instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: extern "C" int EffectGetDescriptor(const effect_uuid_t *uuid,
effect_descriptor_t *pDescriptor) {
const effect_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
if (pDescriptor == NULL || uuid == NULL){
ALOGV("EffectGetDescriptor() called with NULL pointer");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (memcmp(uuid, &gBassBoostDescriptor.uuid, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0) {
desc = &gBassBoostDescriptor;
} else if (memcmp(uuid, &gVirtualizerDescriptor.uuid, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0) {
desc = &gVirtualizerDescriptor;
} else if (memcmp(uuid, &gEqualizerDescriptor.uuid, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0) {
desc = &gEqualizerDescriptor;
} else if (memcmp(uuid, &gVolumeDescriptor.uuid, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0) {
desc = &gVolumeDescriptor;
}
if (desc == NULL) {
return -EINVAL;
}
*pDescriptor = *desc;
return 0;
} /* end EffectGetDescriptor */
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,384
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Con_StopLimboMode_f( void ) {
chat_limbo = qfalse;
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OnCanTriggerClipboardRead(
const GURL& origin, bool* allowed) {
*allowed = extension_info_map_->SecurityOriginHasAPIPermission(
origin, render_process_id_, APIPermission::kClipboardRead);
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkcs7_encrypt)
{
zval ** zrecipcerts, * zheaders = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) * recipcerts = NULL;
BIO * infile = NULL, * outfile = NULL;
long flags = 0;
PKCS7 * p7 = NULL;
HashPosition hpos;
zval ** zcertval;
X509 * cert;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
long cipherid = PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_DEFAULT;
uint strindexlen;
ulong intindex;
char * strindex;
char * infilename = NULL; int infilename_len;
char * outfilename = NULL; int outfilename_len;
RETVAL_FALSE;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ssZa!|ll", &infilename, &infilename_len,
&outfilename, &outfilename_len, &zrecipcerts, &zheaders, &flags, &cipherid) == FAILURE)
return;
if (strlen(infilename) != infilename_len) {
return;
}
if (strlen(outfilename) != outfilename_len) {
return;
}
if (php_openssl_safe_mode_chk(infilename TSRMLS_CC) || php_openssl_safe_mode_chk(outfilename TSRMLS_CC)) {
return;
}
infile = BIO_new_file(infilename, "r");
if (infile == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
outfile = BIO_new_file(outfilename, "w");
if (outfile == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
recipcerts = sk_X509_new_null();
/* get certs */
if (Z_TYPE_PP(zrecipcerts) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(HASH_OF(*zrecipcerts), &hpos);
while(zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(HASH_OF(*zrecipcerts), (void**)&zcertval, &hpos) == SUCCESS) {
long certresource;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcertval, 0, &certresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
if (certresource != -1) {
/* we shouldn't free this particular cert, as it is a resource.
make a copy and push that on the stack instead */
cert = X509_dup(cert);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
sk_X509_push(recipcerts, cert);
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(HASH_OF(*zrecipcerts), &hpos);
}
} else {
/* a single certificate */
long certresource;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zrecipcerts, 0, &certresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
if (certresource != -1) {
/* we shouldn't free this particular cert, as it is a resource.
make a copy and push that on the stack instead */
cert = X509_dup(cert);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
sk_X509_push(recipcerts, cert);
}
/* sanity check the cipher */
cipher = php_openssl_get_evp_cipher_from_algo(cipherid);
if (cipher == NULL) {
/* shouldn't happen */
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to get cipher");
goto clean_exit;
}
p7 = PKCS7_encrypt(recipcerts, infile, (EVP_CIPHER*)cipher, flags);
if (p7 == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
/* tack on extra headers */
if (zheaders) {
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(HASH_OF(zheaders), &hpos);
while(zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(HASH_OF(zheaders), (void**)&zcertval, &hpos) == SUCCESS) {
strindex = NULL;
zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(HASH_OF(zheaders), &strindex, &strindexlen, &intindex, 0, &hpos);
convert_to_string_ex(zcertval);
if (strindex) {
BIO_printf(outfile, "%s: %s\n", strindex, Z_STRVAL_PP(zcertval));
} else {
BIO_printf(outfile, "%s\n", Z_STRVAL_PP(zcertval));
}
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(HASH_OF(zheaders), &hpos);
}
}
(void)BIO_reset(infile);
/* write the encrypted data */
SMIME_write_PKCS7(outfile, p7, infile, flags);
RETVAL_TRUE;
clean_exit:
PKCS7_free(p7);
BIO_free(infile);
BIO_free(outfile);
if (recipcerts) {
sk_X509_pop_free(recipcerts, X509_free);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool nic_exists(char *nic)
{
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
int ret;
struct stat sb;
if (strcmp(nic, "none") == 0)
return true;
ret = snprintf(path, MAXPATHLEN, "/sys/class/net/%s", nic);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= MAXPATHLEN) // should never happen!
return false;
ret = stat(path, &sb);
if (ret != 0)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-5985: Ensure target netns is caller-owned
Before this commit, lxc-user-nic could potentially have been tricked into
operating on a network namespace over which the caller did not hold privilege.
This commit ensures that the caller is privileged over the network namespace by
temporarily dropping privilege.
Launchpad: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxc/+bug/1654676
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-862
| 0
| 68,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IW_IMPL(int) iw_get_input_density(struct iw_context *ctx,
double *px, double *py, int *pcode)
{
*px = 1.0;
*py = 1.0;
*pcode = ctx->img1.density_code;
if(ctx->img1.density_code!=IW_DENSITY_UNKNOWN) {
*px = ctx->img1.density_x;
*py = ctx->img1.density_y;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 1
| 168,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void XMLHttpRequest::didReceiveData(const char* data, int len)
{
if (m_error)
return;
if (m_state < HEADERS_RECEIVED)
changeState(HEADERS_RECEIVED);
bool useDecoder = m_responseTypeCode == ResponseTypeDefault || m_responseTypeCode == ResponseTypeText || m_responseTypeCode == ResponseTypeJSON || m_responseTypeCode == ResponseTypeDocument;
if (useDecoder && !m_decoder) {
if (m_responseTypeCode == ResponseTypeJSON)
m_decoder = TextResourceDecoder::create("application/json", "UTF-8");
else if (!m_responseEncoding.isEmpty())
m_decoder = TextResourceDecoder::create("text/plain", m_responseEncoding);
else if (responseIsXML()) {
m_decoder = TextResourceDecoder::create("application/xml");
m_decoder->useLenientXMLDecoding();
} else if (equalIgnoringCase(responseMIMEType(), "text/html"))
m_decoder = TextResourceDecoder::create("text/html", "UTF-8");
else
m_decoder = TextResourceDecoder::create("text/plain", "UTF-8");
}
if (!len)
return;
if (len == -1)
len = strlen(data);
if (useDecoder) {
m_responseText = m_responseText.concatenateWith(m_decoder->decode(data, len));
} else if (m_responseTypeCode == ResponseTypeArrayBuffer || m_responseTypeCode == ResponseTypeBlob) {
if (!m_binaryResponseBuilder)
m_binaryResponseBuilder = SharedBuffer::create();
m_binaryResponseBuilder->append(data, len);
} else if (m_responseTypeCode == ResponseTypeStream) {
if (!m_responseStream)
m_responseStream = Stream::create(responseMIMEType());
m_responseStream->addData(data, len);
}
if (!m_error) {
long long expectedLength = m_response.expectedContentLength();
m_receivedLength += len;
if (m_async) {
bool lengthComputable = expectedLength > 0 && m_receivedLength <= expectedLength;
unsigned long long total = lengthComputable ? expectedLength : 0;
m_progressEventThrottle.dispatchProgressEvent(lengthComputable, m_receivedLength, total);
}
if (m_state != LOADING)
changeState(LOADING);
else
callReadyStateChangeListener();
}
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,911
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebLocalFrameImpl::DispatchBeforeUnloadEvent(bool is_reload) {
