instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserPpapiHostImpl::AddInstanceObserver(PP_Instance instance,
InstanceObserver* observer) {
instance_map_[instance]->observer_list.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void btpan_close_handle(btpan_conn_t *p)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btpan_close_handle : close handle %d", p->handle);
p->handle = -1;
p->local_role = -1;
p->remote_role = -1;
memset(&p->peer, 0, 6);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,780
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void init_dequant_tables(H264Context *h)
{
int i, x;
init_dequant4_coeff_table(h);
if (h->pps.transform_8x8_mode)
init_dequant8_coeff_table(h);
if (h->sps.transform_bypass) {
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
for (x = 0; x < 16; x++)
h->dequant4_coeff[i][0][x] = 1 << 6;
if (h->pps.transform_8x8_mode)
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
for (x = 0; x < 64; x++)
h->dequant8_coeff[i][0][x] = 1 << 6;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,256
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<ImageProcessorClient> ImageProcessorClient::Create(
const ImageProcessor::PortConfig& input_config,
const ImageProcessor::PortConfig& output_config,
size_t num_buffers,
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<VideoFrameProcessor>> frame_processors) {
auto ip_client =
base::WrapUnique(new ImageProcessorClient(std::move(frame_processors)));
if (!ip_client->CreateImageProcessor(input_config, output_config,
num_buffers)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create ImageProcessor";
return nullptr;
}
return ip_client;
}
Commit Message: media/gpu/test: ImageProcessorClient: Use bytes for width and height in libyuv::CopyPlane()
|width| is in bytes in libyuv::CopyPlane(). We formerly pass width in pixels.
This should matter when a pixel format is used whose pixel is composed of
more than one bytes.
Bug: None
Test: image_processor_test
Change-Id: I98e90be70c8d0128319172d4d19f3a8017b65d78
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1553129
Commit-Queue: Hirokazu Honda <hiroh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#648117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 137,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb, int sync)
{
struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es;
struct buffer_head *sbh = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh;
int error = 0;
if (!sbh)
return error;
if (buffer_write_io_error(sbh)) {
/*
* Oh, dear. A previous attempt to write the
* superblock failed. This could happen because the
* USB device was yanked out. Or it could happen to
* be a transient write error and maybe the block will
* be remapped. Nothing we can do but to retry the
* write and hope for the best.
*/
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "previous I/O error to "
"superblock detected");
clear_buffer_write_io_error(sbh);
set_buffer_uptodate(sbh);
}
/*
* If the file system is mounted read-only, don't update the
* superblock write time. This avoids updating the superblock
* write time when we are mounting the root file system
* read/only but we need to replay the journal; at that point,
* for people who are east of GMT and who make their clock
* tick in localtime for Windows bug-for-bug compatibility,
* the clock is set in the future, and this will cause e2fsck
* to complain and force a full file system check.
*/
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
es->s_wtime = cpu_to_le32(get_seconds());
es->s_kbytes_written =
cpu_to_le64(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_kbytes_written +
((part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part, sectors[1]) -
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sectors_written_start) >> 1));
ext4_free_blocks_count_set(es, percpu_counter_sum_positive(
&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_freeblocks_counter));
es->s_free_inodes_count = cpu_to_le32(percpu_counter_sum_positive(
&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_freeinodes_counter));
sb->s_dirt = 0;
BUFFER_TRACE(sbh, "marking dirty");
mark_buffer_dirty(sbh);
if (sync) {
error = sync_dirty_buffer(sbh);
if (error)
return error;
error = buffer_write_io_error(sbh);
if (error) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "I/O error while writing "
"superblock");
clear_buffer_write_io_error(sbh);
set_buffer_uptodate(sbh);
}
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,564
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ping_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct ping_seq_afinfo *afinfo = PDE_DATA(inode);
return seq_open_net(inode, file, &afinfo->seq_ops,
sizeof(struct ping_iter_state));
}
Commit Message: ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name
A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const std::string& last_text() const { return last_text_; }
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,162
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::Shutdown() {
download_history_.reset();
download_prefs_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,026
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StartMonitoringRequestsFor(const GURL& url) {
request_url_ = url;
saw_request_url_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Allow origin lock for WebUI pages.
Returning true for WebUI pages in DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess helps
to keep enforcing a SiteInstance swap during chrome://foo ->
chrome://bar navigation, even after relaxing
BrowsingInstance::GetSiteInstanceForURL to consider RPH::IsSuitableHost
(see https://crrev.com/c/783470 for that fixes process sharing in
isolated(b(c),d(c)) scenario).
I've manually tested this CL by visiting the following URLs:
- chrome://welcome/
- chrome://settings
- chrome://extensions
- chrome://history
- chrome://help and chrome://chrome (both redirect to chrome://settings/help)
Bug: 510588, 847127
Change-Id: I55073bce00f32cb8bc5c1c91034438ff9a3f8971
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1237392
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595259}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::childTypeAllowed(NodeType type) const
{
switch (type) {
case ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
case CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
case DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE:
case DOCUMENT_NODE:
case ENTITY_NODE:
case NOTATION_NODE:
case TEXT_NODE:
case XPATH_NAMESPACE_NODE:
return false;
case COMMENT_NODE:
case PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION_NODE:
return true;
case DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:
case ELEMENT_NODE:
for (Node* c = firstChild(); c; c = c->nextSibling())
if (c->nodeType() == type)
return false;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PdfCompositorClient::Connect(service_manager::Connector* connector) {
DCHECK(!compositor_.is_bound());
connector->BindInterface(mojom::kServiceName, &compositor_);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SparseHistogram::GetCountAndBucketData(Count* count,
int64_t* sum,
ListValue* buckets) const {
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 140,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: proc_map_files_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct task_struct *task, const void *ptr)
{
fmode_t mode = (fmode_t)(unsigned long)ptr;
struct proc_inode *ei;
struct inode *inode;
inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task);
if (!inode)
return -ENOENT;
ei = PROC_I(inode);
ei->op.proc_get_link = map_files_get_link;
inode->i_op = &proc_map_files_link_inode_operations;
inode->i_size = 64;
inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK;
if (mode & FMODE_READ)
inode->i_mode |= S_IRUSR;
if (mode & FMODE_WRITE)
inode->i_mode |= S_IWUSR;
d_set_d_op(dentry, &tid_map_files_dentry_operations);
d_add(dentry, inode);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 49,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestURLFetcherFactory::TestURLFetcherFactory() {}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long get_unmapped_area_zero(struct file *file,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
if (flags & MAP_SHARED) {
/*
* mmap_zero() will call shmem_zero_setup() to create a file,
* so use shmem's get_unmapped_area in case it can be huge;
* and pass NULL for file as in mmap.c's get_unmapped_area(),
* so as not to confuse shmem with our handle on "/dev/zero".
*/
return shmem_get_unmapped_area(NULL, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
}
/* Otherwise flags & MAP_PRIVATE: with no shmem object beneath it */
return current->mm->get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
#else
return -ENOSYS;
#endif
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 66,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntSize WebPagePrivate::absoluteVisibleOverflowSize() const
{
if (!m_mainFrame->contentRenderer())
return IntSize();
return IntSize(m_mainFrame->contentRenderer()->rightAbsoluteVisibleOverflow(), m_mainFrame->contentRenderer()->bottomAbsoluteVisibleOverflow());
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct nvmet_fc_ls_iod *iod =
container_of(work, struct nvmet_fc_ls_iod, work);
struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport = iod->tgtport;
nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst(tgtport, iod);
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fpu_init(struct sh_fpu_soft_struct *fpu)
{
int i;
fpu->fpscr = FPSCR_INIT;
fpu->fpul = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
fpu->fp_regs[i] = 0;
fpu->xfp_regs[i]= 0;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *FLTGetIsLikeComparisonExpression(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode)
{
const size_t bufferSize = 1024;
char szBuffer[1024];
char szTmp[256];
char *pszValue = NULL;
const char *pszWild = NULL;
const char *pszSingle = NULL;
const char *pszEscape = NULL;
int bCaseInsensitive = 0;
int nLength=0, i=0, iTmp=0;
FEPropertyIsLike* propIsLike;
if (!psFilterNode || !psFilterNode->pOther || !psFilterNode->psLeftNode ||
!psFilterNode->psRightNode || !psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue)
return NULL;
propIsLike = (FEPropertyIsLike *)psFilterNode->pOther;
pszWild = propIsLike->pszWildCard;
pszSingle = propIsLike->pszSingleChar;
pszEscape = propIsLike->pszEscapeChar;
bCaseInsensitive = propIsLike->bCaseInsensitive;
if (!pszWild || strlen(pszWild) == 0 ||
!pszSingle || strlen(pszSingle) == 0 ||
!pszEscape || strlen(pszEscape) == 0)
return NULL;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Use operand with regular expressions. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
szBuffer[0] = '\0';
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", " (\"[");
szTmp[4] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
/* attribute */
strlcat(szBuffer, psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
/*#3521 */
if(bCaseInsensitive == 1)
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" ~* /");
else
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" =~ /");
szTmp[7] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
pszValue = psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue;
nLength = strlen(pszValue);
iTmp =0;
if (nLength > 0 && pszValue[0] != pszWild[0] &&
pszValue[0] != pszSingle[0] &&
pszValue[0] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp]= '^';
iTmp++;
}
for (i=0; i<nLength; i++) {
if (pszValue[i] != pszWild[0] &&
pszValue[i] != pszSingle[0] &&
pszValue[i] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = pszValue[i];
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszSingle[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '.';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '\\';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszWild[0]) {
/* strcat(szBuffer, "[0-9,a-z,A-Z,\\s]*"); */
/* iBuffer+=17; */
szTmp[iTmp++] = '.';
szTmp[iTmp++] = '*';
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
}
}
szTmp[iTmp] = '/';
szTmp[++iTmp] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
strlcat(szBuffer, ")", bufferSize);
return msStrdup(szBuffer);
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 168,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tx3g_dump_rgba8(FILE * trace, char *name, u32 col)
{
fprintf(trace, "%s=\"%x %x %x %x\"", name, (col>>16)&0xFF, (col>>8)&0xFF, (col)&0xFF, (col>>24)&0xFF);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void handle_message(int sd)
{
struct ifsock *ifs;
LIST_FOREACH(ifs, &il, link) {
if (ifs->in != sd)
continue;
if (ifs->cb)
ifs->cb(sd);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 88,797
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CSSStyleSheet::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(contents_);
visitor->Trace(owner_node_);
visitor->Trace(owner_rule_);
visitor->Trace(constructed_tree_scopes_);
visitor->Trace(media_cssom_wrapper_);
visitor->Trace(child_rule_cssom_wrappers_);
visitor->Trace(rule_list_cssom_wrapper_);
StyleSheet::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Disallow access to opaque CSS responses.
