHAR_IS_TCHAR
/* Convert from UTF-16 to locale encoding. */
converted =
u16_conv_to_encoding (locale_charset (),
iconveh_question_mark,
arg, arg_end - arg, NULL,
converted, &converted_len);
# else
/* Convert from UTF-16 to UTF-8/UTF-32. */
converted =
U16_TO_DCHAR (arg, arg_end - arg,
converted, &converted_len);
# endif
if (converted == NULL)
{
int saved_errno = errno;
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = saved_errno;
return NULL;
}
if (converted != result + length)
{
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, converted_len));
DCHAR_CPY (result + length, converted, converted_len);
free (converted);
}
length += converted_len;
}
# endif
if (characters < width && (dp->flags & FLAG_LEFT))
{
size_t n = width - characters;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, n));
DCHAR_SET (result + length, ' ', n);
length += n;
}
}
break;
case TYPE_U32_STRING:
{
const uint32_t *arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_u32_string;
const uint32_t *arg_end;
size_t characters;
if (has_precision)
{
/* Use only PRECISION characters, from the left. */
arg_end = arg;
characters = 0;
for (; precision > 0; precision--)
{
int count = u32_strmblen (arg_end);
if (count == 0)
break;
if (count < 0)
{
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = EILSEQ;
return NULL;
}
arg_end += count;
characters++;
}
}
else if (has_width)
{
/* Use the entire string, and count the number of
characters. */
arg_end = arg;
characters = 0;
for (;;)
{
int count = u32_strmblen (arg_end);
if (count == 0)
break;
if (count < 0)
{
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = EILSEQ;
return NULL;
}
arg_end += count;
characters++;
}
}
else
{
/* Use the entire string. */
arg_end = arg + u32_strlen (arg);
/* The number of characters doesn't matter. */
characters = 0;
}
if (characters < width && !(dp->flags & FLAG_LEFT))
{
size_t n = width - characters;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, n));
DCHAR_SET (result + length, ' ', n);
length += n;
}
# if DCHAR_IS_UINT32_T
{
size_t n = arg_end - arg;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, n));
DCHAR_CPY (result + length, arg, n);
length += n;
}
# else
{ /* Convert. */
DCHAR_T *converted = result + length;
size_t converted_len = allocated - length;
# if DCHAR_IS_TCHAR
/* Convert from UTF-32 to locale encoding. */
converted =
u32_conv_to_encoding (locale_charset (),
iconveh_question_mark,
arg, arg_end - arg, NULL,
converted, &converted_len);
# else
/* Convert from UTF-32 to UTF-8/UTF-16. */
converted =
U32_TO_DCHAR (arg, arg_end - arg,
converted, &converted_len);
# endif
if (converted == NULL)
{
int saved_errno = errno;
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = saved_errno;
return NULL;
}
if (converted != result + length)
{
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, converted_len));
DCHAR_CPY (result + length, converted, converted_len);
free (converted);
}
length += converted_len;
}
# endif
if (characters < width && (dp->flags & FLAG_LEFT))
{
size_t n = width - characters;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, n));
DCHAR_SET (result + length, ' ', n);
length += n;
}
}
break;
default:
abort ();
}
}
#endif
#if (!USE_SNPRINTF || !HAVE_SNPRINTF_RETVAL_C99 || USE_MSVC__SNPRINTF || (NEED_PRINTF_DIRECTIVE_LS && !defined IN_LIBINTL)) && HAVE_WCHAR_T
else if (dp->conversion == 's'
# if WIDE_CHAR_VERSION
&& a.arg[dp->arg_index].type != TYPE_WIDE_STRING
# else
&& a.arg[dp->arg_index].type == TYPE_WIDE_STRING
# endif
)
{
/* The normal handling of the 's' directive below requires
allocating a temporary buffer. The determination of its
length (tmp_length), in the case when a precision is
specified, below requires a conversion between a char[]
string and a wchar_t[] wide string. It could be done, but
we have no guarantee that the implementation of sprintf will
use the exactly same algorithm. Without this guarantee, it
is possible to have buffer overrun bugs. In order to avoid
such bugs, we implement the entire processing of the 's'
directive ourselves. */
int flags = dp->flags;
int has_width;
size_t width;
int has_precision;
size_t precision;
has_width = 0;
width = 0;
if (dp->width_start != dp->width_end)
{
if (dp->width_arg_index != ARG_NONE)
{
int arg;
if (!(a.arg[dp->width_arg_index].type == TYPE_INT))
abort ();
arg = a.arg[dp->width_arg_index].a.a_int;
width = arg;
if (arg < 0)
{
/* "A negative field width is taken as a '-' flag
followed by a positive field width." */
flags |= FLAG_LEFT;
width = -width;
}
}
else
{
const FCHAR_T *digitp = dp->width_start;
do
width = xsum (xtimes (width, 10), *digitp++ - '0');
while (digitp != dp->width_end);
}
has_width = 1;
}
has_precision = 0;
precision = 6;
if (dp->precision_start != dp->precision_end)
{
if (dp->precision_arg_index != ARG_NONE)
{
int arg;
if (!(a.arg[dp->precision_arg_index].type == TYPE_INT))
abort ();
arg = a.arg[dp->precision_arg_index].a.a_int;
/* "A negative precision is taken as if the precision
were omitted." */
if (arg >= 0)
{
precision = arg;
has_precision = 1;
}
}
else
{
const FCHAR_T *digitp = dp->precision_start + 1;
precision = 0;
while (digitp != dp->precision_end)
precision = xsum (xtimes (precision, 10), *digitp++ - '0');
has_precision = 1;
}
}
# if WIDE_CHAR_VERSION
/* %s in vasnwprintf. See the specification of fwprintf. */
{
const char *arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_string;
const char *arg_end;
size_t characters;
if (has_precision)
{
/* Use only as many bytes as needed to produce PRECISION
wide characters, from the left. */
# if HAVE_MBRTOWC
mbstate_t state;
memset (&state, '\0', sizeof (mbstate_t));
# endif
arg_end = arg;
characters = 0;
for (; precision > 0; precision--)
{
int count;
# if HAVE_MBRTOWC
count = mbrlen (arg_end, MB_CUR_MAX, &state);
# else
count = mblen (arg_end, MB_CUR_MAX);
# endif
if (count == 0)
/* Found the terminating NUL. */
break;
if (count < 0)
{
/* Invalid or incomplete multibyte character. */
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = EILSEQ;
return NULL;
}
arg_end += count;
characters++;
}
}
else if (has_width)
{
/* Use the entire string, and count the number of wide
characters. */
# if HAVE_MBRTOWC
mbstate_t state;
memset (&state, '\0', sizeof (mbstate_t));
# endif
arg_end = arg;
characters = 0;
for (;;)
{
int count;
# if HAVE_MBRTOWC
count = mbrlen (arg_end, MB_CUR_MAX, &state);
# else
count = mblen (arg_end, MB_CUR_MAX);
# endif
if (count == 0)
/* Found the terminating NUL. */
break;
if (count < 0)
{
/* Invalid or incomplete multibyte character. */
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = EILSEQ;
return NULL;
}
arg_end += count;
characters++;
}
}
else
{
/* Use the entire string. */
arg_end = arg + strlen (arg);
/* The number of characters doesn't matter. */
characters = 0;
}
if (characters < width && !(dp->flags & FLAG_LEFT))
{
size_t n = width - characters;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, n));
DCHAR_SET (result + length, ' ', n);
length += n;
}
if (has_precision || has_width)
{
/* We know the number of wide characters in advance. */
size_t remaining;
# if HAVE_MBRTOWC
mbstate_t state;
memset (&state, '\0', sizeof (mbstate_t));
# endif
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, characters));
for (remaining = characters; remaining > 0; remaining--)
{
wchar_t wc;
int count;
# if HAVE_MBRTOWC
count = mbrtowc (&wc, arg, arg_end - arg, &state);
# else
count = mbtowc (&wc, arg, arg_end - arg);
# endif
if (count <= 0)
/* mbrtowc not consistent with mbrlen, or mbtowc
not consistent with mblen. */
abort ();
result[length++] = wc;
arg += count;
}
if (!(arg == arg_end))
abort ();
}
else
{
# if HAVE_MBRTOWC
mbstate_t state;
memset (&state, '\0', sizeof (mbstate_t));
# endif
while (arg < arg_end)
{
wchar_t wc;
int count;
# if HAVE_MBRTOWC
count = mbrtowc (&wc, arg, arg_end - arg, &state);
# else
count = mbtowc (&wc, arg, arg_end - arg);
# endif
if (count <= 0)
/* mbrtowc not consistent with mbrlen, or mbtowc
not consistent with mblen. */
abort ();
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, 1));
result[length++] = wc;
arg += count;
}
}
if (characters < width && (dp->flags & FLAG_LEFT))
{
size_t n = width - characters;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, n));
DCHAR_SET (result + length, ' ', n);
length += n;
}
}
# else
/* %ls in vasnprintf. See the specification of fprintf. */
{
const wchar_t *arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_wide_string;
const wchar_t *arg_end;
size_t characters;
# if !DCHAR_IS_TCHAR
/* This code assumes that TCHAR_T is 'char'. */
verify (sizeof (TCHAR_T) == 1);
TCHAR_T *tmpsrc;
DCHAR_T *tmpdst;
size_t tmpdst_len;
# endif
size_t w;
if (has_precision)
{
/* Use only as many wide characters as needed to produce
at most PRECISION bytes, from the left. */
# if HAVE_WCRTOMB && !defined GNULIB_defined_mbstate_t
mbstate_t state;
memset (&state, '\0', sizeof (mbstate_t));
# endif
arg_end = arg;
characters = 0;
while (precision > 0)
{
char cbuf[64]; /* Assume MB_CUR_MAX <= 64. */
int count;
if (*arg_end == 0)
/* Found the terminating null wide character. */
break;
# if HAVE_WCRTOMB && !defined GNULIB_defined_mbstate_t
count = wcrtomb (cbuf, *arg_end, &state);
# else
count = wctomb (cbuf, *arg_end);
# endif
if (count < 0)
{
/* Cannot convert. */
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = EILSEQ;
return NULL;
}
if (precision < count)
break;
arg_end++;
characters += count;
precision -= count;
}
}
# if DCHAR_IS_TCHAR
else if (has_width)
# else
else
# endif
{
/* Use the entire string, and count the number of
bytes. */
# if HAVE_WCRTOMB && !defined GNULIB_defined_mbstate_t
mbstate_t state;
memset (&state, '\0', sizeof (mbstate_t));
# endif
arg_end = arg;
characters = 0;
for (;;)
{
char cbuf[64]; /* Assume MB_CUR_MAX <= 64. */
int count;
if (*arg_end == 0)
/* Found the terminating null wide character. */
break;
# if HAVE_WCRTOMB && !defined GNULIB_defined_mbstate_t
count = wcrtomb (cbuf, *arg_end, &state);
# else
count = wctomb (cbuf, *arg_end);
# endif
if (count < 0)
{
/* Cannot convert. */
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = EILSEQ;
return NULL;
}
arg_end++;
characters += count;
}
}
# if DCHAR_IS_TCHAR
else
{
/* Use the entire string. */
arg_end = arg + local_wcslen (arg);
/* The number of bytes doesn't matter. */
characters = 0;
}
# endif
# if !DCHAR_IS_TCHAR
/* Convert the string into a piece of temporary memory. */
tmpsrc = (TCHAR_T *) malloc (characters * sizeof (TCHAR_T));
if (tmpsrc == NULL)
goto out_of_memory;
{
TCHAR_T *tmpptr = tmpsrc;
size_t remaining;
# if HAVE_WCRTOMB && !defined GNULIB_defined_mbstate_t
mbstate_t state;
memset (&state, '\0', sizeof (mbstate_t));
# endif
for (remaining = characters; remaining > 0; )
{
char cbuf[64]; /* Assume MB_CUR_MAX <= 64. */
int count;
if (*arg == 0)
abort ();
# if HAVE_WCRTOMB && !defined GNULIB_defined_mbstate_t
count = wcrtomb (cbuf, *arg, &state);
# else
count = wctomb (cbuf, *arg);
# endif
if (count <= 0)
/* Inconsistency. */
abort ();
memcpy (tmpptr, cbuf, count);
tmpptr += count;
arg++;
remaining -= count;
}
if (!(arg == arg_end))
abort ();
}
/* Convert from TCHAR_T[] to DCHAR_T[]. */
tmpdst =
DCHAR_CONV_FROM_ENCODING (locale_charset (),
iconveh_question_mark,
tmpsrc, characters,
NULL,
NULL, &tmpdst_len);
if (tmpdst == NULL)
{
int saved_errno = errno;
free (tmpsrc);
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = saved_errno;
return NULL;
}
free (tmpsrc);
# endif
if (has_width)
{
# if ENABLE_UNISTDIO
/* Outside POSIX, it's preferable to compare the width
against the number of _characters_ of the converted
value. */
w = DCHAR_MBSNLEN (result + length, characters);
# else
/* The width is compared against the number of _bytes_
of the converted value, says POSIX. */
w = characters;
# endif
}
else
/* w doesn't matter. */
w = 0;
if (w < width && !(dp->flags & FLAG_LEFT))
{
size_t n = width - w;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, n));
DCHAR_SET (result + length, ' ', n);
length += n;
}
# if DCHAR_IS_TCHAR
if (has_precision || has_width)
{
/* We know the number of bytes in advance. */
size_t remaining;
# if HAVE_WCRTOMB && !defined GNULIB_defined_mbstate_t
mbstate_t state;
memset (&state, '\0', sizeof (mbstate_t));
# endif
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, characters));
for (remaining = characters; remaining > 0; )
{
char cbuf[64]; /* Assume MB_CUR_MAX <= 64. */
int count;
if (*arg == 0)
abort ();
# if HAVE_WCRTOMB && !defined GNULIB_defined_mbstate_t
count = wcrtomb (cbuf, *arg, &state);
# else
count = wctomb (cbuf, *arg);
# endif
if (count <= 0)
/* Inconsistency. */
abort ();
memcpy (result + length, cbuf, count);
length += count;
arg++;
remaining -= count;
}
if (!(arg == arg_end))
abort ();
}
else
{
# if HAVE_WCRTOMB && !defined GNULIB_defined_mbstate_t
mbstate_t state;
memset (&state, '\0', sizeof (mbstate_t));
# endif
while (arg < arg_end)
{
char cbuf[64]; /* Assume MB_CUR_MAX <= 64. */
int count;
if (*arg == 0)
abort ();
# if HAVE_WCRTOMB && !defined GNULIB_defined_mbstate_t
count = wcrtomb (cbuf, *arg, &state);
# else
count = wctomb (cbuf, *arg);
# endif
if (count <= 0)
{
/* Cannot convert. */
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = EILSEQ;
return NULL;
}
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, count));
memcpy (result + length, cbuf, count);
length += count;
arg++;
}
}
# else
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, tmpdst_len));
DCHAR_CPY (result + length, tmpdst, tmpdst_len);
free (tmpdst);
length += tmpdst_len;
# endif
if (w < width && (dp->flags & FLAG_LEFT))
{
size_t n = width - w;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, n));
DCHAR_SET (result + length, ' ', n);
length += n;
}
}
# endif
}
#endif
#if (NEED_PRINTF_DIRECTIVE_A || NEED_PRINTF_LONG_DOUBLE || NEED_PRINTF_DOUBLE) && !defined IN_LIBINTL
else if ((dp->conversion == 'a' || dp->conversion == 'A')
# if !(NEED_PRINTF_DIRECTIVE_A || (NEED_PRINTF_LONG_DOUBLE && NEED_PRINTF_DOUBLE))
&& (0
# if NEED_PRINTF_DOUBLE
|| a.arg[dp->arg_index].type == TYPE_DOUBLE
# endif
# if NEED_PRINTF_LONG_DOUBLE
|| a.arg[dp->arg_index].type == TYPE_LONGDOUBLE
# endif
)
# endif
)
{
arg_type type = a.arg[dp->arg_index].type;
int flags = dp->flags;
size_t width;
int has_precision;
size_t precision;
size_t tmp_length;
size_t count;
DCHAR_T tmpbuf[700];
DCHAR_T *tmp;
DCHAR_T *pad_ptr;
DCHAR_T *p;
width = 0;
if (dp->width_start != dp->width_end)
{
if (dp->width_arg_index != ARG_NONE)
{
int arg;
if (!(a.arg[dp->width_arg_index].type == TYPE_INT))
abort ();
arg = a.arg[dp->width_arg_index].a.a_int;
width = arg;
if (arg < 0)
{
/* "A negative field width is taken as a '-' flag
followed by a positive field width." */
flags |= FLAG_LEFT;
width = -width;
}
}
else
{
const FCHAR_T *digitp = dp->width_start;
do
width = xsum (xtimes (width, 10), *digitp++ - '0');
while (digitp != dp->width_end);
}
}
has_precision = 0;
precision = 0;
if (dp->precision_start != dp->precision_end)
{
if (dp->precision_arg_index != ARG_NONE)
{
int arg;
if (!(a.arg[dp->precision_arg_index].type == TYPE_INT))
abort ();
arg = a.arg[dp->precision_arg_index].a.a_int;
/* "A negative precision is taken as if the precision
were omitted." */
if (arg >= 0)
{
precision = arg;
has_precision = 1;
}
}
else
{
const FCHAR_T *digitp = dp->precision_start + 1;
precision = 0;
while (digitp != dp->precision_end)
precision = xsum (xtimes (precision, 10), *digitp++ - '0');
