instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BeginInstallWithManifestFunction::RunImpl() {
if (!IsWebStoreURL(profile_, source_url())) {
SetResult(PERMISSION_DENIED);
return false;
}
if (!user_gesture() && !ignore_user_gesture_for_tests) {
SetResult(NO_GESTURE);
error_ = kUserGestureRequiredError;
return false;
}
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetString(0, &id_));
if (!Extension::IdIsValid(id_)) {
SetResult(INVALID_ID);
error_ = kInvalidIdError;
return false;
}
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetString(1, &icon_data_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetString(2, &manifest_));
scoped_refptr<SafeBeginInstallHelper> helper =
new SafeBeginInstallHelper(this, icon_data_, manifest_);
helper->Start();
AddRef();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Adding tests for new webstore beginInstallWithManifest method.
BUG=75821
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6900059
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83080 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void _WM_do_midi_divisions(struct _mdi *mdi, struct _event_data *data) {
UNUSED(mdi);
UNUSED(data);
return;
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 63,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs_idmap_new(struct nfs_client *clp)
{
struct idmap *idmap;
struct rpc_pipe *pipe;
int error;
idmap = kzalloc(sizeof(*idmap), GFP_KERNEL);
if (idmap == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
rpc_init_pipe_dir_object(&idmap->idmap_pdo,
&nfs_idmap_pipe_dir_object_ops,
idmap);
pipe = rpc_mkpipe_data(&idmap_upcall_ops, 0);
if (IS_ERR(pipe)) {
error = PTR_ERR(pipe);
goto err;
}
idmap->idmap_pipe = pipe;
mutex_init(&idmap->idmap_mutex);
error = rpc_add_pipe_dir_object(clp->cl_net,
&clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_pipedir_objects,
&idmap->idmap_pdo);
if (error)
goto err_destroy_pipe;
clp->cl_idmap = idmap;
return 0;
err_destroy_pipe:
rpc_destroy_pipe_data(idmap->idmap_pipe);
err:
kfree(idmap);
return error;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 69,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dma_rx(struct b43_dmaring *ring, int *slot)
{
const struct b43_dma_ops *ops = ring->ops;
struct b43_dmadesc_generic *desc;
struct b43_dmadesc_meta *meta;
struct b43_rxhdr_fw4 *rxhdr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
u16 len;
int err;
dma_addr_t dmaaddr;
desc = ops->idx2desc(ring, *slot, &meta);
sync_descbuffer_for_cpu(ring, meta->dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize);
skb = meta->skb;
rxhdr = (struct b43_rxhdr_fw4 *)skb->data;
len = le16_to_cpu(rxhdr->frame_len);
if (len == 0) {
int i = 0;
do {
udelay(2);
barrier();
len = le16_to_cpu(rxhdr->frame_len);
} while (len == 0 && i++ < 5);
if (unlikely(len == 0)) {
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
}
if (unlikely(b43_rx_buffer_is_poisoned(ring, skb))) {
/* Something went wrong with the DMA.
* The device did not touch the buffer and did not overwrite the poison. */
b43dbg(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX: Dropping poisoned buffer.\n");
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
if (unlikely(len > ring->rx_buffersize)) {
/* The data did not fit into one descriptor buffer
* and is split over multiple buffers.
* This should never happen, as we try to allocate buffers
* big enough. So simply ignore this packet.
*/
int cnt = 0;
s32 tmp = len;
while (1) {
desc = ops->idx2desc(ring, *slot, &meta);
/* recycle the descriptor buffer. */
b43_poison_rx_buffer(ring, meta->skb);
sync_descbuffer_for_device(ring, meta->dmaaddr,
ring->rx_buffersize);
*slot = next_slot(ring, *slot);
cnt++;
tmp -= ring->rx_buffersize;
if (tmp <= 0)
break;
}
b43err(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX buffer too small "
"(len: %u, buffer: %u, nr-dropped: %d)\n",
len, ring->rx_buffersize, cnt);
goto drop;
}
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
err = setup_rx_descbuffer(ring, desc, meta, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(err)) {
b43dbg(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX: setup_rx_descbuffer() failed\n");
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
unmap_descbuffer(ring, dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize, 0);
skb_put(skb, len + ring->frameoffset);
skb_pull(skb, ring->frameoffset);
b43_rx(ring->dev, skb, rxhdr);
drop:
return;
drop_recycle_buffer:
/* Poison and recycle the RX buffer. */
b43_poison_rx_buffer(ring, skb);
sync_descbuffer_for_device(ring, dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize);
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 165,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::SetDoctype(DocumentType* doc_type) {
DCHECK(!doc_type_ || !doc_type);
doc_type_ = doc_type;
if (doc_type_) {
AdoptIfNeeded(*doc_type_);
if (doc_type_->publicId().StartsWithIgnoringASCIICase(
"-//wapforum//dtd xhtml mobile 1.")) {
is_mobile_document_ = true;
style_engine_->ViewportRulesChanged();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringCustomURLAttrAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueString(info, imp->getURLAttribute(HTMLNames::customContentURLAttrAttr), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline blink::WebGestureEvent CreateScrollBeginForWrapping(
const blink::WebGestureEvent& gesture_event) {
DCHECK(gesture_event.GetType() == blink::WebInputEvent::kGestureScrollUpdate);
blink::WebGestureEvent wrap_gesture_scroll_begin(
blink::WebInputEvent::kGestureScrollBegin, gesture_event.GetModifiers(),
gesture_event.TimeStampSeconds());
wrap_gesture_scroll_begin.source_device = gesture_event.source_device;
wrap_gesture_scroll_begin.data.scroll_begin.delta_x_hint = 0;
wrap_gesture_scroll_begin.data.scroll_begin.delta_y_hint = 0;
wrap_gesture_scroll_begin.resending_plugin_id =
gesture_event.resending_plugin_id;
wrap_gesture_scroll_begin.data.scroll_begin.delta_hint_units =
gesture_event.data.scroll_update.delta_units;
return wrap_gesture_scroll_begin;
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vrrp_vscript_user_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_script_t *vscript = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp_script);
if (set_script_uid_gid(strvec, 1, &vscript->script.uid, &vscript->script.gid)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Unable to set uid/gid for script %s", cmd_str(&vscript->script));
remove_script = true;
}
else {
remove_script = false;
script_user_set = true;
}
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool use_multiport(struct ports_device *portdev)
{
/*
* This condition can be true when put_chars is called from
* early_init
*/
if (!portdev->vdev)
return false;
return __virtio_test_bit(portdev->vdev, VIRTIO_CONSOLE_F_MULTIPORT);
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int _yr_emit_inst_arg_uint16(
RE_EMIT_CONTEXT* emit_context,
uint8_t opcode,
uint16_t argument,
uint8_t** instruction_addr,
uint16_t** argument_addr,
int* code_size)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&opcode,
sizeof(uint8_t),
(void**) instruction_addr));
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&argument,
sizeof(uint16_t),
(void**) argument_addr));
*code_size = sizeof(uint8_t) + sizeof(uint16_t);
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #646 (#648)
* Fix issue #646 and some edge cases with wide regexps using \b and \B
* Rename function IS_WORD_CHAR to _yr_re_is_word_char
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 66,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char* gethostname_malloc(void) {
struct utsname u;
assert_se(uname(&u) >= 0);
if (u.nodename[0])
return strdup(u.nodename);
return strdup(u.sysname);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isdn_net_close(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct net_device *p;
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_X25
struct concap_proto * cprot =
((isdn_net_local *) netdev_priv(dev))->netdev->cprot;
/* printk(KERN_DEBUG "isdn_net_close %s\n" , dev-> name ); */
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_X25
if( cprot && cprot -> pops ) cprot -> pops -> close( cprot );
#endif
netif_stop_queue(dev);
p = MASTER_TO_SLAVE(dev);
if (p) {
/* If this interface has slaves, stop them also */
while (p) {
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_X25
cprot = ((isdn_net_local *) netdev_priv(p))
-> netdev -> cprot;
if( cprot && cprot -> pops )
cprot -> pops -> close( cprot );
#endif
isdn_net_hangup(p);
p = MASTER_TO_SLAVE(p);
}
}
isdn_net_hangup(dev);
isdn_unlock_drivers();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t surplus_hugepages_show(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct hstate *h;
unsigned long surplus_huge_pages;
int nid;
h = kobj_to_hstate(kobj, &nid);
if (nid == NUMA_NO_NODE)
surplus_huge_pages = h->surplus_huge_pages;
else
surplus_huge_pages = h->surplus_huge_pages_node[nid];
return sprintf(buf, "%lu\n", surplus_huge_pages);
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t cdc_ncm_store_tx_timer_usecs(struct device *d, struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(to_net_dev(d));
struct cdc_ncm_ctx *ctx = (struct cdc_ncm_ctx *)dev->data[0];
ssize_t ret;
unsigned long val;
ret = kstrtoul(buf, 0, &val);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (val && (val < CDC_NCM_TIMER_INTERVAL_MIN || val > CDC_NCM_TIMER_INTERVAL_MAX))
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_bh(&ctx->mtx);
ctx->timer_interval = val * NSEC_PER_USEC;
if (!ctx->timer_interval)
ctx->tx_timer_pending = 0;
spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->mtx);
return len;
}
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHost* RenderFrameHost::FromPlaceholderId(
int render_process_id,
int placeholder_routing_id) {
RenderFrameProxyHost* rfph =
RenderFrameProxyHost::FromID(render_process_id, placeholder_routing_id);
FrameTreeNode* node = rfph ? rfph->frame_tree_node() : nullptr;
return node ? node->current_frame_host() : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _exsltDateParseGMonth (exsltDateValDatePtr dt, const xmlChar **str)
{
const xmlChar *cur = *str;
int ret = 0;
PARSE_2_DIGITS(dt->mon, cur, VALID_MONTH, ret);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
*str = cur;
#ifdef DEBUG_EXSLT_DATE
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Parsed month %02i\n", dt->mon);
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void * gdImageWBMPPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size, int fg)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx(2048, NULL);
gdImageWBMPCtx(im, fg, out);
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
out->gd_free(out);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 1 | 169,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebView::handleFlickableMouseRelease(const QPointF& position, qint64 eventTimestampMillis)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
QMouseEvent mouseEvent(QEvent::MouseButtonRelease, d->axisLocker.adjust(position), Qt::LeftButton, Qt::NoButton, Qt::NoModifier);
d->axisLocker.reset();
mouseEvent.setTimestamp(eventTimestampMillis);
QQuickFlickable::mouseReleaseEvent(&mouseEvent);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vop_virtio_copy_from_user(struct vop_vdev *vdev, void __user *ubuf,
size_t len, u64 daddr, size_t dlen,
int vr_idx)
{
struct vop_device *vpdev = vdev->vpdev;
void __iomem *dbuf = vpdev->hw_ops->ioremap(vpdev, daddr, len);
struct vop_vringh *vvr = &vdev->vvr[vr_idx];
struct vop_info *vi = dev_get_drvdata(&vdev->vpdev->dev);
size_t dma_alignment = 1 << vi->dma_ch->device->copy_align;
bool x200 = is_dma_copy_aligned(vi->dma_ch->device, 1, 1, 1);
size_t partlen;
bool dma = VOP_USE_DMA;
int err = 0;
if (daddr & (dma_alignment - 1)) {
vdev->tx_dst_unaligned += len;
dma = false;
} else if (ALIGN(len, dma_alignment) > dlen) {
vdev->tx_len_unaligned += len;
dma = false;
}
if (!dma)
goto memcpy;
/*
* X100 uses DMA addresses as seen by the card so adding
* the aperture base is not required for DMA. However x200
* requires DMA addresses to be an offset into the bar so
* add the aperture base for x200.
