instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Image *AutoResizeImage(const Image *image,const char *option,
MagickOffsetType *count,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define MAX_SIZES 16
char
*q;
const char
*p;
Image
*resized,
*images;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
sizes[MAX_SIZES]={256,192,128,96,64,48,40,32,24,16};
images=NULL;
*count=0;
i=0;
p=option;
while (*p != '\0' && i < MAX_SIZES)
{
size_t
size;
while ((isspace((int) ((unsigned char) *p)) != 0))
p++;
size=(size_t)strtol(p,&q,10);
if (p == q || size < 16 || size > 256)
return((Image *) NULL);
p=q;
sizes[i++]=size;
while ((isspace((int) ((unsigned char) *p)) != 0) || (*p == ','))
p++;
}
if (i==0)
i=10;
*count=i;
for (i=0; i < *count; i++)
{
resized=ResizeImage(image,sizes[i],sizes[i],image->filter,image->blur,
exception);
if (resized == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(images));
if (images == (Image *) NULL)
images=resized;
else
AppendImageToList(&images,resized);
}
return(images);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestConnection(QuicGuid guid,
IPEndPoint address,
QuicConnectionHelper* helper)
: QuicConnection(guid, address, helper) {
}
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized access in QuicConnectionHelperTest
BUG=159928
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11360153
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@166708 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 115,439
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::setMainDocumentError(const ResourceError& error)
{
m_mainDocumentError = error;
frameLoader()->client()->setMainDocumentError(this, error);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_write_header(AVFormatContext *s)
{
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
MOVMuxContext *mov = s->priv_data;
AVDictionaryEntry *t, *global_tcr = av_dict_get(s->metadata, "timecode", NULL, 0);
int i, ret, hint_track = 0, tmcd_track = 0, nb_tracks = s->nb_streams;
if (mov->mode & (MODE_MP4|MODE_MOV|MODE_IPOD) && s->nb_chapters)
nb_tracks++;
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_RTP_HINT) {
hint_track = nb_tracks;
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++)
if (rtp_hinting_needed(s->streams[i]))
nb_tracks++;
}
if (mov->mode == MODE_MOV || mov->mode == MODE_MP4)
tmcd_track = nb_tracks;
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
int j;
AVStream *st= s->streams[i];
MOVTrack *track= &mov->tracks[i];
/* copy extradata if it exists */
if (st->codecpar->extradata_size) {
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_DVD_SUBTITLE)
mov_create_dvd_sub_decoder_specific_info(track, st);
else if (!TAG_IS_AVCI(track->tag) && st->codecpar->codec_id != AV_CODEC_ID_DNXHD) {
track->vos_len = st->codecpar->extradata_size;
track->vos_data = av_malloc(track->vos_len);
if (!track->vos_data) {
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
memcpy(track->vos_data, st->codecpar->extradata, track->vos_len);
}
}
if (st->codecpar->codec_type != AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO ||
track->par->channel_layout != AV_CH_LAYOUT_MONO)
continue;
for (j = 0; j < s->nb_streams; j++) {
AVStream *stj= s->streams[j];
MOVTrack *trackj= &mov->tracks[j];
if (j == i)
continue;
if (stj->codecpar->codec_type != AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO ||
trackj->par->channel_layout != AV_CH_LAYOUT_MONO ||
trackj->language != track->language ||
trackj->tag != track->tag
)
continue;
track->multichannel_as_mono++;
}
}
if (!(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_DELAY_MOOV)) {
if ((ret = mov_write_identification(pb, s)) < 0)
return ret;
}
if (mov->reserved_moov_size){
mov->reserved_header_pos = avio_tell(pb);
if (mov->reserved_moov_size > 0)
avio_skip(pb, mov->reserved_moov_size);
}
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_FRAGMENT) {
/* If no fragmentation options have been set, set a default. */
if (!(mov->flags & (FF_MOV_FLAG_FRAG_KEYFRAME |
FF_MOV_FLAG_FRAG_CUSTOM |
FF_MOV_FLAG_FRAG_EVERY_FRAME)) &&
!mov->max_fragment_duration && !mov->max_fragment_size)
mov->flags |= FF_MOV_FLAG_FRAG_KEYFRAME;
} else {
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_FASTSTART)
mov->reserved_header_pos = avio_tell(pb);
mov_write_mdat_tag(pb, mov);
}
ff_parse_creation_time_metadata(s, &mov->time, 1);
if (mov->time)
mov->time += 0x7C25B080; // 1970 based -> 1904 based
if (mov->chapter_track)
if ((ret = mov_create_chapter_track(s, mov->chapter_track)) < 0)
return ret;
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_RTP_HINT) {
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
if (rtp_hinting_needed(s->streams[i])) {
if ((ret = ff_mov_init_hinting(s, hint_track, i)) < 0)
return ret;
hint_track++;
}
}
}
if (mov->nb_meta_tmcd) {
/* Initialize the tmcd tracks */
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
AVStream *st = s->streams[i];
t = global_tcr;
if (st->codecpar->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO) {
AVTimecode tc;
if (!t)
t = av_dict_get(st->metadata, "timecode", NULL, 0);
if (!t)
continue;
if (mov_check_timecode_track(s, &tc, i, t->value) < 0)
continue;
if ((ret = mov_create_timecode_track(s, tmcd_track, i, tc)) < 0)
return ret;
tmcd_track++;
}
}
}
avio_flush(pb);
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_ISML)
mov_write_isml_manifest(pb, mov, s);
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_EMPTY_MOOV &&
!(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_DELAY_MOOV)) {
if ((ret = mov_write_moov_tag(pb, mov, s)) < 0)
return ret;
avio_flush(pb);
mov->moov_written = 1;
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_GLOBAL_SIDX)
mov->reserved_header_pos = avio_tell(pb);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 79,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool StartFind(const std::string& text, bool case_sensitive) {
if (ppp_find_ != NULL) {
PP_Bool pp_success =
ppp_find_->StartFind(plugin_->pp_instance(),
text.c_str(),
PP_FromBool(case_sensitive));
return pp_success == PP_TRUE;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int stb_vorbis_get_error(stb_vorbis *f)
{
int e = f->error;
f->error = VORBIS__no_error;
return e;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 75,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sort_persons(void)
{
qsort(s_persons, s_num_persons, sizeof(person_t*), compare_persons);
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t ucma_query_path(struct ucma_context *ctx,
void __user *response, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_query_path_resp *resp;
int i, ret = 0;
if (out_len < sizeof(*resp))
return -ENOSPC;
resp = kzalloc(out_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!resp)
return -ENOMEM;
resp->num_paths = ctx->cm_id->route.num_paths;
for (i = 0, out_len -= sizeof(*resp);
i < resp->num_paths && out_len > sizeof(struct ib_path_rec_data);
i++, out_len -= sizeof(struct ib_path_rec_data)) {
resp->path_data[i].flags = IB_PATH_GMP | IB_PATH_PRIMARY |
IB_PATH_BIDIRECTIONAL;
ib_sa_pack_path(&ctx->cm_id->route.path_rec[i],
&resp->path_data[i].path_rec);
}
if (copy_to_user(response, resp,
sizeof(*resp) + (i * sizeof(struct ib_path_rec_data))))
ret = -EFAULT;
kfree(resp);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sysvipc_sem_proc_show(struct seq_file *s, void *it)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(s);
struct sem_array *sma = it;
return seq_printf(s,
"%10d %10d %4o %10u %5u %5u %5u %5u %10lu %10lu\n",
sma->sem_perm.key,
sma->sem_perm.id,
sma->sem_perm.mode,
sma->sem_nsems,
from_kuid_munged(user_ns, sma->sem_perm.uid),
from_kgid_munged(user_ns, sma->sem_perm.gid),
from_kuid_munged(user_ns, sma->sem_perm.cuid),
from_kgid_munged(user_ns, sma->sem_perm.cgid),
sma->sem_otime,
sma->sem_ctime);
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long Cluster::Parse(long long& pos, long& len) const {
long status = Load(pos, len);
if (status < 0)
return status;
assert(m_pos >= m_element_start);
assert(m_timecode >= 0);
const long long cluster_stop =
(m_element_size < 0) ? -1 : m_element_start + m_element_size;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (m_pos >= cluster_stop))
return 1; // nothing else to do
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = m_pos;
for (;;) {
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
break;
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total)) {
if (m_element_size < 0)
m_element_size = pos - m_element_start;
break;
}
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0) // weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((id == 0x0F43B675) || (id == 0x0C53BB6B)) { // Cluster or Cues ID
if (m_element_size < 0)
m_element_size = pos - m_element_start;
break;
}
pos += len; // consume ID field
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume size field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
const long long block_stop = pos + size;
if (cluster_stop >= 0) {
if (block_stop > cluster_stop) {
if ((id == 0x20) || (id == 0x23))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos = cluster_stop;
break;
}
} else if ((total >= 0) && (block_stop > total)) {
m_element_size = total - m_element_start;
pos = total;
break;
} else if (block_stop > avail) {
len = static_cast<long>(size);
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
Cluster* const this_ = const_cast<Cluster*>(this);
if (id == 0x20) // BlockGroup
return this_->ParseBlockGroup(size, pos, len);
if (id == 0x23) // SimpleBlock
return this_->ParseSimpleBlock(size, pos, len);
pos += size; // consume payload
if (cluster_stop >= 0 && pos > cluster_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
assert(m_element_size > 0);
m_pos = pos;
if (cluster_stop >= 0 && m_pos > cluster_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (m_entries_count > 0) {
const long idx = m_entries_count - 1;
const BlockEntry* const pLast = m_entries[idx];
assert(pLast);
const Block* const pBlock = pLast->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
const long long start = pBlock->m_start;
if ((total >= 0) && (start > total))
return -1; // defend against trucated stream
const long long size = pBlock->m_size;
const long long stop = start + size;
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (stop <= cluster_stop));
if ((total >= 0) && (stop > total))
return -1; // defend against trucated stream
}
return 1; // no more entries
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 164,279
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mainloop_add_trigger(int priority, int(*dispatch) (gpointer user_data), gpointer userdata)
{
GSource *source = NULL;
CRM_ASSERT(sizeof(crm_trigger_t) > sizeof(GSource));
source = g_source_new(&crm_trigger_funcs, sizeof(crm_trigger_t));
CRM_ASSERT(source != NULL);
return mainloop_setup_trigger(source, priority, dispatch, userdata);
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,912
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int h2c_send_rst_stream(struct h2c *h2c, struct h2s *h2s)
{
struct buffer *res;
char str[13];
int ret;
/* RFC7540#5.4.2: To avoid looping, an endpoint MUST NOT send a
* RST_STREAM in response to a RST_STREAM frame.
