instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mq_getsetattr, mqd_t, mqdes,
const struct mq_attr __user *, u_mqstat,
struct mq_attr __user *, u_omqstat)
{
int ret;
struct mq_attr mqstat, omqstat;
struct mq_attr *new = NULL, *old = NULL;
if (u_mqstat) {
new = &mqstat;
if (copy_from_user(new, u_mqstat, sizeof(struct mq_attr)))
return -EFAULT;
}
if (u_omqstat)
old = &omqstat;
ret = do_mq_getsetattr(mqdes, new, old);
if (ret || !old)
return ret;
if (copy_to_user(u_omqstat, old, sizeof(struct mq_attr)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mqueue: fix a use-after-free in sys_mq_notify()
The retry logic for netlink_attachskb() inside sys_mq_notify()
is nasty and vulnerable:
1) The sock refcnt is already released when retry is needed
2) The fd is controllable by user-space because we already
release the file refcnt
so we when retry but the fd has been just closed by user-space
during this small window, we end up calling netlink_detachskb()
on the error path which releases the sock again, later when
the user-space closes this socket a use-after-free could be
triggered.
Setting 'sock' to NULL here should be sufficient to fix it.
Reported-by: GeneBlue <geneblue.mail@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 63,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static signed short ReadDCMSignedShort(DCMStreamInfo *stream_info,Image *image)
{
union
{
unsigned short
unsigned_value;
signed short
signed_value;
} quantum;
quantum.unsigned_value=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
Commit Message: Add additional checks to DCM reader to prevent data-driven faults (bug report from Hanno Böck
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 51,643
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
DOMStringList* arrayArg(toDOMStringList(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->overloadedMethod(arrayArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 170,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ebcdic_filter()
{
return (&methods_ebcdic);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderThreadImpl::PendingFrameCreate::~PendingFrameCreate() {
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 150,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pkinit_get_certs_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ)
{
#ifdef PKINIT_USE_MECH_LIST
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR mechp;
CK_MECHANISM_INFO info;
#endif
CK_OBJECT_CLASS cls;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[4];
CK_ULONG count;
CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE certtype;
CK_BYTE_PTR cert = NULL, cert_id;
const unsigned char *cp;
int i, r;
unsigned int nattrs;
X509 *x = NULL;
/* Copy stuff from idopts -> id_cryptoctx */
if (idopts->p11_module_name != NULL) {
id_cryptoctx->p11_module_name = strdup(idopts->p11_module_name);
if (id_cryptoctx->p11_module_name == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
if (idopts->token_label != NULL) {
id_cryptoctx->token_label = strdup(idopts->token_label);
if (id_cryptoctx->token_label == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
if (idopts->cert_label != NULL) {
id_cryptoctx->cert_label = strdup(idopts->cert_label);
if (id_cryptoctx->cert_label == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
/* Convert the ascii cert_id string into a binary blob */
if (idopts->cert_id_string != NULL) {
BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
BN_hex2bn(&bn, idopts->cert_id_string);
if (bn == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
id_cryptoctx->cert_id = malloc((size_t) id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len);
if (id_cryptoctx->cert_id == NULL) {
BN_free(bn);
return ENOMEM;
}
BN_bn2bin(bn, id_cryptoctx->cert_id);
BN_free(bn);
}
id_cryptoctx->slotid = idopts->slotid;
id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method = 1;
if (pkinit_open_session(context, id_cryptoctx)) {
pkiDebug("can't open pkcs11 session\n");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
#ifndef PKINIT_USE_MECH_LIST
/*
* We'd like to use CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS for signing if it's available, but
* many cards seems to be confused about whether they are capable of
* this or not. The safe thing seems to be to ignore the mechanism list,
* always use CKM_RSA_PKCS and calculate the sha1 digest ourselves.
*/
id_cryptoctx->mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
#else
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetMechanismList(id_cryptoctx->slotid, NULL,
&count)) != CKR_OK || count <= 0) {
pkiDebug("C_GetMechanismList: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
mechp = malloc(count * sizeof (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
if (mechp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetMechanismList(id_cryptoctx->slotid,
mechp, &count)) != CKR_OK)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetMechanismInfo(id_cryptoctx->slotid,
mechp[i], &info)) != CKR_OK)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
#ifdef DEBUG_MECHINFO
pkiDebug("mech %x flags %x\n", (int) mechp[i], (int) info.flags);
if ((info.flags & (CKF_SIGN|CKF_DECRYPT)) == (CKF_SIGN|CKF_DECRYPT))
pkiDebug(" this mech is good for sign & decrypt\n");
#endif
if (mechp[i] == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
/* This seems backwards... */
id_cryptoctx->mech =
(info.flags & CKF_SIGN) ? CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS : CKM_RSA_PKCS;
}
}
free(mechp);
pkiDebug("got %d mechs from card\n", (int) count);
#endif
cls = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
attrs[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
attrs[0].pValue = &cls;
attrs[0].ulValueLen = sizeof cls;
certtype = CKC_X_509;
attrs[1].type = CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
attrs[1].pValue = &certtype;
attrs[1].ulValueLen = sizeof certtype;
nattrs = 2;
/* If a cert id and/or label were given, use them too */
if (id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len > 0) {
attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_ID;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = id_cryptoctx->cert_id;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len;
nattrs++;
}
if (id_cryptoctx->cert_label != NULL) {
attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_LABEL;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = id_cryptoctx->cert_label;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = strlen(id_cryptoctx->cert_label);
nattrs++;
}
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs, nattrs);
if (r != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_FindObjectsInit: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
for (i = 0; ; i++) {
if (i >= MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
/* Look for x.509 cert */
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjects(id_cryptoctx->session,
&obj, 1, &count)) != CKR_OK || count <= 0) {
id_cryptoctx->creds[i] = NULL;
break;
}
/* Get cert and id len */
attrs[0].type = CKA_VALUE;
attrs[0].pValue = NULL;
attrs[0].ulValueLen = 0;
attrs[1].type = CKA_ID;
attrs[1].pValue = NULL;
attrs[1].ulValueLen = 0;
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetAttributeValue(id_cryptoctx->session,
obj, attrs, 2)) != CKR_OK && r != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
pkiDebug("C_GetAttributeValue: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
cert = (CK_BYTE_PTR) malloc((size_t) attrs[0].ulValueLen + 1);
cert_id = (CK_BYTE_PTR) malloc((size_t) attrs[1].ulValueLen + 1);
if (cert == NULL || cert_id == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
/* Read the cert and id off the card */
attrs[0].type = CKA_VALUE;
attrs[0].pValue = cert;
attrs[1].type = CKA_ID;
attrs[1].pValue = cert_id;
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetAttributeValue(id_cryptoctx->session,
obj, attrs, 2)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_GetAttributeValue: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
pkiDebug("cert %d size %d id %d idlen %d\n", i,
(int) attrs[0].ulValueLen, (int) cert_id[0],
(int) attrs[1].ulValueLen);
