instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct key_user *key_user_lookup(kuid_t uid)
{
struct key_user *candidate = NULL, *user;
struct rb_node *parent = NULL;
struct rb_node **p;
try_again:
p = &key_user_tree.rb_node;
spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
/* search the tree for a user record with a matching UID */
while (*p) {
parent = *p;
user = rb_entry(parent, struct key_user, node);
if (uid_lt(uid, user->uid))
p = &(*p)->rb_left;
else if (uid_gt(uid, user->uid))
p = &(*p)->rb_right;
else
goto found;
}
/* if we get here, we failed to find a match in the tree */
if (!candidate) {
/* allocate a candidate user record if we don't already have
* one */
spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
user = NULL;
candidate = kmalloc(sizeof(struct key_user), GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!candidate))
goto out;
/* the allocation may have scheduled, so we need to repeat the
* search lest someone else added the record whilst we were
* asleep */
goto try_again;
}
/* if we get here, then the user record still hadn't appeared on the
* second pass - so we use the candidate record */
refcount_set(&candidate->usage, 1);
atomic_set(&candidate->nkeys, 0);
atomic_set(&candidate->nikeys, 0);
candidate->uid = uid;
candidate->qnkeys = 0;
candidate->qnbytes = 0;
spin_lock_init(&candidate->lock);
mutex_init(&candidate->cons_lock);
rb_link_node(&candidate->node, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(&candidate->node, &key_user_tree);
spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
user = candidate;
goto out;
/* okay - we found a user record for this UID */
found:
refcount_inc(&user->usage);
spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
kfree(candidate);
out:
return user;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 85,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _gnutls_recv_handshake_header (gnutls_session_t session,
gnutls_handshake_description_t type,
gnutls_handshake_description_t * recv_type)
{
int ret;
uint32_t length32 = 0;
uint8_t *dataptr = NULL; /* for realloc */
size_t handshake_header_size = HANDSHAKE_HEADER_SIZE;
/* if we have data into the buffer then return them, do not read the next packet.
* In order to return we need a full TLS handshake header, or in case of a version 2
* packet, then we return the first byte.
*/
if (session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size ==
handshake_header_size || (session->internals.v2_hello != 0
&& type == GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO
&& session->internals.
handshake_header_buffer.packet_length > 0))
{
*recv_type = session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.recv_type;
return session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.packet_length;
}
ret =
_gnutls_handshake_io_recv_int (session, GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE,
type, dataptr, SSL2_HEADERS);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
/* The case ret==0 is caught here.
*/
if (ret != SSL2_HEADERS)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH;
}
session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size = SSL2_HEADERS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 165,147
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int set_sec_attr(sc_file_t *file, unsigned int am, unsigned int ac,
unsigned int meth)
{
const amode_entry_t *table;
/* CHV with reference '0' is the transport PIN
* and is presented as 'AUT' key with reference '0'*/
if (meth == SC_AC_CHV && ac == 0)
meth = SC_AC_AUT;
if (file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF)
table = df_amode_table;
else if (file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF)
table = wef_amode_table;
else if (file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF)
table = ief_amode_table;
else
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
for (; table->am != 0; table++) {
if (table->am & am)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, table->sc, meth, ac);
}
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long media_device_setup_link(struct media_device *mdev,
struct media_link_desc __user *_ulink)
{
struct media_link *link = NULL;
struct media_link_desc ulink;
struct media_entity *source;
struct media_entity *sink;
int ret;
if (copy_from_user(&ulink, _ulink, sizeof(ulink)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Find the source and sink entities and link.
*/
source = find_entity(mdev, ulink.source.entity);
sink = find_entity(mdev, ulink.sink.entity);
if (source == NULL || sink == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
if (ulink.source.index >= source->num_pads ||
ulink.sink.index >= sink->num_pads)
return -EINVAL;
link = media_entity_find_link(&source->pads[ulink.source.index],
&sink->pads[ulink.sink.index]);
if (link == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
/* Setup the link on both entities. */
ret = __media_entity_setup_link(link, ulink.flags);
if (copy_to_user(_ulink, &ulink, sizeof(ulink)))
return -EFAULT;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: [media] media-device: fix infoleak in ioctl media_enum_entities()
This fixes CVE-2014-1739.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Acked-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 39,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeCoordinator::renderNextFrame()
{
m_waitingForUIProcess = false;
scheduleLayerFlush();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < m_updateAtlases.size(); ++i)
m_updateAtlases[i]->didSwapBuffers();
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 97,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pch_says_nonexistent (bool which)
{
return p_says_nonexistent[which];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 2,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LookupMatchInTopDomains(base::StringPiece skeleton) {
DCHECK_NE(skeleton.back(), '.');
auto labels = base::SplitStringPiece(skeleton, ".", base::KEEP_WHITESPACE,
base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
if (labels.size() > kNumberOfLabelsToCheck) {
labels.erase(labels.begin(),
labels.begin() + labels.size() - kNumberOfLabelsToCheck);
}
while (labels.size() > 1) {
std::string partial_skeleton = base::JoinString(labels, ".");
if (net::LookupStringInFixedSet(
g_graph, g_graph_length, partial_skeleton.data(),
partial_skeleton.length()) != net::kDafsaNotFound)
return true;
labels.erase(labels.begin());
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Map U+04CF to lowercase L as well.
U+04CF (ӏ) has the confusability skeleton of 'i' (lowercase
I), but it can be confused for 'l' (lowercase L) or '1' (digit) if rendered
in some fonts.
If a host name contains it, calculate the confusability skeleton
twice, once with the default mapping to 'i' (lowercase I) and the 2nd
time with an alternative mapping to 'l'. Mapping them to 'l' (lowercase L)
also gets it treated as similar to digit 1 because the confusability
skeleton of digit 1 is 'l'.
Bug: 817247
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I7442b950c9457eea285e17f01d1f43c9acc5d79c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/974165
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#551263}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct queue_limits *dm_get_queue_limits(struct mapped_device *md)
{
BUG_ON(!atomic_read(&md->holders));
return &md->queue->limits;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_minor(int minor)
{
spin_lock(&_minor_lock);
idr_remove(&_minor_idr, minor);
spin_unlock(&_minor_lock);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,953
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::RunFileChooser(TabContents* tab,
const ViewHostMsg_RunFileChooser_Params& params) {
RunFileChooserHelper(tab, params);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ScriptController::clearForOutOfMemory()
{
clearForClose(true);
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 111,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeCoordinator::performScheduledLayerFlush()
{
if (m_isSuspended || m_waitingForUIProcess)
return;
syncDisplayState();
if (!m_isValid)
return;
if (flushPendingLayerChanges())
didPerformScheduledLayerFlush();
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 97,595
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: stack_trace_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
loff_t *ppos)
{
int ret;
mutex_lock(&stack_sysctl_mutex);
ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (ret || !write ||
(last_stack_tracer_enabled == !!stack_tracer_enabled))
goto out;
last_stack_tracer_enabled = !!stack_tracer_enabled;
if (stack_tracer_enabled)
register_ftrace_function(&trace_ops);
else
unregister_ftrace_function(&trace_ops);
out:
mutex_unlock(&stack_sysctl_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 30,304
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zsetrgbcolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp; /* required by "push" macro */
int code, i;
float values[3];
/* Gather numeric operand value(s) (also checks type) */
code = float_params(op, 3, (float *)&values);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Clamp numeric operand range(s) */
for (i = 0;i < 3; i++) {
if (values[i] < 0)
values[i] = 0;
else if (values[i] > 1)
values[i] = 1;
}
code = make_floats(&op[-2], (const float *)&values, 3);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Set up for the continuation procedure which will do the work */
/* Make sure the exec stack has enough space */
check_estack(5);
push_mark_estack(es_other, colour_cleanup);
esp++;
/* variable to hold base type (1 = RGB) */
make_int(esp, 1);
esp++;
/* Store the 'stage' of processing (initially 0) */
make_int(esp, 0);
/* Finally, the actual continuation routine */
push_op_estack(setdevicecolor_cont);
return o_push_estack;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MojoVideoEncodeAcceleratorService::BitstreamBufferReady(
int32_t bitstream_buffer_id,
size_t payload_size,
bool key_frame,
base::TimeDelta timestamp) {
DVLOG(2) << __func__ << " bitstream_buffer_id=" << bitstream_buffer_id
<< ", payload_size=" << payload_size
<< "B, key_frame=" << key_frame;
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
if (!vea_client_)
return;
vea_client_->BitstreamBufferReady(bitstream_buffer_id, payload_size,
key_frame, timestamp);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,555
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_stream_memory_set_option(php_stream *stream, int option, int value, void *ptrparam TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_stream_memory_data *ms = (php_stream_memory_data*)stream->abstract;
size_t newsize;
switch(option) {
case PHP_STREAM_OPTION_TRUNCATE_API:
switch (value) {
case PHP_STREAM_TRUNCATE_SUPPORTED:
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_OK;
case PHP_STREAM_TRUNCATE_SET_SIZE:
if (ms->mode & TEMP_STREAM_READONLY) {
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_ERR;
}
newsize = *(size_t*)ptrparam;
if (newsize <= ms->fsize) {
if (newsize < ms->fpos) {
ms->fpos = newsize;
}
} else {
ms->data = erealloc(ms->data, newsize);
memset(ms->data+ms->fsize, 0, newsize - ms->fsize);
ms->fsize = newsize;
}
ms->fsize = newsize;
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_OK;
}
default:
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_NOTIMPL;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 165,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ikev2_vid_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
const u_char *vid;
int i, len;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), e.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d vid=", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
vid = (const u_char *)(ext+1);
len = ntohs(e.len) - 4;
ND_TCHECK2(*vid, len);
for(i=0; i<len; i++) {
if(ND_ISPRINT(vid[i])) ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", vid[i]));
else ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
}
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13689/IKEv1: Fix addr+subnet length check.
An IPv6 address plus subnet mask is 32 bytes, not 20 bytes.