*/
if (h2c->dft == H2_FT_RST_STREAM) {
ret = 1;
goto ignore;
}
if (h2c_mux_busy(h2c, h2s)) {
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_DEM_MBUSY;
return 0;
}
res = h2_get_buf(h2c, &h2c->mbuf);
if (!res) {
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_MUX_MALLOC;
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_DEM_MROOM;
return 0;
}
/* len: 4, type: 3, flags: none */
memcpy(str, "\x00\x00\x04\x03\x00", 5);
write_n32(str + 5, h2c->dsi);
write_n32(str + 9, (h2s->st > H2_SS_IDLE && h2s->st < H2_SS_CLOSED) ?
h2s->errcode : H2_ERR_STREAM_CLOSED);
ret = bo_istput(res, ist2(str, 13));
if (unlikely(ret <= 0)) {
if (!ret) {
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_MUX_MFULL;
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_DEM_MROOM;
return 0;
}
else {
h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
ignore:
if (h2s->st > H2_SS_IDLE && h2s->st < H2_SS_CLOSED) {
h2s->flags |= H2_SF_RST_SENT;
h2s_close(h2s);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int aesni_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
int ret, mode;
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
&& !enc) {
ret = aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
(cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
} else {
ret = aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt;
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
else
dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
}
if (ret < 0) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 69,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ImeObserver::ShouldForwardKeyEvent() const {
const extensions::EventListenerMap::ListenerList& listeners =
extensions::EventRouter::Get(profile_)
->listeners()
.GetEventListenersByName(input_ime::OnKeyEvent::kEventName);
for (const std::unique_ptr<extensions::EventListener>& listener : listeners) {
if (listener->extension_id() == extension_id_ && !listener->IsLazy())
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix the regression caused by http://crrev.com/c/1288350.
Bug: 900124,856135
Change-Id: Ie11ad406bd1ea383dc2a83cc8661076309154865
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1317010
Reviewed-by: Lan Wei <azurewei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shu Chen <shuchen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605282}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 144,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void apply_filter_to_stream(int append, INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)
{
zval *zstream;
php_stream *stream;
char *filtername;
int filternamelen;
long read_write = 0;
zval *filterparams = NULL;
php_stream_filter *filter = NULL;
int ret;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs|lz", &zstream,
&filtername, &filternamelen, &read_write, &filterparams) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_from_zval(stream, &zstream);
if ((read_write & PHP_STREAM_FILTER_ALL) == 0) {
/* Chain not specified.
* Examine stream->mode to determine which filters are needed
* There's no harm in attaching a filter to an unused chain,
* but why waste the memory and clock cycles?
*/
if (strchr(stream->mode, 'r') || strchr(stream->mode, '+')) {
read_write |= PHP_STREAM_FILTER_READ;
}
if (strchr(stream->mode, 'w') || strchr(stream->mode, '+') || strchr(stream->mode, 'a')) {
read_write |= PHP_STREAM_FILTER_WRITE;
}
}
if (read_write & PHP_STREAM_FILTER_READ) {
filter = php_stream_filter_create(filtername, filterparams, php_stream_is_persistent(stream) TSRMLS_CC);
if (filter == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (append) {
ret = php_stream_filter_append_ex(&stream->readfilters, filter TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
ret = php_stream_filter_prepend_ex(&stream->readfilters, filter TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (ret != SUCCESS) {
php_stream_filter_remove(filter, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (read_write & PHP_STREAM_FILTER_WRITE) {
filter = php_stream_filter_create(filtername, filterparams, php_stream_is_persistent(stream) TSRMLS_CC);
if (filter == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (append) {
ret = php_stream_filter_append_ex(&stream->writefilters, filter TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
ret = php_stream_filter_prepend_ex(&stream->writefilters, filter TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (ret != SUCCESS) {
php_stream_filter_remove(filter, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (filter) {
RETURN_RESOURCE(filter->rsrc_id = ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(NULL, filter, php_file_le_stream_filter()));
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NEVER_INLINE FreeList::checkFreedMemoryIsZapped(Address address,
size_t size) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
ASSERT(address[i] == reuseAllowedZapValue ||
address[i] == reuseForbiddenZapValue);
}
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 147,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int zend_parse_method_parameters(int num_args TSRMLS_DC, zval *this_ptr, const char *type_spec, ...) /* {{{ */
{
va_list va;
int retval;
const char *p = type_spec;
zval **object;
zend_class_entry *ce;
if (!this_ptr) {
RETURN_IF_ZERO_ARGS(num_args, p, 0);
va_start(va, type_spec);
retval = zend_parse_va_args(num_args, type_spec, &va, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
va_end(va);
} else {
p++;
RETURN_IF_ZERO_ARGS(num_args, p, 0);
va_start(va, type_spec);
object = va_arg(va, zval **);
ce = va_arg(va, zend_class_entry *);
*object = this_ptr;
if (ce && !instanceof_function(Z_OBJCE_P(this_ptr), ce TSRMLS_CC)) {
zend_error(E_CORE_ERROR, "%s::%s() must be derived from %s::%s",
ce->name, get_active_function_name(TSRMLS_C), Z_OBJCE_P(this_ptr)->name, get_active_function_name(TSRMLS_C));
}
retval = zend_parse_va_args(num_args, p, &va, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
va_end(va);
}
return retval;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sctp_inet_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(backlog < 0))
return err;
lock_sock(sk);
/* Peeled-off sockets are not allowed to listen(). */
if (sctp_style(sk, UDP_HIGH_BANDWIDTH))
goto out;
if (sock->state != SS_UNCONNECTED)
goto out;
/* If backlog is zero, disable listening. */
if (!backlog) {
if (sctp_sstate(sk, CLOSED))
goto out;
err = 0;
sctp_unhash_endpoint(ep);
sk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_CLOSED;
if (sk->sk_reuse)
sctp_sk(sk)->bind_hash->fastreuse = 1;
goto out;
}
/* If we are already listening, just update the backlog */
if (sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING))
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
else {
err = sctp_listen_start(sk, backlog);
if (err)
goto out;
}
err = 0;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 43,552
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CustomButton::SetHotTracked(bool is_hot_tracked) {
if (state_ != STATE_DISABLED)
SetState(is_hot_tracked ? STATE_HOVERED : STATE_NORMAL);
if (is_hot_tracked)
NotifyAccessibilityEvent(ui::AX_EVENT_FOCUS, true);
}
Commit Message: Custom buttons should only handle accelerators when focused.
BUG=541415
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1437523005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360130}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 132,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Parser::Parser(XRef *xrefA, Lexer *lexerA, GBool allowStreamsA) {
xref = xrefA;
lexer = lexerA;
inlineImg = 0;
allowStreams = allowStreamsA;
buf1 = lexer->getObj();
buf2 = lexer->getObj();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 4,783
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int aes_wrap_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&wctx->ks.ks);
else
AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&wctx->ks.ks);
if (!iv)
wctx->iv = NULL;
}
if (iv) {
memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
wctx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 69,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImageResource::OnMemoryDump(WebMemoryDumpLevelOfDetail level_of_detail,
WebProcessMemoryDump* memory_dump) const {
Resource::OnMemoryDump(level_of_detail, memory_dump);
const String name = GetMemoryDumpName() + "/image_content";
auto* dump = memory_dump->CreateMemoryAllocatorDump(name);
size_t encoded_size =
content_->HasImage() ? content_->GetImage()->Data()->size() : 0;
dump->AddScalar("size", "bytes", encoded_size);
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,665
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::BindDevToolsAgentRequest(
mojom::blink::DevToolsAgentAssociatedRequest request) {
if (!dev_tools_agent_)
dev_tools_agent_ = WebDevToolsAgentImpl::CreateForFrame(this);
dev_tools_agent_->BindRequest(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 145,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static loff_t lower_offset_for_page(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
struct page *page)
{
return ecryptfs_lower_header_size(crypt_stat) +
((loff_t)page->index << PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT);
}
Commit Message: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 45,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bt_status_t btsock_l2cap_connect(const bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr, int channel, int* sock_fd, int flags)
{
return btsock_l2cap_listen_or_connect(NULL, bd_addr, channel, sock_fd, flags, 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,844
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Segment::PreloadCluster(Cluster* pCluster, ptrdiff_t idx) {
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
assert(idx >= m_clusterCount);
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
long& size = m_clusterSize;
assert(size >= count);
if (count >= size) {
const long n = (size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2 * size;
Cluster** const qq = new (std::nothrow) Cluster*[n];
if (qq == NULL)
return false;
Cluster** q = qq;
Cluster** p = m_clusters;
Cluster** const pp = p + count;
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_clusters;
m_clusters = qq;
size = n;
}
assert(m_clusters);
Cluster** const p = m_clusters + idx;
Cluster** q = m_clusters + count;
assert(q >= p);
assert(q < (m_clusters + size));
while (q > p) {
Cluster** const qq = q - 1;
assert((*qq)->m_index < 0);
*q = *qq;
q = qq;
}
m_clusters[idx] = pCluster;
++m_clusterPreloadCount;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 164,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void function_trace_probe_call(unsigned long ip, unsigned long parent_ip,
struct ftrace_ops *op, struct pt_regs *pt_regs)
{
struct ftrace_func_probe *entry;
struct hlist_head *hhd;
unsigned long key;
key = hash_long(ip, FTRACE_HASH_BITS);
hhd = &ftrace_func_hash[key];
if (hlist_empty(hhd))
return;
/*
* Disable preemption for these calls to prevent a RCU grace
* period. This syncs the hash iteration and freeing of items
* on the hash. rcu_read_lock is too dangerous here.