has_precision = 1;
}
}
/* Allocate a temporary buffer of sufficient size. */
if (type == TYPE_LONGDOUBLE)
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) ((LDBL_DIG + 1)
* 0.831 /* decimal -> hexadecimal */
)
+ 1; /* turn floor into ceil */
else
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) ((DBL_DIG + 1)
* 0.831 /* decimal -> hexadecimal */
)
+ 1; /* turn floor into ceil */
if (tmp_length < precision)
tmp_length = precision;
/* Account for sign, decimal point etc. */
tmp_length = xsum (tmp_length, 12);
if (tmp_length < width)
tmp_length = width;
tmp_length = xsum (tmp_length, 1); /* account for trailing NUL */
if (tmp_length <= sizeof (tmpbuf) / sizeof (DCHAR_T))
tmp = tmpbuf;
else
{
size_t tmp_memsize = xtimes (tmp_length, sizeof (DCHAR_T));
if (size_overflow_p (tmp_memsize))
/* Overflow, would lead to out of memory. */
goto out_of_memory;
tmp = (DCHAR_T *) malloc (tmp_memsize);
if (tmp == NULL)
/* Out of memory. */
goto out_of_memory;
}
pad_ptr = NULL;
p = tmp;
if (type == TYPE_LONGDOUBLE)
{
# if NEED_PRINTF_DIRECTIVE_A || NEED_PRINTF_LONG_DOUBLE
long double arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_longdouble;
if (isnanl (arg))
{
if (dp->conversion == 'A')
{
*p++ = 'N'; *p++ = 'A'; *p++ = 'N';
}
else
{
*p++ = 'n'; *p++ = 'a'; *p++ = 'n';
}
}
else
{
int sign = 0;
DECL_LONG_DOUBLE_ROUNDING
BEGIN_LONG_DOUBLE_ROUNDING ();
if (signbit (arg)) /* arg < 0.0L or negative zero */
{
sign = -1;
arg = -arg;
}
if (sign < 0)
*p++ = '-';
else if (flags & FLAG_SHOWSIGN)
*p++ = '+';
else if (flags & FLAG_SPACE)
*p++ = ' ';
if (arg > 0.0L && arg + arg == arg)
{
if (dp->conversion == 'A')
{
*p++ = 'I'; *p++ = 'N'; *p++ = 'F';
}
else
{
*p++ = 'i'; *p++ = 'n'; *p++ = 'f';
}
}
else
{
int exponent;
long double mantissa;
if (arg > 0.0L)
mantissa = printf_frexpl (arg, &exponent);
else
{
exponent = 0;
mantissa = 0.0L;
}
if (has_precision
&& precision < (unsigned int) ((LDBL_DIG + 1) * 0.831) + 1)
{
/* Round the mantissa. */
long double tail = mantissa;
size_t q;
for (q = precision; ; q--)
{
int digit = (int) tail;
tail -= digit;
if (q == 0)
{
if (digit & 1 ? tail >= 0.5L : tail > 0.5L)
tail = 1 - tail;
else
tail = - tail;
break;
}
tail *= 16.0L;
}
if (tail != 0.0L)
for (q = precision; q > 0; q--)
tail *= 0.0625L;
mantissa += tail;
}
*p++ = '0';
*p++ = dp->conversion - 'A' + 'X';
pad_ptr = p;
{
int digit;
digit = (int) mantissa;
mantissa -= digit;
*p++ = '0' + digit;
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT)
|| mantissa > 0.0L || precision > 0)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
/* This loop terminates because we assume
that FLT_RADIX is a power of 2. */
while (mantissa > 0.0L)
{
mantissa *= 16.0L;
digit = (int) mantissa;
mantissa -= digit;
*p++ = digit
+ (digit < 10
? '0'
: dp->conversion - 10);
if (precision > 0)
precision--;
}
while (precision > 0)
{
*p++ = '0';
precision--;
}
}
}
*p++ = dp->conversion - 'A' + 'P';
# if WIDE_CHAR_VERSION
{
static const wchar_t decimal_format[] =
{ '%', '+', 'd', '\0' };
SNPRINTF (p, 6 + 1, decimal_format, exponent);
}
while (*p != '\0')
p++;
# else
if (sizeof (DCHAR_T) == 1)
{
sprintf ((char *) p, "%+d", exponent);
while (*p != '\0')
p++;
}
else
{
char expbuf[6 + 1];
const char *ep;
sprintf (expbuf, "%+d", exponent);
for (ep = expbuf; (*p = *ep) != '\0'; ep++)
p++;
}
# endif
}
END_LONG_DOUBLE_ROUNDING ();
}
# else
abort ();
# endif
}
else
{
# if NEED_PRINTF_DIRECTIVE_A || NEED_PRINTF_DOUBLE
double arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_double;
if (isnand (arg))
{
if (dp->conversion == 'A')
{
*p++ = 'N'; *p++ = 'A'; *p++ = 'N';
}
else
{
*p++ = 'n'; *p++ = 'a'; *p++ = 'n';
}
}
else
{
int sign = 0;
if (signbit (arg)) /* arg < 0.0 or negative zero */
{
sign = -1;
arg = -arg;
}
if (sign < 0)
*p++ = '-';
else if (flags & FLAG_SHOWSIGN)
*p++ = '+';
else if (flags & FLAG_SPACE)
*p++ = ' ';
if (arg > 0.0 && arg + arg == arg)
{
if (dp->conversion == 'A')
{
*p++ = 'I'; *p++ = 'N'; *p++ = 'F';
}
else
{
*p++ = 'i'; *p++ = 'n'; *p++ = 'f';
}
}
else
{
int exponent;
double mantissa;
if (arg > 0.0)
mantissa = printf_frexp (arg, &exponent);
else
{
exponent = 0;
mantissa = 0.0;
}
if (has_precision
&& precision < (unsigned int) ((DBL_DIG + 1) * 0.831) + 1)
{
/* Round the mantissa. */
double tail = mantissa;
size_t q;
for (q = precision; ; q--)
{
int digit = (int) tail;
tail -= digit;
if (q == 0)
{
if (digit & 1 ? tail >= 0.5 : tail > 0.5)
tail = 1 - tail;
else
tail = - tail;
break;
}
tail *= 16.0;
}
if (tail != 0.0)
for (q = precision; q > 0; q--)
tail *= 0.0625;
mantissa += tail;
}
*p++ = '0';
*p++ = dp->conversion - 'A' + 'X';
pad_ptr = p;
{
int digit;
digit = (int) mantissa;
mantissa -= digit;
*p++ = '0' + digit;
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT)
|| mantissa > 0.0 || precision > 0)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
/* This loop terminates because we assume
that FLT_RADIX is a power of 2. */
while (mantissa > 0.0)
{
mantissa *= 16.0;
digit = (int) mantissa;
mantissa -= digit;
*p++ = digit
+ (digit < 10
? '0'
: dp->conversion - 10);
if (precision > 0)
precision--;
}
while (precision > 0)
{
*p++ = '0';
precision--;
}
}
}
*p++ = dp->conversion - 'A' + 'P';
# if WIDE_CHAR_VERSION
{
static const wchar_t decimal_format[] =
{ '%', '+', 'd', '\0' };
SNPRINTF (p, 6 + 1, decimal_format, exponent);
}
while (*p != '\0')
p++;
# else
if (sizeof (DCHAR_T) == 1)
{
sprintf ((char *) p, "%+d", exponent);
while (*p != '\0')
p++;
}
else
{
char expbuf[6 + 1];
const char *ep;
sprintf (expbuf, "%+d", exponent);
for (ep = expbuf; (*p = *ep) != '\0'; ep++)
p++;
}
# endif
}
}
# else
abort ();
# endif
}
/* The generated string now extends from tmp to p, with the
zero padding insertion point being at pad_ptr. */
count = p - tmp;
if (count < width)
{
size_t pad = width - count;
DCHAR_T *end = p + pad;
if (flags & FLAG_LEFT)
{
/* Pad with spaces on the right. */
for (; pad > 0; pad--)
*p++ = ' ';
}
else if ((flags & FLAG_ZERO) && pad_ptr != NULL)
{
/* Pad with zeroes. */
DCHAR_T *q = end;
while (p > pad_ptr)
*--q = *--p;
for (; pad > 0; pad--)
*p++ = '0';
}
else
{
/* Pad with spaces on the left. */
DCHAR_T *q = end;
while (p > tmp)
*--q = *--p;
for (; pad > 0; pad--)
*p++ = ' ';
}
p = end;
}
count = p - tmp;
if (count >= tmp_length)
/* tmp_length was incorrectly calculated - fix the
code above! */
abort ();
/* Make room for the result. */
if (count >= allocated - length)
{
size_t n = xsum (length, count);
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (n);
}
/* Append the result. */
memcpy (result + length, tmp, count * sizeof (DCHAR_T));
if (tmp != tmpbuf)
free (tmp);
length += count;
}
#endif
#if (NEED_PRINTF_INFINITE_DOUBLE || NEED_PRINTF_DOUBLE || NEED_PRINTF_INFINITE_LONG_DOUBLE || NEED_PRINTF_LONG_DOUBLE) && !defined IN_LIBINTL
else if ((dp->conversion == 'f' || dp->conversion == 'F'
|| dp->conversion == 'e' || dp->conversion == 'E'
|| dp->conversion == 'g' || dp->conversion == 'G'
|| dp->conversion == 'a' || dp->conversion == 'A')
&& (0
# if NEED_PRINTF_DOUBLE
|| a.arg[dp->arg_index].type == TYPE_DOUBLE
# elif NEED_PRINTF_INFINITE_DOUBLE
|| (a.arg[dp->arg_index].type == TYPE_DOUBLE
/* The systems (mingw) which produce wrong output
for Inf, -Inf, and NaN also do so for -0.0.
Therefore we treat this case here as well. */
&& is_infinite_or_zero (a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_double))
# endif
# if NEED_PRINTF_LONG_DOUBLE
|| a.arg[dp->arg_index].type == TYPE_LONGDOUBLE
# elif NEED_PRINTF_INFINITE_LONG_DOUBLE
|| (a.arg[dp->arg_index].type == TYPE_LONGDOUBLE
/* Some systems produce wrong output for Inf,
-Inf, and NaN. Some systems in this category
(IRIX 5.3) also do so for -0.0. Therefore we
treat this case here as well. */
&& is_infinite_or_zerol (a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_longdouble))
# endif
))
{
# if (NEED_PRINTF_DOUBLE || NEED_PRINTF_INFINITE_DOUBLE) && (NEED_PRINTF_LONG_DOUBLE || NEED_PRINTF_INFINITE_LONG_DOUBLE)
arg_type type = a.arg[dp->arg_index].type;
# endif
int flags = dp->flags;
size_t width;
size_t count;
int has_precision;
size_t precision;
size_t tmp_length;
DCHAR_T tmpbuf[700];
DCHAR_T *tmp;
DCHAR_T *pad_ptr;
DCHAR_T *p;
width = 0;
if (dp->width_start != dp->width_end)
{
if (dp->width_arg_index != ARG_NONE)
{
int arg;
if (!(a.arg[dp->width_arg_index].type == TYPE_INT))
abort ();
arg = a.arg[dp->width_arg_index].a.a_int;
width = arg;
if (arg < 0)
{
/* "A negative field width is taken as a '-' flag
followed by a positive field width." */
flags |= FLAG_LEFT;
width = -width;
}
}
else
{
const FCHAR_T *digitp = dp->width_start;
do
width = xsum (xtimes (width, 10), *digitp++ - '0');
while (digitp != dp->width_end);
}
}
has_precision = 0;
precision = 0;
if (dp->precision_start != dp->precision_end)
{
if (dp->precision_arg_index != ARG_NONE)
{
int arg;
if (!(a.arg[dp->precision_arg_index].type == TYPE_INT))
abort ();
arg = a.arg[dp->precision_arg_index].a.a_int;
/* "A negative precision is taken as if the precision
were omitted." */
if (arg >= 0)
{
precision = arg;
has_precision = 1;
}
}
else
{
const FCHAR_T *digitp = dp->precision_start + 1;
precision = 0;
while (digitp != dp->precision_end)
precision = xsum (xtimes (precision, 10), *digitp++ - '0');
has_precision = 1;
}
}
/* POSIX specifies the default precision to be 6 for %f, %F,
%e, %E, but not for %g, %G. Implementations appear to use
the same default precision also for %g, %G. But for %a, %A,
the default precision is 0. */
if (!has_precision)
if (!(dp->conversion == 'a' || dp->conversion == 'A'))
precision = 6;
/* Allocate a temporary buffer of sufficient size. */
# if NEED_PRINTF_DOUBLE && NEED_PRINTF_LONG_DOUBLE
tmp_length = (type == TYPE_LONGDOUBLE ? LDBL_DIG + 1 : DBL_DIG + 1);
# elif NEED_PRINTF_INFINITE_DOUBLE && NEED_PRINTF_LONG_DOUBLE
tmp_length = (type == TYPE_LONGDOUBLE ? LDBL_DIG + 1 : 0);
# elif NEED_PRINTF_LONG_DOUBLE
tmp_length = LDBL_DIG + 1;
# elif NEED_PRINTF_DOUBLE
tmp_length = DBL_DIG + 1;
# else
tmp_length = 0;
# endif
if (tmp_length < precision)
tmp_length = precision;
# if NEED_PRINTF_LONG_DOUBLE
# if NEED_PRINTF_DOUBLE || NEED_PRINTF_INFINITE_DOUBLE
if (type == TYPE_LONGDOUBLE)
# endif
if (dp->conversion == 'f' || dp->conversion == 'F')
{
long double arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_longdouble;
if (!(isnanl (arg) || arg + arg == arg))
{
/* arg is finite and nonzero. */
int exponent = floorlog10l (arg < 0 ? -arg : arg);
if (exponent >= 0 && tmp_length < exponent + precision)
tmp_length = exponent + precision;
}
}
# endif
# if NEED_PRINTF_DOUBLE
# if NEED_PRINTF_LONG_DOUBLE || NEED_PRINTF_INFINITE_LONG_DOUBLE
if (type == TYPE_DOUBLE)
# endif
if (dp->conversion == 'f' || dp->conversion == 'F')
{
double arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_double;
if (!(isnand (arg) || arg + arg == arg))
{
/* arg is finite and nonzero. */
int exponent = floorlog10 (arg < 0 ? -arg : arg);
if (exponent >= 0 && tmp_length < exponent + precision)
tmp_length = exponent + precision;
}
}
# endif
/* Account for sign, decimal point etc. */
tmp_length = xsum (tmp_length, 12);
if (tmp_length < width)
tmp_length = width;
tmp_length = xsum (tmp_length, 1); /* account for trailing NUL */
if (tmp_length <= sizeof (tmpbuf) / sizeof (DCHAR_T))
tmp = tmpbuf;
else
{
size_t tmp_memsize = xtimes (tmp_length, sizeof (DCHAR_T));
if (size_overflow_p (tmp_memsize))
/* Overflow, would lead to out of memory. */
goto out_of_memory;
tmp = (DCHAR_T *) malloc (tmp_memsize);
if (tmp == NULL)
/* Out of memory. */
goto out_of_memory;
}
pad_ptr = NULL;
p = tmp;
# if NEED_PRINTF_LONG_DOUBLE || NEED_PRINTF_INFINITE_LONG_DOUBLE
# if NEED_PRINTF_DOUBLE || NEED_PRINTF_INFINITE_DOUBLE
if (type == TYPE_LONGDOUBLE)
# endif
{
long double arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_longdouble;
if (isnanl (arg))
{
if (dp->conversion >= 'A' && dp->conversion <= 'Z')
{
*p++ = 'N'; *p++ = 'A'; *p++ = 'N';
}
else
{
*p++ = 'n'; *p++ = 'a'; *p++ = 'n';
}
}
else
{
int sign = 0;
DECL_LONG_DOUBLE_ROUNDING
BEGIN_LONG_DOUBLE_ROUNDING ();
if (signbit (arg)) /* arg < 0.0L or negative zero */
{
sign = -1;
arg = -arg;
}
if (sign < 0)
*p++ = '-';
else if (flags & FLAG_SHOWSIGN)
*p++ = '+';
else if (flags & FLAG_SPACE)
*p++ = ' ';
if (arg > 0.0L && arg + arg == arg)
{
if (dp->conversion >= 'A' && dp->conversion <= 'Z')
{
*p++ = 'I'; *p++ = 'N'; *p++ = 'F';
}
else
{
*p++ = 'i'; *p++ = 'n'; *p++ = 'f';
}
}
else
{
# if NEED_PRINTF_LONG_DOUBLE
pad_ptr = p;
if (dp->conversion == 'f' || dp->conversion == 'F')
{
char *digits;
size_t ndigits;
digits =
scale10_round_decimal_long_double (arg, precision);
if (digits == NULL)
{
END_LONG_DOUBLE_ROUNDING ();
goto out_of_memory;
}
ndigits = strlen (digits);
if (ndigits > precision)
do
{
--ndigits;
*p++ = digits[ndigits];
}
while (ndigits > precision);
else
*p++ = '0';
/* Here ndigits <= precision. */
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || precision > 0)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
for (; precision > ndigits; precision--)
*p++ = '0';
while (ndigits > 0)
{
--ndigits;
*p++ = digits[ndigits];
}
}
free (digits);
}
else if (dp->conversion == 'e' || dp->conversion == 'E')
{
int exponent;
if (arg == 0.0L)
{
exponent = 0;
*p++ = '0';
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || precision > 0)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
for (; precision > 0; precision--)
*p++ = '0';
}
}
else
{
/* arg > 0.0L. */
int adjusted;
char *digits;
size_t ndigits;
exponent = floorlog10l (arg);
adjusted = 0;
for (;;)
{
digits =
scale10_round_decimal_long_double (arg,
(int)precision - exponent);
if (digits == NULL)
{
END_LONG_DOUBLE_ROUNDING ();
goto out_of_memory;
}
ndigits = strlen (digits);
if (ndigits == precision + 1)
break;
if (ndigits < precision
|| ndigits > precision + 2)
/* The exponent was not guessed
precisely enough. */
abort ();
if (adjusted)
/* None of two values of exponent is
the right one. Prevent an endless
loop. */
abort ();
free (digits);
if (ndigits == precision)
exponent -= 1;
else
exponent += 1;
adjusted = 1;
}
/* Here ndigits = precision+1. */
if (is_borderline (digits, precision))
{
/* Maybe the exponent guess was too high
and a smaller exponent can be reached
by turning a 10...0 into 9...9x. */
char *digits2 =
scale10_round_decimal_long_double (arg,
(int)precision - exponent + 1);
if (digits2 == NULL)
{
free (digits);
END_LONG_DOUBLE_ROUNDING ();
goto out_of_memory;
}
if (strlen (digits2) == precision + 1)
{
free (digits);
digits = digits2;
exponent -= 1;
}
else
free (digits2);
}
/* Here ndigits = precision+1. */
*p++ = digits[--ndigits];
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || precision > 0)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
while (ndigits > 0)
{
--ndigits;
*p++ = digits[ndigits];
}
}
free (digits);
}
*p++ = dp->conversion; /* 'e' or 'E' */
# if WIDE_CHAR_VERSION
{
static const wchar_t decimal_format[] =
{ '%', '+', '.', '2', 'd', '\0' };
SNPRINTF (p, 6 + 1, decimal_format, exponent);
}
while (*p != '\0')
p++;
# else
if (sizeof (DCHAR_T) == 1)
{
sprintf ((char *) p, "%+.2d", exponent);
while (*p != '\0')
p++;
}
else
{
char expbuf[6 + 1];
const char *ep;
sprintf (expbuf, "%+.2d", exponent);
for (ep = expbuf; (*p = *ep) != '\0'; ep++)
p++;
}
# endif
}
else if (dp->conversion == 'g' || dp->conversion == 'G')
{
if (precision == 0)
precision = 1;
/* precision >= 1. */
if (arg == 0.0L)
/* The exponent is 0, >= -4, < precision.