16 bytes of IPv6 address, 16 bytes of subnet mask.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_snmp_has_property(zval *object, zval *member, int has_set_exists, const zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_snmp_prop_handler *hnd;
int ret = 0;
if (zend_hash_find(&php_snmp_properties, Z_STRVAL_P(member), Z_STRLEN_P(member) + 1, (void **)&hnd) == SUCCESS) {
switch (has_set_exists) {
case 2:
ret = 1;
break;
case 0: {
zval *value = php_snmp_read_property(object, member, BP_VAR_IS, key TSRMLS_CC);
if (value != EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr)) {
ret = Z_TYPE_P(value) != IS_NULL? 1:0;
/* refcount is 0 */
Z_ADDREF_P(value);
zval_ptr_dtor(&value);
}
break;
}
default: {
zval *value = php_snmp_read_property(object, member, BP_VAR_IS, key TSRMLS_CC);
if (value != EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr)) {
convert_to_boolean(value);
ret = Z_BVAL_P(value)? 1:0;
/* refcount is 0 */
Z_ADDREF_P(value);
zval_ptr_dtor(&value);
}
break;
}
}
} else {
zend_object_handlers * std_hnd = zend_get_std_object_handlers();
ret = std_hnd->has_property(object, member, has_set_exists, key TSRMLS_CC);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,553
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct page *__get_node_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, pgoff_t nid,
struct page *parent, int start)
{
struct page *page;
int err;
if (!nid)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, check_nid_range(sbi, nid));
repeat:
page = f2fs_grab_cache_page(NODE_MAPPING(sbi), nid, false);
if (!page)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
err = read_node_page(page, 0);
if (err < 0) {
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
return ERR_PTR(err);
} else if (err == LOCKED_PAGE) {
goto page_hit;
}
if (parent)
ra_node_pages(parent, start + 1, MAX_RA_NODE);
lock_page(page);
if (unlikely(page->mapping != NODE_MAPPING(sbi))) {
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
goto repeat;
}
if (unlikely(!PageUptodate(page)))
goto out_err;
page_hit:
if(unlikely(nid != nid_of_node(page))) {
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1);
ClearPageUptodate(page);
out_err:
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
}
return page;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,242
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsAgent::clearBrowserCache() {
Send(new DevToolsHostMsg_ClearBrowserCache(routing_id()));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::SetIntentPickerViewVisibility(bool visible) {
LocationBarView* location_bar = GetLocationBarView();
if (!location_bar->intent_picker_view())
return;
if (location_bar->intent_picker_view()->visible() != visible) {
location_bar->intent_picker_view()->SetVisible(visible);
location_bar->Layout();
}
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const Cluster* Segment::GetLast() const
{
if ((m_clusters == NULL) || (m_clusterCount <= 0))
return &m_eos;
const long idx = m_clusterCount - 1;
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t ACodec::submitOutputMetadataBuffer() {
CHECK(storingMetadataInDecodedBuffers());
if (mMetadataBuffersToSubmit == 0)
return OK;
BufferInfo *info = dequeueBufferFromNativeWindow();
if (info == NULL) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
ALOGV("[%s] submitting output meta buffer ID %u for graphic buffer %p",
mComponentName.c_str(), info->mBufferID, info->mGraphicBuffer.get());
--mMetadataBuffersToSubmit;
info->checkWriteFence("submitOutputMetadataBuffer");
status_t err = mOMX->fillBuffer(mNode, info->mBufferID, info->mFenceFd);
info->mFenceFd = -1;
if (err == OK) {
info->mStatus = BufferInfo::OWNED_BY_COMPONENT;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void remove_sits_in_journal(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
struct curseg_info *curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, CURSEG_COLD_DATA);
struct f2fs_journal *journal = curseg->journal;
int i;
down_write(&curseg->journal_rwsem);
for (i = 0; i < sits_in_cursum(journal); i++) {
unsigned int segno;
bool dirtied;
segno = le32_to_cpu(segno_in_journal(journal, i));
dirtied = __mark_sit_entry_dirty(sbi, segno);
if (!dirtied)
add_sit_entry(segno, &SM_I(sbi)->sit_entry_set);
}
update_sits_in_cursum(journal, -i);
up_write(&curseg->journal_rwsem);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,420
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fnhe_flush_routes(struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe)
{
struct rtable *rt;
rt = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_input);
if (rt) {
RCU_INIT_POINTER(fnhe->fnhe_rth_input, NULL);
rt_free(rt);
}
rt = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_output);
if (rt) {
RCU_INIT_POINTER(fnhe->fnhe_rth_output, NULL);
rt_free(rt);
}
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 44,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LaunchURL(
const GURL& url,
const content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& web_contents_getter,
ui::PageTransition page_transition,
bool has_user_gesture) {
content::WebContents* web_contents = web_contents_getter.Run();
if (!web_contents)
return;
prerender::PrerenderContents* prerender_contents =
prerender::PrerenderContents::FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (prerender_contents) {
prerender_contents->Destroy(prerender::FINAL_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_SCHEME);
prerender::ReportPrerenderExternalURL();
return;
}
bool is_whitelisted = false;
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
PolicyBlacklistService* service =
PolicyBlacklistFactory::GetForBrowserContext(profile);
if (service) {
const policy::URLBlacklist::URLBlacklistState url_state =
service->GetURLBlacklistState(url);
is_whitelisted =
url_state == policy::URLBlacklist::URLBlacklistState::URL_IN_WHITELIST;
}
if (is_whitelisted) {
ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrlWithoutSecurityCheck(url, web_contents);
} else {
ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrl(
url, web_contents->GetRenderViewHost()->GetProcess()->GetID(),
web_contents->GetRenderViewHost()->GetRoutingID(), page_transition,
has_user_gesture);
}
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 152,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PDFiumEngine::SelectFindResult(bool forward) {
if (find_results_.empty()) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
SelectionChangeInvalidator selection_invalidator(this);
size_t new_index;
const size_t last_index = find_results_.size() - 1;
if (resume_find_index_.valid()) {
new_index = resume_find_index_.GetIndex();
resume_find_index_.Invalidate();
} else if (current_find_index_.valid()) {
size_t current_index = current_find_index_.GetIndex();
if ((forward && current_index >= last_index) ||
(!forward && current_index == 0)) {
current_find_index_.Invalidate();
client_->NotifySelectedFindResultChanged(-1);
client_->NotifyNumberOfFindResultsChanged(find_results_.size(), true);
return true;
}
int increment = forward ? 1 : -1;
new_index = current_index + increment;
} else {
new_index = forward ? 0 : last_index;
}
current_find_index_.SetIndex(new_index);
selection_.clear();
selection_.push_back(find_results_[current_find_index_.GetIndex()]);
pp::Rect bounding_rect;
pp::Rect visible_rect = GetVisibleRect();
const std::vector<pp::Rect>& rects =
find_results_[current_find_index_.GetIndex()].GetScreenRects(
pp::Point(), 1.0, current_rotation_);
for (const auto& rect : rects)
bounding_rect = bounding_rect.Union(rect);
if (!visible_rect.Contains(bounding_rect)) {
pp::Point center = bounding_rect.CenterPoint();
int new_y = CalculateCenterForZoom(center.y(), visible_rect.height(),
current_zoom_);
client_->ScrollToY(new_y, /*compensate_for_toolbar=*/false);
if (center.x() < visible_rect.x() || center.x() > visible_rect.right()) {
int new_x = CalculateCenterForZoom(center.x(), visible_rect.width(),
current_zoom_);
client_->ScrollToX(new_x);
}
}
client_->NotifySelectedFindResultChanged(current_find_index_.GetIndex());
client_->NotifyNumberOfFindResultsChanged(find_results_.size(), true);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 146,208
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ice_io_error_handler (IceConn conn)
{
g_debug ("GsmXsmpServer: ice_io_error_handler (%p)", conn);
/* We don't need to do anything here; the next call to
* IceProcessMessages() for this connection will receive
* IceProcessMessagesIOError and we can handle the error there.
*/
}
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 63,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NuPlayer::GenericSource::onSecureDecodersInstantiated(status_t err) {
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("Failed to instantiate secure decoders!");
notifyPreparedAndCleanup(err);
return;
}
finishPrepareAsync();
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteMPCImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
buffer[MagickPathExtent],
cache_filename[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*property,
*value;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
scene;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
depth;
/*
Open persistent cache.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) CopyMagickString(cache_filename,image->filename,MagickPathExtent);
AppendImageFormat("cache",cache_filename);
scene=0;
offset=0;
do
{
/*
Write persistent cache meta-information.
*/
depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickTrue);
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) &&
(image->colors > (size_t) (GetQuantumRange(image->depth)+1)))
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"id=MagickCache\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"magick-signature=%u\n",
GetMagickSignature((const StringInfo *) NULL));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"class=%s colors=%.20g alpha-trait=%s\n",CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickClassOptions,image->storage_class),(double) image->colors,
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickPixelTraitOptions,(ssize_t)
image->alpha_trait));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"number-channels=%.20g number-meta-channels=%.20g\n",
(double) image->number_channels,(double) image->number_meta_channels);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"columns=%.20g rows=%.20g depth=%.20g\n",(double) image->columns,
(double) image->rows,(double) image->depth);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if (image->type != UndefinedType)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"type=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickTypeOptions,image->type));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"colorspace=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickColorspaceOptions,image->colorspace));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if (image->intensity != UndefinedPixelIntensityMethod)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"pixel-intensity=%s\n",CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickPixelIntensityOptions,image->intensity));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->endian != UndefinedEndian)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"endian=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickEndianOptions,image->endian));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->compression != UndefinedCompression)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"compression=%s quality=%.20g\n",CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickCompressOptions,image->compression),(double) image->quality);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->units != UndefinedResolution)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"units=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickResolutionOptions,image->units));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if ((image->resolution.x != 0) || (image->resolution.y != 0))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"resolution=%gx%g\n",image->resolution.x,image->resolution.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if ((image->page.width != 0) || (image->page.height != 0))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"page=%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g\n",(double) image->page.width,(double)
image->page.height,(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
else
if ((image->page.x != 0) || (image->page.y != 0))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"page=%+ld%+ld\n",
(long) image->page.x,(long) image->page.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if ((image->tile_offset.x != 0) || (image->tile_offset.y != 0))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"tile-offset=%+ld%+ld\n",(long) image->tile_offset.x,(long)
image->tile_offset.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if ((GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL) ||
(GetPreviousImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL))
{
if (image->scene == 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"iterations=%.20g delay=%.20g ticks-per-second=%.20g\n",(double)
image->iterations,(double) image->delay,(double)
image->ticks_per_second);
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"scene=%.20g "
"iterations=%.20g delay=%.20g ticks-per-second=%.20g\n",
(double) image->scene,(double) image->iterations,(double)
image->delay,(double) image->ticks_per_second);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
else
{
if (image->scene != 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"scene=%.20g\n",
(double) image->scene);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->iterations != 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"iterations=%.20g\n",(double) image->iterations);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->delay != 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"delay=%.20g\n",
(double) image->delay);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->ticks_per_second != UndefinedTicksPerSecond)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"ticks-per-second=%.20g\n",(double) image->ticks_per_second);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
}
if (image->gravity != UndefinedGravity)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"gravity=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickGravityOptions,image->gravity));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->dispose != UndefinedDispose)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"dispose=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickDisposeOptions,image->dispose));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"rendering-intent=%s\n",CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickIntentOptions,
image->rendering_intent));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->gamma != 0.0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"gamma=%g\n",
image->gamma);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->chromaticity.white_point.x != 0.0)
{
/*
Note chomaticity points.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"red-primary="
"%g,%g green-primary=%g,%g blue-primary=%g,%g\n",
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x,image->chromaticity.red_primary.y,
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x,
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y,
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x,
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"white-point=%g,%g\n",image->chromaticity.white_point.x,
image->chromaticity.white_point.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->orientation != UndefinedOrientation)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"orientation=%s\n",CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickOrientationOptions,
image->orientation));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->profiles != (void *) NULL)
{
const char
*name;
const StringInfo
*profile;
/*
Generic profile.
*/
ResetImageProfileIterator(image);
for (name=GetNextImageProfile(image); name != (const char *) NULL; )
{
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"profile:%s=%.20g\n",name,(double)
GetStringInfoLength(profile));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
}
}
if (image->montage != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"montage=%s\n",
image->montage);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
ResetImagePropertyIterator(image);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
while (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%s=",property);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
value=GetImageProperty(image,property,exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
size_t
length;
length=strlen(value);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) value[i])) != 0)
break;
if ((i == (ssize_t) length) && (i != 0))
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,(const unsigned char *) value);
else
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'{');
if (strchr(value,'}') == (char *) NULL)
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,(const unsigned char *) value);
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
{
if (value[i] == (int) '}')
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\\');
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,value[i]);
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'}');
}
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
}
Commit Message: Added check for incorrect number of meta channels report in #492.
