instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebView::inputMethodEvent(QInputMethodEvent* event)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
d->pageView->eventHandler()->handleInputMethodEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int add_assoc_string_ex(zval *arg, const char *key, uint key_len, char *str, int duplicate) /* {{{ */
{
zval *tmp;
size_t _len = strlen(str);
if (UNEXPECTED(_len > INT_MAX)) {
zend_error_noreturn(E_ERROR, "String overflow, max size is %d", INT_MAX);
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(tmp, str, _len, duplicate);
return zend_symtable_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(arg), key, key_len, (void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Reset() {
received_notification_ = false;
waiting_ = false;
extension_ = NULL;
permissions_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check schemes
Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check the schemes of the patterns
when evaluating if one pattern contains another. This is important in
order to prevent extensions from requesting chrome:-scheme permissions
via the permissions API when <all_urls> is specified as an optional
permission.
Bug: 859600,918470
Change-Id: If04d945ad0c939e84a80d83502c0f84b6ef0923d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1396561
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621410}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 153,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vivid_fb_release_buffers(struct vivid_dev *dev)
{
if (dev->video_vbase == NULL)
return;
/* Release cmap */
if (dev->fb_info.cmap.len)
fb_dealloc_cmap(&dev->fb_info.cmap);
/* Release pseudo palette */
kfree(dev->fb_info.pseudo_palette);
kfree((void *)dev->video_vbase);
}
Commit Message: [media] media/vivid-osd: fix info leak in ioctl
The vivid_fb_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of
struct fb_vblank after the ->hcount member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speirofr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nl_pid_hash_rehash(struct nl_pid_hash *hash, int grow)
{
unsigned int omask, mask, shift;
size_t osize, size;
struct hlist_head *otable, *table;
int i;
omask = mask = hash->mask;
osize = size = (mask + 1) * sizeof(*table);
shift = hash->shift;
if (grow) {
if (++shift > hash->max_shift)
return 0;
mask = mask * 2 + 1;
size *= 2;
}
table = nl_pid_hash_zalloc(size);
if (!table)
return 0;
otable = hash->table;
hash->table = table;
hash->mask = mask;
hash->shift = shift;
get_random_bytes(&hash->rnd, sizeof(hash->rnd));
for (i = 0; i <= omask; i++) {
struct sock *sk;
struct hlist_node *node, *tmp;
sk_for_each_safe(sk, node, tmp, &otable[i])
__sk_add_node(sk, nl_pid_hashfn(hash, nlk_sk(sk)->pid));
}
nl_pid_hash_free(otable, osize);
hash->rehash_time = jiffies + 10 * 60 * HZ;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void blk_mq_free_hw_queues(struct request_queue *q,
struct blk_mq_tag_set *set)
{
struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx;
unsigned int i;
queue_for_each_hw_ctx(q, hctx, i)
free_cpumask_var(hctx->cpumask);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 86,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PreconnectManager::PreconnectUrl(
const GURL& url,
int num_sockets,
bool allow_credentials,
const net::NetworkIsolationKey& network_isolation_key) const {
DCHECK(url.GetOrigin() == url);
DCHECK(url.SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS());
if (observer_)
observer_->OnPreconnectUrl(url, num_sockets, allow_credentials);
auto* network_context = GetNetworkContext();
if (!network_context)
return;
network_context->PreconnectSockets(num_sockets, url, allow_credentials,
network_isolation_key);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::Undo() {
RenderFrameHostImpl* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->GetFrameInputHandler()->Undo();
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Undo"));
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int release_terminal(void) {
int r = 0, fd;
struct sigaction sa_old, sa_new;
if ((fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY|O_NDELAY|O_CLOEXEC)) < 0)
return -errno;
/* Temporarily ignore SIGHUP, so that we don't get SIGHUP'ed
* by our own TIOCNOTTY */
zero(sa_new);
sa_new.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
sa_new.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
assert_se(sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa_new, &sa_old) == 0);
if (ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY) < 0)
r = -errno;
assert_se(sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa_old, NULL) == 0);
close_nointr_nofail(fd);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int srpt_xfer_data(struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch,
struct srpt_send_ioctx *ioctx)
{
int ret;
ret = srpt_map_sg_to_ib_sge(ch, ioctx);
if (ret) {
pr_err("%s[%d] ret=%d\n", __func__, __LINE__, ret);
goto out;
}
ret = srpt_perform_rdmas(ch, ioctx);
if (ret) {
if (ret == -EAGAIN || ret == -ENOMEM)
pr_info("%s[%d] queue full -- ret=%d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret);
else
pr_err("%s[%d] fatal error -- ret=%d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret);
goto out_unmap;
}
out:
return ret;
out_unmap:
srpt_unmap_sg_to_ib_sge(ch, ioctx);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 50,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mm_init_aio(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_AIO
spin_lock_init(&mm->ioctx_lock);
mm->ioctx_table = NULL;
#endif
}
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageellipse)
{
zval *IM;
long cx, cy, w, h, color;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rlllll", &IM, &cx, &cy, &w, &h, &color) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
gdImageEllipse(im, cx, cy, w, h, color);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void phar_do_403(char *entry, int entry_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
sapi_header_line ctr = {0};
ctr.response_code = 403;
ctr.line_len = sizeof("HTTP/1.0 403 Access Denied")-1;
ctr.line = "HTTP/1.0 403 Access Denied";
sapi_header_op(SAPI_HEADER_REPLACE, &ctr TSRMLS_CC);
sapi_send_headers(TSRMLS_C);
PHPWRITE("<html>\n <head>\n <title>Access Denied</title>\n </head>\n <body>\n <h1>403 - File ", sizeof("<html>\n <head>\n <title>Access Denied</title>\n </head>\n <body>\n <h1>403 - File ") - 1);
PHPWRITE(entry, entry_len);
PHPWRITE(" Access Denied</h1>\n </body>\n</html>", sizeof(" Access Denied</h1>\n </body>\n</html>") - 1);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: json_t *json_object_iter_value(void *iter)
{
if(!iter)
return NULL;
return (json_t *)hashtable_iter_value(iter);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 40,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __init evm_init_config(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID;
#endif
pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs);
}
Commit Message: EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 55,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLfloat BackBufferAlphaClearColor() const {
return offscreen_buffer_should_have_alpha_ ? 0.f : 1.f;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TEE_Result op_attr_value_from_user(void *attr, const void *buffer,
size_t size)
{
uint32_t *v = attr;
if (size != sizeof(uint32_t) * 2)
return TEE_ERROR_GENERIC; /* "can't happen */
/* Note that only the first value is copied */
memcpy(v, buffer, sizeof(uint32_t));
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void print_usage(int argc, char *argv[])
{
char *name = NULL;
name = strrchr(argv[0], '/');
printf("Usage: %s -i|--infile FILE [-o|--outfile FILE] [-d|--debug]\n", (name ? name + 1: argv[0]));
printf("Convert a plist FILE from binary to XML format or vice-versa.\n\n");
printf(" -i, --infile FILE\tThe FILE to convert from\n");
printf(" -o, --outfile FILE\tOptional FILE to convert to or stdout if not used\n");
printf(" -d, --debug\t\tEnable extended debug output\n");
printf("\n");
}
Commit Message: plistutil: Prevent OOB heap buffer read by checking input size
As pointed out in #87 plistutil would do a memcmp with a heap buffer
without checking the size. If the size is less than 8 it would read
beyond the bounds of this heap buffer. This commit prevents that.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGenSharedIdsCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::GenSharedIdsCHROMIUM& c) {
GLuint namespace_id = static_cast<GLuint>(c.namespace_id);
GLuint id_offset = static_cast<GLuint>(c.id_offset);
GLsizei n = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.n);
uint32 data_size;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(n, sizeof(GLuint), &data_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
GLuint* ids = GetSharedMemoryAs<GLuint*>(
c.ids_shm_id, c.ids_shm_offset, data_size);
if (n < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "GenSharedIdsCHROMIUM: n < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (ids == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
DoGenSharedIdsCHROMIUM(namespace_id, id_offset, n, ids);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __be64 get_umr_update_access_mask(int atomic)
{
u64 result;
result = MLX5_MKEY_MASK_LR |
MLX5_MKEY_MASK_LW |
MLX5_MKEY_MASK_RR |
MLX5_MKEY_MASK_RW;
if (atomic)
result |= MLX5_MKEY_MASK_A;
return cpu_to_be64(result);
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> SerializedScriptValue::create()
{
return adoptRef(new SerializedScriptValue());
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderProcessHost* RenderFrameHostImpl::GetProcess() {
return process_;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tg3_ape_unlock(struct tg3 *tp, int locknum)
{
u32 gnt, bit;
if (!tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_APE))
return;
switch (locknum) {
case TG3_APE_LOCK_GPIO:
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5761)
return;
case TG3_APE_LOCK_GRC:
case TG3_APE_LOCK_MEM:
if (!tp->pci_fn)
bit = APE_LOCK_GRANT_DRIVER;
else
bit = 1 << tp->pci_fn;
break;
case TG3_APE_LOCK_PHY0:
case TG3_APE_LOCK_PHY1:
case TG3_APE_LOCK_PHY2:
case TG3_APE_LOCK_PHY3:
bit = APE_LOCK_GRANT_DRIVER;
break;
default:
return;
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5761)
gnt = TG3_APE_LOCK_GRANT;
else
gnt = TG3_APE_PER_LOCK_GRANT;
tg3_ape_write32(tp, gnt + 4 * locknum, bit);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API int ModPlug_GetLength(ModPlugFile* file)
{
if(!file) return 0;
return (int)(openmpt_module_get_duration_seconds(file->mod)*1000.0);
}
Commit Message: [Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buffer size beforehand. libopenmpt can return strings longer than 32 bytes here beacuse the internal limit of 32 bytes applies to strings encoded in arbitrary character encodings but the API returns them converted to UTF-8, which can be longer. (reported by Antonio Morales Maldonado of Semmle Security Research Team)