Use fixed-point notation. */
{
size_t ndigits = precision;
/* Number of trailing zeroes that have to be
dropped. */
size_t nzeroes =
(flags & FLAG_ALT ? 0 : precision - 1);
--ndigits;
*p++ = '0';
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || ndigits > nzeroes)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
while (ndigits > nzeroes)
{
--ndigits;
*p++ = '0';
}
}
}
else
{
/* arg > 0.0L. */
int exponent;
int adjusted;
char *digits;
size_t ndigits;
size_t nzeroes;
exponent = floorlog10l (arg);
adjusted = 0;
for (;;)
{
digits =
scale10_round_decimal_long_double (arg,
(int)(precision - 1) - exponent);
if (digits == NULL)
{
END_LONG_DOUBLE_ROUNDING ();
goto out_of_memory;
}
ndigits = strlen (digits);
if (ndigits == precision)
break;
if (ndigits < precision - 1
|| ndigits > precision + 1)
/* The exponent was not guessed
precisely enough. */
abort ();
if (adjusted)
/* None of two values of exponent is
the right one. Prevent an endless
loop. */
abort ();
free (digits);
if (ndigits < precision)
exponent -= 1;
else
exponent += 1;
adjusted = 1;
}
/* Here ndigits = precision. */
if (is_borderline (digits, precision - 1))
{
/* Maybe the exponent guess was too high
and a smaller exponent can be reached
by turning a 10...0 into 9...9x. */
char *digits2 =
scale10_round_decimal_long_double (arg,
(int)(precision - 1) - exponent + 1);
if (digits2 == NULL)
{
free (digits);
END_LONG_DOUBLE_ROUNDING ();
goto out_of_memory;
}
if (strlen (digits2) == precision)
{
free (digits);
digits = digits2;
exponent -= 1;
}
else
free (digits2);
}
/* Here ndigits = precision. */
/* Determine the number of trailing zeroes
that have to be dropped. */
nzeroes = 0;
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) == 0)
while (nzeroes < ndigits
&& digits[nzeroes] == '0')
nzeroes++;
/* The exponent is now determined. */
if (exponent >= -4
&& exponent < (long)precision)
{
/* Fixed-point notation:
max(exponent,0)+1 digits, then the
decimal point, then the remaining
digits without trailing zeroes. */
if (exponent >= 0)
{
size_t ecount = exponent + 1;
/* Note: count <= precision = ndigits. */
for (; ecount > 0; ecount--)
*p++ = digits[--ndigits];
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || ndigits > nzeroes)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
while (ndigits > nzeroes)
{
--ndigits;
*p++ = digits[ndigits];
}
}
}
else
{
size_t ecount = -exponent - 1;
*p++ = '0';
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
for (; ecount > 0; ecount--)
*p++ = '0';
while (ndigits > nzeroes)
{
--ndigits;
*p++ = digits[ndigits];
}
}
}
else
{
/* Exponential notation. */
*p++ = digits[--ndigits];
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || ndigits > nzeroes)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
while (ndigits > nzeroes)
{
--ndigits;
*p++ = digits[ndigits];
}
}
*p++ = dp->conversion - 'G' + 'E'; /* 'e' or 'E' */
# if WIDE_CHAR_VERSION
{
static const wchar_t decimal_format[] =
{ '%', '+', '.', '2', 'd', '\0' };
SNPRINTF (p, 6 + 1, decimal_format, exponent);
}
while (*p != '\0')
p++;
# else
if (sizeof (DCHAR_T) == 1)
{
sprintf ((char *) p, "%+.2d", exponent);
while (*p != '\0')
p++;
}
else
{
char expbuf[6 + 1];
const char *ep;
sprintf (expbuf, "%+.2d", exponent);
for (ep = expbuf; (*p = *ep) != '\0'; ep++)
p++;
}
# endif
}
free (digits);
}
}
else
abort ();
# else
/* arg is finite. */
if (!(arg == 0.0L))
abort ();
pad_ptr = p;
if (dp->conversion == 'f' || dp->conversion == 'F')
{
*p++ = '0';
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || precision > 0)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
for (; precision > 0; precision--)
*p++ = '0';
}
}
else if (dp->conversion == 'e' || dp->conversion == 'E')
{
*p++ = '0';
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || precision > 0)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
for (; precision > 0; precision--)
*p++ = '0';
}
*p++ = dp->conversion; /* 'e' or 'E' */
*p++ = '+';
*p++ = '0';
*p++ = '0';
}
else if (dp->conversion == 'g' || dp->conversion == 'G')
{
*p++ = '0';
if (flags & FLAG_ALT)
{
size_t ndigits =
(precision > 0 ? precision - 1 : 0);
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
for (; ndigits > 0; --ndigits)
*p++ = '0';
}
}
else if (dp->conversion == 'a' || dp->conversion == 'A')
{
*p++ = '0';
*p++ = dp->conversion - 'A' + 'X';
pad_ptr = p;
*p++ = '0';
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || precision > 0)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
for (; precision > 0; precision--)
*p++ = '0';
}
*p++ = dp->conversion - 'A' + 'P';
*p++ = '+';
*p++ = '0';
}
else
abort ();
# endif
}
END_LONG_DOUBLE_ROUNDING ();
}
}
# if NEED_PRINTF_DOUBLE || NEED_PRINTF_INFINITE_DOUBLE
else
# endif
# endif
# if NEED_PRINTF_DOUBLE || NEED_PRINTF_INFINITE_DOUBLE
{
double arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_double;
if (isnand (arg))
{
if (dp->conversion >= 'A' && dp->conversion <= 'Z')
{
*p++ = 'N'; *p++ = 'A'; *p++ = 'N';
}
else
{
*p++ = 'n'; *p++ = 'a'; *p++ = 'n';
}
}
else
{
int sign = 0;
if (signbit (arg)) /* arg < 0.0 or negative zero */
{
sign = -1;
arg = -arg;
}
if (sign < 0)
*p++ = '-';
else if (flags & FLAG_SHOWSIGN)
*p++ = '+';
else if (flags & FLAG_SPACE)
*p++ = ' ';
if (arg > 0.0 && arg + arg == arg)
{
if (dp->conversion >= 'A' && dp->conversion <= 'Z')
{
*p++ = 'I'; *p++ = 'N'; *p++ = 'F';
}
else
{
*p++ = 'i'; *p++ = 'n'; *p++ = 'f';
}
}
else
{
# if NEED_PRINTF_DOUBLE
pad_ptr = p;
if (dp->conversion == 'f' || dp->conversion == 'F')
{
char *digits;
size_t ndigits;
digits =
scale10_round_decimal_double (arg, precision);
if (digits == NULL)
goto out_of_memory;
ndigits = strlen (digits);
if (ndigits > precision)
do
{
--ndigits;
*p++ = digits[ndigits];
}
while (ndigits > precision);
else
*p++ = '0';
/* Here ndigits <= precision. */
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || precision > 0)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
for (; precision > ndigits; precision--)
*p++ = '0';
while (ndigits > 0)
{
--ndigits;
*p++ = digits[ndigits];
}
}
free (digits);
}
else if (dp->conversion == 'e' || dp->conversion == 'E')
{
int exponent;
if (arg == 0.0)
{
exponent = 0;
*p++ = '0';
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || precision > 0)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
for (; precision > 0; precision--)
*p++ = '0';
}
}
else
{
/* arg > 0.0. */
int adjusted;
char *digits;
size_t ndigits;
exponent = floorlog10 (arg);
adjusted = 0;
for (;;)
{
digits =
scale10_round_decimal_double (arg,
(int)precision - exponent);
if (digits == NULL)
goto out_of_memory;
ndigits = strlen (digits);
if (ndigits == precision + 1)
break;
if (ndigits < precision
|| ndigits > precision + 2)
/* The exponent was not guessed
precisely enough. */
abort ();
if (adjusted)
/* None of two values of exponent is
the right one. Prevent an endless
loop. */
abort ();
free (digits);
if (ndigits == precision)
exponent -= 1;
else
exponent += 1;
adjusted = 1;
}
/* Here ndigits = precision+1. */
if (is_borderline (digits, precision))
{
/* Maybe the exponent guess was too high
and a smaller exponent can be reached
by turning a 10...0 into 9...9x. */
char *digits2 =
scale10_round_decimal_double (arg,
(int)precision - exponent + 1);
if (digits2 == NULL)
{
free (digits);
goto out_of_memory;
}
if (strlen (digits2) == precision + 1)
{
free (digits);
digits = digits2;
exponent -= 1;
}
else
free (digits2);
}
/* Here ndigits = precision+1. */
*p++ = digits[--ndigits];
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || precision > 0)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
while (ndigits > 0)
{
--ndigits;
*p++ = digits[ndigits];
}
}
free (digits);
}
*p++ = dp->conversion; /* 'e' or 'E' */
# if WIDE_CHAR_VERSION
{
static const wchar_t decimal_format[] =
/* Produce the same number of exponent digits
as the native printf implementation. */
# if defined _WIN32 && ! defined __CYGWIN__
{ '%', '+', '.', '3', 'd', '\0' };
# else
{ '%', '+', '.', '2', 'd', '\0' };
# endif
SNPRINTF (p, 6 + 1, decimal_format, exponent);
}
while (*p != '\0')
p++;
# else
{
static const char decimal_format[] =
/* Produce the same number of exponent digits
as the native printf implementation. */
# if defined _WIN32 && ! defined __CYGWIN__
"%+.3d";
# else
"%+.2d";
# endif
if (sizeof (DCHAR_T) == 1)
{
sprintf ((char *) p, decimal_format, exponent);
while (*p != '\0')
p++;
}
else
{
char expbuf[6 + 1];
const char *ep;
sprintf (expbuf, decimal_format, exponent);
for (ep = expbuf; (*p = *ep) != '\0'; ep++)
p++;
}
}
# endif
}
else if (dp->conversion == 'g' || dp->conversion == 'G')
{
if (precision == 0)
precision = 1;
/* precision >= 1. */
if (arg == 0.0)
/* The exponent is 0, >= -4, < precision.