cp = (unsigned char *) cert;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int) attrs[0].ulValueLen);
if (x == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
id_cryptoctx->creds[i] = malloc(sizeof(struct _pkinit_cred_info));
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[i] == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->name = reassemble_pkcs11_name(idopts);
id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->cert = x;
id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->key = NULL;
id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->cert_id = cert_id;
id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->cert_id_len = attrs[1].ulValueLen;
free(cert);
}
id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsFinal(id_cryptoctx->session);
if (cert == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,672
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fbStore_r5g6b5 (FbBits *bits, const CARD32 *values, int x, int width, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
int i;
CARD16 *pixel = ((CARD16 *) bits) + x;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
CARD32 s = READ(values + i);
WRITE(pixel++, ((s >> 3) & 0x001f) |
((s >> 5) & 0x07e0) |
((s >> 8) & 0xf800));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 11,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String HTMLCanvasElement::toDataURL(const String& mime_type,
const ScriptValue& quality_argument,
ExceptionState& exception_state) const {
if (!OriginClean()) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError("Tainted canvases may not be exported.");
return String();
}
double quality = kUndefinedQualityValue;
if (!quality_argument.IsEmpty()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = quality_argument.V8Value();
if (v8_value->IsNumber())
quality = v8_value.As<v8::Number>()->Value();
}
return ToDataURLInternal(mime_type, quality, kBackBuffer);
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TT_Load_Context( TT_ExecContext exec,
TT_Face face,
TT_Size size )
{
FT_Int i;
FT_ULong tmp;
TT_MaxProfile* maxp;
FT_Error error;
exec->face = face;
maxp = &face->max_profile;
exec->size = size;
if ( size )
{
exec->numFDefs = size->num_function_defs;
exec->maxFDefs = size->max_function_defs;
exec->numIDefs = size->num_instruction_defs;
exec->maxIDefs = size->max_instruction_defs;
exec->FDefs = size->function_defs;
exec->IDefs = size->instruction_defs;
exec->tt_metrics = size->ttmetrics;
exec->metrics = size->metrics;
exec->maxFunc = size->max_func;
exec->maxIns = size->max_ins;
for ( i = 0; i < TT_MAX_CODE_RANGES; i++ )
exec->codeRangeTable[i] = size->codeRangeTable[i];
/* set graphics state */
exec->GS = size->GS;
exec->cvtSize = size->cvt_size;
exec->cvt = size->cvt;
exec->storeSize = size->storage_size;
exec->storage = size->storage;
exec->twilight = size->twilight;
}
/* XXX: We reserve a little more elements on the stack to deal safely */
/* with broken fonts like arialbs, courbs, timesbs, etc. */
tmp = exec->stackSize;
error = Update_Max( exec->memory,
&tmp,
sizeof ( FT_F26Dot6 ),
(void*)&exec->stack,
maxp->maxStackElements + 32 );
exec->stackSize = (FT_UInt)tmp;
if ( error )
return error;
tmp = exec->glyphSize;
error = Update_Max( exec->memory,
&tmp,
sizeof ( FT_Byte ),
(void*)&exec->glyphIns,
maxp->maxSizeOfInstructions );
exec->glyphSize = (FT_UShort)tmp;
if ( error )
return error;
exec->pts.n_points = 0;
exec->pts.n_contours = 0;
exec->zp1 = exec->pts;
exec->zp2 = exec->pts;
exec->zp0 = exec->pts;
exec->instruction_trap = FALSE;
return TT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ar6000_dbglog_init_done(struct ar6_softc *ar)
{
ar->dbglog_init_done = true;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vqa_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx,
void *data, int *data_size,
AVPacket *avpkt)
{
VqaContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int res;
if (s->frame.data[0])
avctx->release_buffer(avctx, &s->frame);
if (avctx->get_buffer(avctx, &s->frame)) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, " VQA Video: get_buffer() failed\n");
return -1;
}
bytestream2_init(&s->gb, avpkt->data, avpkt->size);
if ((res = vqa_decode_chunk(s)) < 0)
return res;
/* make the palette available on the way out */
memcpy(s->frame.data[1], s->palette, PALETTE_COUNT * 4);
s->frame.palette_has_changed = 1;
*data_size = sizeof(AVFrame);
*(AVFrame*)data = s->frame;
/* report that the buffer was completely consumed */
return avpkt->size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ext4_ext_calc_credits_for_single_extent(struct inode *inode, int nrblocks,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
if (path) {
int depth = ext_depth(inode);
int ret = 0;
/* probably there is space in leaf? */
if (le16_to_cpu(path[depth].p_hdr->eh_entries)
< le16_to_cpu(path[depth].p_hdr->eh_max)) {
/*
* There are some space in the leaf tree, no
* need to account for leaf block credit
*
* bitmaps and block group descriptor blocks
* and other metadata blocks still need to be
* accounted.
*/
/* 1 bitmap, 1 block group descriptor */
ret = 2 + EXT4_META_TRANS_BLOCKS(inode->i_sb);
return ret;
}
}
return ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode, nrblocks);
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,545
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nl80211_send_scan_msg(struct sk_buff *msg,
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
struct net_device *netdev,
u32 pid, u32 seq, int flags,
u32 cmd)
{
void *hdr;
hdr = nl80211hdr_put(msg, pid, seq, flags, cmd);
if (!hdr)
return -1;
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY, rdev->wiphy_idx);
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_IFINDEX, netdev->ifindex);
/* ignore errors and send incomplete event anyway */
nl80211_add_scan_req(msg, rdev);
return genlmsg_end(msg, hdr);
nla_put_failure:
genlmsg_cancel(msg, hdr);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fst_op_raise(struct fst_port_info *port, unsigned int outputs)
{
outputs |= FST_RDL(port->card, v24OpSts[port->index]);
FST_WRL(port->card, v24OpSts[port->index], outputs);
if (port->run)
fst_issue_cmd(port, SETV24O);
}
Commit Message: farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 39,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: infobars::InfoBar* ExtensionDevToolsInfoBarDelegate::Create(
RenderViewHost* rvh,
const std::string& client_name) {
if (!rvh)
return NULL;
WebContents* web_contents = WebContents::FromRenderViewHost(rvh);
if (!web_contents)
return NULL;
InfoBarService* infobar_service =
InfoBarService::FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (!infobar_service)
return NULL;
return infobar_service->AddInfoBar(ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::CreateInfoBar(
scoped_ptr<ConfirmInfoBarDelegate>(
new ExtensionDevToolsInfoBarDelegate(client_name))));
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 120,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_info_state_free (GetInfoState *state)
{
g_object_unref (state->cancellable);
g_free (state);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bt_status_t btif_dm_cancel_discovery(void)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __FUNCTION__);
BTA_DmSearchCancel();
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long Track::GetType() const { return m_info.type; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 160,817
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_srcip_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
struct sockaddr_storage *saddr = &vrrp->saddr;
if (inet_stosockaddr(strvec_slot(strvec, 1), NULL, saddr)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Configuration error: VRRP instance[%s] malformed"
" src address[%s]. Skipping..."
, vrrp->iname, FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
return;
}
vrrp->saddr_from_config = true;
if (vrrp->family == AF_UNSPEC)
vrrp->family = saddr->ss_family;
else if (saddr->ss_family != vrrp->family) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Configuration error: VRRP instance[%s] and src address"
"[%s] MUST be of the same family !!! Skipping..."