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 64,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void __mmput(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
VM_BUG_ON(atomic_read(&mm->mm_users));
uprobe_clear_state(mm);
exit_aio(mm);
ksm_exit(mm);
khugepaged_exit(mm); /* must run before exit_mmap */
exit_mmap(mm);
mm_put_huge_zero_page(mm);
set_mm_exe_file(mm, NULL);
if (!list_empty(&mm->mmlist)) {
spin_lock(&mmlist_lock);
list_del(&mm->mmlist);
spin_unlock(&mmlist_lock);
}
if (mm->binfmt)
module_put(mm->binfmt->module);
set_bit(MMF_OOM_SKIP, &mm->flags);
mmdrop(mm);
}
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 59,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(getFromName)
{
php_zip_get_from(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 51,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcQueryTextExtents(ClientPtr client)
{
xQueryTextExtentsReply reply;
FontPtr pFont;
ExtentInfoRec info;
unsigned long length;
int rc;
REQUEST(xQueryTextExtentsReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xQueryTextExtentsReq);
rc = dixLookupFontable(&pFont, stuff->fid, client, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
length = client->req_len - bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xQueryTextExtentsReq));
length = length << 1;
if (stuff->oddLength) {
if (length == 0)
return BadLength;
length--;
}
if (!xfont2_query_text_extents(pFont, length, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1], &info))
return BadAlloc;
reply = (xQueryTextExtentsReply) {
.type = X_Reply,
.drawDirection = info.drawDirection,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = 0,
.fontAscent = info.fontAscent,
.fontDescent = info.fontDescent,
.overallAscent = info.overallAscent,
.overallDescent = info.overallDescent,
.overallWidth = info.overallWidth,
.overallLeft = info.overallLeft,
.overallRight = info.overallRight
};
WriteReplyToClient(client, sizeof(xQueryTextExtentsReply), &reply);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rock_check_overflow(struct rock_state *rs, int sig)
{
int len;
switch (sig) {
case SIG('S', 'P'):
len = sizeof(struct SU_SP_s);
break;
case SIG('C', 'E'):
len = sizeof(struct SU_CE_s);
break;
case SIG('E', 'R'):
len = sizeof(struct SU_ER_s);
break;
case SIG('R', 'R'):
len = sizeof(struct RR_RR_s);
break;
case SIG('P', 'X'):
len = sizeof(struct RR_PX_s);
break;
case SIG('P', 'N'):
len = sizeof(struct RR_PN_s);
break;
case SIG('S', 'L'):
len = sizeof(struct RR_SL_s);
break;
case SIG('N', 'M'):
len = sizeof(struct RR_NM_s);
break;
case SIG('C', 'L'):
len = sizeof(struct RR_CL_s);
break;
case SIG('P', 'L'):
len = sizeof(struct RR_PL_s);
break;
case SIG('T', 'F'):
len = sizeof(struct RR_TF_s);
break;
case SIG('Z', 'F'):
len = sizeof(struct RR_ZF_s);
break;
default:
len = 0;
break;
}
len += offsetof(struct rock_ridge, u);
if (len > rs->len) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "rock: directory entry would overflow "
"storage\n");
printk(KERN_NOTICE "rock: sig=0x%02x, size=%d, remaining=%d\n",
sig, len, rs->len);
return -EIO;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries
Rock Ridge extensions define so called Continuation Entries (CE) which
define where is further space with Rock Ridge data. Corrupted isofs
image can contain arbitrarily long chain of these, including a one
containing loop and thus causing kernel to end in an infinite loop when
traversing these entries.
Limit the traversal to 32 entries which should be more than enough space
to store all the Rock Ridge data.
Reported-by: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,383
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit GetRegistrationsCallback(ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver)
: m_resolver(resolver) { }
Commit Message: Check CSP before registering ServiceWorkers
Service Worker registrations should be subject to the same CSP checks as
other workers. The spec doesn't say this explicitly
(https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#directive-child-src-workers says "Worker or
SharedWorker constructors"), but it seems to be in the spirit of things,
and it matches Firefox's behavior.
BUG=579801
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1861253004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385775}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 156,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t show_tabletExecute(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
/* There is nothing useful to display, so a one-line manual
* is in order...
*/
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
"Write anything to this file to program your tablet.\n");
}
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void stroke_route(private_stroke_socket_t *this, stroke_msg_t *msg, FILE *out)
{
pop_string(msg, &msg->route.name);
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "received stroke: route '%s'", msg->route.name);
this->control->route(this->control, msg, out);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 12,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa)
{
return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DSA,DSA_new,d2i_DSAPrivateKey,bp,dsa
);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 94,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SoftVPXEncoder::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mCodecContext == NULL) {
if (OK != initEncoder()) {
ALOGE("Failed to initialize encoder");
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
return;
}
}
vpx_codec_err_t codec_return;
List<BufferInfo *> &inputBufferInfoQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outputBufferInfoQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
while (!inputBufferInfoQueue.empty() && !outputBufferInfoQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inputBufferInfo = *inputBufferInfoQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inputBufferHeader = inputBufferInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outputBufferInfo = *outputBufferInfoQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outputBufferHeader = outputBufferInfo->mHeader;
if ((inputBufferHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) &&
inputBufferHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inputBufferInfoQueue.erase(inputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
inputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inputBufferHeader);
outputBufferHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outputBufferHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outputBufferInfoQueue.erase(outputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
outputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outputBufferHeader);
return;
}
const uint8_t *source =
inputBufferHeader->pBuffer + inputBufferHeader->nOffset;
if (mInputDataIsMeta) {
source = extractGraphicBuffer(
mConversionBuffer, mWidth * mHeight * 3 / 2,
source, inputBufferHeader->nFilledLen,
mWidth, mHeight);
if (source == NULL) {
ALOGE("Unable to extract gralloc buffer in metadata mode");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
}
} else if (mColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar) {
ConvertYUV420SemiPlanarToYUV420Planar(
source, mConversionBuffer, mWidth, mHeight);
source = mConversionBuffer;
}
vpx_image_t raw_frame;
vpx_img_wrap(&raw_frame, VPX_IMG_FMT_I420, mWidth, mHeight,
kInputBufferAlignment, (uint8_t *)source);
vpx_enc_frame_flags_t flags = 0;
if (mTemporalPatternLength > 0) {
flags = getEncodeFlags();
}
if (mKeyFrameRequested) {
flags |= VPX_EFLAG_FORCE_KF;
mKeyFrameRequested = false;
}
if (mBitrateUpdated) {
mCodecConfiguration->rc_target_bitrate = mBitrate/1000;
vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_enc_config_set(mCodecContext,
mCodecConfiguration);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
ALOGE("vp8 encoder failed to update bitrate: %s",
vpx_codec_err_to_string(res));
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
}
mBitrateUpdated = false;
}
uint32_t frameDuration;
if (inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp > mLastTimestamp) {
frameDuration = (uint32_t)(inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp - mLastTimestamp);
} else {
frameDuration = (uint32_t)(((uint64_t)1000000 << 16) / mFramerate);
}
mLastTimestamp = inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp;
codec_return = vpx_codec_encode(
mCodecContext,
&raw_frame,
inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp, // in timebase units
frameDuration, // frame duration in timebase units
flags, // frame flags
VPX_DL_REALTIME); // encoding deadline
if (codec_return != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
ALOGE("vpx encoder failed to encode frame");
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
return;
}
vpx_codec_iter_t encoded_packet_iterator = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t* encoded_packet;
while ((encoded_packet = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(
mCodecContext, &encoded_packet_iterator))) {
if (encoded_packet->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
outputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp = encoded_packet->data.frame.pts;
outputBufferHeader->nFlags = 0;
if (encoded_packet->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY)
outputBufferHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_SYNCFRAME;
outputBufferHeader->nOffset = 0;
outputBufferHeader->nFilledLen = encoded_packet->data.frame.sz;
memcpy(outputBufferHeader->pBuffer,
encoded_packet->data.frame.buf,
encoded_packet->data.frame.sz);
outputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outputBufferInfoQueue.erase(outputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
if (inputBufferHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
outputBufferHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
}
notifyFillBufferDone(outputBufferHeader);
}
}
inputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inputBufferInfoQueue.erase(inputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inputBufferHeader);
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in VP8 encoder.
Bug: 27569635
Change-Id: I469573f40e21dc9f4c200749d4f220e3a2d31761
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 173,882
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void path_cleanup(struct nameidata *nd)
{
if (nd->root.mnt && !(nd->flags & LOOKUP_ROOT)) {
path_put(&nd->root);
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
}
if (unlikely(nd->base))
fput(nd->base);
}
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 42,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ParamTraits<net::HostPortPair>::Read(const Message* m,
PickleIterator* iter,
param_type* r) {
std::string host;
uint16 port;
if (!ReadParam(m, iter, &host) || !ReadParam(m, iter, &port))
return false;
r->set_host(host);
r->set_port(port);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Beware of print-read inconsistency when serializing GURLs.
BUG=165622
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11576038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173583 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 117,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int PepperMediaDeviceManager::OpenDevice(PP_DeviceType_Dev type,
const std::string& device_id,
const GURL& document_url,
const OpenDeviceCallback& callback) {
open_callbacks_[next_id_] = callback;
int request_id = next_id_++;
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
GetMediaStreamDispatcher()->OpenDevice(
request_id,
AsWeakPtr(),
device_id,
PepperMediaDeviceManager::FromPepperDeviceType(type),
document_url.GetOrigin());
#else
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&PepperMediaDeviceManager::OnDeviceOpenFailed,
AsWeakPtr(),
request_id));
#endif
return request_id;
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit DummyCryptoServerStreamHelper(quic::QuicRandom* random)
: random_(random) {}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned lodepng_deflatev(ucvector* out, const unsigned char* in, size_t insize,
const LodePNGCompressSettings* settings)
{
unsigned error = 0;
size_t i, blocksize, numdeflateblocks;
size_t bp = 0; /*the bit pointer*/
Hash hash;
if(settings->btype > 2) return 61;
else if(settings->btype == 0) return deflateNoCompression(out, in, insize);
else if(settings->btype == 1) blocksize = insize;
else /*if(settings->btype == 2)*/
{
blocksize = insize / 8 + 8;
if(blocksize < 65535) blocksize = 65535;
}
numdeflateblocks = (insize + blocksize - 1) / blocksize;
if(numdeflateblocks == 0) numdeflateblocks = 1;
error = hash_init(&hash, settings->windowsize);
if(error)
goto fail;
for(i = 0; i < numdeflateblocks && !error; i++)
{
unsigned final = (i == numdeflateblocks - 1);
size_t start = i * blocksize;
size_t end = start + blocksize;
if(end > insize) end = insize;
if(settings->btype == 1) error = deflateFixed(out, &bp, &hash, in, start, end, settings, final);
else if(settings->btype == 2) error = deflateDynamic(out, &bp, &hash, in, start, end, settings, final);
}
fail:
hash_cleanup(&hash);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long long EBMLHeader::Parse(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long& pos)
{
assert(pReader);
long long total, available;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
pos = 0;
long long end = (available >= 1024) ? 1024 : available;
for (;;)
{
unsigned char b = 0;
while (pos < end)
{
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (b == 0x1A)
break;
++pos;
}
if (b != 0x1A)
{
if (pos >= 1024)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //don't bother looking anymore
if ((total >= 0) && ((total - available) < 5))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return available + 5; //5 = 4-byte ID + 1st byte of size
}
if ((total >= 0) && ((total - pos) < 5))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((available - pos) < 5)
return pos + 5; //try again later
long len;
const long long result = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return result;
if (result == 0x0A45DFA3) //EBML Header ID
{
pos += len; //consume ID
break;
}
++pos; //throw away just the 0x1A byte, and try again
}
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return result;
if (result > 0) //need more data
return result;
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
if ((total >= 0) && ((total - pos) < len))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((available - pos) < len)
return pos + len; //try again later
result = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return result;
pos += len; //consume size field
if ((total >= 0) && ((total - pos) < result))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((available - pos) < result)
return pos + result;
end = pos + result;
Init();
while (pos < end)
{
long long id, size;
status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
end,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (size == 0) //weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x0286) //version
{
m_version = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_version <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x02F7) //read version
{
m_readVersion = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_readVersion <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x02F2) //max id length
{
m_maxIdLength = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_maxIdLength <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x02F3) //max size length
{
m_maxSizeLength = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_maxSizeLength <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x0282) //doctype
{
if (m_docType)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_docType);
if (status) //error
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x0287) //doctype version
{
m_docTypeVersion = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_docTypeVersion <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x0285) //doctype read version
{
m_docTypeReadVersion = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_docTypeReadVersion <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size;
}
assert(pos == end);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockConnectionVisitor::MockConnectionVisitor() {
}
Commit Message: Add QuicStream and friends to QUIC code.