*/
preempt_disable_notrace();
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, hhd, node) {
if (entry->ip == ip)
entry->ops->func(ip, parent_ip, &entry->data);
}
preempt_enable_notrace();
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 30,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnFindReplyAck() {
if (queued_find_reply_message_.get()) {
Send(queued_find_reply_message_.release());
}
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,380
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodOptionalDictionaryArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodOptionalDictionaryArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodOptionalDictionaryArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *ReadWPGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct
{
size_t FileId;
MagickOffsetType DataOffset;
unsigned int ProductType;
unsigned int FileType;
unsigned char MajorVersion;
unsigned char MinorVersion;
unsigned int EncryptKey;
unsigned int Reserved;
} WPGHeader;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char RecType;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPGRecord;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char Class;
unsigned char RecType;
size_t Extension;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPG2Record;
typedef struct
{
unsigned HorizontalUnits;
unsigned VerticalUnits;
unsigned char PosSizePrecision;
} WPG2Start;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned char Depth;
unsigned char Compression;
} WPG2BitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int RotAngle;
unsigned int LowLeftX;
unsigned int LowLeftY;
unsigned int UpRightX;
unsigned int UpRightY;
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType2;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int StartIndex;
unsigned int NumOfEntries;
} WPGColorMapRec;
/*
typedef struct {
size_t PS_unknown1;
unsigned int PS_unknown2;
unsigned int PS_unknown3;
} WPGPSl1Record;
*/
Image
*image;
unsigned int
status;
WPGHeader
Header;
WPGRecord
Rec;
WPG2Record
Rec2;
WPG2Start StartWPG;
WPGBitmapType1
BitmapHeader1;
WPG2BitmapType1
Bitmap2Header1;
WPGBitmapType2
BitmapHeader2;
WPGColorMapRec
WPG_Palette;
int
i,
bpp,
WPG2Flags;
ssize_t
ldblk;
size_t
one;
unsigned char
*BImgBuff;
tCTM CTM; /*current transform matrix*/
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
one=1;
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
image->depth=8;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read WPG image.
*/
Header.FileId=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.DataOffset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.ProductType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.FileType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.MajorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.MinorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.EncryptKey=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.FileId!=0x435057FF || (Header.ProductType>>8)!=0x16)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (Header.EncryptKey!=0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"EncryptedWPGImageFileNotSupported");
image->columns = 1;
image->rows = 1;
image->colors = 0;
bpp=0;
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=0;
switch(Header.FileType)
{
case 1: /* WPG level 1 */
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec.RecordLength;
switch(Rec.RecType)
{
case 0x0B: /* bitmap type 1 */
BitmapHeader1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader1.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader1.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(BitmapHeader1.HorzRes && BitmapHeader1.VertRes)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=BitmapHeader1.HorzRes/470.0;
image->y_resolution=BitmapHeader1.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader1.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader1.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader1.Depth;
goto UnpackRaster;
case 0x0E: /*Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
goto NoMemory;
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
}
break;
case 0x11: /* Start PS l1 */
if(Rec.RecordLength > 8)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+8, /* skip PS header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-8,exception);
break;
case 0x14: /* bitmap type 2 */
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader2.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader2.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader2.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->page.width=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightX)/470.0);
image->page.height=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightY)/470.0);
image->page.x=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
image->page.y=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
if(BitmapHeader2.HorzRes && BitmapHeader2.VertRes)
{
image->x_resolution=BitmapHeader2.HorzRes/470.0;
image->y_resolution=BitmapHeader2.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader2.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader2.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader2.Depth;
UnpackRaster:
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
{
NoMemory:
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/* printf("Load default colormap \n"); */
for (i=0; (i < (int) image->colors) && (i < 256); i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Blue);
}
}
else
{
if (bpp < 24)
if ( (image->colors < (one << bpp)) && (bpp != 24) )
image->colormap=(PixelPacket *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
if (bpp == 1)
{
if(image->colormap[0].red==0 &&
image->colormap[0].green==0 &&
image->colormap[0].blue==0 &&
image->colormap[1].red==0 &&
image->colormap[1].green==0 &&
image->colormap[1].blue==0)
{ /* fix crippled monochrome palette */
image->colormap[1].red =
image->colormap[1].green =
image->colormap[1].blue = QuantumRange;
}
}
if(UnpackWPGRaster(image,bpp) < 0)
/* The raster cannot be unpacked */
{
DecompressionFailed:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage");
}
if(Rec.RecType==0x14 && BitmapHeader2.RotAngle!=0 && !image_info->ping)
{
/* flop command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x8000)
{
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
}
/* flip command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x2000)
{
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
}
/* rotate command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x0FFF)
{
Image
*rotate_image;
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle &
0x0FFF), exception);
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(rotate_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,rotate_image);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=0;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x1B: /* Postscript l2 */
if(Rec.RecordLength>0x3C)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+0x3C, /* skip PS l2 header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-0x3C,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* WPG level 2 */
(void) memset(CTM,0,sizeof(CTM));
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision = 0;
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec2.Class=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rec2.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.Extension);
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec2.RecordLength;
switch(Rec2.RecType)
{
case 1:
StartWPG.HorizontalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.VerticalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision=ReadBlobByte(image);
break;
case 0x0C: /* Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /*Opacity??*/
}
break;
case 0x0E:
Bitmap2Header1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((Bitmap2Header1.Width == 0) || (Bitmap2Header1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
Bitmap2Header1.Depth=ReadBlobByte(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Compression=ReadBlobByte(image);
if(Bitmap2Header1.Compression > 1)
continue; /*Unknown compression method */
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Depth)
{
case 1:
bpp=1;
break;
case 2:
bpp=2;
break;
case 3:
bpp=4;
break;
case 4:
bpp=8;
break;
case 8:
bpp=24;
break;
default:
continue; /*Ignore raster with unknown depth*/
}
image->columns=Bitmap2Header1.Width;
image->rows=Bitmap2Header1.Height;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
goto NoMemory;
}
else
{
if(bpp < 24)
if( image->colors<(one << bpp) && bpp!=24 )
image->colormap=(PixelPacket *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Compression)
{
case 0: /*Uncompressed raster*/
{
ldblk=(ssize_t) ((bpp*image->columns+7)/8);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
ldblk,sizeof(*BImgBuff));
if (BImgBuff == (unsigned char *) NULL)
goto NoMemory;
for(i=0; i< (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
{
(void) ReadBlob(image,ldblk,BImgBuff);
InsertRow(BImgBuff,i,image,bpp);
}
if(BImgBuff)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);;
break;
}
case 1: /*RLE for WPG2 */
{
if( UnpackWPG2Raster(image,bpp) < 0)
goto DecompressionFailed;
break;
}
}
if(CTM[0][0]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
Tx(0,0)=-1; Tx(1,0)=0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)=(WPG._2Rect.X_ur+WPG._2Rect.X_ll);
Tx(1,2)=0; Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
if(CTM[1][1]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
float_matrix Tx(3,3);
Tx(0,0)= 1; Tx(1,0)= 0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=-1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)= 0; Tx(1,2)=(WPG._2Rect.Y_ur+WPG._2Rect.Y_ll);
Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x12: /* Postscript WPG2*/
i=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(Rec2.RecordLength > (unsigned int) i)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+i, /*skip PS header in the wpg2*/
(ssize_t) (Rec2.RecordLength-i-2),exception);
break;
case 0x1B: /*bitmap rectangle*/
WPG2Flags = LoadWPG2Flags(image,StartWPG.PosSizePrecision,NULL,&CTM);
(void) WPG2Flags;
break;
}
}
break;
default:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
}
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
Finish:
(void) CloseBlob(image);
{
Image
*p;
ssize_t
scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers.