if (!GetFrame())
return true;
return GetFrame()->Loader().ShouldClose(is_reload);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaRecorder::notify(int msg, int ext1, int ext2)
{
ALOGV("message received msg=%d, ext1=%d, ext2=%d", msg, ext1, ext2);
sp<MediaRecorderListener> listener;
mLock.lock();
listener = mListener;
mLock.unlock();
if (listener != NULL) {
Mutex::Autolock _l(mNotifyLock);
ALOGV("callback application");
listener->notify(msg, ext1, ext2);
ALOGV("back from callback");
}
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 159,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Unpack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatAR8, uint8_t, uint8_t>(
const uint8_t* source,
uint8_t* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
destination[0] = source[1];
destination[1] = source[1];
destination[2] = source[1];
destination[3] = source[0];
source += 2;
destination += 4;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 146,734
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
size_t elements = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]);
size_t x;
const char* fname = "xfreerdp-argument.1.xml";
FILE* fp = NULL;
/* Open output file for writing, truncate if existing. */
fp = fopen(fname, "w");
if (NULL == fp)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Could not open '%s' for writing.\n", fname);
return -1;
}
/* The tag used as header in the manpage */
fprintf(fp, "<refsect1>\n");
fprintf(fp, "\t<title>Options</title>\n");
fprintf(fp, "\t\t<variablelist>\n");
/* Iterate over argument struct and write data to docbook 4.5
* compatible XML */
if (elements < 2)
{
fprintf(stderr, "The argument array 'args' is empty, writing an empty file.\n");
elements = 1;
}
for (x = 0; x < elements - 1; x++)
{
const COMMAND_LINE_ARGUMENT_A* arg = &args[x];
char* name = tr_esc_str((LPSTR) arg->Name, FALSE);
char* alias = tr_esc_str((LPSTR) arg->Alias, FALSE);
char* format = tr_esc_str(arg->Format, TRUE);
char* text = tr_esc_str((LPSTR) arg->Text, FALSE);
fprintf(fp, "\t\t\t<varlistentry>\n");
do
{
fprintf(fp, "\t\t\t\t<term><option>");
if (arg->Flags == COMMAND_LINE_VALUE_BOOL)
fprintf(fp, "%s", arg->Default ? "-" : "+");
else
fprintf(fp, "/");
fprintf(fp, "%s</option>", name);
if (format)
{
if (arg->Flags == COMMAND_LINE_VALUE_OPTIONAL)
fprintf(fp, "[");
fprintf(fp, ":%s", format);
if (arg->Flags == COMMAND_LINE_VALUE_OPTIONAL)
fprintf(fp, "]");
}
fprintf(fp, "</term>\n");
if (alias == name)
break;
free(name);
name = alias;
}
while (alias);
if (text)
{
fprintf(fp, "\t\t\t\t<listitem>\n");
fprintf(fp, "\t\t\t\t\t<para>");
if (text)
fprintf(fp, "%s", text);
if (arg->Flags == COMMAND_LINE_VALUE_BOOL)
fprintf(fp, " (default:%s)", arg->Default ? "on" : "off");
else if (arg->Default)
{
char* value = tr_esc_str((LPSTR) arg->Default, FALSE);
fprintf(fp, " (default:%s)", value);
free(value);
}
fprintf(fp, "</para>\n");
fprintf(fp, "\t\t\t\t</listitem>\n");
}
fprintf(fp, "\t\t\t</varlistentry>\n");
free(name);
free(format);
free(text);
}
fprintf(fp, "\t\t</variablelist>\n");
fprintf(fp, "\t</refsect1>\n");
fclose(fp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromotingInstance::SendPerfStats() {
if (!client_.get()) {
return;
}
plugin_task_runner_->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&ChromotingInstance::SendPerfStats, AsWeakPtr()),
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kPerfStatsIntervalMs));
scoped_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> data(new base::DictionaryValue());
ChromotingStats* stats = client_->GetStats();
data->SetDouble("videoBandwidth", stats->video_bandwidth()->Rate());
data->SetDouble("videoFrameRate", stats->video_frame_rate()->Rate());
data->SetDouble("captureLatency", stats->video_capture_ms()->Average());
data->SetDouble("encodeLatency", stats->video_encode_ms()->Average());
data->SetDouble("decodeLatency", stats->video_decode_ms()->Average());
data->SetDouble("renderLatency", stats->video_paint_ms()->Average());
data->SetDouble("roundtripLatency", stats->round_trip_ms()->Average());
PostChromotingMessage("onPerfStats", data.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Restrict the Chromoting client plugin to use by extensions & apps.
BUG=160456
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11365276
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int hidg_get_minor(void)
{
int ret;
ret = ida_simple_get(&hidg_ida, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret >= HIDG_MINORS) {
ida_simple_remove(&hidg_ida, ret);
ret = -ENODEV;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: USB: gadget: f_hid: fix deadlock in f_hidg_write()
In f_hidg_write() the write_spinlock is acquired before calling
usb_ep_queue() which causes a deadlock when dummy_hcd is being used.
This is because dummy_queue() callbacks into f_hidg_req_complete() which
tries to acquire the same spinlock. This is (part of) the backtrace when
the deadlock occurs:
0xffffffffc06b1410 in f_hidg_req_complete
0xffffffffc06a590a in usb_gadget_giveback_request
0xffffffffc06cfff2 in dummy_queue
0xffffffffc06a4b96 in usb_ep_queue
0xffffffffc06b1eb6 in f_hidg_write
0xffffffff8127730b in __vfs_write
0xffffffff812774d1 in vfs_write
0xffffffff81277725 in SYSC_write
Fix this by releasing the write_spinlock before calling usb_ep_queue()
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.11+
Fixes: 749494b6bdbb ("usb: gadget: f_hid: fix: Move IN request allocation to set_alt()")
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Gerganov <rgerganov@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 96,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE venc_dev::allocate_extradata()
{
if (extradata_info.allocated) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Extradata already allocated!");
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
if (extradata_info.buffer_size) {
if (extradata_info.ion.ion_alloc_data.handle) {
munmap((void *)extradata_info.uaddr, extradata_info.size);
close(extradata_info.ion.fd_ion_data.fd);
venc_handle->free_ion_memory(&extradata_info.ion);
}
extradata_info.size = ALIGN(extradata_info.size, SZ_4K);
extradata_info.ion.ion_device_fd = venc_handle->alloc_map_ion_memory(
extradata_info.size,
&extradata_info.ion.ion_alloc_data,
&extradata_info.ion.fd_ion_data, 0);
if (extradata_info.ion.ion_device_fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to alloc extradata memory");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
extradata_info.uaddr = (char *)mmap(NULL,
extradata_info.size,
PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED,
extradata_info.ion.fd_ion_data.fd , 0);
if (extradata_info.uaddr == MAP_FAILED) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to map extradata memory");
close(extradata_info.ion.fd_ion_data.fd);
venc_handle->free_ion_memory(&extradata_info.ion);
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
}
#endif
extradata_info.allocated = 1;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,244
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_pid_syscall(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
long nr;
unsigned long args[6], sp, pc;
int res;
res = lock_trace(task);
if (res)
return res;
if (task_current_syscall(task, &nr, args, 6, &sp, &pc))
seq_puts(m, "running\n");
else if (nr < 0)
seq_printf(m, "%ld 0x%lx 0x%lx\n", nr, sp, pc);
else
seq_printf(m,
"%ld 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx\n",
nr,
args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], args[4], args[5],
sp, pc);
unlock_trace(task);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 49,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SampleTable::~SampleTable() {
delete[] mSampleToChunkEntries;
mSampleToChunkEntries = NULL;
delete[] mSyncSamples;
mSyncSamples = NULL;
delete mCompositionDeltaLookup;
mCompositionDeltaLookup = NULL;
delete[] mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries;
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries = NULL;
delete[] mSampleTimeEntries;
mSampleTimeEntries = NULL;
delete mSampleIterator;
mSampleIterator = NULL;
}
Commit Message: SampleTable.cpp: Fixed a regression caused by a fix for bug
28076789.
Detail: Before the original fix
(Id207f369ab7b27787d83f5d8fc48dc53ed9fcdc9) for 28076789, the
code allowed a time-to-sample table size to be 0. The change
made in that fix disallowed such situation, which in fact should
be allowed. This current patch allows it again while maintaining
the security of the previous fix.
