instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ExtensionViewGuest::GetTaskPrefix() const {
return IDS_EXTENSION_TASK_MANAGER_EXTENSIONVIEW_TAG_PREFIX;
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CL_Clientinfo_f( void ) {
Com_Printf( "--------- Client Information ---------\n" );
Com_Printf( "state: %i\n", clc.state );
Com_Printf( "Server: %s\n", clc.servername );
Com_Printf ("User info settings:\n");
Info_Print( Cvar_InfoString( CVAR_USERINFO ) );
Com_Printf( "--------------------------------------\n" );
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,949
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: win32_gethostbyaddr(const char *addr, int len, int type)
{
static struct hostent host;
static char hostbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
char hname[NI_MAXHOST];
struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
host.h_name = hostbuf;
switch (type) {
case AF_INET:
return gethostbyaddr(addr, len, type);
break;
case AF_INET6:
memset(&addr6, 0, sizeof(addr6));
addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
memcpy(&addr6.sin6_addr, addr, len);
if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr6, sizeof(addr6),
hname, sizeof(hname), NULL, 0, 0)) {
return NULL;
} else {
strcpy(host.h_name, hname);
return &host;
}
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,607
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_packet_in_private_destroy(struct ofputil_packet_in_private *pin)
{
if (pin) {
free(pin->stack);
free(pin->actions);
free(pin->action_set);
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestRenderFrame::ExtendSelectionAndDelete(int before, int after) {
GetFrameInputHandler()->ExtendSelectionAndDelete(before, after);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,921
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
} else {
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
}
unix_tot_inflight++;
}
fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 167,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cpuacct_charge(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 cputime)
{
struct cpuacct *ca;
int cpu;
if (unlikely(!cpuacct_subsys.active))
return;
cpu = task_cpu(tsk);
rcu_read_lock();
ca = task_ca(tsk);
for (; ca; ca = ca->parent) {
u64 *cpuusage = per_cpu_ptr(ca->cpuusage, cpu);
*cpuusage += cputime;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: free_res_descriptor(RES_DESCRIPTOR * rd)
{
RES_DESCRIPTOR *nxt;
if (rd == NULL)
return;
nxt = rd->next;
free(rd->name);
free(rd);
free_res_descriptor(nxt); // tail recursive
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void op_addReg(MCInst *MI, int reg)
{
if (MI->csh->detail) {
MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.operands[MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.op_count].type = X86_OP_REG;
MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.operands[MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.op_count].reg = reg;
MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.operands[MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.op_count].size = MI->csh->regsize_map[reg];
MI->flat_insn->detail->x86.op_count++;
}
if (MI->op1_size == 0)
MI->op1_size = MI->csh->regsize_map[reg];
}
Commit Message: x86: fast path checking for X86_insn_reg_intel()
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 94,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadItemImpl::OnTargetPathDetermined(
const FilePath& target_path,
TargetDisposition disposition,
content::DownloadDangerType danger_type) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
target_path_ = target_path;
target_disposition_ = disposition;
SetDangerType(danger_type);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline float ParentPageZoomFactor(LocalFrame* frame) {
Frame* parent = frame->Tree().Parent();
if (!parent || !parent->IsLocalFrame())
return 1;
return ToLocalFrame(parent)->PageZoomFactor();
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 154,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _radius_close(zend_rsrc_list_entry *rsrc TSRMLS_DC)
{
radius_descriptor *raddesc = (radius_descriptor *)rsrc->ptr;
rad_close(raddesc->radh);
efree(raddesc);
}
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nvmet_fc_target_assoc_free(struct kref *ref)
{
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *assoc =
container_of(ref, struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc, ref);
struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport = assoc->tgtport;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tgtport->lock, flags);
list_del(&assoc->a_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags);
ida_simple_remove(&tgtport->assoc_cnt, assoc->a_id);
kfree(assoc);
nvmet_fc_tgtport_put(tgtport);
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct mqueue_inode_info *MQUEUE_I(struct inode *inode)
{
return container_of(inode, struct mqueue_inode_info, vfs_inode);
}
Commit Message: mqueue: fix a use-after-free in sys_mq_notify()
The retry logic for netlink_attachskb() inside sys_mq_notify()
is nasty and vulnerable:
1) The sock refcnt is already released when retry is needed
2) The fd is controllable by user-space because we already
release the file refcnt
so we when retry but the fd has been just closed by user-space
during this small window, we end up calling netlink_detachskb()
on the error path which releases the sock again, later when
the user-space closes this socket a use-after-free could be
triggered.
Setting 'sock' to NULL here should be sufficient to fix it.
Reported-by: GeneBlue <geneblue.mail@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 63,506
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void incomplete_class_write_property(zval *object, zval *member, zval *value, const zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
incomplete_class_message(object, E_NOTICE TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::SynchronousSwapCompositorFrame(
viz::CompositorFrameMetadata frame_metadata) {
for (auto* page : protocol::PageHandler::ForAgentHost(this))
page->OnSynchronousSwapCompositorFrame(frame_metadata.Clone());
for (auto* input : protocol::InputHandler::ForAgentHost(this))
input->OnSwapCompositorFrame(frame_metadata);
if (!frame_trace_recorder_)
return;
bool did_initiate_recording = false;
for (auto* tracing : protocol::TracingHandler::ForAgentHost(this))
did_initiate_recording |= tracing->did_initiate_recording();
if (did_initiate_recording) {
frame_trace_recorder_->OnSynchronousSwapCompositorFrame(frame_host_,
frame_metadata);
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::shouldParserYieldAgressivelyBeforeScriptExecution()
{
return view() && view()->layoutPending() && !minimumLayoutDelay();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrend_insert_format_swizzle(int override_format, struct vrend_format_table *entry, uint32_t bindings, uint8_t swizzle[4])
{
int i;
tex_conv_table[override_format] = *entry;
tex_conv_table[override_format].bindings = bindings;
tex_conv_table[override_format].flags = VREND_BIND_NEED_SWIZZLE;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
tex_conv_table[override_format].swizzle[i] = swizzle[i];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 8,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void h_block_filter(ERContext *s, uint8_t *dst, int w,
int h, ptrdiff_t stride, int is_luma)
{
int b_x, b_y;
ptrdiff_t mvx_stride, mvy_stride;
const uint8_t *cm = ff_crop_tab + MAX_NEG_CROP;
set_mv_strides(s, &mvx_stride, &mvy_stride);
mvx_stride >>= is_luma;
mvy_stride *= mvx_stride;
for (b_y = 0; b_y < h; b_y++) {
for (b_x = 0; b_x < w - 1; b_x++) {
int y;
int left_status = s->error_status_table[( b_x >> is_luma) + (b_y >> is_luma) * s->mb_stride];
int right_status = s->error_status_table[((b_x + 1) >> is_luma) + (b_y >> is_luma) * s->mb_stride];
int left_intra = IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[( b_x >> is_luma) + (b_y >> is_luma) * s->mb_stride]);
int right_intra = IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[((b_x + 1) >> is_luma) + (b_y >> is_luma) * s->mb_stride]);