Bug: 848786
Change-Id: Ie53fbf644afdd76d7c65649a05c939c63d89b4ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1088335
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565537}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 153,958
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::WillCreateWebSocket(
content::RenderFrameHost* frame,
network::mojom::WebSocketRequest* request,
network::mojom::AuthenticationHandlerPtr* auth_handler) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
auto* web_request_api =
extensions::BrowserContextKeyedAPIFactory<extensions::WebRequestAPI>::Get(
frame->GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext());
if (!web_request_api)
return;
web_request_api->MaybeProxyWebSocket(frame, request, auth_handler);
#endif
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 152,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ieee80211_remove_interfaces(struct ieee80211_local *local)
{
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, *tmp;
LIST_HEAD(unreg_list);
ASSERT_RTNL();
mutex_lock(&local->iflist_mtx);
list_for_each_entry_safe(sdata, tmp, &local->interfaces, list) {
list_del(&sdata->list);
unregister_netdevice_queue(sdata->dev, &unreg_list);
}
mutex_unlock(&local->iflist_mtx);
unregister_netdevice_many(&unreg_list);
list_del(&unreg_list);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool is_session_dead(struct nfsd4_session *ses)
{
return ses->se_flags & NFS4_SESSION_DEAD;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: evdns_set_transaction_id_fn(ev_uint16_t (*fn)(void))
{
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int btrfs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
return __btrfs_set_acl(NULL, inode, acl, type);
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 50,316
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_start_dtd_attlist)
{
php_xmlwriter_string_arg(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, xmlTextWriterStartDTDAttlist, "Invalid Element Name");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHost::DeleteUIResource(UIResourceId uid) {
UIResourceClientMap::iterator iter = ui_resource_client_map_.find(uid);
if (iter == ui_resource_client_map_.end())
return;
UIResourceRequest request(UIResourceRequest::UIResourceDelete, uid);
ui_resource_request_queue_.push_back(request);
ui_resource_client_map_.erase(iter);
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme(edge_connection_t *conn)
{
circuit_t *circ;
if (connection_outbuf_too_full(TO_CONN(conn)))
return;
circ = circuit_get_by_edge_conn(conn);
if (!circ) {
/* this can legitimately happen if the destroy has already
* arrived and torn down the circuit */
log_info(LD_APP,"No circuit associated with conn. Skipping.");
return;
}
while (conn->deliver_window <= STREAMWINDOW_START - STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT) {
log_debug(conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_AP ?LD_APP:LD_EXIT,
"Outbuf %d, Queuing stream sendme.",
(int)conn->base_.outbuf_flushlen);
conn->deliver_window += STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT;
if (connection_edge_send_command(conn, RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME,
NULL, 0) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_APP,"connection_edge_send_command failed. Skipping.");
return; /* the circuit's closed, don't continue */
}
}
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 69,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestFieldTrialObserver() {
FieldTrialList::AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 110,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContainerNode::attach()
{
attachChildren();
Node::attach();
}
Commit Message: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 98,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void gen_scas(DisasContext *s, TCGMemOp ot)
{
gen_string_movl_A0_EDI(s);
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T1, cpu_A0);
gen_op(s, OP_CMPL, ot, R_EAX);
gen_op_movl_T0_Dshift(ot);
gen_op_add_reg_T0(s->aflag, R_EDI);
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 66,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: net::RequestPriority DetermineRequestPriority(
const ResourceHostMsg_Request& request_data) {
switch (request_data.priority) {
case WebKit::WebURLRequest::PriorityVeryHigh:
return net::HIGHEST;
case WebKit::WebURLRequest::PriorityHigh:
return net::MEDIUM;
case WebKit::WebURLRequest::PriorityMedium:
return net::LOW;
case WebKit::WebURLRequest::PriorityLow:
return net::LOWEST;
case WebKit::WebURLRequest::PriorityVeryLow:
return net::IDLE;
case WebKit::WebURLRequest::PriorityUnresolved:
default:
NOTREACHED();
return net::LOW;
}
}
Commit Message: Revert cross-origin auth prompt blocking.
BUG=174129
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12183030
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181113 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MSG_ReadData( msg_t *msg, void *data, int len ) {
int i;
for (i=0 ; i<len ; i++) {
((byte *)data)[i] = MSG_ReadByte (msg);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,147
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebURLLoaderImpl::Context::OnUploadProgress(uint64 position, uint64 size) {
if (client_)
client_->didSendData(loader_, position, size);
}
Commit Message: Protect WebURLLoaderImpl::Context while receiving responses.
A client's didReceiveResponse can cancel a request; by protecting the
Context we avoid a use after free in this case.
Interestingly, we really had very good warning about this problem, see
https://codereview.chromium.org/11900002/ back in January.
R=darin
BUG=241139
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15738007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntry> NavigationController::CreateNavigationEntry(
const GURL& url,
const Referrer& referrer,
ui::PageTransition transition,
bool is_renderer_initiated,
const std::string& extra_headers,
BrowserContext* browser_context) {
GURL dest_url(url);
BrowserURLHandlerImpl::GetInstance()->FixupURLBeforeRewrite(&dest_url,
browser_context);
GURL loaded_url(dest_url);
bool reverse_on_redirect = false;
BrowserURLHandlerImpl::GetInstance()->RewriteURLIfNecessary(
&loaded_url, browser_context, &reverse_on_redirect);
NavigationEntryImpl* entry = new NavigationEntryImpl(
NULL, // The site instance for tabs is sent on navigation
loaded_url,
referrer,
base::string16(),
transition,
is_renderer_initiated);
entry->SetVirtualURL(dest_url);
entry->set_user_typed_url(dest_url);
entry->set_update_virtual_url_with_url(reverse_on_redirect);
entry->set_extra_headers(extra_headers);
return base::WrapUnique(entry);
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,766
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::UpdateTitle(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
const base::string16& title,
base::i18n::TextDirection title_direction) {
SetNotWaitingForResponse();
NavigationEntryImpl* entry = controller_.GetEntryWithUniqueID(
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(render_frame_host)->nav_entry_id());
if (!entry && render_frame_host != GetMainFrame())
return;
UpdateTitleForEntry(entry, title);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: views::View* AutofillDialogViews::GetNotificationAreaForTesting() {
return notification_area_;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 109,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DidUpdateVisualProperties(
const cc::RenderFrameMetadata& metadata) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host",
"RenderWidgetHostImpl::DidUpdateVisualProperties");
DCHECK(!metadata.viewport_size_in_pixels.IsEmpty());
visual_properties_ack_pending_ = false;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_HOST_DID_UPDATE_VISUAL_PROPERTIES,
Source<RenderWidgetHost>(this), NotificationService::NoDetails());
if (!view_ || is_hidden_)
return;
viz::ScopedSurfaceIdAllocator scoped_allocator =
view_->DidUpdateVisualProperties(metadata);
if (auto_resize_enabled_ && delegate_) {
gfx::Size viewport_size_in_dip = gfx::ScaleToCeiledSize(
metadata.viewport_size_in_pixels, 1.f / metadata.device_scale_factor);
delegate_->ResizeDueToAutoResize(this, viewport_size_in_dip);
}
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: json_to_recordset(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
return populate_recordset_worker(fcinfo, "json_to_recordset", false);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::BeginDecoding() {
gpu_tracer_->BeginDecoding();
gpu_trace_commands_ = gpu_tracer_->IsTracing() && *gpu_decoder_category_;
gpu_debug_commands_ = log_commands() || debug() || gpu_trace_commands_;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TabStrip::EndDrag(EndDragReason reason) {
return drag_context_->EndDrag(reason);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRA8,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoUnmultiply,
uint8_t,
uint8_t>(const uint8_t* source,
uint8_t* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
#if defined(ARCH_CPU_X86_FAMILY)
SIMD::PackOneRowOfRGBA8LittleToRA8(source, destination, pixels_per_row);
#endif
#if HAVE_MIPS_MSA_INTRINSICS
SIMD::packOneRowOfRGBA8LittleToRA8MSA(source, destination, pixels_per_row);
#endif
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
float scale_factor = source[3] ? 255.0f / source[3] : 1.0f;
uint8_t source_r =
static_cast<uint8_t>(static_cast<float>(source[0]) * scale_factor);
destination[0] = source_r;
destination[1] = source[3];
source += 4;
destination += 2;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 146,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DataPipeConsumerDispatcher::NotifyRead(uint32_t num_bytes) {
DVLOG(1) << "Data pipe consumer " << pipe_id_
<< " notifying peer: " << num_bytes
<< " bytes read. [control_port=" << control_port_.name() << "]";
SendDataPipeControlMessage(node_controller_, control_port_,
DataPipeCommand::DATA_WAS_READ, num_bytes);
}
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 154,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SoftAVCEncoder::SoftAVCEncoder(
const char *name,
const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component)
: SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent(
name, "video_encoder.avc", OMX_VIDEO_CodingAVC,
kProfileLevels, NELEM(kProfileLevels),
176 /* width */, 144 /* height */,
callbacks, appData, component),
mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec(1),
mAVCEncProfile(AVC_BASELINE),
mAVCEncLevel(AVC_LEVEL2),
mNumInputFrames(-1),
mPrevTimestampUs(-1),
mStarted(false),
mSawInputEOS(false),
mSignalledError(false),
mHandle(new tagAVCHandle),
mEncParams(new tagAVCEncParam),
mInputFrameData(NULL),
mSliceGroup(NULL) {
const size_t kOutputBufferSize =
320 * ConversionTable[NELEM(ConversionTable) - 1].maxMacroBlocks;
initPorts(
kNumBuffers, kNumBuffers, kOutputBufferSize,
MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC, 2 /* minCompressionRatio */);
ALOGI("Construct SoftAVCEncoder");
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void cJSON_AddItemReferenceToObject( cJSON *object, const char *string, cJSON *item )
{
cJSON_AddItemToObject( object, string, create_reference( item ) );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 167,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cmd_idle(char *tag)
{
int c = EOF;
int flags;
static struct buf arg;
static int idle_period = -1;
static time_t idle_timeout = -1;
struct timespec deadline = { 0, 0 };
if (idle_timeout == -1) {
idle_timeout = config_getint(IMAPOPT_IMAPIDLETIMEOUT);
if (idle_timeout <= 0) {
idle_timeout = config_getint(IMAPOPT_TIMEOUT);
}
idle_timeout *= 60; /* unit is minutes */
}
if (idle_timeout > 0) {
errno = 0;
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &deadline) == -1) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "clock_gettime (%d %m): error reading clock",
errno);
} else {
deadline.tv_sec += idle_timeout;
}
}
if (!backend_current) { /* Local mailbox */
/* Tell client we are idling and waiting for end of command */
prot_printf(imapd_out, "+ idling\r\n");
prot_flush(imapd_out);
/* Start doing mailbox updates */
index_check(imapd_index, 1, 0);
idle_start(index_mboxname(imapd_index));
/* use this flag so if getc causes a shutdown due to
* connection abort we tell idled about it */
idling = 1;
index_release(imapd_index);
while ((flags = idle_wait(imapd_in->fd))) {
if (deadline_exceeded(&deadline)) {
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "timeout for user '%s' while idling",
imapd_userid);
shut_down(0);
break;
}
if (flags & IDLE_INPUT) {
/* Get continuation data */
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg);
break;
}
/* Send unsolicited untagged responses to the client */
if (flags & IDLE_MAILBOX)
index_check(imapd_index, 1, 0);
if (flags & IDLE_ALERT) {
char shut[MAX_MAILBOX_PATH+1];
if (! imapd_userisadmin &&
(shutdown_file(shut, sizeof(shut)) ||
(imapd_userid &&
userdeny(imapd_userid, config_ident, shut, sizeof(shut))))) {
char *p;
for (p = shut; *p == '['; p++); /* can't have [ be first char */
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* BYE [ALERT] %s\r\n", p);
shut_down(0);
}
}
index_release(imapd_index);
prot_flush(imapd_out);
}
/* Stop updates and do any necessary cleanup */
idling = 0;
idle_stop(index_mboxname(imapd_index));
}
else { /* Remote mailbox */
int done = 0;
enum { shutdown_skip, shutdown_bye, shutdown_silent } shutdown = shutdown_skip;
char buf[2048];
/* get polling period */
if (idle_period == -1) {
idle_period = config_getint(IMAPOPT_IMAPIDLEPOLL);
}
if (CAPA(backend_current, CAPA_IDLE)) {
/* Start IDLE on backend */
prot_printf(backend_current->out, "%s IDLE\r\n", tag);
if (!prot_fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), backend_current->in)) {
/* If we received nothing from the backend, fail */
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE));
return;
}
if (buf[0] != '+') {
/* If we received anything but a continuation response,
spit out what we received and quit */
prot_write(imapd_out, buf, strlen(buf));
return;
}
}
/* Tell client we are idling and waiting for end of command */
prot_printf(imapd_out, "+ idling\r\n");
prot_flush(imapd_out);
/* Pipe updates to client while waiting for end of command */
while (!done) {
if (deadline_exceeded(&deadline)) {
syslog(LOG_DEBUG,
"timeout for user '%s' while idling on remote mailbox",
imapd_userid);
shutdown = shutdown_silent;
goto done;
}
/* Flush any buffered output */
prot_flush(imapd_out);
/* Check for shutdown file */
if (!imapd_userisadmin &&
(shutdown_file(buf, sizeof(buf)) ||
(imapd_userid &&
userdeny(imapd_userid, config_ident, buf, sizeof(buf))))) {
done = 1;
shutdown = shutdown_bye;
goto done;
}
done = proxy_check_input(protin, imapd_in, imapd_out,
backend_current->in, NULL, idle_period);
/* If not running IDLE on backend, poll the mailbox for updates */
if (!CAPA(backend_current, CAPA_IDLE)) {
imapd_check(NULL, 0);
}
}
/* Get continuation data */
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg);
done:
if (CAPA(backend_current, CAPA_IDLE)) {
/* Either the client timed out, or ended the command.