Bug: 28288202
Bug: 28076789
Change-Id: I1c9a60c7f0cfcbd3d908f24998dde15d5136a295
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 160,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lseg_distance(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
LSEG *l1 = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(0);
LSEG *l2 = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(1);
PG_RETURN_FLOAT8(lseg_dt(l1, l2));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleSystem::ModuleSystem(ScriptContext* context, SourceMap* source_map)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context),
context_(context),
source_map_(source_map),
natives_enabled_(0),
exception_handler_(new DefaultExceptionHandler(context)),
weak_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction(
"require",
base::Bind(&ModuleSystem::RequireForJs, base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction(
"requireNative",
base::Bind(&ModuleSystem::RequireNative, base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction(
"requireAsync",
base::Bind(&ModuleSystem::RequireAsync, base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("privates",
base::Bind(&ModuleSystem::Private, base::Unretained(this)));
v8::Local<v8::Object> global(context->v8_context()->Global());
v8::Isolate* isolate = context->isolate();
global->SetHiddenValue(ToV8StringUnsafe(isolate, kModulesField),
v8::Object::New(isolate));
global->SetHiddenValue(ToV8StringUnsafe(isolate, kModuleSystem),
v8::External::New(isolate, this));
gin::ModuleRegistry::From(context->v8_context())->AddObserver(this);
if (context_->GetRenderFrame()) {
context_->GetRenderFrame()->EnsureMojoBuiltinsAreAvailable(
context->isolate(), context->v8_context());
}
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 133,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ohci_sof(OHCIState *ohci)
{
ohci_eof_timer(ohci);
ohci_set_interrupt(ohci, OHCI_INTR_SF);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void measureAsLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "measureAsLongAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setMeasureAsLongAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string OutOfProcessInstance::GetURL() {
return url_;
}
Commit Message: Prevent leaking PDF data cross-origin
BUG=520422
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1311973002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#345267}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 129,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _store_resource_sdb(struct PE_(r_bin_pe_obj_t) *bin) {
RListIter *iter;
r_pe_resource *rs;
int index = 0;
ut64 vaddr = 0;
char *key;
Sdb *sdb = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb) {
return;
}
r_list_foreach (bin->resources, iter, rs) {
key = sdb_fmt ("resource.%d.timestr", index);
sdb_set (sdb, key, rs->timestr, 0);
key = sdb_fmt ("resource.%d.vaddr", index);
vaddr = bin_pe_rva_to_va (bin, rs->data->OffsetToData);
sdb_num_set (sdb, key, vaddr, 0);
key = sdb_fmt ("resource.%d.name", index);
sdb_num_set (sdb, key, rs->name, 0);
key = sdb_fmt ("resource.%d.size", index);
sdb_num_set (sdb, key, rs->data->Size, 0);
key = sdb_fmt ("resource.%d.type", index);
sdb_set (sdb, key, rs->type, 0);
key = sdb_fmt ("resource.%d.language", index);
sdb_set (sdb, key, rs->language, 0);
index++;
}
sdb_ns_set (bin->kv, "pe_resource", sdb);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in pe
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void drm_mode_object_put(struct drm_device *dev,
struct drm_mode_object *object)
{
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.idr_mutex);
idr_remove(&dev->mode_config.crtc_idr, object->id);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.idr_mutex);
}
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 21,914
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabSpecificContentSettings::DidStartProvisionalLoadForFrame(
int64 frame_id,
int64 parent_frame_id,
bool is_main_frame,
const GURL& validated_url,
bool is_error_page,
bool is_iframe_srcdoc,
RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
if (!is_main_frame)
return;
if (!is_error_page)
ClearCookieSpecificContentSettings();
ClearGeolocationContentSettings();
}
Commit Message: Check the content setting type is valid.
BUG=169770
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11875013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176687 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CrostiniUpgrader::AddObserver(CrostiniUpgraderUIObserver* observer) {
upgrader_observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Creates a WebUI-based Crostini Upgrader"
This reverts commit 29c8bb394dd8b8c03e006efb39ec77fc42f96900.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 717476 as the
culprit for failures in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/waterfall/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyRAsSDVdmU3VzcGVjdGVkQ0wiMWNocm9taXVtLzI5YzhiYjM5NGRkOGI4YzAzZTAwNmVmYjM5ZWM3N2ZjNDJmOTY5MDAM
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/b/8896211200981346592
Sample Failed Step: compile
Original change's description:
> Creates a WebUI-based Crostini Upgrader
>
> The UI is behind the new crostini-webui-upgrader flag
> (currently disabled by default)
>
> The main areas for review are
>
> calamity@:
> html/js - chrome/browser/chromeos/crostini_upgrader/
> mojo and webui glue classes - chrome/browser/ui/webui/crostini_upgrader/
>
> davidmunro@
> crostini business logic - chrome/browser/chromeos/crostini/
>
> In this CL, the optional container backup stage is stubbed, and will be
> in a subsequent CL.
>
> A suite of unit/browser tests are also currently lacking. I intend them for
> follow-up CLs.
>
>
> Bug: 930901
> Change-Id: Ic52c5242e6c57232ffa6be5d6af65aaff5e8f4ff
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1900520
> Commit-Queue: Nicholas Verne <nverne@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: calamity <calamity@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#717476}
Change-Id: I704f549216a7d1dc21942fbf6cf4ab9a1d600380
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 930901
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1928159
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#717481}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fromiccpcs(int cs)
{
switch (cs) {
case ICC_CS_RGB:
return JAS_CLRSPC_GENRGB;
break;
case ICC_CS_YCBCR:
return JAS_CLRSPC_GENYCBCR;
break;
case ICC_CS_GRAY:
return JAS_CLRSPC_GENGRAY;
break;
}
return JAS_CLRSPC_UNKNOWN;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *TrimImage(const Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
RectangleInfo
geometry;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
geometry=GetImageBoundingBox(image,exception);
if ((geometry.width == 0) || (geometry.height == 0))
{
Image
*crop_image;
crop_image=CloneImage(image,1,1,MagickTrue,exception);
if (crop_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
crop_image->background_color.alpha=(Quantum) TransparentAlpha;
crop_image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(crop_image,exception);
crop_image->page=image->page;
crop_image->page.x=(-1);
crop_image->page.y=(-1);
return(crop_image);
}
geometry.x+=image->page.x;
geometry.y+=image->page.y;
return(CropImage(image,&geometry,exception));
}
Commit Message: Fixed out of bounds error in SpliceImage.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 74,030
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void update_regset_xstate_info(unsigned int size, u64 xstate_mask)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
x86_64_regsets[REGSET_XSTATE].n = size / sizeof(u64);
#endif
#if defined CONFIG_X86_32 || defined CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
x86_32_regsets[REGSET_XSTATE].n = size / sizeof(u64);
#endif
xstate_fx_sw_bytes[USER_XSTATE_XCR0_WORD] = xstate_mask;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,920
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dns_deinit(void)
{
struct dns_resolvers *resolvers, *resolversback;
struct dns_nameserver *ns, *nsback;
struct dns_resolution *res, *resback;
struct dns_requester *req, *reqback;
struct dns_srvrq *srvrq, *srvrqback;
list_for_each_entry_safe(resolvers, resolversback, &dns_resolvers, list) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(ns, nsback, &resolvers->nameservers, list) {
free(ns->id);
free((char *)ns->conf.file);
if (ns->dgram && ns->dgram->t.sock.fd != -1)
fd_delete(ns->dgram->t.sock.fd);
free(ns->dgram);
LIST_DEL(&ns->list);
free(ns);
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(res, resback, &resolvers->resolutions.curr, list) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(req, reqback, &res->requesters, list) {
LIST_DEL(&req->list);
free(req);
}
dns_free_resolution(res);
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(res, resback, &resolvers->resolutions.wait, list) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(req, reqback, &res->requesters, list) {
LIST_DEL(&req->list);
free(req);
}
dns_free_resolution(res);
}
free(resolvers->id);
free((char *)resolvers->conf.file);
task_delete(resolvers->t);
task_free(resolvers->t);
LIST_DEL(&resolvers->list);
free(resolvers);
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(srvrq, srvrqback, &dns_srvrq_list, list) {
free(srvrq->name);
free(srvrq->hostname_dn);
LIST_DEL(&srvrq->list);
free(srvrq);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void vring_set_avail_event(VirtQueue *vq, uint16_t val)
{
hwaddr pa;
if (!vq->notification) {
return;
}
pa = vq->vring.used + offsetof(VRingUsed, ring[vq->vring.num]);
virtio_stw_phys(vq->vdev, pa, val);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: armv6pmu_get_event_idx(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,
struct hw_perf_event *event)
{
/* Always place a cycle counter into the cycle counter. */
if (ARMV6_PERFCTR_CPU_CYCLES == event->config_base) {
if (test_and_set_bit(ARMV6_CYCLE_COUNTER, cpuc->used_mask))
return -EAGAIN;
return ARMV6_CYCLE_COUNTER;
} else {
/*
* For anything other than a cycle counter, try and use
* counter0 and counter1.
