instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cdf_read(const cdf_info_t *info, off_t off, void *buf, size_t len)
{
size_t siz = (size_t)off + len;
if ((off_t)(off + len) != (off_t)siz) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
if (info->i_buf != NULL && info->i_len >= siz) {
(void)memcpy(buf, &info->i_buf[off], len);
return (ssize_t)len;
}
if (info->i_fd == -1)
return -1;
if (pread(info->i_fd, buf, len, off) != (ssize_t)len)
return -1;
return (ssize_t)len;
}
Commit Message: Add missing check offset test (Francisco Alonso, Jan Kaluza at RedHat)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,054
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int log_write(void __user *log_base,
u64 write_address, u64 write_length)
{
u64 write_page = write_address / VHOST_PAGE_SIZE;
int r;
if (!write_length)
return 0;
write_length += write_address % VHOST_PAGE_SIZE;
for (;;) {
u64 base = (u64)(unsigned long)log_base;
u64 log = base + write_page / 8;
int bit = write_page % 8;
if ((u64)(unsigned long)log != log)
return -EFAULT;
r = set_bit_to_user(bit, (void __user *)(unsigned long)log);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (write_length <= VHOST_PAGE_SIZE)
break;
write_length -= VHOST_PAGE_SIZE;
write_page += 1;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix length for cross region descriptor
If a single descriptor crosses a region, the
second chunk length should be decremented
by size translated so far, instead it includes
the full descriptor length.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tcp_cwnd_down(struct sock *sk, int flag)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int decr = tp->snd_cwnd_cnt + 1;
if ((flag & (FLAG_ANY_PROGRESS | FLAG_DSACKING_ACK)) ||
(tcp_is_reno(tp) && !(flag & FLAG_NOT_DUP))) {
tp->snd_cwnd_cnt = decr & 1;
decr >>= 1;
if (decr && tp->snd_cwnd > tcp_cwnd_min(sk))
tp->snd_cwnd -= decr;
tp->snd_cwnd = min(tp->snd_cwnd, tcp_packets_in_flight(tp) + 1);
tp->snd_cwnd_stamp = tcp_time_stamp;
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 41,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SyncSocket::CreatePair(SyncSocket* socket_a, SyncSocket* socket_b) {
return CreatePairImpl(&socket_a->handle_, &socket_b->handle_, false);
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 110,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsTopSitesLoaded() { return top_sites()->loaded_; }
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 147,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void getScreenColorProfile(WebVector<char>* profile)
{
static unsigned char profileData[] = {
0x00,0x00,0x01,0xea,0x54,0x45,0x53,0x54,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x6d,0x6e,0x74,0x72,0x52,0x47,0x42,0x20,0x58,0x59,0x5a,0x20,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x61,0x63,0x73,0x70,0x74,0x65,0x73,0x74,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x74,0x65,0x73,0x74,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xf6,0xd6,
0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xd3,0x2d,0x74,0x65,0x73,0x74,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x09,
0x63,0x70,0x72,0x74,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xf0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0d,
0x64,0x65,0x73,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8c,
0x77,0x74,0x70,0x74,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x8c,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x14,
0x72,0x58,0x59,0x5a,0x00,0x00,0x01,0xa0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x14,
0x67,0x58,0x59,0x5a,0x00,0x00,0x01,0xb4,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x14,
0x62,0x58,0x59,0x5a,0x00,0x00,0x01,0xc8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x14,
0x72,0x54,0x52,0x43,0x00,0x00,0x01,0xdc,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0e,
0x67,0x54,0x52,0x43,0x00,0x00,0x01,0xdc,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0e,
0x62,0x54,0x52,0x43,0x00,0x00,0x01,0xdc,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0e,
0x74,0x65,0x78,0x74,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x64,0x65,0x73,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x77,0x68,0x61,0x63,0x6b,0x65,0x64,0x2e,
0x69,0x63,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x11,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x58,0x59,0x5a,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xf3,0x52,
0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x16,0xcc,0x58,0x59,0x5a,0x20,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x34,0x8d,0x00,0x00,0xa0,0x2c,
0x00,0x00,0x0f,0x95,0x58,0x59,0x5a,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x26,0x31,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x2f,0x00,0x00,0xbe,0x9b,
0x58,0x59,0x5a,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x9c,0x18,
0x00,0x00,0x4f,0xa5,0x00,0x00,0x04,0xfc,0x63,0x75,0x72,0x76,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x02,0x33
};
static struct WhackedColorProfile {
char* data() { return reinterpret_cast<char*>(profileData); }
const size_t profileSize = 490u;
size_t size() { return profileSize; }
} screenProfile;
profile->assign(screenProfile.data(), screenProfile.size());
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 132,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BrowserEventRouter::TabEntry::TabEntry()
: complete_waiting_on_load_(false),
url_() {
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 116,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AXObjectCacheImpl::remove(LayoutObject* layoutObject) {
if (!layoutObject)
return;
AXID axID = m_layoutObjectMapping.at(layoutObject);
remove(axID);
m_layoutObjectMapping.erase(layoutObject);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebUserMediaClient* RenderFrameImpl::UserMediaClient() {
if (!web_user_media_client_)
InitializeUserMediaClient();
return web_user_media_client_;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cassignop(JF, js_Ast *exp, int opcode)
{
js_Ast *lhs = exp->a;
js_Ast *rhs = exp->b;
cassignop1(J, F, lhs);
cexp(J, F, rhs);
emit(J, F, opcode);
cassignop2(J, F, lhs, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 7,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ptrace_setoptions(struct task_struct *child, unsigned long data)
{
unsigned flags;
if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) {
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
return -EINVAL;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (seccomp_mode(¤t->seccomp) != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED ||
current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)
return -EPERM;
}
/* Avoid intermediate state when all opts are cleared */
flags = child->ptrace;
flags &= ~(PTRACE_O_MASK << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT);
flags |= (data << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT);
child->ptrace = flags;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ptrace: Fix ->ptracer_cred handling for PTRACE_TRACEME
Fix two issues:
When called for PTRACE_TRACEME, ptrace_link() would obtain an RCU
reference to the parent's objective credentials, then give that pointer
to get_cred(). However, the object lifetime rules for things like
struct cred do not permit unconditionally turning an RCU reference into
a stable reference.
PTRACE_TRACEME records the parent's credentials as if the parent was
acting as the subject, but that's not the case. If a malicious
unprivileged child uses PTRACE_TRACEME and the parent is privileged, and
at a later point, the parent process becomes attacker-controlled
(because it drops privileges and calls execve()), the attacker ends up
with control over two processes with a privileged ptrace relationship,
which can be abused to ptrace a suid binary and obtain root privileges.
Fix both of these by always recording the credentials of the process
that is requesting the creation of the ptrace relationship:
current_cred() can't change under us, and current is the proper subject
for access control.
This change is theoretically userspace-visible, but I am not aware of
any code that it will actually break.
Fixes: 64b875f7ac8a ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 89,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void inode_sb_list_add(struct inode *inode)
{
spin_lock(&inode->i_sb->s_inode_list_lock);
list_add(&inode->i_sb_list, &inode->i_sb->s_inodes);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_sb->s_inode_list_lock);
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 79,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void draw_opaque_box(ASS_Renderer *render_priv, GlyphInfo *info,
int asc, int desc, ASS_Outline *ol,
FT_Vector advance, int sx, int sy)
{
int adv = advance.x;
double scale_y = info->orig_scale_y;
double scale_x = info->orig_scale_x;
sx = FFMAX(64, sx);
sy = FFMAX(64, sy);
adv += double_to_d6(info->hspacing * render_priv->font_scale * scale_x);
adv *= scale_x;
sx *= scale_x;
sy *= scale_y;
desc *= scale_y;
desc += asc * (scale_y - 1.0);
FT_Vector points[4] = {
{ .x = -sx, .y = asc + sy },
{ .x = adv + sx, .y = asc + sy },
{ .x = adv + sx, .y = -desc - sy },
{ .x = -sx, .y = -desc - sy },
};
ol->n_points = ol->n_contours = 0;
if (!outline_alloc(ol, 4, 1))
return;
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
ol->points[ol->n_points] = points[i];
ol->tags[ol->n_points++] = 1;
}
ol->contours[ol->n_contours++] = ol->n_points - 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix line wrapping mode 0/3 bugs
This fixes two separate bugs:
a) Don't move a linebreak into the first symbol. This results in a empty
line at the front, which does not help to equalize line lengths at all.
b) When moving a linebreak into a symbol that already is a break, the
number of lines must be decremented. Otherwise, uninitialized memory
is possibly used for later layout operations.
Found by fuzzer test case
id:000085,sig:11,src:003377+003350,op:splice,rep:8.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 73,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_deassign_dev_irq(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_assigned_irq
*assigned_irq)
{
int r = -ENODEV;
struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel *match;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
match = kvm_find_assigned_dev(&kvm->arch.assigned_dev_head,
assigned_irq->assigned_dev_id);
if (!match)
goto out;
r = kvm_deassign_irq(kvm, match, assigned_irq->flags);
out:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Device assignment permission checks
(cherry picked from commit 3d27e23b17010c668db311140b17bbbb70c78fb9)
Only allow KVM device assignment to attach to devices which:
- Are not bridges
- Have BAR resources (assume others are special devices)
- The user has permissions to use
Assigning a bridge is a configuration error, it's not supported, and
typically doesn't result in the behavior the user is expecting anyway.
Devices without BAR resources are typically chipset components that
also don't have host drivers. We don't want users to hold such devices
captive or cause system problems by fencing them off into an iommu
domain. We determine "permission to use" by testing whether the user
has access to the PCI sysfs resource files. By default a normal user
will not have access to these files, so it provides a good indication
that an administration agent has granted the user access to the device.