Fix bug in tests that caused failures.
Revert 165859
First Landed as 165858
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367082
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165864 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 117,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfsd4_register_conn(struct nfsd4_conn *conn)
{
conn->cn_xpt_user.callback = nfsd4_conn_lost;
return register_xpt_user(conn->cn_xprt, &conn->cn_xpt_user);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zincludecolorspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
ref nsref;
int code;
check_type(*op, t_name);
name_string_ref(imemory, op, &nsref);
code = gs_includecolorspace(igs, nsref.value.const_bytes, r_size(&nsref));
if (!code)
pop(1);
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,181
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool arcmsr_hbaC_get_config(struct AdapterControlBlock *pACB)
{
uint32_t intmask_org, Index, firmware_state = 0;
struct MessageUnit_C __iomem *reg = pACB->pmuC;
char *acb_firm_model = pACB->firm_model;
char *acb_firm_version = pACB->firm_version;
char __iomem *iop_firm_model = (char __iomem *)(®->msgcode_rwbuffer[15]); /*firm_model,15,60-67*/
char __iomem *iop_firm_version = (char __iomem *)(®->msgcode_rwbuffer[17]); /*firm_version,17,68-83*/
int count;
/* disable all outbound interrupt */
intmask_org = readl(®->host_int_mask); /* disable outbound message0 int */
writel(intmask_org|ARCMSR_HBCMU_ALL_INTMASKENABLE, ®->host_int_mask);
/* wait firmware ready */
do {
firmware_state = readl(®->outbound_msgaddr1);
} while ((firmware_state & ARCMSR_HBCMU_MESSAGE_FIRMWARE_OK) == 0);
/* post "get config" instruction */
writel(ARCMSR_INBOUND_MESG0_GET_CONFIG, ®->inbound_msgaddr0);
writel(ARCMSR_HBCMU_DRV2IOP_MESSAGE_CMD_DONE, ®->inbound_doorbell);
/* wait message ready */
for (Index = 0; Index < 2000; Index++) {
if (readl(®->outbound_doorbell) & ARCMSR_HBCMU_IOP2DRV_MESSAGE_CMD_DONE) {
writel(ARCMSR_HBCMU_IOP2DRV_MESSAGE_CMD_DONE_DOORBELL_CLEAR, ®->outbound_doorbell_clear);/*clear interrupt*/
break;
}
udelay(10);
} /*max 1 seconds*/
if (Index >= 2000) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "arcmsr%d: wait 'get adapter firmware \
miscellaneous data' timeout \n", pACB->host->host_no);
return false;
}
count = 8;
while (count) {
*acb_firm_model = readb(iop_firm_model);
acb_firm_model++;
iop_firm_model++;
count--;
}
count = 16;
while (count) {
*acb_firm_version = readb(iop_firm_version);
acb_firm_version++;
iop_firm_version++;
count--;
}
pr_notice("Areca RAID Controller%d: Model %s, F/W %s\n",
pACB->host->host_no,
pACB->firm_model,
pACB->firm_version);
pACB->firm_request_len = readl(®->msgcode_rwbuffer[1]); /*firm_request_len,1,04-07*/
pACB->firm_numbers_queue = readl(®->msgcode_rwbuffer[2]); /*firm_numbers_queue,2,08-11*/
pACB->firm_sdram_size = readl(®->msgcode_rwbuffer[3]); /*firm_sdram_size,3,12-15*/
pACB->firm_hd_channels = readl(®->msgcode_rwbuffer[4]); /*firm_ide_channels,4,16-19*/
pACB->firm_cfg_version = readl(®->msgcode_rwbuffer[25]); /*firm_cfg_version,25,100-103*/
/*all interrupt service will be enable at arcmsr_iop_init*/
return true;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t ext4_direct_IO(int rw, struct kiocb *iocb,
const struct iovec *iov, loff_t offset,
unsigned long nr_segs)
{
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
struct inode *inode = file->f_mapping->host;
if (EXT4_I(inode)->i_flags & EXT4_EXTENTS_FL)
return ext4_ext_direct_IO(rw, iocb, iov, offset, nr_segs);
return ext4_ind_direct_IO(rw, iocb, iov, offset, nr_segs);
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int DefaultTabHandler::GetDragActions() const {
return delegate_->AsBrowser()->GetDragActions();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_set_vlan_vid(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts, bool push_vlan_if_needed)
{
struct ofpact_vlan_vid *vlan_vid;
uint16_t vid;
char *error;
error = str_to_u16(arg, "VLAN VID", &vid);
if (error) {
return error;
}
if (vid & ~VLAN_VID_MASK) {
return xasprintf("%s: not a valid VLAN VID", arg);
}
vlan_vid = ofpact_put_SET_VLAN_VID(ofpacts);
vlan_vid->vlan_vid = vid;
vlan_vid->push_vlan_if_needed = push_vlan_if_needed;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 77,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GraphicsLayer* FrameView::layerForVerticalScrollbar() const
{
RenderView* renderView = this->renderView();
if (!renderView)
return 0;
return renderView->compositor()->layerForVerticalScrollbar();
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 119,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayoutBlockFlow::setLogicalLeftForChild(LayoutBox& child, LayoutUnit logicalLeft)
{
if (isHorizontalWritingMode()) {
child.setX(logicalLeft);
} else {
child.setY(logicalLeft);
}
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 123,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t ucma_bind_ip(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_bind_ip cmd;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
int ret;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!rdma_addr_size_in6(&cmd.addr))
return -EINVAL;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
ret = rdma_bind_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@beyondsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 79,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: getRequestableExtensionsCHROMIUM() {
return WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8(
gl_->GetRequestableExtensionsCHROMIUM());
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __wait_on_freeing_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
wait_queue_head_t *wq;
DEFINE_WAIT_BIT(wait, &inode->i_state, __I_NEW);
wq = bit_waitqueue(&inode->i_state, __I_NEW);
prepare_to_wait(wq, &wait.wq_entry, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
spin_unlock(&inode_hash_lock);
schedule();
finish_wait(wq, &wait.wq_entry);
spin_lock(&inode_hash_lock);
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 79,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Camera3Device::RequestThread::isStreamPending(
sp<Camera3StreamInterface>& stream) {
Mutex::Autolock l(mRequestLock);
for (const auto& nextRequest : mNextRequests) {
if (!nextRequest.submitted) {
for (const auto& s : nextRequest.captureRequest->mOutputStreams) {
if (stream == s) return true;
}
if (stream == nextRequest.captureRequest->mInputStream) return true;
}
}
for (const auto& request : mRequestQueue) {
for (const auto& s : request->mOutputStreams) {
if (stream == s) return true;
}
if (stream == request->mInputStream) return true;
}
for (const auto& request : mRepeatingRequests) {
for (const auto& s : request->mOutputStreams) {
if (stream == s) return true;
}
if (stream == request->mInputStream) return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::OnMemoryPressure(
base::MemoryPressureListener::MemoryPressureLevel memory_pressure_level) {
base::allocator::ReleaseFreeMemory();
if (memory_pressure_level ==
base::MemoryPressureListener::MEMORY_PRESSURE_CRITICAL) {
v8::V8::LowMemoryNotification();
if (webkit_platform_support_) {
blink::WebImageCache::clear();
}
size_t font_cache_limit = SkGraphics::SetFontCacheLimit(0);
SkGraphics::SetFontCacheLimit(font_cache_limit);
} else {
if (!v8::V8::IdleNotification())
v8::V8::IdleNotification();
}
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 111,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int verify_auth_trunc(struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC];
struct xfrm_algo_auth *algp;
if (!rt)
return 0;
algp = nla_data(rt);
if (nla_len(rt) < xfrm_alg_auth_len(algp))
return -EINVAL;
algp->alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME - 1] = '\0';
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(SoapFault, __toString)
{
zval *faultcode, *faultstring, *file, *line, *trace;
char *str;
int len;
zend_fcall_info fci;
zval fname;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
faultcode = zend_read_property(soap_fault_class_entry, this_ptr, "faultcode", sizeof("faultcode")-1, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
faultstring = zend_read_property(soap_fault_class_entry, this_ptr, "faultstring", sizeof("faultstring")-1, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
file = zend_read_property(soap_fault_class_entry, this_ptr, "file", sizeof("file")-1, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
line = zend_read_property(soap_fault_class_entry, this_ptr, "line", sizeof("line")-1, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&fname, "gettraceasstring", sizeof("gettraceasstring")-1, 0);
fci.size = sizeof(fci);
fci.function_table = &Z_OBJCE_P(getThis())->function_table;
fci.function_name = &fname;
fci.symbol_table = NULL;
fci.object_ptr = getThis();
fci.retval_ptr_ptr = &trace;
fci.param_count = 0;
fci.params = NULL;
fci.no_separation = 1;
zend_call_function(&fci, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
len = spprintf(&str, 0, "SoapFault exception: [%s] %s in %s:%ld\nStack trace:\n%s",
Z_STRVAL_P(faultcode), Z_STRVAL_P(faultstring), Z_STRVAL_P(file), Z_LVAL_P(line),
Z_STRLEN_P(trace) ? Z_STRVAL_P(trace) : "#0 {main}\n");
zval_ptr_dtor(&trace);
RETURN_STRINGL(str, len, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int uevent_filter(struct kset *kset, struct kobject *kobj)
{
struct kobj_type *ktype = get_ktype(kobj);
if (ktype == &slab_ktype)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<const Extension> CreateTestExtension(
const std::string& name,
bool has_active_tab_permission,
bool has_tab_capture_permission) {
ExtensionBuilder builder(name);
if (has_active_tab_permission)
builder.AddPermission("activeTab");
if (has_tab_capture_permission)
builder.AddPermission("tabCapture");
return builder.Build();
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 151,449
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~MockPluginProcessHostClient() {
if (channel_)
BrowserThread::DeleteSoon(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE, channel_);
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,832
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void put_prev_entity(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *prev)
{
/*
* If still on the runqueue then deactivate_task()
* was not called and update_curr() has to be done:
*/
if (prev->on_rq)
update_curr(cfs_rq);
/* throttle cfs_rqs exceeding runtime */
check_cfs_rq_runtime(cfs_rq);
check_spread(cfs_rq, prev);
if (prev->on_rq) {
update_stats_wait_start(cfs_rq, prev);
/* Put 'current' back into the tree. */
__enqueue_entity(cfs_rq, prev);
/* in !on_rq case, update occurred at dequeue */
update_load_avg(cfs_rq, prev, 0);
}
cfs_rq->curr = NULL;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_umount(struct mount *mnt, int flags)
{
struct super_block *sb = mnt->mnt.mnt_sb;
int retval;
retval = security_sb_umount(&mnt->mnt, flags);
if (retval)
return retval;
/*
* Allow userspace to request a mountpoint be expired rather than
* unmounting unconditionally. Unmount only happens if:
* (1) the mark is already set (the mark is cleared by mntput())
* (2) the usage count == 1 [parent vfsmount] + 1 [sys_umount]
*/
if (flags & MNT_EXPIRE) {
if (&mnt->mnt == current->fs->root.mnt ||
flags & (MNT_FORCE | MNT_DETACH))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* probably don't strictly need the lock here if we examined
* all race cases, but it's a slowpath.