, vrrp->iname, FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
saddr->ss_family = AF_UNSPEC;
vrrp->saddr_from_config = false;
}
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 76,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fuse_readpage(struct file *file, struct page *page)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
struct fuse_req *req;
size_t num_read;
loff_t pos = page_offset(page);
size_t count = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
u64 attr_ver;
int err;
err = -EIO;
if (is_bad_inode(inode))
goto out;
/*
* Page writeback can extend beyond the liftime of the
* page-cache page, so make sure we read a properly synced
* page.
*/
fuse_wait_on_page_writeback(inode, page->index);
req = fuse_get_req(fc);
err = PTR_ERR(req);
if (IS_ERR(req))
goto out;
attr_ver = fuse_get_attr_version(fc);
req->out.page_zeroing = 1;
req->out.argpages = 1;
req->num_pages = 1;
req->pages[0] = page;
num_read = fuse_send_read(req, file, pos, count, NULL);
err = req->out.h.error;
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
if (!err) {
/*
* Short read means EOF. If file size is larger, truncate it
*/
if (num_read < count)
fuse_read_update_size(inode, pos + num_read, attr_ver);
SetPageUptodate(page);
}
fuse_invalidate_attr(inode); /* atime changed */
out:
unlock_page(page);
return err;
}
Commit Message: fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
CC: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.31+]
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ip_mc_unmap(struct in_device *in_dev)
{
struct ip_mc_list *pmc;
ASSERT_RTNL();
for_each_pmc_rtnl(in_dev, pmc)
igmp_group_dropped(pmc);
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,650
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rmd160_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct rmd160_ctx *rctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
rctx->byte_count = 0;
rctx->state[0] = RMD_H0;
rctx->state[1] = RMD_H1;
rctx->state[2] = RMD_H2;
rctx->state[3] = RMD_H3;
rctx->state[4] = RMD_H4;
memset(rctx->buffer, 0, sizeof(rctx->buffer));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RootWindow::SetFocusWhenShown(bool focused) {
host_->SetFocusWhenShown(focused);
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,970
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_fill_flex_info(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_group_desc *gdp = NULL;
ext4_group_t flex_group;
int i, err;
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex < 1 || sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex > 31) {
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = 0;
return 1;
}
err = ext4_alloc_flex_bg_array(sb, sbi->s_groups_count);
if (err)
goto failed;
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_groups_count; i++) {
gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, i, NULL);
flex_group = ext4_flex_group(sbi, i);
atomic_add(ext4_free_inodes_count(sb, gdp),
&sbi->s_flex_groups[flex_group].free_inodes);
atomic64_add(ext4_free_group_clusters(sb, gdp),
&sbi->s_flex_groups[flex_group].free_clusters);
atomic_add(ext4_used_dirs_count(sb, gdp),
&sbi->s_flex_groups[flex_group].used_dirs);
}
return 1;
failed:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sas_ata_schedule_reset(struct domain_device *dev)
{
struct ata_eh_info *ehi;
struct ata_port *ap;
unsigned long flags;
if (!dev_is_sata(dev))
return;
ap = dev->sata_dev.ap;
ehi = &ap->link.eh_info;
spin_lock_irqsave(ap->lock, flags);
ehi->err_mask |= AC_ERR_TIMEOUT;
ehi->action |= ATA_EH_RESET;
ata_port_schedule_eh(ap);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(ap->lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 85,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Tab::OnMouseMoved(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
tab_style_->SetHoverLocation(event.location());
controller_->OnMouseEventInTab(this, event);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,650
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asn1_get_length_der (const unsigned char *der, int der_len, int *len)
{
unsigned int ans;
int k, punt, sum;
*len = 0;
if (der_len <= 0)
return 0;
if (!(der[0] & 128))
{
/* short form */
*len = 1;
ans = der[0];
}
else
{
/* Long form */
k = der[0] & 0x7F;
punt = 1;
if (k)
{ /* definite length method */
ans = 0;
while (punt <= k && punt < der_len)
{
if (INT_MULTIPLY_OVERFLOW (ans, 256))
return -2;
ans *= 256;
if (INT_ADD_OVERFLOW (ans, ((unsigned) der[punt])))
return -2;
ans += der[punt];
punt++;
}
}
else
{ /* indefinite length method */
*len = punt;
return -1;
}
*len = punt;
}
sum = ans;
if (ans >= INT_MAX || INT_ADD_OVERFLOW (sum, (*len)))
return -2;
sum += *len;
if (sum > der_len)
return -4;
return ans;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u8 nfc_llcp_ptype(struct sk_buff *pdu)
{
return ((pdu->data[0] & 0x03) << 2) | ((pdu->data[1] & 0xc0) >> 6);
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,702
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewTest::LoadHTML(const char* html) {
std::string url_str = "data:text/html;charset=utf-8,";
url_str.append(html);
GURL url(url_str);
GetMainFrame()->loadRequest(WebURLRequest(url));
ProcessPendingMessages();
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void br_ip4_multicast_leave_group(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port *port,
__be32 group,
__u16 vid)
{
struct br_ip br_group;
if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(group))
return;
br_group.u.ip4 = group;
br_group.proto = htons(ETH_P_IP);
br_group.vid = vid;
br_multicast_leave_group(br, port, &br_group);
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,992
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IW_IMPL(struct iw_context*) iw_create_context(struct iw_init_params *params)
{
struct iw_context *ctx;
if(params && params->mallocfn) {
ctx = (*params->mallocfn)(params->userdata,IW_MALLOCFLAG_ZEROMEM,sizeof(struct iw_context));
}
else {
ctx = iwpvt_default_malloc(NULL,IW_MALLOCFLAG_ZEROMEM,sizeof(struct iw_context));
}
if(!ctx) return NULL;
if(params) {
ctx->userdata = params->userdata;
ctx->caller_api_version = params->api_version;
}
if(params && params->mallocfn) {
ctx->mallocfn = params->mallocfn;
ctx->freefn = params->freefn;
}
else {
ctx->mallocfn = iwpvt_default_malloc;
ctx->freefn = iwpvt_default_free;
}
ctx->max_malloc = IW_DEFAULT_MAX_MALLOC;
ctx->max_width = ctx->max_height = IW_DEFAULT_MAX_DIMENSION;
default_resize_settings(&ctx->resize_settings[IW_DIMENSION_H]);
default_resize_settings(&ctx->resize_settings[IW_DIMENSION_V]);
ctx->input_w = -1;
ctx->input_h = -1;
iw_make_srgb_csdescr_2(&ctx->img1cs);
iw_make_srgb_csdescr_2(&ctx->img2cs);
ctx->to_grayscale=0;
ctx->grayscale_formula = IW_GSF_STANDARD;
ctx->req.include_screen = 1;
ctx->opt_grayscale = 1;
ctx->opt_palette = 1;
ctx->opt_16_to_8 = 1;
ctx->opt_strip_alpha = 1;
ctx->opt_binary_trns = 1;
return ctx;
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 64,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL_FILE (const bson_t *b, const char *filename)
{
bson_t *b2 = get_bson (filename);
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL (b, b2);
bson_destroy (b2);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 77,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Browser::SupportsWindowFeatureImpl(WindowFeature feature,