[Yang Bai: add missing #include]
[avi: fix comment style]
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Bai <hamo.by@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 34,655
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodDefaultStringArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodDefaultStringArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodDefaultStringArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SoftVPX::onReset() {
bool portWillReset = false;
if (!outputBuffers(
true /* flushDecoder */, false /* display */, false /* eos */, &portWillReset)) {
ALOGW("Failed to flush decoder. Try to hard reset decoder");
destroyDecoder();
initDecoder();
}
mEOSStatus = INPUT_DATA_AVAILABLE;
}
Commit Message: fix build
Change-Id: I9bb8c659d3fc97a8e748451d82d0f3448faa242b
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 158,334
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void compute_stereo_samples(short *output, int num_c, float **data, int d_offset, int len)
{
#define BUFFER_SIZE 32
float buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
int i,j,o,n = BUFFER_SIZE >> 1;
check_endianness();
for (o = 0; o < len; o += BUFFER_SIZE >> 1) {
int o2 = o << 1;
memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
if (o + n > len) n = len - o;
for (j=0; j < num_c; ++j) {
int m = channel_position[num_c][j] & (PLAYBACK_LEFT | PLAYBACK_RIGHT);
if (m == (PLAYBACK_LEFT | PLAYBACK_RIGHT)) {
for (i=0; i < n; ++i) {
buffer[i*2+0] += data[j][d_offset+o+i];
buffer[i*2+1] += data[j][d_offset+o+i];
}
} else if (m == PLAYBACK_LEFT) {
for (i=0; i < n; ++i) {
buffer[i*2+0] += data[j][d_offset+o+i];
}
} else if (m == PLAYBACK_RIGHT) {
for (i=0; i < n; ++i) {
buffer[i*2+1] += data[j][d_offset+o+i];
}
}
}
for (i=0; i < (n<<1); ++i) {
FASTDEF(temp);
int v = FAST_SCALED_FLOAT_TO_INT(temp,buffer[i],15);
if ((unsigned int) (v + 32768) > 65535)
v = v < 0 ? -32768 : 32767;
output[o2+i] = v;
}
}
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 75,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sc_file_add_acl_entry(sc_file_t *file, unsigned int operation,
unsigned int method, unsigned long key_ref)
{
sc_acl_entry_t *p, *_new;
if (file == NULL || operation >= SC_MAX_AC_OPS) {
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
}
switch (method) {
case SC_AC_NEVER:
sc_file_clear_acl_entries(file, operation);
file->acl[operation] = (sc_acl_entry_t *) 1;
return SC_SUCCESS;
case SC_AC_NONE:
sc_file_clear_acl_entries(file, operation);
file->acl[operation] = (sc_acl_entry_t *) 2;
return SC_SUCCESS;
case SC_AC_UNKNOWN:
sc_file_clear_acl_entries(file, operation);
file->acl[operation] = (sc_acl_entry_t *) 3;
return SC_SUCCESS;
default:
/* NONE and UNKNOWN get zapped when a new AC is added.
* If the ACL is NEVER, additional entries will be
* dropped silently. */
if (file->acl[operation] == (sc_acl_entry_t *) 1)
return SC_SUCCESS;
if (file->acl[operation] == (sc_acl_entry_t *) 2
|| file->acl[operation] == (sc_acl_entry_t *) 3)
file->acl[operation] = NULL;
}
/* If the entry is already present (e.g. due to the mapping)
* of the card's AC with OpenSC's), don't add it again. */
for (p = file->acl[operation]; p != NULL; p = p->next) {
if ((p->method == method) && (p->key_ref == key_ref))
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
_new = malloc(sizeof(sc_acl_entry_t));
if (_new == NULL)
return SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
_new->method = method;
_new->key_ref = key_ref;
_new->next = NULL;
p = file->acl[operation];
if (p == NULL) {
file->acl[operation] = _new;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
while (p->next != NULL)
p = p->next;
p->next = _new;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,832
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, loff_t pos, size_t len)
{
ssize_t res = vfs_read(file, (void __user *)addr, len, &pos);
if (res > 0)
flush_icache_range(addr, addr + len);
return res;
}
Commit Message: fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables
This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a
setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid
root.
This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 43,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
{
#ifdef PANORAMIX
if (!noPanoramiXExtension) {
REQUEST(xScreenSaverSetAttributesReq);
PanoramiXRes *draw;
PanoramiXRes *backPix = NULL;
PanoramiXRes *bordPix = NULL;
PanoramiXRes *cmap = NULL;
int i, status, len;
int pback_offset = 0, pbord_offset = 0, cmap_offset = 0;
XID orig_visual, tmp;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xScreenSaverSetAttributesReq);
status = dixLookupResourceByClass((void **) &draw, stuff->drawable,
XRC_DRAWABLE, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (status != Success)
return (status == BadValue) ? BadDrawable : status;
len =
stuff->length -
bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xScreenSaverSetAttributesReq));
if (Ones(stuff->mask) != len)
return BadLength;
if ((Mask) stuff->mask & CWBackPixmap) {
pback_offset = Ones((Mask) stuff->mask & (CWBackPixmap - 1));
tmp = *((CARD32 *) &stuff[1] + pback_offset);
if ((tmp != None) && (tmp != ParentRelative)) {
status = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &backPix, tmp,
XRT_PIXMAP, client,
DixReadAccess);
if (status != Success)
return status;
}
}
if ((Mask) stuff->mask & CWBorderPixmap) {
pbord_offset = Ones((Mask) stuff->mask & (CWBorderPixmap - 1));
tmp = *((CARD32 *) &stuff[1] + pbord_offset);
if (tmp != CopyFromParent) {
status = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &bordPix, tmp,
XRT_PIXMAP, client,
DixReadAccess);
if (status != Success)
return status;
}
}
if ((Mask) stuff->mask & CWColormap) {
cmap_offset = Ones((Mask) stuff->mask & (CWColormap - 1));
tmp = *((CARD32 *) &stuff[1] + cmap_offset);
if (tmp != CopyFromParent) {
status = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &cmap, tmp,
XRT_COLORMAP, client,
DixReadAccess);
if (status != Success)
return status;
}
}
orig_visual = stuff->visualID;
FOR_NSCREENS_BACKWARD(i) {
stuff->drawable = draw->info[i].id;
if (backPix)
*((CARD32 *) &stuff[1] + pback_offset) = backPix->info[i].id;
if (bordPix)
*((CARD32 *) &stuff[1] + pbord_offset) = bordPix->info[i].id;
if (cmap)
*((CARD32 *) &stuff[1] + cmap_offset) = cmap->info[i].id;
if (orig_visual != CopyFromParent)
stuff->visualID = PanoramiXTranslateVisualID(i, orig_visual);
status = ScreenSaverSetAttributes(client);
}
return status;
}
#endif
return ScreenSaverSetAttributes(client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long task_h_load(struct task_struct *p)
{
return p->se.avg.load_avg;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: save_yourself_request_callback (SmsConn conn,
SmPointer manager_data,
int save_type,
Bool shutdown,
int interact_style,
Bool fast,
Bool global)
{
GsmXSMPClient *client = manager_data;
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: Client '%s' received SaveYourselfRequest(%s, %s, %s, %s, %s)",
client->priv->description,
save_type == SmSaveLocal ? "SmSaveLocal" :
save_type == SmSaveGlobal ? "SmSaveGlobal" : "SmSaveBoth",
shutdown ? "Shutdown" : "!Shutdown",
interact_style == SmInteractStyleAny ? "SmInteractStyleAny" :
interact_style == SmInteractStyleErrors ? "SmInteractStyleErrors" :
"SmInteractStyleNone", fast ? "Fast" : "!Fast",
global ? "Global" : "!Global");
/* Examining the g_debug above, you can see that there are a total
* of 72 different combinations of options that this could have been
* called with. However, most of them are stupid.
*
* If @shutdown and @global are both TRUE, that means the caller is
* requesting that a logout message be sent to all clients, so we do
* that. We use @fast to decide whether or not to show a
* confirmation dialog. (This isn't really what @fast is for, but
* the old gnome-session and ksmserver both interpret it that way,
* so we do too.) We ignore @save_type because we pick the correct
* save_type ourselves later based on user prefs, dialog choices,
* etc, and we ignore @interact_style, because clients have not used
* it correctly consistently enough to make it worth honoring.
*
* If @shutdown is TRUE and @global is FALSE, the caller is
* confused, so we ignore the request.
*
* If @shutdown is FALSE and @save_type is SmSaveGlobal or
* SmSaveBoth, then the client wants us to ask some or all open
* applications to save open files to disk, but NOT quit. This is
* silly and so we ignore the request.
*
* If @shutdown is FALSE and @save_type is SmSaveLocal, then the
* client wants us to ask some or all open applications to update
* their current saved state, but not log out. At the moment, the
* code only supports this for the !global case (ie, a client
* requesting that it be allowed to update *its own* saved state,
* but not having everyone else update their saved state).