Use fixed-point notation. */
{
size_t ndigits = precision;
/* Number of trailing zeroes that have to be
dropped. */
size_t nzeroes =
(flags & FLAG_ALT ? 0 : precision - 1);
--ndigits;
*p++ = '0';
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || ndigits > nzeroes)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
while (ndigits > nzeroes)
{
--ndigits;
*p++ = '0';
}
}
}
else
{
/* arg > 0.0. */
int exponent;
int adjusted;
char *digits;
size_t ndigits;
size_t nzeroes;
exponent = floorlog10 (arg);
adjusted = 0;
for (;;)
{
digits =
scale10_round_decimal_double (arg,
(int)(precision - 1) - exponent);
if (digits == NULL)
goto out_of_memory;
ndigits = strlen (digits);
if (ndigits == precision)
break;
if (ndigits < precision - 1
|| ndigits > precision + 1)
/* The exponent was not guessed
precisely enough. */
abort ();
if (adjusted)
/* None of two values of exponent is
the right one. Prevent an endless
loop. */
abort ();
free (digits);
if (ndigits < precision)
exponent -= 1;
else
exponent += 1;
adjusted = 1;
}
/* Here ndigits = precision. */
if (is_borderline (digits, precision - 1))
{
/* Maybe the exponent guess was too high
and a smaller exponent can be reached
by turning a 10...0 into 9...9x. */
char *digits2 =
scale10_round_decimal_double (arg,
(int)(precision - 1) - exponent + 1);
if (digits2 == NULL)
{
free (digits);
goto out_of_memory;
}
if (strlen (digits2) == precision)
{
free (digits);
digits = digits2;
exponent -= 1;
}
else
free (digits2);
}
/* Here ndigits = precision. */
/* Determine the number of trailing zeroes
that have to be dropped. */
nzeroes = 0;
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) == 0)
while (nzeroes < ndigits
&& digits[nzeroes] == '0')
nzeroes++;
/* The exponent is now determined. */
if (exponent >= -4
&& exponent < (long)precision)
{
/* Fixed-point notation:
max(exponent,0)+1 digits, then the
decimal point, then the remaining
digits without trailing zeroes. */
if (exponent >= 0)
{
size_t ecount = exponent + 1;
/* Note: ecount <= precision = ndigits. */
for (; ecount > 0; ecount--)
*p++ = digits[--ndigits];
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || ndigits > nzeroes)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
while (ndigits > nzeroes)
{
--ndigits;
*p++ = digits[ndigits];
}
}
}
else
{
size_t ecount = -exponent - 1;
*p++ = '0';
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
for (; ecount > 0; ecount--)
*p++ = '0';
while (ndigits > nzeroes)
{
--ndigits;
*p++ = digits[ndigits];
}
}
}
else
{
/* Exponential notation. */
*p++ = digits[--ndigits];
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || ndigits > nzeroes)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
while (ndigits > nzeroes)
{
--ndigits;
*p++ = digits[ndigits];
}
}
*p++ = dp->conversion - 'G' + 'E'; /* 'e' or 'E' */
# if WIDE_CHAR_VERSION
{
static const wchar_t decimal_format[] =
/* Produce the same number of exponent digits
as the native printf implementation. */
# if defined _WIN32 && ! defined __CYGWIN__
{ '%', '+', '.', '3', 'd', '\0' };
# else
{ '%', '+', '.', '2', 'd', '\0' };
# endif
SNPRINTF (p, 6 + 1, decimal_format, exponent);
}
while (*p != '\0')
p++;
# else
{
static const char decimal_format[] =
/* Produce the same number of exponent digits
as the native printf implementation. */
# if defined _WIN32 && ! defined __CYGWIN__
"%+.3d";
# else
"%+.2d";
# endif
if (sizeof (DCHAR_T) == 1)
{
sprintf ((char *) p, decimal_format, exponent);
while (*p != '\0')
p++;
}
else
{
char expbuf[6 + 1];
const char *ep;
sprintf (expbuf, decimal_format, exponent);
for (ep = expbuf; (*p = *ep) != '\0'; ep++)
p++;
}
}
# endif
}
free (digits);
}
}
else
abort ();
# else
/* arg is finite. */
if (!(arg == 0.0))
abort ();
pad_ptr = p;
if (dp->conversion == 'f' || dp->conversion == 'F')
{
*p++ = '0';
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || precision > 0)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
for (; precision > 0; precision--)
*p++ = '0';
}
}
else if (dp->conversion == 'e' || dp->conversion == 'E')
{
*p++ = '0';
if ((flags & FLAG_ALT) || precision > 0)
{
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
for (; precision > 0; precision--)
*p++ = '0';
}
*p++ = dp->conversion; /* 'e' or 'E' */
*p++ = '+';
/* Produce the same number of exponent digits as
the native printf implementation. */
# if defined _WIN32 && ! defined __CYGWIN__
*p++ = '0';
# endif
*p++ = '0';
*p++ = '0';
}
else if (dp->conversion == 'g' || dp->conversion == 'G')
{
*p++ = '0';
if (flags & FLAG_ALT)
{
size_t ndigits =
(precision > 0 ? precision - 1 : 0);
*p++ = decimal_point_char ();
for (; ndigits > 0; --ndigits)
*p++ = '0';
}
}
else
abort ();
# endif
}
}
}
# endif
/* The generated string now extends from tmp to p, with the
zero padding insertion point being at pad_ptr. */
count = p - tmp;
if (count < width)
{
size_t pad = width - count;
DCHAR_T *end = p + pad;
if (flags & FLAG_LEFT)
{
/* Pad with spaces on the right. */
for (; pad > 0; pad--)
*p++ = ' ';
}
else if ((flags & FLAG_ZERO) && pad_ptr != NULL)
{
/* Pad with zeroes. */
DCHAR_T *q = end;
while (p > pad_ptr)
*--q = *--p;
for (; pad > 0; pad--)
*p++ = '0';
}
else
{
/* Pad with spaces on the left. */
DCHAR_T *q = end;
while (p > tmp)
*--q = *--p;
for (; pad > 0; pad--)
*p++ = ' ';
}
p = end;
}
count = p - tmp;
if (count >= tmp_length)
/* tmp_length was incorrectly calculated - fix the
code above! */
abort ();
/* Make room for the result. */
if (count >= allocated - length)
{
size_t n = xsum (length, count);
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (n);
}
/* Append the result. */
memcpy (result + length, tmp, count * sizeof (DCHAR_T));
if (tmp != tmpbuf)
free (tmp);
length += count;
}
#endif
else
{
arg_type type = a.arg[dp->arg_index].type;
int flags = dp->flags;
#if !DCHAR_IS_TCHAR || ENABLE_UNISTDIO || NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_LEFTADJUST || NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_ZERO || NEED_PRINTF_UNBOUNDED_PRECISION
int has_width;
#endif
#if !USE_SNPRINTF || !HAVE_SNPRINTF_RETVAL_C99 || USE_MSVC__SNPRINTF || !DCHAR_IS_TCHAR || ENABLE_UNISTDIO || NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_LEFTADJUST || NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_ZERO || NEED_PRINTF_UNBOUNDED_PRECISION
size_t width;
#endif
#if !USE_SNPRINTF || !HAVE_SNPRINTF_RETVAL_C99 || USE_MSVC__SNPRINTF || NEED_PRINTF_UNBOUNDED_PRECISION
int has_precision;
size_t precision;
#endif
#if NEED_PRINTF_UNBOUNDED_PRECISION
int prec_ourselves;
#else
# define prec_ourselves 0
#endif
#if NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_LEFTADJUST
# define pad_ourselves 1
#elif !DCHAR_IS_TCHAR || ENABLE_UNISTDIO || NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_ZERO || NEED_PRINTF_UNBOUNDED_PRECISION
int pad_ourselves;
#else
# define pad_ourselves 0
#endif
TCHAR_T *fbp;
unsigned int prefix_count;
int prefixes[2] IF_LINT (= { 0 });
int orig_errno;
#if !USE_SNPRINTF
size_t tmp_length;
TCHAR_T tmpbuf[700];
TCHAR_T *tmp;
#endif
#if !DCHAR_IS_TCHAR || ENABLE_UNISTDIO || NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_LEFTADJUST || NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_ZERO || NEED_PRINTF_UNBOUNDED_PRECISION
has_width = 0;
#endif
#if !USE_SNPRINTF || !HAVE_SNPRINTF_RETVAL_C99 || USE_MSVC__SNPRINTF || !DCHAR_IS_TCHAR || ENABLE_UNISTDIO || NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_LEFTADJUST || NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_ZERO || NEED_PRINTF_UNBOUNDED_PRECISION
width = 0;
if (dp->width_start != dp->width_end)
{
if (dp->width_arg_index != ARG_NONE)
{
int arg;
if (!(a.arg[dp->width_arg_index].type == TYPE_INT))
abort ();
arg = a.arg[dp->width_arg_index].a.a_int;
width = arg;
if (arg < 0)
{
/* "A negative field width is taken as a '-' flag
followed by a positive field width." */
flags |= FLAG_LEFT;
width = -width;
}
}
else
{
const FCHAR_T *digitp = dp->width_start;
do
width = xsum (xtimes (width, 10), *digitp++ - '0');
while (digitp != dp->width_end);
}
#if !DCHAR_IS_TCHAR || ENABLE_UNISTDIO || NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_LEFTADJUST || NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_ZERO || NEED_PRINTF_UNBOUNDED_PRECISION
has_width = 1;
#endif
}
#endif
#if !USE_SNPRINTF || !HAVE_SNPRINTF_RETVAL_C99 || USE_MSVC__SNPRINTF || NEED_PRINTF_UNBOUNDED_PRECISION
has_precision = 0;
precision = 6;
if (dp->precision_start != dp->precision_end)
{
if (dp->precision_arg_index != ARG_NONE)
{
int arg;
if (!(a.arg[dp->precision_arg_index].type == TYPE_INT))
abort ();
arg = a.arg[dp->precision_arg_index].a.a_int;
/* "A negative precision is taken as if the precision
were omitted." */
if (arg >= 0)
{
precision = arg;
has_precision = 1;
}
}
else
{
const FCHAR_T *digitp = dp->precision_start + 1;
precision = 0;
while (digitp != dp->precision_end)
precision = xsum (xtimes (precision, 10), *digitp++ - '0');
has_precision = 1;
}
}
#endif
/* Decide whether to handle the precision ourselves. */
#if NEED_PRINTF_UNBOUNDED_PRECISION
switch (dp->conversion)
{
case 'd': case 'i': case 'u':
case 'o':
case 'x': case 'X': case 'p':
prec_ourselves = has_precision && (precision > 0);
break;
default:
prec_ourselves = 0;
break;
}
#endif
/* Decide whether to perform the padding ourselves. */
#if !NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_LEFTADJUST && (!DCHAR_IS_TCHAR || ENABLE_UNISTDIO || NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_ZERO || NEED_PRINTF_UNBOUNDED_PRECISION)
switch (dp->conversion)
{
# if !DCHAR_IS_TCHAR || ENABLE_UNISTDIO
/* If we need conversion from TCHAR_T[] to DCHAR_T[], we need
to perform the padding after this conversion. Functions
with unistdio extensions perform the padding based on
character count rather than element count. */
case 'c': case 's':
# endif
# if NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_ZERO
case 'f': case 'F': case 'e': case 'E': case 'g': case 'G':
case 'a': case 'A':
# endif
pad_ourselves = 1;
break;
default:
pad_ourselves = prec_ourselves;
break;
}
#endif
#if !USE_SNPRINTF
/* Allocate a temporary buffer of sufficient size for calling
sprintf. */
tmp_length =
MAX_ROOM_NEEDED (&a, dp->arg_index, dp->conversion, type,
flags, width, has_precision, precision,
pad_ourselves);
if (tmp_length <= sizeof (tmpbuf) / sizeof (TCHAR_T))
tmp = tmpbuf;
else
{
size_t tmp_memsize = xtimes (tmp_length, sizeof (TCHAR_T));
if (size_overflow_p (tmp_memsize))
/* Overflow, would lead to out of memory. */
goto out_of_memory;
tmp = (TCHAR_T *) malloc (tmp_memsize);
if (tmp == NULL)
/* Out of memory. */
goto out_of_memory;
}
#endif
/* Construct the format string for calling snprintf or
sprintf. */
fbp = buf;
*fbp++ = '%';
#if NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_GROUPING
/* The underlying implementation doesn't support the ' flag.
Produce no grouping characters in this case; this is
acceptable because the grouping is locale dependent. */
#else
if (flags & FLAG_GROUP)
*fbp++ = '\'';
#endif
if (flags & FLAG_LEFT)
*fbp++ = '-';
if (flags & FLAG_SHOWSIGN)
*fbp++ = '+';
if (flags & FLAG_SPACE)
*fbp++ = ' ';
if (flags & FLAG_ALT)
*fbp++ = '#';
#if __GLIBC__ >= 2 && !defined __UCLIBC__
if (flags & FLAG_LOCALIZED)
*fbp++ = 'I';
#endif
if (!pad_ourselves)
{
if (flags & FLAG_ZERO)
*fbp++ = '0';
if (dp->width_start != dp->width_end)
{
size_t n = dp->width_end - dp->width_start;
/* The width specification is known to consist only
of standard ASCII characters. */
if (sizeof (FCHAR_T) == sizeof (TCHAR_T))
{
memcpy (fbp, dp->width_start, n * sizeof (TCHAR_T));
fbp += n;
}
else
{
const FCHAR_T *mp = dp->width_start;
do
*fbp++ = *mp++;
while (--n > 0);
}
}
}
if (!prec_ourselves)
{
if (dp->precision_start != dp->precision_end)
{
size_t n = dp->precision_end - dp->precision_start;
/* The precision specification is known to consist only
of standard ASCII characters. */
if (sizeof (FCHAR_T) == sizeof (TCHAR_T))
{
memcpy (fbp, dp->precision_start, n * sizeof (TCHAR_T));
fbp += n;
}
else
{
const FCHAR_T *mp = dp->precision_start;
do
*fbp++ = *mp++;
while (--n > 0);
}
}
}
switch (type)
{
#if HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT
case TYPE_LONGLONGINT:
case TYPE_ULONGLONGINT:
# if defined _WIN32 && ! defined __CYGWIN__
*fbp++ = 'I';
*fbp++ = '6';
*fbp++ = '4';
break;
# else
*fbp++ = 'l';
# endif
#endif
FALLTHROUGH;
case TYPE_LONGINT:
case TYPE_ULONGINT:
#if HAVE_WINT_T
case TYPE_WIDE_CHAR:
#endif
#if HAVE_WCHAR_T
case TYPE_WIDE_STRING:
#endif
*fbp++ = 'l';
break;
case TYPE_LONGDOUBLE:
*fbp++ = 'L';
break;
default:
break;
}
#if NEED_PRINTF_DIRECTIVE_F
if (dp->conversion == 'F')
*fbp = 'f';
else
#endif
*fbp = dp->conversion;
#if USE_SNPRINTF
# if ! (((__GLIBC__ > 2 || (__GLIBC__ == 2 && __GLIBC_MINOR__ >= 3)) \
&& !defined __UCLIBC__) \
|| (defined __APPLE__ && defined __MACH__) \
|| (defined _WIN32 && ! defined __CYGWIN__))
fbp[1] = '%';
fbp[2] = 'n';
fbp[3] = '\0';
# else
/* On glibc2 systems from glibc >= 2.3 - probably also older
ones - we know that snprintf's return value conforms to
ISO C 99: the tests gl_SNPRINTF_RETVAL_C99 and
gl_SNPRINTF_TRUNCATION_C99 pass.
Therefore we can avoid using %n in this situation.
On glibc2 systems from 2004-10-18 or newer, the use of %n
in format strings in writable memory may crash the program
(if compiled with _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), so we should avoid it
in this situation. */
/* On Mac OS X 10.3 or newer, we know that snprintf's return
value conforms to ISO C 99: the tests gl_SNPRINTF_RETVAL_C99
and gl_SNPRINTF_TRUNCATION_C99 pass.
Therefore we can avoid using %n in this situation.
On Mac OS X 10.13 or newer, the use of %n in format strings
in writable memory by default crashes the program, so we
should avoid it in this situation. */
/* On native Windows systems (such as mingw), we can avoid using
%n because:
- Although the gl_SNPRINTF_TRUNCATION_C99 test fails,
snprintf does not write more than the specified number
of bytes. (snprintf (buf, 3, "%d %d", 4567, 89) writes
'4', '5', '6' into buf, not '4', '5', '\0'.)
- Although the gl_SNPRINTF_RETVAL_C99 test fails, snprintf
allows us to recognize the case of an insufficient
buffer size: it returns -1 in this case.
On native Windows systems (such as mingw) where the OS is
Windows Vista, the use of %n in format strings by default
crashes the program. See
<https://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc/2007-06/msg00122.html> and
<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms175782.aspx>
So we should avoid %n in this situation. */
fbp[1] = '\0';
# endif
#else
fbp[1] = '\0';
#endif
/* Construct the arguments for calling snprintf or sprintf. */
prefix_count = 0;
if (!pad_ourselves && dp->width_arg_index != ARG_NONE)
{
if (!(a.arg[dp->width_arg_index].type == TYPE_INT))
abort ();
prefixes[prefix_count++] = a.arg[dp->width_arg_index].a.a_int;
}
if (!prec_ourselves && dp->precision_arg_index != ARG_NONE)
{
if (!(a.arg[dp->precision_arg_index].type == TYPE_INT))
abort ();
prefixes[prefix_count++] = a.arg[dp->precision_arg_index].a.a_int;
}
#if USE_SNPRINTF
/* The SNPRINTF result is appended after result[0..length].
The latter is an array of DCHAR_T; SNPRINTF appends an
array of TCHAR_T to it. This is possible because
sizeof (TCHAR_T) divides sizeof (DCHAR_T) and
alignof (TCHAR_T) <= alignof (DCHAR_T). */
# define TCHARS_PER_DCHAR (sizeof (DCHAR_T) / sizeof (TCHAR_T))
/* Ensure that maxlen below will be >= 2. Needed on BeOS,
where an snprintf() with maxlen==1 acts like sprintf(). */
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length,
(2 + TCHARS_PER_DCHAR - 1)
/ TCHARS_PER_DCHAR));
/* Prepare checking whether snprintf returns the count
via %n. */
*(TCHAR_T *) (result + length) = '\0';
#endif
orig_errno = errno;
for (;;)
{
int count = -1;
#if USE_SNPRINTF
int retcount = 0;
size_t maxlen = allocated - length;
/* SNPRINTF can fail if its second argument is
> INT_MAX. */
if (maxlen > INT_MAX / TCHARS_PER_DCHAR)
maxlen = INT_MAX / TCHARS_PER_DCHAR;
maxlen = maxlen * TCHARS_PER_DCHAR;
# define SNPRINTF_BUF(arg) \
switch (prefix_count) \
{ \
case 0: \
retcount = SNPRINTF ((TCHAR_T *) (result + length), \
maxlen, buf, \
arg, &count); \
break; \
case 1: \
retcount = SNPRINTF ((TCHAR_T *) (result + length), \
maxlen, buf, \
prefixes[0], arg, &count); \
break; \
case 2: \
retcount = SNPRINTF ((TCHAR_T *) (result + length), \
maxlen, buf, \
prefixes[0], prefixes[1], arg, \
&count); \
break; \
default: \
abort (); \
}
#else
# define SNPRINTF_BUF(arg) \
switch (prefix_count) \
{ \
case 0: \
count = sprintf (tmp, buf, arg); \
break; \
case 1: \
count = sprintf (tmp, buf, prefixes[0], arg); \
break; \
case 2: \
count = sprintf (tmp, buf, prefixes[0], prefixes[1],\
arg); \
break; \
default: \
abort (); \
}
#endif
errno = 0;
switch (type)
{
case TYPE_SCHAR:
{
int arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_schar;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
case TYPE_UCHAR:
{
unsigned int arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_uchar;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
case TYPE_SHORT:
{
int arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_short;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
case TYPE_USHORT:
{
unsigned int arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_ushort;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
case TYPE_INT:
{
int arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_int;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
case TYPE_UINT:
{
unsigned int arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_uint;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
case TYPE_LONGINT:
{
long int arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_longint;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
case TYPE_ULONGINT:
{
unsigned long int arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_ulongint;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
#if HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT
case TYPE_LONGLONGINT:
{
long long int arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_longlongint;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
case TYPE_ULONGLONGINT:
{
unsigned long long int arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_ulonglongint;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
#endif
case TYPE_DOUBLE:
{
double arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_double;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
case TYPE_LONGDOUBLE:
{
long double arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_longdouble;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
case TYPE_CHAR:
{
int arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_char;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
#if HAVE_WINT_T
case TYPE_WIDE_CHAR:
{
wint_t arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_wide_char;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
#endif
case TYPE_STRING:
{
const char *arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_string;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
#if HAVE_WCHAR_T
case TYPE_WIDE_STRING:
{
const wchar_t *arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_wide_string;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
#endif
case TYPE_POINTER:
{
void *arg = a.arg[dp->arg_index].a.a_pointer;
SNPRINTF_BUF (arg);
}
break;
default:
abort ();
}
#if USE_SNPRINTF
/* Portability: Not all implementations of snprintf()
are ISO C 99 compliant. Determine the number of
bytes that snprintf() has produced or would have
produced. */
if (count >= 0)
{
/* Verify that snprintf() has NUL-terminated its
result. */
if (count < maxlen
&& ((TCHAR_T *) (result + length)) [count] != '\0')
abort ();
/* Portability hack. */
if (retcount > count)
count = retcount;
}
else
{
/* snprintf() doesn't understand the '%n'
directive. */
if (fbp[1] != '\0')
{
/* Don't use the '%n' directive; instead, look
at the snprintf() return value. */
fbp[1] = '\0';
continue;
}
else
{
/* Look at the snprintf() return value. */
if (retcount < 0)
{
# if !HAVE_SNPRINTF_RETVAL_C99 || USE_MSVC__SNPRINTF
/* HP-UX 10.20 snprintf() is doubly deficient:
It doesn't understand the '%n' directive,
*and* it returns -1 (rather than the length
that would have been required) when the
buffer is too small.