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=(size_t) scene++;
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageFileDoesNotContainAnyImageData");
return(image);
}
Commit Message: Fixed out-of-bounds write reported in: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/102
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 170,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: signed char comps_objmrtree_cmp(COMPS_ObjMRTree *ort1, COMPS_ObjMRTree *ort2) {
COMPS_HSList *values1, *values2;
COMPS_HSListItem *it;
COMPS_Set *set1, *set2;
signed char ret;
values1 = comps_objmrtree_pairs(ort1);
values2 = comps_objmrtree_pairs(ort2);
set1 = comps_set_create();
comps_set_init(set1, NULL, NULL, NULL, &comps_objmrtree_paircmp);
set2 = comps_set_create();
comps_set_init(set2, NULL, NULL, NULL, &comps_objmrtree_paircmp);
for (it = values1->first; it != NULL; it = it->next) {
comps_set_add(set1, it->data);
}
for (it = values2->first; it != NULL; it = it->next) {
comps_set_add(set2, it->data);
}
ret = comps_set_cmp(set1, set2);
comps_set_destroy(&set1);
comps_set_destroy(&set2);
comps_hslist_destroy(&values1);
comps_hslist_destroy(&values2);
return !ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8ContextNativeHandler::GetModuleSystem(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(args.Length(), 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsObject());
v8::Local<v8::Context> v8_context =
v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(args[0])->CreationContext();
ScriptContext* context =
dispatcher_->script_context_set().GetByV8Context(v8_context);
if (blink::WebFrame::scriptCanAccess(context->web_frame()))
args.GetReturnValue().Set(context->module_system()->NewInstance());
}
Commit Message: Add a test that getModuleSystem() doesn't work cross origin
BUG=504011
R=kalman@chromium.org
TBR=fukino@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1241443004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338663}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 127,659
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::clearAXObjectCache()
{
ASSERT(topDocument() == this);
m_axObjectCache.clear();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::OnNetworkServiceCreated(
network::mojom::NetworkService* network_service) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService))
return;
PrefService* local_state;
if (g_browser_process) {
DCHECK(g_browser_process->local_state());
local_state = g_browser_process->local_state();
} else {
DCHECK(chrome_feature_list_creator_->local_state());
local_state = chrome_feature_list_creator_->local_state();
}
if (!data_use_measurement::ChromeDataUseMeasurement::GetInstance())
data_use_measurement::ChromeDataUseMeasurement::CreateInstance(local_state);
if (!SystemNetworkContextManager::GetInstance()) {
DCHECK(!g_browser_process);
SystemNetworkContextManager::CreateInstance(local_state);
}
SystemNetworkContextManager::GetInstance()->OnNetworkServiceCreated(
network_service);
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 152,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void print_usage(const char *program_name) {
printf("Usage: %s [options] [test name]\n", program_name);
printf("\n");
printf("Options:\n");
printf(" %-20sdisplay this help text.\n", "--help");
printf(" %-20sdo not run sanity suite.\n", "--insanity");
printf("\n");
printf("Valid test names are:\n");
for (size_t i = 0; i < sanity_suite_size; ++i) {
printf(" %s\n", sanity_suite[i].function_name);
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < test_suite_size; ++i) {
printf(" %s\n", test_suite[i].function_name);
}
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 159,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AddPageToHistory(const GURL& url,
const base::string16& title,
const history::RedirectList& redirects,
base::Time time) {
history_service()->AddPage(
url, time, reinterpret_cast<ContextID>(1), 0, GURL(),
redirects, ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED, history::SOURCE_BROWSED,
false);
history_service()->SetPageTitle(url, title);
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 147,102
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Type_ProfileSequenceDesc_Free(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, void* Ptr)
{
cmsFreeProfileSequenceDescription((cmsSEQ*) Ptr);
return;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 71,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int rtnl_unregister(int protocol, int msgtype)
{
int msgindex;
BUG_ON(protocol < 0 || protocol > RTNL_FAMILY_MAX);
msgindex = rtm_msgindex(msgtype);
if (rtnl_msg_handlers[protocol] == NULL)
return -ENOENT;
rtnl_msg_handlers[protocol][msgindex].doit = NULL;
rtnl_msg_handlers[protocol][msgindex].dumpit = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 31,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CapturerMac::ScreenRefreshCallback(CGRectCount count,
const CGRect *rect_array,
void *user_parameter) {
CapturerMac *capturer = reinterpret_cast<CapturerMac *>(user_parameter);
capturer->ScreenRefresh(count, rect_array);
}
Commit Message: Workaround for bad driver issue with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5.
BUG=87283
TEST=Run on a machine with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5 immediately after booting.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7373018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@92651 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 98,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NOINLINE void ClassicPendingScript::CheckState() const {
CHECK(!prefinalizer_called_);
CHECK(GetElement());
CHECK_EQ(is_external_, !!GetResource());
CHECK(GetResource() || !streamer_);
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gs_setdefaultcmykicc(const gs_gstate * pgs, gs_param_string * pval)
{
int code;
char* pname;
int namelen = (pval->size)+1;
gs_memory_t *mem = pgs->memory;
pname = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(mem, namelen,
"set_default_cmyk_icc");
if (pname == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
memcpy(pname,pval->data,namelen-1);
pname[namelen-1] = 0;
code = gsicc_set_profile(pgs->icc_manager,
(const char*) pname, namelen, DEFAULT_CMYK);
gs_free_object(mem, pname,
"set_default_cmyk_icc");
if (code < 0)
return gs_throw(code, "cannot find default cmyk icc profile");
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool init_dynstr(ELFOBJ *bin) {
int i, r;
const char *section_name = NULL;
if (!bin || !bin->shdr) {
return false;
}
if (!bin->shstrtab) {
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->ehdr.e_shnum; ++i) {
if (bin->shdr[i].sh_name > bin->shstrtab_size) {
return false;
}
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[bin->shdr[i].sh_name];
if (bin->shdr[i].sh_type == SHT_STRTAB && !strcmp (section_name, ".dynstr")) {
if (!(bin->dynstr = (char*) calloc (bin->shdr[i].sh_size + 1, sizeof (char)))) {
bprintf("Warning: Cannot allocate memory for dynamic strings\n");
return false;
}
if (bin->shdr[i].sh_offset > bin->size) {
return false;
}
if (bin->shdr[i].sh_offset + bin->shdr[i].sh_size > bin->size) {
return false;
}
if (bin->shdr[i].sh_offset + bin->shdr[i].sh_size < bin->shdr[i].sh_size) {
return false;
}
r = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, bin->shdr[i].sh_offset, (ut8*)bin->dynstr, bin->shdr[i].sh_size);
if (r < 1) {
R_FREE (bin->dynstr);
bin->dynstr_size = 0;
return false;
}
bin->dynstr_size = bin->shdr[i].sh_size;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 60,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HTMLLinkElement* Document::LinkManifest() const {
HTMLHeadElement* head = this->head();
if (!head)
return nullptr;
for (HTMLLinkElement* link_element =
Traversal<HTMLLinkElement>::FirstChild(*head);
link_element;
link_element = Traversal<HTMLLinkElement>::NextSibling(*link_element)) {
if (!link_element->RelAttribute().IsManifest())
continue;
return link_element;
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Inherit referrer and policy when creating a nested browsing context
BUG=763194
R=estark@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ide3950269adf26ba221f573dfa088e95291ab676
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/732652
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark <estark@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511211}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,940
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void strictFunctionMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "strictFunction", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 3)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(3, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, str, info[0]);
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(float, a, static_cast<float>(info[1]->NumberValue()));
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, b, toInt32(info[2], exceptionState), exceptionState);
bool result = imp->strictFunction(str, a, b, exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.throwIfNeeded())
return;
v8SetReturnValueBool(info, result);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,992
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct swap_info_struct *swap_info_get(swp_entry_t entry)
{
struct swap_info_struct *p;
unsigned long offset, type;
if (!entry.val)
goto out;
type = swp_type(entry);
if (type >= nr_swapfiles)
goto bad_nofile;
p = swap_info[type];
if (!(p->flags & SWP_USED))
goto bad_device;
offset = swp_offset(entry);
if (offset >= p->max)
goto bad_offset;
if (!p->swap_map[offset])
goto bad_free;
spin_lock(&swap_lock);
return p;
bad_free:
printk(KERN_ERR "swap_free: %s%08lx\n", Unused_offset, entry.val);
goto out;
bad_offset:
printk(KERN_ERR "swap_free: %s%08lx\n", Bad_offset, entry.val);
goto out;
bad_device:
printk(KERN_ERR "swap_free: %s%08lx\n", Unused_file, entry.val);
goto out;
bad_nofile:
printk(KERN_ERR "swap_free: %s%08lx\n", Bad_file, entry.val);
out:
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void pdf_zero_object(
FILE *fp,
const pdf_t *pdf,
int xref_idx,
int entry_idx)
{
int i;
char *obj;
size_t obj_sz;
xref_entry_t *entry;
entry = &pdf->xrefs[xref_idx].entries[entry_idx];
fseek(fp, entry->offset, SEEK_SET);
/* Get object and size */
obj = get_object(fp, entry->obj_id, &pdf->xrefs[xref_idx], NULL, NULL);
i = obj_sz = 0;
while (strncmp((++i)+obj, "endobj", 6))
++obj_sz;
if (obj_sz)
obj_sz += strlen("endobj") + 1;
/* Zero object */
for (i=0; i<obj_sz; i++)
fputc('0', fp);
printf("Zeroed object %d\n", entry->obj_id);
free(obj);
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 88,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __propagate_umount(struct mount *mnt)
{
struct mount *parent = mnt->mnt_parent;
struct mount *m;
BUG_ON(parent == mnt);
for (m = propagation_next(parent, parent); m;