In either case we're done, so terminate IDLE on backend */
prot_printf(backend_current->out, "Done\r\n");
pipe_until_tag(backend_current, tag, 0);
}
switch (shutdown) {
case shutdown_bye:
;
char *p;
for (p = buf; *p == '['; p++); /* can't have [ be first char */
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* BYE [ALERT] %s\r\n", p);
/* fallthrough */
case shutdown_silent:
shut_down(0);
break;
case shutdown_skip:
default:
break;
}
}
imapd_check(NULL, 1);
if (c != EOF) {
if (!strcasecmp(arg.s, "Done") &&
(c = (c == '\r') ? prot_getc(imapd_in) : c) == '\n') {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED));
}
else {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Invalid Idle continuation\r\n", tag);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
}
}
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 95,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dict_threshold2_params(const ref * pdict, gs_threshold2_halftone * ptp,
ref * ptproc, gs_memory_t *mem)
{
ref *tstring;
int code =
dict_threshold_common_params(pdict,
(gs_threshold_halftone_common *)ptp,
&tstring, ptproc);
int bps;
uint size;
int cw2, ch2;
if (code < 0 ||
(code = cw2 = dict_int_param(pdict, "Width2", 0, 0x7fff, 0,
&ptp->width2)) < 0 ||
(code = ch2 = dict_int_param(pdict, "Height2", 0, 0x7fff, 0,
&ptp->height2)) < 0 ||
(code = dict_int_param(pdict, "BitsPerSample", 8, 16, -1, &bps)) < 0
)
return code;
if ((bps != 8 && bps != 16) || cw2 != ch2 ||
(!cw2 && (ptp->width2 == 0 || ptp->height2 == 0))
)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
ptp->bytes_per_sample = bps / 8;
switch (r_type(tstring)) {
case t_string:
size = r_size(tstring);
gs_bytestring_from_string(&ptp->thresholds, tstring->value.const_bytes,
size);
break;
case t_astruct:
if (gs_object_type(mem, tstring->value.pstruct) != &st_bytes)
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
size = gs_object_size(mem, tstring->value.pstruct);
gs_bytestring_from_bytes(&ptp->thresholds, r_ptr(tstring, byte),
0, size);
break;
default:
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
}
check_read(*tstring);
if (size != (ptp->width * ptp->height + ptp->width2 * ptp->height2) *
ptp->bytes_per_sample)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 13,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AwContents::ShouldDownloadFavicon(const GURL& icon_url) {
return g_should_download_favicons;
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: print_t_info(netdissect_options *ndo,
int info)
{
int ntype = info & 3;
switch (ntype) {
case 0: ND_PRINT((ndo, "reserved-ntype? ")); break;
case TI_L2ROUT: ND_PRINT((ndo, "l2rout ")); break;
case TI_L1ROUT: ND_PRINT((ndo, "l1rout ")); break;
case TI_ENDNODE: ND_PRINT((ndo, "endnode ")); break;
}
if (info & TI_VERIF)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "verif "));
if (info & TI_BLOCK)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "blo "));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12899/DECnet: Fix bounds checking.
If we're skipping over padding before the *real* flags, check whether
the real flags are in the captured data before fetching it. This fixes
a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Note one place where we don't need to do bounds checking as it's already
been done.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 95,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: templPush(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xsltTemplatePtr value)
{
if (ctxt->templMax == 0) {
ctxt->templMax = 4;
ctxt->templTab =
(xsltTemplatePtr *) xmlMalloc(ctxt->templMax *
sizeof(ctxt->templTab[0]));
if (ctxt->templTab == NULL) {
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "malloc failed !\n");
return (0);
}
}
else if (ctxt->templNr >= ctxt->templMax) {
ctxt->templMax *= 2;
ctxt->templTab =
(xsltTemplatePtr *) xmlRealloc(ctxt->templTab,
ctxt->templMax *
sizeof(ctxt->templTab[0]));
if (ctxt->templTab == NULL) {
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "realloc failed !\n");
return (0);
}
}
ctxt->templTab[ctxt->templNr] = value;
ctxt->templ = value;
return (ctxt->templNr++);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CStarter::Continue( void )
{
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "Continuing all jobs.\n");
UserProc *job;
m_job_list.Rewind();
while ((job = m_job_list.Next()) != NULL) {
job->Continue();
}
this->suspended = false;
return ( true );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,385
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int get_signal_to_deliver(siginfo_t *info, struct k_sigaction *return_ka,
struct pt_regs *regs, void *cookie)
{
struct sighand_struct *sighand = current->sighand;
struct signal_struct *signal = current->signal;
int signr;
relock:
/*
* We'll jump back here after any time we were stopped in TASK_STOPPED.
* While in TASK_STOPPED, we were considered "frozen enough".
* Now that we woke up, it's crucial if we're supposed to be
* frozen that we freeze now before running anything substantial.
*/
try_to_freeze();
spin_lock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
/*
* Every stopped thread goes here after wakeup. Check to see if
* we should notify the parent, prepare_signal(SIGCONT) encodes
* the CLD_ si_code into SIGNAL_CLD_MASK bits.
*/
if (unlikely(signal->flags & SIGNAL_CLD_MASK)) {
int why = (signal->flags & SIGNAL_STOP_CONTINUED)
? CLD_CONTINUED : CLD_STOPPED;
signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_CLD_MASK;
why = tracehook_notify_jctl(why, CLD_CONTINUED);
spin_unlock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
if (why) {
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
do_notify_parent_cldstop(current->group_leader, why);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
}
goto relock;
}
for (;;) {
struct k_sigaction *ka;
/*
* Tracing can induce an artifical signal and choose sigaction.
* The return value in @signr determines the default action,
* but @info->si_signo is the signal number we will report.
*/
signr = tracehook_get_signal(current, regs, info, return_ka);
if (unlikely(signr < 0))
goto relock;
if (unlikely(signr != 0))
ka = return_ka;
else {
if (unlikely(signal->group_stop_count > 0) &&
do_signal_stop(0))
goto relock;
signr = dequeue_signal(current, ¤t->blocked,
info);
if (!signr)
break; /* will return 0 */
if (signr != SIGKILL) {
signr = ptrace_signal(signr, info,
regs, cookie);
if (!signr)
continue;
}
ka = &sighand->action[signr-1];
}
/* Trace actually delivered signals. */
trace_signal_deliver(signr, info, ka);
if (ka->sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN) /* Do nothing. */
continue;
if (ka->sa.sa_handler != SIG_DFL) {
/* Run the handler. */
*return_ka = *ka;
if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_ONESHOT)
ka->sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
break; /* will return non-zero "signr" value */
}
/*
* Now we are doing the default action for this signal.
*/
if (sig_kernel_ignore(signr)) /* Default is nothing. */
continue;
/*
* Global init gets no signals it doesn't want.
* Container-init gets no signals it doesn't want from same
* container.
*
* Note that if global/container-init sees a sig_kernel_only()
* signal here, the signal must have been generated internally
* or must have come from an ancestor namespace. In either
* case, the signal cannot be dropped.
*/
if (unlikely(signal->flags & SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE) &&
!sig_kernel_only(signr))
continue;
if (sig_kernel_stop(signr)) {
/*
* The default action is to stop all threads in
* the thread group. The job control signals
* do nothing in an orphaned pgrp, but SIGSTOP
* always works. Note that siglock needs to be
* dropped during the call to is_orphaned_pgrp()
* because of lock ordering with tasklist_lock.
* This allows an intervening SIGCONT to be posted.
* We need to check for that and bail out if necessary.
*/
if (signr != SIGSTOP) {
spin_unlock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
/* signals can be posted during this window */
if (is_current_pgrp_orphaned())
goto relock;
spin_lock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
}
if (likely(do_signal_stop(info->si_signo))) {
/* It released the siglock. */
goto relock;
}
/*
* We didn't actually stop, due to a race
* with SIGCONT or something like that.
*/
continue;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
/*
* Anything else is fatal, maybe with a core dump.
*/
current->flags |= PF_SIGNALED;
if (sig_kernel_coredump(signr)) {
if (print_fatal_signals)
print_fatal_signal(regs, info->si_signo);
/*
* If it was able to dump core, this kills all
* other threads in the group and synchronizes with
* their demise. If we lost the race with another
* thread getting here, it set group_exit_code
* first and our do_group_exit call below will use
* that value and ignore the one we pass it.
*/
do_coredump(info->si_signo, info->si_signo, regs);
}
/*
* Death signals, no core dump.
*/
do_group_exit(info->si_signo);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
spin_unlock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
return signr;
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 35,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void allocate_data_block(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct page *page,
block_t old_blkaddr, block_t *new_blkaddr,
struct f2fs_summary *sum, int type,
struct f2fs_io_info *fio, bool add_list)
{
struct sit_info *sit_i = SIT_I(sbi);
struct curseg_info *curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, type);
mutex_lock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
mutex_lock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
*new_blkaddr = NEXT_FREE_BLKADDR(sbi, curseg);
f2fs_wait_discard_bio(sbi, *new_blkaddr);
/*
* __add_sum_entry should be resided under the curseg_mutex
* because, this function updates a summary entry in the
* current summary block.