int left_damage = left_status & ER_MB_ERROR;
int right_damage = right_status & ER_MB_ERROR;
int offset = b_x * 8 + b_y * stride * 8;
int16_t *left_mv = s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mvy_stride * b_y + mvx_stride * b_x];
int16_t *right_mv = s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mvy_stride * b_y + mvx_stride * (b_x + 1)];
if (!(left_damage || right_damage))
continue; // both undamaged
if ((!left_intra) && (!right_intra) &&
FFABS(left_mv[0] - right_mv[0]) +
FFABS(left_mv[1] + right_mv[1]) < 2)
continue;
for (y = 0; y < 8; y++) {
int a, b, c, d;
a = dst[offset + 7 + y * stride] - dst[offset + 6 + y * stride];
b = dst[offset + 8 + y * stride] - dst[offset + 7 + y * stride];
c = dst[offset + 9 + y * stride] - dst[offset + 8 + y * stride];
d = FFABS(b) - ((FFABS(a) + FFABS(c) + 1) >> 1);
d = FFMAX(d, 0);
if (b < 0)
d = -d;
if (d == 0)
continue;
if (!(left_damage && right_damage))
d = d * 16 / 9;
if (left_damage) {
dst[offset + 7 + y * stride] = cm[dst[offset + 7 + y * stride] + ((d * 7) >> 4)];
dst[offset + 6 + y * stride] = cm[dst[offset + 6 + y * stride] + ((d * 5) >> 4)];
dst[offset + 5 + y * stride] = cm[dst[offset + 5 + y * stride] + ((d * 3) >> 4)];
dst[offset + 4 + y * stride] = cm[dst[offset + 4 + y * stride] + ((d * 1) >> 4)];
}
if (right_damage) {
dst[offset + 8 + y * stride] = cm[dst[offset + 8 + y * stride] - ((d * 7) >> 4)];
dst[offset + 9 + y * stride] = cm[dst[offset + 9 + y * stride] - ((d * 5) >> 4)];
dst[offset + 10+ y * stride] = cm[dst[offset + 10 + y * stride] - ((d * 3) >> 4)];
dst[offset + 11+ y * stride] = cm[dst[offset + 11 + y * stride] - ((d * 1) >> 4)];
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 79,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long long thread_group_sched_runtime(struct task_struct *p)
{
struct task_cputime totals;
unsigned long flags;
struct rq *rq;
u64 ns;
rq = task_rq_lock(p, &flags);
thread_group_cputime(p, &totals);
ns = totals.sum_exec_runtime + do_task_delta_exec(p, rq);
task_rq_unlock(rq, &flags);
return ns;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::canAcceptChild(const Node& newChild, const Node* oldChild, ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
if (oldChild && oldChild->nodeType() == newChild.nodeType())
return true;
int numDoctypes = 0;
int numElements = 0;
for (Node& child : NodeTraversal::childrenOf(*this)) {
if (oldChild && *oldChild == child)
continue;
switch (child.nodeType()) {
case DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:
numDoctypes++;
break;
case ELEMENT_NODE:
numElements++;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (newChild.isDocumentFragment()) {
for (Node& child : NodeTraversal::childrenOf(toDocumentFragment(newChild))) {
switch (child.nodeType()) {
case ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
case CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
case DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE:
case DOCUMENT_NODE:
case TEXT_NODE:
exceptionState.throwDOMException(HierarchyRequestError, "Nodes of type '" + newChild.nodeName() +
"' may not be inserted inside nodes of type '#document'.");
return false;
case COMMENT_NODE:
case PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION_NODE:
break;
case DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:
numDoctypes++;
break;
case ELEMENT_NODE:
numElements++;
break;
}
}
} else {
switch (newChild.nodeType()) {
case ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
case CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
case DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE:
case DOCUMENT_NODE:
case TEXT_NODE:
exceptionState.throwDOMException(HierarchyRequestError, "Nodes of type '" + newChild.nodeName() +
"' may not be inserted inside nodes of type '#document'.");
return false;
case COMMENT_NODE:
case PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION_NODE:
return true;
case DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:
numDoctypes++;
break;
case ELEMENT_NODE:
numElements++;
break;
}
}
if (numElements > 1 || numDoctypes > 1) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(HierarchyRequestError,
String::format("Only one %s on document allowed.",
numElements > 1 ? "element" : "doctype"));
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __sock_create(struct net *net, int family, int type, int protocol,
struct socket **res, int kern)
{
int err;
struct socket *sock;
const struct net_proto_family *pf;
/*
* Check protocol is in range
*/
if (family < 0 || family >= NPROTO)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
/* Compatibility.
This uglymoron is moved from INET layer to here to avoid
deadlock in module load.
*/
if (family == PF_INET && type == SOCK_PACKET) {
pr_info_once("%s uses obsolete (PF_INET,SOCK_PACKET)\n",
current->comm);
family = PF_PACKET;
}
err = security_socket_create(family, type, protocol, kern);
if (err)
return err;
/*
* Allocate the socket and allow the family to set things up. if
* the protocol is 0, the family is instructed to select an appropriate
* default.
*/
sock = sock_alloc();
if (!sock) {
net_warn_ratelimited("socket: no more sockets\n");
return -ENFILE; /* Not exactly a match, but its the
closest posix thing */
}
sock->type = type;
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
/* Attempt to load a protocol module if the find failed.
*
* 12/09/1996 Marcin: But! this makes REALLY only sense, if the user
* requested real, full-featured networking support upon configuration.
* Otherwise module support will break!
*/
if (rcu_access_pointer(net_families[family]) == NULL)
request_module("net-pf-%d", family);
#endif
rcu_read_lock();
pf = rcu_dereference(net_families[family]);
err = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (!pf)
goto out_release;
/*
* We will call the ->create function, that possibly is in a loadable
* module, so we have to bump that loadable module refcnt first.
*/
if (!try_module_get(pf->owner))
goto out_release;
/* Now protected by module ref count */
rcu_read_unlock();
err = pf->create(net, sock, protocol, kern);
if (err < 0)
goto out_module_put;
/*
* Now to bump the refcnt of the [loadable] module that owns this
* socket at sock_release time we decrement its refcnt.
*/
if (!try_module_get(sock->ops->owner))
goto out_module_busy;
/*
* Now that we're done with the ->create function, the [loadable]
* module can have its refcnt decremented
*/
module_put(pf->owner);
err = security_socket_post_create(sock, family, type, protocol, kern);
if (err)
goto out_sock_release;
*res = sock;
return 0;
out_module_busy:
err = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
out_module_put:
sock->ops = NULL;
module_put(pf->owner);
out_sock_release:
sock_release(sock);
return err;
out_release:
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_sock_release;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path
The syzkaller fuzzer hit the following use-after-free:
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8175ea0e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:295
[<ffffffff851cc31a>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x6fa/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2261
[< inline >] SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2281
[<ffffffff851cc57f>] SyS_recvmmsg+0x16f/0x180 net/socket.c:2270
[<ffffffff86332bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
And, as Dmitry rightly assessed, that is because we can drop the
reference and then touch it when the underlying recvmsg calls return
some packets and then hit an error, which will make recvmmsg to set
sock->sk->sk_err, oops, fix it.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Fixes: a2e2725541fa ("net: Introduce recvmmsg socket syscall")
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160122211644.GC2470@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 50,251
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::FinishReset() {
VLOGF(2);
DCHECK(task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
if (state_ != kResetting) {
DCHECK(state_ == kDestroying || state_ == kUninitialized) << state_;
return; // We could've gotten destroyed already.