*/
if (!test_and_set_bit(ARMV6_COUNTER1, cpuc->used_mask))
return ARMV6_COUNTER1;
if (!test_and_set_bit(ARMV6_COUNTER0, cpuc->used_mask))
return ARMV6_COUNTER0;
/* The counters are all in use. */
return -EAGAIN;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state *ps)
{
int r = 0;
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
memcpy(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state, ps, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state));
kvm_pit_load_count(kvm, 0, ps->channels[0].count, 0);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dmg_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::HasTouchEventHandlers(bool need_touch_events) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline MagickBooleanType IsSkipTag(const char *tag)
{
register ssize_t
i;
i=0;
while (skip_tags[i] != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(tag,skip_tags[i]) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
i++;
}
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 71,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int generic_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root)
{
const char *options;
rcu_read_lock();
options = rcu_dereference(root->d_sb->s_options);
if (options != NULL && options[0]) {
seq_putc(m, ',');
mangle(m, options);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 32,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_timers_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct timers_private *tp;
tp = __seq_open_private(file, &proc_timers_seq_ops,
sizeof(struct timers_private));
if (!tp)
return -ENOMEM;
tp->pid = proc_pid(inode);
tp->ns = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 49,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~SystemTrayDelegate() {
AudioHandler* audiohandler = AudioHandler::GetInstance();
if (audiohandler)
audiohandler->RemoveVolumeObserver(this);
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetPowerManagerClient()->RemoveObserver(this);
NetworkLibrary* crosnet = CrosLibrary::Get()->GetNetworkLibrary();
if (crosnet) {
crosnet->RemoveNetworkManagerObserver(this);
crosnet->RemoveCellularDataPlanObserver(this);
}
input_method::InputMethodManager::GetInstance()->RemoveObserver(this);
system::TimezoneSettings::GetInstance()->RemoveObserver(this);
if (SystemKeyEventListener::GetInstance())
SystemKeyEventListener::GetInstance()->RemoveCapsLockObserver(this);
bluetooth_adapter_->RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Use display_email() for Uber Tray messages.
BUG=124087
TEST=manually
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10388171
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137721 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 106,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XML_SetReturnNSTriplet(XML_Parser parser, int do_nst)
{
if (parser == NULL)
return;
/* block after XML_Parse()/XML_ParseBuffer() has been called */
if (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_PARSING || parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED)
return;
parser->m_ns_triplets = do_nst ? XML_TRUE : XML_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 92,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const gfx::VectorIcon& AuthenticatorBlePinEntrySheetModel::GetStepIllustration(
ImageColorScheme color_scheme) const {
return color_scheme == ImageColorScheme::kDark ? kWebauthnBlePinDarkIcon
: kWebauthnBlePinIcon;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType LevelImageColors(Image *image,
const PixelInfo *black_color,const PixelInfo *white_color,
const MagickBooleanType invert,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
ChannelType
channel_mask;
MagickStatusType
status;
/*
Allocate and initialize levels map.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if ((IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
((IsGrayColorspace(black_color->colorspace) == MagickFalse) ||
(IsGrayColorspace(white_color->colorspace) == MagickFalse)))
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
status=MagickTrue;
if (invert == MagickFalse)
{
if ((GetPixelRedTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
channel_mask=SetImageChannelMask(image,RedChannel);
status&=LevelImage(image,black_color->red,white_color->red,1.0,
exception);
(void) SetImageChannelMask(image,channel_mask);
}
if ((GetPixelGreenTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
channel_mask=SetImageChannelMask(image,GreenChannel);
status&=LevelImage(image,black_color->green,white_color->green,1.0,
exception);
(void) SetImageChannelMask(image,channel_mask);
}
if ((GetPixelBlueTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
channel_mask=SetImageChannelMask(image,BlueChannel);
status&=LevelImage(image,black_color->blue,white_color->blue,1.0,
exception);
(void) SetImageChannelMask(image,channel_mask);
}
if (((GetPixelBlackTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0) &&
(image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace))
{
channel_mask=SetImageChannelMask(image,BlackChannel);
status&=LevelImage(image,black_color->black,white_color->black,1.0,
exception);
(void) SetImageChannelMask(image,channel_mask);
}
if (((GetPixelAlphaTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0) &&
(image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait))
{
channel_mask=SetImageChannelMask(image,AlphaChannel);
status&=LevelImage(image,black_color->alpha,white_color->alpha,1.0,
exception);
(void) SetImageChannelMask(image,channel_mask);
}
}
else
{
if ((GetPixelRedTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
channel_mask=SetImageChannelMask(image,RedChannel);
status&=LevelizeImage(image,black_color->red,white_color->red,1.0,
exception);
(void) SetImageChannelMask(image,channel_mask);
}
if ((GetPixelGreenTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
channel_mask=SetImageChannelMask(image,GreenChannel);
status&=LevelizeImage(image,black_color->green,white_color->green,1.0,
exception);
(void) SetImageChannelMask(image,channel_mask);
}
if ((GetPixelBlueTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
channel_mask=SetImageChannelMask(image,BlueChannel);
status&=LevelizeImage(image,black_color->blue,white_color->blue,1.0,
exception);
(void) SetImageChannelMask(image,channel_mask);
}
if (((GetPixelBlackTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0) &&
(image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace))
{
channel_mask=SetImageChannelMask(image,BlackChannel);
status&=LevelizeImage(image,black_color->black,white_color->black,1.0,
exception);
(void) SetImageChannelMask(image,channel_mask);
}
if (((GetPixelAlphaTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0) &&
(image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait))
{
channel_mask=SetImageChannelMask(image,AlphaChannel);
status&=LevelizeImage(image,black_color->alpha,white_color->alpha,1.0,
exception);
(void) SetImageChannelMask(image,channel_mask);
}
}
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: Evaluate lazy pixel cache morphology to prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim M. El-Sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 50,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit bt_exit(void)
{
sco_exit();
l2cap_exit();
hci_sock_cleanup();
sock_unregister(PF_BLUETOOTH);
bt_sysfs_cleanup();
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: fix possible info leak in bt_sock_recvmsg()
In case the socket is already shutting down, bt_sock_recvmsg() returns
with 0 without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the
local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes
of kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the msg_namelen assignment in front of the shutdown
test.
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InterstitialPageImpl::UnderlyingContentObserver::WebContentsDestroyed() {
interstitial_->OnNavigatingAwayOrTabClosing();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,143
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::ShowValidationMessage(content::WebContents* web_contents,
const gfx::Rect& anchor_in_root_view,
const base::string16& main_text,
const base::string16& sub_text) {
if (!web_contents->GetTopLevelNativeWindow())
return;
validation_message_bubble_ =
TabDialogs::FromWebContents(web_contents)
->ShowValidationMessage(anchor_in_root_view, main_text, sub_text);
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 139,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Compositor::SetVisible(bool visible) {
host_->SetVisible(visible);
if (context_factory_private_)
context_factory_private_->SetDisplayVisible(this, visible);
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 140,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodSequenceStringArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodSequenceStringArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodSequenceStringArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,468
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct async *async_getcompleted(struct usb_dev_state *ps)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct async *as = NULL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ps->lock, flags);
if (!list_empty(&ps->async_completed)) {
as = list_entry(ps->async_completed.next, struct async,
asynclist);
list_del_init(&as->asynclist);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ps->lock, flags);
return as;
}
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 53,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLInputElement::isFileUpload() const
{
return m_inputType->isFileUpload();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int test_inode_iunique(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
{
struct hlist_head *b = inode_hashtable + hash(sb, ino);
struct inode *inode;
spin_lock(&inode_hash_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry(inode, b, i_hash) {
if (inode->i_ino == ino && inode->i_sb == sb) {
spin_unlock(&inode_hash_lock);
return 0;
}
}
spin_unlock(&inode_hash_lock);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,894
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void twofish_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
twofish_dec_blk(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), dst, src);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::UserChangedTheme() {
frame_->FrameTypeChanged();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,474
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StartUpdateCallback(bool result, void* param) {
last_start_result_ = result;
last_callback_param_ = param;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,227
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int check_for_xstate(struct fxregs_state __user *buf,
void __user *fpstate,
struct _fpx_sw_bytes *fx_sw)
{
int min_xstate_size = sizeof(struct fxregs_state) +
sizeof(struct xstate_header);
unsigned int magic2;
if (__copy_from_user(fx_sw, &buf->sw_reserved[0], sizeof(*fx_sw)))
return -1;
/* Check for the first magic field and other error scenarios. */
if (fx_sw->magic1 != FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 ||
fx_sw->xstate_size < min_xstate_size ||
fx_sw->xstate_size > fpu_user_xstate_size ||
fx_sw->xstate_size > fx_sw->extended_size)
return -1;
/*
* Check for the presence of second magic word at the end of memory
* layout. This detects the case where the user just copied the legacy
* fpstate layout with out copying the extended state information
* in the memory layout.
*/
if (__get_user(magic2, (__u32 __user *)(fpstate + fx_sw->xstate_size))
|| magic2 != FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to
set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers. ptrace() can
set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with
NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task.
In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel
assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the
CPU can restore it.
However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate
format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable),
it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the
xstate_header to an arbitrary value. However, all bits in that field
are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with
nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault. This
caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit. In
addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from
the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked.
Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in
the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise.
The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it
with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly)
provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted
format.
Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state.
This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be
better to return an error before changing anything. But it seems the
"clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to
do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full
userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user().