*/
if (shutdown && global) {
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: initiating shutdown");
g_signal_emit (client, signals[LOGOUT_REQUEST], 0, !fast);
} else if (!shutdown && !global) {
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: initiating checkpoint");
do_save_yourself (client, SmSaveLocal, TRUE);
} else {
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: ignoring");
}
}
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 63,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_buf_ioerror(
xfs_buf_t *bp,
int error)
{
ASSERT(error >= 0 && error <= 0xffff);
bp->b_error = (unsigned short)error;
trace_xfs_buf_ioerror(bp, error, _RET_IP_);
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 33,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void br_multicast_init(struct net_bridge *br)
{
br->hash_elasticity = 4;
br->hash_max = 512;
br->multicast_router = 1;
br->multicast_querier = 0;
br->multicast_query_use_ifaddr = 0;
br->multicast_last_member_count = 2;
br->multicast_startup_query_count = 2;
br->multicast_last_member_interval = HZ;
br->multicast_query_response_interval = 10 * HZ;
br->multicast_startup_query_interval = 125 * HZ / 4;
br->multicast_query_interval = 125 * HZ;
br->multicast_querier_interval = 255 * HZ;
br->multicast_membership_interval = 260 * HZ;
spin_lock_init(&br->multicast_lock);
setup_timer(&br->multicast_router_timer,
br_multicast_local_router_expired, 0);
setup_timer(&br->multicast_querier_timer,
br_multicast_querier_expired, (unsigned long)br);
setup_timer(&br->multicast_query_timer, br_multicast_query_expired,
(unsigned long)br);
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 30,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void setterCallWithExecutionContextStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::setterCallWithExecutionContextStringAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mac80211_hwsim_monitor_rx(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
struct sk_buff *tx_skb,
struct ieee80211_channel *chan)
{
struct mac80211_hwsim_data *data = hw->priv;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct hwsim_radiotap_hdr *hdr;
u16 flags;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(tx_skb);
struct ieee80211_rate *txrate = ieee80211_get_tx_rate(hw, info);
if (WARN_ON(!txrate))
return;
if (!netif_running(hwsim_mon))
return;
skb = skb_copy_expand(tx_skb, sizeof(*hdr), 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return;
hdr = skb_push(skb, sizeof(*hdr));
hdr->hdr.it_version = PKTHDR_RADIOTAP_VERSION;
hdr->hdr.it_pad = 0;
hdr->hdr.it_len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(*hdr));
hdr->hdr.it_present = cpu_to_le32((1 << IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_FLAGS) |
(1 << IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_RATE) |
(1 << IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_TSFT) |
(1 << IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_CHANNEL));
hdr->rt_tsft = __mac80211_hwsim_get_tsf(data);
hdr->rt_flags = 0;
hdr->rt_rate = txrate->bitrate / 5;
hdr->rt_channel = cpu_to_le16(chan->center_freq);
flags = IEEE80211_CHAN_2GHZ;
if (txrate->flags & IEEE80211_RATE_ERP_G)
flags |= IEEE80211_CHAN_OFDM;
else
flags |= IEEE80211_CHAN_CCK;
hdr->rt_chbitmask = cpu_to_le16(flags);
skb->dev = hwsim_mon;
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
skb->pkt_type = PACKET_OTHERHOST;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_802_2);
memset(skb->cb, 0, sizeof(skb->cb));
netif_rx(skb);
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 83,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int addReplyCommandFlag(client *c, struct redisCommand *cmd, int f, char *reply) {
if (cmd->flags & f) {
addReplyStatus(c, reply);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 69,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: httpd_write_response( httpd_conn* hc )
{
/* If we are in a sub-process, turn off no-delay mode. */
if ( sub_process )
httpd_clear_ndelay( hc->conn_fd );
/* Send the response, if necessary. */
if ( hc->responselen > 0 )
{
(void) httpd_write_fully( hc->conn_fd, hc->response, hc->responselen );
hc->responselen = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SoftAACEncoder2::~SoftAACEncoder2() {
aacEncClose(&mAACEncoder);
onReset();
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check in SoftAACEncoder2::onQueueFilled()
Original code blindly copied some header information into the
user-supplied buffer without checking for sufficient space.
The code does check when it gets to filling the data -- it's
just the header copies that weren't checked.
Bug: 34617444
Test: ran POC before/after
Change-Id: I6e80ec90616f6cd02bb8316cd2d6e309b7e4729d
(cherry picked from commit 6231243626b8b9c57593b1f0ee417f2c4af4c0aa)
CWE ID: CWE-120
| 0
| 162,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ExtensionService::IsInstalledApp(const GURL& url) {
return !!GetInstalledApp(url);
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 98,607
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rb_iter_reset(struct ring_buffer_iter *iter)
{
struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer = iter->cpu_buffer;
/* Iterator usage is expected to have record disabled */
iter->head_page = cpu_buffer->reader_page;
iter->head = cpu_buffer->reader_page->read;
iter->cache_reader_page = iter->head_page;
iter->cache_read = cpu_buffer->read;
if (iter->head)
iter->read_stamp = cpu_buffer->read_stamp;
else
iter->read_stamp = iter->head_page->page->time_stamp;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SampleTable::isValid() const {
return mChunkOffsetOffset >= 0
&& mSampleToChunkOffset >= 0
&& mSampleSizeOffset >= 0
&& mHasTimeToSample;
}
Commit Message: Fix 'potential memory leak' compiler warning.
This CL fixes the following compiler warning:
frameworks/av/media/libstagefright/SampleTable.cpp:569:9: warning:
Memory allocated by 'new[]' should be deallocated by 'delete[]', not
'delete'.
Bug: 33137046
Test: Compiled with change; no warning generated.
Change-Id: I29abd90e02bf482fa840d1f7206ebbdacf7dfa37
(cherry picked from commit 158c197b668ad684f92829db6a31bee3aec794ba)
(cherry picked from commit 37c428cd521351837fccb6864f509f996820b234)
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 162,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ffs_func_resume(struct usb_function *f)
{
ENTER();
ffs_event_add(ffs_func_from_usb(f)->ffs, FUNCTIONFS_RESUME);
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagecolorclosesthwb)
{
zval *IM;
long red, green, blue;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rlll", &IM, &red, &green, &blue) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
RETURN_LONG(gdImageColorClosestHWB(im, red, green, blue));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,133
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SyncDataList ExtensionService::GetAllSyncData(syncable::ModelType type) const {
const SyncBundle* bundle = GetSyncBundleForModelTypeConst(type);
CHECK(bundle);
std::vector<ExtensionSyncData> extension_sync_data = GetSyncDataList(*bundle);
SyncDataList result(extension_sync_data.size());
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(extension_sync_data.size()); ++i) {
result[i] = extension_sync_data[i].GetSyncData();
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 98,569
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IPCThreadState::freeBuffer(Parcel* parcel, const uint8_t* data,
size_t /*dataSize*/,
const binder_size_t* /*objects*/,
size_t /*objectsSize*/, void* /*cookie*/)
{
IF_LOG_COMMANDS() {
alog << "Writing BC_FREE_BUFFER for " << data << endl;
}
ALOG_ASSERT(data != NULL, "Called with NULL data");
if (parcel != NULL) parcel->closeFileDescriptors();
IPCThreadState* state = self();
state->mOut.writeInt32(BC_FREE_BUFFER);
state->mOut.writePointer((uintptr_t)data);
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #27252896: Security Vulnerability -- weak binder
Sending transaction to freed BBinder through weak handle
can cause use of a (mostly) freed object. We need to try to
safely promote to a strong reference first.
Change-Id: Ic9c6940fa824980472e94ed2dfeca52a6b0fd342
(cherry picked from commit c11146106f94e07016e8e26e4f8628f9a0c73199)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::NativeCursor RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetCursor(const gfx::Point& point) {
if (mouse_locked_)
return ui::CursorType::kNone;
return current_cursor_.GetNativeCursor();
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 132,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool has_intersects_mems_allowed(struct task_struct *tsk,
const nodemask_t *mask)
{
struct task_struct *start = tsk;
do {
if (mask) {
/*
* If this is a mempolicy constrained oom, tsk's
* cpuset is irrelevant. Only return true if its
* mempolicy intersects current, otherwise it may be
* needlessly killed.
*/
if (mempolicy_nodemask_intersects(tsk, mask))
return true;
} else {
/*
* This is not a mempolicy constrained oom, so only
* check the mems of tsk's cpuset.
*/
if (cpuset_mems_allowed_intersects(current, tsk))
return true;
}
} while_each_thread(start, tsk);
return false;
}
Commit Message: oom: fix integer overflow of points in oom_badness
commit ff05b6f7ae762b6eb464183eec994b28ea09f6dd upstream.
An integer overflow will happen on 64bit archs if task's sum of rss,
swapents and nr_ptes exceeds (2^31)/1000 value. This was introduced by
commit
f755a04 oom: use pte pages in OOM score
where the oom score computation was divided into several steps and it's no
longer computed as one expression in unsigned long(rss, swapents, nr_pte
are unsigned long), where the result value assigned to points(int) is in
range(1..1000). So there could be an int overflow while computing
176 points *= 1000;
and points may have negative value. Meaning the oom score for a mem hog task
will be one.
196 if (points <= 0)
197 return 1;
For example:
[ 3366] 0 3366 35390480 24303939 5 0 0 oom01
Out of memory: Kill process 3366 (oom01) score 1 or sacrifice child
Here the oom1 process consumes more than 24303939(rss)*4096~=92GB physical
memory, but it's oom score is one.
In this situation the mem hog task is skipped and oom killer kills another and
most probably innocent task with oom score greater than one.
The points variable should be of type long instead of int to prevent the
int overflow.