m = propagation_next(m, parent)) {
struct mount *child = __lookup_mnt(&m->mnt,
mnt->mnt_mountpoint, 0);
/*
* umount the child only if the child has no
* other children
*/
if (child && list_empty(&child->mnt_mounts))
list_move_tail(&child->mnt_hash, &mnt->mnt_hash);
}
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 32,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int opfbld(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY &&
op->operands[0].type & OT_TBYTE ) {
data[l++] = 0xdf;
data[l++] = 0x20 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsVirtualKeyboardRequested() {
return virtual_keyboard_requested_;
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,898
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderView::didLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(
WebFrame* frame, const WebURLRequest& request,
const WebURLResponse& response) {
Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(
routing_id_,
request.url(),
response.securityInfo()));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::ForEachImmediateLocalRoot(
const base::Callback<void(RenderFrameHostImpl*)>& callback) {
if (!frame_tree_node_->child_count())
return;
base::queue<FrameTreeNode*> queue;
for (size_t index = 0; index < frame_tree_node_->child_count(); ++index)
queue.push(frame_tree_node_->child_at(index));
while (queue.size()) {
FrameTreeNode* current = queue.front();
queue.pop();
if (current->current_frame_host()->is_local_root()) {
callback.Run(current->current_frame_host());
} else {
for (size_t index = 0; index < current->child_count(); ++index)
queue.push(current->child_at(index));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *cJSON_Print(cJSON *item) {return print_value(item,0,1,0);}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,722
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameView::gatherDebugLayoutRects(RenderObject* layoutRoot)
{
bool isTracing;
TRACE_EVENT_CATEGORY_GROUP_ENABLED(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("blink.debug.layout"), &isTracing);
if (!isTracing)
return;
if (!layoutRoot->enclosingLayer()->hasCompositedLayerMapping())
return;
DisableCompositingQueryAsserts disabler;
GraphicsLayer* graphicsLayer = layoutRoot->enclosingLayer()->compositedLayerMapping()->mainGraphicsLayer();
if (!graphicsLayer)
return;
GraphicsLayerDebugInfo& debugInfo = graphicsLayer->debugInfo();
debugInfo.currentLayoutRects().clear();
for (RenderObject* renderer = layoutRoot; renderer; renderer = renderer->nextInPreOrder()) {
if (renderer->layoutDidGetCalled()) {
FloatQuad quad = renderer->localToAbsoluteQuad(FloatQuad(renderer->previousPaintInvalidationRect()));
LayoutRect rect = quad.enclosingBoundingBox();
debugInfo.currentLayoutRects().append(rect);
renderer->setLayoutDidGetCalled(false);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 119,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_counters(const struct xt_table_info *t,
struct xt_counters counters[])
{
struct ip6t_entry *iter;
unsigned int cpu;
unsigned int i;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
seqcount_t *s = &per_cpu(xt_recseq, cpu);
i = 0;
xt_entry_foreach(iter, t->entries, t->size) {
struct xt_counters *tmp;
u64 bcnt, pcnt;
unsigned int start;
tmp = xt_get_per_cpu_counter(&iter->counters, cpu);
do {
start = read_seqcount_begin(s);
bcnt = tmp->bcnt;
pcnt = tmp->pcnt;
} while (read_seqcount_retry(s, start));
ADD_COUNTER(counters[i], bcnt, pcnt);
++i;
cond_resched();
}
}
}
Commit Message: netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cuse_parse_one(char **pp, char *end, char **keyp, char **valp)
{
char *p = *pp;
char *key, *val;
while (p < end && *p == '\0')
p++;
if (p == end)
return 0;
if (end[-1] != '\0') {
printk(KERN_ERR "CUSE: info not properly terminated\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
key = val = p;
p += strlen(p);
if (valp) {
strsep(&val, "=");
if (!val)
val = key + strlen(key);
key = strstrip(key);
val = strstrip(val);
} else
key = strstrip(key);
if (!strlen(key)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "CUSE: zero length info key specified\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
*pp = p;
*keyp = key;
if (valp)
*valp = val;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: cuse: fix memory leak
The problem is that fuse_dev_alloc() acquires an extra reference to cc.fc,
and the original ref count is never dropped.
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: cc080e9e9be1 ("fuse: introduce per-instance fuse_dev structure")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 58,064
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void check_pointer_type_change(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
{
VncState *vs = container_of(notifier, VncState, mouse_mode_notifier);
int absolute = qemu_input_is_absolute();
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE) && vs->absolute != absolute) {
vnc_lock_output(vs);
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, absolute, 0,
pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server),
pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server),
VNC_ENCODING_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
}
vs->absolute = absolute;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 7,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ceph_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int ret = 0, size = 0;
const char *name = NULL;
char *value = NULL;
struct iattr newattrs;
umode_t new_mode = inode->i_mode, old_mode = inode->i_mode;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
ret = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &new_mode);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
if (ret == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
ret = acl ? -EINVAL : 0;
goto out;
}
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
value = kmalloc(size, GFP_NOFS);
if (!value) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_free;
}
if (new_mode != old_mode) {
newattrs.ia_mode = new_mode;
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
ret = __ceph_setattr(inode, &newattrs);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
}
ret = __ceph_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0);
if (ret) {
if (new_mode != old_mode) {
newattrs.ia_mode = old_mode;
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
__ceph_setattr(inode, &newattrs);
}
goto out_free;
}
ceph_set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
out_free:
kfree(value);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 1
| 166,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: file_new(struct archive_read *a, struct xar *xar, struct xmlattr_list *list)
{
struct xar_file *file;
struct xmlattr *attr;
file = calloc(1, sizeof(*file));
if (file == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, "Out of memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
file->parent = xar->file;
file->mode = 0777 | AE_IFREG;
file->atime = time(NULL);
file->mtime = time(NULL);
xar->file = file;
xar->xattr = NULL;
for (attr = list->first; attr != NULL; attr = attr->next) {
if (strcmp(attr->name, "id") == 0)
file->id = atol10(attr->value, strlen(attr->value));
}
file->nlink = 1;
if (heap_add_entry(a, &(xar->file_queue), file) != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 61,651
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AutofillManager::IsCreditCardAutofillEnabled() {
return client_->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kAutofillCreditCardEnabled) &&
client_->IsAutofillSupported();
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 154,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
const struct cred *cred;
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(target);
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
/*
* cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
* initialize effective and permitted.
*/
if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
*effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
*permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 51,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnFindMatchRectsReply(
int version,
const std::vector<gfx::RectF>& rects,
const gfx::RectF& active_rect) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->FindMatchRectsReply(this, version, rects, active_rect);
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetVertexAttribIiv(GLuint index,
GLenum pname,
GLint* params,
GLsizei params_size) {
DoGetVertexAttribImpl<GLint>(index, pname, params);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void acm_read_buffers_free(struct acm *acm)
{
struct usb_device *usb_dev = interface_to_usbdev(acm->control);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < acm->rx_buflimit; i++)
usb_free_coherent(usb_dev, acm->readsize,
acm->read_buffers[i].base, acm->read_buffers[i].dma);
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checking
An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky
device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel
by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check
to the code path for quirky devices.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: STDMETHODIMP UrlmonUrlRequest::GetBindInfo(DWORD* bind_flags,
BINDINFO* bind_info) {
if ((bind_info == NULL) || (bind_info->cbSize == 0) || (bind_flags == NULL))
return E_INVALIDARG;
*bind_flags = BINDF_ASYNCHRONOUS | BINDF_ASYNCSTORAGE | BINDF_PULLDATA;
bind_info->dwOptionsFlags = INTERNET_FLAG_NO_AUTO_REDIRECT;
bind_info->dwOptions = BINDINFO_OPTIONS_WININETFLAG;
if (load_flags_ & net::LOAD_VALIDATE_CACHE)
*bind_flags |= BINDF_RESYNCHRONIZE;
if (load_flags_ & net::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE)
*bind_flags |= BINDF_GETNEWESTVERSION;
if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(method(), "get")) {
bind_info->dwBindVerb = BINDVERB_GET;
} else if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(method(), "post")) {
bind_info->dwBindVerb = BINDVERB_POST;
} else if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(method(), "put")) {
bind_info->dwBindVerb = BINDVERB_PUT;
} else {
std::wstring verb(ASCIIToWide(StringToUpperASCII(method())));
bind_info->dwBindVerb = BINDVERB_CUSTOM;
bind_info->szCustomVerb = reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>(
::CoTaskMemAlloc((verb.length() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t)));
lstrcpyW(bind_info->szCustomVerb, verb.c_str());
}
if (post_data_len()) {
*bind_flags |= BINDF_GETNEWESTVERSION | BINDF_PRAGMA_NO_CACHE;
if (resource_type_ != ResourceType::MAIN_FRAME)
*bind_flags |= BINDF_NOWRITECACHE;
memset(&bind_info->stgmedData, 0, sizeof(STGMEDIUM));
bind_info->grfBindInfoF = 0;
if (bind_info->dwBindVerb != BINDVERB_CUSTOM)
bind_info->szCustomVerb = NULL;
if (get_upload_data(&bind_info->stgmedData.pstm) == S_OK) {
bind_info->stgmedData.tymed = TYMED_ISTREAM;