*/
if (x200)
daddr += vpdev->aper->pa;
while (len) {
partlen = min_t(size_t, len, VOP_INT_DMA_BUF_SIZE);
if (copy_from_user(vvr->buf, ubuf, partlen)) {
err = -EFAULT;
dev_err(vop_dev(vdev), "%s %d err %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, err);
goto err;
}
err = vop_sync_dma(vdev, daddr, vvr->buf_da,
ALIGN(partlen, dma_alignment));
if (err) {
dev_err(vop_dev(vdev), "%s %d err %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, err);
goto err;
}
daddr += partlen;
ubuf += partlen;
dbuf += partlen;
vdev->out_bytes_dma += partlen;
vdev->out_bytes += partlen;
len -= partlen;
}
memcpy:
/*
* We are copying to IO below and should ideally use something
* like copy_from_user_toio(..) if it existed.
*/
if (copy_from_user((void __force *)dbuf, ubuf, len)) {
err = -EFAULT;
dev_err(vop_dev(vdev), "%s %d err %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, err);
goto err;
}
vdev->out_bytes += len;
err = 0;
err:
vpdev->hw_ops->iounmap(vpdev, dbuf);
dev_dbg(vop_dev(vdev),
"%s: ubuf %p dbuf %p len 0x%lx vr_idx 0x%x\n",
__func__, ubuf, dbuf, len, vr_idx);
return err;
}
Commit Message: misc: mic: Fix for double fetch security bug in VOP driver
The MIC VOP driver does two successive reads from user space to read a
variable length data structure. Kernel memory corruption can result if
the data structure changes between the two reads. This patch disallows
the chance of this happening.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116651
Reported by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Dutt <sudeep.dutt@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::SetFormat(size_t number_of_channels,
float source_sample_rate) {
if (number_of_channels != source_number_of_channels_ ||
source_sample_rate != source_sample_rate_) {
if (!number_of_channels ||
number_of_channels > BaseAudioContext::MaxNumberOfChannels() ||
!AudioUtilities::IsValidAudioBufferSampleRate(source_sample_rate)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "setFormat(" << number_of_channels << ", "
<< source_sample_rate << ") - unhandled format change";
Locker<MediaElementAudioSourceHandler> locker(*this);
source_number_of_channels_ = 0;
source_sample_rate_ = 0;
return;
}
Locker<MediaElementAudioSourceHandler> locker(*this);
source_number_of_channels_ = number_of_channels;
source_sample_rate_ = source_sample_rate;
if (source_sample_rate != Context()->sampleRate()) {
double scale_factor = source_sample_rate / Context()->sampleRate();
multi_channel_resampler_ = std::make_unique<MultiChannelResampler>(
scale_factor, number_of_channels);
} else {
multi_channel_resampler_.reset();
}
{
BaseAudioContext::GraphAutoLocker context_locker(Context());
Output(0).SetNumberOfChannels(number_of_channels);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_send_NPObject(rpc_message_t *message, void *p_value)
{
uint32_t npobj_id = 0;
NPObject *npobj = (NPObject *)p_value;
if (npobj) {
NPObjectInfo *npobj_info = npobject_info_lookup(npobj);
if (npobj_info)
npobj_id = npobj_info->npobj_id;
#ifdef BUILD_WRAPPER
else {
if ((npobj_info = npobject_info_new(npobj)) == NULL)
return RPC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
npobj_id = npobj_info->npobj_id;
npobject_associate(npobj, npobj_info);
}
#endif
assert(npobj_id != 0);
}
int error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, npobj_id);
if (error < 0)
return error;
#ifdef BUILD_WRAPPER
if (npobj) {
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, npobj->referenceCount)) < 0)
return error;
}
#endif
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const struct arm_pmu *__init xscale2pmu_init(void)
{
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppLauncherHandler::FillAppDictionary(base::DictionaryValue* dictionary) {
base::AutoReset<bool> auto_reset(&ignore_changes_, true);
base::ListValue* list = new base::ListValue();
Profile* profile = Profile::FromWebUI(web_ui());
PrefService* prefs = profile->GetPrefs();
for (std::set<std::string>::iterator it = visible_apps_.begin();
it != visible_apps_.end(); ++it) {
const Extension* extension = extension_service_->GetInstalledExtension(*it);
if (extension && extensions::ui_util::ShouldDisplayInNewTabPage(
extension, profile)) {
base::DictionaryValue* app_info = GetAppInfo(extension);
list->Append(app_info);
}
}
dictionary->Set("apps", list);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableAppWindowLaunch", true);
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableCreateAppShortcut", true);
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableCreateAppShortcut", true);
#endif
const base::ListValue* app_page_names =
prefs->GetList(prefs::kNtpAppPageNames);
if (!app_page_names || !app_page_names->GetSize()) {
ListPrefUpdate update(prefs, prefs::kNtpAppPageNames);
base::ListValue* list = update.Get();
list->Set(0, new base::StringValue(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_APP_DEFAULT_PAGE_NAME)));
dictionary->Set("appPageNames",
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(list->DeepCopy()));
} else {
dictionary->Set("appPageNames",
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(app_page_names->DeepCopy()));
}
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderLayerCompositor::updateRootLayerAttachment()
{
ensureRootLayer();
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void cached_cmyk_conv(unsigned char *restrict const pr, unsigned char *restrict const pg, unsigned char *restrict const pb,
unsigned int *restrict const C, unsigned int *restrict const M, unsigned int *restrict const Y, unsigned int *restrict const K,
unsigned int c, unsigned int m, unsigned int y, unsigned int k)
{
#ifdef SLOWCMYK
unsigned int r, g, b;
unsigned int cm, c1m, cm1, c1m1, c1m1y, c1m1y1, c1my, c1my1, cm1y, cm1y1, cmy, cmy1;
unsigned int x0, x1;
if (c == *C && m == *M && y == *Y && k == *K)
{
/* Nothing to do */
}
else if (k == 0 && c == 0 && m == 0 && y == 0)
{
*C = 0;
*M = 0;
*Y = 0;
*K = 0;
*pr = *pg = *pb = 255;
}
else if (k == 255)
{
*C = 0;
*M = 0;
*Y = 0;
*K = 255;
*pr = *pg = *pb = 0;
}
else
{
*C = c;
*M = m;
*Y = y;
*K = k;
c += c>>7;
m += m>>7;
y += y>>7;
k += k>>7;
y >>= 1; /* Ditch 1 bit of Y to avoid overflow */
cm = c * m;
c1m = (m<<8) - cm;
cm1 = (c<<8) - cm;
c1m1 = ((256 - m)<<8) - cm1;
c1m1y = c1m1 * y;
c1m1y1 = (c1m1<<7) - c1m1y;
c1my = c1m * y;
c1my1 = (c1m<<7) - c1my;
cm1y = cm1 * y;
cm1y1 = (cm1<<7) - cm1y;
cmy = cm * y;
cmy1 = (cm<<7) - cmy;
/* this is a matrix multiplication, unrolled for performance */
x1 = c1m1y1 * k; /* 0 0 0 1 */
x0 = (c1m1y1<<8) - x1; /* 0 0 0 0 */
x1 = x1>>8; /* From 23 fractional bits to 15 */
r = g = b = x0;
r += 35 * x1; /* 0.1373f */
g += 31 * x1; /* 0.1216f */
b += 32 * x1; /* 0.1255f */
x1 = c1m1y * k; /* 0 0 1 1 */
x0 = (c1m1y<<8) - x1; /* 0 0 1 0 */
x1 >>= 8; /* From 23 fractional bits to 15 */
r += 28 * x1; /* 0.1098f */
g += 26 * x1; /* 0.1020f */
r += x0;
x0 >>= 8; /* From 23 fractional bits to 15 */
g += 243 * x0; /* 0.9490f */
x1 = c1my1 * k; /* 0 1 0 1 */
x0 = (c1my1<<8) - x1; /* 0 1 0 0 */
x1 >>= 8; /* From 23 fractional bits to 15 */
x0 >>= 8; /* From 23 fractional bits to 15 */
r += 36 * x1; /* 0.1412f */
r += 237 * x0; /* 0.9255f */
b += 141 * x0; /* 0.5490f */
x1 = c1my * k; /* 0 1 1 1 */
x0 = (c1my<<8) - x1; /* 0 1 1 0 */
x1 >>= 8; /* From 23 fractional bits to 15 */
x0 >>= 8; /* From 23 fractional bits to 15 */
r += 34 * x1; /* 0.1333f */
r += 238 * x0; /* 0.9294f */
g += 28 * x0; /* 0.1098f */
b += 36 * x0; /* 0.1412f */
x1 = cm1y1 * k; /* 1 0 0 1 */
x0 = (cm1y1<<8) - x1; /* 1 0 0 0 */
x1 >>= 8; /* From 23 fractional bits to 15 */
x0 >>= 8; /* From 23 fractional bits to 15 */
g += 15 * x1; /* 0.0588f */
b += 36 * x1; /* 0.1412f */
g += 174 * x0; /* 0.6784f */
b += 240 * x0; /* 0.9373f */
x1 = cm1y * k; /* 1 0 1 1 */
x0 = (cm1y<<8) - x1; /* 1 0 1 0 */
x1 >>= 8; /* From 23 fractional bits to 15 */
x0 >>= 8; /* From 23 fractional bits to 15 */
g += 19 * x1; /* 0.0745f */
g += 167 * x0; /* 0.6510f */
b += 80 * x0; /* 0.3137f */
x1 = cmy1 * k; /* 1 1 0 1 */
x0 = (cmy1<<8) - x1; /* 1 1 0 0 */
x1 >>= 8; /* From 23 fractional bits to 15 */
x0 >>= 8; /* From 23 fractional bits to 15 */
b += 2 * x1; /* 0.0078f */
r += 46 * x0; /* 0.1804f */
g += 49 * x0; /* 0.1922f */
b += 147 * x0; /* 0.5725f */
x0 = cmy * (256-k); /* 1 1 1 0 */
x0 >>= 8; /* From 23 fractional bits to 15 */
r += 54 * x0; /* 0.2118f */
g += 54 * x0; /* 0.2119f */
b += 57 * x0; /* 0.2235f */
r -= (r>>8);
g -= (g>>8);
b -= (b>>8);
*pr = r>>23;
*pg = g>>23;
*pb = b>>23;
}
#else
*pr = 255 - (unsigned char)fz_mini(c + k, 255);
*pg = 255 - (unsigned char)fz_mini(m + k, 255);
*pb = 255 - (unsigned char)fz_mini(y + k, 255);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::ByteMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_byteMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::ByteMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: content::DevToolsClientHost* DevToolsWindow::GetDevToolsClientHostForTest() {
return frontend_host_.get();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CreateFrameResourceCoordinator(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
resource_coordinator::mojom::FrameCoordinationUnitRequest request) {
render_frame_host->GetFrameResourceCoordinator()->AddBinding(
std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NormalPage::RemoveFromHeap() {
ArenaForNormalPage()->FreePage(this);
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SiteInstanceImpl::DecrementRelatedActiveContentsCount() {
browsing_instance_->decrement_active_contents_count();
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::RenderbufferStorageMultisampleHelper(
GLenum target,
GLsizei samples,
GLenum internal_format,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