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@12127 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-120 | 0 | 87,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_qf_name(struct super_block *sb, int qtype, substring_t *args)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
char *qname;
if (sb_any_quota_loaded(sb) &&
!sbi->s_qf_names[qtype]) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Cannot change journaled "
"quota options when quota turned on");
return 0;
}
qname = match_strdup(args);
if (!qname) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Not enough memory for storing quotafile name");
return 0;
}
if (sbi->s_qf_names[qtype] &&
strcmp(sbi->s_qf_names[qtype], qname)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"%s quota file already specified", QTYPE2NAME(qtype));
kfree(qname);
return 0;
}
sbi->s_qf_names[qtype] = qname;
if (strchr(sbi->s_qf_names[qtype], '/')) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"quotafile must be on filesystem root");
kfree(sbi->s_qf_names[qtype]);
sbi->s_qf_names[qtype] = NULL;
return 0;
}
set_opt(sb, QUOTA);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const base::Optional<gfx::Size>& RenderFrameHostImpl::GetFrameSize() {
return frame_size_;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_IUP( INS_ARG )
{
IUP_WorkerRec V;
FT_Byte mask;
FT_UInt first_point; /* first point of contour */
FT_UInt end_point; /* end point (last+1) of contour */
FT_UInt first_touched; /* first touched point in contour */
FT_UInt cur_touched; /* current touched point in contour */
FT_UInt point; /* current point */
FT_Short contour; /* current contour */
FT_UNUSED_ARG;
/* ignore empty outlines */
if ( CUR.pts.n_contours == 0 )
return;
if ( CUR.opcode & 1 )
{
mask = FT_CURVE_TAG_TOUCH_X;
V.orgs = CUR.pts.org;
V.curs = CUR.pts.cur;
V.orus = CUR.pts.orus;
}
else
{
mask = FT_CURVE_TAG_TOUCH_Y;
V.orgs = (FT_Vector*)( (FT_Pos*)CUR.pts.org + 1 );
V.curs = (FT_Vector*)( (FT_Pos*)CUR.pts.cur + 1 );
V.orus = (FT_Vector*)( (FT_Pos*)CUR.pts.orus + 1 );
}
V.max_points = CUR.pts.n_points;
contour = 0;
point = 0;
do
{
end_point = CUR.pts.contours[contour] - CUR.pts.first_point;
first_point = point;
if ( CUR.pts.n_points <= end_point )
end_point = CUR.pts.n_points;
while ( point <= end_point && ( CUR.pts.tags[point] & mask ) == 0 )
point++;
if ( point <= end_point )
{
first_touched = point;
cur_touched = point;
point++;
while ( point <= end_point )
{
if ( ( CUR.pts.tags[point] & mask ) != 0 )
{
if ( point > 0 )
_iup_worker_interpolate( &V,
cur_touched + 1,
point - 1,
cur_touched,
point );
cur_touched = point;
}
point++;
}
if ( cur_touched == first_touched )
_iup_worker_shift( &V, first_point, end_point, cur_touched );
else
{
_iup_worker_interpolate( &V,
(FT_UShort)( cur_touched + 1 ),
end_point,
cur_touched,
first_touched );
if ( first_touched > 0 )
_iup_worker_interpolate( &V,
first_point,
first_touched - 1,
cur_touched,
first_touched );
}
}
contour++;
} while ( contour < CUR.pts.n_contours );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 165,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline double ConstrainCoordinate(double x)
{
if (x < (double) -SSIZE_MAX)
return((double) -SSIZE_MAX);
if (x > (double) SSIZE_MAX)
return((double) SSIZE_MAX);
return(x);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: | 0 | 87,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameObserverNatives::InvokeCallback(
v8::Global<v8::Function> callback,
bool succeeded) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = context()->isolate();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> args[] = {v8::Boolean::New(isolate, succeeded)};
context()->CallFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::New(isolate, callback),
arraysize(args), args);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::IsPresentationAttribute(
const QualifiedName& name) const {
if (name == vspaceAttr || name == hspaceAttr || name == alignAttr ||
name == widthAttr || name == heightAttr ||
(name == borderAttr && type() == InputTypeNames::image))
return true;
return TextControlElement::IsPresentationAttribute(name);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static std::string Attach(TargetHandler* handler,
DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host,
bool waiting_for_debugger) {
std::string id = base::StringPrintf("%s:%d", agent_host->GetId().c_str(),
++handler->last_session_id_);
Session* session = new Session(handler, agent_host, id);
handler->attached_sessions_[id].reset(session);
agent_host->AttachClient(session);
handler->frontend_->AttachedToTarget(id, CreateInfo(agent_host),
waiting_for_debugger);
return id;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionViewGuest::DidCommitProvisionalLoadForFrame(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
const GURL& url,
ui::PageTransition transition_type) {
if (render_frame_host->GetParent())
return;
url_ = url;
scoped_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> args(new base::DictionaryValue());
args->SetString(guest_view::kUrl, url_.spec());
DispatchEventToView(make_scoped_ptr(
new GuestViewEvent(extensionview::kEventLoadCommit, std::move(args))));
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::LoadStateChanged(
const GURL& url,
const net::LoadStateWithParam& load_state,
uint64_t upload_position,
uint64_t upload_size) {
tracked_objects::ScopedTracker tracking_profile1(
FROM_HERE_WITH_EXPLICIT_FUNCTION(
"466285 WebContentsImpl::LoadStateChanged::Start"));
load_state_ = load_state;
upload_position_ = upload_position;
upload_size_ = upload_size;
load_state_host_ = url_formatter::IDNToUnicode(
url.host(),
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetAcceptLangs(GetBrowserContext()));
if (load_state_.state == net::LOAD_STATE_READING_RESPONSE)
SetNotWaitingForResponse();
if (IsLoading()) {
NotifyNavigationStateChanged(static_cast<InvalidateTypes>(
INVALIDATE_TYPE_LOAD | INVALIDATE_TYPE_TAB));
}
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::AddContextLostObserver(
ContextLostObserver* observer) {
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 135,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_U32 omx_venc::dev_resume(void)
{
return handle->venc_resume();
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_io_s_sysclose(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value klass)
{
mrb_int fd;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "i", &fd);
if (close((int)fd) == -1) {
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, "close");
}
return mrb_fixnum_value(0);
}
Commit Message: Fix `use after free in File#initilialize_copy`; fix #4001
The bug and the fix were reported by https://hackerone.com/pnoltof
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 83,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sparse_extract_file (int fd, struct tar_stat_info *st, off_t *size)
{
bool rc = true;
struct tar_sparse_file file;
size_t i;
if (!tar_sparse_init (&file))
return dump_status_not_implemented;
file.stat_info = st;
file.fd = fd;
file.seekable = lseek (fd, 0, SEEK_SET) == 0;
file.offset = 0;
rc = tar_sparse_decode_header (&file);
for (i = 0; rc && i < file.stat_info->sparse_map_avail; i++)
rc = tar_sparse_extract_region (&file, i);
*size = file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size;
return (tar_sparse_done (&file) && rc) ? dump_status_ok : dump_status_short;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 664 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long iowarrior_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct iowarrior *dev = NULL;
__u8 *buffer;
__u8 __user *user_buffer;
int retval;
int io_res; /* checks for bytes read/written and copy_to/from_user results */
dev = file->private_data;
if (dev == NULL) {
return -ENODEV;
}
buffer = kzalloc(dev->report_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
/* lock this object */
mutex_lock(&iowarrior_mutex);
mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
/* verify that the device wasn't unplugged */
if (!dev->present) {
retval = -ENODEV;
goto error_out;
}
dev_dbg(&dev->interface->dev, "minor %d, cmd 0x%.4x, arg %ld\n",
dev->minor, cmd, arg);
retval = 0;
io_res = 0;
switch (cmd) {
case IOW_WRITE:
if (dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW24 ||
dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOWPV1 ||
dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOWPV2 ||
dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW40) {
user_buffer = (__u8 __user *)arg;
io_res = copy_from_user(buffer, user_buffer,
dev->report_size);
if (io_res) {
retval = -EFAULT;
} else {
io_res = usb_set_report(dev->interface, 2, 0,
buffer,
dev->report_size);
if (io_res < 0)
retval = io_res;
}
} else {
retval = -EINVAL;
dev_err(&dev->interface->dev,
"ioctl 'IOW_WRITE' is not supported for product=0x%x.\n",
dev->product_id);
}
break;
case IOW_READ:
user_buffer = (__u8 __user *)arg;
io_res = usb_get_report(dev->udev,
dev->interface->cur_altsetting, 1, 0,
buffer, dev->report_size);
if (io_res < 0)
retval = io_res;
else {
io_res = copy_to_user(user_buffer, buffer, dev->report_size);
if (io_res)
retval = -EFAULT;
}
break;
case IOW_GETINFO:
{
/* Report available information for the device */
struct iowarrior_info info;
/* needed for power consumption */
struct usb_config_descriptor *cfg_descriptor = &dev->udev->actconfig->desc;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
/* directly from the descriptor */
info.vendor = le16_to_cpu(dev->udev->descriptor.idVendor);
info.product = dev->product_id;
info.revision = le16_to_cpu(dev->udev->descriptor.bcdDevice);
/* 0==UNKNOWN, 1==LOW(usb1.1) ,2=FULL(usb1.1), 3=HIGH(usb2.0) */
info.speed = le16_to_cpu(dev->udev->speed);
info.if_num = dev->interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber;
info.report_size = dev->report_size;
/* serial number string has been read earlier 8 chars or empty string */
memcpy(info.serial, dev->chip_serial,
sizeof(dev->chip_serial));
if (cfg_descriptor == NULL) {
info.power = -1; /* no information available */
} else {
/* the MaxPower is stored in units of 2mA to make it fit into a byte-value */
info.power = cfg_descriptor->bMaxPower * 2;
}
io_res = copy_to_user((struct iowarrior_info __user *)arg, &info,
sizeof(struct iowarrior_info));
if (io_res)
retval = -EFAULT;
break;
}
default:
/* return that we did not understand this ioctl call */
retval = -ENOTTY;
break;
}
error_out:
/* unlock the device */
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
mutex_unlock(&iowarrior_mutex);
kfree(buffer);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: USB: iowarrior: fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
The iowarrior driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given
malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints,
it will crash in the probe function. Ensure there is at least
one endpoint on the interface before using it.