#pragma warning(disable:4244)
bind_info->cbstgmedData = post_data_len();
#pragma warning(default:4244)
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << me() << method()
<< " request with " << base::Int64ToString(post_data_len())
<< " bytes. url=" << url();
} else {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << me() << "POST request with no data!";
}
}
return S_OK;
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 100,944
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSValue jsTestNamedConstructorConstructor(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestNamedConstructor* domObject = jsCast<JSTestNamedConstructor*>(asObject(slotBase));
return JSTestNamedConstructor::getConstructor(exec, domObject->globalObject());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SoftMP3::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while ((!inQueue.empty() || (mSawInputEos && !mSignalledOutputEos)) && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = NULL;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = NULL;
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
if (inHeader) {
if (inHeader->nOffset == 0 && inHeader->nFilledLen) {
mAnchorTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
mNumFramesOutput = 0;
}
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mSawInputEos = true;
}
mConfig->pInputBuffer =
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
mConfig->inputBufferCurrentLength = inHeader->nFilledLen;
} else {
mConfig->pInputBuffer = NULL;
mConfig->inputBufferCurrentLength = 0;
}
mConfig->inputBufferMaxLength = 0;
mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength = 0;
mConfig->outputFrameSize = kOutputBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t);
if ((int32)outHeader->nAllocLen < mConfig->outputFrameSize) {
ALOGE("input buffer too small: got %u, expected %u",
outHeader->nAllocLen, mConfig->outputFrameSize);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27793371");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
mConfig->pOutputBuffer =
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer);
ERROR_CODE decoderErr;
if ((decoderErr = pvmp3_framedecoder(mConfig, mDecoderBuf))
!= NO_DECODING_ERROR) {
ALOGV("mp3 decoder returned error %d", decoderErr);
if (decoderErr != NO_ENOUGH_MAIN_DATA_ERROR
&& decoderErr != SIDE_INFO_ERROR) {
ALOGE("mp3 decoder returned error %d", decoderErr);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
if (mConfig->outputFrameSize == 0) {
mConfig->outputFrameSize = kOutputBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t);
}
if (decoderErr == NO_ENOUGH_MAIN_DATA_ERROR && mSawInputEos) {
if (!mIsFirst) {
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = kPVMP3DecoderDelay * mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t);
if (!memsetSafe(outHeader, 0, outHeader->nFilledLen)) {
return;
}
}
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
mSignalledOutputEos = true;
} else {
ALOGV_IF(mIsFirst, "insufficient data for first frame, sending silence");
if (!memsetSafe(outHeader, 0, mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t))) {
return;
}
if (inHeader) {
mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength = inHeader->nFilledLen;
}
}
} else if (mConfig->samplingRate != mSamplingRate
|| mConfig->num_channels != mNumChannels) {
mSamplingRate = mConfig->samplingRate;
mNumChannels = mConfig->num_channels;
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, 1, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
return;
}
if (mIsFirst) {
mIsFirst = false;
outHeader->nOffset =
kPVMP3DecoderDelay * mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFilledLen =
mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t) - outHeader->nOffset;
} else if (!mSignalledOutputEos) {
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t);
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs + (mNumFramesOutput * 1000000ll) / mSamplingRate;
if (inHeader) {
CHECK_GE(inHeader->nFilledLen, mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength);
inHeader->nOffset += mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
mNumFramesOutput += mConfig->outputFrameSize / mNumChannels;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix build
Change-Id: I48ba34b3df9c9a896d4b18c3f48e41744b7dab54
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 163,552
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_char_amb_opt_map(OptMap* map, UChar* p, UChar* end,
OnigEncoding enc, OnigCaseFoldType fold_flag)
{
OnigCaseFoldCodeItem items[ONIGENC_GET_CASE_FOLD_CODES_MAX_NUM];
UChar buf[ONIGENC_CODE_TO_MBC_MAXLEN];
int i, n;
add_char_opt_map(map, p[0], enc);
fold_flag = DISABLE_CASE_FOLD_MULTI_CHAR(fold_flag);
n = ONIGENC_GET_CASE_FOLD_CODES_BY_STR(enc, fold_flag, p, end, items);
if (n < 0) return n;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ONIGENC_CODE_TO_MBC(enc, items[i].code[0], buf);
add_char_opt_map(map, buf[0], enc);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void clean_dir(const char *name, int *pidarr, int start_pid, int max_pids) {
DIR *dir;
if (!(dir = opendir(name))) {
fwarning("cannot clean %s directory\n", name);
return; // we live to fight another day!
}
struct dirent *entry;
char *end;
while ((entry = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
pid_t pid = strtol(entry->d_name, &end, 10);
pid %= max_pids;
if (end == entry->d_name || *end)
continue;
if (pid < start_pid)
continue;
if (pidarr[pid] == 0)
delete_run_files(pid);
}
closedir(dir);
}
Commit Message: mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 89,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int propagate_mount_busy(struct mount *mnt, int refcnt)
{
struct mount *m, *child;
struct mount *parent = mnt->mnt_parent;
int ret = 0;
if (mnt == parent)
return do_refcount_check(mnt, refcnt);
/*
* quickly check if the current mount can be unmounted.
* If not, we don't have to go checking for all other
* mounts
*/
if (!list_empty(&mnt->mnt_mounts) || do_refcount_check(mnt, refcnt))
return 1;
for (m = propagation_next(parent, parent); m;
m = propagation_next(m, parent)) {
child = __lookup_mnt_last(&m->mnt, mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
if (child && list_empty(&child->mnt_mounts) &&
(ret = do_refcount_check(child, 1)))
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 50,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xdr_chrand_ret(XDR *xdrs, chrand_ret *objp)
{
if (!xdr_ui_4(xdrs, &objp->api_version)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_kadm5_ret_t(xdrs, &objp->code)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (objp->code == KADM5_OK) {
if (!xdr_array(xdrs, (char **)&objp->keys,
(unsigned int *)&objp->n_keys, ~0,
sizeof(krb5_keyblock), xdr_krb5_keyblock))
return FALSE;
}
return (TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
| 0
| 46,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcGetImage(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xGetImageReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGetImageReq);
return DoGetImage(client, stuff->format, stuff->drawable,
stuff->x, stuff->y,
(int) stuff->width, (int) stuff->height,
stuff->planeMask);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 14,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPages(WebFrame* frame, const WebNode& node) {
const PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params& params = *print_pages_params_;
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& print_params = params.params;
PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint prep_frame_view(print_params, frame, node);
UpdateFrameAndViewFromCssPageLayout(frame, node, &prep_frame_view,
print_params, ignore_css_margins_);
int page_count = prep_frame_view.GetExpectedPageCount();
if (!page_count)
return false;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_DidGetPrintedPagesCount(routing_id(),
print_params.document_cookie,
page_count));
const gfx::Size& canvas_size = prep_frame_view.GetPrintCanvasSize();
PrintMsg_PrintPage_Params page_params;
page_params.params = print_params;
if (params.pages.empty()) {
for (int i = 0; i < page_count; ++i) {
page_params.page_number = i;
PrintPageInternal(page_params, canvas_size, frame);
}
} else {
for (size_t i = 0; i < params.pages.size(); ++i) {
if (params.pages[i] >= page_count)
break;
page_params.page_number = params.pages[i];
PrintPageInternal(page_params, canvas_size, frame);
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 105,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void icmp_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
{
struct iphdr *iph;
int room;
struct icmp_bxm icmp_param;
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb_in);
struct ipcm_cookie ipc;
__be32 saddr;
u8 tos;
struct net *net;
struct sock *sk;
if (!rt)
goto out;
net = dev_net(rt->dst.dev);
/*
* Find the original header. It is expected to be valid, of course.
* Check this, icmp_send is called from the most obscure devices
* sometimes.
*/
iph = ip_hdr(skb_in);
if ((u8 *)iph < skb_in->head ||
(skb_in->network_header + sizeof(*iph)) > skb_in->tail)
goto out;
/*
* No replies to physical multicast/broadcast
*/
if (skb_in->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST)
goto out;
/*
* Now check at the protocol level
*/
if (rt->rt_flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_MULTICAST))
goto out;
/*
* Only reply to fragment 0. We byte re-order the constant
* mask for efficiency.
*/
if (iph->frag_off & htons(IP_OFFSET))
goto out;
/*
* If we send an ICMP error to an ICMP error a mess would result..
*/
if (icmp_pointers[type].error) {
/*
* We are an error, check if we are replying to an
* ICMP error
*/
if (iph->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP) {
u8 _inner_type, *itp;
itp = skb_header_pointer(skb_in,
skb_network_header(skb_in) +
(iph->ihl << 2) +
offsetof(struct icmphdr,
type) -
skb_in->data,
sizeof(_inner_type),
&_inner_type);
if (itp == NULL)
goto out;
/*
* Assume any unknown ICMP type is an error. This
* isn't specified by the RFC, but think about it..
*/
if (*itp > NR_ICMP_TYPES ||
icmp_pointers[*itp].error)
goto out;
}
}
sk = icmp_xmit_lock(net);
if (sk == NULL)
return;
/*
* Construct source address and options.
*/
saddr = iph->daddr;
if (!(rt->rt_flags & RTCF_LOCAL)) {
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
if (rt_is_input_route(rt) &&
net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr)
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, rt->rt_iif);
if (dev)
saddr = inet_select_addr(dev, 0, RT_SCOPE_LINK);
else
saddr = 0;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
tos = icmp_pointers[type].error ? ((iph->tos & IPTOS_TOS_MASK) |
IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL) :
iph->tos;
if (ip_options_echo(&icmp_param.replyopts, skb_in))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* Prepare data for ICMP header.