ForcedMultisampleMode mode) {
if (samples == 0) {
api()->glRenderbufferStorageEXTFn(target, internal_format, width, height);
return;
}
if (mode == kForceExtMultisampledRenderToTexture) {
api()->glRenderbufferStorageMultisampleEXTFn(
target, samples, internal_format, width, height);
} else {
api()->glRenderbufferStorageMultisampleFn(target, samples, internal_format,
width, height);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseCommentComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar *buf,
size_t len, size_t size) {
int q, ql;
int r, rl;
int cur, l;
size_t count = 0;
int inputid;
inputid = ctxt->input->id;
if (buf == NULL) {
len = 0;
size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return;
}
}
GROW; /* Assure there's enough input data */
q = CUR_CHAR(ql);
if (q == 0)
goto not_terminated;
if (!IS_CHAR(q)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"xmlParseComment: invalid xmlChar value %d\n",
q);
xmlFree (buf);
return;
}
NEXTL(ql);
r = CUR_CHAR(rl);
if (r == 0)
goto not_terminated;
if (!IS_CHAR(r)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"xmlParseComment: invalid xmlChar value %d\n",
q);
xmlFree (buf);
return;
}
NEXTL(rl);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (cur == 0)
goto not_terminated;
while (IS_CHAR(cur) && /* checked */
((cur != '>') ||
(r != '-') || (q != '-'))) {
if ((r == '-') && (q == '-')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_HYPHEN_IN_COMMENT, NULL);
}
if ((len > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED,
"Comment too big found", NULL);
xmlFree (buf);
return;
}
if (len + 5 >= size) {
xmlChar *new_buf;
size_t new_size;
new_size = size * 2;
new_buf = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, new_size);
if (new_buf == NULL) {
xmlFree (buf);
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return;
}
buf = new_buf;
size = new_size;
}
COPY_BUF(ql,buf,len,q);
q = r;
ql = rl;
r = cur;
rl = l;
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
count = 0;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(buf);
return;
}
}
NEXTL(l);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (cur == 0) {
SHRINK;
GROW;
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (cur == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED,
"Comment not terminated \n<!--%.50s\n", buf);
} else if (!IS_CHAR(cur)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"xmlParseComment: invalid xmlChar value %d\n",
cur);
} else {
if (inputid != ctxt->input->id) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Comment doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n");
}
NEXT;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->comment != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->comment(ctxt->userData, buf);
}
xmlFree(buf);
return;
not_terminated:
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED,
"Comment not terminated\n", NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
return;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AddOsStrings(unsigned bitmask, base::ListValue* list) {
struct {
unsigned bit;
const char* const name;
} kBitsToOs[] = {
{kOsMac, "Mac"},
{kOsWin, "Windows"},
{kOsLinux, "Linux"},
{kOsCrOS, "Chrome OS"},
{kOsAndroid, "Android"},
{kOsCrOSOwnerOnly, "Chrome OS (owner only)"},
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kBitsToOs); ++i) {
if (bitmask & kBitsToOs[i].bit)
list->Append(new base::StringValue(kBitsToOs[i].name));
}
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int instantiate_empty(struct lxc_handler *handler, struct lxc_netdev *netdev)
{
netdev->ifindex = 0;
if (netdev->upscript) {
int err;
err = run_script(handler->name, "net", netdev->upscript,
"up", "empty", (char*) NULL);
if (err)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static iw_tmpsample linear_to_x_sample(iw_tmpsample samp_lin, const struct iw_csdescr *csdescr)
{
if(samp_lin > 0.999999999) {
return 1.0;
}
switch(csdescr->cstype) {
case IW_CSTYPE_SRGB:
return linear_to_srgb_sample(samp_lin);
case IW_CSTYPE_LINEAR:
return samp_lin;
case IW_CSTYPE_GAMMA:
return linear_to_gamma_sample(samp_lin,csdescr->gamma);
case IW_CSTYPE_REC709:
return linear_to_rec709_sample(samp_lin);
}
return linear_to_srgb_sample(samp_lin);
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct signal_struct *sig;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
return 0;
sig = kmem_cache_alloc(signal_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
tsk->signal = sig;
if (!sig)
return -ENOMEM;
atomic_set(&sig->count, 1);
atomic_set(&sig->live, 1);
init_waitqueue_head(&sig->wait_chldexit);
sig->flags = 0;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWPID)
sig->flags |= SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;
sig->group_exit_code = 0;
sig->group_exit_task = NULL;
sig->group_stop_count = 0;
sig->curr_target = tsk;
init_sigpending(&sig->shared_pending);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sig->posix_timers);
hrtimer_init(&sig->real_timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL);
sig->it_real_incr.tv64 = 0;
sig->real_timer.function = it_real_fn;
sig->leader = 0; /* session leadership doesn't inherit */
sig->tty_old_pgrp = NULL;
sig->tty = NULL;
sig->utime = sig->stime = sig->cutime = sig->cstime = cputime_zero;
sig->gtime = cputime_zero;
sig->cgtime = cputime_zero;
sig->nvcsw = sig->nivcsw = sig->cnvcsw = sig->cnivcsw = 0;
sig->min_flt = sig->maj_flt = sig->cmin_flt = sig->cmaj_flt = 0;
sig->inblock = sig->oublock = sig->cinblock = sig->coublock = 0;
sig->maxrss = sig->cmaxrss = 0;
task_io_accounting_init(&sig->ioac);
sig->sum_sched_runtime = 0;
taskstats_tgid_init(sig);
task_lock(current->group_leader);
memcpy(sig->rlim, current->signal->rlim, sizeof sig->rlim);
task_unlock(current->group_leader);
posix_cpu_timers_init_group(sig);
acct_init_pacct(&sig->pacct);
tty_audit_fork(sig);
sig->oom_adj = current->signal->oom_adj;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after failure of clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, parent's io_context->nr_tasks is incremented, but never
decremented whenever copy_process() fails afterwards, which prevents
exit_io_context() from calling IO schedulers exit functions.
Give a task_struct to exit_io_context(), and call exit_io_context() instead of
put_io_context() in copy_process() cleanup path.
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 94,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cliprdr_send_packet(uint16 type, uint16 status, uint8 * data, uint32 length)
{
STREAM s;
logger(Clipboard, Debug, "cliprdr_send_packet(), type=%d, status=%d, length=%d", type,
status, length);
s = channel_init(cliprdr_channel, length + 12);
out_uint16_le(s, type);
out_uint16_le(s, status);
out_uint32_le(s, length);
out_uint8p(s, data, length);
out_uint32(s, 0); /* pad? */
s_mark_end(s);
channel_send(s, cliprdr_channel);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct snd_seq_queue *snd_seq_queue_find_name(char *name)
{
int i;
struct snd_seq_queue *q;
for (i = 0; i < SNDRV_SEQ_MAX_QUEUES; i++) {
if ((q = queueptr(i)) != NULL) {
if (strncmp(q->name, name, sizeof(q->name)) == 0)
return q;
queuefree(q);
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close
ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client. This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.
This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 54,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit NoNavigationsObserver(WebContents* web_contents)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents) {}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void des3_ede_enc_blk_3way(struct des3_ede_x86_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src)
{
u32 *enc_ctx = ctx->enc_expkey;
des3_ede_x86_64_crypt_blk_3way(enc_ctx, dst, src);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texSubImage2D(GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLintptr offset) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateTexture2DBinding("texSubImage2D", target))
return;
if (!bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texSubImage2D",
"no bound PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER");
return;
}
if (unpack_flip_y_ || unpack_premultiply_alpha_) {
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texSubImage2D",
"FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA isn't allowed while uploading from PBO");
return;
}
if (!ValidateTexFunc("texSubImage2D", kTexSubImage, kSourceUnpackBuffer,
target, level, 0, width, height, 1, 0, format, type,
xoffset, yoffset, 0))
return;
if (!ValidateValueFitNonNegInt32("texSubImage2D", "offset", offset))
return;
ContextGL()->TexSubImage2D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, height,
format, type,
reinterpret_cast<const void*>(offset));
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 153,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static byte cdecrypt(byte cipher, unsigned short *cr)
{
const byte plain = (cipher ^ (*cr >> 8));
*cr = (cipher + *cr) * t1_c1 + t1_c2;
return plain;
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 76,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zcolor_remap_one(
i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p,
const ref * pproc,
gx_transfer_map * pmap,
const gs_gstate * pgs,
op_proc_t finish_proc )
{
os_ptr op;
/*
* Detect the identity function, which is a common value for one or
* more of these functions.
*/
if (r_size(pproc) == 0) {
gx_set_identity_transfer(pmap);
/*
* Even though we don't actually push anything on the e-stack, all
* clients do, so we return o_push_estack in this case. This is
* needed so that clients' finishing procedures will get run.