}
while (!pending_output_cbs_.empty())
pending_output_cbs_.pop();
if (awaiting_va_surfaces_recycle_) {
task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::FinishReset, weak_this_));
return;
}
state_ = kIdle;
task_runner_->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Client::NotifyResetDone, client_));
if (!input_buffers_.empty()) {
state_ = kDecoding;
decoder_thread_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::DecodeTask,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 148,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, getSupportedCompression)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
if (PHAR_G(has_zlib)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "GZ", 2, 1);
}
if (PHAR_G(has_bz2)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "BZIP2", 5, 1);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 165,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_operr_notify(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
sctp_errhdr_t *err;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the ERROR chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_operr_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
sctp_walk_errors(err, chunk->chunk_hdr);
if ((void *)err != (void *)chunk->chunk_end)
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
(void *)err, commands);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_PROCESS_OPERR,
SCTP_CHUNK(chunk));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 31,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidChangeFramePolicy(
blink::WebFrame* child_frame,
blink::WebSandboxFlags flags,
const blink::ParsedFeaturePolicy& container_policy) {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidChangeFramePolicy(
routing_id_, RenderFrame::GetRoutingIdForWebFrame(child_frame),
{flags, container_policy}));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void virgl_cmd_transfer_to_host_3d(VirtIOGPU *g,
struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
{
struct virtio_gpu_transfer_host_3d t3d;
VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(t3d);
trace_virtio_gpu_cmd_res_xfer_toh_3d(t3d.resource_id);
virgl_renderer_transfer_write_iov(t3d.resource_id,
t3d.hdr.ctx_id,
t3d.level,
t3d.stride,
t3d.layer_stride,
(struct virgl_box *)&t3d.box,
t3d.offset, NULL, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 9,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nntp_hcache_namer(const char *path, char *dest, size_t destlen)
{
return snprintf(dest, destlen, "%s.hcache", path);
}
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 1
| 169,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: person_set_visible(person_t* person, bool visible)
{
person->is_visible = visible;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,117
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void bond_resend_igmp_join_requests(struct bonding *bond)
{
struct net_device *vlan_dev;
struct vlan_entry *vlan;
read_lock(&bond->lock);
/* rejoin all groups on bond device */
__bond_resend_igmp_join_requests(bond->dev);
/* rejoin all groups on vlan devices */
list_for_each_entry(vlan, &bond->vlan_list, vlan_list) {
rcu_read_lock();
vlan_dev = __vlan_find_dev_deep(bond->dev,
vlan->vlan_id);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (vlan_dev)
__bond_resend_igmp_join_requests(vlan_dev);
}
if (--bond->igmp_retrans > 0)
queue_delayed_work(bond->wq, &bond->mcast_work, HZ/5);
read_unlock(&bond->lock);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::DoIsRenderbuffer(GLuint client_id) {
const RenderbufferManager::RenderbufferInfo* renderbuffer =
GetRenderbufferInfo(client_id);
return renderbuffer && renderbuffer->IsValid() && !renderbuffer->IsDeleted();
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 103,544
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static FILE *local_fopenat(int dirfd, const char *name, const char *mode)
{
int fd, o_mode = 0;
FILE *fp;
int flags;
/*
* only supports two modes
*/
if (mode[0] == 'r') {
flags = O_RDONLY;
} else if (mode[0] == 'w') {
flags = O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_CREAT;
o_mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP | S_IROTH | S_IWOTH;
} else {
return NULL;
}
fd = openat_file(dirfd, name, flags, o_mode);
if (fd == -1) {
return NULL;
}
fp = fdopen(fd, mode);
if (!fp) {
close(fd);
}
return fp;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 17,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: smtp_alert(smtp_msg_t msg_type, void* data, const char *subject, const char *body)
{
smtp_t *smtp;
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
vrrp_t *vrrp;
vrrp_sgroup_t *vgroup;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
checker_t *checker;
virtual_server_t *vs;
smtp_rs *rs_info;
#endif
/* Only send mail if email specified */
if (LIST_ISEMPTY(global_data->email) || !global_data->smtp_server.ss_family)
return;
/* allocate & initialize smtp argument data structure */
smtp = (smtp_t *) MALLOC(sizeof(smtp_t));
smtp->subject = (char *) MALLOC(MAX_HEADERS_LENGTH);
smtp->body = (char *) MALLOC(MAX_BODY_LENGTH);
smtp->buffer = (char *) MALLOC(SMTP_BUFFER_MAX);
smtp->email_to = (char *) MALLOC(SMTP_BUFFER_MAX);
/* format subject if rserver is specified */
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
if (msg_type == SMTP_MSG_RS) {
checker = (checker_t *)data;
snprintf(smtp->subject, MAX_HEADERS_LENGTH, "[%s] Realserver %s of virtual server %s - %s",
global_data->router_id,
FMT_RS(checker->rs, checker->vs),
FMT_VS(checker->vs),
checker->rs->alive ? "UP" : "DOWN");
}
else if (msg_type == SMTP_MSG_VS) {
vs = (virtual_server_t *)data;
snprintf(smtp->subject, MAX_HEADERS_LENGTH, "[%s] Virtualserver %s - %s",
global_data->router_id,
FMT_VS(vs),
subject);
}
else if (msg_type == SMTP_MSG_RS_SHUT) {
rs_info = (smtp_rs *)data;
snprintf(smtp->subject, MAX_HEADERS_LENGTH, "[%s] Realserver %s of virtual server %s - %s",
global_data->router_id,
FMT_RS(rs_info->rs, rs_info->vs),
FMT_VS(rs_info->vs),
subject);
}
else
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
if (msg_type == SMTP_MSG_VRRP) {
vrrp = (vrrp_t *)data;
snprintf(smtp->subject, MAX_HEADERS_LENGTH, "[%s] VRRP Instance %s - %s",
global_data->router_id,
vrrp->iname,
subject);
} else if (msg_type == SMTP_MSG_VGROUP) {
vgroup = (vrrp_sgroup_t *)data;
snprintf(smtp->subject, MAX_HEADERS_LENGTH, "[%s] VRRP Group %s - %s",
global_data->router_id,
vgroup->gname,
subject);
}
else
#endif
if (global_data->router_id)
snprintf(smtp->subject, MAX_HEADERS_LENGTH, "[%s] %s"
, global_data->router_id
, subject);
else
snprintf(smtp->subject, MAX_HEADERS_LENGTH, "%s", subject);
strncpy(smtp->body, body, MAX_BODY_LENGTH - 1);
smtp->body[MAX_BODY_LENGTH - 1]= '\0';
build_to_header_rcpt_addrs(smtp);
#ifdef _SMTP_ALERT_DEBUG_
if (do_smtp_alert_debug)
smtp_log_to_file(smtp);
else
#endif
smtp_connect(smtp);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 75,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SelectionController::MouseDownMayStartSelect() const {
return mouse_down_may_start_select_;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int llc_ui_wait_for_conn(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
{
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
while (1) {
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (sk_wait_event(sk, &timeout, sk->sk_state != TCP_SYN_SENT))
break;
if (signal_pending(current) || !timeout)
break;
}
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
return timeout;
}
Commit Message: llc: Fix missing msg_namelen update in llc_ui_recvmsg()
For stream sockets the code misses to update the msg_namelen member
to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized
sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack
memory. The msg_namelen update is also missing for datagram sockets
in case the socket is shutting down during receive.
Fix both issues by setting msg_namelen to 0 early. It will be
updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int libevt_record_values_get_type(
libevt_record_values_t *record_values,
uint8_t *type,
libcerror_error_t **error )
{
static char *function = "libevt_record_values_get_type";
if( record_values == NULL )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_ARGUMENTS,
LIBCERROR_ARGUMENT_ERROR_INVALID_VALUE,
"%s: invalid record values.",
function );
return( -1 );
}
if( type == NULL )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_ARGUMENTS,
LIBCERROR_ARGUMENT_ERROR_INVALID_VALUE,
"%s: invalid type.",
function );
return( -1 );
}
*type = record_values->type;
return( 1 );
}
Commit Message: Applied updates and addition boundary checks for corrupted data