bool check_fullscreen) const {
bool hide_ui_for_fullscreen = false;
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
hide_ui_for_fullscreen = check_fullscreen && window_ &&
window_->IsFullscreen();
#endif
unsigned int features = FEATURE_INFOBAR | FEATURE_SIDEBAR;
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
features |= FEATURE_DOWNLOADSHELF;
#endif // !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (is_type_tabbed())
features |= FEATURE_BOOKMARKBAR;
if (!hide_ui_for_fullscreen) {
if (!is_type_tabbed())
features |= FEATURE_TITLEBAR;
if (is_type_tabbed())
features |= FEATURE_TABSTRIP;
if (is_type_tabbed())
features |= FEATURE_TOOLBAR;
if (!is_app())
features |= FEATURE_LOCATIONBAR;
}
return !!(features & feature);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_get_asm_flagmask (int flag_select)
{
/* Obsolete, to be removed from libpng-1.4.0 */
PNG_UNUSED(flag_select)
return 0L;
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 131,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decode_set_vlan_vid(uint16_t vid, bool push_vlan_if_needed, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
if (vid & ~0xfff) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
} else {
struct ofpact_vlan_vid *vlan_vid = ofpact_put_SET_VLAN_VID(out);
vlan_vid->vlan_vid = vid;
vlan_vid->push_vlan_if_needed = push_vlan_if_needed;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::discardFramebufferEXT(
WGC3Denum target, WGC3Dsizei numAttachments, const WGC3Denum* attachments) {
gl_->Flush();
command_buffer_->DiscardBackbuffer();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,806
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult TranslateConnectErrorAndRecord(
device::BluetoothDevice::ConnectErrorCode error_code) {
switch (error_code) {
case device::BluetoothDevice::ERROR_UNKNOWN:
RecordConnectGATTOutcome(UMAConnectGATTOutcome::UNKNOWN);
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CONNECT_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
case device::BluetoothDevice::ERROR_INPROGRESS:
RecordConnectGATTOutcome(UMAConnectGATTOutcome::IN_PROGRESS);
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CONNECT_ALREADY_IN_PROGRESS;
case device::BluetoothDevice::ERROR_FAILED:
RecordConnectGATTOutcome(UMAConnectGATTOutcome::FAILED);
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CONNECT_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
case device::BluetoothDevice::ERROR_AUTH_FAILED:
RecordConnectGATTOutcome(UMAConnectGATTOutcome::AUTH_FAILED);
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CONNECT_AUTH_FAILED;
case device::BluetoothDevice::ERROR_AUTH_CANCELED:
RecordConnectGATTOutcome(UMAConnectGATTOutcome::AUTH_CANCELED);
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CONNECT_AUTH_CANCELED;
case device::BluetoothDevice::ERROR_AUTH_REJECTED:
RecordConnectGATTOutcome(UMAConnectGATTOutcome::AUTH_REJECTED);
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CONNECT_AUTH_REJECTED;
case device::BluetoothDevice::ERROR_AUTH_TIMEOUT:
RecordConnectGATTOutcome(UMAConnectGATTOutcome::AUTH_TIMEOUT);
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CONNECT_AUTH_TIMEOUT;
case device::BluetoothDevice::ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DEVICE:
RecordConnectGATTOutcome(UMAConnectGATTOutcome::UNSUPPORTED_DEVICE);
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CONNECT_UNSUPPORTED_DEVICE;
case device::BluetoothDevice::NUM_CONNECT_ERROR_CODES:
NOTREACHED();
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CONNECT_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
}
NOTREACHED();
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CONNECT_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderBlockFlow::lowestFloatLogicalBottom(FloatingObject::Type floatType) const
{
if (!m_floatingObjects)
return 0;
return m_floatingObjects->lowestFloatLogicalBottom(floatType);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,388
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_serial_info(struct acm *acm, struct serial_struct __user *info)
{
struct serial_struct tmp;
if (!info)
return -EINVAL;
memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
tmp.flags = ASYNC_LOW_LATENCY;
tmp.xmit_fifo_size = acm->writesize;
tmp.baud_base = le32_to_cpu(acm->line.dwDTERate);
tmp.close_delay = acm->port.close_delay / 10;
tmp.closing_wait = acm->port.closing_wait == ASYNC_CLOSING_WAIT_NONE ?
ASYNC_CLOSING_WAIT_NONE :
acm->port.closing_wait / 10;
if (copy_to_user(info, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
return -EFAULT;
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checking
An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky
device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel
by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check
to the code path for quirky devices.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,225
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_find_handle(
unsigned int cmd,
xfs_fsop_handlereq_t *hreq)
{
int hsize;
xfs_handle_t handle;
struct inode *inode;
struct fd f = {NULL};
struct path path;
int error;
struct xfs_inode *ip;
if (cmd == XFS_IOC_FD_TO_HANDLE) {
f = fdget(hreq->fd);
if (!f.file)
return -EBADF;
inode = file_inode(f.file);
} else {
error = user_lpath((const char __user *)hreq->path, &path);
if (error)
return error;
inode = path.dentry->d_inode;
}
ip = XFS_I(inode);
/*
* We can only generate handles for inodes residing on a XFS filesystem,
* and only for regular files, directories or symbolic links.
*/
error = -EINVAL;
if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != XFS_SB_MAGIC)
goto out_put;
error = -EBADF;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) &&
!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
goto out_put;
memcpy(&handle.ha_fsid, ip->i_mount->m_fixedfsid, sizeof(xfs_fsid_t));
if (cmd == XFS_IOC_PATH_TO_FSHANDLE) {
/*
* This handle only contains an fsid, zero the rest.
*/
memset(&handle.ha_fid, 0, sizeof(handle.ha_fid));
hsize = sizeof(xfs_fsid_t);
} else {
handle.ha_fid.fid_len = sizeof(xfs_fid_t) -
sizeof(handle.ha_fid.fid_len);
handle.ha_fid.fid_pad = 0;
handle.ha_fid.fid_gen = ip->i_d.di_gen;
handle.ha_fid.fid_ino = ip->i_ino;
hsize = XFS_HSIZE(handle);
}
error = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(hreq->ohandle, &handle, hsize) ||
copy_to_user(hreq->ohandlen, &hsize, sizeof(__s32)))
goto out_put;
error = 0;
out_put:
if (cmd == XFS_IOC_FD_TO_HANDLE)
fdput(f);
else
path_put(&path);
return error;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FrameView::isPainting() const
{
return m_isPainting;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 119,855
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_next_char(void)
{
int c;
FILE *f;
c = '\n';
if ((f = config_file) != NULL) {
c = fgetc(f);
if (c == '\r') {
/* DOS like systems */
c = fgetc(f);
if (c != '\n') {
ungetc(c, f);
c = '\r';
}
}
if (c == '\n')
config_linenr++;
if (c == EOF) {
config_file_eof = 1;
c = '\n';
}
}
return c;
}
Commit Message: perf tools: do not look at ./config for configuration
In addition to /etc/perfconfig and $HOME/.perfconfig, perf looks for
configuration in the file ./config, imitating git which looks at
$GIT_DIR/config. If ./config is not a perf configuration file, it
fails, or worse, treats it as a configuration file and changes behavior
in some unexpected way.