*/
return o_push_estack;
}
op = osp += 4;
make_real(op - 3, 0);
make_int(op - 2, transfer_map_size - 1);
make_real(op - 1, 1);
*op = *pproc;
++esp;
make_struct(esp, imemory_space((gs_ref_memory_t *) pgs->memory),
pmap);
push_op_estack(finish_proc);
push_op_estack(zfor_samples);
return o_push_estack;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnHittestData(
const FrameHostMsg_HittestData_Params& params) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->GetInputEventRouter()->OnHittestData(params);
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int airspy_convert_stream(struct airspy *s,
void *dst, void *src, unsigned int src_len)
{
unsigned int dst_len;
if (s->pixelformat == V4L2_SDR_FMT_RU12LE) {
memcpy(dst, src, src_len);
dst_len = src_len;
} else {
dst_len = 0;
}
/* calculate sample rate and output it in 10 seconds intervals */
if (unlikely(time_is_before_jiffies(s->jiffies_next))) {
#define MSECS 10000UL
unsigned int msecs = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies -
s->jiffies_next + msecs_to_jiffies(MSECS));
unsigned int samples = s->sample - s->sample_measured;
s->jiffies_next = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(MSECS);
s->sample_measured = s->sample;
dev_dbg(s->dev, "slen=%u samples=%u msecs=%u sample rate=%lu\n",
src_len, samples, msecs,
samples * 1000UL / msecs);
}
/* total number of samples */
s->sample += src_len / 2;
return dst_len;
}
Commit Message: media: fix airspy usb probe error path
Fix a memory leak on probe error of the airspy usb device driver.
The problem is triggered when more than 64 usb devices register with
v4l2 of type VFL_TYPE_SDR or VFL_TYPE_SUBDEV.
The memory leak is caused by the probe function of the airspy driver
mishandeling errors and not freeing the corresponding control structures
when an error occours registering the device to v4l2 core.
A badusb device can emulate 64 of these devices, and then through
continual emulated connect/disconnect of the 65th device, cause the
kernel to run out of RAM and crash the kernel, thus causing a local DOS
vulnerability.
Fixes CVE-2016-5400
Signed-off-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestState()
: added_input_method_extensions_(), active_input_method_ids_() {}
Commit Message: Clear |composing_text_| after CommitText() is called.
|composing_text_| of InputConnectionImpl should be cleared after
CommitText() is called. Otherwise, FinishComposingText() will commit the
same text twice.
Bug: 899736
Test: unit_tests
Change-Id: Idb22d968ffe95d946789fbe62454e8e79cb0b384
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1304773
Commit-Queue: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#603518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: onig_new_deluxe(regex_t** reg, const UChar* pattern, const UChar* pattern_end,
OnigCompileInfo* ci, OnigErrorInfo* einfo)
{
int r;
UChar *cpat, *cpat_end;
if (IS_NOT_NULL(einfo)) einfo->par = (UChar* )NULL;
if (ci->pattern_enc != ci->target_enc) {
r = conv_encoding(ci->pattern_enc, ci->target_enc, pattern, pattern_end,
&cpat, &cpat_end);
if (r != 0) return r;
}
else {
cpat = (UChar* )pattern;
cpat_end = (UChar* )pattern_end;
}
*reg = (regex_t* )xmalloc(sizeof(regex_t));
if (IS_NULL(*reg)) {
r = ONIGERR_MEMORY;
goto err2;
}
r = onig_reg_init(*reg, ci->option, ci->case_fold_flag, ci->target_enc,
ci->syntax);
if (r != 0) goto err;
r = onig_compile(*reg, cpat, cpat_end, einfo);
if (r != 0) {
err:
onig_free(*reg);
*reg = NULL;
}
err2:
if (cpat != pattern) xfree(cpat);
return r;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13224: don't allow different encodings for onig_new_deluxe()
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 169,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleCompressedTexImage2DBucket(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::CompressedTexImage2DBucket& c) {
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLenum internal_format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.internalformat);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLint border = static_cast<GLint>(c.border);
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(c.bucket_id);
if (!bucket) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
uint32 data_size = bucket->size();
GLsizei imageSize = data_size;
const void* data = bucket->GetData(0, data_size);
if (!data) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
return DoCompressedTexImage2D(
target, level, internal_format, width, height, border,
imageSize, data);
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int unimac_mdio_write(struct mii_bus *bus, int phy_id,
int reg, u16 val)
{
struct unimac_mdio_priv *priv = bus->priv;
u32 cmd;
/* Prepare the write operation */
cmd = MDIO_WR | (phy_id << MDIO_PMD_SHIFT) |
(reg << MDIO_REG_SHIFT) | (0xffff & val);
unimac_mdio_writel(priv, cmd, MDIO_CMD);
unimac_mdio_start(priv);
return priv->wait_func(priv->wait_func_data);
}
Commit Message: net: phy: mdio-bcm-unimac: fix potential NULL dereference in unimac_mdio_probe()
platform_get_resource() may fail and return NULL, so we should
better check it's return value to avoid a NULL pointer dereference
a bit later in the code.
This is detected by Coccinelle semantic patch.
@@
expression pdev, res, n, t, e, e1, e2;
@@
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, t, n);
+ if (!res)
+ return -EINVAL;
... when != res == NULL
e = devm_ioremap(e1, res->start, e2);
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 83,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __first_xml_child_match(xmlNode *parent, const char *name, const char *id)
{
xmlNode *cIter = NULL;
for (cIter = __xml_first_child(parent); cIter != NULL; cIter = __xml_next(cIter)) {
if(strcmp((const char *)cIter->name, name) != 0) {
continue;
} else if(id) {
const char *cid = ID(cIter);
if(cid == NULL || strcmp(cid, id) != 0) {
continue;
}
}
return cIter;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 43,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
{
STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
int i, r, ri_type;
int debug = 0, match_ri = 0;
ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
if (ris)
debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
ri_type = cms_pkey_get_ri_type(pk);
if (ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_NONE) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY,
CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++) {
ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != ri_type)
continue;
match_ri = 1;
if (ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
r = cms_kari_set1_pkey(cms, ri, pk, cert);
if (r > 0)
return 1;
if (r < 0)
return 0;
}
/*
* If we have a cert try matching RecipientInfo otherwise try them
* all.
*/
else if (!cert || !CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(ri, cert)) {
CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
if (cert) {
/*
* If not debugging clear any error and return success to
* avoid leaking of information useful to MMA
*/
if (!debug) {
ERR_clear_error();
return 1;
}
if (r > 0)
return 1;
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop after first
* successful decrypt. Always attempt to decrypt all recipients
* to avoid leaking timing of a successful decrypt.
*/
else if (r > 0 && debug)
return 1;
}
}
/* If no cert and not debugging always return success */
if (match_ri && !cert && !debug) {
ERR_clear_error();
return 1;
}
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 11,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __perf_event_header__init_id(struct perf_event_header *header,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct perf_event *event)
{
u64 sample_type = event->attr.sample_type;
data->type = sample_type;
header->size += event->id_header_size;
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_TID) {
/* namespace issues */
data->tid_entry.pid = perf_event_pid(event, current);
data->tid_entry.tid = perf_event_tid(event, current);
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_TIME)
data->time = perf_clock();
if (sample_type & (PERF_SAMPLE_ID | PERF_SAMPLE_IDENTIFIER))
data->id = primary_event_id(event);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_STREAM_ID)
data->stream_id = event->id;
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CPU) {
data->cpu_entry.cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
data->cpu_entry.reserved = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 50,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void next_entry(struct ctl_table_header **phead, struct ctl_table **pentry)
{
struct ctl_table_header *head = *phead;
struct ctl_table *entry = *pentry;
struct ctl_node *ctl_node = &head->node[entry - head->ctl_table];
spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
unuse_table(head);
ctl_node = first_usable_entry(rb_next(&ctl_node->node));
spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
head = NULL;
if (ctl_node) {
head = ctl_node->header;
entry = &head->ctl_table[ctl_node - head->node];
}
*phead = head;
*pentry = entry;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void SVGCDataBlock(void *context,const xmlChar *value,int length)
{
SVGInfo
*svg_info;
xmlNodePtr
child;
xmlParserCtxtPtr
parser;
/*
Called when a pcdata block has been parsed.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," SAX.pcdata(%s, %d)",
value,length);
svg_info=(SVGInfo *) context;
parser=svg_info->parser;
child=xmlGetLastChild(parser->node);
if ((child != (xmlNodePtr) NULL) && (child->type == XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE))
{
xmlTextConcat(child,value,length);
return;
}
(void) xmlAddChild(parser->node,xmlNewCDataBlock(parser->myDoc,value,length));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 cpuusage_read(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct cftype *cft)
{
struct cpuacct *ca = cgroup_ca(cgrp);
u64 totalcpuusage = 0;
int i;
for_each_present_cpu(i)
totalcpuusage += cpuacct_cpuusage_read(ca, i);
return totalcpuusage;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: devzvol_open_zfs()
{
int rc;
dev_t dv;
devzvol_li = ldi_ident_from_anon();
if (ldi_open_by_name("/dev/zfs", FREAD | FWRITE, kcred,
&devzvol_lh, devzvol_li))
return (-1);
if (zfs_mod == NULL && ((zfs_mod = ddi_modopen("fs/zfs",
KRTLD_MODE_FIRST, &rc)) == NULL)) {
return (rc);
}
ASSERT(szcm == NULL && szn2m == NULL);
if ((szcm = (int (*)(char *))
ddi_modsym(zfs_mod, "zvol_create_minor", &rc)) == NULL) {
cmn_err(CE_WARN, "couldn't resolve zvol_create_minor");
return (rc);
}
if ((szn2m = (int(*)(char *, minor_t *))
ddi_modsym(zfs_mod, "zvol_name2minor", &rc)) == NULL) {
cmn_err(CE_WARN, "couldn't resolve zvol_name2minor");
return (rc);
}
if (ldi_get_dev(devzvol_lh, &dv))
return (-1);
devzvol_major = getmajor(dv);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: 5421 devzvol_readdir() needs to be more careful with strchr
Reviewed by: Keith Wesolowski <keith.wesolowski@joyent.com>
Reviewed by: Jerry Jelinek <jerry.jelinek@joyent.com>
Approved by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 46,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerMS::SetSinkId(
const blink::WebString& sink_id,