*/
icmp_param.data.icmph.type = type;
icmp_param.data.icmph.code = code;
icmp_param.data.icmph.un.gateway = info;
icmp_param.data.icmph.checksum = 0;
icmp_param.skb = skb_in;
icmp_param.offset = skb_network_offset(skb_in);
inet_sk(sk)->tos = tos;
ipc.addr = iph->saddr;
ipc.opt = &icmp_param.replyopts;
ipc.tx_flags = 0;
rt = icmp_route_lookup(net, skb_in, iph, saddr, tos,
type, code, &icmp_param);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto out_unlock;
if (!icmpv4_xrlim_allow(net, rt, type, code))
goto ende;
/* RFC says return as much as we can without exceeding 576 bytes. */
room = dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
if (room > 576)
room = 576;
room -= sizeof(struct iphdr) + icmp_param.replyopts.optlen;
room -= sizeof(struct icmphdr);
icmp_param.data_len = skb_in->len - icmp_param.offset;
if (icmp_param.data_len > room)
icmp_param.data_len = room;
icmp_param.head_len = sizeof(struct icmphdr);
icmp_push_reply(&icmp_param, &ipc, &rt);
ende:
ip_rt_put(rt);
out_unlock:
icmp_xmit_unlock(sk);
out:;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 165,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_proc_async_renew(struct nfs_client *clp, struct rpc_cred *cred, unsigned renew_flags)
{
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_RENEW],
.rpc_argp = clp,
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
struct nfs4_renewdata *data;
if (renew_flags == 0)
return 0;
if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&clp->cl_count))
return -EIO;
data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_NOFS);
if (data == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
data->client = clp;
data->timestamp = jiffies;
return rpc_call_async(clp->cl_rpcclient, &msg, RPC_TASK_SOFT,
&nfs4_renew_ops, data);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,958
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::DidFinishNavigation(
NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
NavigationHandleImpl* handle =
static_cast<NavigationHandleImpl*>(navigation_handle);
if (handle->frame_tree_node() != frame_tree_node_)
return;
navigation_handles_.erase(handle);
NotifyNavigated();
scoped_refptr<RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost> protect(this);
UpdateFrameHost(frame_tree_node_->current_frame_host());
if (navigation_handles_.empty()) {
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions())
session->ResumeSendingMessagesToAgent();
}
if (handle->HasCommitted()) {
for (auto* target : protocol::TargetHandler::ForAgentHost(this))
target->DidCommitNavigation();
}
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: print_syscall_enter(struct trace_iterator *iter, int flags,
struct trace_event *event)
{
struct trace_seq *s = &iter->seq;
struct trace_entry *ent = iter->ent;
struct syscall_trace_enter *trace;
struct syscall_metadata *entry;
int i, ret, syscall;
trace = (typeof(trace))ent;
syscall = trace->nr;
entry = syscall_nr_to_meta(syscall);
if (!entry)
goto end;
if (entry->enter_event->event.type != ent->type) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
goto end;
}
ret = trace_seq_printf(s, "%s(", entry->name);
if (!ret)
return TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE;
for (i = 0; i < entry->nb_args; i++) {
/* parameter types */
if (trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_VERBOSE) {
ret = trace_seq_printf(s, "%s ", entry->types[i]);
if (!ret)
return TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE;
}
/* parameter values */
ret = trace_seq_printf(s, "%s: %lx%s", entry->args[i],
trace->args[i],
i == entry->nb_args - 1 ? "" : ", ");
if (!ret)
return TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE;
}
ret = trace_seq_putc(s, ')');
if (!ret)
return TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE;
end:
ret = trace_seq_putc(s, '\n');
if (!ret)
return TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE;
return TRACE_TYPE_HANDLED;
}
Commit Message: tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in
Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Initialize(bool can_respond_to_crypto_handshake = true) {
clock_.AdvanceTime(quic::QuicTime::Delta::FromMilliseconds(1000));
runner_ = new net::test::TestTaskRunner(&clock_);
net::QuicChromiumAlarmFactory* alarm_factory =
new net::QuicChromiumAlarmFactory(runner_.get(), &clock_);
quic_transport_factory_ = std::make_unique<P2PQuicTransportFactoryImpl>(
&clock_, std::unique_ptr<net::QuicChromiumAlarmFactory>(alarm_factory));
auto client_packet_transport =
std::make_unique<FakePacketTransport>(alarm_factory, &clock_);
auto server_packet_transport =
std::make_unique<FakePacketTransport>(alarm_factory, &clock_);
client_packet_transport->ConnectPeerTransport(
server_packet_transport.get());
server_packet_transport->ConnectPeerTransport(
client_packet_transport.get());
rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate> client_cert =
CreateTestCertificate();
auto client_quic_transport_delegate =
std::make_unique<MockP2PQuicTransportDelegate>();
std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate>> client_certificates;
client_certificates.push_back(client_cert);
P2PQuicTransportConfig client_config(client_quic_transport_delegate.get(),
client_packet_transport.get(),
client_certificates);
client_config.is_server = false;
client_config.can_respond_to_crypto_handshake =
can_respond_to_crypto_handshake;
P2PQuicTransportImpl* client_quic_transport_ptr =
static_cast<P2PQuicTransportImpl*>(
quic_transport_factory_
->CreateQuicTransport(std::move(client_config))
.release());
std::unique_ptr<P2PQuicTransportImpl> client_quic_transport =
std::unique_ptr<P2PQuicTransportImpl>(client_quic_transport_ptr);
client_peer_ = std::make_unique<QuicPeerForTest>(
std::move(client_packet_transport),
std::move(client_quic_transport_delegate),
std::move(client_quic_transport), client_cert);
auto server_quic_transport_delegate =
std::make_unique<MockP2PQuicTransportDelegate>();
rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate> server_cert =
CreateTestCertificate();
std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate>> server_certificates;
server_certificates.push_back(server_cert);
P2PQuicTransportConfig server_config(server_quic_transport_delegate.get(),
server_packet_transport.get(),
server_certificates);
server_config.is_server = true;
server_config.can_respond_to_crypto_handshake =
can_respond_to_crypto_handshake;
P2PQuicTransportImpl* server_quic_transport_ptr =
static_cast<P2PQuicTransportImpl*>(
quic_transport_factory_
->CreateQuicTransport(std::move(server_config))
.release());
std::unique_ptr<P2PQuicTransportImpl> server_quic_transport =
std::unique_ptr<P2PQuicTransportImpl>(server_quic_transport_ptr);
server_peer_ = std::make_unique<QuicPeerForTest>(
std::move(server_packet_transport),
std::move(server_quic_transport_delegate),
std::move(server_quic_transport), server_cert);
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 172,267
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_realloc_slot_table(struct nfs4_slot_table *tbl, u32 max_reqs,
u32 ivalue)
{
struct nfs4_slot *new = NULL;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
dprintk("--> %s: max_reqs=%u, tbl->max_slots %d\n", __func__,
max_reqs, tbl->max_slots);
/* Does the newly negotiated max_reqs match the existing slot table? */
if (max_reqs != tbl->max_slots) {
new = nfs4_alloc_slots(max_reqs, GFP_NOFS);
if (!new)
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
nfs4_add_and_init_slots(tbl, new, max_reqs, ivalue);
dprintk("%s: tbl=%p slots=%p max_slots=%d\n", __func__,
tbl, tbl->slots, tbl->max_slots);
out:
dprintk("<-- %s: return %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string ChromeContentRendererClient::GetDefaultEncoding() {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_DEFAULT_ENCODING);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tg3_test_msi(struct tg3 *tp)
{
int err;
u16 pci_cmd;
if (!tg3_flag(tp, USING_MSI))
return 0;
/* Turn off SERR reporting in case MSI terminates with Master
* Abort.
*/
pci_read_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, &pci_cmd);
pci_write_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND,
pci_cmd & ~PCI_COMMAND_SERR);
err = tg3_test_interrupt(tp);
pci_write_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, pci_cmd);
if (!err)
return 0;
/* other failures */
if (err != -EIO)
return err;
/* MSI test failed, go back to INTx mode */
netdev_warn(tp->dev, "No interrupt was generated using MSI. Switching "
"to INTx mode. Please report this failure to the PCI "
"maintainer and include system chipset information\n");
free_irq(tp->napi[0].irq_vec, &tp->napi[0]);
pci_disable_msi(tp->pdev);
tg3_flag_clear(tp, USING_MSI);
tp->napi[0].irq_vec = tp->pdev->irq;
err = tg3_request_irq(tp, 0);
if (err)
return err;
/* Need to reset the chip because the MSI cycle may have terminated
* with Master Abort.