But a failure at this point can also come
from other reasons than a too small buffer,
such as an invalid wide string argument to
the %ls directive, or possibly an invalid
floating-point argument. */
size_t tmp_length =
MAX_ROOM_NEEDED (&a, dp->arg_index,
dp->conversion, type, flags,
width,
has_precision,
precision, pad_ourselves);
if (maxlen < tmp_length)
{
/* Make more room. But try to do through
this reallocation only once. */
size_t bigger_need =
xsum (length,
xsum (tmp_length,
TCHARS_PER_DCHAR - 1)
/ TCHARS_PER_DCHAR);
/* And always grow proportionally.
(There may be several arguments, each
needing a little more room than the
previous one.) */
size_t bigger_need2 =
xsum (xtimes (allocated, 2), 12);
if (bigger_need < bigger_need2)
bigger_need = bigger_need2;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (bigger_need);
continue;
}
# endif
}
else
count = retcount;
}
}
#endif
/* Attempt to handle failure. */
if (count < 0)
{
/* SNPRINTF or sprintf failed. Save and use the errno
that it has set, if any. */
int saved_errno = errno;
if (saved_errno == 0)
{
if (dp->conversion == 'c' || dp->conversion == 's')
saved_errno = EILSEQ;
else
saved_errno = EINVAL;
}
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = saved_errno;
return NULL;
}
#if USE_SNPRINTF
/* Handle overflow of the allocated buffer.
If such an overflow occurs, a C99 compliant snprintf()
returns a count >= maxlen. However, a non-compliant
snprintf() function returns only count = maxlen - 1. To
cover both cases, test whether count >= maxlen - 1. */
if ((unsigned int) count + 1 >= maxlen)
{
/* If maxlen already has attained its allowed maximum,
allocating more memory will not increase maxlen.
Instead of looping, bail out. */
if (maxlen == INT_MAX / TCHARS_PER_DCHAR)
goto overflow;
else
{
/* Need at least (count + 1) * sizeof (TCHAR_T)
bytes. (The +1 is for the trailing NUL.)
But ask for (count + 2) * sizeof (TCHAR_T)
bytes, so that in the next round, we likely get
maxlen > (unsigned int) count + 1
and so we don't get here again.
And allocate proportionally, to avoid looping
eternally if snprintf() reports a too small
count. */
size_t n =
xmax (xsum (length,
((unsigned int) count + 2
+ TCHARS_PER_DCHAR - 1)
/ TCHARS_PER_DCHAR),
xtimes (allocated, 2));
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (n);
continue;
}
}
#endif
#if NEED_PRINTF_UNBOUNDED_PRECISION
if (prec_ourselves)
{
/* Handle the precision. */
TCHAR_T *prec_ptr =
# if USE_SNPRINTF
(TCHAR_T *) (result + length);
# else
tmp;
# endif
size_t prefix_count;
size_t move;
prefix_count = 0;
/* Put the additional zeroes after the sign. */
if (count >= 1
&& (*prec_ptr == '-' || *prec_ptr == '+'
|| *prec_ptr == ' '))
prefix_count = 1;
/* Put the additional zeroes after the 0x prefix if
(flags & FLAG_ALT) || (dp->conversion == 'p'). */
else if (count >= 2
&& prec_ptr[0] == '0'
&& (prec_ptr[1] == 'x' || prec_ptr[1] == 'X'))
prefix_count = 2;
move = count - prefix_count;
if (precision > move)
{
/* Insert zeroes. */
size_t insert = precision - move;
TCHAR_T *prec_end;
# if USE_SNPRINTF
size_t n =
xsum (length,
(count + insert + TCHARS_PER_DCHAR - 1)
/ TCHARS_PER_DCHAR);
length += (count + TCHARS_PER_DCHAR - 1) / TCHARS_PER_DCHAR;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (n);
length -= (count + TCHARS_PER_DCHAR - 1) / TCHARS_PER_DCHAR;
prec_ptr = (TCHAR_T *) (result + length);
# endif
prec_end = prec_ptr + count;
prec_ptr += prefix_count;
while (prec_end > prec_ptr)
{
prec_end--;
prec_end[insert] = prec_end[0];
}
prec_end += insert;
do
*--prec_end = '0';
while (prec_end > prec_ptr);
count += insert;
}
}
#endif
#if !USE_SNPRINTF
if (count >= tmp_length)
/* tmp_length was incorrectly calculated - fix the
code above! */
abort ();
#endif
#if !DCHAR_IS_TCHAR
/* Convert from TCHAR_T[] to DCHAR_T[]. */
if (dp->conversion == 'c' || dp->conversion == 's')
{
/* type = TYPE_CHAR or TYPE_WIDE_CHAR or TYPE_STRING
TYPE_WIDE_STRING.
The result string is not certainly ASCII. */
const TCHAR_T *tmpsrc;
DCHAR_T *tmpdst;
size_t tmpdst_len;
/* This code assumes that TCHAR_T is 'char'. */
verify (sizeof (TCHAR_T) == 1);
# if USE_SNPRINTF
tmpsrc = (TCHAR_T *) (result + length);
# else
tmpsrc = tmp;
# endif
tmpdst =
DCHAR_CONV_FROM_ENCODING (locale_charset (),
iconveh_question_mark,
tmpsrc, count,
NULL,
NULL, &tmpdst_len);
if (tmpdst == NULL)
{
int saved_errno = errno;
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = saved_errno;
return NULL;
}
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, tmpdst_len));
DCHAR_CPY (result + length, tmpdst, tmpdst_len);
free (tmpdst);
count = tmpdst_len;
}
else
{
/* The result string is ASCII.
Simple 1:1 conversion. */
# if USE_SNPRINTF
/* If sizeof (DCHAR_T) == sizeof (TCHAR_T), it's a
no-op conversion, in-place on the array starting
at (result + length). */
if (sizeof (DCHAR_T) != sizeof (TCHAR_T))
# endif
{
const TCHAR_T *tmpsrc;
DCHAR_T *tmpdst;
size_t n;
# if USE_SNPRINTF
if (result == resultbuf)
{
tmpsrc = (TCHAR_T *) (result + length);
/* ENSURE_ALLOCATION will not move tmpsrc
(because it's part of resultbuf). */
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, count));
}
else
{
/* ENSURE_ALLOCATION will move the array
(because it uses realloc(). */
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, count));
tmpsrc = (TCHAR_T *) (result + length);
}
# else
tmpsrc = tmp;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, count));
# endif
tmpdst = result + length;
/* Copy backwards, because of overlapping. */
tmpsrc += count;
tmpdst += count;
for (n = count; n > 0; n--)
*--tmpdst = *--tmpsrc;
}
}
#endif
#if DCHAR_IS_TCHAR && !USE_SNPRINTF
/* Make room for the result. */
if (count > allocated - length)
{
/* Need at least count elements. But allocate
proportionally. */
size_t n =
xmax (xsum (length, count), xtimes (allocated, 2));
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (n);
}
#endif
/* Here count <= allocated - length. */
/* Perform padding. */
#if !DCHAR_IS_TCHAR || ENABLE_UNISTDIO || NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_LEFTADJUST || NEED_PRINTF_FLAG_ZERO || NEED_PRINTF_UNBOUNDED_PRECISION
if (pad_ourselves && has_width)
{
size_t w;
# if ENABLE_UNISTDIO
/* Outside POSIX, it's preferable to compare the width
against the number of _characters_ of the converted
value. */
w = DCHAR_MBSNLEN (result + length, count);
# else
/* The width is compared against the number of _bytes_
of the converted value, says POSIX. */
w = count;
# endif
if (w < width)
{
size_t pad = width - w;
/* Make room for the result. */
if (xsum (count, pad) > allocated - length)
{
/* Need at least count + pad elements. But
allocate proportionally. */
size_t n =
xmax (xsum3 (length, count, pad),
xtimes (allocated, 2));
# if USE_SNPRINTF
length += count;
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (n);
length -= count;
# else
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (n);
# endif
}
/* Here count + pad <= allocated - length. */
{
# if !DCHAR_IS_TCHAR || USE_SNPRINTF
DCHAR_T * const rp = result + length;
# else
DCHAR_T * const rp = tmp;
# endif
DCHAR_T *p = rp + count;
DCHAR_T *end = p + pad;
DCHAR_T *pad_ptr;
# if !DCHAR_IS_TCHAR || ENABLE_UNISTDIO
if (dp->conversion == 'c'
|| dp->conversion == 's')
/* No zero-padding for string directives. */
pad_ptr = NULL;
else
# endif
{
pad_ptr = (*rp == '-' ? rp + 1 : rp);
/* No zero-padding of "inf" and "nan". */
if ((*pad_ptr >= 'A' && *pad_ptr <= 'Z')
|| (*pad_ptr >= 'a' && *pad_ptr <= 'z'))
pad_ptr = NULL;
}
/* The generated string now extends from rp to p,
with the zero padding insertion point being at
pad_ptr. */
count = count + pad; /* = end - rp */
if (flags & FLAG_LEFT)
{
/* Pad with spaces on the right. */
for (; pad > 0; pad--)
*p++ = ' ';
}
else if ((flags & FLAG_ZERO) && pad_ptr != NULL)
{
/* Pad with zeroes. */
DCHAR_T *q = end;
while (p > pad_ptr)
*--q = *--p;
for (; pad > 0; pad--)
*p++ = '0';
}
else
{
/* Pad with spaces on the left. */
DCHAR_T *q = end;
while (p > rp)
*--q = *--p;
for (; pad > 0; pad--)
*p++ = ' ';
}
}
}
}
#endif
/* Here still count <= allocated - length. */
#if !DCHAR_IS_TCHAR || USE_SNPRINTF
/* The snprintf() result did fit. */
#else
/* Append the sprintf() result. */
memcpy (result + length, tmp, count * sizeof (DCHAR_T));
#endif
#if !USE_SNPRINTF
if (tmp != tmpbuf)
free (tmp);
#endif
#if NEED_PRINTF_DIRECTIVE_F
if (dp->conversion == 'F')
{
/* Convert the %f result to upper case for %F. */
DCHAR_T *rp = result + length;
size_t rc;
for (rc = count; rc > 0; rc--, rp++)
if (*rp >= 'a' && *rp <= 'z')
*rp = *rp - 'a' + 'A';
}
#endif
length += count;
break;
}
errno = orig_errno;
#undef pad_ourselves
#undef prec_ourselves
}
}
}
/* Add the final NUL. */
ENSURE_ALLOCATION (xsum (length, 1));
result[length] = '\0';
if (result != resultbuf && length + 1 < allocated)
{
/* Shrink the allocated memory if possible. */
DCHAR_T *memory;
memory = (DCHAR_T *) realloc (result, (length + 1) * sizeof (DCHAR_T));
if (memory != NULL)
result = memory;
}
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
*lengthp = length;
/* Note that we can produce a big string of a length > INT_MAX. POSIX
says that snprintf() fails with errno = EOVERFLOW in this case, but
that's only because snprintf() returns an 'int'. This function does
not have this limitation. */
return result;
#if USE_SNPRINTF
overflow:
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
CLEANUP ();
errno = EOVERFLOW;
return NULL;
#endif
out_of_memory:
if (!(result == resultbuf || result == NULL))
free (result);
if (buf_malloced != NULL)
free (buf_malloced);
out_of_memory_1:
CLEANUP ();
errno = ENOMEM;
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: vasnprintf: Fix heap memory overrun bug.
Reported by Ben Pfaff <blp@cs.stanford.edu> in
<https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-gnulib/2018-09/msg00107.html>.
* lib/vasnprintf.c (convert_to_decimal): Allocate one more byte of
memory.
* tests/test-vasnprintf.c (test_function): Add another test.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 76,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t reds_stream_sasl_read(RedsStream *s, uint8_t *buf, size_t nbyte)
{
uint8_t encoded[4096];
const char *decoded;
unsigned int decodedlen;
int err;
int n;
n = spice_buffer_copy(&s->sasl.inbuffer, buf, nbyte);
if (n > 0) {
spice_buffer_remove(&s->sasl.inbuffer, n);
if (n == nbyte)
return n;
nbyte -= n;
buf += n;
}
n = s->read(s, encoded, sizeof(encoded));
if (n <= 0) {
return n;
}
err = sasl_decode(s->sasl.conn,
(char *)encoded, n,
&decoded, &decodedlen);
if (err != SASL_OK) {
spice_warning("sasl_decode error: %d", err);
return -1;
}
if (decodedlen == 0) {
errno = EAGAIN;
return -1;
}
n = MIN(nbyte, decodedlen);
memcpy(buf, decoded, n);
spice_buffer_append(&s->sasl.inbuffer, decoded + n, decodedlen - n);
return n;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API RBinFile *r_bin_file_find_by_id(RBin *bin, ut32 binfile_id) {
RBinFile *binfile = NULL;
RListIter *iter = NULL;
r_list_foreach (bin->binfiles, iter, binfile) {
if (binfile->id == binfile_id) {
break;
}
binfile = NULL;
}
return binfile;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9902 - Fix oobread in RBin.string_scan_range
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackendIO::OnIOComplete(int result) {
DCHECK(IsEntryOperation());
DCHECK_NE(result, net::ERR_IO_PENDING);
result_ = result;
NotifyController();
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::WillInsertBody() {
if (GetFrame())
GetFrame()->Client()->DispatchWillInsertBody();
BeginLifecycleUpdatesIfRenderingReady();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool xmp_files_can_put_xmp_xmpstring(XmpFilePtr xf, XmpStringPtr xmp_packet)
{
CHECK_PTR(xf, false);
RESET_ERROR;
SXMPFiles *txf = reinterpret_cast<SXMPFiles*>(xf);
bool result = false;
try {
result = txf->CanPutXMP(*reinterpret_cast<const std::string*>(xmp_packet));
}
catch(const XMP_Error & e) {
set_error(e);
return false;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 16,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t transferred() const { return transferred_; }
Commit Message: Update helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest for OnceCallback
Helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest.cc don't fit to OnceCallback
migration, as they are copied and passed to others.
This CL updates them to pass new callbacks for each use to avoid the
copy of callbacks.