blink::WebSetSinkIdCallbacks* web_callback) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
const media::OutputDeviceStatusCB callback =
media::ConvertToOutputDeviceStatusCB(web_callback);
if (audio_renderer_) {
audio_renderer_->SwitchOutputDevice(sink_id.Utf8(), callback);
} else {
callback.Run(media::OUTPUT_DEVICE_STATUS_ERROR_INTERNAL);
}
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ConversionContext::Convert(const PaintChunkSubset& paint_chunks,
const DisplayItemList& display_items) {
for (const auto& chunk : paint_chunks) {
const auto& chunk_state = chunk.properties;
bool switched_to_chunk_state = false;
for (const auto& item : display_items.ItemsInPaintChunk(chunk)) {
DCHECK(item.IsDrawing());
auto record =
static_cast<const DrawingDisplayItem&>(item).GetPaintRecord();
if ((!record || record->size() == 0) &&
chunk_state.Effect() == EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root()) {
continue;
}
TranslateForLayerOffsetOnce();
if (!switched_to_chunk_state) {
SwitchToChunkState(chunk);
switched_to_chunk_state = true;
}
cc_list_.StartPaint();
if (record && record->size() != 0)
cc_list_.push<cc::DrawRecordOp>(std::move(record));
cc_list_.EndPaintOfUnpaired(
chunk_to_layer_mapper_.MapVisualRect(item.VisualRect()));
}
UpdateEffectBounds(chunk.bounds, chunk_state.Transform());
}
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool key_handled() const { return key_handled_; }
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hevc_update_thread_context(AVCodecContext *dst,
const AVCodecContext *src)
{
HEVCContext *s = dst->priv_data;
HEVCContext *s0 = src->priv_data;
int i, ret;
if (!s->context_initialized) {
ret = hevc_init_context(dst);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(s->DPB); i++) {
ff_hevc_unref_frame(s, &s->DPB[i], ~0);
if (s0->DPB[i].frame->buf[0]) {
ret = hevc_ref_frame(s, &s->DPB[i], &s0->DPB[i]);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
}
if (s->ps.sps != s0->ps.sps)
s->ps.sps = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(s->ps.vps_list); i++) {
av_buffer_unref(&s->ps.vps_list[i]);
if (s0->ps.vps_list[i]) {
s->ps.vps_list[i] = av_buffer_ref(s0->ps.vps_list[i]);
if (!s->ps.vps_list[i])
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(s->ps.sps_list); i++) {
av_buffer_unref(&s->ps.sps_list[i]);
if (s0->ps.sps_list[i]) {
s->ps.sps_list[i] = av_buffer_ref(s0->ps.sps_list[i]);
if (!s->ps.sps_list[i])
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(s->ps.pps_list); i++) {
av_buffer_unref(&s->ps.pps_list[i]);
if (s0->ps.pps_list[i]) {
s->ps.pps_list[i] = av_buffer_ref(s0->ps.pps_list[i]);
if (!s->ps.pps_list[i])
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
}
if (s->ps.sps != s0->ps.sps)
if ((ret = set_sps(s, s0->ps.sps, src->pix_fmt)) < 0)
return ret;
s->seq_decode = s0->seq_decode;
s->seq_output = s0->seq_output;
s->pocTid0 = s0->pocTid0;
s->max_ra = s0->max_ra;
s->eos = s0->eos;
s->no_rasl_output_flag = s0->no_rasl_output_flag;
s->is_nalff = s0->is_nalff;
s->nal_length_size = s0->nal_length_size;
s->threads_number = s0->threads_number;
s->threads_type = s0->threads_type;
if (s0->eos) {
s->seq_decode = (s->seq_decode + 1) & 0xff;
s->max_ra = INT_MAX;
}
s->sei.frame_packing = s0->sei.frame_packing;
s->sei.display_orientation = s0->sei.display_orientation;
s->sei.mastering_display = s0->sei.mastering_display;
s->sei.content_light = s0->sei.content_light;
s->sei.alternative_transfer = s0->sei.alternative_transfer;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/hevcdec: Avoid only partly skiping duplicate first slices
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference and out of array access
Fixes: 13871/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5746167087890432
Fixes: 13845/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5650370728034304
This also fixes the return code for explode mode
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned checkColorValidity(LodePNGColorType colortype, unsigned bd) /*bd = bitdepth*/
{
switch(colortype)
{
case 0: if(!(bd == 1 || bd == 2 || bd == 4 || bd == 8 || bd == 16)) return 37; break; /*grey*/
case 2: if(!( bd == 8 || bd == 16)) return 37; break; /*RGB*/
case 3: if(!(bd == 1 || bd == 2 || bd == 4 || bd == 8 )) return 37; break; /*palette*/
case 4: if(!( bd == 8 || bd == 16)) return 37; break; /*grey + alpha*/
case 6: if(!( bd == 8 || bd == 16)) return 37; break; /*RGBA*/
default: return 31;
}
return 0; /*allowed color type / bits combination*/
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void md_check_recovery(struct mddev *mddev)
{
if (mddev->suspended)
return;
if (mddev->bitmap)
bitmap_daemon_work(mddev);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
if (mddev->pers->sync_request && !mddev->external) {
printk(KERN_INFO "md: %s in immediate safe mode\n",
mdname(mddev));
mddev->safemode = 2;
}
flush_signals(current);
}
if (mddev->ro && !test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED, &mddev->recovery))
return;
if ( ! (
(mddev->flags & MD_UPDATE_SB_FLAGS & ~ (1<<MD_CHANGE_PENDING)) ||
test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED, &mddev->recovery) ||
test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_DONE, &mddev->recovery) ||
(mddev->external == 0 && mddev->safemode == 1) ||
(mddev->safemode == 2 && ! atomic_read(&mddev->writes_pending)
&& !mddev->in_sync && mddev->recovery_cp == MaxSector)
))
return;
if (mddev_trylock(mddev)) {
int spares = 0;
if (mddev->ro) {
struct md_rdev *rdev;
if (!mddev->external && mddev->in_sync)
/* 'Blocked' flag not needed as failed devices
* will be recorded if array switched to read/write.
* Leaving it set will prevent the device
* from being removed.
*/
rdev_for_each(rdev, mddev)
clear_bit(Blocked, &rdev->flags);
/* On a read-only array we can:
* - remove failed devices
* - add already-in_sync devices if the array itself
* is in-sync.
* As we only add devices that are already in-sync,
* we can activate the spares immediately.
*/
remove_and_add_spares(mddev, NULL);
/* There is no thread, but we need to call
* ->spare_active and clear saved_raid_disk
*/
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery);
md_reap_sync_thread(mddev);
clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED, &mddev->recovery);
goto unlock;
}
if (!mddev->external) {
int did_change = 0;
spin_lock(&mddev->lock);
if (mddev->safemode &&
!atomic_read(&mddev->writes_pending) &&
!mddev->in_sync &&
mddev->recovery_cp == MaxSector) {
mddev->in_sync = 1;
did_change = 1;
set_bit(MD_CHANGE_CLEAN, &mddev->flags);
}
if (mddev->safemode == 1)
mddev->safemode = 0;
spin_unlock(&mddev->lock);
if (did_change)
sysfs_notify_dirent_safe(mddev->sysfs_state);
}
if (mddev->flags & MD_UPDATE_SB_FLAGS) {
if (mddev_is_clustered(mddev))
md_cluster_ops->metadata_update_start(mddev);
md_update_sb(mddev, 0);
if (mddev_is_clustered(mddev))
md_cluster_ops->metadata_update_finish(mddev);
}
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery) &&
!test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_DONE, &mddev->recovery)) {
/* resync/recovery still happening */
clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED, &mddev->recovery);
goto unlock;
}
if (mddev->sync_thread) {
md_reap_sync_thread(mddev);
goto unlock;
}
/* Set RUNNING before clearing NEEDED to avoid
* any transients in the value of "sync_action".
*/
mddev->curr_resync_completed = 0;
spin_lock(&mddev->lock);
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery);
spin_unlock(&mddev->lock);
/* Clear some bits that don't mean anything, but
* might be left set
*/
clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery);
clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_DONE, &mddev->recovery);
if (!test_and_clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED, &mddev->recovery) ||
test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN, &mddev->recovery))
goto not_running;
/* no recovery is running.
* remove any failed drives, then
* add spares if possible.
* Spares are also removed and re-added, to allow
* the personality to fail the re-add.
*/
if (mddev->reshape_position != MaxSector) {
if (mddev->pers->check_reshape == NULL ||
mddev->pers->check_reshape(mddev) != 0)
/* Cannot proceed */
goto not_running;
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RESHAPE, &mddev->recovery);
clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RECOVER, &mddev->recovery);
} else if ((spares = remove_and_add_spares(mddev, NULL))) {
clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_SYNC, &mddev->recovery);
clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_CHECK, &mddev->recovery);
clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_REQUESTED, &mddev->recovery);
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RECOVER, &mddev->recovery);
} else if (mddev->recovery_cp < MaxSector) {
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_SYNC, &mddev->recovery);
clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RECOVER, &mddev->recovery);
} else if (!test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_SYNC, &mddev->recovery))
/* nothing to be done ... */
goto not_running;
if (mddev->pers->sync_request) {
if (spares) {
/* We are adding a device or devices to an array
* which has the bitmap stored on all devices.
* So make sure all bitmap pages get written
*/
bitmap_write_all(mddev->bitmap);
}
INIT_WORK(&mddev->del_work, md_start_sync);
queue_work(md_misc_wq, &mddev->del_work);
goto unlock;
}
not_running:
if (!mddev->sync_thread) {
clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery);
wake_up(&resync_wait);
if (test_and_clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RECOVER,
&mddev->recovery))
if (mddev->sysfs_action)
sysfs_notify_dirent_safe(mddev->sysfs_action);
}
unlock:
wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait);
mddev_unlock(mddev);
}
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::Show() {
window_->Show();
if (!host_->is_hidden())
return;
bool has_saved_frame =
delegated_frame_host_ ? delegated_frame_host_->HasSavedFrame() : false;
ui::LatencyInfo renderer_latency_info, browser_latency_info;
if (has_saved_frame) {
browser_latency_info.AddLatencyNumber(
ui::TAB_SHOW_COMPONENT, host_->GetLatencyComponentId(), 0);
} else {
renderer_latency_info.AddLatencyNumber(
ui::TAB_SHOW_COMPONENT, host_->GetLatencyComponentId(), 0);
}
host_->WasShown(renderer_latency_info);
aura::Window* root = window_->GetRootWindow();
if (root) {
aura::client::CursorClient* cursor_client =
aura::client::GetCursorClient(root);
if (cursor_client)
NotifyRendererOfCursorVisibilityState(cursor_client->IsCursorVisible());
}
if (delegated_frame_host_)
delegated_frame_host_->WasShown(browser_latency_info);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
UpdateLegacyWin();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShellAuraPlatformData::ResizeWindow(int width, int height) {
root_window_->host()->SetBounds(gfx::Rect(width, height));
}
Commit Message: shell_aura: Set child to root window size, not host size
The host size is in pixels and the root window size is in scaled pixels.
So, using the pixel size may make the child window much larger than the
root window (and screen). Fix this by matching the root window size.