*/
tg3_full_lock(tp, 1);
tg3_halt(tp, RESET_KIND_SHUTDOWN, 1);
err = tg3_init_hw(tp, 1);
tg3_full_unlock(tp);
if (err)
free_irq(tp->napi[0].irq_vec, &tp->napi[0]);
return err;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::NativeWindow BrowserView::GetNativeWindow() const {
return GetWidget() ? GetWidget()->GetNativeWindow() : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_decode_queue_get_config_request(const struct ofp_header *oh,
ofp_port_t *port, uint32_t *queue)
{
const struct ofp10_queue_get_config_request *qgcr10;
const struct ofp11_queue_get_config_request *qgcr11;
const struct ofp14_queue_desc_request *qdr14;
struct ofpbuf b = ofpbuf_const_initializer(oh, ntohs(oh->length));
enum ofpraw raw = ofpraw_pull_assert(&b);
switch ((int) raw) {
case OFPRAW_OFPT10_QUEUE_GET_CONFIG_REQUEST:
qgcr10 = b.data;
*port = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(qgcr10->port));
*queue = OFPQ_ALL;
break;
case OFPRAW_OFPT11_QUEUE_GET_CONFIG_REQUEST:
qgcr11 = b.data;
*queue = OFPQ_ALL;
enum ofperr error = ofputil_port_from_ofp11(qgcr11->port, port);
if (error || *port == OFPP_ANY) {
return error;
}
break;
case OFPRAW_OFPST14_QUEUE_DESC_REQUEST:
qdr14 = b.data;
*queue = ntohl(qdr14->queue);
return ofputil_port_from_ofp11(qdr14->port, port);
default:
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
return (ofp_to_u16(*port) < ofp_to_u16(OFPP_MAX)
? 0
: OFPERR_OFPQOFC_BAD_PORT);
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texImage3D(GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLsizei depth,
GLint border,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
ImageBitmap* bitmap,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texImage3D",
"a buffer is bound to PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER");
return;
}
TexImageHelperImageBitmap(kTexImage3D, target, level, internalformat, format,
type, 0, 0, 0, bitmap,
GetTextureSourceSubRectangle(width, height), depth,
unpack_image_height_, exception_state);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetShelfVisibilityState(aura::Window* window,
ShelfVisibilityState visibility_state) {
Shelf* shelf = GetShelfForWindow(window);
shelf->shelf_layout_manager()->SetState(visibility_state);
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __init reserve_crashkernel(void)
{
unsigned long long crash_size, crash_base, total_mem;
bool high = false;
int ret;
total_mem = memblock_phys_mem_size();
/* crashkernel=XM */
ret = parse_crashkernel(boot_command_line, total_mem, &crash_size, &crash_base);
if (ret != 0 || crash_size <= 0) {
/* crashkernel=X,high */
ret = parse_crashkernel_high(boot_command_line, total_mem,
&crash_size, &crash_base);
if (ret != 0 || crash_size <= 0)
return;
high = true;
}
/* 0 means: find the address automatically */
if (crash_base <= 0) {
/*
* kexec want bzImage is below CRASH_KERNEL_ADDR_MAX
*/
crash_base = memblock_find_in_range(CRASH_ALIGN,
high ? CRASH_ADDR_HIGH_MAX
: CRASH_ADDR_LOW_MAX,
crash_size, CRASH_ALIGN);
if (!crash_base) {
pr_info("crashkernel reservation failed - No suitable area found.\n");
return;
}
} else {
unsigned long long start;
start = memblock_find_in_range(crash_base,
crash_base + crash_size,
crash_size, 1 << 20);
if (start != crash_base) {
pr_info("crashkernel reservation failed - memory is in use.\n");
return;
}
}
ret = memblock_reserve(crash_base, crash_size);
if (ret) {
pr_err("%s: Error reserving crashkernel memblock.\n", __func__);
return;
}
if (crash_base >= (1ULL << 32) && reserve_crashkernel_low()) {
memblock_free(crash_base, crash_size);
return;
}
pr_info("Reserving %ldMB of memory at %ldMB for crashkernel (System RAM: %ldMB)\n",
(unsigned long)(crash_size >> 20),
(unsigned long)(crash_base >> 20),
(unsigned long)(total_mem >> 20));
crashk_res.start = crash_base;
crashk_res.end = crash_base + crash_size - 1;
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &crashk_res);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 53,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::RunWhenLoaded(const base::Closure& task) {
if (!is_loaded_) {
delayed_tasks_.push_back(task);
return;
}
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, task);
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 155,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool smb1cli_conn_signing_is_active(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
return smb_signing_is_active(conn->smb1.signing);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_locku_release_calldata(void *data)
{
struct nfs4_unlockdata *calldata = data;
nfs_free_seqid(calldata->arg.seqid);
nfs4_put_lock_state(calldata->lsp);
put_nfs_open_context(calldata->ctx);
kfree(calldata);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mojom::FrameHost* RenderFrameImpl::GetFrameHost() {
if (!frame_host_ptr_.is_bound())
GetRemoteAssociatedInterfaces()->GetInterface(&frame_host_ptr_);
return frame_host_ptr_.get();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,658
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas(int dimension, ShareableBitmap::Flags flags)
: m_flags(flags)
{
IntSize size = nextPowerOfTwo(IntSize(dimension, dimension));
m_surface = ShareableSurface::create(size, flags, ShareableSurface::SupportsGraphicsSurface);
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 170,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofproto_configure_table(struct ofproto *ofproto, int table_id,
const struct ofproto_table_settings *s)
{
struct oftable *table;
ovs_assert(table_id >= 0 && table_id < ofproto->n_tables);
table = &ofproto->tables[table_id];
oftable_set_name(table, s->name);
if (table->flags & OFTABLE_READONLY) {
return;
}
if (classifier_set_prefix_fields(&table->cls,
s->prefix_fields, s->n_prefix_fields)) {
/* XXX: Trigger revalidation. */
}
ovs_mutex_lock(&ofproto_mutex);
unsigned int new_eviction = (s->enable_eviction
? table->eviction | EVICTION_CLIENT
: table->eviction & ~EVICTION_CLIENT);
oftable_configure_eviction(table, new_eviction, s->groups, s->n_groups);
table->max_flows = s->max_flows;
evict_rules_from_table(table);
ovs_mutex_unlock(&ofproto_mutex);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,302
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __perf_event_mark_enabled(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event *sub;
u64 tstamp = perf_event_time(event);
event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE;
event->tstamp_enabled = tstamp - event->total_time_enabled;
list_for_each_entry(sub, &event->sibling_list, group_entry) {
if (sub->state >= PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE)
sub->tstamp_enabled = tstamp - sub->total_time_enabled;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 31,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const wbxml_decoding *get_wbxml_decoding_from_content_type (
const char *content_type, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset)
{
const wbxml_decoding *map = NULL;
DebugLog(("get_wbxml_decoding_from_content_type: content_type = [%s]\n",
content_type));
if (content_type && content_type[0]) {
const wbxml_literal_list *item = content_type_list;
while (item && item->content_type) {
if (g_ascii_strcasecmp(content_type, item->content_type) == 0) {
/* Try the discriminator */
if (item->discriminator != NULL) {
map = item->discriminator(tvb, offset);
}
if (map == NULL) {
map = item->map;
}
break;
}
item++;
}
}
return map;
}
Commit Message: WBXML: add a basic sanity check for offset overflow
This is a naive approach allowing to detact that something went wrong,
without the need to replace all proto_tree_add_text() calls as what was
done in master-2.0 branch.
Bug: 12408
Change-Id: Ia14905005e17ae322c2fc639ad5e491fa08b0108
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15310
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Pascal Quantin <pascal.quantin@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 51,709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ReadLinkState(PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext)
{
if (pContext->bLinkDetectSupported)
{
USHORT linkStatus = 0;
VirtIODeviceGet(pContext->IODevice, ETH_LENGTH_OF_ADDRESS, &linkStatus, sizeof(linkStatus));
pContext->bConnected = !!(linkStatus & VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP);
}
else
{
pContext->bConnected = TRUE;
}
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FrameLoader::ShouldClose(bool is_reload) {
Page* page = frame_->GetPage();
if (!page || !page->GetChromeClient().CanOpenBeforeUnloadConfirmPanel())
return true;
HeapVector<Member<LocalFrame>> target_frames;
target_frames.push_back(frame_);
for (Frame* child = frame_->Tree().FirstChild(); child;
child = child->Tree().TraverseNext(frame_)) {
if (child->IsLocalFrame())
target_frames.push_back(ToLocalFrame(child));
}
bool should_close = false;
{
NavigationDisablerForBeforeUnload navigation_disabler;
size_t i;
bool did_allow_navigation = false;
for (i = 0; i < target_frames.size(); i++) {
if (!target_frames[i]->Tree().IsDescendantOf(frame_))
continue;
if (!target_frames[i]->GetDocument()->DispatchBeforeUnloadEvent(
page->GetChromeClient(), is_reload, did_allow_navigation))
break;
}
if (i == target_frames.size())
should_close = true;
}
return should_close;
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 125,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int config_get_int(const config_t *config, const char *section, const char *key, int def_value) {
assert(config != NULL);
assert(section != NULL);
assert(key != NULL);
entry_t *entry = entry_find(config, section, key);
if (!entry)
return def_value;
char *endptr;
int ret = strtol(entry->value, &endptr, 0);
return (*endptr == '\0') ? ret : def_value;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static float t1_scan_num(char *p, char **r)
{
float f;
skip(p, ' ');
if (sscanf(p, "%g", &f) != 1) {
remove_eol(p, t1_line_array);
pdftex_fail("a number expected: `%s'", t1_line_array);
}
if (r != NULL) {
for (; isdigit((unsigned char)*p) || *p == '.' ||
*p == 'e' || *p == 'E' || *p == '+' || *p == '-'; p++);
*r = p;
}
return f;
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 76,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExecuteSoapAction(struct upnphttp * h, const char * action, int n)
{
char * p;
char * p2;
int i, len, methodlen;
char namespace[256];
/* SoapAction example :
* urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANIPConnection:1#GetStatusInfo */
p = strchr(action, '#');
if(p && (p - action) < n) {
for(i = 0; i < ((int)sizeof(namespace) - 1) && (action + i) < p; i++)
namespace[i] = action[i];
namespace[i] = '\0';
p++;
p2 = strchr(p, '"');
if(p2 && (p2 - action) <= n)
methodlen = p2 - p;
else
methodlen = n - (p - action);
/*syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "SoapMethod: %.*s %d %d %p %p %d",
methodlen, p, methodlen, n, action, p, (int)(p - action));*/
for(i = 0; soapMethods[i].methodName; i++) {
len = strlen(soapMethods[i].methodName);
if((len == methodlen) && memcmp(p, soapMethods[i].methodName, len) == 0) {
#ifdef DEBUG
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "Remote Call of SoapMethod '%s' %s",
soapMethods[i].methodName, namespace);
#endif /* DEBUG */
soapMethods[i].methodImpl(h, soapMethods[i].methodName, namespace);
return;
}
}
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "SoapMethod: Unknown: %.*s %s", methodlen, p, namespace);
} else {
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "cannot parse SoapAction");
}
SoapError(h, 401, "Invalid Action");
}
Commit Message: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout: check args
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::exitPictureInPicture(
WebMediaPlayer::PipWindowClosedCallback callback) {
if (GetWebMediaPlayer())
GetWebMediaPlayer()->ExitPictureInPicture(std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 154,159
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool IsReload(const ViewMsg_Navigate_Params& params) {
return
params.navigation_type == ViewMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD ||
params.navigation_type == ViewMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_IGNORING_CACHE;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,373
|
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