Signed-off-by: Frantisek Hrbata <fhrbata@redhat.com>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,348
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ext4_zero_partial_blocks(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
loff_t lstart, loff_t length)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
unsigned partial_start, partial_end;
ext4_fsblk_t start, end;
loff_t byte_end = (lstart + length - 1);
int err = 0;
partial_start = lstart & (sb->s_blocksize - 1);
partial_end = byte_end & (sb->s_blocksize - 1);
start = lstart >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
end = byte_end >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
/* Handle partial zero within the single block */
if (start == end &&
(partial_start || (partial_end != sb->s_blocksize - 1))) {
err = ext4_block_zero_page_range(handle, mapping,
lstart, length);
return err;
}
/* Handle partial zero out on the start of the range */
if (partial_start) {
err = ext4_block_zero_page_range(handle, mapping,
lstart, sb->s_blocksize);
if (err)
return err;
}
/* Handle partial zero out on the end of the range */
if (partial_end != sb->s_blocksize - 1)
err = ext4_block_zero_page_range(handle, mapping,
byte_end - partial_end,
partial_end + 1);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: process_runtime_configs()
{
int i, rval, fd;
bool processed = false;
for (i=0; i <= rArray.getlast(); i++) {
processed = true;
char* tmp_dir = temp_dir_path();
ASSERT(tmp_dir);
MyString tmp_file_tmpl = tmp_dir;
free(tmp_dir);
tmp_file_tmpl += "/cndrtmpXXXXXX";
char* tmp_file = strdup(tmp_file_tmpl.Value());
fd = condor_mkstemp( tmp_file );
if (fd < 0) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "condor_mkstemp(%s) returned %d, '%s' (errno %d) in "
"process_dynamic_configs()\n", tmp_file, fd,
strerror(errno), errno );
exit(1);
}
if (write(fd, rArray[i].config, strlen(rArray[i].config))
!= (ssize_t)strlen(rArray[i].config)) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "write failed with errno %d in "
"process_dynamic_configs\n", errno );
exit(1);
}
if (close(fd) < 0) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "close failed with errno %d in "
"process_dynamic_configs\n", errno );
exit(1);
}
rval = Read_config( tmp_file, ConfigTab, TABLESIZE,
EXPAND_LAZY, false, extra_info );
if (rval < 0) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "Configuration Error Line %d "
"while reading %s, runtime config: %s\n",
ConfigLineNo, tmp_file, rArray[i].admin );
exit(1);
}
unlink(tmp_file);
free(tmp_file);
}
return (int)processed;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iscsi_process_write(void *arg)
{
IscsiLun *iscsilun = arg;
struct iscsi_context *iscsi = iscsilun->iscsi;
iscsi_service(iscsi, POLLOUT);
iscsi_set_events(iscsilun);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,521
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UIPC_Init(void *p_data)
{
UNUSED(p_data);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("UIPC_Init");
memset(&uipc_main, 0, sizeof(tUIPC_MAIN));
uipc_main_init();
uipc_start_main_server_thread();
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 159,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HistogramBase* LinearHistogram::FactoryTimeGet(const char* name,
TimeDelta minimum,
TimeDelta maximum,
uint32_t bucket_count,
int32_t flags) {
return FactoryTimeGet(std::string(name), minimum, maximum, bucket_count,
flags);
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 140,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Document& Document::EnsureTemplateDocument() {
if (IsTemplateDocument())
return *this;
if (template_document_)
return *template_document_;
if (IsHTMLDocument()) {
template_document_ =
HTMLDocument::Create(DocumentInit::Create()
.WithContextDocument(ContextDocument())
.WithURL(BlankURL())
.WithNewRegistrationContext());
} else {
template_document_ =
Document::Create(DocumentInit::Create().WithURL(BlankURL()));
}
template_document_->template_document_host_ = this; // balanced in dtor.
return *template_document_.Get();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSRetainPtr<JSStringRef> AccessibilityUIElement::subrole()
{
return JSStringCreateWithCharacters(0, 0);
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,414
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: trigger_set_script(int trigger_index, script_t* script)
{
script_t* old_script;
struct map_trigger* trigger;
trigger = vector_get(s_map->triggers, trigger_index);
old_script = trigger->script;
trigger->script = script_ref(script);
script_unref(old_script);
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t socket_write(const socket_t *socket, const void *buf, size_t count) {
assert(socket != NULL);
assert(buf != NULL);
return send(socket->fd, buf, count, MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 173,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
/*
* This function is (usually) called only once, by
* SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
*/
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 5,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderMessageFilter::OnGetMonitorColorProfile(std::vector<char>* profile) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
if (BackingStoreWin::ColorManagementEnabled())
return;
#endif
*profile = g_color_profile.Get().profile();
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lseg_horizontal(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
LSEG *lseg = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(0);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPeq(lseg->p[0].y, lseg->p[1].y));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,920
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int insert_inode_locked(struct inode *inode)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ino_t ino = inode->i_ino;
struct hlist_head *head = inode_hashtable + hash(sb, ino);
while (1) {
struct inode *old = NULL;
spin_lock(&inode_hash_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry(old, head, i_hash) {
if (old->i_ino != ino)
continue;
if (old->i_sb != sb)
continue;
spin_lock(&old->i_lock);
if (old->i_state & (I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE)) {
spin_unlock(&old->i_lock);
continue;
}
break;
}
if (likely(!old)) {
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
inode->i_state |= I_NEW;
hlist_add_head(&inode->i_hash, head);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
spin_unlock(&inode_hash_lock);
return 0;
}
__iget(old);
spin_unlock(&old->i_lock);
spin_unlock(&inode_hash_lock);
wait_on_inode(old);
if (unlikely(!inode_unhashed(old))) {
iput(old);
return -EBUSY;
}
iput(old);
}
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HRESULT CGaiaCredentialBase::GetGlsCommandline(
base::CommandLine* command_line) {
DCHECK(command_line);
HRESULT hr = GetBaseGlsCommandline(command_line);
if (FAILED(hr)) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "GetBaseGlsCommandline hr=" << putHR(hr);
return hr;
}
base::string16 email_domains = GetEmailDomains();
if (email_domains[0])
command_line->AppendSwitchNative(kEmailDomainsSwitch, email_domains);
hr = GetUserGlsCommandline(command_line);
if (FAILED(hr)) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "GetBaseGlsCommandline hr=" << putHR(hr);
return hr;
}
LOGFN(INFO) << "Command line: " << command_line->GetCommandLineString();
return S_OK;
}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 130,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltStyleStylesheetLevelGetExtData(xsltStylesheetPtr style,
const xmlChar * URI)
{
xsltExtDataPtr dataContainer = NULL;
if ((style == NULL) || (URI == NULL) ||
(xsltExtensionsHash == NULL))
return (NULL);
if (style->extInfos != NULL) {
dataContainer = (xsltExtDataPtr) xmlHashLookup(style->extInfos, URI);
/*
* The module was already initialized in the context
* of this stylesheet; just return the user-data that
* comes with it.
*/
if (dataContainer)
return(dataContainer->extData);
}
dataContainer =
xsltStyleInitializeStylesheetModule(style, URI);
if (dataContainer != NULL)
return (dataContainer->extData);
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,717
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLElement::setItemValueText(const String& value, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
setTextContent(value, ec);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,393
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int futex_unlock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags)
{
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q *this, *next;
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
u32 uval, vpid = task_pid_vnr(current);
int ret;
retry:
if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* We release only a lock we actually own:
*/
if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != vpid)
return -EPERM;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key, VERIFY_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
hb = hash_futex(&key);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
/*
* To avoid races, try to do the TID -> 0 atomic transition
* again. If it succeeds then we can return without waking
* anyone else up:
*/
if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) &&
cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr, vpid, 0))
goto pi_faulted;
/*
* Rare case: we managed to release the lock atomically,
* no need to wake anyone else up:
*/
if (unlikely(uval == vpid))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* Ok, other tasks may need to be woken up - check waiters
* and do the wakeup if necessary:
*/
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb->chain, list) {
if (!match_futex (&this->key, &key))
continue;
ret = wake_futex_pi(uaddr, uval, this);
/*
* The atomic access to the futex value
* generated a pagefault, so retry the
* user-access and the wakeup:
*/
if (ret == -EFAULT)
goto pi_faulted;
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* No waiters - kernel unlocks the futex:
*/
if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) {
ret = unlock_futex_pi(uaddr, uval);
if (ret == -EFAULT)
goto pi_faulted;
}
out_unlock:
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
put_futex_key(&key);
out:
return ret;
pi_faulted:
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
put_futex_key(&key);
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
if (!ret)
goto retry;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 38,207
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Framebuffer* GetBoundReadFramebuffer() const {
GLenum target = GetReadFramebufferTarget();
return GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(target);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hot_add_disk(struct mddev *mddev, dev_t dev)
{
char b[BDEVNAME_SIZE];
int err;
struct md_rdev *rdev;
if (!mddev->pers)
return -ENODEV;
if (mddev->major_version != 0) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: HOT_ADD may only be used with"
" version-0 superblocks.\n",
mdname(mddev));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!mddev->pers->hot_add_disk) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: personality does not support diskops!\n",
mdname(mddev));
return -EINVAL;
}
rdev = md_import_device(dev, -1, 0);
if (IS_ERR(rdev)) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"md: error, md_import_device() returned %ld\n",
PTR_ERR(rdev));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (mddev->persistent)
rdev->sb_start = calc_dev_sboffset(rdev);
else
rdev->sb_start = i_size_read(rdev->bdev->bd_inode) / 512;
rdev->sectors = rdev->sb_start;
if (test_bit(Faulty, &rdev->flags)) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"md: can not hot-add faulty %s disk to %s!\n",
bdevname(rdev->bdev,b), mdname(mddev));
err = -EINVAL;
goto abort_export;
}
if (mddev_is_clustered(mddev))
md_cluster_ops->metadata_update_start(mddev);
clear_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags);
rdev->desc_nr = -1;
rdev->saved_raid_disk = -1;
err = bind_rdev_to_array(rdev, mddev);
if (err)
goto abort_clustered;
/*
* The rest should better be atomic, we can have disk failures
* noticed in interrupt contexts ...
*/
rdev->raid_disk = -1;
md_update_sb(mddev, 1);
if (mddev_is_clustered(mddev))
md_cluster_ops->metadata_update_finish(mddev);
/*
* Kick recovery, maybe this spare has to be added to the
* array immediately.
*/
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread(mddev->thread);
md_new_event(mddev);
return 0;
abort_clustered:
if (mddev_is_clustered(mddev))
md_cluster_ops->metadata_update_cancel(mddev);
abort_export:
export_rdev(rdev);
return err;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SessionStore::WriteBatch::~WriteBatch() {
DCHECK(!batch_) << "Destructed without prior commit";
}
Commit Message: Add trace event to sync_sessions::OnReadAllMetadata()
It is likely a cause of janks on UI thread on Android.
Add a trace event to get metrics about the duration.