BUG=335713
TEST=ozone content_shell with --force-device-scale-factor=2
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/141853003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@246389 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 113,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripModelObserver::TabBlockedStateChanged(WebContents* contents,
int index) {
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoSamplerParameterfv(GLuint client_id,
GLenum pname,
const volatile GLfloat* params) {
DCHECK(params);
Sampler* sampler = GetSampler(client_id);
if (!sampler) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glSamplerParameterfv", "unknown sampler");
return;
}
sampler_manager()->SetParameterf("glSamplerParameterfv", error_state_.get(),
sampler, pname, params[0]);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void raw_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct raw_iter_state *state = raw_seq_private(seq);
read_unlock(&state->h->lock);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
const char *op,
void *aux)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
key_serial_t prkey, sskey;
struct key *key = cons->key, *authkey = cons->authkey, *keyring,
*session;
char *argv[9], *envp[3], uid_str[12], gid_str[12];
char key_str[12], keyring_str[3][12];
char desc[20];
int ret, i;
kenter("{%d},{%d},%s", key->serial, authkey->serial, op);
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error_alloc;
/* allocate a new session keyring */
sprintf(desc, "_req.%u", key->serial);
cred = get_current_cred();
keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
put_cred(cred);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error_alloc;
}
/* attach the auth key to the session keyring */
ret = key_link(keyring, authkey);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_link;
/* record the UID and GID */
sprintf(uid_str, "%d", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid));
sprintf(gid_str, "%d", from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));
/* we say which key is under construction */
sprintf(key_str, "%d", key->serial);
/* we specify the process's default keyrings */
sprintf(keyring_str[0], "%d",
cred->thread_keyring ? cred->thread_keyring->serial : 0);
prkey = 0;
if (cred->process_keyring)
prkey = cred->process_keyring->serial;
sprintf(keyring_str[1], "%d", prkey);
rcu_read_lock();
session = rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring);
if (!session)
session = cred->user->session_keyring;
sskey = session->serial;
rcu_read_unlock();
sprintf(keyring_str[2], "%d", sskey);
/* set up a minimal environment */
i = 0;
envp[i++] = "HOME=/";
envp[i++] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin";
envp[i] = NULL;
/* set up the argument list */
i = 0;
argv[i++] = "/sbin/request-key";
argv[i++] = (char *) op;
argv[i++] = key_str;
argv[i++] = uid_str;
argv[i++] = gid_str;
argv[i++] = keyring_str[0];
argv[i++] = keyring_str[1];
argv[i++] = keyring_str[2];
argv[i] = NULL;
/* do it */
ret = call_usermodehelper_keys(argv[0], argv, envp, keyring,
UMH_WAIT_PROC);
kdebug("usermode -> 0x%x", ret);
if (ret >= 0) {
/* ret is the exit/wait code */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags) ||
key_validate(key) < 0)
ret = -ENOKEY;
else
/* ignore any errors from userspace if the key was
* instantiated */
ret = 0;
}
error_link:
key_put(keyring);
error_alloc:
complete_request_key(cons, ret);
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull key handling fixes from David Howells:
"Here are two patches, the first of which at least should go upstream
immediately:
(1) Prevent a user-triggerable crash in the keyrings destructor when a
negatively instantiated keyring is garbage collected. I have also
seen this triggered for user type keys.
(2) Prevent the user from using requesting that a keyring be created
and instantiated through an upcall. Doing so is probably safe
since the keyring type ignores the arguments to its instantiation
function - but we probably shouldn't let keyrings be created in
this manner"
* 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring
KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyring
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mem_cgroup_write(struct cgroup *cont, struct cftype *cft,
const char *buffer)
{
struct mem_cgroup *memcg = mem_cgroup_from_cont(cont);
int type, name;
unsigned long long val;
int ret;
type = MEMFILE_TYPE(cft->private);
name = MEMFILE_ATTR(cft->private);
switch (name) {
case RES_LIMIT:
if (mem_cgroup_is_root(memcg)) { /* Can't set limit on root */
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* This function does all necessary parse...reuse it */
ret = res_counter_memparse_write_strategy(buffer, &val);
if (ret)
break;
if (type == _MEM)
ret = mem_cgroup_resize_limit(memcg, val);
else
ret = mem_cgroup_resize_memsw_limit(memcg, val);
break;
case RES_SOFT_LIMIT:
ret = res_counter_memparse_write_strategy(buffer, &val);
if (ret)
break;
/*
* For memsw, soft limits are hard to implement in terms
* of semantics, for now, we support soft limits for
* control without swap
*/
if (type == _MEM)
ret = res_counter_set_soft_limit(&memcg->res, val);
else
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL; /* should be BUG() ? */
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WaitUntilReceivedGesture(ui::EventType type) {
wait_until_event_ = type;
run_loop_.reset(new base::RunLoop());
run_loop_->Run();
}
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,094 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: brcmf_cfg80211_get_key(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *ndev, u8 key_idx,
bool pairwise, const u8 *mac_addr, void *cookie,
void (*callback)(void *cookie,
struct key_params *params))
{
struct key_params params;
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
struct brcmf_cfg80211_profile *profile = &ifp->vif->profile;
struct brcmf_cfg80211_security *sec;
s32 wsec;
s32 err = 0;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "key index (%d)\n", key_idx);
if (!check_vif_up(ifp->vif))
return -EIO;
memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_get(ifp, "wsec", &wsec);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("WLC_GET_WSEC error (%d)\n", err);
/* Ignore this error, may happen during DISASSOC */
err = -EAGAIN;
goto done;
}
if (wsec & WEP_ENABLED) {
sec = &profile->sec;
if (sec->cipher_pairwise & WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40) {
params.cipher = WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40\n");
} else if (sec->cipher_pairwise & WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104) {
params.cipher = WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104\n");
}
} else if (wsec & TKIP_ENABLED) {
params.cipher = WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP\n");
} else if (wsec & AES_ENABLED) {
params.cipher = WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC\n");
} else {
brcmf_err("Invalid algo (0x%x)\n", wsec);
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
callback(cookie, ¶ms);
done:
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Exit\n");
return err;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-16 | 0 | 21,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageSerializer::serialize(Page* page)
{
serializeFrame(page->deprecatedLocalMainFrame());
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 125,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int br_ip_hash(struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb,
struct br_ip *ip)
{
switch (ip->proto) {
case htons(ETH_P_IP):
return __br_ip4_hash(mdb, ip->u.ip4, ip->vid);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
return __br_ip6_hash(mdb, &ip->u.ip6, ip->vid);
#endif
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 30,000 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bgp_capabilities_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *opt, int caps_len)
{
int cap_type, cap_len, tcap_len, cap_offset;
int i = 0;
while (i < caps_len) {
ND_TCHECK2(opt[i], BGP_CAP_HEADER_SIZE);
cap_type=opt[i];
cap_len=opt[i+1];
tcap_len=cap_len;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_capcode_values, "Unknown",
cap_type),
cap_type,
cap_len));
ND_TCHECK2(opt[i+2], cap_len);
switch (cap_type) {
case BGP_CAPCODE_MP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAFI %s (%u), SAFI %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+2)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+2),
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown",
opt[i+5]),
opt[i+5]));
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_RESTART:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tRestart Flags: [%s], Restart Time %us",
((opt[i+2])&0x80) ? "R" : "none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+2)&0xfff));
tcap_len-=2;
cap_offset=4;
while(tcap_len>=4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t AFI %s (%u), SAFI %s (%u), Forwarding state preserved: %s",
tok2str(af_values,"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset),
tok2str(bgp_safi_values,"Unknown",
opt[i+cap_offset+2]),
opt[i+cap_offset+2],
((opt[i+cap_offset+3])&0x80) ? "yes" : "no" ));
tcap_len-=4;
cap_offset+=4;
}
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_RR:
case BGP_CAPCODE_RR_CISCO:
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_AS_NEW:
/*
* Extract the 4 byte AS number encoded.
*/
if (cap_len == 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t 4 Byte AS %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(opt + i + 2))));
}
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_ADD_PATH:
cap_offset=2;
if (tcap_len == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (bogus)")); /* length */
break;
}
while (tcap_len > 0) {
if (tcap_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t(invalid)"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAFI %s (%u), SAFI %s (%u), Send/Receive: %s",
tok2str(af_values,"Unknown",EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset),
tok2str(bgp_safi_values,"Unknown",opt[i+cap_offset+2]),
opt[i+cap_offset+2],
tok2str(bgp_add_path_recvsend,"Bogus (0x%02x)",opt[i+cap_offset+3])
));
tcap_len-=4;
cap_offset+=4;
}
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tno decoder for Capability %u",
cap_type));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &opt[i+2], "\n\t\t", cap_len);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 && cap_len > 0) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, &opt[i+2], "\n\t\t", cap_len);
}
i += BGP_CAP_HEADER_SIZE + cap_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|BGP]"));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14881/BGP: Fix BGP_CAPCODE_RESTART.
Add a bounds check and a comment to bgp_capabilities_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 169,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void RequestHDRStatus() {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&HDRProxy::RequestOnIOThread));
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VideoCaptureManager* MediaStreamManager::video_capture_manager() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(video_capture_manager_.get());
return video_capture_manager_.get();
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseArena::MakeConsistentForGC() {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK(IsConsistentForGC());
#endif
CHECK(SweepingCompleted());
HeapCompact* heap_compactor = GetThreadState()->Heap().Compaction();
if (!heap_compactor->IsCompactingArena(ArenaIndex()))
return;
BasePage* next_page = first_page_;
while (next_page) {
if (!next_page->IsLargeObjectPage())
heap_compactor->AddCompactingPage(next_page);
next_page = next_page->Next();
}
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void xackCommand(client *c) {
streamCG *group = NULL;
robj *o = lookupKeyRead(c->db,c->argv[1]);
if (o) {
if (checkType(c,o,OBJ_STREAM)) return; /* Type error. */
group = streamLookupCG(o->ptr,c->argv[2]->ptr);
}
/* No key or group? Nothing to ack. */
if (o == NULL || group == NULL) {
addReply(c,shared.czero);
return;
}
int acknowledged = 0;
for (int j = 3; j < c->argc; j++) {
streamID id;
unsigned char buf[sizeof(streamID)];
if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[j],&id,0) != C_OK) return;
streamEncodeID(buf,&id);
/* Lookup the ID in the group PEL: it will have a reference to the
* NACK structure that will have a reference to the consumer, so that
* we are able to remove the entry from both PELs. */
streamNACK *nack = raxFind(group->pel,buf,sizeof(buf));
if (nack != raxNotFound) {
raxRemove(group->pel,buf,sizeof(buf),NULL);
raxRemove(nack->consumer->pel,buf,sizeof(buf),NULL);
streamFreeNACK(nack);
acknowledged++;
server.dirty++;
}
}
addReplyLongLong(c,acknowledged);
}
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 81,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vp9_init_context_buffers(VP9_COMMON *cm) {
cm->setup_mi(cm);
if (cm->last_frame_seg_map && !cm->frame_parallel_decode)
memset(cm->last_frame_seg_map, 0, cm->mi_rows * cm->mi_cols);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE libvpx: Cherry-pick 8b4c315 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9_alloc_context_buffers: clear cm->mi* on failure
this fixes a crash in vp9_dec_setup_mi() via
vp9_init_context_buffers() should decoding continue and the decoder
resyncs on a smaller frame
Bug: 30593752
Change-Id: Iafbf1c4114062bf796f51a6b03be71328f7bcc69
(cherry picked from commit 737c8493693243838128788fe9c3abc51f17338e)
(cherry picked from commit 3e88ffac8c80b76e15286ef8a7b3bd8fa246c761)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 157,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t GLES2Util::GLFaceTargetToTextureTarget(uint32_t target) {
switch (target) {
case GL_TEXTURE_2D:
case GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES:
case GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB:
case GL_TEXTURE_3D:
case GL_TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY:
return target;
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_POSITIVE_X:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_NEGATIVE_X:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_POSITIVE_Y:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_NEGATIVE_Y:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_POSITIVE_Z:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_NEGATIVE_Z:
return GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Validate glClearBuffer*v function |buffer| param on the client side
Otherwise we could read out-of-bounds even if an invalid |buffer| is passed
in and in theory we should not read the buffer at all.