*/
__add_sum_entry(sbi, type, sum);
__refresh_next_blkoff(sbi, curseg);
stat_inc_block_count(sbi, curseg);
if (!__has_curseg_space(sbi, type))
sit_i->s_ops->allocate_segment(sbi, type, false);
/*
* SIT information should be updated after segment allocation,
* since we need to keep dirty segments precisely under SSR.
*/
refresh_sit_entry(sbi, old_blkaddr, *new_blkaddr);
mutex_unlock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
if (page && IS_NODESEG(type))
fill_node_footer_blkaddr(page, NEXT_FREE_BLKADDR(sbi, curseg));
if (add_list) {
struct f2fs_bio_info *io;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fio->list);
fio->in_list = true;
io = sbi->write_io[fio->type] + fio->temp;
spin_lock(&io->io_lock);
list_add_tail(&fio->list, &io->io_list);
spin_unlock(&io->io_lock);
}
mutex_unlock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileBrowserPrivateGetDownloadUrlFunction::OnGetResourceEntry(
drive::FileError error,
scoped_ptr<drive::ResourceEntry> entry) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (error != drive::FILE_ERROR_OK) {
SetError("Download Url for this item is not available.");
SetResult(new base::StringValue("")); // Intentionally returns a blank.
SendResponse(false);
return;
}
download_url_ =
google_apis::DriveApiUrlGenerator::kBaseDownloadUrlForProduction +
entry->resource_id();
ProfileOAuth2TokenService* oauth2_token_service =
ProfileOAuth2TokenServiceFactory::GetForProfile(GetProfile());
SigninManagerBase* signin_manager =
SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(GetProfile());
const std::string& account_id = signin_manager->GetAuthenticatedAccountId();
std::vector<std::string> scopes;
scopes.push_back("https://www.googleapis.com/auth/drive.readonly");
auth_service_.reset(
new google_apis::AuthService(oauth2_token_service,
account_id,
GetProfile()->GetRequestContext(),
scopes));
auth_service_->StartAuthentication(base::Bind(
&FileBrowserPrivateGetDownloadUrlFunction::OnTokenFetched, this));
}
Commit Message: Reland r286968: The CL borrows ShareDialog from Files.app and add it to Gallery.
Previous Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/431293002
BUG=374667
TEST=manually
R=yoshiki@chromium.org, mtomasz@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/433733004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286975 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,771
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_unmap_hva(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long hva)
{
return kvm_handle_hva(kvm, hva, 0, kvm_unmap_rmapp);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit dm_multipath_exit(void)
{
destroy_workqueue(kmpath_handlerd);
destroy_workqueue(kmultipathd);
dm_unregister_target(&multipath_target);
kmem_cache_destroy(_mpio_cache);
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool xmp_files_put_xmp(XmpFilePtr xf, XmpPtr xmp)
{
CHECK_PTR(xf, false);
CHECK_PTR(xmp, false);
RESET_ERROR;
auto txf = reinterpret_cast<SXMPFiles *>(xf);
try {
txf->PutXMP(*reinterpret_cast<const SXMPMeta *>(xmp));
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static js_Ast *arrayelement(js_State *J)
{
if (J->lookahead == ',')
return EXP0(UNDEF);
return assignment(J, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-674
| 0
| 11,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: string16 AutocompleteInput::FormattedStringWithEquivalentMeaning(
const GURL& url,
const string16& formatted_url) {
if (!net::CanStripTrailingSlash(url))
return formatted_url;
const string16 url_with_path(formatted_url + char16('/'));
return (AutocompleteInput::Parse(formatted_url, string16(), NULL, NULL,
NULL) ==
AutocompleteInput::Parse(url_with_path, string16(), NULL, NULL,
NULL)) ?
formatted_url : url_with_path;
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: selCreateFromPta(PTA *pta,
l_int32 cy,
l_int32 cx,
const char *name)
{
l_int32 i, n, x, y, w, h;
BOX *box;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selCreateFromPta");
if (!pta)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("pta not defined", procName, NULL);
if (cy < 0 || cx < 0)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("(cy, cx) not both >= 0", procName, NULL);
n = ptaGetCount(pta);
if (n == 0)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("no pts in pta", procName, NULL);
box = ptaGetBoundingRegion(pta);
boxGetGeometry(box, &x, &y, &w, &h);
boxDestroy(&box);
if (x < 0 || y < 0)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("not all x and y >= 0", procName, NULL);
sel = selCreate(y + h, x + w, name);
selSetOrigin(sel, cy, cx);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ptaGetIPt(pta, i, &x, &y);
selSetElement(sel, y, x, SEL_HIT);
}
return sel;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: getftp (struct url *u, wgint passed_expected_bytes, wgint *qtyread,
wgint restval, ccon *con, int count, wgint *last_expected_bytes,
FILE *warc_tmp)
{
int csock, dtsock, local_sock, res;
uerr_t err = RETROK; /* appease the compiler */
FILE *fp;
char *respline, *tms;
const char *user, *passwd, *tmrate;
int cmd = con->cmd;
bool pasv_mode_open = false;
wgint expected_bytes = 0;
bool got_expected_bytes = false;
bool rest_failed = false;
bool rest_failed = false;
int flags;
wgint rd_size, previous_rd_size = 0;
char type_char;
bool try_again;
bool list_a_used = false;
assert (con != NULL);
assert (con->target != NULL);
/* Debug-check of the sanity of the request by making sure that LIST
and RETR are never both requested (since we can handle only one
at a time. */
assert (!((cmd & DO_LIST) && (cmd & DO_RETR)));
/* Make sure that at least *something* is requested. */
assert ((cmd & (DO_LIST | DO_CWD | DO_RETR | DO_LOGIN)) != 0);
*qtyread = restval;
user = u->user;
passwd = u->passwd;
search_netrc (u->host, (const char **)&user, (const char **)&passwd, 1);
user = user ? user : (opt.ftp_user ? opt.ftp_user : opt.user);
if (!user) user = "anonymous";
passwd = passwd ? passwd : (opt.ftp_passwd ? opt.ftp_passwd : opt.passwd);
if (!passwd) passwd = "-wget@";
dtsock = -1;
local_sock = -1;
con->dltime = 0;
if (!(cmd & DO_LOGIN))
csock = con->csock;
else /* cmd & DO_LOGIN */
{
char *host = con->proxy ? con->proxy->host : u->host;
int port = con->proxy ? con->proxy->port : u->port;
/* Login to the server: */
/* First: Establish the control connection. */
csock = connect_to_host (host, port);
if (csock == E_HOST)
return HOSTERR;
else if (csock < 0)
return (retryable_socket_connect_error (errno)
? CONERROR : CONIMPOSSIBLE);
if (cmd & LEAVE_PENDING)
con->csock = csock;
else
con->csock = -1;
/* Second: Login with proper USER/PASS sequence. */
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Logging in as %s ... "),
quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, user));
if (opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_ALWAYS, "\n");
if (con->proxy)
{
/* If proxy is in use, log in as username@target-site. */
char *logname = concat_strings (user, "@", u->host, (char *) 0);
err = ftp_login (csock, logname, passwd);
xfree (logname);
}
else
err = ftp_login (csock, user, passwd);
/* FTPRERR, FTPSRVERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPLOGREFUSED, FTPLOGINC */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPSRVERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Error in server greeting.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPLOGREFUSED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("The server refuses login.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return FTPLOGREFUSED;
case FTPLOGINC:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Login incorrect.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return FTPLOGINC;
case FTPOK:
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Logged in!\n"));
break;
default:
abort ();
}
/* Third: Get the system type */
if (!opt.server_response)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> SYST ... ");
err = ftp_syst (csock, &con->rs, &con->rsu);
/* FTPRERR */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPSRVERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Server error, can't determine system type.\n"));
break;
case FTPOK:
/* Everything is OK. */
break;
default:
abort ();
}
if (!opt.server_response && err != FTPSRVERR)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done. "));
/* 2013-10-17 Andrea Urbani (matfanjol)
According to the system type I choose which
list command will be used.
If I don't know that system, I will try, the
first time of each session, "LIST -a" and
"LIST". (see __LIST_A_EXPLANATION__ below) */
switch (con->rs)
{
case ST_VMS:
/* About ST_VMS there is an old note:
2008-01-29 SMS. For a VMS FTP server, where "LIST -a" may not
fail, but will never do what is desired here,
skip directly to the simple "LIST" command
(assumed to be the last one in the list). */
DEBUGP (("\nVMS: I know it and I will use \"LIST\" as standard list command\n"));
con->st |= LIST_AFTER_LIST_A_CHECK_DONE;
con->st |= AVOID_LIST_A;
break;
case ST_UNIX:
if (con->rsu == UST_MULTINET)
{
DEBUGP (("\nUNIX MultiNet: I know it and I will use \"LIST\" "
"as standard list command\n"));
con->st |= LIST_AFTER_LIST_A_CHECK_DONE;
con->st |= AVOID_LIST_A;
}
else if (con->rsu == UST_TYPE_L8)
{
DEBUGP (("\nUNIX TYPE L8: I know it and I will use \"LIST -a\" "
"as standard list command\n"));
con->st |= LIST_AFTER_LIST_A_CHECK_DONE;
con->st |= AVOID_LIST;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
/* Fourth: Find the initial ftp directory */
if (!opt.server_response)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> PWD ... ");
err = ftp_pwd (csock, &con->id);
/* FTPRERR */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPSRVERR :
/* PWD unsupported -- assume "/". */
xfree (con->id);
con->id = xstrdup ("/");
break;
case FTPOK:
/* Everything is OK. */
break;
default:
abort ();
}
#if 0
/* 2004-09-17 SMS.
Don't help me out. Please.
A reasonably recent VMS FTP server will cope just fine with
UNIX file specifications. This code just spoils things.
Discarding the device name, for example, is not a wise move.
This code was disabled but left in as an example of what not
to do.
*/
/* VMS will report something like "PUB$DEVICE:[INITIAL.FOLDER]".
Convert it to "/INITIAL/FOLDER" */
if (con->rs == ST_VMS)
{
char *path = strchr (con->id, '[');
char *pathend = path ? strchr (path + 1, ']') : NULL;
if (!path || !pathend)
DEBUGP (("Initial VMS directory not in the form [...]!\n"));
else
{
char *idir = con->id;
DEBUGP (("Preprocessing the initial VMS directory\n"));
DEBUGP ((" old = '%s'\n", con->id));
/* We do the conversion in-place by copying the stuff
between [ and ] to the beginning, and changing dots
to slashes at the same time. */
*idir++ = '/';
for (++path; path < pathend; path++, idir++)
*idir = *path == '.' ? '/' : *path;
*idir = '\0';
DEBUGP ((" new = '%s'\n\n", con->id));
}
}
#endif /* 0 */
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done.\n"));
/* Fifth: Set the FTP type. */
type_char = ftp_process_type (u->params);
if (!opt.server_response)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> TYPE %c ... ", type_char);
err = ftp_type (csock, type_char);
/* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPUNKNOWNTYPE */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPUNKNOWNTYPE:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Unknown type `%c', closing control connection.\n"),
type_char);
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPOK:
/* Everything is OK. */
break;
default:
abort ();
}
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done. "));
} /* do login */
if (cmd & DO_CWD)
{
if (!*u->dir)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("==> CWD not needed.\n"));
else
{
const char *targ = NULL;
int cwd_count;
int cwd_end;
int cwd_start;
char *target = u->dir;
DEBUGP (("changing working directory\n"));
/* Change working directory. To change to a non-absolute
Unix directory, we need to prepend initial directory
(con->id) to it. Absolute directories "just work".