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 83,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ptt_on(struct net_device *dev)
{
outb(PTT_ON, MCR(dev->base_addr));
}
Commit Message: hamradio/yam: fix info leak in ioctl
The yam_ioctl() code fails to initialise the cmd field
of the struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the 4-byte info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 39,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SWFShape_setRenderHintingFlags(SWFShape shape, int flags)
{
flags &= (SWF_SHAPE_USESCALINGSTROKES | SWF_SHAPE_USENONSCALINGSTROKES);
shape->flags = flags;
SWFShape_useVersion(shape, SWF_SHAPE4);
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 89,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jas_matrix_clip(jas_matrix_t *matrix, jas_seqent_t minval,
jas_seqent_t maxval)
{
int i;
int j;
jas_seqent_t v;
jas_seqent_t *rowstart;
jas_seqent_t *data;
int rowstep;
if (jas_matrix_numrows(matrix) > 0 && jas_matrix_numcols(matrix) > 0) {
assert(matrix->rows_);
rowstep = jas_matrix_rowstep(matrix);
for (i = matrix->numrows_, rowstart = matrix->rows_[0]; i > 0; --i,
rowstart += rowstep) {
data = rowstart;
for (j = matrix->numcols_, data = rowstart; j > 0; --j,
++data) {
v = *data;
if (v < minval) {
*data = minval;
} else if (v > maxval) {
*data = maxval;
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 168,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API void zend_ts_hash_graceful_destroy(TsHashTable *ht)
{
begin_write(ht);
zend_hash_graceful_destroy(TS_HASH(ht));
end_write(ht);
#ifdef ZTS
tsrm_mutex_free(ht->mx_reader);
tsrm_mutex_free(ht->mx_reader);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 1
| 164,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Browser::HasCompletedUnloadProcessing() const {
return is_attempting_to_close_browser_ &&
tabs_needing_before_unload_fired_.empty() &&
tabs_needing_unload_fired_.empty();
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,243
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cm_cleanup_timewait(struct cm_timewait_info *timewait_info)
{
if (timewait_info->inserted_remote_id) {
rb_erase(&timewait_info->remote_id_node, &cm.remote_id_table);
timewait_info->inserted_remote_id = 0;
}
if (timewait_info->inserted_remote_qp) {
rb_erase(&timewait_info->remote_qp_node, &cm.remote_qp_table);
timewait_info->inserted_remote_qp = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,348
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t ssi_sd_transfer(SSISlave *dev, uint32_t val)
{
ssi_sd_state *s = FROM_SSI_SLAVE(ssi_sd_state, dev);
/* Special case: allow CMD12 (STOP TRANSMISSION) while reading data. */
if (s->mode == SSI_SD_DATA_READ && val == 0x4d) {
s->mode = SSI_SD_CMD;
/* There must be at least one byte delay before the card responds. */
s->stopping = 1;
}
switch (s->mode) {
case SSI_SD_CMD:
if (val == 0xff) {
DPRINTF("NULL command\n");
return 0xff;
}
s->cmd = val & 0x3f;
s->mode = SSI_SD_CMDARG;
s->arglen = 0;
return 0xff;
case SSI_SD_CMDARG:
if (s->arglen == 4) {
SDRequest request;
uint8_t longresp[16];
/* FIXME: Check CRC. */
request.cmd = s->cmd;
request.arg = (s->cmdarg[0] << 24) | (s->cmdarg[1] << 16)
| (s->cmdarg[2] << 8) | s->cmdarg[3];
DPRINTF("CMD%d arg 0x%08x\n", s->cmd, request.arg);
s->arglen = sd_do_command(s->sd, &request, longresp);
if (s->arglen <= 0) {
s->arglen = 1;
s->response[0] = 4;
DPRINTF("SD command failed\n");
} else if (s->cmd == 58) {
/* CMD58 returns R3 response (OCR) */
DPRINTF("Returned OCR\n");
s->arglen = 5;
s->response[0] = 1;
memcpy(&s->response[1], longresp, 4);
} else if (s->arglen != 4) {
BADF("Unexpected response to cmd %d\n", s->cmd);
/* Illegal command is about as near as we can get. */
s->arglen = 1;
s->response[0] = 4;
} else {
/* All other commands return status. */
uint32_t cardstatus;
uint16_t status;
/* CMD13 returns a 2-byte statuse work. Other commands
only return the first byte. */
s->arglen = (s->cmd == 13) ? 2 : 1;
cardstatus = (longresp[0] << 24) | (longresp[1] << 16)
| (longresp[2] << 8) | longresp[3];
status = 0;
if (((cardstatus >> 9) & 0xf) < 4)
status |= SSI_SDR_IDLE;
if (cardstatus & ERASE_RESET)
status |= SSI_SDR_ERASE_RESET;
if (cardstatus & ILLEGAL_COMMAND)
status |= SSI_SDR_ILLEGAL_COMMAND;
if (cardstatus & COM_CRC_ERROR)
status |= SSI_SDR_COM_CRC_ERROR;
if (cardstatus & ERASE_SEQ_ERROR)
status |= SSI_SDR_ERASE_SEQ_ERROR;
if (cardstatus & ADDRESS_ERROR)
status |= SSI_SDR_ADDRESS_ERROR;
if (cardstatus & CARD_IS_LOCKED)
status |= SSI_SDR_LOCKED;
if (cardstatus & (LOCK_UNLOCK_FAILED | WP_ERASE_SKIP))
status |= SSI_SDR_WP_ERASE;
if (cardstatus & SD_ERROR)
status |= SSI_SDR_ERROR;
if (cardstatus & CC_ERROR)
status |= SSI_SDR_CC_ERROR;
if (cardstatus & CARD_ECC_FAILED)
status |= SSI_SDR_ECC_FAILED;
if (cardstatus & WP_VIOLATION)
status |= SSI_SDR_WP_VIOLATION;
if (cardstatus & ERASE_PARAM)
status |= SSI_SDR_ERASE_PARAM;
if (cardstatus & (OUT_OF_RANGE | CID_CSD_OVERWRITE))
status |= SSI_SDR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
/* ??? Don't know what Parameter Error really means, so
assume it's set if the second byte is nonzero. */
if (status & 0xff)
status |= SSI_SDR_PARAMETER_ERROR;
s->response[0] = status >> 8;
s->response[1] = status;
DPRINTF("Card status 0x%02x\n", status);
}
s->mode = SSI_SD_RESPONSE;
s->response_pos = 0;
} else {
s->cmdarg[s->arglen++] = val;
}
return 0xff;
case SSI_SD_RESPONSE:
if (s->stopping) {
s->stopping = 0;
return 0xff;
}
if (s->response_pos < s->arglen) {
DPRINTF("Response 0x%02x\n", s->response[s->response_pos]);
return s->response[s->response_pos++];
}
if (sd_data_ready(s->sd)) {
DPRINTF("Data read\n");
s->mode = SSI_SD_DATA_START;
} else {
DPRINTF("End of command\n");
s->mode = SSI_SD_CMD;
}
return 0xff;
case SSI_SD_DATA_START:
DPRINTF("Start read block\n");
s->mode = SSI_SD_DATA_READ;
return 0xfe;
case SSI_SD_DATA_READ:
val = sd_read_data(s->sd);
if (!sd_data_ready(s->sd)) {
DPRINTF("Data read end\n");
s->mode = SSI_SD_CMD;
}
return val;
}
/* Should never happen. */
return 0xff;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 15,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_SEC_DESC_BUF(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
proto_tree *subtree;
guint32 len;
/* XXX: I think this is really a array of bytes which can be
dissected using dissect_ndr_cvstring(). The dissected data
can be passed to dissect_nt_sec_desc(). The problem is that
dissect_nt_cvstring() passes back a char * where it really
should pass back a tvb. */
subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(
tree, tvb, offset, 0, ett_SEC_DESC_BUF, NULL, "Security descriptor buffer");
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep,
hf_secdescbuf_maxlen, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep,
hf_secdescbuf_undoc, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep,
hf_secdescbuf_len, &len);
dissect_nt_sec_desc(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, drep, TRUE, len,
&spoolss_printer_access_mask_info);
offset += len;
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 52,024
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LayerTreeCoordinator::showRepaintCounter(const WebCore::GraphicsLayer*) const
{
return m_webPage->corePage()->settings()->showRepaintCounter();
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 97,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::HandleCacheFailure(
const blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails& error_details,
ResultType result,
const GURL& failed_resource_url) {
DCHECK(internal_state_ != CACHE_FAILURE);
DCHECK(!error_details.message.empty());
DCHECK(result != UPDATE_OK);
internal_state_ = CACHE_FAILURE;
LogHistogramStats(result, failed_resource_url);
CancelAllUrlFetches();
CancelAllMasterEntryFetches(error_details);
NotifyAllError(error_details);
DiscardInprogressCache();
internal_state_ = COMPLETED;
if (update_type_ == CACHE_ATTEMPT ||
!IsEvictableError(result, error_details) ||
service_->storage() != storage_) {
DeleteSoon();
return;
}
if (group_->first_evictable_error_time().is_null()) {
group_->set_first_evictable_error_time(base::Time::Now());
storage_->StoreEvictionTimes(group_);
DeleteSoon();
return;
}
base::TimeDelta kMaxEvictableErrorDuration = base::TimeDelta::FromDays(14);
base::TimeDelta error_duration =
base::Time::Now() - group_->first_evictable_error_time();
if (error_duration > kMaxEvictableErrorDuration) {
group_->SetUpdateAppCacheStatus(AppCacheGroup::IDLE);
group_ = nullptr;
service_->DeleteAppCacheGroup(manifest_url_,
base::BindOnce(EmptyCompletionCallback));
}
DeleteSoon(); // To unwind the stack prior to deletion.