"config" is not an unusual name for a file to be lying around and perf
does not have a private directory dedicated for its own use, so let's
just stop looking for configuration in the cwd. Callers needing
context-sensitive configuration can use the PERF_CONFIG environment
variable.
Requested-by: Christian Ohm <chr.ohm@gmx.net>
Cc: 632923@bugs.debian.org
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Ohm <chr.ohm@gmx.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20110805165838.GA7237@elie.gateway.2wire.net
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 34,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ServiceWorkerContainer* ServiceWorkerContainer::create(ExecutionContext* executionContext)
{
return new ServiceWorkerContainer(executionContext);
}
Commit Message: Check CSP before registering ServiceWorkers
Service Worker registrations should be subject to the same CSP checks as
other workers. The spec doesn't say this explicitly
(https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#directive-child-src-workers says "Worker or
SharedWorker constructors"), but it seems to be in the spirit of things,
and it matches Firefox's behavior.
BUG=579801
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1861253004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385775}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 156,552
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::handleMouseEvent(QMouseEvent* event)
{
if (!pageView->eventHandler())
return;
pageView->eventHandler()->handleInputEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_read_ilst(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
int ret;
c->itunes_metadata = 1;
ret = mov_read_default(c, pb, atom);
c->itunes_metadata = 0;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool(
ResourceProvider* resource_provider,
ContextProvider* context_provider,
size_t num_threads,
size_t max_transfer_buffer_usage_bytes)
: RasterWorkerPool(resource_provider, context_provider, num_threads),
shutdown_(false),
scheduled_raster_task_count_(0),
bytes_pending_upload_(0),
max_bytes_pending_upload_(max_transfer_buffer_usage_bytes),
has_performed_uploads_since_last_flush_(false),
check_for_completed_raster_tasks_pending_(false),
should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_are_pending_(false),
should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending_(
false) {
}
Commit Message: cc: Simplify raster task completion notification logic
(Relanding after missing activation bug fixed in https://codereview.chromium.org/131763003/)
Previously the pixel buffer raster worker pool used a combination of
polling and explicit notifications from the raster worker pool to decide
when to tell the client about the completion of 1) all tasks or 2) the
subset of tasks required for activation. This patch simplifies the logic
by only triggering the notification based on the OnRasterTasksFinished
and OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished calls from the worker
pool.
BUG=307841,331534
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/99873007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@243991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 171,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<AXProperty> createRelatedNodeListProperty(
const String& key,
AXRelatedObjectVector& nodes) {
std::unique_ptr<AXValue> nodeListValue =
createRelatedNodeListValue(nodes, AXValueTypeEnum::NodeList);
return createProperty(key, std::move(nodeListValue));
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,420
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::updateInspectorStateCookie(const String& state)
{
m_client->saveAgentRuntimeState(state);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,240
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageCopyMergeGray (gdImagePtr dst, gdImagePtr src, int dstX, int dstY,
int srcX, int srcY, int w, int h, int pct)
{
int c, dc;
int x, y;
int tox, toy;
int ncR, ncG, ncB;
float g;
toy = dstY;
for (y = srcY; (y < (srcY + h)); y++) {
tox = dstX;
for (x = srcX; (x < (srcX + w)); x++) {
int nc;
c = gdImageGetPixel (src, x, y);
/* Added 7/24/95: support transparent copies */
if (gdImageGetTransparent (src) == c) {
tox++;
continue;
}
/*
* If it's the same image, mapping is NOT trivial since we
* merge with greyscale target, but if pct is 100, the grey
* value is not used, so it becomes trivial. pjw 2.0.12.
*/
if (dst == src && pct == 100) {
nc = c;
} else {
dc = gdImageGetPixel (dst, tox, toy);
g = 0.29900 * gdImageRed(dst, dc)
+ 0.58700 * gdImageGreen(dst, dc) + 0.11400 * gdImageBlue(dst, dc);
ncR = gdImageRed (src, c) * (pct / 100.0)
+ g * ((100 - pct) / 100.0);
ncG = gdImageGreen (src, c) * (pct / 100.0)
+ g * ((100 - pct) / 100.0);
ncB = gdImageBlue (src, c) * (pct / 100.0)
+ g * ((100 - pct) / 100.0);
/* First look for an exact match */
nc = gdImageColorExact (dst, ncR, ncG, ncB);
if (nc == (-1)) {
/* No, so try to allocate it */
nc = gdImageColorAllocate (dst, ncR, ncG, ncB);
/* If we're out of colors, go for the
closest color */
if (nc == (-1)) {
nc = gdImageColorClosest (dst, ncR, ncG, ncB);
}
}
}
gdImageSetPixel (dst, tox, toy, nc);
tox++;
}
toy++;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 73,057
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int hidp_get_connlist(struct hidp_connlist_req *req)
{
struct hidp_session *session;
int err = 0, n = 0;
BT_DBG("");
down_read(&hidp_session_sem);
list_for_each_entry(session, &hidp_session_list, list) {
struct hidp_conninfo ci;
__hidp_copy_session(session, &ci);
if (copy_to_user(req->ci, &ci, sizeof(ci))) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (++n >= req->cnum)
break;
req->ci++;
}
req->cnum = n;
up_read(&hidp_session_sem);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Fix incorrect strncpy() in hidp_setup_hid()
The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.
Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:
$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af
("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 33,733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int bdrv_check_request(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t sector_num,
int nb_sectors)
{
return bdrv_check_byte_request(bs, sector_num * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE,
nb_sectors * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 165,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::SetGLError(GLenum error,
const char* function_name,
const char* msg) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] Client Synthesized Error: "
<< GLES2Util::GetStringError(error) << ": "
<< function_name << ": " << msg);
FailGLError(error);
if (msg) {
last_error_ = msg;
}
if (!error_message_callback_.is_null()) {
std::string temp(GLES2Util::GetStringError(error) + " : " + function_name +
": " + (msg ? msg : ""));
SendErrorMessage(temp.c_str(), 0);
}
error_bits_ |= GLES2Util::GLErrorToErrorBit(error);
if (error == GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY && lose_context_when_out_of_memory_) {
helper_->LoseContextCHROMIUM(GL_GUILTY_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB,
GL_UNKNOWN_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err fdsa_AddBox(GF_Box *s, GF_Box *a)
{
GF_HintSample *ptr = (GF_HintSample *)s;
switch(a->type) {
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_FDPA:
gf_list_add(ptr->packetTable, a);
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_EXTR:
if (ptr->extra_data) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->extra_data = (GF_ExtraDataBox*)a;
break;
default:
return gf_isom_box_add_default(s, a);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
{
int ok;
X509 *issuer = NULL;
int crl_score = 0;
unsigned int reasons;
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
&issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
if (ok)
goto done;
/* Lookup CRLs from store */
skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
/* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
if (!skcrl && crl)
goto done;
get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
done:
/* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
if (crl) {
ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
*pcrl = crl;
*pdcrl = dcrl;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 5,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
{
vfree(to_kvm_vmx(kvm));
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 81,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ohci_copy_iso_td(OHCIState *ohci,
uint32_t start_addr, uint32_t end_addr,
uint8_t *buf, int len, DMADirection dir)
{
dma_addr_t ptr, n;
ptr = start_addr;
n = 0x1000 - (ptr & 0xfff);
if (n > len)
n = len;
if (dma_memory_rw(ohci->as, ptr + ohci->localmem_base, buf, n, dir)) {
return -1;
}
if (n == len) {
return 0;
}
ptr = end_addr & ~0xfffu;
buf += n;
if (dma_memory_rw(ohci->as, ptr + ohci->localmem_base, buf,
len - n, dir)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void lzxd_set_output_length(struct lzxd_stream *lzx, off_t out_bytes) {
if (lzx) lzx->length = out_bytes;
}
Commit Message: Prevent a 1-byte underread of the input buffer if an odd-sized data block comes just before an uncompressed block header
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,039
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AutofillPopupSuggestionView::CreateBackground() {
return views::CreateSolidBackground(
is_selected_ ? popup_view_->GetSelectedBackgroundColor()
: popup_view_->GetBackgroundColor());
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 130,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string DownloadItemImpl::GetRemoteAddress() const {
return remote_address_;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
int i, ret, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0;
struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
/* Add entry function. */
ret = add_subprog(env, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
if (insn[i].code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
continue;
if (insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
continue;
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
verbose(env, "function calls to other bpf functions are allowed for root only\n");
return -EPERM;
}
if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) {
verbose(env, "function calls in offloaded programs are not supported yet\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn[i].imm + 1);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
/* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration
* logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased.
*/
subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt;
if (env->log.level > 1)
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start);
/* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */
subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start;
subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
u8 code = insn[i].code;
if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP)
goto next;
if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL)
goto next;
off = i + insn[i].off + 1;
if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) {
verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off);
return -EINVAL;
}
next:
if (i == subprog_end - 1) {
/* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another
* the last insn of the subprog should be either exit
* or unconditional jump back
*/
if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) &&
code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
subprog_start = subprog_end;
cur_subprog++;
if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt)
subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 76,388
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::ReflectedIdAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_reflectedId_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::ReflectedIdAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int inet_csk_wait_for_connect(struct sock *sk, long timeo)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
int err;
/*
* True wake-one mechanism for incoming connections: only
* one process gets woken up, not the 'whole herd'.
* Since we do not 'race & poll' for established sockets
* anymore, the common case will execute the loop only once.
*
* Subtle issue: "add_wait_queue_exclusive()" will be added
* after any current non-exclusive waiters, and we know that
* it will always _stay_ after any new non-exclusive waiters
* because all non-exclusive waiters are added at the
* beginning of the wait-queue. As such, it's ok to "drop"
* our exclusiveness temporarily when we get woken up without
* having to remove and re-insert us on the wait queue.
*/
for (;;) {
prepare_to_wait_exclusive(sk_sleep(sk), &wait,
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
release_sock(sk);
if (reqsk_queue_empty(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue))
timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo);
lock_sock(sk);
err = 0;
if (!reqsk_queue_empty(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue))
break;
err = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)
break;
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
if (signal_pending(current))
break;
err = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
break;
}
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
return err;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::CheckCompletedInternal() {
if (!ShouldComplete())
return false;
if (frame_) {
frame_->Client()->RunScriptsAtDocumentIdle();
if (!frame_)
return false;
if (!ShouldComplete())
return false;
}
SetReadyState(kComplete);
if (LoadEventStillNeeded())
ImplicitClose();
if (!frame_ || !frame_->IsAttached())
return false;
if (frame_->GetSettings()->GetSavePreviousDocumentResources() ==
SavePreviousDocumentResources::kUntilOnLoad) {
fetcher_->ClearResourcesFromPreviousFetcher();
}
frame_->GetNavigationScheduler().StartTimer();
View()->HandleLoadCompleted();
if (!AllDescendantsAreComplete(frame_))
return false;
if (!Loader()->SentDidFinishLoad()) {
if (frame_->IsMainFrame())
GetViewportData().GetViewportDescription().ReportMobilePageStats(frame_);
Loader()->SetSentDidFinishLoad();
frame_->Client()->DispatchDidFinishLoad();
if (!frame_)
return false;
if (frame_->Client()->GetRemoteNavigationAssociatedInterfaces()) {
mojom::blink::UkmSourceIdFrameHostAssociatedPtr ukm_binding;
frame_->Client()->GetRemoteNavigationAssociatedInterfaces()->GetInterface(
&ukm_binding);
DCHECK(ukm_binding.is_bound());
ukm_binding->SetDocumentSourceId(ukm_source_id_);
}
AnchorElementMetrics::MaybeReportViewportMetricsOnLoad(*this);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 143,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::DeleteSurroundingTextInCodePoints(int before,
int after) {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "WebLocalFrameImpl::deleteSurroundingTextInCodePoints");
if (WebPlugin* plugin = FocusedPluginIfInputMethodSupported()) {
plugin->DeleteSurroundingTextInCodePoints(before, after);
return;
}
GetFrame()->GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
GetFrame()->GetInputMethodController().DeleteSurroundingTextInCodePoints(
before, after);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ass_pre_blur2_horz_c(int16_t *dst, const int16_t *src,
uintptr_t src_width, uintptr_t src_height)
{
uintptr_t dst_width = src_width + 4;
uintptr_t size = ((src_width + STRIPE_MASK) & ~STRIPE_MASK) * src_height;
uintptr_t step = STRIPE_WIDTH * src_height;
uintptr_t offs = 0;
int16_t buf[2 * STRIPE_WIDTH];
int16_t *ptr = buf + STRIPE_WIDTH;
for (uintptr_t x = 0; x < dst_width; x += STRIPE_WIDTH) {
for (uintptr_t y = 0; y < src_height; ++y) {
copy_line(ptr - 1 * STRIPE_WIDTH, src, offs - 1 * step, size);
copy_line(ptr - 0 * STRIPE_WIDTH, src, offs - 0 * step, size);
for (int k = 0; k < STRIPE_WIDTH; ++k)
dst[k] = pre_blur2_func(ptr[k - 4], ptr[k - 3], ptr[k - 2], ptr[k - 1], ptr[k]);
dst += STRIPE_WIDTH;
offs += STRIPE_WIDTH;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix blur coefficient calculation buffer overflow
Found by fuzzer test case id:000082,sig:11,src:002579,op:havoc,rep:8.