Bug: 714018
Change-Id: Ifb70901439ae92b6b049b84534283c39ebc40ee0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/527549
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478549}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __init blk_dev_init(void)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(REQ_OP_LAST >= (1 << REQ_OP_BITS));
BUILD_BUG_ON(REQ_OP_BITS + REQ_FLAG_BITS > 8 *
FIELD_SIZEOF(struct request, cmd_flags));
BUILD_BUG_ON(REQ_OP_BITS + REQ_FLAG_BITS > 8 *
FIELD_SIZEOF(struct bio, bi_opf));
/* used for unplugging and affects IO latency/throughput - HIGHPRI */
kblockd_workqueue = alloc_workqueue("kblockd",
WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_HIGHPRI, 0);
if (!kblockd_workqueue)
panic("Failed to create kblockd\n");
request_cachep = kmem_cache_create("blkdev_requests",
sizeof(struct request), 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
blk_requestq_cachep = kmem_cache_create("request_queue",
sizeof(struct request_queue), 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
blk_debugfs_root = debugfs_create_dir("block", NULL);
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool QQuickWebView::event(QEvent* ev)
{
return QQuickFlickable::event(ev);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr< ::ppapi::CallbackTracker> PluginModule::GetCallbackTracker() {
return callback_tracker_;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int hns_rcb_get_cfg(struct rcb_common_cb *rcb_common)
{
struct ring_pair_cb *ring_pair_cb;
u32 i;
u32 ring_num = rcb_common->ring_num;
int base_irq_idx = hns_rcb_get_base_irq_idx(rcb_common);
struct platform_device *pdev =
to_platform_device(rcb_common->dsaf_dev->dev);
bool is_ver1 = AE_IS_VER1(rcb_common->dsaf_dev->dsaf_ver);
for (i = 0; i < ring_num; i++) {
ring_pair_cb = &rcb_common->ring_pair_cb[i];
ring_pair_cb->rcb_common = rcb_common;
ring_pair_cb->dev = rcb_common->dsaf_dev->dev;
ring_pair_cb->index = i;
ring_pair_cb->q.io_base =
RCB_COMM_BASE_TO_RING_BASE(rcb_common->io_base, i);
ring_pair_cb->port_id_in_comm =
hns_rcb_get_port_in_comm(rcb_common, i);
ring_pair_cb->virq[HNS_RCB_IRQ_IDX_TX] =
is_ver1 ? platform_get_irq(pdev, base_irq_idx + i * 2) :
platform_get_irq(pdev, base_irq_idx + i * 3 + 1);
ring_pair_cb->virq[HNS_RCB_IRQ_IDX_RX] =
is_ver1 ? platform_get_irq(pdev, base_irq_idx + i * 2 + 1) :
platform_get_irq(pdev, base_irq_idx + i * 3);
if ((ring_pair_cb->virq[HNS_RCB_IRQ_IDX_TX] == -EPROBE_DEFER) ||
(ring_pair_cb->virq[HNS_RCB_IRQ_IDX_RX] == -EPROBE_DEFER))
return -EPROBE_DEFER;
ring_pair_cb->q.phy_base =
RCB_COMM_BASE_TO_RING_BASE(rcb_common->phy_base, i);
hns_rcb_ring_pair_get_cfg(ring_pair_cb);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: move_files_prepare (CopyMoveJob *job,
const char *dest_fs_id,
char **dest_fs_type,
GList **fallbacks)
{
CommonJob *common;
GList *l;
GFile *src;
gboolean same_fs;
int i;
GdkPoint *point;
int total, left;
common = &job->common;
total = left = g_list_length (job->files);
report_preparing_move_progress (job, total, left);
i = 0;
for (l = job->files;
l != NULL && !job_aborted (common);
l = l->next)
{
src = l->data;
if (i < job->n_icon_positions)
{
point = &job->icon_positions[i];
}
else
{
point = NULL;
}
same_fs = FALSE;
if (dest_fs_id)
{
same_fs = has_fs_id (src, dest_fs_id);
}
move_file_prepare (job, src, job->destination,
same_fs, dest_fs_type,
job->debuting_files,
point,
fallbacks,
left);
report_preparing_move_progress (job, total, --left);
i++;
}
*fallbacks = g_list_reverse (*fallbacks);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sas_unregister_devs_sas_addr(struct domain_device *parent,
int phy_id, bool last)
{
struct expander_device *ex_dev = &parent->ex_dev;
struct ex_phy *phy = &ex_dev->ex_phy[phy_id];
struct domain_device *child, *n, *found = NULL;
if (last) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(child, n,
&ex_dev->children, siblings) {
if (SAS_ADDR(child->sas_addr) ==
SAS_ADDR(phy->attached_sas_addr)) {
set_bit(SAS_DEV_GONE, &child->state);
if (child->dev_type == SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE ||
child->dev_type == SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE)
sas_unregister_ex_tree(parent->port, child);
else
sas_unregister_dev(parent->port, child);
found = child;
break;
}
}
sas_disable_routing(parent, phy->attached_sas_addr);
}
memset(phy->attached_sas_addr, 0, SAS_ADDR_SIZE);
if (phy->port) {
sas_port_delete_phy(phy->port, phy->phy);
sas_device_set_phy(found, phy->port);
if (phy->port->num_phys == 0)
sas_port_delete(phy->port);
phy->port = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 1 | 169,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: compile_length_bag_node(BagNode* node, regex_t* reg)
{
int len;
int tlen;
if (node->type == BAG_OPTION)
return compile_length_option_node(node, reg);
if (NODE_BAG_BODY(node)) {
tlen = compile_length_tree(NODE_BAG_BODY(node), reg);
if (tlen < 0) return tlen;
}
else
tlen = 0;
switch (node->type) {
case BAG_MEMORY:
#ifdef USE_CALL
if (node->m.regnum == 0 && NODE_IS_CALLED(node)) {
len = tlen + SIZE_OP_CALL + SIZE_OP_JUMP + SIZE_OP_RETURN;
return len;
}
if (NODE_IS_CALLED(node)) {
len = SIZE_OP_MEMORY_START_PUSH + tlen
+ SIZE_OP_CALL + SIZE_OP_JUMP + SIZE_OP_RETURN;
if (MEM_STATUS_AT0(reg->bt_mem_end, node->m.regnum))
len += (NODE_IS_RECURSION(node)
? SIZE_OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH_REC : SIZE_OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH);
else
len += (NODE_IS_RECURSION(node)
? SIZE_OP_MEMORY_END_REC : SIZE_OP_MEMORY_END);
}
else if (NODE_IS_RECURSION(node)) {
len = SIZE_OP_MEMORY_START_PUSH;
len += tlen + (MEM_STATUS_AT0(reg->bt_mem_end, node->m.regnum)
? SIZE_OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH_REC : SIZE_OP_MEMORY_END_REC);
}
else
#endif
{
if (MEM_STATUS_AT0(reg->bt_mem_start, node->m.regnum))
len = SIZE_OP_MEMORY_START_PUSH;
else
len = SIZE_OP_MEMORY_START;
len += tlen + (MEM_STATUS_AT0(reg->bt_mem_end, node->m.regnum)
? SIZE_OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH : SIZE_OP_MEMORY_END);
}
break;
case BAG_STOP_BACKTRACK:
if (NODE_IS_STOP_BT_SIMPLE_REPEAT(node)) {
int v;
QuantNode* qn;
qn = QUANT_(NODE_BAG_BODY(node));
tlen = compile_length_tree(NODE_QUANT_BODY(qn), reg);
if (tlen < 0) return tlen;
v = onig_positive_int_multiply(qn->lower, tlen);
if (v < 0) return ONIGERR_TOO_BIG_NUMBER_FOR_REPEAT_RANGE;
len = v + SIZE_OP_PUSH + tlen + SIZE_OP_POP_OUT + SIZE_OP_JUMP;
}
else {
len = SIZE_OP_ATOMIC_START + tlen + SIZE_OP_ATOMIC_END;
}
break;
case BAG_IF_ELSE:
{
Node* cond = NODE_BAG_BODY(node);
Node* Then = node->te.Then;
Node* Else = node->te.Else;
len = compile_length_tree(cond, reg);
if (len < 0) return len;
len += SIZE_OP_PUSH;
len += SIZE_OP_ATOMIC_START + SIZE_OP_ATOMIC_END;
if (IS_NOT_NULL(Then)) {
tlen = compile_length_tree(Then, reg);
if (tlen < 0) return tlen;
len += tlen;
}
if (IS_NOT_NULL(Else)) {
len += SIZE_OP_JUMP;
tlen = compile_length_tree(Else, reg);
if (tlen < 0) return tlen;
len += tlen;
}
}
break;
case BAG_OPTION:
/* never come here, but set for escape warning */
len = 0;
break;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 169,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *ndp_msg_payload_opts(struct ndp_msg *msg)
{
return msg->opts_start;
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 53,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void btrfs_clear_bit_hook(struct inode *inode,
struct extent_state *state, int *bits)
{
/*
* set_bit and clear bit hooks normally require _irqsave/restore
* but in this case, we are only testing for the DELALLOC
* bit, which is only set or cleared with irqs on
*/
if ((state->state & EXTENT_DELALLOC) && (*bits & EXTENT_DELALLOC)) {
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
u64 len = state->end + 1 - state->start;
bool do_list = !btrfs_is_free_space_inode(inode);
if (*bits & EXTENT_FIRST_DELALLOC) {
*bits &= ~EXTENT_FIRST_DELALLOC;
} else if (!(*bits & EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING)) {
spin_lock(&BTRFS_I(inode)->lock);
BTRFS_I(inode)->outstanding_extents--;
spin_unlock(&BTRFS_I(inode)->lock);
}
if (*bits & EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING)
btrfs_delalloc_release_metadata(inode, len);
if (root->root_key.objectid != BTRFS_DATA_RELOC_TREE_OBJECTID
&& do_list)
btrfs_free_reserved_data_space(inode, len);
spin_lock(&root->fs_info->delalloc_lock);
root->fs_info->delalloc_bytes -= len;
BTRFS_I(inode)->delalloc_bytes -= len;
if (do_list && BTRFS_I(inode)->delalloc_bytes == 0 &&
!list_empty(&BTRFS_I(inode)->delalloc_inodes)) {
list_del_init(&BTRFS_I(inode)->delalloc_inodes);
}
spin_unlock(&root->fs_info->delalloc_lock);
}
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void print_prots(pgprot_t prot)
{
printk("prot is 0x%016llx\n",pgprot_val(prot));
printk("%s %s %s %s %s\n",PPROT(_PAGE_SHARED),PPROT(_PAGE_READ),
PPROT(_PAGE_EXECUTE),PPROT(_PAGE_WRITE),PPROT(_PAGE_USER));
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dev_set_mtu(struct net_device *dev, int new_mtu)
{
int err, orig_mtu;
if (new_mtu == dev->mtu)
return 0;
/* MTU must be positive. */
if (new_mtu < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (!netif_device_present(dev))
return -ENODEV;
err = call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_PRECHANGEMTU, dev);
err = notifier_to_errno(err);
if (err)
return err;
orig_mtu = dev->mtu;
err = __dev_set_mtu(dev, new_mtu);
if (!err) {
err = call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_CHANGEMTU, dev);
err = notifier_to_errno(err);
if (err) {
/* setting mtu back and notifying everyone again,
* so that they have a chance to revert changes.
*/
__dev_set_mtu(dev, orig_mtu);
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_CHANGEMTU, dev);
}
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_valid(display *d, png_infop info_ptr)
{
png_uint_32 flags = png_get_valid(d->png_ptr, info_ptr, (png_uint_32)~0);
/* Map the text chunks back into the flags */
{
png_textp text;
png_uint_32 ntext = png_get_text(d->png_ptr, info_ptr, &text, NULL);
while (ntext-- > 0) switch (text[ntext].compression)
{
case -1:
flags |= PNG_INFO_tEXt;
break;
case 0:
flags |= PNG_INFO_zTXt;
break;
case 1:
case 2:
flags |= PNG_INFO_iTXt;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "%s(%s): unknown text compression %d\n", d->file,
d->test, text[ntext].compression);
display_exit(d);
}
}
return flags;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned char paethPredictor(short a, short b, short c)
{
short pa = abs(b - c);
short pb = abs(a - c);
short pc = abs(a + b - c - c);
if(pc < pa && pc < pb) return (unsigned char)c;
else if(pb < pa) return (unsigned char)b;
else return (unsigned char)a;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DrawingBuffer::RequiresAlphaChannelToBePreserved() {
return client_->DrawingBufferClientIsBoundForDraw() &&
DefaultBufferRequiresAlphaChannelToBePreserved();
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GaiaCookieManagerService::OnUbertokenSuccess(
const std::string& uber_token) {
DCHECK(requests_.front().request_type() ==
GaiaCookieRequestType::ADD_ACCOUNT);
VLOG(1) << "GaiaCookieManagerService::OnUbertokenSuccess"
<< " account=" << requests_.front().account_id();
fetcher_retries_ = 0;
uber_token_ = uber_token;
if (!external_cc_result_fetched_ &&
!external_cc_result_fetcher_.IsRunning()) {
external_cc_result_fetcher_.Start();
return;
}
signin_client_->DelayNetworkCall(
base::Bind(&GaiaCookieManagerService::StartFetchingMergeSession,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 129,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainMigrateVersion3Params(virDomainPtr domain,
virConnectPtr dconn,
virTypedParameterPtr params,
int nparams,
unsigned int flags)
{
return virDomainMigrateVersion3Full(domain, dconn, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0,
params, nparams, true, flags);
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: event_clear_no_set_filter_flag(struct trace_event_file *file)
{
file->flags &= ~EVENT_FILE_FL_NO_SET_FILTER;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HFSForkReadStream::~HFSForkReadStream() {}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void flush_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, struct kmem_cache_cpu *c)
{
stat(c, CPUSLAB_FLUSH);
slab_lock(c->page);
deactivate_slab(s, c);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_client_renew_locked(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(clp->net, nfsd_net_id);
lockdep_assert_held(&nn->client_lock);
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&clp->cl_refcount))
return;
if (!is_client_expired(clp))
renew_client_locked(clp);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nodes_in_same_family(const node_t *node1, const node_t *node2)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
/* Are they in the same family because of their addresses? */
if (options->EnforceDistinctSubnets) {
tor_addr_t a1, a2;
node_get_addr(node1, &a1);
node_get_addr(node2, &a2);
if (addrs_in_same_network_family(&a1, &a2))
return 1;
}
/* Are they in the same family because the agree they are? */
{
const smartlist_t *f1, *f2;
f1 = node_get_declared_family(node1);
f2 = node_get_declared_family(node2);
if (f1 && f2 &&
node_in_nickname_smartlist(f1, node2) &&
node_in_nickname_smartlist(f2, node1))
return 1;
}
/* Are they in the same option because the user says they are? */
if (options->NodeFamilySets) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options->NodeFamilySets, const routerset_t *, rs, {
if (routerset_contains_node(rs, node1) &&
routerset_contains_node(rs, node2))
return 1;
});
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline bool SearchBuffer::atBreak() const
{
return m_atBreak;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TrayCast::DestroyTrayView() {
tray_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 119,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormElement::didAssociateByParser() {
if (!m_didFinishParsingChildren)
return;
m_hasElementsAssociatedByParser = true;
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::FormAssociationByParser);
}
Commit Message: Enforce form-action CSP even when form.target is present.
BUG=630332
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2464123004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#429922}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 142,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/* we need a nested vmexit to enter SMM, postpone if run is pending */
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 81,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cbc_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int err;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
nbytes = __cbc_encrypt(desc, &walk);
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::ResumeBlockedRequestsForFrame() {
NotifyForEachFrameFromUI(
this,
base::Bind(&ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::ResumeBlockedRequestsForRoute));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IndexedDBDatabase::DeleteIndex(IndexedDBTransaction* transaction,
int64_t object_store_id,
int64_t index_id) {
DCHECK(transaction);
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBDatabase::DeleteIndex", "txn.id", transaction->id());
DCHECK_EQ(transaction->mode(), blink::kWebIDBTransactionModeVersionChange);
if (!ValidateObjectStoreIdAndIndexId(object_store_id, index_id))
return;
transaction->ScheduleTask(
base::BindOnce(&IndexedDBDatabase::DeleteIndexOperation, this,
object_store_id, index_id));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mem_cgroup_reset_owner(struct page *newpage)
{
struct page_cgroup *pc;
if (mem_cgroup_disabled())
return;
pc = lookup_page_cgroup(newpage);
VM_BUG_ON(PageCgroupUsed(pc));
pc->mem_cgroup = root_mem_cgroup;
}
Commit Message: mm: memcg: Correct unregistring of events attached to the same eventfd
There is an issue when memcg unregisters events that were attached to
the same eventfd:
- On the first call mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() removes all
events attached to a given eventfd, and if there were no events left,
thresholds->primary would become NULL;
- Since there were several events registered, cgroups core will call
mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() again, but now kernel will oops,
as the function doesn't expect that threshold->primary may be NULL.
That's a good question whether mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event()
should actually remove all events in one go, but nowadays it can't
do any better as cftype->unregister_event callback doesn't pass
any private event-associated cookie. So, let's fix the issue by
simply checking for threshold->primary.
FWIW, w/o the patch the following oops may be observed:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
IP: [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
Pid: 574, comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.3.0-rc4+ #9 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810be32c>] [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88001d0b9d60 EFLAGS: 00010246
Process kworker/0:2 (pid: 574, threadinfo ffff88001d0b8000, task ffff88001de91cc0)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8107092b>] cgroup_event_remove+0x2b/0x60
[<ffffffff8103db94>] process_one_work+0x174/0x450
[<ffffffff8103e413>] worker_thread+0x123/0x2d0
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anton Vorontsov <anton.vorontsov@linaro.org>
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SkBitmap SystemClipboard::ReadImage(mojom::ClipboardBuffer buffer) {
SkBitmap image;
if (IsValidBufferType(buffer))
clipboard_->ReadImage(buffer, &image);
return image;
}
Commit Message: System Clipboard: Remove extraneous check for bitmap.getPixels()
Bug 369621 originally led to this check being introduced via
https://codereview.chromium.org/289573002/patch/40001/50002, but after
https://crrev.com/c/1345809, I'm not sure that it's still necessary.
This change succeeds when tested against the "minimized test case" provided in
crbug.com/369621 's description, but I'm unsure how to make the minimized test
case fail, so this doesn't prove that the change would succeed against the
fuzzer's test case (which originally filed the bug).
As I'm unable to view the relevant fuzzer test case, (see crbug.com/918705),
I don't know exactly what may have caused the fuzzer to fail. Therefore,
I've added a CHECK for the time being, so that we will be notified in canary
if my assumption was incorrect.