This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned
WARN_ON_FPU():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000
RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0
RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40
FS: 00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff <0f> ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f
Here is a C reproducer. The expected behavior is that the program spin
forever with no output. However, on a buggy kernel running on a
processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature
(e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two
the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not
restored correctly. With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above
kernel warning.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();
uint64_t xstate[512];
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) };
if (pid == 0) {
bool tracee = true;
for (int i = 0; i < sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) && tracee; i++)
tracee = (fork() != 0);
uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF };
asm volatile(" movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n"
" mov %0, %%rbx\n"
"1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n"
" mov %0, %%rax\n"
" cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n"
" je 1b\n"
: "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0");
printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted! tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n",
tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]);
} else {
usleep(100000);
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
xstate[65] = -1;
ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call.
The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but
only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the
kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR
directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking).
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.17+]
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Fixes: 0b29643a5843 ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-25-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 60,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sock *mroute6_socket(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct mr6_table *mrt;
struct flowi6 fl6 = {
.flowi6_iif = skb->skb_iif ? : LOOPBACK_IFINDEX,
.flowi6_oif = skb->dev->ifindex,
.flowi6_mark = skb->mark,
};
if (ip6mr_fib_lookup(net, &fl6, &mrt) < 0)
return NULL;
return mrt->mroute6_sk;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 93,570
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int checkRef(IntegrityCk *pCheck, Pgno iPage){
if( iPage==0 ) return 1;
if( iPage>pCheck->nPage ){
checkAppendMsg(pCheck, "invalid page number %d", iPage);
return 1;
}
if( getPageReferenced(pCheck, iPage) ){
checkAppendMsg(pCheck, "2nd reference to page %d", iPage);
return 1;
}
setPageReferenced(pCheck, iPage);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: print_resource_usage(const gs_main_instance * minst, gs_dual_memory_t * dmem,
const char *msg)
{
ulong used = 0; /* this we accumulate for the PS memories */
long utime[2];
int i;
gs_memory_status_t status;
gp_get_realtime(utime);
for (i = 0; i < countof(dmem->spaces_indexed); ++i) {
gs_ref_memory_t *mem = dmem->spaces_indexed[i];
if (mem != 0 && (i == 0 || mem != dmem->spaces_indexed[i - 1])) {
gs_ref_memory_t *mem_stable =
(gs_ref_memory_t *)gs_memory_stable((gs_memory_t *)mem);
gs_memory_status((gs_memory_t *)mem, &status);
used += status.used;
if (mem_stable != mem) {
gs_memory_status((gs_memory_t *)mem_stable, &status);
used += status.used;
}
}
}
/* Now get the overall values from the heap memory */
gs_memory_status(minst->heap, &status);
dmprintf5(minst->heap, "%% %s time = %g, memory allocated = %lu, used = %lu, max_used = %lu\n",
msg, utime[0] - minst->base_time[0] +
(utime[1] - minst->base_time[1]) / 1000000000.0,
status.allocated, used, status.max_used);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,923
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __sha512_sparc64_update(struct sha512_state *sctx, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, unsigned int partial)
{
unsigned int done = 0;
if ((sctx->count[0] += len) < len)
sctx->count[1]++;
if (partial) {
done = SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE - partial;
memcpy(sctx->buf + partial, data, done);
sha512_sparc64_transform(sctx->state, sctx->buf, 1);
}
if (len - done >= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) {
const unsigned int rounds = (len - done) / SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE;
sha512_sparc64_transform(sctx->state, data + done, rounds);
done += rounds * SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
memcpy(sctx->buf, data + done, len - done);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,806
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: views::View* CastDetailedView::AddToReceiverList(
const CastConfigDelegate::ReceiverAndActivity& receiverActivity) {
HoverHighlightView* container = new HoverHighlightView(this);
const gfx::ImageSkia* image =
ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance()
.GetImageNamed(IDR_AURA_UBER_TRAY_CAST_DEVICE_ICON)
.ToImageSkia();
const base::string16& name = receiverActivity.receiver.name;
container->AddIndentedIconAndLabel(*image, name, false);
scroll_content()->AddChildView(container);
return container;
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 119,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gsicc_set_iccsmaskprofile(const char *pname,
int namelen, gsicc_manager_t *icc_manager,
gs_memory_t *mem)
{
stream *str;
int code;
cmm_profile_t *icc_profile;
if (icc_manager == NULL) {
code = gsicc_open_search(pname, namelen, mem, NULL, 0, &str);
} else {
code = gsicc_open_search(pname, namelen, mem, mem->gs_lib_ctx->profiledir,
mem->gs_lib_ctx->profiledir_len, &str);
}
if (code < 0 || str == NULL)
return NULL;
icc_profile = gsicc_profile_new(str, mem, pname, namelen);
code = sfclose(str);
if (icc_profile == NULL)
return NULL;
/* Get the profile handle */
icc_profile->profile_handle =
gsicc_get_profile_handle_buffer(icc_profile->buffer,
icc_profile->buffer_size,
mem);
/* Compute the hash code of the profile. Everything in the
ICC manager will have it's hash code precomputed */
gsicc_get_icc_buff_hash(icc_profile->buffer, &(icc_profile->hashcode),
icc_profile->buffer_size);
icc_profile->hash_is_valid = true;
icc_profile->num_comps =
gscms_get_input_channel_count(icc_profile->profile_handle);
icc_profile->num_comps_out =
gscms_get_output_channel_count(icc_profile->profile_handle);
icc_profile->data_cs =
gscms_get_profile_data_space(icc_profile->profile_handle);
gscms_set_icc_range(&icc_profile);
return icc_profile;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: channel_set_fds(int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id);
channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty);
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max;
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
packet_put_int(c->local_window);
packet_send();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AddInterceptedResourceType(
const std::string& resource_type,
base::flat_set<ResourceType>* intercepted_resource_types) {
if (resource_type == protocol::Page::ResourceTypeEnum::Document) {
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_MAIN_FRAME);
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_SUB_FRAME);
return true;
}
if (resource_type == protocol::Page::ResourceTypeEnum::Stylesheet) {
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_STYLESHEET);
return true;
}
if (resource_type == protocol::Page::ResourceTypeEnum::Image) {
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_IMAGE);
return true;
}
if (resource_type == protocol::Page::ResourceTypeEnum::Media) {
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_MEDIA);
return true;
}
if (resource_type == protocol::Page::ResourceTypeEnum::Font) {
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_FONT_RESOURCE);
return true;
}
if (resource_type == protocol::Page::ResourceTypeEnum::Script) {
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_SCRIPT);
return true;
}
if (resource_type == protocol::Page::ResourceTypeEnum::XHR) {
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_XHR);
return true;
}
if (resource_type == protocol::Page::ResourceTypeEnum::Fetch) {
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_PREFETCH);
return true;
}
if (resource_type == protocol::Page::ResourceTypeEnum::Other) {
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_SUB_RESOURCE);
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_OBJECT);
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_WORKER);
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_SHARED_WORKER);
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_FAVICON);
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_PING);
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_SERVICE_WORKER);
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_CSP_REPORT);
intercepted_resource_types->insert(RESOURCE_TYPE_PLUGIN_RESOURCE);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned int fps_regval(struct fpustate *f,
unsigned int insn_regnum)
{
return f->regs[insn_regnum];
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main( int argc, char **argv )
{
int i;
char commandLine[ MAX_STRING_CHARS ] = { 0 };
#ifndef DEDICATED
# if !SDL_VERSION_ATLEAST(MINSDL_MAJOR,MINSDL_MINOR,MINSDL_PATCH)
# error A more recent version of SDL is required
# endif
SDL_version ver;
SDL_GetVersion( &ver );
#define MINSDL_VERSION \
XSTRING(MINSDL_MAJOR) "." \
XSTRING(MINSDL_MINOR) "." \
XSTRING(MINSDL_PATCH)
if( SDL_VERSIONNUM( ver.major, ver.minor, ver.patch ) <
SDL_VERSIONNUM( MINSDL_MAJOR, MINSDL_MINOR, MINSDL_PATCH ) )
{
Sys_Dialog( DT_ERROR, va( "SDL version " MINSDL_VERSION " or greater is required, "