BUG=902203
Change-Id: I4c4e9c2a20790264b982007ea7ee88ddfa7b972c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1319369
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <mastiz@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: ssid <ssid@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606104}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,793
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit atl2_exit_module(void)
{
pci_unregister_driver(&atl2_driver);
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,291
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API RFlagItem *r_flag_set_next(RFlag *f, const char *name, ut64 off, ut32 size) {
if (!r_flag_get (f, name)) {
return r_flag_set (f, name, off, size);
}
int i, newNameSize = strlen (name);
char *newName = malloc (newNameSize + 16);
strcpy (newName, name);
for (i = 0; ; i++) {
snprintf (newName + newNameSize, 15, ".%d", i);
if (!r_flag_get (f, newName)) {
RFlagItem *fi = r_flag_set (f, newName, off, size);
free (newName);
return fi;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 60,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SerializedFlashMenu::SetPPMenu(const PP_Flash_Menu* menu) {
DCHECK(!pp_menu_);
if (!CheckMenu(0, menu))
return false;
pp_menu_ = menu;
own_menu_ = false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: IPC: defend against excessive number of submenu entries in PPAPI message.
BUG=168710
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11794037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@175576 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabCountChangeObserver::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents,
int index) {
CheckTabCount();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 171,504
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPluginDelegateProxy::UpdateGeometry(const gfx::Rect& window_rect,
const gfx::Rect& clip_rect) {
if (window_rect.width() < 0 || window_rect.width() > kMaxPluginSideLength ||
window_rect.height() < 0 || window_rect.height() > kMaxPluginSideLength ||
static_cast<uint32>(window_rect.width()) *
static_cast<uint32>(window_rect.height()) > kMaxPluginSize) {
return;
}
plugin_rect_ = window_rect;
clip_rect_ = clip_rect;
bool bitmaps_changed = false;
if (uses_shared_bitmaps_) {
if (!front_buffer_canvas() ||
(window_rect.width() != front_buffer_canvas()->getDevice()->width() ||
window_rect.height() != front_buffer_canvas()->getDevice()->height()))
{
bitmaps_changed = true;
bool needs_background_store = transparent_;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
needs_background_store = false;
#endif
ResetWindowlessBitmaps();
if (!window_rect.IsEmpty()) {
if (!CreateSharedBitmap(&transport_stores_[0].dib,
&transport_stores_[0].canvas) ||
!CreateSharedBitmap(&transport_stores_[1].dib,
&transport_stores_[1].canvas) ||
(needs_background_store &&
!CreateSharedBitmap(&background_store_.dib,
&background_store_.canvas))) {
DCHECK(false);
ResetWindowlessBitmaps();
return;
}
}
}
}
SendUpdateGeometry(bitmaps_changed);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int create_rq(struct mlx5_ib_rwq *rwq, struct ib_pd *pd,
struct ib_wq_init_attr *init_attr)
{
struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev;
int has_net_offloads;
__be64 *rq_pas0;
void *in;
void *rqc;
void *wq;
int inlen;
int err;
dev = to_mdev(pd->device);
inlen = MLX5_ST_SZ_BYTES(create_rq_in) + sizeof(u64) * rwq->rq_num_pas;
in = kvzalloc(inlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!in)
return -ENOMEM;
rqc = MLX5_ADDR_OF(create_rq_in, in, ctx);
MLX5_SET(rqc, rqc, mem_rq_type,
MLX5_RQC_MEM_RQ_TYPE_MEMORY_RQ_INLINE);
MLX5_SET(rqc, rqc, user_index, rwq->user_index);
MLX5_SET(rqc, rqc, cqn, to_mcq(init_attr->cq)->mcq.cqn);
MLX5_SET(rqc, rqc, state, MLX5_RQC_STATE_RST);
MLX5_SET(rqc, rqc, flush_in_error_en, 1);
wq = MLX5_ADDR_OF(rqc, rqc, wq);
MLX5_SET(wq, wq, wq_type,
rwq->create_flags & MLX5_IB_WQ_FLAGS_STRIDING_RQ ?
MLX5_WQ_TYPE_CYCLIC_STRIDING_RQ : MLX5_WQ_TYPE_CYCLIC);
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_WQ_FLAGS_PCI_WRITE_END_PADDING) {
if (!MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, end_pad)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Scatter end padding is not supported\n");
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
} else {
MLX5_SET(wq, wq, end_padding_mode, MLX5_WQ_END_PAD_MODE_ALIGN);
}
}
MLX5_SET(wq, wq, log_wq_stride, rwq->log_rq_stride);
if (rwq->create_flags & MLX5_IB_WQ_FLAGS_STRIDING_RQ) {
MLX5_SET(wq, wq, two_byte_shift_en, rwq->two_byte_shift_en);
MLX5_SET(wq, wq, log_wqe_stride_size,
rwq->single_stride_log_num_of_bytes -
MLX5_MIN_SINGLE_STRIDE_LOG_NUM_BYTES);
MLX5_SET(wq, wq, log_wqe_num_of_strides, rwq->log_num_strides -
MLX5_MIN_SINGLE_WQE_LOG_NUM_STRIDES);
}
MLX5_SET(wq, wq, log_wq_sz, rwq->log_rq_size);
MLX5_SET(wq, wq, pd, to_mpd(pd)->pdn);
MLX5_SET(wq, wq, page_offset, rwq->rq_page_offset);
MLX5_SET(wq, wq, log_wq_pg_sz, rwq->log_page_size);
MLX5_SET(wq, wq, wq_signature, rwq->wq_sig);
MLX5_SET64(wq, wq, dbr_addr, rwq->db.dma);
has_net_offloads = MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, eth_net_offloads);
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_WQ_FLAGS_CVLAN_STRIPPING) {
if (!(has_net_offloads && MLX5_CAP_ETH(dev->mdev, vlan_cap))) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "VLAN offloads are not supported\n");
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
} else {
MLX5_SET(rqc, rqc, vsd, 1);
}
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_WQ_FLAGS_SCATTER_FCS) {
if (!(has_net_offloads && MLX5_CAP_ETH(dev->mdev, scatter_fcs))) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Scatter FCS is not supported\n");
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
MLX5_SET(rqc, rqc, scatter_fcs, 1);
}
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_WQ_FLAGS_DELAY_DROP) {
if (!(dev->ib_dev.attrs.raw_packet_caps &
IB_RAW_PACKET_CAP_DELAY_DROP)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Delay drop is not supported\n");
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
MLX5_SET(rqc, rqc, delay_drop_en, 1);
}
rq_pas0 = (__be64 *)MLX5_ADDR_OF(wq, wq, pas);
mlx5_ib_populate_pas(dev, rwq->umem, rwq->page_shift, rq_pas0, 0);
err = mlx5_core_create_rq_tracked(dev->mdev, in, inlen, &rwq->core_qp);
if (!err && init_attr->create_flags & IB_WQ_FLAGS_DELAY_DROP) {
err = set_delay_drop(dev);
if (err) {
mlx5_ib_warn(dev, "Failed to enable delay drop err=%d\n",
err);
mlx5_core_destroy_rq_tracked(dev->mdev, &rwq->core_qp);
} else {
rwq->create_flags |= MLX5_IB_WQ_FLAGS_DELAY_DROP;
}
}
out:
kvfree(in);
return err;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<Element> Document::createElementNS(const AtomicString& namespaceURI, const String& qualifiedName, const AtomicString& typeExtension, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
String prefix, localName;
if (!parseQualifiedName(qualifiedName, prefix, localName, ec))
return 0;
QualifiedName qName(prefix, localName, namespaceURI);
if (!hasValidNamespaceForElements(qName)) {
ec = NAMESPACE_ERR;
return 0;
}
if (m_registry) {
if (PassRefPtr<Element> created = m_registry->createElement(qName, typeExtension))
return created;
}
return setTypeExtension(createElementNS(namespaceURI, qualifiedName, ec), typeExtension);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int bt_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t copied;
int err;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p len %zu", sock, sk, len);
if (flags & (MSG_OOB))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb) {
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) {
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
return 0;
}
return err;
}
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err == 0) {
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
if (bt_sk(sk)->skb_msg_name)
bt_sk(sk)->skb_msg_name(skb, msg->msg_name,
&msg->msg_namelen);
else
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return err ? : copied;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 166,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t copy_from_iter_nocache(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i)
{
char *to = addr;
if (unlikely(i->type & ITER_PIPE)) {
WARN_ON(1);
return 0;
}
iterate_and_advance(i, bytes, v,
__copy_from_user_nocache((to += v.iov_len) - v.iov_len,
v.iov_base, v.iov_len),
memcpy_from_page((to += v.bv_len) - v.bv_len, v.bv_page,
v.bv_offset, v.bv_len),
memcpy((to += v.iov_len) - v.iov_len, v.iov_base, v.iov_len)
)
return bytes;
}
Commit Message: fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 68,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsIT8SetIndexColumn(cmsHANDLE hIT8, const char* cSample)
{
cmsIT8* it8 = (cmsIT8*) hIT8;
int pos;
_cmsAssert(hIT8 != NULL);
pos = LocateSample(it8, cSample);
if(pos == -1)
return FALSE;
it8->Tab[it8->nTable].SampleID = pos;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 78,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateTitleBar() {
TRACE_EVENT0("ui::gtk", "BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateTitleBar");
string16 title = browser_->GetWindowTitleForCurrentTab();
gtk_window_set_title(window_, UTF16ToUTF8(title).c_str());
if (ShouldShowWindowIcon())
titlebar_->UpdateTitleAndIcon();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SecureProxyChecker::CheckIfSecureProxyIsAllowed(
SecureProxyCheckerCallback fetcher_callback) {
net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag traffic_annotation =
net::DefineNetworkTrafficAnnotation(
"data_reduction_proxy_secure_proxy_check", R"(
semantics {
sender: "Data Reduction Proxy"
description:
"Sends a request to the Data Reduction Proxy server. Proceeds "
"with using a secure connection to the proxy only if the "
"response is not blocked or modified by an intermediary."
trigger:
"A request can be sent whenever the browser is determining how "
"to configure its connection to the data reduction proxy. This "
"happens on startup and network changes."
data: "A specific URL, not related to user data."
destination: GOOGLE_OWNED_SERVICE
}
policy {
cookies_allowed: NO
setting:
"Users can control Data Saver on Android via the 'Data Saver' "
"setting. Data Saver is not available on iOS, and on desktop "
"it is enabled by installing the Data Saver extension."
policy_exception_justification: "Not implemented."