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::BeginDecoding() {
gpu_tracer_->BeginDecoding();
gpu_trace_commands_ = gpu_tracer_->IsTracing() && *gpu_decoder_category_;
gpu_debug_commands_ = log_commands() || debug() || gpu_trace_commands_;
query_manager_->ProcessFrameBeginUpdates();
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 145,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dump_cfg_strarray(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 72,214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct vmcs12 *get_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.current_vmcs12;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,055
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hns_nic_tx_clr_all_bufs(struct hns_nic_ring_data *ring_data)
{
struct hnae_ring *ring = ring_data->ring;
struct net_device *ndev = ring_data->napi.dev;
struct netdev_queue *dev_queue;
int head;
int bytes, pkts;
NETIF_TX_LOCK(ring);
head = ring->next_to_use; /* ntu :soft setted ring position*/
bytes = 0;
pkts = 0;
while (head != ring->next_to_clean)
hns_nic_reclaim_one_desc(ring, &bytes, &pkts);
NETIF_TX_UNLOCK(ring);
dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(ndev, ring_data->queue_index);
netdev_tx_reset_queue(dev_queue);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 85,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AutofillPopupBaseView::OnMouseDragged(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
if (HitTestPoint(event.location())) {
SetSelection(event.location());
return true;
}
ClearSelection();
return false;
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 130,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mojom::VideoCaptureHost* VideoCaptureImpl::GetVideoCaptureHost() {
DCHECK(io_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (video_capture_host_for_testing_)
return video_capture_host_for_testing_;
if (!video_capture_host_.get())
video_capture_host_.Bind(std::move(video_capture_host_info_));
return video_capture_host_.get();
};
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int arcmsr_bios_param(struct scsi_device *sdev,
struct block_device *bdev, sector_t capacity, int *geom)
{
int ret, heads, sectors, cylinders, total_capacity;
unsigned char *buffer;/* return copy of block device's partition table */
buffer = scsi_bios_ptable(bdev);
if (buffer) {
ret = scsi_partsize(buffer, capacity, &geom[2], &geom[0], &geom[1]);
kfree(buffer);
if (ret != -1)
return ret;
}
total_capacity = capacity;
heads = 64;
sectors = 32;
cylinders = total_capacity / (heads * sectors);
if (cylinders > 1024) {
heads = 255;
sectors = 63;
cylinders = total_capacity / (heads * sectors);
}
geom[0] = heads;
geom[1] = sectors;
geom[2] = cylinders;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,737
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int phar_archive_delref(phar_archive_data *phar TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (phar->is_persistent) {
return 0;
}
if (--phar->refcount < 0) {
if (PHAR_GLOBALS->request_done
|| zend_hash_del(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), phar->fname, phar->fname_len) != SUCCESS) {
phar_destroy_phar_data(phar TSRMLS_CC);
}
return 1;
} else if (!phar->refcount) {
/* invalidate phar cache */
PHAR_G(last_phar) = NULL;
PHAR_G(last_phar_name) = PHAR_G(last_alias) = NULL;
if (phar->fp && !(phar->flags & PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSION_MASK)) {
/* close open file handle - allows removal or rename of
the file on windows, which has greedy locking
only close if the archive was not already compressed. If it
was compressed, then the fp does not refer to the original file */
php_stream_close(phar->fp);
phar->fp = NULL;
}
if (!zend_hash_num_elements(&phar->manifest)) {
/* this is a new phar that has perhaps had an alias/metadata set, but has never
been flushed */
if (zend_hash_del(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), phar->fname, phar->fname_len) != SUCCESS) {
phar_destroy_phar_data(phar TSRMLS_CC);
}
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* }}}*/
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 4,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int emulate_exception(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int vec,
u32 error, bool valid)
{
ctxt->exception.vector = vec;
ctxt->exception.error_code = error;
ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = valid;
return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::DispatchProtocolMessageFromDevToolsFrontend(
const std::string& message) {
if (agent_host_.get())
agent_host_->DispatchProtocolMessage(this, message);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 138,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void server_connect_callback_init(SERVER_REC *server, GIOChannel *handle)
{
int error;
g_return_if_fail(IS_SERVER(server));
error = net_geterror(handle);
if (error != 0) {
server->connection_lost = TRUE;
server_connect_failed(server, g_strerror(error));
return;
}
lookup_servers = g_slist_remove(lookup_servers, server);
g_source_remove(server->connect_tag);
server->connect_tag = -1;
server_connect_finished(server);
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MACH0_(mach_headerfields)(RBinFile *file) {
RBuffer *buf = file->buf;
int n = 0;
struct MACH0_(mach_header) *mh = MACH0_(get_hdr_from_bytes)(buf);
if (!mh) {
return;
}
printf ("0x00000000 Magic 0x%x\n", mh->magic);
printf ("0x00000004 CpuType 0x%x\n", mh->cputype);
printf ("0x00000008 CpuSubType 0x%x\n", mh->cpusubtype);
printf ("0x0000000c FileType 0x%x\n", mh->filetype);
printf ("0x00000010 nCmds %d\n", mh->ncmds);
printf ("0x00000014 sizeOfCmds %d\n", mh->sizeofcmds);
printf ("0x00000018 Flags 0x%x\n", mh->flags);
ut64 addr = 0x20 - 4;
ut32 word = 0;
ut8 wordbuf[sizeof (word)];
#define READWORD() \
addr += 4; \
if (!r_buf_read_at (buf, addr, (ut8*)wordbuf, 4)) { \
eprintf ("Invalid address in buffer."); \
break; \
} \
word = r_read_le32 (wordbuf);
for (n = 0; n < mh->ncmds; n++) {
printf ("\n# Load Command %d\n", n);
READWORD();
int lcType = word;
eprintf ("0x%08"PFMT64x" cmd 0x%x %s\n",
addr, lcType, cmd_to_string (lcType));
READWORD();
int lcSize = word;
word &= 0xFFFFFF;
printf ("0x%08"PFMT64x" cmdsize %d\n", addr, word);
if (lcSize < 1) {
eprintf ("Invalid size for a load command\n");
break;
}
switch (lcType) {
case LC_ID_DYLIB: // install_name_tool
printf ("0x%08"PFMT64x" id %s\n",
addr + 20, r_buf_get_at (buf, addr + 20, NULL));
break;
case LC_UUID:
printf ("0x%08"PFMT64x" uuid %s\n",
addr + 20, r_buf_get_at (buf, addr + 32, NULL));
break;
case LC_LOAD_DYLIB:
printf ("0x%08"PFMT64x" uuid %s\n",
addr + 20, r_buf_get_at (buf, addr + 20, NULL));
break;
case LC_RPATH:
printf ("0x%08"PFMT64x" uuid %s\n",
addr + 8, r_buf_get_at (buf, addr + 8, NULL));
break;
case LC_CODE_SIGNATURE:
{
ut32 *words = (ut32*)r_buf_get_at (buf, addr + 4, NULL);
printf ("0x%08"PFMT64x" dataoff 0x%08x\n", addr + 4, words[0]);
printf ("0x%08"PFMT64x" datasize %d\n", addr + 8, words[1]);
printf ("# wtf mach0.sign %d @ 0x%x\n", words[1], words[0]);
}
break;
}
addr += word - 8;
}
free (mh);
}
Commit Message: Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_obtain_object(struct ipc_ids *ids, int id)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *out;
int lid = ipcid_to_idx(id);
out = idr_find(&ids->ipcs_idr, lid);
if (!out)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
return out;
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,569
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TabStrip::FindClosingTabResult TabStrip::FindClosingTab(const Tab* tab) {
DCHECK(tab->closing());
for (auto i = tabs_closing_map_.begin(); i != tabs_closing_map_.end(); ++i) {
auto j = std::find(i->second.begin(), i->second.end(), tab);
if (j != i->second.end())
return FindClosingTabResult(i, j);
}
NOTREACHED();
return FindClosingTabResult(tabs_closing_map_.end(), Tabs::iterator());
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool is_flush_request(struct request *rq,
struct blk_flush_queue *fq, unsigned int tag)
{
return ((rq->cmd_flags & REQ_FLUSH_SEQ) &&
fq->flush_rq->tag == tag);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 169,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const AtomicString& Document::dir() {
Element* root_element = documentElement();
if (auto* html = ToHTMLHtmlElementOrNull(root_element))
return html->dir();
return g_null_atom;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: juniper_mlfr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_MLFR;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
/* suppress Bundle-ID if frame was captured on a child-link */
if (ndo->ndo_eflag && EXTRACT_32BITS(l2info.cookie) != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Bundle-ID %u, ", l2info.bundle));
switch (l2info.proto) {
case (LLC_UI):
case (LLC_UI<<8):
isoclns_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen);
break;
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_Q933):
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_IP):
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_IP6):
/* pass IP{4,6} to the OSI layer for proper link-layer printing */
isoclns_print(ndo, p - 1, l2info.length + 1, l2info.caplen + 1);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown protocol 0x%04x, length %u", l2info.proto, l2info.length));
}
return l2info.header_len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 167,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Vector<IconURL> Document::IconURLs(int icon_types_mask) {
IconURL first_favicon;
IconURL first_touch_icon;
IconURL first_touch_precomposed_icon;
Vector<IconURL> secondary_icons;
using TraversalFunction = HTMLLinkElement* (*)(const Node&);
TraversalFunction find_next_candidate =
&Traversal<HTMLLinkElement>::NextSibling;
HTMLLinkElement* first_element = nullptr;
if (head()) {
first_element = Traversal<HTMLLinkElement>::FirstChild(*head());
} else if (IsSVGDocument() && isSVGSVGElement(documentElement())) {
first_element = Traversal<HTMLLinkElement>::FirstWithin(*documentElement());
find_next_candidate = &Traversal<HTMLLinkElement>::Next;
}
for (HTMLLinkElement* link_element = first_element; link_element;
link_element = find_next_candidate(*link_element)) {
if (!(link_element->GetIconType() & icon_types_mask))
continue;
if (link_element->Href().IsEmpty())
continue;
IconURL new_url(link_element->Href(), link_element->IconSizes(),