A relative directory is one that does not begin with '/'
and, on non-Unix OS'es, one that doesn't begin with
"[a-z]:".
This is not done for OS400, which doesn't use
"/"-delimited directories, nor does it support directory
hierarchies. "CWD foo" followed by "CWD bar" leaves us
in "bar", not in "foo/bar", as would be customary
elsewhere. */
/* 2004-09-20 SMS.
Why is this wise even on UNIX? It certainly fouls VMS.
See below for a more reliable, more universal method.
*/
/* 2008-04-22 MJC.
I'm not crazy about it either. I'm informed it's useful
for misconfigured servers that have some dirs in the path
with +x but -r, but this method is not RFC-conformant. I
understand the need to deal with crappy server
configurations, but it's far better to use the canonical
method first, and fall back to kludges second.
*/
if (target[0] != '/'
&& !(con->rs != ST_UNIX
&& c_isalpha (target[0])
&& target[1] == ':')
&& (con->rs != ST_OS400)
&& (con->rs != ST_VMS))
{
int idlen = strlen (con->id);
char *ntarget, *p;
/* Strip trailing slash(es) from con->id. */
while (idlen > 0 && con->id[idlen - 1] == '/')
--idlen;
p = ntarget = (char *)alloca (idlen + 1 + strlen (u->dir) + 1);
memcpy (p, con->id, idlen);
p += idlen;
*p++ = '/';
strcpy (p, target);
DEBUGP (("Prepended initial PWD to relative path:\n"));
DEBUGP ((" pwd: '%s'\n old: '%s'\n new: '%s'\n",
con->id, target, ntarget));
target = ntarget;
}
#if 0
/* 2004-09-17 SMS.
Don't help me out. Please.
A reasonably recent VMS FTP server will cope just fine with
UNIX file specifications. This code just spoils things.
Discarding the device name, for example, is not a wise
move.
This code was disabled but left in as an example of what
not to do.
*/
/* If the FTP host runs VMS, we will have to convert the absolute
directory path in UNIX notation to absolute directory path in
VMS notation as VMS FTP servers do not like UNIX notation of
absolute paths. "VMS notation" is [dir.subdir.subsubdir]. */
if (con->rs == ST_VMS)
{
char *tmpp;
char *ntarget = (char *)alloca (strlen (target) + 2);
/* We use a converted initial dir, so directories in
TARGET will be separated with slashes, something like
"/INITIAL/FOLDER/DIR/SUBDIR". Convert that to
"[INITIAL.FOLDER.DIR.SUBDIR]". */
strcpy (ntarget, target);
assert (*ntarget == '/');
*ntarget = '[';
for (tmpp = ntarget + 1; *tmpp; tmpp++)
if (*tmpp == '/')
*tmpp = '.';
*tmpp++ = ']';
*tmpp = '\0';
DEBUGP (("Changed file name to VMS syntax:\n"));
DEBUGP ((" Unix: '%s'\n VMS: '%s'\n", target, ntarget));
target = ntarget;
}
#endif /* 0 */
/* 2004-09-20 SMS.
A relative directory is relative to the initial directory.
Thus, what _is_ useful on VMS (and probably elsewhere) is
to CWD to the initial directory (ideally, whatever the
server reports, _exactly_, NOT badly UNIX-ixed), and then
CWD to the (new) relative directory. This should probably
be restructured as a function, called once or twice, but
I'm lazy enough to take the badly indented loop short-cut
for now.
*/
/* Decide on one pass (absolute) or two (relative).
The VMS restriction may be relaxed when the squirrely code
above is reformed.
*/
if ((con->rs == ST_VMS) && (target[0] != '/'))
{
cwd_start = 0;
DEBUGP (("Using two-step CWD for relative path.\n"));
}
else
{
/* Go straight to the target. */
cwd_start = 1;
}
/* At least one VMS FTP server (TCPware V5.6-2) can switch to
a UNIX emulation mode when given a UNIX-like directory
specification (like "a/b/c"). If allowed to continue this
way, LIST interpretation will be confused, because the
system type (SYST response) will not be re-checked, and
future UNIX-format directory listings (for multiple URLs or
"-r") will be horribly misinterpreted.
The cheap and nasty work-around is to do a "CWD []" after a
UNIX-like directory specification is used. (A single-level
directory is harmless.) This puts the TCPware server back
into VMS mode, and does no harm on other servers.
Unlike the rest of this block, this particular behavior
_is_ VMS-specific, so it gets its own VMS test.
*/
if ((con->rs == ST_VMS) && (strchr( target, '/') != NULL))
{
cwd_end = 3;
DEBUGP (("Using extra \"CWD []\" step for VMS server.\n"));
}
else
{
cwd_end = 2;
}
/* 2004-09-20 SMS. */
/* Sorry about the deviant indenting. Laziness. */
for (cwd_count = cwd_start; cwd_count < cwd_end; cwd_count++)
{
switch (cwd_count)
{
case 0:
/* Step one (optional): Go to the initial directory,
exactly as reported by the server.
*/
targ = con->id;
break;
case 1:
/* Step two: Go to the target directory. (Absolute or
relative will work now.)
*/
targ = target;
break;
case 2:
/* Step three (optional): "CWD []" to restore server
VMS-ness.
*/
targ = "[]";
break;
default:
logprintf (LOG_ALWAYS, _("Logically impossible section reached in getftp()"));
logprintf (LOG_ALWAYS, _("cwd_count: %d\ncwd_start: %d\ncwd_end: %d\n"),
cwd_count, cwd_start, cwd_end);
abort ();
}
if (!opt.server_response)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> CWD (%d) %s ... ", cwd_count,
quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, target));
err = ftp_cwd (csock, targ);
/* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPNSFOD */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPNSFOD:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("No such directory %s.\n\n"),
quote (u->dir));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPOK:
break;
default:
abort ();
}
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done.\n"));
} /* for */
/* 2004-09-20 SMS. */
} /* else */
}
else /* do not CWD */
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("==> CWD not required.\n"));
if ((cmd & DO_RETR) && passed_expected_bytes == 0)
{
if (opt.verbose)
{
if (!opt.server_response)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> SIZE %s ... ",
quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, u->file));
}
err = ftp_size (csock, u->file, &expected_bytes);
/* FTPRERR */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
case FTPSRVERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPOK:
got_expected_bytes = true;
/* Everything is OK. */
break;
default:
abort ();
}
if (!opt.server_response)
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "%s\n",
expected_bytes ?
number_to_static_string (expected_bytes) :
_("done.\n"));
}
}
if (cmd & DO_RETR && restval > 0 && restval == expected_bytes)
{
/* Server confirms that file has length restval. We should stop now.
Some servers (f.e. NcFTPd) return error when receive REST 0 */
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("File has already been retrieved.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return RETRFINISHED;
}
do
{
try_again = false;
/* If anything is to be retrieved, PORT (or PASV) must be sent. */
if (cmd & (DO_LIST | DO_RETR))
{
if (opt.ftp_pasv)
{
ip_address passive_addr;
int passive_port;
err = ftp_do_pasv (csock, &passive_addr, &passive_port);
/* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPNOPASV, FTPINVPASV */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPNOPASV:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Cannot initiate PASV transfer.\n"));
break;
case FTPINVPASV:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Cannot parse PASV response.\n"));
break;
case FTPOK:
break;
default:
abort ();
} /* switch (err) */
if (err==FTPOK)
{
DEBUGP (("trying to connect to %s port %d\n",
print_address (&passive_addr), passive_port));
dtsock = connect_to_ip (&passive_addr, passive_port, NULL);
if (dtsock < 0)
{
int save_errno = errno;
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("couldn't connect to %s port %d: %s\n"),
print_address (&passive_addr), passive_port,
strerror (save_errno));
? CONERROR : CONIMPOSSIBLE);
}
pasv_mode_open = true; /* Flag to avoid accept port */
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done. "));
} /* err==FTP_OK */
}
if (!pasv_mode_open) /* Try to use a port command if PASV failed */
{
err = ftp_do_port (csock, &local_sock);
/* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, bindport (FTPSYSERR), HOSTERR,
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case CONSOCKERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "socket: %s\n", strerror (errno));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case FTPSYSERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Bind error (%s).\n"),
strerror (errno));
fd_close (dtsock);
return err;
case FTPPORTERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Invalid PORT.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case FTPOK:
break;
default:
abort ();
} /* port switch */
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done. "));
} /* dtsock == -1 */
} /* cmd & (DO_LIST | DO_RETR) */
/* Restart if needed. */
if (restval && (cmd & DO_RETR))
{
if (!opt.server_response)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> REST %s ... ",
number_to_static_string (restval));
err = ftp_rest (csock, restval);
/* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPRESTFAIL */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case FTPRESTFAIL:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\nREST failed, starting from scratch.\n"));
rest_failed = true;
break;
case FTPOK:
break;
default:
abort ();
}
if (err != FTPRESTFAIL && !opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done. "));
} /* restval && cmd & DO_RETR */
if (cmd & DO_RETR)
{
/* If we're in spider mode, don't really retrieve anything except
the directory listing and verify whether the given "file" exists. */
if (opt.spider)
{
bool exists = false;
struct fileinfo *f;
uerr_t _res = ftp_get_listing (u, con, &f);
/* Set the DO_RETR command flag again, because it gets unset when
calling ftp_get_listing() and would otherwise cause an assertion
failure earlier on when this function gets repeatedly called
(e.g., when recursing). */
con->cmd |= DO_RETR;
if (_res == RETROK)
{
while (f)
{
if (!strcmp (f->name, u->file))
{
exists = true;
break;
}
f = f->next;
}
if (exists)
{
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("File %s exists.\n"),
quote (u->file));
}
else
{
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("No such file %s.\n"),
quote (u->file));
}
}
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return RETRFINISHED;
}
if (opt.verbose)
{
if (!opt.server_response)
{
if (restval)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> RETR %s ... ",
quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, u->file));
}
}
err = ftp_retr (csock, u->file);
/* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPNSFOD */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case FTPNSFOD:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("No such file %s.\n\n"),
quote (u->file));
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case FTPOK:
break;
default:
abort ();
}
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done.\n"));
if (! got_expected_bytes)
expected_bytes = *last_expected_bytes;
} /* do retrieve */
if (cmd & DO_LIST)
{
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> LIST ... ");
/* As Maciej W. Rozycki (macro@ds2.pg.gda.pl) says, `LIST'
without arguments is better than `LIST .'; confirmed by
RFC959. */
err = ftp_list (csock, NULL, con->st&AVOID_LIST_A, con->st&AVOID_LIST, &list_a_used);
/* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case FTPNSFOD:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("No such file or directory %s.\n\n"),
quote ("."));
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case FTPOK:
break;
default:
abort ();
}
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done.\n"));