The full report of this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/87
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 55,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CheckMaybeActivateDataReductionProxy(bool initially_enabled,
bool request_succeeded,
bool expected_enabled,
bool expected_restricted,
bool expected_fallback_restricted) {
test_context_->SetDataReductionProxyEnabled(initially_enabled);
test_context_->config()->UpdateConfigForTesting(initially_enabled,
request_succeeded, true);
ExpectSetProxyPrefs(expected_enabled, false);
settings_->MaybeActivateDataReductionProxy(false);
test_context_->RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int pf_check_events(struct gendisk *disk, unsigned int clearing)
{
return DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE;
}
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 88,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline gfp_t gfp_exact_node(gfp_t flags)
{
return flags & ~__GFP_NOFAIL;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rtnl_link_info_fill(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct net_device *dev)
{
const struct rtnl_link_ops *ops = dev->rtnl_link_ops;
struct nlattr *data;
int err;
if (!ops)
return 0;
if (nla_put_string(skb, IFLA_INFO_KIND, ops->kind) < 0)
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (ops->fill_xstats) {
err = ops->fill_xstats(skb, dev);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (ops->fill_info) {
data = nla_nest_start(skb, IFLA_INFO_DATA);
if (data == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
err = ops->fill_info(skb, dev);
if (err < 0)
goto err_cancel_data;
nla_nest_end(skb, data);
}
return 0;
err_cancel_data:
nla_nest_cancel(skb, data);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gen_session_key(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *req,
krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_keyblock *skey,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_enctype useenctype = 0;
/*
* Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user
* case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server
* which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We
* know that it at least must be able to support the encryption
* type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be
* able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference
* to anything else.
*/
if (req->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) {
retval = get_2ndtkt_enctype(kdc_active_realm, req, &useenctype,
status);
if (retval != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (useenctype == 0) {
useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_active_realm, server,
req->nktypes,
req->ktype);
}
if (useenctype == 0) {
/* unsupported ktype */
*status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, skey);
if (retval != 0) {
/* random key failed */
*status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: KDC null deref due to referrals [CVE-2013-1417]
An authenticated remote client can cause a KDC to crash by making a
valid TGS-REQ to a KDC serving a realm with a single-component name.
The process_tgs_req() function dereferences a null pointer because an
unusual failure condition causes a helper function to return success.
While attempting to provide cross-realm referrals for host-based
service principals, the find_referral_tgs() function could return a
TGS principal for a zero-length realm name (indicating that the
hostname in the service principal has no known realm associated with
it).
Subsequently, the find_alternate_tgs() function would attempt to
construct a path to this empty-string realm, and return success along
with a null pointer in its output parameter. This happens because
krb5_walk_realm_tree() returns a list of length one when it attempts
to construct a transit path between a single-component realm and the
empty-string realm. This list causes a loop in find_alternate_tgs()
to iterate over zero elements, resulting in the unexpected output of a
null pointer, which process_tgs_req() proceeds to dereference because
there is no error condition.
Add an error condition to find_referral_tgs() when
krb5_get_host_realm() returns an empty realm name. Also add an error
condition to find_alternate_tgs() to handle the length-one output from
krb5_walk_realm_tree().
The vulnerable configuration is not likely to arise in practice.
(Realm names that have a single component are likely to be test
realms.) Releases prior to krb5-1.11 are not vulnerable.
Thanks to Sol Jerome for reporting this problem.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
(cherry picked from commit 3c7f1c21ffaaf6c90f1045f0f5440303c766acc0)
ticket: 7668
version_fixed: 1.11.4
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long region_del(struct resv_map *resv, long f, long t)
{
struct list_head *head = &resv->regions;
struct file_region *rg, *trg;
struct file_region *nrg = NULL;
long del = 0;
retry:
spin_lock(&resv->lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(rg, trg, head, link) {
/*
* Skip regions before the range to be deleted. file_region
* ranges are normally of the form [from, to). However, there
* may be a "placeholder" entry in the map which is of the form
* (from, to) with from == to. Check for placeholder entries
* at the beginning of the range to be deleted.
*/
if (rg->to <= f && (rg->to != rg->from || rg->to != f))
continue;
if (rg->from >= t)
break;
if (f > rg->from && t < rg->to) { /* Must split region */
/*
* Check for an entry in the cache before dropping
* lock and attempting allocation.
*/
if (!nrg &&
resv->region_cache_count > resv->adds_in_progress) {
nrg = list_first_entry(&resv->region_cache,
struct file_region,
link);
list_del(&nrg->link);
resv->region_cache_count--;
}
if (!nrg) {
spin_unlock(&resv->lock);
nrg = kmalloc(sizeof(*nrg), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!nrg)
return -ENOMEM;
goto retry;
}
del += t - f;
/* New entry for end of split region */
nrg->from = t;
nrg->to = rg->to;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&nrg->link);
/* Original entry is trimmed */
rg->to = f;
list_add(&nrg->link, &rg->link);
nrg = NULL;
break;
}
if (f <= rg->from && t >= rg->to) { /* Remove entire region */
del += rg->to - rg->from;
list_del(&rg->link);
kfree(rg);
continue;
}
if (f <= rg->from) { /* Trim beginning of region */
del += t - rg->from;
rg->from = t;
} else { /* Trim end of region */
del += rg->to - f;
rg->to = f;
}
}
spin_unlock(&resv->lock);
kfree(nrg);
return del;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smb_ofile_seek(
smb_ofile_t *of,
ushort_t mode,
int32_t off,
uint32_t *retoff)
{
u_offset_t newoff = 0;
int rc = 0;
smb_attr_t attr;
ASSERT(of);
ASSERT(of->f_magic == SMB_OFILE_MAGIC);
ASSERT(of->f_refcnt);
mutex_enter(&of->f_mutex);
switch (mode) {
case SMB_SEEK_SET:
if (off < 0)
newoff = 0;
else
newoff = (u_offset_t)off;
break;
case SMB_SEEK_CUR:
if (off < 0 && (-off) > of->f_seek_pos)
newoff = 0;
else
newoff = of->f_seek_pos + (u_offset_t)off;
break;
case SMB_SEEK_END:
bzero(&attr, sizeof (smb_attr_t));
attr.sa_mask |= SMB_AT_SIZE;
rc = smb_fsop_getattr(NULL, zone_kcred(), of->f_node, &attr);
if (rc != 0) {
mutex_exit(&of->f_mutex);
return (rc);
}
if (off < 0 && (-off) > attr.sa_vattr.va_size)
newoff = 0;
else
newoff = attr.sa_vattr.va_size + (u_offset_t)off;
break;
default:
mutex_exit(&of->f_mutex);
return (EINVAL);
}
/*
* See comments at the beginning of smb_seek.c.
* If the offset is greater than UINT_MAX, we will return an error.
*/
if (newoff > UINT_MAX) {
rc = EOVERFLOW;
} else {
of->f_seek_pos = newoff;
*retoff = (uint32_t)newoff;
}
mutex_exit(&of->f_mutex);
return (rc);
}
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <matt.barden@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <evan.layton@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 73,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rpng2_x_create_window(void)
{
ulg bg_red = rpng2_info.bg_red;
ulg bg_green = rpng2_info.bg_green;
ulg bg_blue = rpng2_info.bg_blue;
ulg bg_pixel = 0L;
ulg attrmask;
int need_colormap = FALSE;
int screen, pad;
uch *xdata;
Window root;
XEvent e;
XGCValues gcvalues;
XSetWindowAttributes attr;
XTextProperty windowName, *pWindowName = &windowName;
XTextProperty iconName, *pIconName = &iconName;
XVisualInfo visual_info;
XSizeHints *size_hints;
XWMHints *wm_hints;
XClassHint *class_hints;
Trace((stderr, "beginning rpng2_x_create_window()\n"))
screen = DefaultScreen(display);
depth = DisplayPlanes(display, screen);
root = RootWindow(display, screen);
#ifdef DEBUG
XSynchronize(display, True);
#endif
if (depth != 16 && depth != 24 && depth != 32) {
int visuals_matched = 0;
Trace((stderr, "default depth is %d: checking other visuals\n",
depth))
/* 24-bit first */
visual_info.screen = screen;
visual_info.depth = 24;
visual_list = XGetVisualInfo(display,
VisualScreenMask | VisualDepthMask, &visual_info, &visuals_matched);
if (visuals_matched == 0) {
/* GRR: add 15-, 16- and 32-bit TrueColor visuals (also DirectColor?) */
fprintf(stderr, "default screen depth %d not supported, and no"
" 24-bit visuals found\n", depth);
return 2;
}
Trace((stderr, "XGetVisualInfo() returned %d 24-bit visuals\n",
visuals_matched))
visual = visual_list[0].visual;
depth = visual_list[0].depth;
/*
colormap_size = visual_list[0].colormap_size;
visual_class = visual->class;
visualID = XVisualIDFromVisual(visual);
*/
have_nondefault_visual = TRUE;
need_colormap = TRUE;
} else {
XMatchVisualInfo(display, screen, depth, TrueColor, &visual_info);
visual = visual_info.visual;
}
RMask = visual->red_mask;
GMask = visual->green_mask;
BMask = visual->blue_mask;
/* GRR: add/check 8-bit support */
if (depth == 8 || need_colormap) {
colormap = XCreateColormap(display, root, visual, AllocNone);
if (!colormap) {
fprintf(stderr, "XCreateColormap() failed\n");
return 2;
}
have_colormap = TRUE;
if (depth == 8)
bg_image = FALSE; /* gradient just wastes palette entries */
}
if (depth == 15 || depth == 16) {
RShift = 15 - rpng2_x_msb(RMask); /* these are right-shifts */
GShift = 15 - rpng2_x_msb(GMask);
BShift = 15 - rpng2_x_msb(BMask);
} else if (depth > 16) {
RShift = rpng2_x_msb(RMask) - 7; /* these are left-shifts */