link_element->GetType(), link_element->GetIconType());
if (link_element->GetIconType() == kFavicon) {
if (first_favicon.icon_type_ != kInvalidIcon)
secondary_icons.push_back(first_favicon);
first_favicon = new_url;
} else if (link_element->GetIconType() == kTouchIcon) {
if (first_touch_icon.icon_type_ != kInvalidIcon)
secondary_icons.push_back(first_touch_icon);
first_touch_icon = new_url;
} else if (link_element->GetIconType() == kTouchPrecomposedIcon) {
if (first_touch_precomposed_icon.icon_type_ != kInvalidIcon)
secondary_icons.push_back(first_touch_precomposed_icon);
first_touch_precomposed_icon = new_url;
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Vector<IconURL> icon_urls;
if (first_favicon.icon_type_ != kInvalidIcon)
icon_urls.push_back(first_favicon);
else if (url_.ProtocolIsInHTTPFamily() && icon_types_mask & kFavicon)
icon_urls.push_back(IconURL::DefaultFavicon(url_));
if (first_touch_icon.icon_type_ != kInvalidIcon)
icon_urls.push_back(first_touch_icon);
if (first_touch_precomposed_icon.icon_type_ != kInvalidIcon)
icon_urls.push_back(first_touch_precomposed_icon);
for (int i = secondary_icons.size() - 1; i >= 0; --i)
icon_urls.push_back(secondary_icons[i]);
return icon_urls;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PaintController::ResetCurrentListIndices() {
next_item_to_match_ = 0;
next_item_to_index_ = 0;
next_chunk_to_match_ = 0;
under_invalidation_checking_begin_ = 0;
under_invalidation_checking_end_ = 0;
skipped_probable_under_invalidation_count_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,675
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(parse_ini_string)
{
char *string = NULL, *str = NULL;
int str_len = 0;
zend_bool process_sections = 0;
long scanner_mode = ZEND_INI_SCANNER_NORMAL;
zend_ini_parser_cb_t ini_parser_cb;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|bl", &str, &str_len, &process_sections, &scanner_mode) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (INT_MAX - str_len < ZEND_MMAP_AHEAD) {
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
/* Set callback function */
if (process_sections) {
BG(active_ini_file_section) = NULL;
ini_parser_cb = (zend_ini_parser_cb_t) php_ini_parser_cb_with_sections;
} else {
ini_parser_cb = (zend_ini_parser_cb_t) php_simple_ini_parser_cb;
}
/* Setup string */
string = (char *) emalloc(str_len + ZEND_MMAP_AHEAD);
memcpy(string, str, str_len);
memset(string + str_len, 0, ZEND_MMAP_AHEAD);
array_init(return_value);
if (zend_parse_ini_string(string, 0, scanner_mode, ini_parser_cb, return_value TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
zend_hash_destroy(Z_ARRVAL_P(return_value));
efree(Z_ARRVAL_P(return_value));
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
efree(string);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int server_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p, *d;
int n, hit;
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A) {
d = p + 11;
*(p++) = SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO; /* type */
hit = s->hit;
*(p++) = (unsigned char)hit;
# if 1
if (!hit) {
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
/*
* This can't really happen because get_client_hello has
* called ssl_get_new_session, which does not set sess_cert.
*/
ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
}
/*
* If 'hit' is set, then s->sess_cert may be non-NULL or NULL,
* depending on whether it survived in the internal cache or was
* retrieved from an external cache. If it is NULL, we cannot put any
* useful data in it anyway, so we don't touch it.
*/
# else /* That's what used to be done when cert_st
* and sess_cert_st were * the same. */
if (!hit) { /* else add cert to session */
CRYPTO_add(&s->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
ssl_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
s->session->sess_cert = s->cert;
} else { /* We have a session id-cache hit, if the *
* session-id has no certificate listed
* against * the 'cert' structure, grab the
* 'old' one * listed against the SSL
* connection */
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
CRYPTO_add(&s->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
s->session->sess_cert = s->cert;
}
}
# endif
if (s->cert == NULL) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED);
return (-1);
}
if (hit) {
*(p++) = 0; /* no certificate type */
s2n(s->version, p); /* version */
s2n(0, p); /* cert len */
s2n(0, p); /* ciphers len */
} else {
/* EAY EAY */
/* put certificate type */
*(p++) = SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE;
s2n(s->version, p); /* version */
n = i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509, NULL);
s2n(n, p); /* certificate length */
i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509, &d);
n = 0;
/*
* lets send out the ciphers we like in the prefered order
*/
n = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, s->session->ciphers, d, 0);
d += n;
s2n(n, p); /* add cipher length */
}
/* make and send conn_id */
s2n(SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH, p); /* add conn_id length */
s->s2->conn_id_length = SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH;
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->conn_id, (int)s->s2->conn_id_length) <=
0)
return -1;
memcpy(d, s->s2->conn_id, SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH);
d += SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH;
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B;
s->init_num = d - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
s->init_off = 0;
}
/* SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B */
/*
* If we are using TCP/IP, the performance is bad if we do 2 writes
* without a read between them. This occurs when Session-id reuse is
* used, so I will put in a buffering module
*/
if (s->hit) {
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1))
return (-1);
}
return (ssl2_do_write(s));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunUntilCallbacksFired() {
while (callback_counter_ != 0) {
ASSERT_GT(task_runner_->GetPostedTasks().size(), 0u);
task_runner_->RunNextTask();
}
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,755
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: t42_parse_dict( T42_Face face,
T42_Loader loader,
FT_Byte* base,
FT_Long size )
{
T42_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Byte* limit;
FT_Int n_keywords = (FT_Int)( sizeof ( t42_keywords ) /
sizeof ( t42_keywords[0] ) );
parser->root.cursor = base;
parser->root.limit = base + size;
parser->root.error = FT_Err_Ok;
limit = parser->root.limit;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
while ( parser->root.cursor < limit )
{
FT_Byte* cur;
cur = parser->root.cursor;
/* look for `FontDirectory' which causes problems for some fonts */
if ( *cur == 'F' && cur + 25 < limit &&
ft_strncmp( (char*)cur, "FontDirectory", 13 ) == 0 )
{
FT_Byte* cur2;
/* skip the `FontDirectory' keyword */
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
T1_Skip_Spaces ( parser );
cur = cur2 = parser->root.cursor;
/* look up the `known' keyword */
while ( cur < limit )
{
if ( *cur == 'k' && cur + 5 < limit &&
ft_strncmp( (char*)cur, "known", 5 ) == 0 )
break;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
goto Exit;
T1_Skip_Spaces ( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
}
if ( cur < limit )
{
T1_TokenRec token;
/* skip the `known' keyword and the token following it */
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
T1_ToToken( parser, &token );
/* if the last token was an array, skip it! */
if ( token.type == T1_TOKEN_TYPE_ARRAY )
cur2 = parser->root.cursor;
}
parser->root.cursor = cur2;
}
/* look for immediates */
else if ( *cur == '/' && cur + 2 < limit )
{
FT_PtrDist len;
cur++;
parser->root.cursor = cur;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
goto Exit;
len = parser->root.cursor - cur;
if ( len > 0 && len < 22 && parser->root.cursor < limit )
{
int i;
/* now compare the immediate name to the keyword table */
/* loop through all known keywords */
for ( i = 0; i < n_keywords; i++ )
{
T1_Field keyword = (T1_Field)&t42_keywords[i];
FT_Byte *name = (FT_Byte*)keyword->ident;
if ( !name )
continue;
if ( cur[0] == name[0] &&
len == (FT_PtrDist)ft_strlen( (const char *)name ) &&
ft_memcmp( cur, name, len ) == 0 )
{
/* we found it -- run the parsing callback! */
parser->root.error = t42_load_keyword( face,
loader,
keyword );
if ( parser->root.error )
return parser->root.error;
break;
}
}
}
}
else
{
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
goto Exit;
}
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
}
Exit:
return parser->root.error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CrosMock::SetStatusAreaMocksExpectations() {
SetInputMethodLibraryStatusAreaExpectations();
SetNetworkLibraryStatusAreaExpectations();
SetPowerLibraryStatusAreaExpectations();
SetPowerLibraryExpectations();
SetTouchpadLibraryExpectations();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DGACloseFramebuffer(int index)
{
DGAScreenPtr pScreenPriv = DGA_GET_SCREEN_PRIV(screenInfo.screens[index]);
/* We rely on the extension to check that DGA is available */
if (pScreenPriv->funcs->CloseFramebuffer)
(*pScreenPriv->funcs->CloseFramebuffer) (pScreenPriv->pScrn);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int caif_sktrecv_cb(struct cflayer *layr, struct cfpkt *pkt)
{
struct caifsock *cf_sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
cf_sk = container_of(layr, struct caifsock, layer);
skb = cfpkt_tonative(pkt);
if (unlikely(cf_sk->sk.sk_state != CAIF_CONNECTED)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
caif_queue_rcv_skb(&cf_sk->sk, skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: caif: Fix missing msg_namelen update in caif_seqpkt_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about caif_seqpkt_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Sjur Braendeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,678
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ImageEventSender& loadEventSender() {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(ImageEventSender, sender,
(ImageEventSender::create(EventTypeNames::load)));
return sender;
}
Commit Message: Move ImageLoader timer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
Move ImageLoader timer m_derefElementTimer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
This associates it with the frame's Networking timer task queue.