if (! got_expected_bytes)
expected_bytes = *last_expected_bytes;
} /* cmd & DO_LIST */
if (!(cmd & (DO_LIST | DO_RETR)) || (opt.spider && !(cmd & DO_LIST)))
return RETRFINISHED;
/* Some FTP servers return the total length of file after REST
command, others just return the remaining size. */
if (passed_expected_bytes && restval && expected_bytes
&& (expected_bytes == passed_expected_bytes - restval))
{
DEBUGP (("Lying FTP server found, adjusting.\n"));
expected_bytes = passed_expected_bytes;
}
/* If no transmission was required, then everything is OK. */
if (!pasv_mode_open) /* we are not using pasive mode so we need
to accept */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 164,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cryp_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct cryp_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct crypto_alg *alg = tfm->__crt_alg;
struct cryp_algo_template *cryp_alg = container_of(alg,
struct cryp_algo_template,
crypto);
ctx->config.algomode = cryp_alg->algomode;
ctx->blocksize = crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(tfm);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,489
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_swevent_start(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
event->hw.state = 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void imapd_reset(void)
{
int i;
int bytes_in = 0;
int bytes_out = 0;
proc_cleanup();
/* close backend connections */
i = 0;
while (backend_cached && backend_cached[i]) {
proxy_downserver(backend_cached[i]);
if (backend_cached[i]->last_result.s) {
free(backend_cached[i]->last_result.s);
}
free(backend_cached[i]);
i++;
}
if (backend_cached) free(backend_cached);
backend_cached = NULL;
backend_inbox = backend_current = NULL;
if (mupdate_h) mupdate_disconnect(&mupdate_h);
mupdate_h = NULL;
proxy_cmdcnt = 0;
disable_referrals = 0;
supports_referrals = 0;
if (imapd_index) index_close(&imapd_index);
if (imapd_in) {
/* Flush the incoming buffer */
prot_NONBLOCK(imapd_in);
prot_fill(imapd_in);
bytes_in = prot_bytes_in(imapd_in);
prot_free(imapd_in);
}
if (imapd_out) {
/* Flush the outgoing buffer */
prot_flush(imapd_out);
bytes_out = prot_bytes_out(imapd_out);
prot_free(imapd_out);
}
if (config_auditlog)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "auditlog: traffic sessionid=<%s> bytes_in=<%d> bytes_out=<%d>",
session_id(), bytes_in, bytes_out);
imapd_in = imapd_out = NULL;
if (protin) protgroup_reset(protin);
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
if (tls_conn) {
if (tls_reset_servertls(&tls_conn) == -1) {
fatal("tls_reset() failed", EC_TEMPFAIL);
}
tls_conn = NULL;
}
#endif
cyrus_reset_stdio();
imapd_clienthost = "[local]";
if (imapd_logfd != -1) {
close(imapd_logfd);
imapd_logfd = -1;
}
if (imapd_userid != NULL) {
free(imapd_userid);
imapd_userid = NULL;
}
if (proxy_userid != NULL) {
free(proxy_userid);
proxy_userid = NULL;
}
if (imapd_magicplus != NULL) {
free(imapd_magicplus);
imapd_magicplus = NULL;
}
if (imapd_authstate) {
auth_freestate(imapd_authstate);
imapd_authstate = NULL;
}
imapd_userisadmin = 0;
imapd_userisproxyadmin = 0;
client_capa = 0;
if (imapd_saslconn) {
sasl_dispose(&imapd_saslconn);
free(imapd_saslconn);
imapd_saslconn = NULL;
}
imapd_compress_done = 0;
imapd_tls_comp = NULL;
imapd_starttls_done = 0;
plaintextloginalert = NULL;
if(saslprops.iplocalport) {
free(saslprops.iplocalport);
saslprops.iplocalport = NULL;
}
if(saslprops.ipremoteport) {
free(saslprops.ipremoteport);
saslprops.ipremoteport = NULL;
}
if(saslprops.authid) {
free(saslprops.authid);
saslprops.authid = NULL;
}
saslprops.ssf = 0;
clear_id();
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 95,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HFSIterator::IsSymbolicLink() {
if (IsDirectory())
return S_ISLNK(catalog_->current_record()->folder->bsdInfo.fileMode);
else
return S_ISLNK(catalog_->current_record()->file->bsdInfo.fileMode);
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,801
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void squashfs_closedir(struct dir *dir)
{
free(dir->dirs);
free(dir);
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 74,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __dev_remove_offload(struct packet_offload *po)
{
struct list_head *head = &offload_base;
struct packet_offload *po1;
spin_lock(&offload_lock);
list_for_each_entry(po1, head, list) {
if (po == po1) {
list_del_rcu(&po->list);
goto out;
}
}
pr_warn("dev_remove_offload: %p not found\n", po);
out:
spin_unlock(&offload_lock);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,737
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int is_errata100(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if ((regs->cs == __USER32_CS || (regs->cs & (1<<2))) && (address >> 32))
return 1;
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceRelease(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceRelease_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceRelease");
gfx::PluginWindowHandle handle =
GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->GetSurfaceWindowHandle(params.surface_id);
if (!handle) {
#if defined(USE_AURA)
RouteOnUIThread(GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceRelease(params));
return;
#endif
}
scoped_refptr<AcceleratedPresenter> presenter(
AcceleratedPresenter::GetForWindow(handle));
if (!presenter)
return;
presenter->ReleaseSurface();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void zend_extension_activator(zend_extension *extension) /* {{{ */
{
if (extension->activate) {
extension->activate();
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Use format string
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 57,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::InsertOnlineWhiteList(
const OnlineWhiteListRecord* record) {
if (!LazyOpen(kCreateIfNeeded))
return false;
static const char kSql[] =
"INSERT INTO OnlineWhiteLists (cache_id, namespace_url, is_pattern)"
" VALUES (?, ?, ?)";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, record->cache_id);
statement.BindString(1, record->namespace_url.spec());
statement.BindBool(2, record->is_pattern);
return statement.Run();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::FrameInfo::FrameInfo(size_t length,
QuicTime timestamp)
: length(length), timestamp(timestamp) {}
Commit Message: Fix OOB Write in QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::OnStreamData
BUG=778505
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I1dfd1d26a2c7ee8fe047f7fe6e4ac2e9b97efa52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748282
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513144}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 150,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct mddev *mddev_get(struct mddev *mddev)
{
atomic_inc(&mddev->active);
return mddev;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,489
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message,
bool* message_was_ok) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(ChromeRenderMessageFilter, message, *message_was_ok)
#if !defined(DISABLE_NACL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ChromeViewHostMsg_LaunchNaCl, OnLaunchNaCl)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_DnsPrefetch, OnDnsPrefetch)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_RendererHistograms,
OnRendererHistograms)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_ResourceTypeStats,
OnResourceTypeStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_UpdatedCacheStats,
OnUpdatedCacheStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_FPS, OnFPS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_V8HeapStats, OnV8HeapStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_OpenChannelToExtension,
OnOpenChannelToExtension)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_OpenChannelToTab, OnOpenChannelToTab)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ExtensionHostMsg_GetMessageBundle,
OnGetExtensionMessageBundle)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_AddListener, OnExtensionAddListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_RemoveListener,
OnExtensionRemoveListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_AddLazyListener,
OnExtensionAddLazyListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_RemoveLazyListener,
OnExtensionRemoveLazyListener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_CloseChannel, OnExtensionCloseChannel)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_RequestForIOThread,
OnExtensionRequestForIOThread)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_ShouldUnloadAck,
OnExtensionShouldUnloadAck)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_GenerateUniqueID,
OnExtensionGenerateUniqueID)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_UnloadAck, OnExtensionUnloadAck)
#if defined(USE_TCMALLOC)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_WriteTcmallocHeapProfile_ACK,
OnWriteTcmallocHeapProfile)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowDatabase, OnAllowDatabase)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowDOMStorage, OnAllowDOMStorage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowFileSystem, OnAllowFileSystem)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_AllowIndexedDB, OnAllowIndexedDB)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_CanTriggerClipboardRead,
OnCanTriggerClipboardRead)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_CanTriggerClipboardWrite,
OnCanTriggerClipboardWrite)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
#if defined(ENABLE_AUTOMATION)
if ((message.type() == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetCookies::ID ||
message.type() == ChromeViewHostMsg_SetCookie::ID) &&
AutomationResourceMessageFilter::ShouldFilterCookieMessages(
render_process_id_, message.routing_id())) {
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(ChromeRenderMessageFilter, message,
*message_was_ok)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ChromeViewHostMsg_GetCookies,
OnGetCookies)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_SetCookie, OnSetCookie)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
handled = true;
}
#endif
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 170,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs_fhget(struct super_block *sb, struct nfs_fh *fh, struct nfs_fattr *fattr)
{
struct nfs_find_desc desc = {
.fh = fh,
.fattr = fattr
};
struct inode *inode = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
unsigned long hash;
if ((fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR) == 0)
goto out_no_inode;
if (!fattr->nlink) {
printk("NFS: Buggy server - nlink == 0!\n");
goto out_no_inode;
}
hash = nfs_fattr_to_ino_t(fattr);
inode = iget5_locked(sb, hash, nfs_find_actor, nfs_init_locked, &desc);
if (inode == NULL) {
inode = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
goto out_no_inode;
}
if (inode->i_state & I_NEW) {
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(inode);
unsigned long now = jiffies;
/* We set i_ino for the few things that still rely on it,
* such as stat(2) */
inode->i_ino = hash;
/* We can't support update_atime(), since the server will reset it */
inode->i_flags |= S_NOATIME|S_NOCMTIME;
inode->i_mode = fattr->mode;
/* Why so? Because we want revalidate for devices/FIFOs, and
* that's precisely what we have in nfs_file_inode_operations.