*/
lock_mount_hash();
if (mnt_get_count(mnt) != 2) {
unlock_mount_hash();
return -EBUSY;
}
unlock_mount_hash();
if (!xchg(&mnt->mnt_expiry_mark, 1))
return -EAGAIN;
}
/*
* If we may have to abort operations to get out of this
* mount, and they will themselves hold resources we must
* allow the fs to do things. In the Unix tradition of
* 'Gee thats tricky lets do it in userspace' the umount_begin
* might fail to complete on the first run through as other tasks
* must return, and the like. Thats for the mount program to worry
* about for the moment.
*/
if (flags & MNT_FORCE && sb->s_op->umount_begin) {
sb->s_op->umount_begin(sb);
}
/*
* No sense to grab the lock for this test, but test itself looks
* somewhat bogus. Suggestions for better replacement?
* Ho-hum... In principle, we might treat that as umount + switch
* to rootfs. GC would eventually take care of the old vfsmount.
* Actually it makes sense, especially if rootfs would contain a
* /reboot - static binary that would close all descriptors and
* call reboot(9). Then init(8) could umount root and exec /reboot.
*/
if (&mnt->mnt == current->fs->root.mnt && !(flags & MNT_DETACH)) {
/*
* Special case for "unmounting" root ...
* we just try to remount it readonly.
*/
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
retval = do_remount_sb(sb, MS_RDONLY, NULL, 0);
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
return retval;
}
namespace_lock();
lock_mount_hash();
event++;
if (flags & MNT_DETACH) {
if (!list_empty(&mnt->mnt_list))
umount_tree(mnt, UMOUNT_PROPAGATE);
retval = 0;
} else {
shrink_submounts(mnt);
retval = -EBUSY;
if (!propagate_mount_busy(mnt, 2)) {
if (!list_empty(&mnt->mnt_list))
umount_tree(mnt, UMOUNT_PROPAGATE|UMOUNT_SYNC);
retval = 0;
}
}
unlock_mount_hash();
namespace_unlock();
return retval;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 50,942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: opj_bool pi_next(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
switch (pi->poc.prg) {
case LRCP:
return pi_next_lrcp(pi);
case RLCP:
return pi_next_rlcp(pi);
case RPCL:
return pi_next_rpcl(pi);
case PCRL:
return pi_next_pcrl(pi);
case CPRL:
return pi_next_cprl(pi);
case PROG_UNKNOWN:
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [MJ2] Avoid index out of bounds access to pi->include[]
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 92,234
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::TestDictionaryMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_testDictionaryMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::TestDictionaryMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RootInlineBox* RenderBlockFlow::createRootInlineBox()
{
return new RootInlineBox(*this);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_mx_access_request (BD_ADDR bd_addr, UINT16 psm, BOOLEAN is_originator,
UINT32 mx_proto_id, UINT32 mx_chan_id,
tBTM_SEC_CALLBACK *p_callback, void *p_ref_data)
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec;
tBTM_SEC_SERV_REC *p_serv_rec;
tBTM_STATUS rc;
UINT16 security_required;
BOOLEAN transport = FALSE;/* should check PSM range in LE connection oriented L2CAP connection */
BTM_TRACE_DEBUG ("btm_sec_mx_access_request is_originator:%d", is_originator);
/* Find or get oldest record */
p_dev_rec = btm_find_or_alloc_dev (bd_addr);
/* Find the service record for the PSM */
p_serv_rec = btm_sec_find_mx_serv (is_originator, psm, mx_proto_id, mx_chan_id);
/* If there is no application registered with this PSM do not allow connection */
if (!p_serv_rec)
{
if (p_callback)
(*p_callback) (bd_addr, transport, p_ref_data, BTM_MODE_UNSUPPORTED);
BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("Security Manager: MX service not found PSM:%d Proto:%d SCN:%d",
psm, mx_proto_id, mx_chan_id);
return BTM_NO_RESOURCES;
}
/* there are some devices (moto phone) which connects to several services at the same time */
/* we will process one after another */
if ( (p_dev_rec->p_callback) || (btm_cb.pairing_state != BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE) )
{
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_mx_access_request service PSM:%d Proto:%d SCN:%d delayed state: %s",
psm, mx_proto_id, mx_chan_id, btm_pair_state_descr(btm_cb.pairing_state));
rc = BTM_CMD_STARTED;
security_required = p_serv_rec->security_flags;
if ((BTM_SEC_MODE_SP != btm_cb.security_mode)
|| ((BTM_SEC_MODE_SP == btm_cb.security_mode) && (BTM_SM4_KNOWN == p_dev_rec->sm4))
|| (BTM_SEC_IS_SM4(p_dev_rec->sm4) && (btm_sec_is_upgrade_possible(p_dev_rec, is_originator) == FALSE))
)
{
/* legacy mode - local is legacy or local is lisbon/peer is legacy
* or SM4 with no possibility of link key upgrade */
if (is_originator)
{
if (((security_required & BTM_SEC_OUT_FLAGS) == 0) ||
((((security_required & BTM_SEC_OUT_FLAGS) == BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE) && btm_dev_authenticated(p_dev_rec))) ||
((((security_required & BTM_SEC_OUT_FLAGS) == (BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_OUT_ENCRYPT)) && btm_dev_encrypted(p_dev_rec)))
)
{
rc = BTM_SUCCESS;
}
}
else
{
if (((security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_FLAGS) == 0) ||
((((security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_FLAGS) == BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE) && btm_dev_authenticated(p_dev_rec))) ||
(((security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_FLAGS) == BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHORIZE) && (btm_dev_authorized(p_dev_rec)||btm_serv_trusted(p_dev_rec, p_serv_rec))) ||
(((security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_FLAGS) == (BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHORIZE | BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE)) && ((btm_dev_authorized(p_dev_rec)||btm_serv_trusted(p_dev_rec, p_serv_rec)) && btm_dev_authenticated(p_dev_rec))) ||
(((security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_FLAGS) == (BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHORIZE | BTM_SEC_IN_ENCRYPT)) && ((btm_dev_authorized(p_dev_rec)||btm_serv_trusted(p_dev_rec, p_serv_rec))&& btm_dev_encrypted(p_dev_rec))) ||
((((security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_FLAGS) == (BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_IN_ENCRYPT)) && btm_dev_encrypted(p_dev_rec)))
)
{
rc = BTM_SUCCESS;
}
}
}
if (rc == BTM_CMD_STARTED)
{
btm_sec_queue_mx_request (bd_addr, psm, is_originator, mx_proto_id, mx_chan_id, p_callback, p_ref_data);
return rc;
}
}
p_dev_rec->p_cur_service = p_serv_rec;
p_dev_rec->security_required = p_serv_rec->security_flags;
if (BTM_SEC_MODE_SP == btm_cb.security_mode)
{
if (BTM_SEC_IS_SM4(p_dev_rec->sm4))
{
/* If we already have a link key, check if that link key is good enough */
btm_sec_check_upgrade(p_dev_rec, is_originator);
}
}
p_dev_rec->is_originator = is_originator;
p_dev_rec->p_callback = p_callback;
p_dev_rec->p_ref_data = p_ref_data;
/* Although authentication and encryption are per connection */
/* authorization is per access request. For example when serial connection */
/* is up and authorized and client requests to read file (access to other */
/* scn, we need to request user's permission again. */
p_dev_rec->sec_flags &= ~(BTM_SEC_AUTHORIZED);
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("Security Manager: mx_access_req proto_id:%d chan_id:%d State:%d Flags:0x%x Required:0x%x Service ID:%d",
mx_proto_id, mx_chan_id, p_dev_rec->sec_state, p_dev_rec->sec_flags, p_dev_rec->security_required, p_dev_rec->p_cur_service->service_id);
if ((rc = btm_sec_execute_procedure (p_dev_rec)) != BTM_CMD_STARTED)
{
if (p_callback)
{
p_dev_rec->p_callback = NULL;
(*p_callback) (bd_addr,transport, p_ref_data, (UINT8)rc);
}
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(rt_sigsuspend, sigset_t __user *, unewset, size_t, sigsetsize)
{
sigset_t newset;
/* XXX: Don't preclude handling different sized sigset_t's. */
if (sigsetsize != sizeof(sigset_t))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&newset, unewset, sizeof(newset)))
return -EFAULT;
sigdelsetmask(&newset, sigmask(SIGKILL)|sigmask(SIGSTOP));
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
current->saved_sigmask = current->blocked;
current->blocked = newset;
recalc_sigpending();
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
current->state = TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE;
schedule();
set_restore_sigmask();
return -ERESTARTNOHAND;
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 35,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int http_process_tarpit(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
{
struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
/* This connection is being tarpitted. The CLIENT side has
* already set the connect expiration date to the right
* timeout. We just have to check that the client is still
* there and that the timeout has not expired.
*/
channel_dont_connect(req);
if ((req->flags & (CF_SHUTR|CF_READ_ERROR)) == 0 &&
!tick_is_expired(req->analyse_exp, now_ms))
return 0;
/* We will set the queue timer to the time spent, just for
* logging purposes. We fake a 500 server error, so that the
* attacker will not suspect his connection has been tarpitted.
* It will not cause trouble to the logs because we can exclude
* the tarpitted connections by filtering on the 'PT' status flags.