BUG=624694
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2642103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#444927}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jpc_ns_invlift_colgrp(jpc_fix_t *a, int numrows, int stride,
int parity)
{
jpc_fix_t *lptr;
jpc_fix_t *hptr;
register jpc_fix_t *lptr2;
register jpc_fix_t *hptr2;
register int n;
register int i;
int llen;
llen = (numrows + 1 - parity) >> 1;
if (numrows > 1) {
/* Apply the scaling step. */
#if defined(WT_DOSCALE)
lptr = &a[0];
n = llen;
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
lptr2[0] = jpc_fix_mul(lptr2[0], jpc_dbltofix(1.0 / LGAIN));
++lptr2;
}
lptr += stride;
}
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
n = numrows - llen;
while (n-- > 0) {
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
hptr2[0] = jpc_fix_mul(hptr2[0], jpc_dbltofix(1.0 / HGAIN));
++hptr2;
}
hptr += stride;
}
#endif
/* Apply the first lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (!parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
DELTA), hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
lptr += stride;
}
n = llen - (!parity) - (parity != (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(DELTA),
jpc_fix_add(hptr2[0], hptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
lptr += stride;
hptr += stride;
}
if (parity != (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
DELTA), hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
}
/* Apply the second lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
GAMMA), lptr2[0]));
++hptr2;
++lptr2;
}
hptr += stride;
}
n = numrows - llen - parity - (parity == (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(GAMMA),
jpc_fix_add(lptr2[0], lptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
hptr += stride;
lptr += stride;
}
if (parity == (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
GAMMA), lptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
}
/* Apply the third lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (!parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * BETA),
hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
lptr += stride;
}
n = llen - (!parity) - (parity != (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(BETA),
jpc_fix_add(hptr2[0], hptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
lptr += stride;
hptr += stride;
}
if (parity != (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * BETA),
hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
}
/* Apply the fourth lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
ALPHA), lptr2[0]));
++hptr2;
++lptr2;
}
hptr += stride;
}
n = numrows - llen - parity - (parity == (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(ALPHA),
jpc_fix_add(lptr2[0], lptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
hptr += stride;
lptr += stride;
}
if (parity == (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 *
ALPHA), lptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
}
} else {
#if defined(WT_LENONE)
if (parity) {
lptr2 = &a[0];
for (i = 0; i < JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE; ++i) {
lptr2[0] = jpc_fix_asr(lptr2[0], 1);
++lptr2;
}
}
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::moveNodeIteratorsToNewDocument(Node& node, Document& newDocument)
{
WillBeHeapHashSet<RawPtrWillBeWeakMember<NodeIterator>> nodeIteratorsList = m_nodeIterators;
for (NodeIterator* ni : nodeIteratorsList) {
if (ni->root() == node) {
detachNodeIterator(ni);
newDocument.attachNodeIterator(ni);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: extern __weak const char *perf_pmu_name(void)
{
return "pmu";
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fuse_ref_page(struct fuse_copy_state *cs, struct page *page,
unsigned offset, unsigned count)
{
struct pipe_buffer *buf;
if (cs->nr_segs == cs->pipe->buffers)
return -EIO;
unlock_request(cs->fc, cs->req);
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
buf = cs->pipebufs;
page_cache_get(page);
buf->page = page;
buf->offset = offset;
buf->len = count;
cs->pipebufs++;
cs->nr_segs++;
cs->len = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPluginDelegateProxy::CopyFromBackBufferToFrontBuffer(
const gfx::Rect& rect) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
const size_t stride =
skia::PlatformCanvas::StrideForWidth(plugin_rect_.width());
const size_t chunk_size = 4 * rect.width();
DCHECK(back_buffer_dib() != NULL);
uint8* source_data = static_cast<uint8*>(back_buffer_dib()->memory()) +
rect.y() * stride + 4 * rect.x();
DCHECK(front_buffer_dib() != NULL);
uint8* target_data = static_cast<uint8*>(front_buffer_dib()->memory()) +
rect.y() * stride + 4 * rect.x();
for (int row = 0; row < rect.height(); ++row) {
memcpy(target_data, source_data, chunk_size);
source_data += stride;
target_data += stride;
}
#else
BlitCanvasToCanvas(front_buffer_canvas(),
rect,
back_buffer_canvas(),
rect.origin());
#endif
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
{
unsigned long old_cr0 = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
unsigned long update_bits = X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_WP |
X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_NW;
cr0 |= X86_CR0_ET;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (cr0 & 0xffffffff00000000UL)
return 1;
#endif
cr0 &= ~CR0_RESERVED_BITS;
if ((cr0 & X86_CR0_NW) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_CD))
return 1;
if ((cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PE))
return 1;
if (!is_paging(vcpu) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if ((vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME)) {
int cs_db, cs_l;
if (!is_pae(vcpu))
return 1;
kvm_x86_ops->get_cs_db_l_bits(vcpu, &cs_db, &cs_l);
if (cs_l)
return 1;
} else
#endif
if (is_pae(vcpu) && !load_pdptrs(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu,
vcpu->arch.cr3))
return 1;
}
kvm_x86_ops->set_cr0(vcpu, cr0);
if ((cr0 ^ old_cr0) & X86_CR0_PG)
kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue(vcpu);
if ((cr0 ^ old_cr0) & update_bits)
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 41,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::GetNativeViewAccessible() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint64_t sysbus_esp_mem_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
unsigned int size)
{
SysBusESPState *sysbus = opaque;
uint32_t saddr;
saddr = addr >> sysbus->it_shift;
return esp_reg_read(&sysbus->esp, saddr);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 9,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decode_NXAST_RAW_RESUBMIT(uint16_t port,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
struct ofpact_resubmit *resubmit;
resubmit = ofpact_put_RESUBMIT(out);
resubmit->ofpact.raw = NXAST_RAW_RESUBMIT;
resubmit->in_port = u16_to_ofp(port);
resubmit->table_id = 0xff;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init bdev_cache_init(void)
{
int err;
static struct vfsmount *bd_mnt;
bdev_cachep = kmem_cache_create("bdev_cache", sizeof(struct bdev_inode),
0, (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|
SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_PANIC),
init_once);
err = register_filesystem(&bd_type);
if (err)
panic("Cannot register bdev pseudo-fs");
bd_mnt = kern_mount(&bd_type);
if (IS_ERR(bd_mnt))
panic("Cannot create bdev pseudo-fs");
blockdev_superblock = bd_mnt->mnt_sb; /* For writeback */
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,244
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RootWindow::ShowCursor(bool show) {
cursor_shown_ = show;
host_->ShowCursor(show);
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,976
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_get_5752_nvram_info(struct tg3 *tp)
{
u32 nvcfg1;
nvcfg1 = tr32(NVRAM_CFG1);
/* NVRAM protection for TPM */
if (nvcfg1 & (1 << 27))
tg3_flag_set(tp, PROTECTED_NVRAM);
switch (nvcfg1 & NVRAM_CFG1_5752VENDOR_MASK) {
case FLASH_5752VENDOR_ATMEL_EEPROM_64KHZ:
case FLASH_5752VENDOR_ATMEL_EEPROM_376KHZ:
tp->nvram_jedecnum = JEDEC_ATMEL;
tg3_flag_set(tp, NVRAM_BUFFERED);
break;
case FLASH_5752VENDOR_ATMEL_FLASH_BUFFERED:
tp->nvram_jedecnum = JEDEC_ATMEL;
tg3_flag_set(tp, NVRAM_BUFFERED);
tg3_flag_set(tp, FLASH);
break;
case FLASH_5752VENDOR_ST_M45PE10:
case FLASH_5752VENDOR_ST_M45PE20:
case FLASH_5752VENDOR_ST_M45PE40:
tp->nvram_jedecnum = JEDEC_ST;
tg3_flag_set(tp, NVRAM_BUFFERED);
tg3_flag_set(tp, FLASH);
break;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, FLASH)) {
tg3_nvram_get_pagesize(tp, nvcfg1);
} else {
/* For eeprom, set pagesize to maximum eeprom size */
tp->nvram_pagesize = ATMEL_AT24C512_CHIP_SIZE;
nvcfg1 &= ~NVRAM_CFG1_COMPAT_BYPASS;
tw32(NVRAM_CFG1, nvcfg1);
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,545
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::ReportInvalidDirectiveInMeta(
const String& directive) {
LogToConsole(
"Content Security Policies delivered via a <meta> element may not "
"contain the " +
directive + " directive.");
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 152,508
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_mod_eqq(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value mod)
{
mrb_value obj;
mrb_bool eqq;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "o", &obj);
eqq = mrb_obj_is_kind_of(mrb, obj, mrb_class_ptr(mod));
return mrb_bool_value(eqq);
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static noinline int may_destroy_subvol(struct btrfs_root *root)
{
struct btrfs_path *path;
struct btrfs_key key;
int ret;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
key.objectid = root->root_key.objectid;
key.type = BTRFS_ROOT_REF_KEY;
key.offset = (u64)-1;
ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root->fs_info->tree_root,
&key, path, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
BUG_ON(ret == 0);
ret = 0;
if (path->slots[0] > 0) {
path->slots[0]--;
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(path->nodes[0], &key, path->slots[0]);
if (key.objectid == root->root_key.objectid &&
key.type == BTRFS_ROOT_REF_KEY)
ret = -ENOTEMPTY;
}
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sk_release_kernel(struct sock *sk)
{
if (sk == NULL || sk->sk_socket == NULL)
return;
sock_hold(sk);
sock_release(sk->sk_socket);
release_net(sock_net(sk));
sock_net_set(sk, get_net(&init_net));
sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_vcpu_first_run_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (likely(vcpu->arch.has_run_once))
return 0;
vcpu->arch.has_run_once = true;
/*
* Initialize the VGIC before running a vcpu the first time on
* this VM.