Correctness should be checked, but this fixes the overflow for good.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void DrawBoundingRectangles(Image *image,const DrawInfo *draw_info,
const PolygonInfo *polygon_info)
{
double
mid;
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
PointInfo
end,
resolution,
start;
PrimitiveInfo
primitive_info[6];
register ssize_t
i;
SegmentInfo
bounds;
ssize_t
coordinates;
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
(void) QueryColorDatabase("#0000",&clone_info->fill,&image->exception);
resolution.x=DefaultResolution;
resolution.y=DefaultResolution;
if (clone_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
flags=ParseGeometry(clone_info->density,&geometry_info);
resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == MagickFalse)
resolution.y=resolution.x;
}
mid=(resolution.x/72.0)*ExpandAffine(&clone_info->affine)*
clone_info->stroke_width/2.0;
bounds.x1=0.0;
bounds.y1=0.0;
bounds.x2=0.0;
bounds.y2=0.0;
if (polygon_info != (PolygonInfo *) NULL)
{
bounds=polygon_info->edges[0].bounds;
for (i=1; i < (ssize_t) polygon_info->number_edges; i++)
{
if (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x1 < (double) bounds.x1)
bounds.x1=polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x1;
if (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y1 < (double) bounds.y1)
bounds.y1=polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y1;
if (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x2 > (double) bounds.x2)
bounds.x2=polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x2;
if (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y2 > (double) bounds.y2)
bounds.y2=polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y2;
}
bounds.x1-=mid;
bounds.x1=bounds.x1 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.x1 >= (double)
image->columns ? (double) image->columns-1 : bounds.x1;
bounds.y1-=mid;
bounds.y1=bounds.y1 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.y1 >= (double)
image->rows ? (double) image->rows-1 : bounds.y1;
bounds.x2+=mid;
bounds.x2=bounds.x2 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.x2 >= (double)
image->columns ? (double) image->columns-1 : bounds.x2;
bounds.y2+=mid;
bounds.y2=bounds.y2 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.y2 >= (double)
image->rows ? (double) image->rows-1 : bounds.y2;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) polygon_info->number_edges; i++)
{
if (polygon_info->edges[i].direction != 0)
(void) QueryColorDatabase("red",&clone_info->stroke,
&image->exception);
else
(void) QueryColorDatabase("green",&clone_info->stroke,
&image->exception);
start.x=(double) (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x1-mid);
start.y=(double) (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y1-mid);
end.x=(double) (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x2+mid);
end.y=(double) (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y2+mid);
primitive_info[0].primitive=RectanglePrimitive;
TraceRectangle(primitive_info,start,end);
primitive_info[0].method=ReplaceMethod;
coordinates=(ssize_t) primitive_info[0].coordinates;
primitive_info[coordinates].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
(void) DrawPrimitive(image,clone_info,primitive_info);
}
}
(void) QueryColorDatabase("blue",&clone_info->stroke,&image->exception);
start.x=(double) (bounds.x1-mid);
start.y=(double) (bounds.y1-mid);
end.x=(double) (bounds.x2+mid);
end.y=(double) (bounds.y2+mid);
primitive_info[0].primitive=RectanglePrimitive;
TraceRectangle(primitive_info,start,end);
primitive_info[0].method=ReplaceMethod;
coordinates=(ssize_t) primitive_info[0].coordinates;
primitive_info[coordinates].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
(void) DrawPrimitive(image,clone_info,primitive_info);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ath6kl_init_netdev_wmi(struct net_device *dev)
{
if (!eppingtest && bypasswmi)
return 0;
return __ath6kl_init_netdev(dev);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,245
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool zone_spans_last_pfn(const struct zone *zone,
unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages)
{
unsigned long last_pfn = start_pfn + nr_pages - 1;
return zone_spans_pfn(zone, last_pfn);
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL GetFileManagerBaseUrl() {
return GetFileManagerUrl("/");
}
Commit Message: Reland r286968: The CL borrows ShareDialog from Files.app and add it to Gallery.
Previous Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/431293002
BUG=374667
TEST=manually
R=yoshiki@chromium.org, mtomasz@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/433733004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286975 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 171,195
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_attr3_rmt_verify(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
void *ptr,
int fsbsize,
xfs_daddr_t bno)
{
struct xfs_attr3_rmt_hdr *rmt = ptr;
if (!xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb))
return false;
if (rmt->rm_magic != cpu_to_be32(XFS_ATTR3_RMT_MAGIC))
return false;
if (!uuid_equal(&rmt->rm_uuid, &mp->m_sb.sb_uuid))
return false;
if (be64_to_cpu(rmt->rm_blkno) != bno)
return false;
if (be32_to_cpu(rmt->rm_bytes) > fsbsize - sizeof(*rmt))
return false;
if (be32_to_cpu(rmt->rm_offset) +
be32_to_cpu(rmt->rm_bytes) > XATTR_SIZE_MAX)
return false;
if (rmt->rm_owner == 0)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 44,971
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoTexParameterfv(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, const GLfloat* params) {
TextureRef* texture = texture_manager()->GetTextureInfoForTarget(
&state_, target);
if (!texture) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexParameterfv", "unknown texture");
return;
}
texture_manager()->SetParameterf(
"glTexParameterfv", GetErrorState(), texture, pname, *params);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntSize WebPagePrivate::transformedContentsSize() const
{
const IntSize untransformedContentsSize = contentsSize();
const FloatPoint transformedBottomRight = m_transformationMatrix->mapPoint(
FloatPoint(untransformedContentsSize.width(), untransformedContentsSize.height()));
return IntSize(floorf(transformedBottomRight.x()), floorf(transformedBottomRight.y()));
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NavigationURLLoaderImpl::~NavigationURLLoaderImpl() {
BrowserThread::DeleteSoon(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
request_controller_.release());
}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,393
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pvscsi_send_msg(PVSCSIState *s, SCSIDevice *dev, uint32_t msg_type)
{
if (s->msg_ring_info_valid && pvscsi_ring_msg_has_room(&s->rings)) {
PVSCSIMsgDescDevStatusChanged msg = {0};
msg.type = msg_type;
msg.bus = dev->channel;
msg.target = dev->id;
msg.lun[1] = dev->lun;
pvscsi_msg_ring_put(s, (PVSCSIRingMsgDesc *)&msg);
pvscsi_ring_flush_msg(&s->rings);
pvscsi_raise_message_interrupt(s);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::DocumentTypeAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_documentTypeAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::DocumentTypeAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ocfs2_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
struct buffer_head *di_bh,
u64 new_i_size)
{
int ret = 0;
struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
BUG_ON(!di_bh);
/* setattr sometimes calls us like this. */
if (new_i_size == 0)
goto out;
if (i_size_read(inode) == new_i_size)
goto out;
BUG_ON(new_i_size < i_size_read(inode));
/*
* The alloc sem blocks people in read/write from reading our
* allocation until we're done changing it. We depend on
* i_mutex to block other extend/truncate calls while we're
* here. We even have to hold it for sparse files because there
* might be some tail zeroing.
*/
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) {
/*
* We can optimize small extends by keeping the inodes
* inline data.