GShift = rpng2_x_msb(GMask) - 7;
BShift = rpng2_x_msb(BMask) - 7;
}
if (depth >= 15 && (RShift < 0 || GShift < 0 || BShift < 0)) {
fprintf(stderr, "rpng2 internal logic error: negative X shift(s)!\n");
return 2;
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, create the window.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
attr.backing_store = Always;
attr.event_mask = ExposureMask | KeyPressMask | ButtonPressMask;
attrmask = CWBackingStore | CWEventMask;
if (have_nondefault_visual) {
attr.colormap = colormap;
attr.background_pixel = 0;
attr.border_pixel = 1;
attrmask |= CWColormap | CWBackPixel | CWBorderPixel;
}
window = XCreateWindow(display, root, 0, 0, rpng2_info.width,
rpng2_info.height, 0, depth, InputOutput, visual, attrmask, &attr);
if (window == None) {
fprintf(stderr, "XCreateWindow() failed\n");
return 2;
} else
have_window = TRUE;
if (depth == 8)
XSetWindowColormap(display, window, colormap);
if (!XStringListToTextProperty(&window_name, 1, pWindowName))
pWindowName = NULL;
if (!XStringListToTextProperty(&icon_name, 1, pIconName))
pIconName = NULL;
/* OK if either hints allocation fails; XSetWMProperties() allows NULLs */
if ((size_hints = XAllocSizeHints()) != NULL) {
/* window will not be resizable */
size_hints->flags = PMinSize | PMaxSize;
size_hints->min_width = size_hints->max_width = (int)rpng2_info.width;
size_hints->min_height = size_hints->max_height =
(int)rpng2_info.height;
}
if ((wm_hints = XAllocWMHints()) != NULL) {
wm_hints->initial_state = NormalState;
wm_hints->input = True;
/* wm_hints->icon_pixmap = icon_pixmap; */
wm_hints->flags = StateHint | InputHint /* | IconPixmapHint */ ;
}
if ((class_hints = XAllocClassHint()) != NULL) {
class_hints->res_name = res_name;
class_hints->res_class = res_class;
}
XSetWMProperties(display, window, pWindowName, pIconName, NULL, 0,
size_hints, wm_hints, class_hints);
/* various properties and hints no longer needed; free memory */
if (pWindowName)
XFree(pWindowName->value);
if (pIconName)
XFree(pIconName->value);
if (size_hints)
XFree(size_hints);
if (wm_hints)
XFree(wm_hints);
if (class_hints)
XFree(class_hints);
XMapWindow(display, window);
gc = XCreateGC(display, window, 0, &gcvalues);
have_gc = TRUE;
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Allocate memory for the X- and display-specific version of the image.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if (depth == 24 || depth == 32) {
xdata = (uch *)malloc(4*rpng2_info.width*rpng2_info.height);
pad = 32;
} else if (depth == 16) {
xdata = (uch *)malloc(2*rpng2_info.width*rpng2_info.height);
pad = 16;
} else /* depth == 8 */ {
xdata = (uch *)malloc(rpng2_info.width*rpng2_info.height);
pad = 8;
}
if (!xdata) {
fprintf(stderr, PROGNAME ": unable to allocate image memory\n");
return 4;
}
ximage = XCreateImage(display, visual, depth, ZPixmap, 0,
(char *)xdata, rpng2_info.width, rpng2_info.height, pad, 0);
if (!ximage) {
fprintf(stderr, PROGNAME ": XCreateImage() failed\n");
free(xdata);
return 3;
}
/* to avoid testing the byte order every pixel (or doubling the size of
* the drawing routine with a giant if-test), we arbitrarily set the byte
* order to MSBFirst and let Xlib worry about inverting things on little-
* endian machines (e.g., Linux/x86, old VAXen, etc.)--this is not the
* most efficient approach (the giant if-test would be better), but in
* the interest of clarity, we'll take the easy way out... */
ximage->byte_order = MSBFirst;
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fill window with the specified background color (default is black) or
faked "background image" (but latter is disabled if 8-bit; gradients
just waste palette entries).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if (bg_image)
rpng2_x_load_bg_image(); /* resets bg_image if fails */
if (!bg_image) {
if (depth == 24 || depth == 32) {
bg_pixel = (bg_red << RShift) |
(bg_green << GShift) |
(bg_blue << BShift);
} else if (depth == 16) {
bg_pixel = (((bg_red << 8) >> RShift) & RMask) |
(((bg_green << 8) >> GShift) & GMask) |
(((bg_blue << 8) >> BShift) & BMask);
} else /* depth == 8 */ {
/* GRR: add 8-bit support */
}
XSetForeground(display, gc, bg_pixel);
XFillRectangle(display, window, gc, 0, 0, rpng2_info.width,
rpng2_info.height);
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wait for first Expose event to do any drawing, then flush and return.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
do
XNextEvent(display, &e);
while (e.type != Expose || e.xexpose.count);
XFlush(display);
return 0;
} /* end function rpng2_x_create_window() */
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ccall(JF, js_Ast *fun, js_Ast *args)
{
int n;
switch (fun->type) {
case EXP_INDEX:
cexp(J, F, fun->a);
emit(J, F, OP_DUP);
cexp(J, F, fun->b);
emit(J, F, OP_GETPROP);
emit(J, F, OP_ROT2);
break;
case EXP_MEMBER:
cexp(J, F, fun->a);
emit(J, F, OP_DUP);
emitstring(J, F, OP_GETPROP_S, fun->b->string);
emit(J, F, OP_ROT2);
break;
case EXP_IDENTIFIER:
if (!strcmp(fun->string, "eval")) {
ceval(J, F, fun, args);
return;
}
/* fallthrough */
default:
cexp(J, F, fun);
emit(J, F, OP_UNDEF);
break;
}
n = cargs(J, F, args);
emit(J, F, OP_CALL);
emitarg(J, F, n);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700947: Add missing ENDTRY opcode in try/catch/finally byte code.
In one of the code branches in handling exceptions in the catch block
we forgot to call the ENDTRY opcode to pop the inner hidden try.
This leads to an unbalanced exception stack which can cause a crash
due to us jumping to a stack frame that has already been exited.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 90,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NetworkActionPredictor::NetworkActionPredictor(Profile* profile)
: profile_(profile),
db_(new NetworkActionPredictorDatabase(profile)),
initialized_(false) {
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(content::BrowserThread::DB, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&NetworkActionPredictorDatabase::Initialize, db_));
HistoryService* history_service =
profile_->GetHistoryService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (history_service)
history_service->InMemoryDatabase();
std::vector<NetworkActionPredictorDatabase::Row>* rows =
new std::vector<NetworkActionPredictorDatabase::Row>();
content::BrowserThread::PostTaskAndReply(
content::BrowserThread::DB, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&NetworkActionPredictorDatabase::GetAllRows, db_, rows),
base::Bind(&NetworkActionPredictor::CreateCaches, AsWeakPtr(),
base::Owned(rows)));
}
Commit Message: Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 107,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mailimf_msg_id_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx,
char ** result)
{
size_t cur_token;
#if 0
char * id_left;
char * id_right;
#endif
char * msg_id;
int r;
int res;
cur_token = * indx;
r = mailimf_cfws_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if ((r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) && (r != MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE))
return r;
r = mailimf_lower_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r == MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE) {
r = mailimf_addr_spec_msg_id_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &msg_id);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
* result = msg_id;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
else if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_lower_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r == MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
}
else if (r == MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE) {
}
else {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_addr_spec_msg_id_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &msg_id);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_greater_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
free(msg_id);
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_greater_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r == MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
}
else if (r == MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE) {
}
else {
free(msg_id);
res = r;
goto err;
}
#if 0
r = mailimf_id_left_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &id_left);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_at_sign_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_id_left;
}
r = mailimf_id_right_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &id_right);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_id_left;
}
r = mailimf_greater_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_id_right;
}
msg_id = malloc(strlen(id_left) + strlen(id_right) + 2);
if (msg_id == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_id_right;
}
strcpy(msg_id, id_left);
strcat(msg_id, "@");
strcat(msg_id, id_right);
mailimf_id_left_free(id_left);
mailimf_id_right_free(id_right);
#endif
* result = msg_id;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
#if 0
free_id_right:
mailimf_id_right_free(id_right);
free_id_left:
mailimf_id_left_free(id_left);
#endif
/*
free:
mailimf_atom_free(msg_id);
*/
err:
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 66,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ecb_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
if (unlikely(need_fallback(sctx->key_len)))
return fallback_blk_enc(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
return ecb_aes_crypt(desc, sctx->enc, sctx->key, &walk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,664 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct io_context *current_io_context(gfp_t gfp_flags, int node)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct io_context *ret;
ret = tsk->io_context;
if (likely(ret))
return ret;
ret = alloc_io_context(gfp_flags, node);
if (ret) {
/* make sure set_task_ioprio() sees the settings above */
smp_wmb();
tsk->io_context = ret;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, copy_io() increments both ioc->refcount and ioc->nr_tasks.
However exit_io_context() only decrements ioc->refcount if ioc->nr_tasks
reaches 0.
Always call put_io_context() in exit_io_context().