*/
inode->i_op = NFS_SB(sb)->nfs_client->rpc_ops->file_inode_ops;
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
inode->i_fop = &nfs_file_operations;
inode->i_data.a_ops = &nfs_file_aops;
inode->i_data.backing_dev_info = &NFS_SB(sb)->backing_dev_info;
} else if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
inode->i_op = NFS_SB(sb)->nfs_client->rpc_ops->dir_inode_ops;
inode->i_fop = &nfs_dir_operations;
if (nfs_server_capable(inode, NFS_CAP_READDIRPLUS)
&& fattr->size <= NFS_LIMIT_READDIRPLUS)
set_bit(NFS_INO_ADVISE_RDPLUS, &NFS_I(inode)->flags);
/* Deal with crossing mountpoints */
if (!nfs_fsid_equal(&NFS_SB(sb)->fsid, &fattr->fsid)) {
if (fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_REFERRAL)
inode->i_op = &nfs_referral_inode_operations;
else
inode->i_op = &nfs_mountpoint_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = NULL;
set_bit(NFS_INO_MOUNTPOINT, &nfsi->flags);
}
} else if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
inode->i_op = &nfs_symlink_inode_operations;
else
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, fattr->rdev);
nfsi->read_cache_jiffies = fattr->time_start;
nfsi->attr_gencount = fattr->gencount;
inode->i_atime = fattr->atime;
inode->i_mtime = fattr->mtime;
inode->i_ctime = fattr->ctime;
if (fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4)
nfsi->change_attr = fattr->change_attr;
inode->i_size = nfs_size_to_loff_t(fattr->size);
inode->i_nlink = fattr->nlink;
inode->i_uid = fattr->uid;
inode->i_gid = fattr->gid;
if (fattr->valid & (NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V3 | NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4)) {
/*
* report the blocks in 512byte units
*/
inode->i_blocks = nfs_calc_block_size(fattr->du.nfs3.used);
} else {
inode->i_blocks = fattr->du.nfs2.blocks;
}
nfsi->attrtimeo = NFS_MINATTRTIMEO(inode);
nfsi->attrtimeo_timestamp = now;
memset(nfsi->cookieverf, 0, sizeof(nfsi->cookieverf));
nfsi->access_cache = RB_ROOT;
unlock_new_inode(inode);
} else
nfs_refresh_inode(inode, fattr);
dprintk("NFS: nfs_fhget(%s/%Ld ct=%d)\n",
inode->i_sb->s_id,
(long long)NFS_FILEID(inode),
atomic_read(&inode->i_count));
out:
return inode;
out_no_inode:
dprintk("nfs_fhget: iget failed with error %ld\n", PTR_ERR(inode));
goto out;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,791
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tcp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tcp_extend_values tmp_ext;
struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
u8 *hash_location;
struct request_sock *req;
struct inet6_request_sock *treq;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
__u32 isn = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->when;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
int want_cookie = 0;
#else
#define want_cookie 0
#endif
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
return tcp_v4_conn_request(sk, skb);
if (!ipv6_unicast_destination(skb))
goto drop;
if (inet_csk_reqsk_queue_is_full(sk) && !isn) {
if (net_ratelimit())
syn_flood_warning(skb);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
if (sysctl_tcp_syncookies)
want_cookie = 1;
else
#endif
goto drop;
}
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk) && inet_csk_reqsk_queue_young(sk) > 1)
goto drop;
req = inet6_reqsk_alloc(&tcp6_request_sock_ops);
if (req == NULL)
goto drop;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
tcp_rsk(req)->af_specific = &tcp_request_sock_ipv6_ops;
#endif
tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt);
tmp_opt.mss_clamp = IPV6_MIN_MTU - sizeof(struct tcphdr) - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
tmp_opt.user_mss = tp->rx_opt.user_mss;
tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, &hash_location, 0);
if (tmp_opt.cookie_plus > 0 &&
tmp_opt.saw_tstamp &&
!tp->rx_opt.cookie_out_never &&
(sysctl_tcp_cookie_size > 0 ||
(tp->cookie_values != NULL &&
tp->cookie_values->cookie_desired > 0))) {
u8 *c;
u32 *d;
u32 *mess = &tmp_ext.cookie_bakery[COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS];
int l = tmp_opt.cookie_plus - TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE;
if (tcp_cookie_generator(&tmp_ext.cookie_bakery[0]) != 0)
goto drop_and_free;
/* Secret recipe starts with IP addresses */
d = (__force u32 *)&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32[0];
*mess++ ^= *d++;
*mess++ ^= *d++;
*mess++ ^= *d++;
*mess++ ^= *d++;
d = (__force u32 *)&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32[0];
*mess++ ^= *d++;
*mess++ ^= *d++;
*mess++ ^= *d++;
*mess++ ^= *d++;
/* plus variable length Initiator Cookie */
c = (u8 *)mess;
while (l-- > 0)
*c++ ^= *hash_location++;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
want_cookie = 0; /* not our kind of cookie */
#endif
tmp_ext.cookie_out_never = 0; /* false */
tmp_ext.cookie_plus = tmp_opt.cookie_plus;
} else if (!tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always) {
/* redundant indications, but ensure initialization. */
tmp_ext.cookie_out_never = 1; /* true */
tmp_ext.cookie_plus = 0;
} else {
goto drop_and_free;
}
tmp_ext.cookie_in_always = tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always;
if (want_cookie && !tmp_opt.saw_tstamp)
tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt);
tmp_opt.tstamp_ok = tmp_opt.saw_tstamp;
tcp_openreq_init(req, &tmp_opt, skb);
treq = inet6_rsk(req);
ipv6_addr_copy(&treq->rmt_addr, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&treq->loc_addr, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr);
if (!want_cookie || tmp_opt.tstamp_ok)
TCP_ECN_create_request(req, tcp_hdr(skb));
if (!isn) {
struct inet_peer *peer = NULL;
if (ipv6_opt_accepted(sk, skb) ||
np->rxopt.bits.rxinfo || np->rxopt.bits.rxoinfo ||
np->rxopt.bits.rxhlim || np->rxopt.bits.rxohlim) {
atomic_inc(&skb->users);
treq->pktopts = skb;
}
treq->iif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
/* So that link locals have meaning */
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if &&
ipv6_addr_type(&treq->rmt_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
treq->iif = inet6_iif(skb);
if (want_cookie) {
isn = cookie_v6_init_sequence(sk, skb, &req->mss);
req->cookie_ts = tmp_opt.tstamp_ok;
goto have_isn;
}
/* VJ's idea. We save last timestamp seen
* from the destination in peer table, when entering
* state TIME-WAIT, and check against it before
* accepting new connection request.
*
* If "isn" is not zero, this request hit alive
* timewait bucket, so that all the necessary checks
* are made in the function processing timewait state.
*/
if (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp &&
tcp_death_row.sysctl_tw_recycle &&
(dst = inet6_csk_route_req(sk, req)) != NULL &&
(peer = rt6_get_peer((struct rt6_info *)dst)) != NULL &&
ipv6_addr_equal((struct in6_addr *)peer->daddr.addr.a6,
&treq->rmt_addr)) {
inet_peer_refcheck(peer);
if ((u32)get_seconds() - peer->tcp_ts_stamp < TCP_PAWS_MSL &&
(s32)(peer->tcp_ts - req->ts_recent) >
TCP_PAWS_WINDOW) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_PAWSPASSIVEREJECTED);
goto drop_and_release;
}
}
/* Kill the following clause, if you dislike this way. */
else if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies &&
(sysctl_max_syn_backlog - inet_csk_reqsk_queue_len(sk) <
(sysctl_max_syn_backlog >> 2)) &&
(!peer || !peer->tcp_ts_stamp) &&
(!dst || !dst_metric(dst, RTAX_RTT))) {
/* Without syncookies last quarter of
* backlog is filled with destinations,
* proven to be alive.
* It means that we continue to communicate
* to destinations, already remembered
* to the moment of synflood.
*/
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG "TCP: drop open request from %pI6/%u\n",
&treq->rmt_addr, ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->source));
goto drop_and_release;
}
isn = tcp_v6_init_sequence(skb);
}
have_isn:
tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn = isn;
tcp_rsk(req)->snt_synack = tcp_time_stamp;
security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req);
if (tcp_v6_send_synack(sk, req,
(struct request_values *)&tmp_ext) ||
want_cookie)
goto drop_and_free;
inet6_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(sk, req, TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
return 0;
drop_and_release:
dst_release(dst);
drop_and_free:
reqsk_free(req);
drop:
return 0; /* don't send reset */
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long gfn_to_hva_prot(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, bool *writable)
{
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
return gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot(slot, gfn, writable);
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 71,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::vector<gfx::Size> ConvertToFaviconSizes(
const blink::WebVector<blink::WebSize>& web_sizes) {
std::vector<gfx::Size> result;
result.reserve(web_sizes.size());
for (const blink::WebSize& web_size : web_sizes)
result.push_back(gfx::Size(web_size));
return result;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int first_nibble_is_4(RAnal* anal, RAnalOp* op, ut16 code){
switch (code & 0xF0FF) {
case 0x4020: //shal
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_SAL;
break;
case 0x4021: //shar
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_SAR;
break;
case 0x4000: //shll
case 0x4008: //shll2
case 0x4018: //shll8
case 0x4028: //shll16
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_SHL;
break;
case 0x4001: //shlr
case 0x4009: //shlr2
case 0x4019: //shlr8
case 0x4029: //shlr16
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_SHR;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (IS_JSR(code)) {
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UCALL; //call to reg
op->delay = 1;
op->dst = anal_fill_ai_rg (anal, GET_TARGET_REG(code));
} else if ( IS_JMP(code) ) {
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UJMP; //jmp to reg
op->dst = anal_fill_ai_rg (anal, GET_TARGET_REG(code));
op->delay = 1;
op->eob = true;
} else if (IS_CMPPL(code) || IS_CMPPZ(code)) {
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CMP;
} else if (IS_LDCLSR1(code) || IS_LDSLMAC(code) || IS_LDSLPR(code)) {
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_POP;
} else if (IS_LDCSR1(code) || IS_LDSMAC(code) || IS_LDSPR(code)) {
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_MOV;
} else if (IS_ROT(code)) {
op->type = (code&1)? R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_ROR:R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_ROL;
} else if (IS_STCLSR1(code) || IS_STSLMAC(code) || IS_STSLPR(code)) {
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_PUSH;
} else if (IS_TASB(code)) {
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK;
} else if (IS_DT(code)) {
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK;
}
return op->size;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9903 - oobread in RAnal.sh
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,685
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayerTreeHost::InitParams::~InitParams() {}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_RESULT_CODE php_http_url_encode_hash_ex(HashTable *hash, php_http_buffer_t *qstr, const char *arg_sep_str, size_t arg_sep_len, const char *val_sep_str, size_t val_sep_len, const char *pre_encoded_str, size_t pre_encoded_len TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (pre_encoded_len && pre_encoded_str) {
php_http_buffer_append(qstr, pre_encoded_str, pre_encoded_len);
}
if (!php_http_params_to_string(qstr, hash, arg_sep_str, arg_sep_len, "", 0, val_sep_str, val_sep_len, PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_QUERY TSRMLS_CC)) {
return FAILURE;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fix bug #71719 (Buffer overflow in HTTP url parsing functions)
The parser's offset was not reset when we softfail in scheme
parsing and continue to parse a path.
Thanks to hlt99 at blinkenshell dot org for the report.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: more_files_callback (GObject *source_object,
GAsyncResult *res,
gpointer user_data)
{
DirectoryLoadState *state;
NautilusDirectory *directory;
GError *error;
GList *files, *l;
GFileInfo *info;
state = user_data;
if (state->directory == NULL)
{
/* Operation was cancelled. Bail out */
directory_load_state_free (state);
return;
}
directory = nautilus_directory_ref (state->directory);
g_assert (directory->details->directory_load_in_progress != NULL);
g_assert (directory->details->directory_load_in_progress == state);
error = NULL;
files = g_file_enumerator_next_files_finish (state->enumerator,
res, &error);
for (l = files; l != NULL; l = l->next)
{
info = l->data;
directory_load_one (directory, info);
g_object_unref (info);
}
if (files == NULL)
{
directory_load_done (directory, error);
directory_load_state_free (state);
}
else
{
g_file_enumerator_next_files_async (state->enumerator,
DIRECTORY_LOAD_ITEMS_PER_CALLBACK,
G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT,
state->cancellable,
more_files_callback,
state);
}
nautilus_directory_unref (directory);
if (error)
{
g_error_free (error);
}
g_list_free (files);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void usbhid_request(struct hid_device *hid, struct hid_report *rep, int reqtype)
{
switch (reqtype) {
case HID_REQ_GET_REPORT:
usbhid_submit_report(hid, rep, USB_DIR_IN);
break;
case HID_REQ_SET_REPORT:
usbhid_submit_report(hid, rep, USB_DIR_OUT);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: HID: usbhid: fix out-of-bounds bug
The hid descriptor identifies the length and type of subordinate
descriptors for a device. If the received hid descriptor is smaller than
the size of the struct hid_descriptor, it is possible to cause
out-of-bounds.