"but only version %d.%d.%d was found. You may be able to obtain a more recent copy "
"from http://www.libsdl.org/.", ver.major, ver.minor, ver.patch ), "SDL Library Too Old" );
Sys_Exit( 1 );
}
#endif
Sys_PlatformInit( );
Sys_Milliseconds( );
#ifdef __APPLE__
if ( argc >= 2 && Q_strncmp ( argv[1], "-psn", 4 ) == 0 )
argc = 1;
#endif
Sys_ParseArgs( argc, argv );
Sys_SetBinaryPath( Sys_Dirname( argv[ 0 ] ) );
Sys_SetDefaultInstallPath( DEFAULT_BASEDIR );
for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ )
{
const qboolean containsSpaces = strchr(argv[i], ' ') != NULL;
if (containsSpaces)
Q_strcat( commandLine, sizeof( commandLine ), "\"" );
Q_strcat( commandLine, sizeof( commandLine ), argv[ i ] );
if (containsSpaces)
Q_strcat( commandLine, sizeof( commandLine ), "\"" );
Q_strcat( commandLine, sizeof( commandLine ), " " );
}
Com_Init( commandLine );
NET_Init( );
CON_Init( );
signal( SIGILL, Sys_SigHandler );
signal( SIGFPE, Sys_SigHandler );
signal( SIGSEGV, Sys_SigHandler );
signal( SIGTERM, Sys_SigHandler );
signal( SIGINT, Sys_SigHandler );
while( 1 )
{
IN_Frame( );
Com_Frame( );
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,870
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const sc_path_t *sc_get_mf_path(void)
{
static const sc_path_t mf_path = {
{0x3f, 0x00, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 2,
0,
0,
SC_PATH_TYPE_PATH,
{{0},0}
};
return &mf_path;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,844
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_exe_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *exe_path)
{
struct task_struct *task;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct file *exe_file;
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (!task)
return -ENOENT;
mm = get_task_mm(task);
put_task_struct(task);
if (!mm)
return -ENOENT;
exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm);
mmput(mm);
if (exe_file) {
*exe_path = exe_file->f_path;
path_get(&exe_file->f_path);
fput(exe_file);
return 0;
} else
return -ENOENT;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,844
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mboxlist_find_category(struct find_rock *rock, const char *prefix, size_t len)
{
int r = 0;
if (!rock->issubs && !rock->isadmin && !cyrusdb_fetch(rock->db, "$RACL", 5, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
/* we're using reverse ACLs */
struct buf buf = BUF_INITIALIZER;
strarray_t matches = STRARRAY_INITIALIZER;
mboxlist_racl_key(rock->mb_category == MBNAME_OTHERUSER, rock->userid, NULL, &buf);
/* this is the prefix */
struct raclrock raclrock = { buf.len, &matches };
/* we only need to look inside the prefix still, but we keep the length
* in raclrock pointing to the start of the mboxname part of the key so
* we get correct names in matches */
if (len) buf_appendmap(&buf, prefix, len);
r = cyrusdb_foreach(rock->db, buf.s, buf.len, NULL, racl_cb, &raclrock, NULL);
/* XXX - later we need to sort the array when we've added groups */
int i;
for (i = 0; !r && i < strarray_size(&matches); i++) {
const char *key = strarray_nth(&matches, i);
r = cyrusdb_forone(rock->db, key, strlen(key), &find_p, &find_cb, rock, NULL);
}
strarray_fini(&matches);
}
else {
r = cyrusdb_foreach(rock->db, prefix, len, &find_p, &find_cb, rock, NULL);
}
if (r == CYRUSDB_DONE) r = 0;
return r;
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid,
int, which, compat_pid_t, pid,
struct compat_siginfo __user *, infop, int, options,
struct compat_rusage __user *, uru)
{
struct rusage ru;
struct waitid_info info = {.status = 0};
long err = kernel_waitid(which, pid, &info, options, uru ? &ru : NULL);
int signo = 0;
if (err > 0) {
signo = SIGCHLD;
err = 0;
}
if (!err && uru) {
/* kernel_waitid() overwrites everything in ru */
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
err = copy_to_user(uru, &ru, sizeof(ru));
else
err = put_compat_rusage(&ru, uru);
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
}
if (!infop)
return err;
user_access_begin();
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(0, &infop->si_errno, Efault);
unsafe_put_user((short)info.cause, &infop->si_code, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.pid, &infop->si_pid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.uid, &infop->si_uid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.status, &infop->si_status, Efault);
user_access_end();
return err;
Efault:
user_access_end();
return -EFAULT;
}
Commit Message: kernel/exit.c: avoid undefined behaviour when calling wait4()
wait4(-2147483648, 0x20, 0, 0xdd0000) triggers:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/exit.c:1651:9
The related calltrace is as follows:
negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
CPU: 9 PID: 16482 Comm: zj Tainted: G B ---- ------- 3.10.0-327.53.58.71.x86_64+ #66
Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Tecal RH2285 /BC11BTSA , BIOS CTSAV036 04/27/2011
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x50
__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow+0x109/0x14e
SyS_wait4+0x1cb/0x1e0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Exclude the overflow to avoid the UBSAN warning.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497264618-20212-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 83,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: config_ntpd(
config_tree *ptree
)
{
config_nic_rules(ptree);
io_open_sockets();
config_monitor(ptree);
config_auth(ptree);
config_tos(ptree);
config_access(ptree);
config_tinker(ptree);
config_system_opts(ptree);
config_logconfig(ptree);
config_phone(ptree);
config_setvar(ptree);
config_ttl(ptree);
config_trap(ptree);
config_vars(ptree);
config_other_modes(ptree);
config_peers(ptree);
config_unpeers(ptree);
config_fudge(ptree);
config_qos(ptree);
#ifdef TEST_BLOCKING_WORKER
{
struct addrinfo hints;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
getaddrinfo_sometime("www.cnn.com", "ntp", &hints,
INITIAL_DNS_RETRY,
gai_test_callback, (void *)1);
hints.ai_family = AF_INET6;
getaddrinfo_sometime("ipv6.google.com", "ntp", &hints,
INITIAL_DNS_RETRY,
gai_test_callback, (void *)0x600);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,135
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __net_exit udp4_proc_exit_net(struct net *net)
{
udp_proc_unregister(net, &udp4_seq_afinfo);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool xmp_register_namespace(const char *namespaceURI,
const char *suggestedPrefix,
XmpStringPtr registeredPrefix)
{
RESET_ERROR;
try {
return SXMPMeta::RegisterNamespace(namespaceURI, suggestedPrefix,
STRING(registeredPrefix));
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_read_chunk_header(png_structrp png_ptr)
{
png_byte buf[8];
png_uint_32 length;
#ifdef PNG_IO_STATE_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->io_state = PNG_IO_READING | PNG_IO_CHUNK_HDR;
#endif
/* Read the length and the chunk name.
* This must be performed in a single I/O call.
*/
png_read_data(png_ptr, buf, 8);
length = png_get_uint_31(png_ptr, buf);
/* Put the chunk name into png_ptr->chunk_name. */
png_ptr->chunk_name = PNG_CHUNK_FROM_STRING(buf+4);
png_debug2(0, "Reading %lx chunk, length = %lu",
(unsigned long)png_ptr->chunk_name, (unsigned long)length);
/* Reset the crc and run it over the chunk name. */
png_reset_crc(png_ptr);
png_calculate_crc(png_ptr, buf + 4, 4);
/* Check to see if chunk name is valid. */
png_check_chunk_name(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunk_name);
/* Check for too-large chunk length */
png_check_chunk_length(png_ptr, length);
#ifdef PNG_IO_STATE_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->io_state = PNG_IO_READING | PNG_IO_CHUNK_DATA;
#endif
return length;
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 79,756
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int compat_mtw_from_user(struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *mwt,
enum compat_mwt compat_mwt,
struct ebt_entries_buf_state *state,
const unsigned char *base)
{
char name[EBT_FUNCTION_MAXNAMELEN];
struct xt_match *match;
struct xt_target *wt;
void *dst = NULL;
int off, pad = 0, ret = 0;
unsigned int size_kern, entry_offset, match_size = mwt->match_size;
strlcpy(name, mwt->u.name, sizeof(name));
if (state->buf_kern_start)
dst = state->buf_kern_start + state->buf_kern_offset;
entry_offset = (unsigned char *) mwt - base;
switch (compat_mwt) {
case EBT_COMPAT_MATCH:
match = try_then_request_module(xt_find_match(NFPROTO_BRIDGE,
name, 0), "ebt_%s", name);
if (match == NULL)
return -ENOENT;
if (IS_ERR(match))
return PTR_ERR(match);
off = ebt_compat_match_offset(match, match_size);
if (dst) {
if (match->compat_from_user)
match->compat_from_user(dst, mwt->data);
else
memcpy(dst, mwt->data, match_size);
}
size_kern = match->matchsize;
if (unlikely(size_kern == -1))
size_kern = match_size;
module_put(match->me);
break;
case EBT_COMPAT_WATCHER: /* fallthrough */
case EBT_COMPAT_TARGET:
wt = try_then_request_module(xt_find_target(NFPROTO_BRIDGE,
name, 0), "ebt_%s", name);
if (wt == NULL)
return -ENOENT;
if (IS_ERR(wt))
return PTR_ERR(wt);
off = xt_compat_target_offset(wt);
if (dst) {
if (wt->compat_from_user)
wt->compat_from_user(dst, mwt->data);
else
memcpy(dst, mwt->data, match_size);
}
size_kern = wt->targetsize;
module_put(wt->me);
break;
}
if (!dst) {
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(NFPROTO_BRIDGE, entry_offset,
off + ebt_compat_entry_padsize());
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
state->buf_kern_offset += match_size + off;
state->buf_user_offset += match_size;
pad = XT_ALIGN(size_kern) - size_kern;
if (pad > 0 && dst) {
BUG_ON(state->buf_kern_len <= pad);
BUG_ON(state->buf_kern_offset - (match_size + off) + size_kern > state->buf_kern_len - pad);
memset(dst + size_kern, 0, pad);
}
return off + match_size;
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Update(const PaintArtifact& artifact) {
CompositorElementIdSet element_ids;
Update(artifact, element_ids);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,570