})");
auto resource_request = std::make_unique<network::ResourceRequest>();
resource_request->url = params::GetSecureProxyCheckURL();
resource_request->load_flags =
net::LOAD_DISABLE_CACHE | net::LOAD_BYPASS_PROXY;
resource_request->allow_credentials = false;
url_loader_ = network::SimpleURLLoader::Create(std::move(resource_request),
traffic_annotation);
static const int kMaxRetries = 5;
url_loader_->SetRetryOptions(
kMaxRetries, network::SimpleURLLoader::RETRY_ON_NETWORK_CHANGE |
network::SimpleURLLoader::RETRY_ON_5XX);
url_loader_->SetOnRedirectCallback(base::BindRepeating(
&SecureProxyChecker::OnURLLoaderRedirect, base::Unretained(this)));
fetcher_callback_ = fetcher_callback;
secure_proxy_check_start_time_ = base::Time::Now();
url_loader_->DownloadToStringOfUnboundedSizeUntilCrashAndDie(
url_loader_factory_.get(),
base::BindOnce(&SecureProxyChecker::OnURLLoadComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 172,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::allocate_color_convert_buf::free_output_buffer(
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufhdr)
{
unsigned int index = 0;
if (!enabled)
return omx->free_output_buffer(bufhdr);
if (enabled && omx->is_component_secure())
return OMX_ErrorNone;
if (!allocated_count || !bufhdr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Color convert no buffer to be freed %p",bufhdr);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
index = bufhdr - m_out_mem_ptr_client;
if (index >= omx->drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Incorrect index color convert free_output_buffer");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pmem_fd[index] > 0) {
munmap(pmem_baseaddress[index], buffer_size_req);
close(pmem_fd[index]);
}
pmem_fd[index] = -1;
#ifdef USE_ION
omx->free_ion_memory(&op_buf_ion_info[index]);
#endif
m_heap_ptr[index].video_heap_ptr = NULL;
if (allocated_count > 0)
allocated_count--;
else
allocated_count = 0;
if (!allocated_count) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&omx->c_lock);
c2d.close();
init_members();
pthread_mutex_unlock(&omx->c_lock);
}
return omx->free_output_buffer(&omx->m_out_mem_ptr[index]);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct crypto_instance *crypto_cts_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct crypto_instance *inst;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
int err;
err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
alg = crypto_attr_alg(tb[1], CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
if (IS_ERR(alg))
return ERR_CAST(alg);
inst = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!is_power_of_2(alg->cra_blocksize))
goto out_put_alg;
inst = crypto_alloc_instance("cts", alg);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto out_put_alg;
inst->alg.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER;
inst->alg.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
inst->alg.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
inst->alg.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
inst->alg.cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type;
/* We access the data as u32s when xoring. */
inst->alg.cra_alignmask |= __alignof__(u32) - 1;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.ivsize = alg->cra_blocksize;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.min_keysize = alg->cra_blkcipher.min_keysize;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.max_keysize = alg->cra_blkcipher.max_keysize;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.geniv = "seqiv";
inst->alg.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_cts_ctx);
inst->alg.cra_init = crypto_cts_init_tfm;
inst->alg.cra_exit = crypto_cts_exit_tfm;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.setkey = crypto_cts_setkey;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.encrypt = crypto_cts_encrypt;
inst->alg.cra_blkcipher.decrypt = crypto_cts_decrypt;
out_put_alg:
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return inst;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,696
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void try_to_free_low(struct hstate *h, unsigned long count,
nodemask_t *nodes_allowed)
{
int i;
if (h->order >= MAX_ORDER)
return;
for_each_node_mask(i, *nodes_allowed) {
struct page *page, *next;
struct list_head *freel = &h->hugepage_freelists[i];
list_for_each_entry_safe(page, next, freel, lru) {
if (count >= h->nr_huge_pages)
return;
if (PageHighMem(page))
continue;
list_del(&page->lru);
update_and_free_page(h, page);
h->free_huge_pages--;
h->free_huge_pages_node[page_to_nid(page)]--;
}
}
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int wc_ecc_export_public_raw(ecc_key* key, byte* qx, word32* qxLen,
byte* qy, word32* qyLen)
{
return wc_ecc_export_raw(key, qx, qxLen, qy, qyLen, NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 81,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err edts_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_EditBox *ptr = (GF_EditBox *)s;
if (!ptr->editList || ! gf_list_count(ptr->editList->entryList)) {
ptr->size = 0;
} else {
e = gf_isom_box_size((GF_Box *)ptr->editList);
if (e) return e;
ptr->size += ptr->editList->size;
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImageInputType::appendToFormData(FormData& formData) const
{
if (!element().isActivatedSubmit())
return;
const AtomicString& name = element().name();
if (name.isEmpty()) {
formData.append("x", m_clickLocation.x());
formData.append("y", m_clickLocation.y());
return;
}
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(String, dotXString, (".x"));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(String, dotYString, (".y"));
formData.append(name + dotXString, m_clickLocation.x());
formData.append(name + dotYString, m_clickLocation.y());
if (!element().value().isEmpty())
formData.append(name, element().value());
}
Commit Message: ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent should recreate UA shadow tree.
Once the fallback shadow tree was created, it was never recreated even if
ensurePrimaryContent was called. Such situation happens by updating |src|
attribute.
BUG=589838
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1732753004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#377804}
CWE ID: CWE-361
| 0
| 133,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __d_move(struct dentry *dentry, struct dentry *target,
bool exchange)
{
if (!dentry->d_inode)
printk(KERN_WARNING "VFS: moving negative dcache entry\n");
BUG_ON(d_ancestor(dentry, target));
BUG_ON(d_ancestor(target, dentry));
dentry_lock_for_move(dentry, target);
write_seqcount_begin(&dentry->d_seq);
write_seqcount_begin_nested(&target->d_seq, DENTRY_D_LOCK_NESTED);
/* __d_drop does write_seqcount_barrier, but they're OK to nest. */
/*
* Move the dentry to the target hash queue. Don't bother checking
* for the same hash queue because of how unlikely it is.
*/
__d_drop(dentry);
__d_rehash(dentry, d_hash(target->d_parent, target->d_name.hash));
/*
* Unhash the target (d_delete() is not usable here). If exchanging
* the two dentries, then rehash onto the other's hash queue.
*/
__d_drop(target);
if (exchange) {
__d_rehash(target,
d_hash(dentry->d_parent, dentry->d_name.hash));
}
/* Switch the names.. */
if (exchange)
swap_names(dentry, target);
else
copy_name(dentry, target);
/* ... and switch them in the tree */
if (IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
/* splicing a tree */
dentry->d_parent = target->d_parent;
target->d_parent = target;
list_del_init(&target->d_child);
list_move(&dentry->d_child, &dentry->d_parent->d_subdirs);
} else {
/* swapping two dentries */
swap(dentry->d_parent, target->d_parent);
list_move(&target->d_child, &target->d_parent->d_subdirs);
list_move(&dentry->d_child, &dentry->d_parent->d_subdirs);
if (exchange)
fsnotify_d_move(target);
fsnotify_d_move(dentry);
}
write_seqcount_end(&target->d_seq);
write_seqcount_end(&dentry->d_seq);
dentry_unlock_for_move(dentry, target);
}
Commit Message: dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 94,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: flac_init (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{
if (psf->file.mode == SFM_RDWR)
return SFE_BAD_MODE_RW ;
if (psf->file.mode == SFM_READ)
{ psf->read_short = flac_read_flac2s ;
psf->read_int = flac_read_flac2i ;
psf->read_float = flac_read_flac2f ;
psf->read_double = flac_read_flac2d ;
} ;
if (psf->file.mode == SFM_WRITE)
{ psf->write_short = flac_write_s2flac ;
psf->write_int = flac_write_i2flac ;
psf->write_float = flac_write_f2flac ;
psf->write_double = flac_write_d2flac ;
} ;
if (psf->filelength > psf->dataoffset)
psf->datalength = (psf->dataend) ? psf->dataend - psf->dataoffset : psf->filelength - psf->dataoffset ;
else
psf->datalength = 0 ;
return 0 ;
} /* flac_init */
Commit Message: src/flac.c: Improve error handling
Especially when dealing with corrupt or malicious files.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 67,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int translate_table(struct net *net, const char *name,
struct ebt_table_info *newinfo)
{
unsigned int i, j, k, udc_cnt;
int ret;
struct ebt_cl_stack *cl_s = NULL; /* used in the checking for chain loops */
i = 0;
while (i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS && !newinfo->hook_entry[i])
i++;
if (i == NF_BR_NUMHOOKS) {
BUGPRINT("No valid hooks specified\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] != (struct ebt_entries *)newinfo->entries) {
BUGPRINT("Chains don't start at beginning\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* make sure chains are ordered after each other in same order
* as their corresponding hooks
*/
for (j = i + 1; j < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; j++) {
if (!newinfo->hook_entry[j])
continue;
if (newinfo->hook_entry[j] <= newinfo->hook_entry[i]) {
BUGPRINT("Hook order must be followed\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
i = j;
}
/* do some early checkings and initialize some things */
i = 0; /* holds the expected nr. of entries for the chain */
j = 0; /* holds the up to now counted entries for the chain */
k = 0; /* holds the total nr. of entries, should equal
* newinfo->nentries afterwards
*/
udc_cnt = 0; /* will hold the nr. of user defined chains (udc) */
ret = EBT_ENTRY_ITERATE(newinfo->entries, newinfo->entries_size,
ebt_check_entry_size_and_hooks, newinfo,
&i, &j, &k, &udc_cnt);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
if (i != j) {
BUGPRINT("nentries does not equal the nr of entries in the "
"(last) chain\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (k != newinfo->nentries) {
BUGPRINT("Total nentries is wrong\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* get the location of the udc, put them in an array
* while we're at it, allocate the chainstack
*/
if (udc_cnt) {
/* this will get free'd in do_replace()/ebt_register_table()
* if an error occurs
*/
newinfo->chainstack =
vmalloc(nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(*(newinfo->chainstack)));
if (!newinfo->chainstack)
return -ENOMEM;
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
newinfo->chainstack[i] =
vmalloc(udc_cnt * sizeof(*(newinfo->chainstack[0])));
if (!newinfo->chainstack[i]) {
while (i)
vfree(newinfo->chainstack[--i]);
vfree(newinfo->chainstack);
newinfo->chainstack = NULL;
return -ENOMEM;
}
}
cl_s = vmalloc(udc_cnt * sizeof(*cl_s));
if (!cl_s)
return -ENOMEM;
i = 0; /* the i'th udc */
EBT_ENTRY_ITERATE(newinfo->entries, newinfo->entries_size,
ebt_get_udc_positions, newinfo, &i, cl_s);
/* sanity check */
if (i != udc_cnt) {
BUGPRINT("i != udc_cnt\n");
vfree(cl_s);
return -EFAULT;
}
}
/* Check for loops */
for (i = 0; i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; i++)
if (newinfo->hook_entry[i])
if (check_chainloops(newinfo->hook_entry[i],
cl_s, udc_cnt, i, newinfo->entries)) {
vfree(cl_s);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* we now know the following (along with E=mc²):
* - the nr of entries in each chain is right
* - the size of the allocated space is right
* - all valid hooks have a corresponding chain
* - there are no loops
* - wrong data can still be on the level of a single entry
* - could be there are jumps to places that are not the
* beginning of a chain. This can only occur in chains that
* are not accessible from any base chains, so we don't care.