*/
s->logs.t_queue = tv_ms_elapsed(&s->logs.tv_accept, &now);
if (!(req->flags & CF_READ_ERROR))
http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_FINST_T;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 6,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int CMS_data(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
{
BIO *cont;
int r;
if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_data) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DATA, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
return 0;
}
cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, NULL);
if (!cont)
return 0;
r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
BIO_free_all(cont);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 11,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int migrate_to_node(struct mm_struct *mm, int source, int dest,
int flags)
{
nodemask_t nmask;
LIST_HEAD(pagelist);
int err = 0;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
nodes_clear(nmask);
node_set(source, nmask);
vma = check_range(mm, mm->mmap->vm_start, mm->task_size, &nmask,
flags | MPOL_MF_DISCONTIG_OK, &pagelist);
if (IS_ERR(vma))
return PTR_ERR(vma);
if (!list_empty(&pagelist)) {
err = migrate_pages(&pagelist, new_node_page, dest,
false, MIGRATE_SYNC);
if (err)
putback_lru_pages(&pagelist);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,320
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __mnt_unmake_readonly(struct mount *mnt)
{
lock_mount_hash();
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_READONLY;
unlock_mount_hash();
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,181
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t ACodec::selectAudioPortFormat(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_AUDIO_CODINGTYPE desiredFormat) {
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE format;
InitOMXParams(&format);
format.nPortIndex = portIndex;
for (OMX_U32 index = 0;; ++index) {
format.nIndex = index;
status_t err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat,
&format, sizeof(format));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (format.eEncoding == desiredFormat) {
break;
}
}
return mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat, &format, sizeof(format));
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VREyeParameters* VRDisplay::getEyeParameters(const String& which_eye) {
switch (StringToVREye(which_eye)) {
case kVREyeLeft:
return eye_parameters_left_;
case kVREyeRight:
return eye_parameters_right_;
default:
return nullptr;
}
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,373
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fuse_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t pos, unsigned len, unsigned flags,
struct page **pagep, void **fsdata)
{
pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(file_inode(file));
struct page *page;
loff_t fsize;
int err = -ENOMEM;
WARN_ON(!fc->writeback_cache);
page = grab_cache_page_write_begin(mapping, index, flags);
if (!page)
goto error;
fuse_wait_on_page_writeback(mapping->host, page->index);
if (PageUptodate(page) || len == PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)
goto success;
/*
* Check if the start this page comes after the end of file, in which
* case the readpage can be optimized away.
*/
fsize = i_size_read(mapping->host);
if (fsize <= (pos & PAGE_CACHE_MASK)) {
size_t off = pos & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK;
if (off)
zero_user_segment(page, 0, off);
goto success;
}
err = fuse_do_readpage(file, page);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
success:
*pagep = page;
return 0;
cleanup:
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
error:
return err;
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 56,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void install_list_entry(const char *lib) {
assert(lib);
int len = strlen(lib);
if (strcspn(lib, "\\&!?\"'<>%^(){}[];,") != (size_t)len ||
strstr(lib, "..")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: \"%s\" is an invalid library\n", lib);
exit(1);
}
if (*lib == '/')
return load_library(lib);
int i;
for (i = 0; default_lib_paths[i]; i++) {
char *fname = NULL;
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/%s", default_lib_paths[i], lib) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
#define DO_GLOBBING
#ifdef DO_GLOBBING
glob_t globbuf;
int globerr = glob(fname, GLOB_NOCHECK | GLOB_NOSORT | GLOB_PERIOD, NULL, &globbuf);
if (globerr) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: failed to glob private-lib pattern %s\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
size_t j;
for (j = 0; j < globbuf.gl_pathc; j++) {
assert(globbuf.gl_pathv[j]);
load_library(globbuf.gl_pathv[j]);
}
globfree(&globbuf);
#else
load_library(fname);
#endif
free(fname);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 89,748
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int crypto_pcomp_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 31,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_vcpu_kick(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int me;
int cpu = vcpu->cpu;
wait_queue_head_t *wqp;
wqp = kvm_arch_vcpu_wq(vcpu);
if (waitqueue_active(wqp)) {
wake_up_interruptible(wqp);
++vcpu->stat.halt_wakeup;
}
me = get_cpu();
if (cpu != me && (unsigned)cpu < nr_cpu_ids && cpu_online(cpu))
if (kvm_arch_vcpu_should_kick(vcpu))
smp_send_reschedule(cpu);
put_cpu();
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void skcipher_walk_complete(struct skcipher_walk *walk, int err)
{
struct skcipher_walk_buffer *p, *tmp;
list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &walk->buffers, entry) {
u8 *data;
if (err)
goto done;
data = p->data;
if (!data) {
data = PTR_ALIGN(&p->buffer[0], walk->alignmask + 1);
data = skcipher_get_spot(data, walk->stride);
}
scatterwalk_copychunks(data, &p->dst, p->len, 1);
if (offset_in_page(p->data) + p->len + walk->stride >
PAGE_SIZE)
free_page((unsigned long)p->data);
done:
list_del(&p->entry);
kfree(p);
}
if (!err && walk->iv != walk->oiv)
memcpy(walk->oiv, walk->iv, walk->ivsize);
if (walk->buffer != walk->page)
kfree(walk->buffer);
if (walk->page)
free_page((unsigned long)walk->page);
}
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void comedi_error(const struct comedi_device *dev, const char *s)
{
printk(KERN_ERR "comedi%d: %s: %s\n", dev->minor,
dev->driver->driver_name, s);
}
Commit Message: staging: comedi: fix infoleak to userspace
driver_name and board_name are pointers to strings, not buffers of size
COMEDI_NAMELEN. Copying COMEDI_NAMELEN bytes of a string containing
less than COMEDI_NAMELEN-1 bytes would leak some unrelated bytes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 41,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ip_checkentry(const struct ipt_ip *ip)
{
if (ip->flags & ~IPT_F_MASK) {
duprintf("Unknown flag bits set: %08X\n",
ip->flags & ~IPT_F_MASK);
return false;
}
if (ip->invflags & ~IPT_INV_MASK) {
duprintf("Unknown invflag bits set: %08X\n",
ip->invflags & ~IPT_INV_MASK);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 52,304
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static noinline int udf_process_sequence(struct super_block *sb, long block,
long lastblock, struct kernel_lb_addr *fileset)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct udf_vds_record vds[VDS_POS_LENGTH];
struct udf_vds_record *curr;
struct generic_desc *gd;
struct volDescPtr *vdp;
int done = 0;
uint32_t vdsn;
uint16_t ident;
long next_s = 0, next_e = 0;
memset(vds, 0, sizeof(struct udf_vds_record) * VDS_POS_LENGTH);
/*
* Read the main descriptor sequence and find which descriptors
* are in it.
*/
for (; (!done && block <= lastblock); block++) {
bh = udf_read_tagged(sb, block, block, &ident);
if (!bh) {
udf_err(sb,
"Block %llu of volume descriptor sequence is corrupted or we could not read it\n",
(unsigned long long)block);
return 1;
}
/* Process each descriptor (ISO 13346 3/8.3-8.4) */
gd = (struct generic_desc *)bh->b_data;
vdsn = le32_to_cpu(gd->volDescSeqNum);
switch (ident) {
case TAG_IDENT_PVD: /* ISO 13346 3/10.1 */
curr = &vds[VDS_POS_PRIMARY_VOL_DESC];
if (vdsn >= curr->volDescSeqNum) {
curr->volDescSeqNum = vdsn;
curr->block = block;
}
break;
case TAG_IDENT_VDP: /* ISO 13346 3/10.3 */
curr = &vds[VDS_POS_VOL_DESC_PTR];
if (vdsn >= curr->volDescSeqNum) {
curr->volDescSeqNum = vdsn;
curr->block = block;
vdp = (struct volDescPtr *)bh->b_data;
next_s = le32_to_cpu(
vdp->nextVolDescSeqExt.extLocation);
next_e = le32_to_cpu(
vdp->nextVolDescSeqExt.extLength);
next_e = next_e >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
next_e += next_s;
}
break;
case TAG_IDENT_IUVD: /* ISO 13346 3/10.4 */
curr = &vds[VDS_POS_IMP_USE_VOL_DESC];
if (vdsn >= curr->volDescSeqNum) {
curr->volDescSeqNum = vdsn;
curr->block = block;
}
break;
case TAG_IDENT_PD: /* ISO 13346 3/10.5 */
curr = &vds[VDS_POS_PARTITION_DESC];
if (!curr->block)
curr->block = block;
break;
case TAG_IDENT_LVD: /* ISO 13346 3/10.6 */
curr = &vds[VDS_POS_LOGICAL_VOL_DESC];
if (vdsn >= curr->volDescSeqNum) {
curr->volDescSeqNum = vdsn;
curr->block = block;
}
break;
case TAG_IDENT_USD: /* ISO 13346 3/10.8 */
curr = &vds[VDS_POS_UNALLOC_SPACE_DESC];
if (vdsn >= curr->volDescSeqNum) {
curr->volDescSeqNum = vdsn;
curr->block = block;
}
break;
case TAG_IDENT_TD: /* ISO 13346 3/10.9 */
vds[VDS_POS_TERMINATING_DESC].block = block;
if (next_e) {
block = next_s;
lastblock = next_e;
next_s = next_e = 0;
} else
done = 1;
break;
}
brelse(bh);
}
/*
* Now read interesting descriptors again and process them
* in a suitable order
*/
if (!vds[VDS_POS_PRIMARY_VOL_DESC].block) {
udf_err(sb, "Primary Volume Descriptor not found!\n");
return 1;
}
if (udf_load_pvoldesc(sb, vds[VDS_POS_PRIMARY_VOL_DESC].block))
return 1;
if (vds[VDS_POS_LOGICAL_VOL_DESC].block && udf_load_logicalvol(sb,
vds[VDS_POS_LOGICAL_VOL_DESC].block, fileset))
return 1;
if (vds[VDS_POS_PARTITION_DESC].block) {
/*
* We rescan the whole descriptor sequence to find
* partition descriptor blocks and process them.