BUG=908749
TEST=gl_tests in ASAN build
R=piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I94b69b56ce3358ff9bfc0e21f0618aec4371d1ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1354571
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#612023}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 153,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Textfield::OnVisibleBoundsChanged() {
if (touch_selection_controller_)
touch_selection_controller_->SelectionChanged();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmxnet3_activate_device(VMXNET3State *s)
{
int i;
static const uint32_t VMXNET3_DEF_TX_THRESHOLD = 1;
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
hwaddr qdescr_table_pa;
uint64_t pa;
uint32_t size;
/* Verify configuration consistency */
if (!vmxnet3_verify_driver_magic(d, s->drv_shmem)) {
VMW_ERPRN("Device configuration received from driver is invalid");
return;
}
/* Verify if device is active */
if (s->device_active) {
VMW_CFPRN("Vmxnet3 device is active");
return;
}
vmxnet3_adjust_by_guest_type(s);
vmxnet3_update_features(s);
vmxnet3_update_pm_state(s);
vmxnet3_setup_rx_filtering(s);
/* Cache fields from shared memory */
s->mtu = VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED32(d, s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.mtu);
VMW_CFPRN("MTU is %u", s->mtu);
s->max_rx_frags =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED16(d, s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.maxNumRxSG);
if (s->max_rx_frags == 0) {
s->max_rx_frags = 1;
}
VMW_CFPRN("Max RX fragments is %u", s->max_rx_frags);
s->event_int_idx =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(d, s->drv_shmem, devRead.intrConf.eventIntrIdx);
assert(vmxnet3_verify_intx(s, s->event_int_idx));
VMW_CFPRN("Events interrupt line is %u", s->event_int_idx);
s->auto_int_masking =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(d, s->drv_shmem, devRead.intrConf.autoMask);
VMW_CFPRN("Automatic interrupt masking is %d", (int)s->auto_int_masking);
s->txq_num =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(d, s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.numTxQueues);
s->rxq_num =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(d, s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.numRxQueues);
VMW_CFPRN("Number of TX/RX queues %u/%u", s->txq_num, s->rxq_num);
vmxnet3_validate_queues(s);
qdescr_table_pa =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED64(d, s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.queueDescPA);
VMW_CFPRN("TX queues descriptors table is at 0x%" PRIx64, qdescr_table_pa);
/*
* Worst-case scenario is a packet that holds all TX rings space so
* we calculate total size of all TX rings for max TX fragments number
*/
s->max_tx_frags = 0;
/* TX queues */
for (i = 0; i < s->txq_num; i++) {
hwaddr qdescr_pa =
qdescr_table_pa + i * sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_TxQueueDesc);
/* Read interrupt number for this TX queue */
s->txq_descr[i].intr_idx =
VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR8(d, qdescr_pa, conf.intrIdx);
assert(vmxnet3_verify_intx(s, s->txq_descr[i].intr_idx));
VMW_CFPRN("TX Queue %d interrupt: %d", i, s->txq_descr[i].intr_idx);
/* Read rings memory locations for TX queues */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR64(d, qdescr_pa, conf.txRingBasePA);
size = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR32(d, qdescr_pa, conf.txRingSize);
vmxnet3_ring_init(d, &s->txq_descr[i].tx_ring, pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_TxDesc), false);
VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_CFPRN, "TX", i, &s->txq_descr[i].tx_ring);
s->max_tx_frags += size;
/* TXC ring */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR64(d, qdescr_pa, conf.compRingBasePA);
size = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR32(d, qdescr_pa, conf.compRingSize);
vmxnet3_ring_init(d, &s->txq_descr[i].comp_ring, pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_TxCompDesc), true);
VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_CFPRN, "TXC", i, &s->txq_descr[i].comp_ring);
s->txq_descr[i].tx_stats_pa =
qdescr_pa + offsetof(struct Vmxnet3_TxQueueDesc, stats);
memset(&s->txq_descr[i].txq_stats, 0,
sizeof(s->txq_descr[i].txq_stats));
/* Fill device-managed parameters for queues */
VMXNET3_WRITE_TX_QUEUE_DESCR32(d, qdescr_pa,
ctrl.txThreshold,
VMXNET3_DEF_TX_THRESHOLD);
}
/* Preallocate TX packet wrapper */
VMW_CFPRN("Max TX fragments is %u", s->max_tx_frags);
net_tx_pkt_init(&s->tx_pkt, PCI_DEVICE(s),
s->max_tx_frags, s->peer_has_vhdr);
net_rx_pkt_init(&s->rx_pkt, s->peer_has_vhdr);
/* Read rings memory locations for RX queues */
for (i = 0; i < s->rxq_num; i++) {
int j;
hwaddr qd_pa =
qdescr_table_pa + s->txq_num * sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_TxQueueDesc) +
i * sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_RxQueueDesc);
/* Read interrupt number for this RX queue */
s->rxq_descr[i].intr_idx =
VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR8(d, qd_pa, conf.intrIdx);
assert(vmxnet3_verify_intx(s, s->rxq_descr[i].intr_idx));
VMW_CFPRN("RX Queue %d interrupt: %d", i, s->rxq_descr[i].intr_idx);
/* Read rings memory locations */
for (j = 0; j < VMXNET3_RX_RINGS_PER_QUEUE; j++) {
/* RX rings */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR64(d, qd_pa, conf.rxRingBasePA[j]);
size = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR32(d, qd_pa, conf.rxRingSize[j]);
vmxnet3_ring_init(d, &s->rxq_descr[i].rx_ring[j], pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_RxDesc), false);
VMW_CFPRN("RX queue %d:%d: Base: %" PRIx64 ", Size: %d",
i, j, pa, size);
}
/* RXC ring */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR64(d, qd_pa, conf.compRingBasePA);
size = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR32(d, qd_pa, conf.compRingSize);
vmxnet3_ring_init(d, &s->rxq_descr[i].comp_ring, pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_RxCompDesc), true);
VMW_CFPRN("RXC queue %d: Base: %" PRIx64 ", Size: %d", i, pa, size);
s->rxq_descr[i].rx_stats_pa =
qd_pa + offsetof(struct Vmxnet3_RxQueueDesc, stats);
memset(&s->rxq_descr[i].rxq_stats, 0,
sizeof(s->rxq_descr[i].rxq_stats));
}
vmxnet3_validate_interrupts(s);
/* Make sure everything is in place before device activation */
smp_wmb();
vmxnet3_reset_mac(s);
s->device_active = true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 8,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: create_parent_dir(struct archive_write_disk *a, char *path)
{
char *slash;
int r;
/* Remove tail element to obtain parent name. */
slash = strrchr(path, '/');
if (slash == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
*slash = '\0';
r = create_dir(a, path);
*slash = '/';
return (r);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 43,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool is_ro_export(FsContext *ctx)
{
return ctx->export_flags & V9FS_RDONLY;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 1,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_printer_state_reasons(
cupsd_client_t *con, /* I - Client connection */
cupsd_printer_t *p) /* I - Printer info */
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2,
"add_printer_state_reasons(%p[%d], %p[%s])",
con, con->number, p, p->name);
if (p->num_reasons == 0)
ippAddString(con->response, IPP_TAG_PRINTER, IPP_TAG_KEYWORD,
"printer-state-reasons", NULL, "none");
else
ippAddStrings(con->response, IPP_TAG_PRINTER, IPP_TAG_KEYWORD,
"printer-state-reasons", p->num_reasons, NULL,
(const char * const *)p->reasons);
}
Commit Message: DBUS notifications could crash the scheduler (Issue #5143)
- scheduler/ipp.c: Make sure requesting-user-name string is valid UTF-8.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 85,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ping_check_bind_addr(struct sock *sk, struct inet_sock *isk,
struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) {
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *) uaddr;
int chk_addr_ret;
if (addr_len < sizeof(*addr))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->sin_family != AF_INET &&
!(addr->sin_family == AF_UNSPEC &&
addr->sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_ANY)))
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
pr_debug("ping_check_bind_addr(sk=%p,addr=%pI4,port=%d)\n",
sk, &addr->sin_addr.s_addr, ntohs(addr->sin_port));
chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(net, addr->sin_addr.s_addr);
if (addr->sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_ANY))
chk_addr_ret = RTN_LOCAL;
if ((net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind == 0 &&
isk->freebind == 0 && isk->transparent == 0 &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_LOCAL) ||
chk_addr_ret == RTN_MULTICAST ||
chk_addr_ret == RTN_BROADCAST)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) {
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) uaddr;
int addr_type, scoped, has_addr;
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
if (addr_len < sizeof(*addr))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
pr_debug("ping_check_bind_addr(sk=%p,addr=%pI6c,port=%d)\n",
sk, addr->sin6_addr.s6_addr, ntohs(addr->sin6_port));
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&addr->sin6_addr);
scoped = __ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(addr_type);
if ((addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY &&
!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_UNICAST)) ||
(scoped && !addr->sin6_scope_id))
return -EINVAL;
rcu_read_lock();
if (addr->sin6_scope_id) {
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, addr->sin6_scope_id);
if (!dev) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return -ENODEV;
}
}
has_addr = pingv6_ops.ipv6_chk_addr(net, &addr->sin6_addr, dev,
scoped);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!(isk->freebind || isk->transparent || has_addr ||
addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY))
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (scoped)
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = addr->sin6_scope_id;
#endif
} else {
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Missing sk_nulls_node_init() in ping_unhash().
If we don't do that, then the poison value is left in the ->pprev
backlink.
This can cause crashes if we do a disconnect, followed by a connect().
Tested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Wen Xu <hotdog3645@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 43,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_raw_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
if (optname == ICMP_FILTER) {
if (inet_sk(sk)->inet_num != IPPROTO_ICMP)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
else
return raw_geticmpfilter(sk, optval, optlen);
}
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void GetBucketsForArgs(const ListValue* args, BucketList* buckets) {
IdList ids;
bool invalid_id = false;
if (!FunctionType::ExtractIds(args, &ids, &invalid_id) || invalid_id)
return;
for (IdList::iterator it = ids.begin(); it != ids.end(); ++it)
buckets->push_back(GetBucket(*it));
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free in BookmarksIOFunction::ShowSelectFileDialog.