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl::RenderWidgetHostImpl(RenderWidgetHostDelegate* delegate,
RenderProcessHost* process,
int32_t routing_id,
mojom::WidgetPtr widget,
bool hidden)
: renderer_initialized_(false),
destroyed_(false),
delegate_(delegate),
owner_delegate_(nullptr),
process_(process),
routing_id_(routing_id),
is_loading_(false),
is_hidden_(hidden),
repaint_ack_pending_(false),
resize_ack_pending_(false),
auto_resize_enabled_(false),
waiting_for_screen_rects_ack_(false),
needs_repainting_on_restore_(false),
is_unresponsive_(false),
in_flight_event_count_(0),
in_get_backing_store_(false),
ignore_input_events_(false),
text_direction_updated_(false),
text_direction_(blink::kWebTextDirectionLeftToRight),
text_direction_canceled_(false),
suppress_events_until_keydown_(false),
pending_mouse_lock_request_(false),
allow_privileged_mouse_lock_(false),
is_last_unlocked_by_target_(false),
has_touch_handler_(false),
is_in_touchpad_gesture_fling_(false),
latency_tracker_(true, delegate_),
next_browser_snapshot_id_(1),
owned_by_render_frame_host_(false),
is_focused_(false),
hung_renderer_delay_(
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kHungRendererDelayMs)),
new_content_rendering_delay_(
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kNewContentRenderingDelayMs)),
current_content_source_id_(0),
monitoring_composition_info_(false),
compositor_frame_sink_binding_(this),
frame_token_message_queue_(
std::make_unique<FrameTokenMessageQueue>(this)),
render_frame_metadata_provider_(frame_token_message_queue_.get()),
frame_sink_id_(base::checked_cast<uint32_t>(process_->GetID()),
base::checked_cast<uint32_t>(routing_id_)),
weak_factory_(this) {
CHECK(delegate_);
CHECK_NE(MSG_ROUTING_NONE, routing_id_);
DCHECK(base::TaskScheduler::GetInstance())
<< "Ref. Prerequisite section of post_task.h";
std::pair<RoutingIDWidgetMap::iterator, bool> result =
g_routing_id_widget_map.Get().insert(std::make_pair(
RenderWidgetHostID(process->GetID(), routing_id_), this));
CHECK(result.second) << "Inserting a duplicate item!";
process_->AddRoute(routing_id_, this);
process_->AddWidget(this);
process_->GetSharedBitmapAllocationNotifier()->AddObserver(this);
if (!hidden)
process_->WidgetRestored();
latency_tracker_.Initialize(routing_id_, GetProcess()->GetID());
SetupInputRouter();
touch_emulator_.reset();
SetWidget(std::move(widget));
const auto* command_line = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (!command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableHangMonitor)) {
hang_monitor_timeout_.reset(new TimeoutMonitor(
base::Bind(&RenderWidgetHostImpl::RendererIsUnresponsive,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
}
if (!command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableNewContentRenderingTimeout)) {
new_content_rendering_timeout_.reset(new TimeoutMonitor(
base::Bind(&RenderWidgetHostImpl::ClearDisplayedGraphics,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
}
enable_surface_synchronization_ = features::IsSurfaceSynchronizationEnabled();
enable_viz_ = base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kVizDisplayCompositor);
delegate_->RenderWidgetCreated(this);
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFINE_INLINE_VIRTUAL_TRACE() {
visitor->Trace(plugin_);
ChromePrintContext::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SigTermHandler(int signal_number) {
DCHECK(signal_number == SIGTERM);
DCHECK(context_->network_task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
LOG(INFO) << "Caught SIGTERM: Shutting down...";
Shutdown(kSuccessExitCode);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in CreateAuthenticatorFactory().
CreateAuthenticatorFactory() is called asynchronously, but it didn't handle
the case when it's called after host object is destroyed.
BUG=150644
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11090036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161077 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Extension::LoadUserScriptHelper(const DictionaryValue* content_script,
int definition_index,
int flags,
std::string* error,
UserScript* result) {
URLPattern::ParseOption parse_strictness =
(flags & STRICT_ERROR_CHECKS ? URLPattern::ERROR_ON_PORTS
: URLPattern::IGNORE_PORTS);
if (content_script->HasKey(keys::kRunAt)) {
std::string run_location;
if (!content_script->GetString(keys::kRunAt, &run_location)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(errors::kInvalidRunAt,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
if (run_location == values::kRunAtDocumentStart) {
result->set_run_location(UserScript::DOCUMENT_START);
} else if (run_location == values::kRunAtDocumentEnd) {
result->set_run_location(UserScript::DOCUMENT_END);
} else if (run_location == values::kRunAtDocumentIdle) {
result->set_run_location(UserScript::DOCUMENT_IDLE);
} else {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(errors::kInvalidRunAt,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
}
if (content_script->HasKey(keys::kAllFrames)) {
bool all_frames = false;
if (!content_script->GetBoolean(keys::kAllFrames, &all_frames)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidAllFrames, base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
result->set_match_all_frames(all_frames);
}
ListValue* matches = NULL;
if (!content_script->GetList(keys::kMatches, &matches)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(errors::kInvalidMatches,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
if (matches->GetSize() == 0) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(errors::kInvalidMatchCount,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
for (size_t j = 0; j < matches->GetSize(); ++j) {
std::string match_str;
if (!matches->GetString(j, &match_str)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidMatch,
base::IntToString(definition_index),
base::IntToString(j),
errors::kExpectString);
return false;
}
URLPattern pattern(UserScript::kValidUserScriptSchemes);
if (CanExecuteScriptEverywhere())
pattern.set_valid_schemes(URLPattern::SCHEME_ALL);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = pattern.Parse(match_str,
parse_strictness);
if (parse_result != URLPattern::PARSE_SUCCESS) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidMatch,
base::IntToString(definition_index),
base::IntToString(j),
URLPattern::GetParseResultString(parse_result));
return false;
}
if (pattern.MatchesScheme(chrome::kFileScheme) &&
!CanExecuteScriptEverywhere()) {
wants_file_access_ = true;
if (!(flags & ALLOW_FILE_ACCESS))
pattern.set_valid_schemes(
pattern.valid_schemes() & ~URLPattern::SCHEME_FILE);
}
result->add_url_pattern(pattern);
}
if (content_script->HasKey(keys::kExcludeMatches)) { // optional
ListValue* exclude_matches = NULL;
if (!content_script->GetList(keys::kExcludeMatches, &exclude_matches)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidExcludeMatches,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
for (size_t j = 0; j < exclude_matches->GetSize(); ++j) {
std::string match_str;
if (!exclude_matches->GetString(j, &match_str)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidExcludeMatch,
base::IntToString(definition_index),
base::IntToString(j),
errors::kExpectString);
return false;
}
URLPattern pattern(UserScript::kValidUserScriptSchemes);
if (CanExecuteScriptEverywhere())
pattern.set_valid_schemes(URLPattern::SCHEME_ALL);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = pattern.Parse(match_str,
parse_strictness);
if (parse_result != URLPattern::PARSE_SUCCESS) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
errors::kInvalidExcludeMatch,
base::IntToString(definition_index), base::IntToString(j),
URLPattern::GetParseResultString(parse_result));
return false;
}
result->add_exclude_url_pattern(pattern);
}
}
if (!LoadGlobsHelper(content_script, definition_index, keys::kIncludeGlobs,
error, &UserScript::add_glob, result)) {
return false;
}
if (!LoadGlobsHelper(content_script, definition_index, keys::kExcludeGlobs,
error, &UserScript::add_exclude_glob, result)) {
return false;
}
ListValue* js = NULL;
if (content_script->HasKey(keys::kJs) &&
!content_script->GetList(keys::kJs, &js)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(errors::kInvalidJsList,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
ListValue* css = NULL;
if (content_script->HasKey(keys::kCss) &&
!content_script->GetList(keys::kCss, &css)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(errors::kInvalidCssList,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
if (((js ? js->GetSize() : 0) + (css ? css->GetSize() : 0)) == 0) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(errors::kMissingFile,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
if (js) {
for (size_t script_index = 0; script_index < js->GetSize();
++script_index) {
Value* value;
std::string relative;
if (!js->Get(script_index, &value) || !value->GetAsString(&relative)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(errors::kInvalidJs,
base::IntToString(definition_index),
base::IntToString(script_index));
return false;
}
GURL url = GetResourceURL(relative);
ExtensionResource resource = GetResource(relative);
result->js_scripts().push_back(UserScript::File(
resource.extension_root(), resource.relative_path(), url));
}
}
if (css) {
for (size_t script_index = 0; script_index < css->GetSize();
++script_index) {
Value* value;
std::string relative;
if (!css->Get(script_index, &value) || !value->GetAsString(&relative)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(errors::kInvalidCss,
base::IntToString(definition_index),
base::IntToString(script_index));
return false;
}
GURL url = GetResourceURL(relative);
ExtensionResource resource = GetResource(relative);
result->css_scripts().push_back(UserScript::File(
resource.extension_root(), resource.relative_path(), url));
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void set_task_cpu(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int new_cpu)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG
/*
* We should never call set_task_cpu() on a blocked task,
* ttwu() will sort out the placement.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(p->state != TASK_RUNNING && p->state != TASK_WAKING &&
!(task_thread_info(p)->preempt_count & PREEMPT_ACTIVE));
#endif
trace_sched_migrate_task(p, new_cpu);
if (task_cpu(p) != new_cpu) {
p->se.nr_migrations++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_MIGRATIONS, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
}
__set_task_cpu(p, new_cpu);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FetchContext* FrameFetchContext::Detach() {
if (IsDetached())
return this;
if (document_) {
frozen_state_ = new FrozenState(
GetReferrerPolicy(), GetOutgoingReferrer(), Url(), GetSecurityOrigin(),
GetParentSecurityOrigin(), GetAddressSpace(),
GetContentSecurityPolicy(), GetSiteForCookies(), GetRequestorOrigin(),
GetRequestorOriginForFrameLoading(), GetClientHintsPreferences(),
GetDevicePixelRatio(), GetUserAgent(), IsMainFrame(),
IsSVGImageChromeClient());
} else {
frozen_state_ = new FrozenState(
kReferrerPolicyDefault, String(), NullURL(), GetSecurityOrigin(),
GetParentSecurityOrigin(), GetAddressSpace(),
GetContentSecurityPolicy(), GetSiteForCookies(),
SecurityOrigin::CreateUnique(), SecurityOrigin::CreateUnique(),
GetClientHintsPreferences(), GetDevicePixelRatio(), GetUserAgent(),
IsMainFrame(), IsSVGImageChromeClient());
}
document_ = nullptr;
return this;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void jsB_RegExp(js_State *J)
{
if (js_isregexp(J, 1))
return;