*/
/* used to know what we need to clean up if something goes wrong */
i = 0;
ret = EBT_ENTRY_ITERATE(newinfo->entries, newinfo->entries_size,
ebt_check_entry, net, newinfo, name, &i, cl_s, udc_cnt);
if (ret != 0) {
EBT_ENTRY_ITERATE(newinfo->entries, newinfo->entries_size,
ebt_cleanup_entry, net, &i);
}
vfree(cl_s);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets
We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.
The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.
Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.
Reported-by: <syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 84,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int network_config_set_buffer_size (const oconfig_item_t *ci) /* {{{ */
{
int tmp;
if ((ci->values_num != 1)
|| (ci->values[0].type != OCONFIG_TYPE_NUMBER))
{
WARNING ("network plugin: The `MaxPacketSize' config option needs exactly "
"one numeric argument.");
return (-1);
}
tmp = (int) ci->values[0].value.number;
if ((tmp >= 1024) && (tmp <= 65535))
network_config_packet_size = tmp;
return (0);
} /* }}} int network_config_set_buffer_size */
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 50,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nested_ept_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct x86_exception *fault)
{
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
u32 exit_reason;
if (fault->error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK)
exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG;
else
exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION;
nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, exit_reason, 0, vcpu->arch.exit_qualification);
vmcs12->guest_physical_address = fault->address;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,133
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Document::Document(const DocumentInit& initializer, DocumentClassFlags documentClasses)
: ContainerNode(0, CreateDocument)
, TreeScope(*this)
, m_hasNodesWithPlaceholderStyle(false)
, m_evaluateMediaQueriesOnStyleRecalc(false)
, m_pendingSheetLayout(NoLayoutWithPendingSheets)
, m_frame(initializer.frame())
, m_domWindow(m_frame ? m_frame->localDOMWindow() : 0)
, m_importsController(initializer.importsController())
, m_activeParserCount(0)
, m_contextFeatures(ContextFeatures::defaultSwitch())
, m_wellFormed(false)
, m_printing(false)
, m_paginatedForScreen(false)
, m_compatibilityMode(NoQuirksMode)
, m_compatibilityModeLocked(false)
, m_executeScriptsWaitingForResourcesTask(CancellableTaskFactory::create(this, &Document::executeScriptsWaitingForResources))
, m_hasAutofocused(false)
, m_clearFocusedElementTimer(this, &Document::clearFocusedElementTimerFired)
, m_domTreeVersion(++s_globalTreeVersion)
, m_styleVersion(0)
, m_listenerTypes(0)
, m_mutationObserverTypes(0)
, m_visitedLinkState(VisitedLinkState::create(*this))
, m_visuallyOrdered(false)
, m_readyState(Complete)
, m_parsingState(FinishedParsing)
, m_gotoAnchorNeededAfterStylesheetsLoad(false)
, m_containsValidityStyleRules(false)
, m_updateFocusAppearanceRestoresSelection(false)
, m_containsPlugins(false)
, m_ignoreDestructiveWriteCount(0)
, m_markers(adoptPtrWillBeNoop(new DocumentMarkerController))
, m_updateFocusAppearanceTimer(this, &Document::updateFocusAppearanceTimerFired)
, m_cssTarget(nullptr)
, m_loadEventProgress(LoadEventNotRun)
, m_startTime(currentTime())
, m_scriptRunner(ScriptRunner::create(this))
, m_xmlVersion("1.0")
, m_xmlStandalone(StandaloneUnspecified)
, m_hasXMLDeclaration(0)
, m_designMode(false)
, m_hasAnnotatedRegions(false)
, m_annotatedRegionsDirty(false)
, m_useSecureKeyboardEntryWhenActive(false)
, m_documentClasses(documentClasses)
, m_isViewSource(false)
, m_sawElementsInKnownNamespaces(false)
, m_isSrcdocDocument(false)
, m_isMobileDocument(false)
, m_layoutView(0)
#if !ENABLE(OILPAN)
, m_weakFactory(this)
#endif
, m_contextDocument(initializer.contextDocument())
, m_hasFullscreenSupplement(false)
, m_loadEventDelayCount(0)
, m_loadEventDelayTimer(this, &Document::loadEventDelayTimerFired)
, m_pluginLoadingTimer(this, &Document::pluginLoadingTimerFired)
, m_documentTiming(*this)
, m_writeRecursionIsTooDeep(false)
, m_writeRecursionDepth(0)
, m_taskRunner(MainThreadTaskRunner::create(this))
, m_registrationContext(initializer.registrationContext(this))
, m_elementDataCacheClearTimer(this, &Document::elementDataCacheClearTimerFired)
, m_timeline(AnimationTimeline::create(this))
, m_templateDocumentHost(nullptr)
, m_didAssociateFormControlsTimer(this, &Document::didAssociateFormControlsTimerFired)
, m_timers(Platform::current()->currentThread()->scheduler()->timerTaskRunner())
, m_hasViewportUnits(false)
, m_styleRecalcElementCounter(0)
, m_parserSyncPolicy(AllowAsynchronousParsing)
, m_nodeCount(0)
{
if (m_frame) {
ASSERT(m_frame->page());
provideContextFeaturesToDocumentFrom(*this, *m_frame->page());
m_fetcher = m_frame->loader().documentLoader()->fetcher();
m_timers.setTimerTaskRunner(m_frame->frameScheduler()->timerTaskRunner());
FrameFetchContext::provideDocumentToContext(m_fetcher->context(), this);
} else if (m_importsController) {
m_fetcher = FrameFetchContext::createContextAndFetcher(nullptr);
FrameFetchContext::provideDocumentToContext(m_fetcher->context(), this);
} else {
m_fetcher = ResourceFetcher::create(nullptr);
}
if (initializer.shouldSetURL())
setURL(initializer.url());
initSecurityContext(initializer);
initDNSPrefetch();
#if !ENABLE(OILPAN)
for (unsigned i = 0; i < WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(m_nodeListCounts); ++i)
m_nodeListCounts[i] = 0;
#endif
InstanceCounters::incrementCounter(InstanceCounters::DocumentCounter);
m_lifecycle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Inactive);
m_styleEngine = StyleEngine::create(*this);
ASSERT(!parentDocument() || !parentDocument()->activeDOMObjectsAreSuspended());
liveDocumentSet().add(this);
}
Commit Message: Don't change Document load progress in any page dismissal events.
This can confuse the logic for blocking modal dialogs.
BUG=536652
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1373113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351419}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 125,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::vector<GURL> ComputeCookieURLs(RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host,
Maybe<Array<String>>& protocol_urls) {
std::vector<GURL> urls;
if (protocol_urls.isJust()) {
std::unique_ptr<Array<std::string>> actual_urls = protocol_urls.takeJust();
for (size_t i = 0; i < actual_urls->length(); i++)
urls.push_back(GURL(actual_urls->get(i)));
} else {
base::queue<FrameTreeNode*> queue;
queue.push(frame_host->frame_tree_node());
while (!queue.empty()) {
FrameTreeNode* node = queue.front();
queue.pop();
urls.push_back(node->current_url());
for (size_t i = 0; i < node->child_count(); ++i)
queue.push(node->child_at(i));
}
}
return urls;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderMessageFilter::OnDownloadUrl(const IPC::Message& message,
const GURL& url,
const Referrer& referrer,
const string16& suggested_name) {
scoped_ptr<DownloadSaveInfo> save_info(new DownloadSaveInfo());
save_info->suggested_name = suggested_name;
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequest> request(
resource_context_->GetRequestContext()->CreateRequest(url, NULL));
request->set_referrer(referrer.url.spec());
webkit_glue::ConfigureURLRequestForReferrerPolicy(
request.get(), referrer.policy);
RecordDownloadSource(INITIATED_BY_RENDERER);
resource_dispatcher_host_->BeginDownload(
request.Pass(),
true, // is_content_initiated
resource_context_,
render_process_id_,
message.routing_id(),
false,
save_info.Pass(),
content::DownloadId::Invalid(),
ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::DownloadStartedCallback());
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,855
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nsv_read_packet(AVFormatContext *s, AVPacket *pkt)
{
NSVContext *nsv = s->priv_data;
int i, err = 0;
/* in case we don't already have something to eat ... */
if (!nsv->ahead[0].data && !nsv->ahead[1].data)
err = nsv_read_chunk(s, 0);
if (err < 0)
return err;
/* now pick one of the plates */
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if (nsv->ahead[i].data) {
/* avoid the cost of new_packet + memcpy(->data) */
memcpy(pkt, &nsv->ahead[i], sizeof(AVPacket));
nsv->ahead[i].data = NULL; /* we ate that one */
return pkt->size;
}
}
/* this restaurant is not provisioned :^] */
return -1;
}
Commit Message: avformat/nsvdec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check in nsvs_file_offset loop.