*/
for (block = vds[VDS_POS_PARTITION_DESC].block;
block < vds[VDS_POS_TERMINATING_DESC].block;
block++)
if (udf_load_partdesc(sb, block))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int yr_arena_save_stream(
YR_ARENA* arena,
YR_STREAM* stream)
{
YR_ARENA_PAGE* page;
YR_RELOC* reloc;
ARENA_FILE_HEADER header;
uint32_t end_marker = 0xFFFFFFFF;
uint8_t** reloc_address;
uint8_t* reloc_target;
assert(arena->flags & ARENA_FLAGS_COALESCED);
page = arena->page_list_head;
reloc = page->reloc_list_head;
while (reloc != NULL)
{
reloc_address = (uint8_t**) (page->address + reloc->offset);
reloc_target = *reloc_address;
if (reloc_target != NULL)
{
assert(reloc_target >= page->address);
assert(reloc_target < page->address + page->used);
*reloc_address = (uint8_t*) (*reloc_address - page->address);
}
else
{
*reloc_address = (uint8_t*) (size_t) 0xFFFABADA;
}
reloc = reloc->next;
}
assert(page->size < 0x80000000); // 2GB
header.magic[0] = 'Y';
header.magic[1] = 'A';
header.magic[2] = 'R';
header.magic[3] = 'A';
header.size = (int32_t) page->size;
header.version = ARENA_FILE_VERSION;
yr_stream_write(&header, sizeof(header), 1, stream);
yr_stream_write(page->address, header.size, 1, stream);
reloc = page->reloc_list_head;
while (reloc != NULL)
{
yr_stream_write(&reloc->offset, sizeof(reloc->offset), 1, stream);
reloc_address = (uint8_t**) (page->address + reloc->offset);
reloc_target = *reloc_address;
if (reloc_target != (void*) (size_t) 0xFFFABADA)
*reloc_address += (size_t) page->address;
else
*reloc_address = 0;
reloc = reloc->next;
}
yr_stream_write(&end_marker, sizeof(end_marker), 1, stream);
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #658
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 66,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: double XMLRPC_GetValueDouble(XMLRPC_VALUE value) {
return ((value && value->type == xmlrpc_double) ? value->d : 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _cgsem_wait(cgsem_t *cgsem, const char *file, const char *func, const int line)
{
retry:
if (unlikely(sem_wait(cgsem))) {
if (interrupted())
goto retry;
quitfrom(1, file, func, line, "Failed to sem_wait errno=%d cgsem=0x%p", errno, cgsem);
}
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 36,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __get_device_id(struct ipmi_smi *intf, struct bmc_device *bmc)
{
int rv;
bmc->dyn_id_set = 2;
intf->null_user_handler = bmc_device_id_handler;
rv = send_get_device_id_cmd(intf);
if (rv)
return rv;
wait_event(intf->waitq, bmc->dyn_id_set != 2);
if (!bmc->dyn_id_set)
rv = -EIO; /* Something went wrong in the fetch. */
/* dyn_id_set makes the id data available. */
smp_rmb();
intf->null_user_handler = NULL;
return rv;
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xprt_rdma_bc_free(struct rpc_task *task)
{
struct rpc_rqst *rqst = task->tk_rqstp;
kfree(rqst->rq_rbuffer);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void on_l2cap_connect(tBTA_JV *p_data, uint32_t id)
{
l2cap_socket *sock;
tBTA_JV_L2CAP_OPEN *psm_open = &p_data->l2c_open;
tBTA_JV_L2CAP_LE_OPEN *le_open = &p_data->l2c_le_open;
pthread_mutex_lock(&state_lock);
sock = btsock_l2cap_find_by_id_l(id);
if (!sock) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("on_l2cap_connect on unknown socket");
} else {
if (sock->fixed_chan && le_open->status == BTA_JV_SUCCESS) {
if (!sock->server)
on_cl_l2cap_le_connect_l(le_open, sock);
else
on_srv_l2cap_le_connect_l(le_open, sock);
} else if (!sock->fixed_chan && psm_open->status == BTA_JV_SUCCESS) {
if (!sock->server)
on_cl_l2cap_psm_connect_l(psm_open, sock);
else
on_srv_l2cap_psm_connect_l(psm_open, sock);
}
else
btsock_l2cap_free_l(sock);
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&state_lock);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,856
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(struct nfs4_opendata *data)
{
struct inode *inode;
struct nfs4_state *state = NULL;
int ret;
if (!data->rpc_done) {
state = nfs4_try_open_cached(data);
goto out;
}
ret = -EAGAIN;
if (!(data->f_attr.valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR))
goto err;
inode = nfs_fhget(data->dir->d_sb, &data->o_res.fh, &data->f_attr);
ret = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto err;
ret = -ENOMEM;
state = nfs4_get_open_state(inode, data->owner);
if (state == NULL)
goto err_put_inode;
if (data->o_res.delegation_type != 0)
nfs4_opendata_check_deleg(data, state);
update_open_stateid(state, &data->o_res.stateid, NULL,
data->o_arg.fmode);
iput(inode);
out:
return state;
err_put_inode:
iput(inode);
err:
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnSerializeAsMHTML(
const FrameMsg_SerializeAsMHTML_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("page-serialization", "RenderFrameImpl::OnSerializeAsMHTML");
base::TimeTicks start_time = base::TimeTicks::Now();
base::File file = IPC::PlatformFileForTransitToFile(params.destination_file);
const WebString mhtml_boundary =
WebString::FromUTF8(params.mhtml_boundary_marker);
DCHECK(!mhtml_boundary.IsEmpty());
std::vector<WebThreadSafeData> mhtml_contents;
std::set<std::string> serialized_resources_uri_digests;
MHTMLPartsGenerationDelegate delegate(params,
&serialized_resources_uri_digests);
MhtmlSaveStatus save_status = MhtmlSaveStatus::SUCCESS;
bool has_some_data = false;
if (IsMainFrame()) {
TRACE_EVENT0("page-serialization",
"RenderFrameImpl::OnSerializeAsMHTML header");
mhtml_contents.emplace_back(WebFrameSerializer::GenerateMHTMLHeader(
mhtml_boundary, GetWebFrame(), &delegate));
if (mhtml_contents.back().IsEmpty())
save_status = MhtmlSaveStatus::FRAME_SERIALIZATION_FORBIDDEN;
else
has_some_data = true;
}
if (save_status == MhtmlSaveStatus::SUCCESS) {
TRACE_EVENT0("page-serialization",
"RenderFrameImpl::OnSerializeAsMHTML parts serialization");
mhtml_contents.emplace_back(WebFrameSerializer::GenerateMHTMLParts(
mhtml_boundary, GetWebFrame(), &delegate));
has_some_data |= !mhtml_contents.back().IsEmpty();
}
base::TimeDelta main_thread_use_time = base::TimeTicks::Now() - start_time;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES(
"PageSerialization.MhtmlGeneration.RendererMainThreadTime.SingleFrame",
main_thread_use_time);
if (save_status == MhtmlSaveStatus::SUCCESS && has_some_data) {
base::PostTaskWithTraitsAndReplyWithResult(
FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock()},
base::Bind(&WriteMHTMLToDisk, base::Passed(&mhtml_contents),
base::Passed(&file)),
base::Bind(&RenderFrameImpl::OnWriteMHTMLToDiskComplete,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), params.job_id,
base::Passed(&serialized_resources_uri_digests),
main_thread_use_time));
} else {
file.Close();
OnWriteMHTMLToDiskComplete(params.job_id, serialized_resources_uri_digests,
main_thread_use_time, save_status);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static vpx_image_t *vp8_get_frame(vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *ctx,
vpx_codec_iter_t *iter)
{
vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
/* iter acts as a flip flop, so an image is only returned on the first
* call to get_frame.
*/
if (!(*iter) && ctx->yv12_frame_buffers.pbi[0])
{
YV12_BUFFER_CONFIG sd;
int64_t time_stamp = 0, time_end_stamp = 0;
vp8_ppflags_t flags = {0};
if (ctx->base.init_flags & VPX_CODEC_USE_POSTPROC)
{
flags.post_proc_flag= ctx->postproc_cfg.post_proc_flag
#if CONFIG_POSTPROC_VISUALIZER
| ((ctx->dbg_color_ref_frame_flag != 0) ? VP8D_DEBUG_CLR_FRM_REF_BLKS : 0)
| ((ctx->dbg_color_mb_modes_flag != 0) ? VP8D_DEBUG_CLR_BLK_MODES : 0)
| ((ctx->dbg_color_b_modes_flag != 0) ? VP8D_DEBUG_CLR_BLK_MODES : 0)
| ((ctx->dbg_display_mv_flag != 0) ? VP8D_DEBUG_DRAW_MV : 0)
#endif
;
flags.deblocking_level = ctx->postproc_cfg.deblocking_level;
flags.noise_level = ctx->postproc_cfg.noise_level;
#if CONFIG_POSTPROC_VISUALIZER
flags.display_ref_frame_flag= ctx->dbg_color_ref_frame_flag;
flags.display_mb_modes_flag = ctx->dbg_color_mb_modes_flag;
flags.display_b_modes_flag = ctx->dbg_color_b_modes_flag;
flags.display_mv_flag = ctx->dbg_display_mv_flag;
#endif
}
if (0 == vp8dx_get_raw_frame(ctx->yv12_frame_buffers.pbi[0], &sd,
&time_stamp, &time_end_stamp, &flags))
{
yuvconfig2image(&ctx->img, &sd, ctx->user_priv);
img = &ctx->img;
*iter = img;
}
}
return img;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: Cherry-pick 0f42d1f from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp8: fix decoder crash with invalid leading keyframes
decoding the same invalid keyframe twice would result in a crash as the
second time through the decoder would be assumed to have been
initialized as there was no resolution change. in this case the
resolution was itself invalid (0x6), but vp8_peek_si() was only failing
in the case of 0x0.
invalid-vp80-00-comprehensive-018.ivf.2kf_0x6.ivf tests this case by
duplicating the first keyframe and additionally adds a valid one to
ensure decoding can resume without error.
Bug: 30593765
Change-Id: I0de85f5a5eb5c0a5605230faf20c042b69aea507
(cherry picked from commit fc0466b695dce03e10390101844caa374848d903)
(cherry picked from commit 1114575245cb9d2f108749f916c76549524f5136)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 157,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImageLoader::UpdateImageState(ImageResourceContent* new_image_content) {
image_content_ = new_image_content;
if (!new_image_content) {
image_resource_for_image_document_ = nullptr;
image_complete_ = true;
} else {
image_complete_ = false;
}
delay_until_image_notify_finished_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool Enabled(LocalFrame&, Event*, EditorCommandSource) {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err stbl_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_SampleTableBox *p;
p = (GF_SampleTableBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "SampleTableBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (p->size)
gf_isom_box_dump_ex(p->SampleDescription, trace, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSD);
if (p->size)
gf_isom_box_dump_ex(p->TimeToSample, trace, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STTS);
if (p->CompositionOffset) gf_isom_box_dump(p->CompositionOffset, trace);
if (p->CompositionToDecode) gf_isom_box_dump(p->CompositionToDecode, trace);
if (p->SyncSample) gf_isom_box_dump(p->SyncSample, trace);
if (p->ShadowSync) gf_isom_box_dump(p->ShadowSync, trace);
if (p->size)
gf_isom_box_dump_ex(p->SampleToChunk, trace, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSC);
if (p->size)
gf_isom_box_dump_ex(p->SampleSize, trace, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSZ);
if (p->size)
gf_isom_box_dump_ex(p->ChunkOffset, trace, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STCO);
if (p->DegradationPriority) gf_isom_box_dump(p->DegradationPriority, trace);
if (p->SampleDep) gf_isom_box_dump(p->SampleDep, trace);
if (p->PaddingBits) gf_isom_box_dump(p->PaddingBits, trace);
if (p->Fragments) gf_isom_box_dump(p->Fragments, trace);
if (p->sub_samples) gf_isom_box_array_dump(p->sub_samples, trace);
if (p->sampleGroupsDescription) gf_isom_box_array_dump(p->sampleGroupsDescription, trace);
if (p->sampleGroups) gf_isom_box_array_dump(p->sampleGroups, trace);
if (p->sai_sizes) {
u32 i;
for (i = 0; i < gf_list_count(p->sai_sizes); i++) {
GF_SampleAuxiliaryInfoSizeBox *saiz = (GF_SampleAuxiliaryInfoSizeBox *)gf_list_get(p->sai_sizes, i);
gf_isom_box_dump(saiz, trace);
}
}
if (p->sai_offsets) {
u32 i;
for (i = 0; i < gf_list_count(p->sai_offsets); i++) {
GF_SampleAuxiliaryInfoOffsetBox *saio = (GF_SampleAuxiliaryInfoOffsetBox *)gf_list_get(p->sai_offsets, i);
gf_isom_box_dump(saio, trace);
}
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("SampleTableBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,848
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DocumentLoader::ShouldContinueForResponse() const {
if (substitute_data_.IsValid())
return true;
int status_code = response_.HttpStatusCode();
if (status_code == 204 || status_code == 205) {
return false;
}
if (IsContentDispositionAttachment(
response_.HttpHeaderField(http_names::kContentDisposition))) {
return false;
}
if (!CanShowMIMEType(response_.MimeType(), frame_))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 152,548
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: read_Header(struct archive_read *a, struct _7z_header_info *h,
int check_header_id)
{
struct _7zip *zip = (struct _7zip *)a->format->data;
const unsigned char *p;
struct _7z_folder *folders;
struct _7z_stream_info *si = &(zip->si);
struct _7zip_entry *entries;
uint32_t folderIndex, indexInFolder;
unsigned i;
int eindex, empty_streams, sindex;
if (check_header_id) {
/*
* Read Header.