jsB_new_RegExp(J);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 90,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_read_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr)
{
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
if (!nfs4_sequence_done(task, &hdr->res.seq_res))
return -EAGAIN;
if (nfs4_read_stateid_changed(task, &hdr->args))
return -EAGAIN;
return hdr->pgio_done_cb ? hdr->pgio_done_cb(task, hdr) :
nfs4_read_done_cb(task, hdr);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smb_ofile_release(smb_ofile_t *of)
{
SMB_OFILE_VALID(of);
mutex_enter(&of->f_mutex);
ASSERT(of->f_refcnt);
of->f_refcnt--;
switch (of->f_state) {
case SMB_OFILE_STATE_OPEN:
case SMB_OFILE_STATE_CLOSING:
break;
case SMB_OFILE_STATE_CLOSED:
if (of->f_refcnt == 0)
smb_tree_post_ofile(of->f_tree, of);
break;
default:
ASSERT(0);
break;
}
mutex_exit(&of->f_mutex);
}
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <matt.barden@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <evan.layton@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 73,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NTSTATUS ReadRegistryConfigFlags (BOOL driverEntry)
{
PKEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION data;
UNICODE_STRING name;
NTSTATUS status;
uint32 flags = 0;
RtlInitUnicodeString (&name, L"\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\veracrypt");
status = TCReadRegistryKey (&name, TC_DRIVER_CONFIG_REG_VALUE_NAME, &data);
if (NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
if (data->Type == REG_DWORD)
{
flags = *(uint32 *) data->Data;
Dump ("Configuration flags = 0x%x\n", flags);
if (driverEntry)
{
if (flags & (TC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CACHE_BOOT_PASSWORD | TC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CACHE_BOOT_PASSWORD_FOR_SYS_FAVORITES))
CacheBootPassword = TRUE;
if (flags & TC_DRIVER_CONFIG_DISABLE_NONADMIN_SYS_FAVORITES_ACCESS)
NonAdminSystemFavoritesAccessDisabled = TRUE;
if (flags & TC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CACHE_BOOT_PIM)
CacheBootPim = TRUE;
if (flags & VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_BLOCK_SYS_TRIM)
BlockSystemTrimCommand = TRUE;
}
EnableHwEncryption ((flags & TC_DRIVER_CONFIG_DISABLE_HARDWARE_ENCRYPTION) ? FALSE : TRUE);
EnableExtendedIoctlSupport = (flags & TC_DRIVER_CONFIG_ENABLE_EXTENDED_IOCTL)? TRUE : FALSE;
AllowTrimCommand = (flags & VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_ALLOW_NONSYS_TRIM)? TRUE : FALSE;
AllowWindowsDefrag = (flags & VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_ALLOW_WINDOWS_DEFRAG)? TRUE : FALSE;
}
else
status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
TCfree (data);
}
if (driverEntry && NT_SUCCESS (TCReadRegistryKey (&name, TC_ENCRYPTION_FREE_CPU_COUNT_REG_VALUE_NAME, &data)))
{
if (data->Type == REG_DWORD)
EncryptionThreadPoolFreeCpuCountLimit = *(uint32 *) data->Data;
TCfree (data);
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 87,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hns_nic_update_link_status(struct net_device *netdev)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(netdev);
struct hnae_handle *h = priv->ae_handle;
if (h->phy_dev) {
if (h->phy_if != PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_XGMII)
return;
(void)genphy_read_status(h->phy_dev);
}
hns_nic_adjust_link(netdev);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 85,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rtecp_card_ctl(sc_card_t *card, unsigned long request, void *data)
{
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 buf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE];
sc_rtecp_genkey_data_t *genkey_data = data;
sc_serial_number_t *serial = data;
int r;
assert(card && card->ctx);
switch (request)
{
case SC_CARDCTL_RTECP_INIT:
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_1, 0x8A, 0, 0);
apdu.cla = 0x80;
break;
case SC_CARDCTL_RTECP_INIT_END:
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_1, 0x84, 0x4E, 0x19);
apdu.cla = 0x80;
break;
case SC_CARDCTL_GET_SERIALNR:
if (!serial)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xCA, 0x01, 0x81);
apdu.resp = buf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(buf);
apdu.le = 256;
serial->len = sizeof(serial->value);
break;
case SC_CARDCTL_RTECP_GENERATE_KEY:
if (!genkey_data)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0x46, 0x80,
genkey_data->key_id);
apdu.resp = buf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(buf);
apdu.le = 256;
break;
case SC_CARDCTL_LIFECYCLE_SET:
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "%s\n",
"SC_CARDCTL_LIFECYCLE_SET not supported");
/* no call sc_debug (SC_FUNC_RETURN) */
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
default:
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"request = 0x%lx\n", request);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
}
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
if (!r && request == SC_CARDCTL_RTECP_GENERATE_KEY)
{
if (genkey_data->type == SC_ALGORITHM_RSA &&
genkey_data->u.rsa.modulus_len >= apdu.resplen &&
genkey_data->u.rsa.exponent_len >= 3)
{
memcpy(genkey_data->u.rsa.modulus, apdu.resp, apdu.resplen);
genkey_data->u.rsa.modulus_len = apdu.resplen;
reverse(genkey_data->u.rsa.modulus,
genkey_data->u.rsa.modulus_len);
memcpy(genkey_data->u.rsa.exponent, "\x01\x00\x01", 3);
genkey_data->u.rsa.exponent_len = 3;
}
else if (genkey_data->type == SC_ALGORITHM_GOSTR3410 &&
genkey_data->u.gostr3410.xy_len >= apdu.resplen)
{
memcpy(genkey_data->u.gostr3410.xy, apdu.resp, apdu.resplen);
genkey_data->u.gostr3410.xy_len = apdu.resplen;
}
else
r = SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
else if (!r && request == SC_CARDCTL_GET_SERIALNR)
{
if (serial->len >= apdu.resplen)
{
memcpy(serial->value, apdu.resp, apdu.resplen);
serial->len = apdu.resplen;
}
else
r = SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,664 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_acquire_cred_with_password(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_name_t desired_name,
const gss_buffer_t password,
OM_uint32 time_req,
const gss_OID_set desired_mechs,
gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage,
gss_cred_id_t *output_cred_handle,
gss_OID_set *actual_mechs,
OM_uint32 *time_rec)
{
OM_uint32 status, tmpmin;
gss_OID_set amechs = GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET;
gss_cred_id_t mcred = NULL;
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred = NULL;
dsyslog("Entering spnego_gss_acquire_cred_with_password\n");
if (actual_mechs)
*actual_mechs = NULL;
if (time_rec)
*time_rec = 0;
status = get_available_mechs(minor_status, desired_name,
cred_usage, GSS_C_NO_CRED_STORE,
NULL, &amechs);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
status = gss_acquire_cred_with_password(minor_status, desired_name,
password, time_req, amechs,
cred_usage, &mcred,
actual_mechs, time_rec);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
spcred = malloc(sizeof(spnego_gss_cred_id_rec));
if (spcred == NULL) {
*minor_status = ENOMEM;
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
spcred->neg_mechs = GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET;
spcred->mcred = mcred;
mcred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
*output_cred_handle = (gss_cred_id_t)spcred;
cleanup:
(void) gss_release_oid_set(&tmpmin, &amechs);
(void) gss_release_cred(&tmpmin, &mcred);
dsyslog("Leaving spnego_gss_acquire_cred_with_password\n");
return (status);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 36,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host() { return agent_host_.get(); }
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void red_channel_client_shutdown(RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
if (rcc->stream && !rcc->stream->shutdown) {
rcc->channel->core->watch_remove(rcc->stream->watch);
rcc->stream->watch = NULL;
shutdown(rcc->stream->socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rcc->stream->shutdown = TRUE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(date_create_immutable_from_format)
{
zval *timezone_object = NULL;
char *time_str = NULL, *format_str = NULL;
int time_str_len = 0, format_str_len = 0;
zval datetime_object;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss|O", &format_str, &format_str_len, &time_str, &time_str_len, &timezone_object, date_ce_timezone) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_date_instantiate(date_ce_immutable, &datetime_object TSRMLS_CC);
if (!php_date_initialize(zend_object_store_get_object(&datetime_object TSRMLS_CC), time_str, time_str_len, format_str, timezone_object, 0 TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(&datetime_object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_ZVAL(&datetime_object, 0, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nlmsg_set_dst(struct nl_msg *msg, struct sockaddr_nl *addr)
{
memcpy(&msg->nm_dst, addr, sizeof(*addr));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 12,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void brcmf_set_mpc(struct brcmf_if *ifp, int mpc)
{
s32 err = 0;
if (check_vif_up(ifp->vif)) {
err = brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "mpc", mpc);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("fail to set mpc\n");
return;
}
brcmf_dbg(INFO, "MPC : %d\n", mpc);
}
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OfflineEventLogger* StubOfflinePageModel::GetLogger() {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ViewSelectedSource() {
ViewSource(GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper());
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::RequestAuthorization(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
const ConfirmationCallback& callback) {
callback.Run(CANCELLED);
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int prepareClientToWrite(client *c) {
/* If it's the Lua client we always return ok without installing any
* handler since there is no socket at all. */
if (c->flags & CLIENT_LUA) return C_OK;
/* CLIENT REPLY OFF / SKIP handling: don't send replies. */
if (c->flags & (CLIENT_REPLY_OFF|CLIENT_REPLY_SKIP)) return C_ERR;
/* Masters don't receive replies, unless CLIENT_MASTER_FORCE_REPLY flag
* is set. */
if ((c->flags & CLIENT_MASTER) &&
!(c->flags & CLIENT_MASTER_FORCE_REPLY)) return C_ERR;
if (c->fd <= 0) return C_ERR; /* Fake client for AOF loading. */
/* Schedule the client to write the output buffers to the socket only
* if not already done (there were no pending writes already and the client
* was yet not flagged), and, for slaves, if the slave can actually
* receive writes at this stage. */
if (!clientHasPendingReplies(c) &&
!(c->flags & CLIENT_PENDING_WRITE) &&
(c->replstate == REPL_STATE_NONE ||
(c->replstate == SLAVE_STATE_ONLINE && !c->repl_put_online_on_ack)))
{
/* Here instead of installing the write handler, we just flag the
* client and put it into a list of clients that have something
* to write to the socket. This way before re-entering the event
* loop, we can try to directly write to the client sockets avoiding
* a system call. We'll only really install the write handler if
* we'll not be able to write the whole reply at once. */
c->flags |= CLIENT_PENDING_WRITE;
listAddNodeHead(server.clients_pending_write,c);
}
/* Authorize the caller to queue in the output buffer of this client. */
return C_OK;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 69,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jbig2_error(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Severity severity, int32_t segment_number, const char *fmt, ...)