*/
if (irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm) &&
unlikely(!vgic_initialized(vcpu->kvm))) {
int ret = kvm_vgic_init(vcpu->kvm);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Handle the "start in power-off" case by calling into the
* PSCI code.
*/
if (test_and_clear_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_POWER_OFF, vcpu->arch.features)) {
*vcpu_reg(vcpu, 0) = KVM_PSCI_FN_CPU_OFF;
kvm_psci_call(vcpu);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void doWriteHmacKey(const blink::WebCryptoKey& key)
{
ASSERT(key.algorithm().paramsType() == blink::WebCryptoKeyAlgorithmParamsTypeHmac);
append(static_cast<uint8_t>(HmacKeyTag));
ASSERT(!(key.algorithm().hmacParams()->lengthBits() % 8));
doWriteUint32(key.algorithm().hmacParams()->lengthBits() / 8);
doWriteAlgorithmId(key.algorithm().hmacParams()->hash().id());
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CameraService::Client* CameraService::Client::getClientFromCookie(void* user) {
BasicClient *basicClient = gCameraService->getClientByIdUnsafe((int) user);
Client* client = static_cast<Client*>(basicClient);
if (client == NULL) return NULL;
if (client->mDestructionStarted) return NULL;
return client;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _out_dialback(conn_t out, char *rkey, int rkeylen) {
char *c, *dbkey, *tmp;
nad_t nad;
int elem, ns;
int from_len, to_len;
time_t now;
now = time(NULL);
c = memchr(rkey, '/', rkeylen);
from_len = c - rkey;
c++;
to_len = rkeylen - (c - rkey);
/* kick off the dialback */
tmp = strndup(c, to_len);
dbkey = s2s_db_key(NULL, out->s2s->local_secret, tmp, out->s->id);
free(tmp);
nad = nad_new();
/* request auth */
ns = nad_add_namespace(nad, uri_DIALBACK, "db");
elem = nad_append_elem(nad, ns, "result", 0);
nad_set_attr(nad, elem, -1, "from", rkey, from_len);
nad_set_attr(nad, elem, -1, "to", c, to_len);
nad_append_cdata(nad, dbkey, strlen(dbkey), 1);
log_debug(ZONE, "sending auth request for %.*s (key %s)", rkeylen, rkey, dbkey);
log_write(out->s2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "[%d] [%s, port=%d] sending dialback auth request for route '%.*s'", out->fd->fd, out->ip, out->port, rkeylen, rkey);
/* off it goes */
sx_nad_write(out->s, nad);
free(dbkey);
/* we're in progress now */
xhash_put(out->states, pstrdupx(xhash_pool(out->states), rkey, rkeylen), (void *) conn_INPROGRESS);
/* record the time that we set conn_INPROGRESS state */
xhash_put(out->states_time, pstrdupx(xhash_pool(out->states_time), rkey, rkeylen), (void *) now);
}
Commit Message: Fixed possibility of Unsolicited Dialback Attacks
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void smp_link_encrypted(const RawAddress& bda, uint8_t encr_enable) {
tSMP_CB* p_cb = &smp_cb;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: encr_enable=%d", __func__, encr_enable);
if (smp_cb.pairing_bda == bda) {
/* encryption completed with STK, remember the key size now, could be
* overwritten when key exchange happens */
if (p_cb->loc_enc_size != 0 && encr_enable) {
/* update the link encryption key size if a SMP pairing just performed */
btm_ble_update_sec_key_size(bda, p_cb->loc_enc_size);
}
smp_sm_event(&smp_cb, SMP_ENCRYPTED_EVT, &encr_enable);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix OOB read before buffer length check
Bug: 111936834
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ib98528fb62db0d724ebd9112d071e367f78e369d
(cherry picked from commit 4548f34c90803c6544f6bed03399f2eabeab2a8e)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,808
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FakeAudioManagerWithAssociations(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner,
media::AudioLogFactory* factory)
: FakeAudioManager(task_runner, task_runner, factory) {}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API void r_config_node_free(void *n) {
RConfigNode *node = (RConfigNode *)n;
if (!node) {
return;
}
free (node->name);
free (node->desc);
free (node->value);
r_list_free (node->options);
free (node);
}
Commit Message: Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void scan_inflight(struct sock *x, void (*func)(struct unix_sock *),
struct sk_buff_head *hitlist)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sk_buff *next;
spin_lock(&x->sk_receive_queue.lock);
skb_queue_walk_safe(&x->sk_receive_queue, skb, next) {
/* Do we have file descriptors ? */
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp) {
bool hit = false;
/* Process the descriptors of this socket */
int nfd = UNIXCB(skb).fp->count;
struct file **fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp->fp;
while (nfd--) {
/* Get the socket the fd matches if it indeed does so */
struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(*fp++);
if (sk) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
/* Ignore non-candidates, they could
* have been added to the queues after
* starting the garbage collection
*/
if (test_bit(UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE, &u->gc_flags)) {
hit = true;
func(u);
}
}
}
if (hit && hitlist != NULL) {
__skb_unlink(skb, &x->sk_receive_queue);
__skb_queue_tail(hitlist, skb);
}
}
}
spin_unlock(&x->sk_receive_queue.lock);
}
Commit Message: unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than
the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them
to keep the process' fd count low.
This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs
in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having
more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit.
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 58,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arch_hardware_setup(void)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_run_li_request(struct ext4_li_request *elr)
{
struct ext4_group_desc *gdp = NULL;
ext4_group_t group, ngroups;
struct super_block *sb;
unsigned long timeout = 0;
int ret = 0;
sb = elr->lr_super;
ngroups = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_groups_count;
sb_start_write(sb);
for (group = elr->lr_next_group; group < ngroups; group++) {
gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, group, NULL);
if (!gdp) {
ret = 1;
break;
}
if (!(gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED)))
break;
}
if (group >= ngroups)
ret = 1;
if (!ret) {
timeout = jiffies;
ret = ext4_init_inode_table(sb, group,
elr->lr_timeout ? 0 : 1);
if (elr->lr_timeout == 0) {
timeout = (jiffies - timeout) *
elr->lr_sbi->s_li_wait_mult;
elr->lr_timeout = timeout;
}
elr->lr_next_sched = jiffies + elr->lr_timeout;
elr->lr_next_group = group + 1;
}
sb_end_write(sb);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameImpl::RunModalPromptDialog(
const blink::WebString& message,
const blink::WebString& default_value,
blink::WebString* actual_value) {
base::string16 result;
bool ok = RunJavaScriptDialog(JAVASCRIPT_DIALOG_TYPE_PROMPT, message.Utf16(),
default_value.Utf16(), &result);
if (ok)
*actual_value = WebString::FromUTF16(result);
return ok;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,828
|
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