Bug: 369621
Change-Id: Ie9b47a4b38ba1ed47624de776015728e541d27f7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1393436
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#619591}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoSetEnableDCLayersCHROMIUM(
GLboolean enable) {
GLint current_framebuffer = 0;
api()->glGetIntegervFn(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_BINDING, ¤t_framebuffer);
if (current_framebuffer != 0) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "framebuffer must not be bound.");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!surface_->SupportsDCLayers()) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"surface doesn't support SetDrawRectangle.");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!surface_->SetEnableDCLayers(!!enable)) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "SetEnableDCLayers failed on surface.");
return error::kNoError;
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mp_pack(lua_State *L) {
int nargs = lua_gettop(L);
int i;
mp_buf *buf;
if (nargs == 0)
return luaL_argerror(L, 0, "MessagePack pack needs input.");
if (!lua_checkstack(L, nargs))
return luaL_argerror(L, 0, "Too many arguments for MessagePack pack.");
buf = mp_buf_new(L);
for(i = 1; i <= nargs; i++) {
/* Copy argument i to top of stack for _encode processing;
* the encode function pops it from the stack when complete. */
lua_pushvalue(L, i);
mp_encode_lua_type(L,buf,0);
lua_pushlstring(L,(char*)buf->b,buf->len);
/* Reuse the buffer for the next operation by
* setting its free count to the total buffer size
* and the current position to zero. */
buf->free += buf->len;
buf->len = 0;
}
mp_buf_free(L, buf);
/* Concatenate all nargs buffers together */
lua_concat(L, nargs);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void task_change_group_fair(struct task_struct *p, int type)
{
switch (type) {
case TASK_SET_GROUP:
task_set_group_fair(p);
break;
case TASK_MOVE_GROUP:
task_move_group_fair(p);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void namedPropertyQueryCallback(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Integer>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMNamedProperty");
TestObjectV8Internal::namedPropertyQuery(name, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutomationProvider::InstallExtensionAndGetHandle(
const FilePath& crx_path, bool with_ui, IPC::Message* reply_message) {
ExtensionService* service = profile_->GetExtensionService();
ExtensionProcessManager* manager = profile_->GetExtensionProcessManager();
if (service && manager) {
new ExtensionReadyNotificationObserver(
manager,
this,
AutomationMsg_InstallExtensionAndGetHandle::ID,
reply_message);
ExtensionInstallUI* client =
(with_ui ? new ExtensionInstallUI(profile_) : NULL);
scoped_refptr<CrxInstaller> installer(new CrxInstaller(service, client));
installer->InstallCrx(crx_path);
} else {
AutomationMsg_InstallExtensionAndGetHandle::WriteReplyParams(
reply_message, 0);
Send(reply_message);
}
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int http_header_match2(const char *hdr, const char *end,
const char *name, int len)
{
const char *val;
if (hdr + len >= end)
return 0;
if (hdr[len] != ':')
return 0;
if (strncasecmp(hdr, name, len) != 0)
return 0;
val = hdr + len + 1;
while (val < end && HTTP_IS_SPHT(*val))
val++;
if ((val >= end) && (len + 2 <= end - hdr))
return len + 2; /* we may replace starting from second space */
return val - hdr;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u32 hns_rcb_get_coalesce_usecs(
struct rcb_common_cb *rcb_common, u32 port_idx)
{
if (AE_IS_VER1(rcb_common->dsaf_dev->dsaf_ver))
return dsaf_read_dev(rcb_common, RCB_CFG_OVERTIME_REG) /
HNS_RCB_CLK_FREQ_MHZ;
else
return dsaf_read_dev(rcb_common,
RCB_PORT_CFG_OVERTIME_REG + port_idx * 4);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShellSurface::OnWindowBoundsChanged(aura::Window* window,
const gfx::Rect& old_bounds,
const gfx::Rect& new_bounds) {
if (!widget_ || !surface_ || ignore_window_bounds_changes_)
return;
if (window == widget_->GetNativeWindow()) {
if (new_bounds.size() == old_bounds.size())
return;
gfx::Vector2d origin_offset = new_bounds.origin() - old_bounds.origin();
pending_origin_config_offset_ += origin_offset;
origin_ -= origin_offset;
surface_->window()->SetBounds(
gfx::Rect(GetSurfaceOrigin(), surface_->window()->layer()->size()));
Configure();
}
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetTextFromRange(
const ui::Range& range,
string16* text) {
ui::Range selection_text_range(selection_text_offset_,
selection_text_offset_ + selection_text_.length());
if (!selection_text_range.Contains(range)) {
text->clear();
return false;
}
if (selection_text_range.EqualsIgnoringDirection(range)) {
*text = selection_text_;
} else {
*text = selection_text_.substr(
range.GetMin() - selection_text_offset_,
range.length());
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout(struct upnphttp * h, const char * action, const char * ns)
{
int r;
static const char resp[] =
"<u:%sResponse "
"xmlns:u=\"%s\">"
"<OutboundPinholeTimeout>%d</OutboundPinholeTimeout>"
"</u:%sResponse>";
char body[512];
int bodylen;
struct NameValueParserData data;
char * int_ip, * int_port, * rem_host, * rem_port, * protocol;
int opt=0;
/*int proto=0;*/
unsigned short iport, rport;
if (GETFLAG(IPV6FCFWDISABLEDMASK))
{
SoapError(h, 702, "FirewallDisabled");
return;
}
ParseNameValue(h->req_buf + h->req_contentoff, h->req_contentlen, &data);
int_ip = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "InternalClient");
int_port = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "InternalPort");
rem_host = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "RemoteHost");
rem_port = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "RemotePort");
protocol = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "Protocol");
rport = (unsigned short)atoi(rem_port);
iport = (unsigned short)atoi(int_port);
/*proto = atoi(protocol);*/
syslog(LOG_INFO, "%s: retrieving timeout for outbound pinhole from [%s]:%hu to [%s]:%hu protocol %s", action, int_ip, iport,rem_host, rport, protocol);
/* TODO */
r = -1;/*upnp_check_outbound_pinhole(proto, &opt);*/
switch(r)
{
case 1: /* success */
bodylen = snprintf(body, sizeof(body), resp,
action, ns/*"urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANIPv6FirewallControl:1"*/,
opt, action);
BuildSendAndCloseSoapResp(h, body, bodylen);
break;
case -5: /* Protocol not supported */
SoapError(h, 705, "ProtocolNotSupported");
break;
default:
SoapError(h, 501, "ActionFailed");
}
ClearNameValueList(&data);
}
Commit Message: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout: check args
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 169,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BackTexture::BackTexture(GLES2DecoderImpl* decoder)
: memory_tracker_(decoder->memory_tracker()),
bytes_allocated_(0),
decoder_(decoder) {
DCHECK(!decoder_->should_use_native_gmb_for_backbuffer_ ||
decoder_->GetContextGroup()->image_factory());
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
int ret;
uint16_t extracted_ethertype;
u_int dlci;
u_int addr_len;
uint16_t nlpid;
u_int hdr_len;
uint8_t flags[4];
ret = parse_q922_addr(ndo, p, &dlci, &addr_len, flags, length);
if (ret == -1)
goto trunc;
if (ret == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Q.922, invalid address"));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK(p[addr_len]);
if (length < addr_len + 1)
goto trunc;
if (p[addr_len] != LLC_UI && dlci != 0) {
/*
* Let's figure out if we have Cisco-style encapsulation,
* with an Ethernet type (Cisco HDLC type?) following the
* address.
*/
if (!ND_TTEST2(p[addr_len], 2) || length < addr_len + 2) {
/* no Ethertype */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "UI %02x! ", p[addr_len]));
} else {
extracted_ethertype = EXTRACT_16BITS(p+addr_len);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
fr_hdr_print(ndo, length, addr_len, dlci,
flags, extracted_ethertype);
if (ethertype_print(ndo, extracted_ethertype,
p+addr_len+ETHERTYPE_LEN,
length-addr_len-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
ndo->ndo_snapend-p-addr_len-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
NULL, NULL) == 0)
/* ether_type not known, probably it wasn't one */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "UI %02x! ", p[addr_len]));
else
return addr_len + 2;
}
}
ND_TCHECK(p[addr_len+1]);
if (length < addr_len + 2)
goto trunc;
if (p[addr_len + 1] == 0) {
/*
* Assume a pad byte after the control (UI) byte.
* A pad byte should only be used with 3-byte Q.922.
*/
if (addr_len != 3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Pad! "));
hdr_len = addr_len + 1 /* UI */ + 1 /* pad */ + 1 /* NLPID */;
} else {
/*
* Not a pad byte.
* A pad byte should be used with 3-byte Q.922.
*/
if (addr_len == 3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "No pad! "));
hdr_len = addr_len + 1 /* UI */ + 1 /* NLPID */;
}
ND_TCHECK(p[hdr_len - 1]);
if (length < hdr_len)
goto trunc;
nlpid = p[hdr_len - 1];
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
fr_hdr_print(ndo, length, addr_len, dlci, flags, nlpid);
p += hdr_len;
length -= hdr_len;
switch (nlpid) {
case NLPID_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case NLPID_IP6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case NLPID_CLNP:
case NLPID_ESIS:
case NLPID_ISIS:
isoclns_print(ndo, p - 1, length + 1, ndo->ndo_snapend - p + 1); /* OSI printers need the NLPID field */
break;
case NLPID_SNAP:
if (snap_print(ndo, p, length, ndo->ndo_snapend - p, NULL, NULL, 0) == 0) {
/* ether_type not known, print raw packet */
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
fr_hdr_print(ndo, length + hdr_len, hdr_len,
dlci, flags, nlpid);
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p - hdr_len, length + hdr_len);
}
break;
case NLPID_Q933:
q933_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case NLPID_MFR:
frf15_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case NLPID_PPP:
ppp_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
fr_hdr_print(ndo, length + hdr_len, addr_len,
dlci, flags, nlpid);
if (!ndo->ndo_xflag)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, length);
}
return hdr_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|fr]"));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FileSystemOperation::TaskParamsForDidGetQuota::TaskParamsForDidGetQuota()
: type(kFileSystemTypeUnknown) {
}
Commit Message: Crash fix in fileapi::FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10008047 introduced delete-with-inflight-tasks in Write sequence but I failed to convert this callback to use WeakPtr().
BUG=128178
TEST=manual test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10408006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137635 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::LimitedToOnlyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_limitedToOnlyAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::LimitedToOnlyAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RList * get_java_bin_obj_list(RAnal *anal) {
RBinJavaObj *bin_obj = (RBinJavaObj * )get_java_bin_obj(anal);
return r_bin_java_get_bin_obj_list_thru_obj (bin_obj);
}
Commit Message: Fix #10296 - Heap out of bounds read in java_switch_op()
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: handle_tlv_table_mod(struct ofconn *ofconn, const struct ofp_header *oh)
{
struct ofproto *ofproto = ofconn_get_ofproto(ofconn);
struct tun_table *old_tab, *new_tab;
struct ofputil_tlv_table_mod ttm;
enum ofperr error;
error = reject_slave_controller(ofconn);
if (error) {
return error;
}
error = ofputil_decode_tlv_table_mod(oh, &ttm);
if (error) {
return error;
}
old_tab = ovsrcu_get_protected(struct tun_table *, &ofproto->metadata_tab);
error = tun_metadata_table_mod(&ttm, old_tab, &new_tab);
if (!error) {
ovs_mutex_lock(&ofproto->vl_mff_map.mutex);
error = mf_vl_mff_map_mod_from_tun_metadata(&ofproto->vl_mff_map,
&ttm);
ovs_mutex_unlock(&ofproto->vl_mff_map.mutex);
if (!error) {
ovsrcu_set(&ofproto->metadata_tab, new_tab);
tun_metadata_postpone_free(old_tab);
}
}
ofputil_uninit_tlv_table(&ttm.mappings);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ip_connect(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
__be16 *sport;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&server->dstaddr;
struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&server->dstaddr;
if (server->dstaddr.ss_family == AF_INET6)
sport = &addr6->sin6_port;
else
sport = &addr->sin_port;
if (*sport == 0) {
int rc;
/* try with 445 port at first */
*sport = htons(CIFS_PORT);
rc = generic_ip_connect(server);
if (rc >= 0)
return rc;
/* if it failed, try with 139 port */
*sport = htons(RFC1001_PORT);
}
return generic_ip_connect(server);
}
Commit Message: cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BackingStore* RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::AllocBackingStore(
const gfx::Size& size) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvmppc_emulate_mmio_vsx_loadstore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_run *run)
{
enum emulation_result emulated = EMULATE_FAIL;
int r;
vcpu->arch.paddr_accessed += run->mmio.len;
if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write) {
emulated = kvmppc_handle_vsx_load(run, vcpu, vcpu->arch.io_gpr,
run->mmio.len, 1, vcpu->arch.mmio_sign_extend);
} else {
emulated = kvmppc_handle_vsx_store(run, vcpu,
vcpu->arch.io_gpr, run->mmio.len, 1);
}
switch (emulated) {
case EMULATE_DO_MMIO:
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
r = RESUME_HOST;
break;
case EMULATE_FAIL:
pr_info("KVM: MMIO emulation failed (VSX repeat)\n");
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
r = RESUME_HOST;
break;
default:
r = RESUME_GUEST;
break;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rm_read_close(AVFormatContext *s)
{
int i;
for (i=0;i<s->nb_streams;i++)
ff_rm_free_rmstream(s->streams[i]->priv_data);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rmdec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check
Fixes: loop.ivr
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bits_image_fetch_pixel_nearest (bits_image_t *image,
pixman_fixed_t x,
pixman_fixed_t y,
get_pixel_t get_pixel)
{
int x0 = pixman_fixed_to_int (x - pixman_fixed_e);
int y0 = pixman_fixed_to_int (y - pixman_fixed_e);
if (image->common.repeat != PIXMAN_REPEAT_NONE)
{
repeat (image->common.repeat, &x0, image->width);
repeat (image->common.repeat, &y0, image->height);
return get_pixel (image, x0, y0, FALSE);
}
else
{
return get_pixel (image, x0, y0, TRUE);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 15,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static LayoutUnit alignContentSpaceBetweenChildren(LayoutUnit availableFreeSpace, EAlignContent alignContent, unsigned numberOfLines)
{
if (availableFreeSpace > 0 && numberOfLines > 1) {
if (alignContent == AlignContentSpaceBetween)
return availableFreeSpace / (numberOfLines - 1);
if (alignContent == AlignContentSpaceAround || alignContent == AlignContentStretch)
return availableFreeSpace / numberOfLines;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabContents* Browser::OpenApplicationWindow(
Profile* profile,
const Extension* extension,
extension_misc::LaunchContainer container,
const GURL& url_input,
Browser** app_browser) {
GURL url;
if (!url_input.is_empty()) {
if (extension)
DCHECK(extension->web_extent().ContainsURL(url_input));
url = url_input;
} else {
DCHECK(extension);
url = extension->GetFullLaunchURL();
}
std::string app_name;
if (extension)
app_name =
web_app::GenerateApplicationNameFromExtensionId(extension->id());
else
app_name = web_app::GenerateApplicationNameFromURL(url);
RegisterAppPrefs(app_name, profile);
bool as_panel = extension && (container == extension_misc::LAUNCH_PANEL);
gfx::Size window_size;
if (extension)
window_size.SetSize(extension->launch_width(),
extension->launch_height());
Browser* browser = Browser::CreateForApp(app_name, window_size, profile,
as_panel);
if (app_browser)
*app_browser = browser;
TabContentsWrapper* wrapper =
browser->AddSelectedTabWithURL(url, PageTransition::START_PAGE);
TabContents* contents = wrapper->tab_contents();
contents->GetMutableRendererPrefs()->can_accept_load_drops = false;
contents->render_view_host()->SyncRendererPrefs();
browser->window()->Show();
contents->view()->SetInitialFocus();
return contents;
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void PromiseOverloadMethod1Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "promiseOverloadMethod");
ExceptionToRejectPromiseScope reject_promise_scope(info, exception_state);
if (!V8TestObject::HasInstance(info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate())) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("Illegal invocation");
return;
}
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8SetReturnValue(info, impl->promiseOverloadMethod().V8Value());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smb_ofile_set_delete_on_close(smb_ofile_t *of)
{
mutex_enter(&of->f_mutex);
of->f_flags |= SMB_OFLAGS_SET_DELETE_ON_CLOSE;
mutex_exit(&of->f_mutex);
}
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <matt.barden@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <evan.layton@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 73,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_set_neg_mechs(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_cred_id_t cred_handle,
const gss_OID_set mech_list)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred = (spnego_gss_cred_id_t)cred_handle;
/* Store mech_list in spcred for use in negotiation logic. */
gss_release_oid_set(minor_status, &spcred->neg_mechs);
ret = generic_gss_copy_oid_set(minor_status, mech_list,
&spcred->neg_mechs);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 36,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AP_DECLARE(void) ap_get_server_revision(ap_version_t *version)
{
version->major = AP_SERVER_MAJORVERSION_NUMBER;
version->minor = AP_SERVER_MINORVERSION_NUMBER;
version->patch = AP_SERVER_PATCHLEVEL_NUMBER;
version->add_string = AP_SERVER_ADD_STRING;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_free_lock_stateid(stateid_t *stateid, struct nfs4_stid *s)
{
struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp = openlockstateid(s);
__be32 ret;
mutex_lock(&stp->st_mutex);
ret = check_stateid_generation(stateid, &s->sc_stateid, 1);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = nfserr_locks_held;
if (check_for_locks(stp->st_stid.sc_file,
lockowner(stp->st_stateowner)))
goto out;
release_lock_stateid(stp);
ret = nfs_ok;
out:
mutex_unlock(&stp->st_mutex);
nfs4_put_stid(s);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::CreateFromWebGLContextImage(
const gpu::Mailbox& mailbox,
const gpu::SyncToken& sync_token,
unsigned texture_id,
base::WeakPtr<WebGraphicsContext3DProviderWrapper>&&
context_provider_wrapper,
IntSize mailbox_size) {
return base::AdoptRef(new AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage(
mailbox, sync_token, texture_id, std::move(context_provider_wrapper),
mailbox_size));
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err odrb_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_OMADRMRightsObjectBox*ptr = (GF_OMADRMRightsObjectBox*)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "OMADRMRightsObjectBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "OMARightsObject=\"");