{
char buf[1024];
va_list ap;
int n;
int code;
va_start(ap, fmt);
n = vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (n < 0 || n == sizeof(buf))
strncpy(buf, "jbig2_error: error in generating error string", sizeof(buf));
code = ctx->error_callback(ctx->error_callback_data, buf, severity, segment_number);
if (severity == JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL)
code = -1;
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,009 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: json_t *json_real(double value)
{
json_real_t *real;
if(isnan(value) || isinf(value))
return NULL;
real = jsonp_malloc(sizeof(json_real_t));
if(!real)
return NULL;
json_init(&real->json, JSON_REAL);
real->value = value;
return &real->json;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 40,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_get_mic(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t message_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_get_mic(minor_status,
context_handle,
qop_req,
message_buffer,
message_token);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18 | 1 | 166,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void readonlyEventTargetAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, WTF::getPtr(imp->readonlyEventTargetAttribute()), imp);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mapInvfMode (INVF_MODE mode,
INVF_MODE prevMode,
WHITENING_FACTORS whFactors)
{
switch (mode) {
case INVF_LOW_LEVEL:
if(prevMode == INVF_OFF)
return whFactors.transitionLevel;
else
return whFactors.lowLevel;
case INVF_MID_LEVEL:
return whFactors.midLevel;
case INVF_HIGH_LEVEL:
return whFactors.highLevel;
default:
if(prevMode == INVF_LOW_LEVEL)
return whFactors.transitionLevel;
else
return whFactors.off;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bound memory access in lppTransposer
In TRANSPOSER_SETTINGS, initialize the whole bwBorders array to a
reasonable value to guarantee correct termination in while loop
in lppTransposer function. This fixes the reported bug.
For completeness:
- clear the whole bwIndex array instead of noOfPatches entries only.
- abort criterion in while loop to prevent potential
infinite loop, and limit bwIndex[patch] to a valid range.
Test: see bug for malicious content, decoded with "stagefright -s -a"
Bug: 65280786
Change-Id: I16ed2e1c0f1601926239a652ca20a91284151843
(cherry picked from commit 6d3dd40e204bf550abcfa589bd9615df8778e118)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 163,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnCancelRequest(int request_id) {
int child_id = filter_->child_id();
if (IsTransferredNavigation(GlobalRequestID(child_id, request_id)))
return;
ResourceLoader* loader = GetLoader(child_id, request_id);
if (!loader) {
DVLOG(1) << "Canceling a request that wasn't found";
return;
}
loader->CancelRequest(true);
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 132,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ppp_gidle(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd,
struct ppp_idle32 __user *idle32)
{
struct ppp_idle __user *idle;
__kernel_time_t xmit, recv;
int err;
idle = compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(*idle));
err = sys_ioctl(fd, PPPIOCGIDLE, (unsigned long) idle);
if (!err) {
if (get_user(xmit, &idle->xmit_idle) ||
get_user(recv, &idle->recv_idle) ||
put_user(xmit, &idle32->xmit_idle) ||
put_user(recv, &idle32->recv_idle))
err = -EFAULT;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: fs/compat_ioctl.c: VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE missing error check
The compat ioctl for VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE was missing an error check
while converting ioctl arguments. This could lead to leaking kernel
stack contents into userspace.
Patch extracted from existing fix in grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 32,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: logger_day_changed_signal_cb (const void *pointer, void *data,
const char *signal,
const char *type_data, void *signal_data)
{
/* make C compiler happy */
(void) pointer;
(void) data;
(void) signal;
(void) type_data;
(void) signal_data;
logger_adjust_log_filenames ();
return WEECHAT_RC_OK;
}
Commit Message: logger: call strftime before replacing buffer local variables
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 60,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PepperMediaDeviceManager::OnDevicesEnumerated(
int request_id,
const StreamDeviceInfoArray& device_array) {
EnumerateCallbackMap::iterator iter = enumerate_callbacks_.find(request_id);
if (iter == enumerate_callbacks_.end()) {
return;
}
EnumerateDevicesCallback callback = iter->second;
std::vector<ppapi::DeviceRefData> devices;
devices.reserve(device_array.size());
for (StreamDeviceInfoArray::const_iterator info = device_array.begin();
info != device_array.end();
++info) {
devices.push_back(FromStreamDeviceInfo(*info));
}
callback.Run(request_id, devices);
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayerTreeHostTestFrameTimeUpdatesAfterDraw() : frame_(0) {}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameImpl::IsPepperAcceptingCompositionEvents() const {
if (!focused_pepper_plugin_)
return false;
return focused_pepper_plugin_->IsPluginAcceptingCompositionEvents();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cbc_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
int err, first, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
unsigned int blocks;
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
kernel_neon_begin();
for (first = 1; (blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE)); first = 0) {
aes_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
(u8 *)ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk.iv,
first);
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
kernel_neon_end();
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void XMLRPC_Free(void* mem) {
my_free(mem);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::GetUniformiv(GLuint program,
GLint location,
GLint* params) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glGetUniformiv(" << program << ", "
<< location << ", " << static_cast<const void*>(params)
<< ")");
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2::GetUniformiv");
typedef cmds::GetUniformiv::Result Result;
auto result = GetResultAs<Result>();
if (!result) {
return;
}
result->SetNumResults(0);
helper_->GetUniformiv(program, location, GetResultShmId(), result.offset());
WaitForCmd();
result->CopyResult(params);
GPU_CLIENT_LOG_CODE_BLOCK({
for (int32_t i = 0; i < result->GetNumResults(); ++i) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" " << i << ": " << result->GetData()[i]);
}
});
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void customImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
V8TestObjectPython::customImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCustom(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit ZoomAdapter(Plugin* plugin)
: pp::Zoom_Dev(plugin),
plugin_(plugin) {
BrowserPpp* proxy = plugin_->ppapi_proxy();
CHECK(proxy != NULL);
ppp_zoom_ = static_cast<const PPP_Zoom_Dev*>(
proxy->GetPluginInterface(PPP_ZOOM_DEV_INTERFACE));
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evaluate_uid(void)
{
uid_t ruid = getuid();
uid_t euid = geteuid();
/* if we're really root and aren't running setuid */
return (uid_t) 0 == ruid && ruid == euid ? 0 : 1;
}
Commit Message: su: properly clear child PID
Reported-by: Tobias Stöckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 86,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hstate_next_node_to_free(struct hstate *h, nodemask_t *nodes_allowed)
{
int nid;
VM_BUG_ON(!nodes_allowed);
nid = get_valid_node_allowed(h->next_nid_to_free, nodes_allowed);
h->next_nid_to_free = next_node_allowed(nid, nodes_allowed);
return nid;
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_core_note(struct magic_set *ms, unsigned char *nbuf, uint32_t type,
int swap, uint32_t namesz, uint32_t descsz,
size_t noff, size_t doff, int *flags, size_t size, int clazz)
{
#ifdef ELFCORE
int os_style = -1;
/*
* Sigh. The 2.0.36 kernel in Debian 2.1, at
* least, doesn't correctly implement name
* sections, in core dumps, as specified by
* the "Program Linking" section of "UNIX(R) System
* V Release 4 Programmer's Guide: ANSI C and
* Programming Support Tools", because my copy
* clearly says "The first 'namesz' bytes in 'name'
* contain a *null-terminated* [emphasis mine]
* character representation of the entry's owner
* or originator", but the 2.0.36 kernel code
* doesn't include the terminating null in the
* name....
*/
if ((namesz == 4 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE", 4) == 0) ||
(namesz == 5 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_SVR4;
}
if ((namesz == 8 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "FreeBSD") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_FREEBSD;
}
if ((namesz >= 11 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD-CORE", 11)
== 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_NETBSD;
}
if (os_style != -1 && (*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE) == 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s-style", os_style_names[os_style])
== -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE;
*flags |= os_style;
}
switch (os_style) {
case OS_STYLE_NETBSD:
if (type == NT_NETBSD_CORE_PROCINFO) {
char sbuf[512];
struct NetBSD_elfcore_procinfo pi;
memset(&pi, 0, sizeof(pi));
memcpy(&pi, nbuf + doff, descsz);
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.31s', pid=%u, uid=%u, "
"gid=%u, nlwps=%u, lwp=%u (signal %u/code %u)",
file_printable(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf),
RCAST(char *, pi.cpi_name)),
elf_getu32(swap, (uint32_t)pi.cpi_pid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_euid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_egid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_nlwps),
elf_getu32(swap, (uint32_t)pi.cpi_siglwp),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_signo),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_sigcode)) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
}
break;
case OS_STYLE_FREEBSD:
if (type == NT_PRPSINFO && *flags & FLAGS_IS_CORE) {
size_t argoff, pidoff;
if (clazz == ELFCLASS32)
argoff = 4 + 4 + 17;
else
argoff = 4 + 4 + 8 + 17;
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.80s'", nbuf + doff +
argoff) == -1)
return 1;
pidoff = argoff + 81 + 2;
if (doff + pidoff + 4 <= size) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", pid=%u",
elf_getu32(swap, *RCAST(uint32_t *, (nbuf +
doff + pidoff)))) == -1)
return 1;
}
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
}
break;
default:
if (type == NT_PRPSINFO && *flags & FLAGS_IS_CORE) {
size_t i, j;
unsigned char c;
/*
* Extract the program name. We assume
* it to be 16 characters (that's what it
* is in SunOS 5.x and Linux).
*
* Unfortunately, it's at a different offset
* in various OSes, so try multiple offsets.