*/
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
if (*p != kHeader)
return (-1);
}
/*
* Read ArchiveProperties.
*/
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
if (*p == kArchiveProperties) {
for (;;) {
uint64_t size;
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
if (*p == 0)
break;
if (parse_7zip_uint64(a, &size) < 0)
return (-1);
}
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
}
/*
* Read MainStreamsInfo.
*/
if (*p == kMainStreamsInfo) {
if (read_StreamsInfo(a, &(zip->si)) < 0)
return (-1);
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
}
if (*p == kEnd)
return (0);
/*
* Read FilesInfo.
*/
if (*p != kFilesInfo)
return (-1);
if (parse_7zip_uint64(a, &(zip->numFiles)) < 0)
return (-1);
if (UMAX_ENTRY < zip->numFiles)
return (-1);
zip->entries = calloc((size_t)zip->numFiles, sizeof(*zip->entries));
if (zip->entries == NULL)
return (-1);
entries = zip->entries;
empty_streams = 0;
for (;;) {
int type;
uint64_t size;
size_t ll;
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
type = *p;
if (type == kEnd)
break;
if (parse_7zip_uint64(a, &size) < 0)
return (-1);
if (zip->header_bytes_remaining < size)
return (-1);
ll = (size_t)size;
switch (type) {
case kEmptyStream:
if (h->emptyStreamBools != NULL)
return (-1);
h->emptyStreamBools = calloc((size_t)zip->numFiles,
sizeof(*h->emptyStreamBools));
if (h->emptyStreamBools == NULL)
return (-1);
if (read_Bools(
a, h->emptyStreamBools, (size_t)zip->numFiles) < 0)
return (-1);
empty_streams = 0;
for (i = 0; i < zip->numFiles; i++) {
if (h->emptyStreamBools[i])
empty_streams++;
}
break;
case kEmptyFile:
if (empty_streams <= 0) {
/* Unexcepted sequence. Skip this. */
if (header_bytes(a, ll) == NULL)
return (-1);
break;
}
if (h->emptyFileBools != NULL)
return (-1);
h->emptyFileBools = calloc(empty_streams,
sizeof(*h->emptyFileBools));
if (h->emptyFileBools == NULL)
return (-1);
if (read_Bools(a, h->emptyFileBools, empty_streams) < 0)
return (-1);
break;
case kAnti:
if (empty_streams <= 0) {
/* Unexcepted sequence. Skip this. */
if (header_bytes(a, ll) == NULL)
return (-1);
break;
}
if (h->antiBools != NULL)
return (-1);
h->antiBools = calloc(empty_streams,
sizeof(*h->antiBools));
if (h->antiBools == NULL)
return (-1);
if (read_Bools(a, h->antiBools, empty_streams) < 0)
return (-1);
break;
case kCTime:
case kATime:
case kMTime:
if (read_Times(a, h, type) < 0)
return (-1);
break;
case kName:
{
unsigned char *np;
size_t nl, nb;
/* Skip one byte. */
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
ll--;
if ((ll & 1) || ll < zip->numFiles * 4)
return (-1);
if (zip->entry_names != NULL)
return (-1);
zip->entry_names = malloc(ll);
if (zip->entry_names == NULL)
return (-1);
np = zip->entry_names;
nb = ll;
/*
* Copy whole file names.
* NOTE: This loop prevents from expanding
* the uncompressed buffer in order not to
* use extra memory resource.
*/
while (nb) {
size_t b;
if (nb > UBUFF_SIZE)
b = UBUFF_SIZE;
else
b = nb;
if ((p = header_bytes(a, b)) == NULL)
return (-1);
memcpy(np, p, b);
np += b;
nb -= b;
}
np = zip->entry_names;
nl = ll;
for (i = 0; i < zip->numFiles; i++) {
entries[i].utf16name = np;
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__) && defined(_DEBUG)
entries[i].wname = (wchar_t *)np;
#endif
/* Find a terminator. */
while (nl >= 2 && (np[0] || np[1])) {
np += 2;
nl -= 2;
}
if (nl < 2)
return (-1);/* Terminator not found */
entries[i].name_len = np - entries[i].utf16name;
np += 2;
nl -= 2;
}
break;
}
case kAttributes:
{
int allAreDefined;
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 2)) == NULL)
return (-1);
allAreDefined = *p;
if (h->attrBools != NULL)
return (-1);
h->attrBools = calloc((size_t)zip->numFiles,
sizeof(*h->attrBools));
if (h->attrBools == NULL)
return (-1);
if (allAreDefined)
memset(h->attrBools, 1, (size_t)zip->numFiles);
else {
if (read_Bools(a, h->attrBools,
(size_t)zip->numFiles) < 0)
return (-1);
}
for (i = 0; i < zip->numFiles; i++) {
if (h->attrBools[i]) {
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 4)) == NULL)
return (-1);
entries[i].attr = archive_le32dec(p);
}
}
break;
}
case kDummy:
if (ll == 0)
break;
__LA_FALLTHROUGH;
default:
if (header_bytes(a, ll) == NULL)
return (-1);
break;
}
}
/*
* Set up entry's attributes.
*/
folders = si->ci.folders;
eindex = sindex = 0;
folderIndex = indexInFolder = 0;
for (i = 0; i < zip->numFiles; i++) {
if (h->emptyStreamBools == NULL || h->emptyStreamBools[i] == 0)
entries[i].flg |= HAS_STREAM;
/* The high 16 bits of attributes is a posix file mode. */
entries[i].mode = entries[i].attr >> 16;
if (entries[i].flg & HAS_STREAM) {
if ((size_t)sindex >= si->ss.unpack_streams)
return (-1);
if (entries[i].mode == 0)
entries[i].mode = AE_IFREG | 0666;
if (si->ss.digestsDefined[sindex])
entries[i].flg |= CRC32_IS_SET;
entries[i].ssIndex = sindex;
sindex++;
} else {
int dir;
if (h->emptyFileBools == NULL)
dir = 1;
else {
if (h->emptyFileBools[eindex])
dir = 0;
else
dir = 1;
eindex++;
}
if (entries[i].mode == 0) {
if (dir)
entries[i].mode = AE_IFDIR | 0777;
else
entries[i].mode = AE_IFREG | 0666;
} else if (dir &&
(entries[i].mode & AE_IFMT) != AE_IFDIR) {
entries[i].mode &= ~AE_IFMT;
entries[i].mode |= AE_IFDIR;
}
if ((entries[i].mode & AE_IFMT) == AE_IFDIR &&
entries[i].name_len >= 2 &&
(entries[i].utf16name[entries[i].name_len-2] != '/' ||
entries[i].utf16name[entries[i].name_len-1] != 0)) {
entries[i].utf16name[entries[i].name_len] = '/';
entries[i].utf16name[entries[i].name_len+1] = 0;
entries[i].name_len += 2;
}
entries[i].ssIndex = -1;
}
if (entries[i].attr & 0x01)
entries[i].mode &= ~0222;/* Read only. */
if ((entries[i].flg & HAS_STREAM) == 0 && indexInFolder == 0) {
/*
* The entry is an empty file or a directory file,
* those both have no contents.
*/
entries[i].folderIndex = -1;
continue;
}
if (indexInFolder == 0) {
for (;;) {
if (folderIndex >= si->ci.numFolders)
return (-1);
if (folders[folderIndex].numUnpackStreams)
break;
folderIndex++;
}
}
entries[i].folderIndex = folderIndex;
if ((entries[i].flg & HAS_STREAM) == 0)
continue;
indexInFolder++;
if (indexInFolder >= folders[folderIndex].numUnpackStreams) {
folderIndex++;
indexInFolder = 0;
}
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: 7zip: fix crash when parsing certain archives
Fuzzing with CRCs disabled revealed that a call to get_uncompressed_data()
would sometimes fail to return at least 'minimum' bytes. This can cause
the crc32() invocation in header_bytes to read off into invalid memory.
A specially crafted archive can use this to cause a crash.
An ASAN trace is below, but ASAN is not required - an uninstrumented
binary will also crash.
==7719==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x631000040000 (pc 0x7fbdb3b3ec1d bp 0x7ffe77a51310 sp 0x7ffe77a51150 T0)
==7719==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
#0 0x7fbdb3b3ec1c in crc32_z (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libz.so.1+0x2c1c)
#1 0x84f5eb in header_bytes (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84f5eb)
#2 0x856156 in read_Header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x856156)
#3 0x84e134 in slurp_central_directory (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84e134)
#4 0x849690 in archive_read_format_7zip_read_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x849690)
#5 0x5713b7 in _archive_read_next_header2 (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5713b7)
#6 0x570e63 in _archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x570e63)
#7 0x6f08bd in archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x6f08bd)
#8 0x52373f in read_archive (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x52373f)
#9 0x5257be in tar_mode_x (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5257be)
#10 0x51daeb in main (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x51daeb)
#11 0x7fbdb27cab96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310
#12 0x41dd09 in _start (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x41dd09)
This was primarly done with afl and FairFuzz. Some early corpus entries
may have been generated by qsym.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 87,251
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::DrawCustomFrame(cairo_t* cr,
GtkWidget* widget,
GdkEventExpose* event) {
GtkThemeService* theme_provider = GtkThemeService::GetFrom(
browser()->profile());
int image_name = GetThemeFrameResource();
gfx::CairoCachedSurface* surface = theme_provider->GetImageNamed(
image_name).ToCairo();
if (event->area.y < surface->Height()) {
surface->SetSource(cr, widget, 0, GetVerticalOffset());
cairo_pattern_set_extend(cairo_get_source(cr), CAIRO_EXTEND_REPEAT);
cairo_rectangle(cr, event->area.x, event->area.y,
event->area.width, surface->Height() - event->area.y);
cairo_fill(cr);
}
if (theme_provider->HasCustomImage(IDR_THEME_FRAME_OVERLAY) &&
!browser()->profile()->IsOffTheRecord()) {
gfx::CairoCachedSurface* theme_overlay = theme_provider->GetImageNamed(
DrawFrameAsActive() ? IDR_THEME_FRAME_OVERLAY
: IDR_THEME_FRAME_OVERLAY_INACTIVE).ToCairo();
theme_overlay->SetSource(cr, widget, 0, GetVerticalOffset());
cairo_paint(cr);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,911
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