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum hrtimer_restart vmx_preemption_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *timer)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx =
container_of(timer, struct vcpu_vmx, nested.preemption_timer);
vmx->nested.preemption_timer_expired = true;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &vmx->vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_kick(&vmx->vcpu);
return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidRunInsecureContent(const GURL& security_origin,
const GURL& target_url) {
LOG(WARNING) << security_origin << " ran insecure content from "
<< target_url.possibly_invalid_spec();
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("SSL.RanInsecureContent"));
if (base::EndsWith(security_origin.spec(), kDotGoogleDotCom,
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII))
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("SSL.RanInsecureContentGoogle"));
controller_.ssl_manager()->DidRunMixedContent(security_origin);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebPageVisibilityState RenderFrameHostImpl::GetVisibilityState() {
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame = this;
while (frame) {
if (frame->render_widget_host_)
break;
frame = frame->GetParent();
}
if (!frame)
return blink::kWebPageVisibilityStateHidden;
blink::WebPageVisibilityState visibility_state =
GetRenderWidgetHost()->is_hidden()
? blink::kWebPageVisibilityStateHidden
: blink::kWebPageVisibilityStateVisible;
GetContentClient()->browser()->OverridePageVisibilityState(this,
&visibility_state);
return visibility_state;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int read_extra_header(FFV1Context *f)
{
RangeCoder *const c = &f->c;
uint8_t state[CONTEXT_SIZE];
int i, j, k, ret;
uint8_t state2[32][CONTEXT_SIZE];
memset(state2, 128, sizeof(state2));
memset(state, 128, sizeof(state));
ff_init_range_decoder(c, f->avctx->extradata, f->avctx->extradata_size);
ff_build_rac_states(c, 0.05 * (1LL << 32), 256 - 8);
f->version = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (f->version < 2) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid version in global header\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (f->version > 2) {
c->bytestream_end -= 4;
f->micro_version = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
}
f->ac = f->avctx->coder_type = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (f->ac > 1) {
for (i = 1; i < 256; i++)
f->state_transition[i] = get_symbol(c, state, 1) + c->one_state[i];
}
f->colorspace = get_symbol(c, state, 0); //YUV cs type
f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
f->chroma_planes = get_rac(c, state);
f->chroma_h_shift = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
f->chroma_v_shift = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
f->transparency = get_rac(c, state);
f->plane_count = 1 + (f->chroma_planes || f->version<4) + f->transparency;
f->num_h_slices = 1 + get_symbol(c, state, 0);
f->num_v_slices = 1 + get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (f->num_h_slices > (unsigned)f->width || !f->num_h_slices ||
f->num_v_slices > (unsigned)f->height || !f->num_v_slices
) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "slice count invalid\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
f->quant_table_count = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (f->quant_table_count > (unsigned)MAX_QUANT_TABLES)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (i = 0; i < f->quant_table_count; i++) {
f->context_count[i] = read_quant_tables(c, f->quant_tables[i]);
if (f->context_count[i] < 0) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "read_quant_table error\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
if ((ret = ffv1_allocate_initial_states(f)) < 0)
return ret;
for (i = 0; i < f->quant_table_count; i++)
if (get_rac(c, state)) {
for (j = 0; j < f->context_count[i]; j++)
for (k = 0; k < CONTEXT_SIZE; k++) {
int pred = j ? f->initial_states[i][j - 1][k] : 128;
f->initial_states[i][j][k] =
(pred + get_symbol(c, state2[k], 1)) & 0xFF;
}
}
if (f->version > 2) {
f->ec = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (f->micro_version > 2)
f->intra = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
}
if (f->version > 2) {
unsigned v;
v = av_crc(av_crc_get_table(AV_CRC_32_IEEE), 0,
f->avctx->extradata, f->avctx->extradata_size);
if (v) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "CRC mismatch %X!\n", v);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
if (f->avctx->debug & FF_DEBUG_PICT_INFO)
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"global: ver:%d.%d, coder:%d, colorspace: %d bpr:%d chroma:%d(%d:%d), alpha:%d slices:%dx%d qtabs:%d ec:%d intra:%d\n",
f->version, f->micro_version,
f->ac,
f->colorspace,
f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample,
f->chroma_planes, f->chroma_h_shift, f->chroma_v_shift,
f->transparency,
f->num_h_slices, f->num_v_slices,
f->quant_table_count,
f->ec,
f->intra
);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ffv1dec: Check bits_per_raw_sample and colorspace for equality in ver 0/1 headers
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,057
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::OnCreateNewFrameProxy(int routing_id,
int parent_routing_id,
int render_view_routing_id) {
RenderFrameProxy::CreateFrameProxy(
routing_id, parent_routing_id, render_view_routing_id);
}
Commit Message: Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler
Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler to avoid some
regressions which it has introduced.
BUG=391005,415758,415478,412714,416362,416827,417608
TBR=jamesr@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/609483002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#296916}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,748
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdf_run_EX(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc)
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void initialize_string8()
{
gDarwinIsReallyAnnoying = gDarwinCantLoadAllObjects;
SharedBuffer* buf = SharedBuffer::alloc(1);
char* str = (char*)buf->data();
*str = 0;
gEmptyStringBuf = buf;
gEmptyString = str;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 158,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int netlink_remove_tap(struct netlink_tap *nt)
{
int ret;
ret = __netlink_remove_tap(nt);
synchronize_net();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TextTrackCueList::InvalidateCueIndex(size_t index) {
first_invalid_index_ = std::min(first_invalid_index_, index);
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int CLASS nikon_e995()
{
int i, histo[256];
const uchar often[] = { 0x00, 0x55, 0xaa, 0xff };
memset (histo, 0, sizeof histo);
fseek (ifp, -2000, SEEK_END);
for (i=0; i < 2000; i++)
histo[fgetc(ifp)]++;
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
if (histo[often[i]] < 200)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __fuse_get_request(struct fuse_req *req)
{
atomic_inc(&req->count);
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool OnMountEvent(
chromeos::disks::DiskMountManager::MountEvent event,
chromeos::MountError error_code,
const chromeos::disks::DiskMountManager::MountPointInfo& mount_info) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(host_->sequence_checker_);
if (mount_info.mount_type != chromeos::MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE ||
mount_info.source_path != source_path_ ||
event != chromeos::disks::DiskMountManager::MOUNTING) {
return true;
}
if (error_code != chromeos::MOUNT_ERROR_NONE) {
return false;
}
mount_path_ = base::FilePath(mount_info.mount_path);
DCHECK(!mount_info.mount_path.empty());
if (mounted()) {
NotifyDelegateOnMounted();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptValue ScriptController::executeScriptInMainWorld(const ScriptSourceCode& sourceCode, AccessControlStatus corsStatus)
{
String sourceURL = sourceCode.url();
const String* savedSourceURL = m_sourceURL;
m_sourceURL = &sourceURL;
v8::HandleScope handleScope;
v8::Handle<v8::Context> v8Context = ScriptController::mainWorldContext(m_frame);
if (v8Context.IsEmpty())
return ScriptValue();
v8::Context::Scope scope(v8Context);
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame);
v8::Local<v8::Value> object = compileAndRunScript(sourceCode, corsStatus);
m_sourceURL = savedSourceURL;
if (object.IsEmpty())
return ScriptValue();
return ScriptValue(object);
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DonePaintingToBackingStore() {
Send(new ViewMsg_UpdateRect_ACK(GetRoutingID()));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,605
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int bio_check_eod(struct bio *bio, sector_t maxsector)
{
unsigned int nr_sectors = bio_sectors(bio);
if (nr_sectors && maxsector &&
(nr_sectors > maxsector ||
bio->bi_iter.bi_sector > maxsector - nr_sectors)) {
handle_bad_sector(bio, maxsector);
return -EIO;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,958
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_vcpu_write_guest_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn,
const void *data, int offset, int len)
{
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gfn);
return __kvm_write_guest_page(slot, gfn, data, offset, len);
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 71,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OmniboxViewViews::OnCompositingDidCommit(ui::Compositor* compositor) {
if (latency_histogram_state_ == ON_PAINT_CALLED) {
latency_histogram_state_ = COMPOSITING_COMMIT;
} else if (latency_histogram_state_ == COMPOSITING_COMMIT) {
insert_char_time_ = base::TimeTicks();
latency_histogram_state_ = NOT_ACTIVE;
}
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 142,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_bioerror_relse(
struct xfs_buf *bp)
{
int64_t fl = bp->b_flags;
/*
* No need to wait until the buffer is unpinned.