* If the characters aren't all printable,
* reject it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < NOFFSETS; i++) {
unsigned char *cname, *cp;
size_t reloffset = prpsoffsets(i);
size_t noffset = doff + reloffset;
size_t k;
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++, noffset++,
reloffset++) {
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the buffer; if
* we are, just give up.
*/
if (noffset >= size)
goto tryanother;
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the contents;
* if we are, this obviously
* isn't the right offset.
*/
if (reloffset >= descsz)
goto tryanother;
c = nbuf[noffset];
if (c == '\0') {
/*
* A '\0' at the
* beginning is
* obviously wrong.
* Any other '\0'
* means we're done.
*/
if (j == 0)
goto tryanother;
else
break;
} else {
/*
* A nonprintable
* character is also
* wrong.
*/
if (!isprint(c) || isquote(c))
goto tryanother;
}
}
/*
* Well, that worked.
*/
/*
* Try next offsets, in case this match is
* in the middle of a string.
*/
for (k = i + 1 ; k < NOFFSETS; k++) {
size_t no;
int adjust = 1;
if (prpsoffsets(k) >= prpsoffsets(i))
continue;
for (no = doff + prpsoffsets(k);
no < doff + prpsoffsets(i); no++)
adjust = adjust
&& isprint(nbuf[no]);
if (adjust)
i = k;
}
cname = (unsigned char *)
&nbuf[doff + prpsoffsets(i)];
for (cp = cname; cp < nbuf + size && *cp
&& isprint(*cp); cp++)
continue;
/*
* Linux apparently appends a space at the end
* of the command line: remove it.
*/
while (cp > cname && isspace(cp[-1]))
cp--;
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.*s'",
(int)(cp - cname), cname) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
tryanother:
;
}
}
break;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Avoid OOB read (found by ASAN reported by F. Alonso)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 169,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ebt_entry *ebt_next_entry(const struct ebt_entry *entry)
{
return (void *)entry + entry->next_offset;
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMB2_ioctl(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, u64 persistent_fid,
u64 volatile_fid, u32 opcode, bool is_fsctl, char *in_data,
u32 indatalen, char **out_data, u32 *plen /* returned data len */)
{
struct smb2_ioctl_req *req;
struct smb2_ioctl_rsp *rsp;
struct smb2_sync_hdr *shdr;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
struct cifs_ses *ses;
struct kvec iov[2];
struct kvec rsp_iov;
int resp_buftype;
int n_iov;
int rc = 0;
int flags = 0;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "SMB2 IOCTL\n");
if (out_data != NULL)
*out_data = NULL;
/* zero out returned data len, in case of error */
if (plen)
*plen = 0;
if (tcon)
ses = tcon->ses;
else
return -EIO;
if (ses && (ses->server))
server = ses->server;
else
return -EIO;
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_IOCTL, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (encryption_required(tcon))
flags |= CIFS_TRANSFORM_REQ;
req->CtlCode = cpu_to_le32(opcode);
req->PersistentFileId = persistent_fid;
req->VolatileFileId = volatile_fid;
if (indatalen) {
req->InputCount = cpu_to_le32(indatalen);
/* do not set InputOffset if no input data */
req->InputOffset =
cpu_to_le32(offsetof(struct smb2_ioctl_req, Buffer) - 4);
iov[1].iov_base = in_data;
iov[1].iov_len = indatalen;
n_iov = 2;
} else
n_iov = 1;
req->OutputOffset = 0;
req->OutputCount = 0; /* MBZ */
/*
* Could increase MaxOutputResponse, but that would require more
* than one credit. Windows typically sets this smaller, but for some
* ioctls it may be useful to allow server to send more. No point
* limiting what the server can send as long as fits in one credit
*/
req->MaxOutputResponse = cpu_to_le32(0xFF00); /* < 64K uses 1 credit */
if (is_fsctl)
req->Flags = cpu_to_le32(SMB2_0_IOCTL_IS_FSCTL);
else
req->Flags = 0;
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/*
* If no input data, the size of ioctl struct in
* protocol spec still includes a 1 byte data buffer,
* but if input data passed to ioctl, we do not
* want to double count this, so we do not send
* the dummy one byte of data in iovec[0] if sending
* input data (in iovec[1]). We also must add 4 bytes
* in first iovec to allow for rfc1002 length field.
*/
if (indatalen) {
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4 - 1;
inc_rfc1001_len(req, indatalen - 1);
} else
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4;
rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, iov, n_iov, &resp_buftype, flags, &rsp_iov);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
rsp = (struct smb2_ioctl_rsp *)rsp_iov.iov_base;
if ((rc != 0) && (rc != -EINVAL)) {
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_IOCTL_HE);
goto ioctl_exit;
} else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
if ((opcode != FSCTL_SRV_COPYCHUNK_WRITE) &&
(opcode != FSCTL_SRV_COPYCHUNK)) {
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_IOCTL_HE);
goto ioctl_exit;
}
}
/* check if caller wants to look at return data or just return rc */
if ((plen == NULL) || (out_data == NULL))
goto ioctl_exit;
*plen = le32_to_cpu(rsp->OutputCount);
/* We check for obvious errors in the output buffer length and offset */
if (*plen == 0)
goto ioctl_exit; /* server returned no data */
else if (*plen > 0xFF00) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "srv returned invalid ioctl length: %d\n", *plen);
*plen = 0;
rc = -EIO;
goto ioctl_exit;
}
if (get_rfc1002_length(rsp) < le32_to_cpu(rsp->OutputOffset) + *plen) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Malformed ioctl resp: len %d offset %d\n", *plen,
le32_to_cpu(rsp->OutputOffset));
*plen = 0;
rc = -EIO;
goto ioctl_exit;
}
*out_data = kmalloc(*plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (*out_data == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto ioctl_exit;
}
shdr = get_sync_hdr(rsp);
memcpy(*out_data, (char *)shdr + le32_to_cpu(rsp->OutputOffset), *plen);
ioctl_exit:
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 84,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Buffer::Unmap() {
if (--map_count_ == 0)
shm_.Unmap();
}
Commit Message: Add permission checks for PPB_Buffer.
BUG=116317
TEST=browser_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11446075
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171951 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 113,753 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iperf_set_test_role(struct iperf_test *ipt, char role)
{
ipt->role = role;
if (role == 'c')
ipt->sender = 1;
else if (role == 's')
ipt->sender = 0;
if (ipt->reverse)
ipt->sender = ! ipt->sender;
check_sender_has_retransmits(ipt);
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkey_export_to_file)
{
struct php_x509_request req;
zval * zpkey, * args = NULL;
char * passphrase = NULL;
size_t passphrase_len = 0;
char * filename = NULL;
size_t filename_len = 0;
zend_resource *key_resource = NULL;
int pem_write = 0;
EVP_PKEY * key;
BIO * bio_out = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER * cipher;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "zp|s!a!", &zpkey, &filename, &filename_len, &passphrase, &passphrase_len, &args) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
PHP_OPENSSL_CHECK_SIZE_T_TO_INT(passphrase_len, passphrase);
key = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(zpkey, 0, passphrase, passphrase_len, 0, &key_resource);
if (key == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "cannot get key from parameter 1");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(filename)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PHP_SSL_REQ_INIT(&req);
if (PHP_SSL_REQ_PARSE(&req, args) == SUCCESS) {
bio_out = BIO_new_file(filename, "w");
if (passphrase && req.priv_key_encrypt) {
if (req.priv_key_encrypt_cipher) {
cipher = req.priv_key_encrypt_cipher;
} else {
cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *) EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
}
} else {
cipher = NULL;
}
switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(key)) {
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_EC
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
pem_write = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio_out, EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(key), cipher, (unsigned char *)passphrase, (int)passphrase_len, NULL, NULL);
break;
#endif
default:
pem_write = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bio_out, key, cipher, (unsigned char *)passphrase, (int)passphrase_len, NULL, NULL);
break;
}
if (pem_write) {
/* Success!
* If returning the output as a string, do so now */
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
}
PHP_SSL_REQ_DISPOSE(&req);
if (key_resource == NULL && key) {
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
}
if (bio_out) {
BIO_free(bio_out);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabSpecificContentSettings::SiteDataObserver::~SiteDataObserver() {
if (tab_specific_content_settings_)
tab_specific_content_settings_->RemoveSiteDataObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Check the content setting type is valid.
BUG=169770
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11875013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176687 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserMainParts::PreMainMessageLoopRun() {
device::GeolocationProvider::SetGeolocationDelegate(
new GeolocationDelegate());
media::AudioManager::SetGlobalAppName(
BrowserPlatformIntegration::GetInstance()->GetApplicationName());
if (CanUseSharedGLContext()) {
scoped_refptr<GLContextDependent> share_context =
BrowserPlatformIntegration::GetInstance()->GetGLShareContext();
if (share_context) {
gl_share_context_ = GLContextDependent::CloneFrom(share_context.get());
gpu::oxide_shim::SetGLShareGroup(gl_share_context_->share_group());
}
}
#if defined(ENABLE_HYBRIS_CAMERA)
VideoCaptureDeviceHybris::Initialize();
#endif
gpu::GPUInfo gpu_info;
gpu::CollectInfoResult rv = gpu::CollectContextGraphicsInfo(&gpu_info);
switch (rv) {
case gpu::kCollectInfoFatalFailure:
LOG(ERROR) << "gpu::CollectContextGraphicsInfo failed";
break;
case gpu::kCollectInfoNone:
NOTREACHED();
break;
default:
break;
}
content::GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->UpdateGpuInfo(gpu_info);
CompositorUtils::GetInstance()->Initialize(gl_share_context_.get());
net::NetModule::SetResourceProvider(NetResourceProvider);
lifecycle_observer_.reset(new LifecycleObserver());
render_process_initializer_.reset(new RenderProcessInitializer());
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vhost_vq_access_ok(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
{
return vq_access_ok(vq->dev, vq->num, vq->desc, vq->avail, vq->used) &&
vq_log_access_ok(vq->dev, vq, vq->log_base);
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix length for cross region descriptor
If a single descriptor crosses a region, the
second chunk length should be decremented
by size translated so far, instead it includes
the full descriptor length.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,812 |
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