BUG=177410
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12326086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 115,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_sidt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
return emulate_store_desc_ptr(ctxt, ctxt->ops->get_idt);
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::StaticStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_staticStringAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::StaticStringAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mpeg4_encode_gop_header(MpegEncContext *s)
{
int hours, minutes, seconds;
int64_t time;
put_bits(&s->pb, 16, 0);
put_bits(&s->pb, 16, GOP_STARTCODE);
time = s->current_picture_ptr->f->pts;
if (s->reordered_input_picture[1])
time = FFMIN(time, s->reordered_input_picture[1]->f->pts);
time = time * s->avctx->time_base.num;
s->last_time_base = FFUDIV(time, s->avctx->time_base.den);
seconds = FFUDIV(time, s->avctx->time_base.den);
minutes = FFUDIV(seconds, 60); seconds = FFUMOD(seconds, 60);
hours = FFUDIV(minutes, 60); minutes = FFUMOD(minutes, 60);
hours = FFUMOD(hours , 24);
put_bits(&s->pb, 5, hours);
put_bits(&s->pb, 6, minutes);
put_bits(&s->pb, 1, 1);
put_bits(&s->pb, 6, seconds);
put_bits(&s->pb, 1, !!(s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_CLOSED_GOP));
put_bits(&s->pb, 1, 0); // broken link == NO
ff_mpeg4_stuffing(&s->pb);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videoenc: Use 64 bit for times in mpeg4_encode_gop_header()
Fixes truncation
Fixes Assertion n <= 31 && value < (1U << n) failed at libavcodec/put_bits.h:169
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_2.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 169,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PluginDataRemover::GetSupportedPlugins(
std::vector<WebPluginInfo>* supported_plugins) {
bool allow_wildcard = false;
std::vector<WebPluginInfo> plugins;
PluginService::GetInstance()->GetPluginInfoArray(
GURL(), kFlashPluginSwfMimeType, allow_wildcard, &plugins, NULL);
Version min_version(kMinFlashVersion);
for (std::vector<WebPluginInfo>::iterator it = plugins.begin();
it != plugins.end(); ++it) {
Version version;
WebPluginInfo::CreateVersionFromString(it->version, &version);
if (version.IsValid() && min_version.CompareTo(version) == -1)
supported_plugins->push_back(*it);
}
}
Commit Message: Do not attempt to open a channel to a plugin in Plugin Data Remover if there are no plugins available.
BUG=485886
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1144353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#331168}
CWE ID: | 0 | 119,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, int *ok)
{
/*-
* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
* if so:
* (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
* (2) update s->init_num
*/
pitem *item;
hm_fragment *frag;
int al;
*ok = 0;
item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
if (item == NULL)
return 0;
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
/* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
frag->msg_header.frag_len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 165,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SitePerProcessHighDPIBrowserTest() {}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 143,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Con_Dump_f( void ) {
int l, x, i;
short *line;
fileHandle_t f;
int bufferlen;
char *buffer;
char filename[MAX_QPATH];
if ( Cmd_Argc() != 2 ) {
Com_Printf( "usage: condump <filename>\n" );
return;
}
Q_strncpyz( filename, Cmd_Argv( 1 ), sizeof( filename ) );
COM_DefaultExtension( filename, sizeof( filename ), ".txt" );
f = FS_FOpenFileWrite( filename );
if ( !f ) {
Com_Printf ("ERROR: couldn't open %s.\n", filename);
return;
}
Com_Printf ("Dumped console text to %s.\n", filename );
for ( l = con.current - con.totallines + 1 ; l <= con.current ; l++ )
{
line = con.text + ( l % con.totallines ) * con.linewidth;
for ( x = 0 ; x < con.linewidth ; x++ )
if ( ( line[x] & 0xff ) != ' ' ) {
break;
}
if ( x != con.linewidth ) {
break;
}
}
#ifdef _WIN32
bufferlen = con.linewidth + 3 * sizeof ( char );
#else
bufferlen = con.linewidth + 2 * sizeof ( char );
#endif
buffer = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory( bufferlen );
buffer[bufferlen-1] = 0;
for ( ; l <= con.current ; l++ )
{
line = con.text + ( l % con.totallines ) * con.linewidth;
for ( i = 0; i < con.linewidth; i++ )
buffer[i] = line[i] & 0xff;
for ( x = con.linewidth - 1 ; x >= 0 ; x-- )
{
if ( buffer[x] == ' ' ) {
buffer[x] = 0;
} else {
break;
}
}
#ifdef _WIN32
Q_strcat(buffer, bufferlen, "\r\n");
#else
Q_strcat(buffer, bufferlen, "\n");
#endif
FS_Write( buffer, strlen( buffer ), f );
}
Hunk_FreeTempMemory( buffer );
FS_FCloseFile( f );
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 1 | 170,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadPSDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
has_merged_image,
skip_layers;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickSizeType
length;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PSDInfo
psd_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*data;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read image header.
*/
image->endian=MSBEndian;
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) psd_info.signature);
psd_info.version=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(psd_info.signature,"8BPS",4) != 0) ||
((psd_info.version != 1) && (psd_info.version != 2)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) ReadBlob(image,6,psd_info.reserved);
psd_info.channels=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (psd_info.channels > MaxPSDChannels)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded");
psd_info.rows=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
psd_info.columns=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if ((psd_info.version == 1) && ((psd_info.rows > 30000) ||
(psd_info.columns > 30000)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((psd_info.depth != 1) && (psd_info.depth != 8) && (psd_info.depth != 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.mode=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image is %.20g x %.20g with channels=%.20g, depth=%.20g, mode=%s",
(double) psd_info.columns,(double) psd_info.rows,(double)
psd_info.channels,(double) psd_info.depth,ModeToString((PSDImageType)
psd_info.mode));
/*
Initialize image.
*/
image->depth=psd_info.depth;
image->columns=psd_info.columns;
image->rows=psd_info.rows;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image) == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (psd_info.mode == LabMode)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace);
if (psd_info.mode == CMYKMode)
{
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
image->matte=psd_info.channels > 4 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
}
else if ((psd_info.mode == BitmapMode) || (psd_info.mode == GrayscaleMode) ||
(psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode))
{
status=AcquireImageColormap(image,psd_info.depth != 16 ? 256 : 65536);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image colormap allocated");
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->matte=psd_info.channels > 1 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
}
else
image->matte=psd_info.channels > 3 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
/*
Read PSD raster colormap only present for indexed and duotone images.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading colormap");
if (psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode)
{
/*
Duotone image data; the format of this data is undocumented.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length,
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,data);
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
}
else
{
size_t
number_colors;
/*
Read PSD raster colormap.
*/
number_colors=length/3;
if (number_colors > 65536)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,number_colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->matte=MagickFalse;
}
}
if ((image->depth == 1) && (image->storage_class != PseudoClass))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, "ImproperImageHeader");
has_merged_image=MagickTrue;
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
unsigned char
*blocks;
/*
Image resources block.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading image resource blocks - %.20g bytes",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
if (length > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
blocks=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length,
sizeof(*blocks));
if (blocks == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,blocks);
if ((count != (ssize_t) length) || (length < 4) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) blocks,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
ParseImageResourceBlocks(image,blocks,(size_t) length,&has_merged_image);
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
}
/*
Layer and mask block.
*/
length=GetPSDSize(&psd_info,image);
if (length == 8)
{
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
}
offset=TellBlob(image);
skip_layers=MagickFalse;
if ((image_info->number_scenes == 1) && (image_info->scene == 0) &&
(has_merged_image != MagickFalse))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" read composite only");
skip_layers=MagickTrue;
}
if (length == 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image has no layers");
}
else
{
if (ReadPSDLayersInternal(image,image_info,&psd_info,skip_layers,
exception) != MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Skip the rest of the layer and mask information.
*/
SeekBlob(image,offset+length,SEEK_SET);
}
/*
If we are only "pinging" the image, then we're done - so return.
*/
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Read the precombined layer, present for PSD < 4 compatibility.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading the precombined layer");
if (has_merged_image != MagickFalse || GetImageListLength(image) == 1)
has_merged_image=(MagickBooleanType) ReadPSDMergedImage(image_info,image,
&psd_info,exception);
if ((has_merged_image == MagickFalse) && (GetImageListLength(image) == 1) &&
(length != 0))
{
SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET);
status=ReadPSDLayersInternal(image,image_info,&psd_info,MagickFalse,
exception);
if (status != MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
}
if (has_merged_image == MagickFalse)
{
Image
*merged;
if (GetImageListLength(image) == 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
SetImageAlphaChannel(image,TransparentAlphaChannel);
image->background_color.opacity=TransparentOpacity;
merged=MergeImageLayers(image,FlattenLayer,exception);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,merged);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mixer_ctl_procunit_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
struct snd_ctl_elem_value *ucontrol)
{
struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval = kcontrol->private_data;
int err, val;
err = get_cur_ctl_value(cval, cval->control << 8, &val);
if (err < 0) {
ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = cval->min;
return filter_error(cval, err);
}
val = get_relative_value(cval, val);
ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = val;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: yydestruct (const char *yymsg, int yytype, YYSTYPE *yyvaluep, void *yyscanner, YR_COMPILER* compiler)
{
YYUSE (yyvaluep);
YYUSE (yyscanner);
YYUSE (compiler);
if (!yymsg)
yymsg = "Deleting";
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT (yymsg, yytype, yyvaluep, yylocationp);
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
switch (yytype)
{
case 10: /* _IDENTIFIER_ */
#line 194 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_free(((*yyvaluep).c_string)); }
#line 1339 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 11: /* _STRING_IDENTIFIER_ */
#line 198 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_free(((*yyvaluep).c_string)); }
#line 1345 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 12: /* _STRING_COUNT_ */
#line 195 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_free(((*yyvaluep).c_string)); }
#line 1351 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 13: /* _STRING_OFFSET_ */
#line 196 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_free(((*yyvaluep).c_string)); }
#line 1357 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 14: /* _STRING_LENGTH_ */
#line 197 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_free(((*yyvaluep).c_string)); }
#line 1363 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 15: /* _STRING_IDENTIFIER_WITH_WILDCARD_ */
#line 199 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_free(((*yyvaluep).c_string)); }
#line 1369 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 19: /* _TEXT_STRING_ */
#line 200 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_free(((*yyvaluep).sized_string)); }
#line 1375 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 20: /* _HEX_STRING_ */
#line 201 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_free(((*yyvaluep).sized_string)); }
#line 1381 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 21: /* _REGEXP_ */
#line 202 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_free(((*yyvaluep).sized_string)); }
#line 1387 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
default:
break;
}
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #597
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,482 |
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