dump_data(trace, ptr->oma_ro, ptr->oma_ro_size);
fprintf(trace, "\">\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("OMADRMRightsObjectBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_codes(struct archive_read *a)
{
int i, j, val, n, r;
unsigned char bitlengths[MAX_SYMBOLS], zerocount, ppmd_flags;
unsigned int maxorder;
struct huffman_code precode;
struct rar *rar = (struct rar *)(a->format->data);
struct rar_br *br = &(rar->br);
free_codes(a);
/* Skip to the next byte */
rar_br_consume_unalined_bits(br);
/* PPMd block flag */
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 1))
goto truncated_data;
if ((rar->is_ppmd_block = rar_br_bits(br, 1)) != 0)
{
rar_br_consume(br, 1);
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 7))
goto truncated_data;
ppmd_flags = rar_br_bits(br, 7);
rar_br_consume(br, 7);
/* Memory is allocated in MB */
if (ppmd_flags & 0x20)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 8))
goto truncated_data;
rar->dictionary_size = (rar_br_bits(br, 8) + 1) << 20;
rar_br_consume(br, 8);
}
if (ppmd_flags & 0x40)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 8))
goto truncated_data;
rar->ppmd_escape = rar->ppmd7_context.InitEsc = rar_br_bits(br, 8);
rar_br_consume(br, 8);
}
else
rar->ppmd_escape = 2;
if (ppmd_flags & 0x20)
{
maxorder = (ppmd_flags & 0x1F) + 1;
if(maxorder > 16)
maxorder = 16 + (maxorder - 16) * 3;
if (maxorder == 1)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated RAR file data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Make sure ppmd7_contest is freed before Ppmd7_Construct
* because reading a broken file cause this abnormal sequence. */
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Free(&rar->ppmd7_context, &g_szalloc);
rar->bytein.a = a;
rar->bytein.Read = &ppmd_read;
__archive_ppmd7_functions.PpmdRAR_RangeDec_CreateVTable(&rar->range_dec);
rar->range_dec.Stream = &rar->bytein;
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Construct(&rar->ppmd7_context);
if (!__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Alloc(&rar->ppmd7_context,
rar->dictionary_size, &g_szalloc))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Out of memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (!__archive_ppmd7_functions.PpmdRAR_RangeDec_Init(&rar->range_dec))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unable to initialize PPMd range decoder");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Init(&rar->ppmd7_context, maxorder);
rar->ppmd_valid = 1;
}
else
{
if (!rar->ppmd_valid) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid PPMd sequence");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (!__archive_ppmd7_functions.PpmdRAR_RangeDec_Init(&rar->range_dec))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unable to initialize PPMd range decoder");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
}
}
else
{
rar_br_consume(br, 1);
/* Keep existing table flag */
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 1))
goto truncated_data;
if (!rar_br_bits(br, 1))
memset(rar->lengthtable, 0, sizeof(rar->lengthtable));
rar_br_consume(br, 1);
memset(&bitlengths, 0, sizeof(bitlengths));
for (i = 0; i < MAX_SYMBOLS;)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 4))
goto truncated_data;
bitlengths[i++] = rar_br_bits(br, 4);
rar_br_consume(br, 4);
if (bitlengths[i-1] == 0xF)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 4))
goto truncated_data;
zerocount = rar_br_bits(br, 4);
rar_br_consume(br, 4);
if (zerocount)
{
i--;
for (j = 0; j < zerocount + 2 && i < MAX_SYMBOLS; j++)
bitlengths[i++] = 0;
}
}
}
memset(&precode, 0, sizeof(precode));
r = create_code(a, &precode, bitlengths, MAX_SYMBOLS, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
return (r);
}
for (i = 0; i < HUFFMAN_TABLE_SIZE;)
{
if ((val = read_next_symbol(a, &precode)) < 0) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (val < 16)
{
rar->lengthtable[i] = (rar->lengthtable[i] + val) & 0xF;
i++;
}
else if (val < 18)
{
if (i == 0)
{
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Internal error extracting RAR file.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if(val == 16) {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 3)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 3) + 3;
rar_br_consume(br, 3);
} else {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 7)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 7) + 11;
rar_br_consume(br, 7);
}
for (j = 0; j < n && i < HUFFMAN_TABLE_SIZE; j++)
{
rar->lengthtable[i] = rar->lengthtable[i-1];
i++;
}
}
else
{
if(val == 18) {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 3)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 3) + 3;
rar_br_consume(br, 3);
} else {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 7)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 7) + 11;
rar_br_consume(br, 7);
}
for(j = 0; j < n && i < HUFFMAN_TABLE_SIZE; j++)
rar->lengthtable[i++] = 0;
}
}
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
r = create_code(a, &rar->maincode, &rar->lengthtable[0], MAINCODE_SIZE,
MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
r = create_code(a, &rar->offsetcode, &rar->lengthtable[MAINCODE_SIZE],
OFFSETCODE_SIZE, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
r = create_code(a, &rar->lowoffsetcode,
&rar->lengthtable[MAINCODE_SIZE + OFFSETCODE_SIZE],
LOWOFFSETCODE_SIZE, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
r = create_code(a, &rar->lengthcode,
&rar->lengthtable[MAINCODE_SIZE + OFFSETCODE_SIZE +
LOWOFFSETCODE_SIZE], LENGTHCODE_SIZE, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
}
if (!rar->dictionary_size || !rar->lzss.window)
{
/* Seems as though dictionary sizes are not used. Even so, minimize
* memory usage as much as possible.
*/
void *new_window;
unsigned int new_size;
if (rar->unp_size >= DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE)
new_size = DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE;
else
new_size = rar_fls((unsigned int)rar->unp_size) << 1;
new_window = realloc(rar->lzss.window, new_size);
if (new_window == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Unable to allocate memory for uncompressed data.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->lzss.window = (unsigned char *)new_window;
rar->dictionary_size = new_size;
memset(rar->lzss.window, 0, rar->dictionary_size);
rar->lzss.mask = rar->dictionary_size - 1;
}
rar->start_new_table = 0;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
truncated_data:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated RAR file data");
rar->valid = 0;
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
Commit Message: Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,319 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_ticket_handler(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, int service)
{
struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
struct ceph_x_info *xi = ac->private;
struct rb_node *parent = NULL, **p = &xi->ticket_handlers.rb_node;
while (*p) {
parent = *p;
th = rb_entry(parent, struct ceph_x_ticket_handler, node);
if (service < th->service)
p = &(*p)->rb_left;
else if (service > th->service)
p = &(*p)->rb_right;
else
return th;
}
/* add it */
th = kzalloc(sizeof(*th), GFP_NOFS);
if (!th)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
th->service = service;
rb_link_node(&th->node, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(&th->node, &xi->ticket_handlers);
return th;
}
Commit Message: libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len
We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't
enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not
encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but
ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the
buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at
the point where we know how much is going to be needed.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 36,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: upnp_delete_redirection(unsigned short eport, const char * protocol)
{
syslog(LOG_INFO, "removing redirect rule port %hu %s", eport, protocol);
return _upnp_delete_redir(eport, proto_atoi(protocol));
}
Commit Message: upnp_redirect(): accept NULL desc argument
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static php_stream *phar_make_dirstream(char *dir, HashTable *manifest TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
HashTable *data;
int dirlen = strlen(dir);
phar_zstr key;
char *entry, *found, *save, *str_key;
uint keylen;
ulong unused;
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(data);
zend_hash_init(data, 64, zend_get_hash_value, NULL, 0);
if ((*dir == '/' && dirlen == 1 && (manifest->nNumOfElements == 0)) || (dirlen >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(dir, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1))) {
/* make empty root directory for empty phar */
/* make empty directory for .phar magic directory */
efree(dir);
return php_stream_alloc(&phar_dir_ops, data, NULL, "r");
}
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(manifest);
while (FAILURE != zend_hash_has_more_elements(manifest)) {
if (HASH_KEY_IS_STRING != zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(manifest, &key, &keylen, &unused, 0, NULL)) {
break;
}
PHAR_STR(key, str_key);
if (keylen <= (uint)dirlen) {
if (keylen < (uint)dirlen || !strncmp(str_key, dir, dirlen)) {
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_move_forward(manifest)) {
break;
}
continue;
}
}
if (*dir == '/') {
/* root directory */
if (keylen >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(str_key, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
/* do not add any magic entries to this directory */
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_move_forward(manifest)) {
break;
}
continue;
}
if (NULL != (found = (char *) memchr(str_key, '/', keylen))) {
/* the entry has a path separator and is a subdirectory */
entry = (char *) safe_emalloc(found - str_key, 1, 1);
memcpy(entry, str_key, found - str_key);
keylen = found - str_key;
entry[keylen] = '\0';
} else {
entry = (char *) safe_emalloc(keylen, 1, 1);
memcpy(entry, str_key, keylen);
entry[keylen] = '\0';
}
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
goto PHAR_ADD_ENTRY;
} else {
if (0 != memcmp(str_key, dir, dirlen)) {
/* entry in directory not found */
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_move_forward(manifest)) {
break;
}
continue;
} else {
if (str_key[dirlen] != '/') {
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_move_forward(manifest)) {
break;
}
continue;
}
}
}
save = str_key;
save += dirlen + 1; /* seek to just past the path separator */
if (NULL != (found = (char *) memchr(save, '/', keylen - dirlen - 1))) {
/* is subdirectory */
save -= dirlen + 1;
entry = (char *) safe_emalloc(found - save + dirlen, 1, 1);
memcpy(entry, save + dirlen + 1, found - save - dirlen - 1);
keylen = found - save - dirlen - 1;
entry[keylen] = '\0';
} else {
/* is file */
save -= dirlen + 1;
entry = (char *) safe_emalloc(keylen - dirlen, 1, 1);
memcpy(entry, save + dirlen + 1, keylen - dirlen - 1);
entry[keylen - dirlen - 1] = '\0';
keylen = keylen - dirlen - 1;
}
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
PHAR_ADD_ENTRY:
if (keylen) {
phar_add_empty(data, entry, keylen);
}
efree(entry);
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_move_forward(manifest)) {
break;
}
}
if (FAILURE != zend_hash_has_more_elements(data)) {
efree(dir);
if (zend_hash_sort(data, zend_qsort, phar_compare_dir_name, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
FREE_HASHTABLE(data);
return NULL;
}
return php_stream_alloc(&phar_dir_ops, data, NULL, "r");
} else {
efree(dir);
return php_stream_alloc(&phar_dir_ops, data, NULL, "r");
}
}
/* }}}*/
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 164,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void inode_sb_list_del(struct inode *inode)
{
if (!list_empty(&inode->i_sb_list)) {
spin_lock(&inode_sb_list_lock);
list_del_init(&inode->i_sb_list);
spin_unlock(&inode_sb_list_lock);
}
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectedUnsignedIntegralAttrAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::reflectedUnsignedIntegralAttrAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int readlink_value(const char *p, char **ret) {
_cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL;
char *value;
int r;
r = readlink_malloc(p, &link);
if (r < 0)
return r;
value = basename(link);
if (!value)
return -ENOENT;
value = strdup(value);
if (!value)
return -ENOMEM;
*ret = value;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: basic: fix touch() creating files with 07777 mode
mode_t is unsigned, so MODE_INVALID < 0 can never be true.
This fixes a possible DoS where any user could fill /run by writing to
a world-writable /run/systemd/show-status.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 71,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, add)
{
zval *zindex, *value;
spl_dllist_object *intern;
spl_ptr_llist_element *element;
zend_long index;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "zz", &zindex, &value) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = Z_SPLDLLIST_P(getThis());
index = spl_offset_convert_to_long(zindex);
if (index < 0 || index > intern->llist->count) {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_OutOfRangeException, "Offset invalid or out of range", 0);
return;
}
if (Z_REFCOUNTED_P(value)) {
Z_ADDREF_P(value);
}
if (index == intern->llist->count) {
/* If index is the last entry+1 then we do a push because we're not inserting before any entry */
spl_ptr_llist_push(intern->llist, value);
} else {
/* Create the new element we want to insert */
spl_ptr_llist_element *elem = emalloc(sizeof(spl_ptr_llist_element));
/* Get the element we want to insert before */
element = spl_ptr_llist_offset(intern->llist, index, intern->flags & SPL_DLLIST_IT_LIFO);
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&elem->data, value);
elem->rc = 1;
/* connect to the neighbours */
elem->next = element;
elem->prev = element->prev;
/* connect the neighbours to this new element */
if (elem->prev == NULL) {
intern->llist->head = elem;
} else {
element->prev->next = elem;
}
element->prev = elem;
intern->llist->count++;
if (intern->llist->ctor) {
intern->llist->ctor(elem);
}
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ iterator handler table */
Commit Message: Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 54,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Verify_LoadGroup_Far_Hit() {
EXPECT_TRUE(delegate()->loaded_group_.get());
EXPECT_EQ(kManifestUrl, delegate()->loaded_manifest_url_);
EXPECT_TRUE(delegate()->loaded_group_->newest_complete_cache());
delegate()->loaded_groups_newest_cache_ = nullptr;
EXPECT_TRUE(delegate()->loaded_group_->HasOneRef());
EXPECT_EQ(2, mock_quota_manager_proxy_->notify_storage_accessed_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(0, mock_quota_manager_proxy_->notify_storage_modified_count_);
TestFinished();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void String8::toUpper()
{
toUpper(0, size());
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 158,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpServer::setPollInterval(unsigned int interval)
{
if (poll_tid != -1) {
daemonCore->Cancel_Timer(poll_tid);
poll_tid = -1;
}
m_pollInterval = interval;
if ( m_pollInterval > 0 ) {
poll_tid = daemonCore->Register_Timer(m_pollInterval,
m_pollInterval,
(TimerHandlercpp)&GahpServer::poll,
"GahpServer::poll",this);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void task_oncpu_function_call(struct task_struct *p,
void (*func) (void *info), void *info)
{
int cpu;
preempt_disable();
cpu = task_cpu(p);
if (task_curr(p))
smp_call_function_single(cpu, func, info, 1);
preempt_enable();
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport char *GetNextImageProfile(const Image *image)
{
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->profiles == (SplayTreeInfo *) NULL)
return((char *) NULL);
return((char *) GetNextKeyInSplayTree((SplayTreeInfo *) image->profiles));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/354
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 69,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcp_skb_seglen(const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return tcp_skb_pcount(skb) == 1 ? skb->len : tcp_skb_mss(skb);
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 41,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool BetterSniffMPEG4(
const sp<DataSource> &source, String8 *mimeType, float *confidence,
sp<AMessage> *meta) {
static const off64_t kMaxScanOffset = 128ll;
off64_t offset = 0ll;
bool foundGoodFileType = false;
off64_t moovAtomEndOffset = -1ll;
bool done = false;
while (!done && offset < kMaxScanOffset) {
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (source->readAt(offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return false;
}
uint64_t chunkSize = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunkType = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t chunkDataOffset = offset + 8;
if (chunkSize == 1) {
if (source->readAt(offset + 8, &chunkSize, 8) < 8) {
return false;
}
chunkSize = ntoh64(chunkSize);
chunkDataOffset += 8;
if (chunkSize < 16) {
return false;
}
} else if (chunkSize < 8) {
return false;
}
off64_t chunkDataSize = chunkSize - (chunkDataOffset - offset);
if (chunkDataSize < 0) {
ALOGE("b/23540914");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunkstring[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunkType, chunkstring);
ALOGV("saw chunk type %s, size %" PRIu64 " @ %lld", chunkstring, chunkSize, (long long)offset);
switch (chunkType) {
case FOURCC('f', 't', 'y', 'p'):
{
if (chunkDataSize < 8) {
return false;
}
uint32_t numCompatibleBrands = (chunkDataSize - 8) / 4;
for (size_t i = 0; i < numCompatibleBrands + 2; ++i) {
if (i == 1) {
continue;
}
uint32_t brand;
if (source->readAt(
chunkDataOffset + 4 * i, &brand, 4) < 4) {
return false;
}
brand = ntohl(brand);
if (isCompatibleBrand(brand)) {
foundGoodFileType = true;
break;
}
}
if (!foundGoodFileType) {
return false;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
{
moovAtomEndOffset = offset + chunkSize;
done = true;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
offset += chunkSize;
}
if (!foundGoodFileType) {
return false;
}
*mimeType = MEDIA_MIMETYPE_CONTAINER_MPEG4;
*confidence = 0.4f;
if (moovAtomEndOffset >= 0) {
*meta = new AMessage;
(*meta)->setInt64("meta-data-size", moovAtomEndOffset);
ALOGV("found metadata size: %lld", (long long)moovAtomEndOffset);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Skip track if verification fails
Bug: 62187433
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: Ib9b0b6de88d046d8149e9ea5073d6c40ffec7b0c
(cherry picked from commit ef8c7830d838d877e6b37b75b47294b064c79397)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void zend_destroy_modules(void) /* {{{ */
{
free(class_cleanup_handlers);
free(module_request_startup_handlers);
zend_hash_graceful_reverse_destroy(&module_registry);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,786 |
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