Fixes: 20170829.nsv
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,555
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ablkcipher_walk_phys(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
struct ablkcipher_walk *walk)
{
walk->blocksize = crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(req->base.tfm);
return ablkcipher_walk_first(req, walk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 31,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::MaybeQueueSendDidEditFieldInInsecureContext() {
if (logged_field_edit_ || sensitive_input_edited_task_.IsActive() ||
IsSecureContext()) {
return;
}
logged_field_edit_ = true;
sensitive_input_edited_task_ =
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kUserInteraction, this)
->PostCancellableTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&Document::SendDidEditFieldInInsecureContext,
WrapWeakPersistent(this)));
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sco_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sco_pinfo *pi = sco_pi(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT2 &&
test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags)) {
sco_conn_defer_accept(pi->conn->hcon, pi->setting);
sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
return bt_sock_recvmsg(iocb, sock, msg, len, flags);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 166,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_renew(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
clientid_t *clid)
{
struct nfs4_client *clp;
__be32 status;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), nfsd_net_id);
dprintk("process_renew(%08x/%08x): starting\n",
clid->cl_boot, clid->cl_id);
status = lookup_clientid(clid, cstate, nn);
if (status)
goto out;
clp = cstate->clp;
status = nfserr_cb_path_down;
if (!list_empty(&clp->cl_delegations)
&& clp->cl_cb_state != NFSD4_CB_UP)
goto out;
status = nfs_ok;
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameSelection::ScheduleVisualUpdate() const {
if (Page* page = frame_->GetPage())
page->Animator().ScheduleVisualUpdate(&frame_->LocalFrameRoot());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,798
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MODRET set_accessgrantmsg(cmd_rec *cmd) {
config_rec *c = NULL;
CHECK_ARGS(cmd, 1);
CHECK_CONF(cmd, CONF_ROOT|CONF_VIRTUAL|CONF_GLOBAL|CONF_ANON);
c = add_config_param_str(cmd->argv[0], 1, cmd->argv[1]);
c->flags |= CF_MERGEDOWN;
return PR_HANDLED(cmd);
}
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 67,603
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ebcdic_free(BIO *a)
{
if (a == NULL)
return (0);
if (a->ptr != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(a->ptr);
a->ptr = NULL;
a->init = 0;
a->flags = 0;
return (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FakeDesktopSession::FakeDesktopSession(DaemonProcess* daemon_process, int id)
: DesktopSession(daemon_process, id) {
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,775
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OmniboxViewViews::OnTabChanged(const content::WebContents* web_contents) {
UpdateSecurityLevel();
const OmniboxState* state = static_cast<OmniboxState*>(
web_contents->GetUserData(&OmniboxState::kKey));
model()->RestoreState(state ? &state->model_state : NULL);
if (state) {
SelectRange(state->selection);
saved_selection_for_focus_change_ = state->saved_selection_for_focus_change;
}
ClearEditHistory();
}
Commit Message: Strip JavaScript schemas on Linux text drop
When dropping text onto the Omnibox, any leading JavaScript schemes
should be stripped to avoid a "self-XSS" attack. This stripping already
occurs in all cases except when plaintext is dropped on Linux. This CL
corrects that oversight.
Bug: 768910
Change-Id: I43af24ace4a13cf61d15a32eb9382dcdd498a062
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/685638
Reviewed-by: Justin Donnelly <jdonnelly@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504695}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 150,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irc_server_get_prefix_char_for_mode (struct t_irc_server *server, char mode)
{
const char *prefix_chars;
int index;
if (server)
{
prefix_chars = irc_server_get_prefix_chars (server);
index = irc_server_get_prefix_mode_index (server, mode);
if (index >= 0)
return prefix_chars[index];
}
return ' ';
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static EAS_RESULT Parse_art (SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA *pDLSData, EAS_I32 pos, S_DLS_ART_VALUES *pArt)
{
EAS_RESULT result;
EAS_U32 structSize;
EAS_U32 numConnections;
EAS_U16 source;
EAS_U16 control;
EAS_U16 destination;
EAS_U16 transform;
EAS_I32 scale;
EAS_INT i;
/* seek to start of data */
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, pos)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get the structure size */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &structSize, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
pos += (EAS_I32) structSize;
/* get the number of connections */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &numConnections, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* skip to start of connections */
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, pos)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
while (numConnections--)
{
/* read the connection data */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &source, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &control, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &destination, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &transform, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &scale, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* look up the connection */
for (i = 0; i < (EAS_INT) ENTRIES_IN_CONN_TABLE; i++)
{
if ((connTable[i].source == source) &&
(connTable[i].destination == destination) &&
(connTable[i].control == control))
{
/*lint -e{704} use shift for performance */
pArt->values[connTable[i].connection] = (EAS_I16) (scale >> 16);
pArt->values[PARAM_MODIFIED] = EAS_TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (i == PARAM_TABLE_SIZE)
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_WARNING, "WARN: Unsupported parameter in DLS file\n"); */ }
}
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DLS parser: fix wave pool size check.
Bug: 21132860.
Change-Id: I8ae872ea2cc2e8fec5fa0b7815f0b6b31ce744ff
(cherry picked from commit 2d7f8e1be2241e48458f5d3cab5e90be2b07c699)
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,516
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int opxchg(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
int mod_byte = 0;
int reg = 0;
int rm = 0;
st32 offset = 0;
if (op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY || op->operands[1].type & OT_MEMORY) {
data[l++] = 0x87;
if (op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY) {
rm = op->operands[0].regs[0];
offset = op->operands[0].offset * op->operands[0].offset_sign;
reg = op->operands[1].reg;
} else if (op->operands[1].type & OT_MEMORY) {
rm = op->operands[1].regs[0];
offset = op->operands[1].offset * op->operands[1].offset_sign;
reg = op->operands[0].reg;
}
if (offset) {
mod_byte = 1;
if (offset < ST8_MIN || offset > ST8_MAX) {
mod_byte = 2;
}
}
} else {
if (op->operands[0].reg == X86R_EAX &&
op->operands[1].type & OT_GPREG) {
data[l++] = 0x90 + op->operands[1].reg;
return l;
} else if (op->operands[1].reg == X86R_EAX &&
op->operands[0].type & OT_GPREG) {
data[l++] = 0x90 + op->operands[0].reg;
return l;
} else if (op->operands[0].type & OT_GPREG &&
op->operands[1].type & OT_GPREG) {
mod_byte = 3;
data[l++] = 0x87;
reg = op->operands[1].reg;
rm = op->operands[0].reg;
}
}
data[l++] = mod_byte << 6 | reg << 3 | rm;
if (mod_byte > 0 && mod_byte < 3) {
data[l++] = offset;
if (mod_byte == 2) {
data[l++] = offset >> 8;
data[l++] = offset >> 16;
data[l++] = offset >> 24;
}
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TEE_Result tee_mmu_check_access_rights(const struct user_ta_ctx *utc,
uint32_t flags, uaddr_t uaddr,
size_t len)
{
uaddr_t a;
size_t addr_incr = MIN(CORE_MMU_USER_CODE_SIZE,
CORE_MMU_USER_PARAM_SIZE);
if (ADD_OVERFLOW(uaddr, len, &a))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if ((flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_NONSECURE) &&
(flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_SECURE))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
/*
* Rely on TA private memory test to check if address range is private
* to TA or not.
*/
if (!(flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER) &&
!tee_mmu_is_vbuf_inside_ta_private(utc, (void *)uaddr, len))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
for (a = uaddr; a < (uaddr + len); a += addr_incr) {
uint32_t attr;
TEE_Result res;
res = tee_mmu_user_va2pa_attr(utc, (void *)a, NULL, &attr);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
if ((flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_NONSECURE) &&
(attr & TEE_MATTR_SECURE))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if ((flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_SECURE) &&
!(attr & TEE_MATTR_SECURE))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if ((flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_WRITE) && !(attr & TEE_MATTR_UW))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if ((flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ) && !(attr & TEE_MATTR_UR))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: core: tee_mmu_check_access_rights() check all pages
Prior to this patch tee_mmu_check_access_rights() checks an address in
each page of a supplied range. If both the start and length of that
range is unaligned the last page in the range is sometimes not checked.
With this patch the first address of each page in the range is checked
to simplify the logic of checking each page and the range and also to
cover the last page under all circumstances.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0005: "tee_mmu_check_access_rights does not check
final page of TA buffer"
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 169,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewExperimental::setAuthenticationDialog(QDeclarativeComponent* authenticationDialog)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
if (d->authenticationDialog == authenticationDialog)
return;
d->authenticationDialog = authenticationDialog;
emit authenticationDialogChanged();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 101,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PressLeftMouseButton(int extra_flags = 0) {
PressMouseButton(ui::EF_LEFT_MOUSE_BUTTON, extra_flags);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,485
|
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