* We aren't flushing it.
*
* chunkhold expects B_DONE to be set, whether
* we actually finish the I/O or not. We don't want to
* change that interface.
*/
XFS_BUF_UNREAD(bp);
XFS_BUF_DONE(bp);
xfs_buf_stale(bp);
bp->b_iodone = NULL;
if (!(fl & XBF_ASYNC)) {
/*
* Mark b_error and B_ERROR _both_.
* Lot's of chunkcache code assumes that.
* There's no reason to mark error for
* ASYNC buffers.
*/
xfs_buf_ioerror(bp, EIO);
complete(&bp->b_iowait);
} else {
xfs_buf_relse(bp);
}
return EIO;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 33,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderBlock::hasMarginAfterQuirk(const RenderBox* child) const
{
if (!child->isWritingModeRoot())
return child->isRenderBlock() ? toRenderBlock(child)->hasMarginAfterQuirk() : child->style()->hasMarginAfterQuirk();
if (child->isHorizontalWritingMode() == isHorizontalWritingMode())
return child->isRenderBlock() ? toRenderBlock(child)->hasMarginBeforeQuirk() : child->style()->hasMarginBeforeQuirk();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,207
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLInputElement::isTextFormControlKeyboardFocusable(KeyboardEvent* event) const
{
return HTMLTextFormControlElement::isKeyboardFocusable(event);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,940
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int megasas_alloc_ctrl_dma_buffers(struct megasas_instance *instance)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = instance->pdev;
struct fusion_context *fusion = instance->ctrl_context;
instance->evt_detail = dma_alloc_coherent(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct megasas_evt_detail),
&instance->evt_detail_h, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!instance->evt_detail) {
dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev,
"Failed to allocate event detail buffer\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (fusion) {
fusion->ioc_init_request =
dma_alloc_coherent(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct MPI2_IOC_INIT_REQUEST),
&fusion->ioc_init_request_phys,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fusion->ioc_init_request) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev,
"Failed to allocate PD list buffer\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
instance->snapdump_prop = dma_alloc_coherent(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct MR_SNAPDUMP_PROPERTIES),
&instance->snapdump_prop_h, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!instance->snapdump_prop)
dev_err(&pdev->dev,
"Failed to allocate snapdump properties buffer\n");
instance->host_device_list_buf = dma_alloc_coherent(&pdev->dev,
HOST_DEVICE_LIST_SZ,
&instance->host_device_list_buf_h,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!instance->host_device_list_buf) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev,
"Failed to allocate targetid list buffer\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
}
instance->pd_list_buf =
dma_alloc_coherent(&pdev->dev,
MEGASAS_MAX_PD * sizeof(struct MR_PD_LIST),
&instance->pd_list_buf_h, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!instance->pd_list_buf) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to allocate PD list buffer\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
instance->ctrl_info_buf =
dma_alloc_coherent(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct megasas_ctrl_info),
&instance->ctrl_info_buf_h, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!instance->ctrl_info_buf) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev,
"Failed to allocate controller info buffer\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
instance->ld_list_buf =
dma_alloc_coherent(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct MR_LD_LIST),
&instance->ld_list_buf_h, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!instance->ld_list_buf) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to allocate LD list buffer\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
instance->ld_targetid_list_buf =
dma_alloc_coherent(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct MR_LD_TARGETID_LIST),
&instance->ld_targetid_list_buf_h, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!instance->ld_targetid_list_buf) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev,
"Failed to allocate LD targetid list buffer\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (!reset_devices) {
instance->system_info_buf =
dma_alloc_coherent(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct MR_DRV_SYSTEM_INFO),
&instance->system_info_h, GFP_KERNEL);
instance->pd_info =
dma_alloc_coherent(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct MR_PD_INFO),
&instance->pd_info_h, GFP_KERNEL);
instance->tgt_prop =
dma_alloc_coherent(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct MR_TARGET_PROPERTIES),
&instance->tgt_prop_h, GFP_KERNEL);
instance->crash_dump_buf =
dma_alloc_coherent(&pdev->dev, CRASH_DMA_BUF_SIZE,
&instance->crash_dump_h, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!instance->system_info_buf)
dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev,
"Failed to allocate system info buffer\n");
if (!instance->pd_info)
dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev,
"Failed to allocate pd_info buffer\n");
if (!instance->tgt_prop)
dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev,
"Failed to allocate tgt_prop buffer\n");
if (!instance->crash_dump_buf)
dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev,
"Failed to allocate crash dump buffer\n");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 90,295
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static base::PlatformFileError PerformCommonCheckAndPreparationForMoveAndCopy(
const FilePath& src_file_path,
const FilePath& dest_file_path) {
if (!file_util::PathExists(src_file_path))
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
if (!file_util::DirectoryExists(dest_file_path.DirName()))
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
if (src_file_path.IsParent(dest_file_path))
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION;
if (!file_util::PathExists(dest_file_path))
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK;
bool src_is_directory = file_util::DirectoryExists(src_file_path);
bool dest_is_directory = file_util::DirectoryExists(dest_file_path);
if (src_is_directory && !dest_is_directory)
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_A_DIRECTORY;
if (!src_is_directory && dest_is_directory)
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_A_FILE;
if (src_file_path.value() == dest_file_path.value())
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_EXISTS;
if (dest_is_directory) {
if (!file_util::Delete(dest_file_path, false /* recursive */)) {
if (!file_util::IsDirectoryEmpty(dest_file_path))
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_EMPTY;
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_FAILED;
}
}
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 97,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
unsigned data_len, int *al)
{
unsigned i;
unsigned proto_len;
if (data_len < 2)
goto parse_error;
/*
* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
* length-prefixed strings.
*/
i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
data_len -= 2;
data += 2;
if (data_len != i)
goto parse_error;
if (data_len < 2)
goto parse_error;
for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
proto_len = data[i];
i++;
if (proto_len == 0)
goto parse_error;
if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
goto parse_error;
i += proto_len;
}
if (s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed);
s->cert->alpn_proposed = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len);
if (s->cert->alpn_proposed == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return -1;
}
memcpy(s->cert->alpn_proposed, data, data_len);
s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = data_len;
return 0;
parse_error:
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 12,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mem_cgroup_try_charge_swapin(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct page *page,
gfp_t mask, struct mem_cgroup **memcgp)
{
struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
int ret;
*memcgp = NULL;
if (mem_cgroup_disabled())
return 0;
if (!do_swap_account)
goto charge_cur_mm;
/*
* A racing thread's fault, or swapoff, may have already updated
* the pte, and even removed page from swap cache: in those cases
* do_swap_page()'s pte_same() test will fail; but there's also a
* KSM case which does need to charge the page.
*/
if (!PageSwapCache(page))
goto charge_cur_mm;
memcg = try_get_mem_cgroup_from_page(page);
if (!memcg)
goto charge_cur_mm;
*memcgp = memcg;
ret = __mem_cgroup_try_charge(NULL, mask, 1, memcgp, true);
css_put(&memcg->css);
if (ret == -EINTR)
ret = 0;
return ret;
charge_cur_mm:
if (unlikely(!mm))
mm = &init_mm;
ret = __mem_cgroup_try_charge(mm, mask, 1, memcgp, true);
if (ret == -EINTR)
ret = 0;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ff_http_averror(int status_code, int default_averror)
{
switch (status_code) {
case 400: return AVERROR_HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
case 401: return AVERROR_HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
case 403: return AVERROR_HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
case 404: return AVERROR_HTTP_NOT_FOUND;
default: break;
}
if (status_code >= 400 && status_code <= 499)
return AVERROR_HTTP_OTHER_4XX;
else if (status_code >= 500)
return AVERROR_HTTP_SERVER_ERROR;
else
return default_averror;
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 70,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::UpdateRendererChannel(bool force) {
blink::mojom::DevToolsAgentAssociatedPtr agent_ptr;
if (frame_host_ && render_frame_alive_ && force)
frame_host_->GetRemoteAssociatedInterfaces()->GetInterface(&agent_ptr);
int process_id = frame_host_ ? frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetID()
: ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID;
GetRendererChannel()->SetRenderer(std::move(agent_ptr), process_id,
frame_host_);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,696
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::CachedArrayAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_cachedArrayAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::CachedArrayAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,562
|
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