In addition, if bNumDescriptors of the hid descriptor have an incorrect
value, this can also cause out-of-bounds while approaching hdesc->desc[n].
So check the size of hid descriptor and bNumDescriptors.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006c5f8edf by task kworker/1:2/1261
CPU: 1 PID: 1261 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted
4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #169
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1004
hid_add_device+0x16b/0xb30 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2944
usbhid_probe+0xc28/0x1100 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1369
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaejoong Kim <climbbb.kim@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 59,832
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __attribute__((__noreturn__)) Com_Error_f (void) {
if ( Cmd_Argc() > 1 ) {
Com_Error( ERR_DROP, "Testing drop error" );
} else {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Testing fatal error" );
}
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StrictModeTypeErrorFunction::destroy(JSCell* cell)
{
jsCast<StrictModeTypeErrorFunction*>(cell)->StrictModeTypeErrorFunction::~StrictModeTypeErrorFunction();
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadItemImplDelegate::ResumeInterruptedDownload(
std::unique_ptr<DownloadUrlParameters> params,
uint32_t id) {}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContext* WebContext::FromBrowserContext(oxide::BrowserContext* context) {
BrowserContextDelegate* delegate =
static_cast<BrowserContextDelegate*>(context->GetDelegate());
if (!delegate) {
return nullptr;
}
return delegate->context();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 165,411
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mwifiex_uap_custom_ie_prepare(u8 *tlv, void *cmd_buf, u16 *ie_size)
{
struct mwifiex_ie_list *ap_ie = cmd_buf;
struct mwifiex_ie_types_header *tlv_ie = (void *)tlv;
if (!ap_ie || !ap_ie->len)
return -1;
*ie_size += le16_to_cpu(ap_ie->len) +
sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header);
tlv_ie->type = cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_MGMT_IE);
tlv_ie->len = ap_ie->len;
tlv += sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header);
memcpy(tlv, ap_ie->ie_list, le16_to_cpu(ap_ie->len));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <huangwenabc@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <gbhat@marvell.comg>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-120
| 0
| 88,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Element::isUnresolvedCustomElement()
{
return isCustomElement() && document()->registry()->isUnresolved(this);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init snd_compress_init(void)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 58,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OMXCodec::setMinBufferSize(OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_U32 size) {
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
status_t err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
CHECK_EQ(err, (status_t)OK);
if ((portIndex == kPortIndexInput && (mQuirks & kInputBufferSizesAreBogus))
|| (def.nBufferSize < size)) {
def.nBufferSize = size;
}
err = mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
CHECK_EQ(err, (status_t)OK);
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
CHECK_EQ(err, (status_t)OK);
if (portIndex == kPortIndexInput
&& (mQuirks & kInputBufferSizesAreBogus)) {
CHECK_EQ(def.nBufferSize, size);
} else {
CHECK(def.nBufferSize >= size);
}
}
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kill_ioctx(struct mm_struct *mm, struct kioctx *ctx)
{
if (!atomic_xchg(&ctx->dead, 1)) {
struct kioctx_table *table;
spin_lock(&mm->ioctx_lock);
rcu_read_lock();
table = rcu_dereference(mm->ioctx_table);
WARN_ON(ctx != table->table[ctx->id]);
table->table[ctx->id] = NULL;
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock(&mm->ioctx_lock);
/* percpu_ref_kill() will do the necessary call_rcu() */
wake_up_all(&ctx->wait);
/*
* It'd be more correct to do this in free_ioctx(), after all
* the outstanding kiocbs have finished - but by then io_destroy
* has already returned, so io_setup() could potentially return
* -EAGAIN with no ioctxs actually in use (as far as userspace
* could tell).
*/
aio_nr_sub(ctx->max_reqs);
if (ctx->mmap_size)
vm_munmap(ctx->mmap_base, ctx->mmap_size);
percpu_ref_kill(&ctx->users);
}
}
Commit Message: aio: prevent double free in ioctx_alloc
ioctx_alloc() calls aio_setup_ring() to allocate a ring. If aio_setup_ring()
fails to do so it would call aio_free_ring() before returning, but
ioctx_alloc() would call aio_free_ring() again causing a double free of
the ring.
This is easily reproducible from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 40,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: otp_edata(krb5_context context, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb, krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock,
krb5_kdcpreauth_moddata moddata, krb5_preauthtype pa_type,
krb5_kdcpreauth_edata_respond_fn respond, void *arg)
{
krb5_otp_tokeninfo ti, *tis[2] = { &ti, NULL };
krb5_keyblock *armor_key = NULL;
krb5_pa_otp_challenge chl;
krb5_pa_data *pa = NULL;
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_data *encoding;
char *config;
/* Determine if otp is enabled for the user. */
retval = cb->get_string(context, rock, "otp", &config);
if (retval == 0 && config == NULL)
retval = ENOENT;
if (retval != 0)
goto out;
cb->free_string(context, rock, config);
/* Get the armor key. This indicates the length of random data to use in
* the nonce. */
armor_key = cb->fast_armor(context, rock);
if (armor_key == NULL) {
retval = ENOENT;
goto out;
}
/* Build the (mostly empty) challenge. */
memset(&ti, 0, sizeof(ti));
memset(&chl, 0, sizeof(chl));
chl.tokeninfo = tis;
ti.format = -1;
ti.length = -1;
ti.iteration_count = -1;
/* Generate the nonce. */
retval = nonce_generate(context, armor_key->length, &chl.nonce);
if (retval != 0)
goto out;
/* Build the output pa-data. */
retval = encode_krb5_pa_otp_challenge(&chl, &encoding);
if (retval != 0)
goto out;
pa = k5alloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data), &retval);
if (pa == NULL) {
krb5_free_data(context, encoding);
goto out;
}
pa->pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_OTP_CHALLENGE;
pa->contents = (krb5_octet *)encoding->data;
pa->length = encoding->length;
free(encoding);
out:
(*respond)(arg, retval, pa);
}
Commit Message: Prevent requires_preauth bypass [CVE-2015-2694]
In the OTP kdcpreauth module, don't set the TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH bit until
the request is successfully verified. In the PKINIT kdcpreauth
module, don't respond with code 0 on empty input or an unconfigured
realm. Together these bugs could cause the KDC preauth framework to
erroneously treat a request as pre-authenticated.
CVE-2015-2694:
In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, when the KDC is configured with PKINIT
support, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the
requires_preauth flag on a client principal and obtain a ciphertext
encrypted in the principal's long-term key. This ciphertext could be
used to conduct an off-line dictionary attack against the user's
password.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8160 (new)
target_version: 1.13.2
tags: pullup
subject: requires_preauth bypass in PKINIT-enabled KDC [CVE-2015-2694]
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 43,827
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: httpd_close_conn( httpd_conn* hc, struct timeval* nowP )
{
make_log_entry( hc, nowP );
if ( hc->file_address != (char*) 0 )
{
mmc_unmap( hc->file_address, &(hc->sb), nowP );
hc->file_address = (char*) 0;
}
if ( hc->conn_fd >= 0 )
{
(void) close( hc->conn_fd );
hc->conn_fd = -1;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,807
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dns_link_resolution(void *requester, int requester_type, int requester_locked)
{
struct dns_resolution *res = NULL;
struct dns_requester *req;
struct dns_resolvers *resolvers;
struct server *srv = NULL;
struct dns_srvrq *srvrq = NULL;
char **hostname_dn;
int hostname_dn_len, query_type;
switch (requester_type) {
case OBJ_TYPE_SERVER:
srv = (struct server *)requester;
hostname_dn = &srv->hostname_dn;
hostname_dn_len = srv->hostname_dn_len;
resolvers = srv->resolvers;
query_type = ((srv->dns_opts.family_prio == AF_INET)
? DNS_RTYPE_A
: DNS_RTYPE_AAAA);
break;
case OBJ_TYPE_SRVRQ:
srvrq = (struct dns_srvrq *)requester;
hostname_dn = &srvrq->hostname_dn;
hostname_dn_len = srvrq->hostname_dn_len;
resolvers = srvrq->resolvers;
query_type = DNS_RTYPE_SRV;
break;
default:
goto err;
}
/* Get a resolution from the resolvers' wait queue or pool */
if ((res = dns_pick_resolution(resolvers, hostname_dn, hostname_dn_len, query_type)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (srv) {
if (!requester_locked)
HA_SPIN_LOCK(SERVER_LOCK, &srv->lock);
if (srv->dns_requester == NULL) {
if ((req = calloc(1, sizeof(*req))) == NULL) {
if (!requester_locked)
HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(SERVER_LOCK, &srv->lock);
goto err;
}
req->owner = &srv->obj_type;
srv->dns_requester = req;
}
else
req = srv->dns_requester;
if (!requester_locked)
HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(SERVER_LOCK, &srv->lock);
}
else if (srvrq) {
if (srvrq->dns_requester == NULL) {
if ((req = calloc(1, sizeof(*req))) == NULL)
goto err;
req->owner = &srvrq->obj_type;
srvrq->dns_requester = req;
}
else
req = srvrq->dns_requester;
}
else
goto err;
req->resolution = res;
req->requester_cb = snr_resolution_cb;
req->requester_error_cb = snr_resolution_error_cb;
LIST_ADDQ(&res->requesters, &req->list);
return 0;
err:
if (res && LIST_ISEMPTY(&res->requesters))
dns_free_resolution(res);
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 722
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const unsigned char* lodepng_chunk_data_const(const unsigned char* chunk)
{
return &chunk[8];
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static double KernelBessel_Order1(double x)
{
double p, q;
if (x == 0.0)
return (0.0f);
p = x;
if (x < 0.0)
x=(-x);
if (x < 8.0)
return (p*KernelBessel_J1(x));
q = (double)sqrt(2.0f/(M_PI*x))*(double)(KernelBessel_P1(x)*(1.0f/sqrt(2.0f)*(sin(x)-cos(x)))-8.0f/x*KernelBessel_Q1(x)*
(-1.0f/sqrt(2.0f)*(sin(x)+cos(x))));
if (p < 0.0f)
q = (-q);
return (q);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #72227: imagescale out-of-bounds read
Ported from https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 95,052
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PaintLayerScrollableArea::SetHorizontalScrollbarVisualRect(
const LayoutRect& rect) {
horizontal_scrollbar_visual_rect_ = rect;
if (Scrollbar* scrollbar = HorizontalScrollbar())
scrollbar->SetVisualRect(rect);
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,129
|
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