*/
if (ocfs2_size_fits_inline_data(di_bh, new_i_size)) {
up_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
goto out_update_size;
}
ret = ocfs2_convert_inline_data_to_extents(inode, di_bh);
if (ret) {
up_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
}
if (ocfs2_sparse_alloc(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb)))
ret = ocfs2_zero_extend(inode, di_bh, new_i_size);
else
ret = ocfs2_extend_no_holes(inode, di_bh, new_i_size,
new_i_size);
up_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
if (ret < 0) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
out_update_size:
ret = ocfs2_simple_size_update(inode, di_bh, new_i_size);
if (ret < 0)
mlog_errno(ret);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 85,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ShapeRecord addShapeRecord(SWFShape shape, ShapeRecord record,
int *vx, int *vy, float scale)
{
if ( shape->nRecords % SHAPERECORD_INCREMENT == 0 )
{
shape->records = (ShapeRecord*) realloc(shape->records,
sizeof(ShapeRecord) *
(shape->nRecords + SHAPERECORD_INCREMENT));
}
switch ( record.type )
{
case SHAPERECORD_STATECHANGE:
{
StateChangeRecord change = (StateChangeRecord)
calloc(1,sizeof(struct stateChangeRecord));
*change = *record.record.stateChange;
shape->records[shape->nRecords].record.stateChange = change;
change->moveToX += shape->xpos;
change->moveToY += shape->ypos;
change->moveToX *= scale;
change->moveToY *= scale;
*vx = change->moveToX;
*vy = change->moveToY;
break;
}
case SHAPERECORD_LINETO:
{
LineToRecord lineTo = (LineToRecord)
calloc(1,sizeof(struct lineToRecord));
*lineTo = *record.record.lineTo;
lineTo->dx *= scale;
lineTo->dy *= scale;
shape->records[shape->nRecords].record.lineTo = lineTo;
*vx += lineTo->dx;
*vy += lineTo->dy;
SWFRect_includePoint(SWFCharacter_getBounds(CHARACTER(shape)),
*vx, *vy, shape->lineWidth);
SWFRect_includePoint(shape->edgeBounds, *vx, *vy, 0);
break;
}
case SHAPERECORD_CURVETO:
{
CurveToRecord curveTo = (CurveToRecord)
calloc(1,sizeof(struct curveToRecord));
*curveTo = *record.record.curveTo;
curveTo->controlx *= scale;
curveTo->controly *= scale;
curveTo->anchorx *= scale;
curveTo->anchory *= scale;
shape->records[shape->nRecords].record.curveTo = curveTo;
*vx += curveTo->controlx;
*vy += curveTo->controly;
SWFRect_includePoint(SWFCharacter_getBounds(CHARACTER(shape)),
*vx, *vy, shape->lineWidth);
SWFRect_includePoint(shape->edgeBounds, *vx, *vy, 0);
*vx += curveTo->anchorx;
*vy += curveTo->anchory;
SWFRect_includePoint(SWFCharacter_getBounds(CHARACTER(shape)),
*vx, *vy, shape->lineWidth);
SWFRect_includePoint(shape->edgeBounds, *vx, *vy, 0);
break;
}
}
shape->records[shape->nRecords].type = record.type;
shape->nRecords++;
return shape->records[shape->nRecords-1];
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 89,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct ext3_inode_info *ei = (struct ext3_inode_info *) foo;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_orphan);
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT3_FS_XATTR
init_rwsem(&ei->xattr_sem);
#endif
mutex_init(&ei->truncate_mutex);
inode_init_once(&ei->vfs_inode);
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 32,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: perf_install_in_context(struct perf_event_context *ctx,
struct perf_event *event,
int cpu)
{
struct task_struct *task = ctx->task;
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->mutex);
event->ctx = ctx;
if (!task) {
/*
* Per cpu events are installed via an smp call and
* the install is always successful.
*/
cpu_function_call(cpu, __perf_install_in_context, event);
return;
}
retry:
if (!task_function_call(task, __perf_install_in_context, event))
return;
raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
/*
* If we failed to find a running task, but find the context active now
* that we've acquired the ctx->lock, retry.
*/
if (ctx->is_active) {
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
goto retry;
}
/*
* Since the task isn't running, its safe to add the event, us holding
* the ctx->lock ensures the task won't get scheduled in.
*/
add_event_to_ctx(event, ctx);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdf_run_gs_BM(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, const char *blendmode)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_gstate *gstate = pdf_flush_text(ctx, pr);
gstate->blendmode = fz_lookup_blendmode(blendmode);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::ReturnFrontBuffer(const Mailbox& mailbox, bool is_lost) {
TextureBase* texture = mailbox_manager()->ConsumeTexture(mailbox);
mailbox_manager()->TextureDeleted(texture);
if (offscreen_single_buffer_)
return;
for (auto it = saved_back_textures_.begin(); it != saved_back_textures_.end();
++it) {
if (texture != it->back_texture->texture_ref()->texture())
continue;
if (is_lost || it->back_texture->size() != offscreen_size_) {
if (is_lost)
it->back_texture->Invalidate();
else
it->back_texture->Destroy();
saved_back_textures_.erase(it);
return;
}
it->in_use = false;
return;
}
DLOG(ERROR) << "Attempting to return a frontbuffer that was not saved.";
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,660
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init setup_slub_min_objects(char *str)
{
get_option(&str, &slub_min_objects);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int perf_event_set_bpf_prog(struct perf_event *event, u32 prog_fd)
{
struct bpf_prog *prog;
if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT)
return -EINVAL;
if (event->tp_event->prog)
return -EEXIST;
if (!(event->tp_event->flags & TRACE_EVENT_FL_UKPROBE))
/* bpf programs can only be attached to u/kprobes */
return -EINVAL;
prog = bpf_prog_get(prog_fd);
if (IS_ERR(prog))
return PTR_ERR(prog);
if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) {
/* valid fd, but invalid bpf program type */
bpf_prog_put(prog);
return -EINVAL;
}
event->tp_event->prog = prog;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 56,096
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int airo_networks_allocate(struct airo_info *ai)
{
if (ai->networks)
return 0;
ai->networks = kcalloc(AIRO_MAX_NETWORK_COUNT, sizeof(BSSListElement),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ai->networks) {
airo_print_warn("", "Out of memory allocating beacons");
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,976
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(u32 new_ctl)
{
/*
* These bits in the secondary execution controls field
* are dynamic, the others are mostly based on the hypervisor
* architecture and the guest's CPUID. Do not touch the
* dynamic bits.
*/
u32 mask =
SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
u32 cur_ctl = vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
(new_ctl & ~mask) | (cur_ctl & mask));
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void conditionalAndLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::conditionalAndLongAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void md_new_event(struct mddev *mddev)
{
atomic_inc(&md_event_count);
wake_up(&md_event_waiters);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void release_object(const sp<ProcessState>& proc,
const flat_binder_object& obj, const void* who, size_t* outAshmemSize)
{
switch (obj.type) {
case BINDER_TYPE_BINDER:
if (obj.binder) {
LOG_REFS("Parcel %p releasing reference on local %p", who, obj.cookie);
reinterpret_cast<IBinder*>(obj.cookie)->decStrong(who);
}
return;
case BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_BINDER:
if (obj.binder)
reinterpret_cast<RefBase::weakref_type*>(obj.binder)->decWeak(who);
return;
case BINDER_TYPE_HANDLE: {
const sp<IBinder> b = proc->getStrongProxyForHandle(obj.handle);
if (b != NULL) {
LOG_REFS("Parcel %p releasing reference on remote %p", who, b.get());
b->decStrong(who);
}
return;
}
case BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_HANDLE: {
const wp<IBinder> b = proc->getWeakProxyForHandle(obj.handle);
if (b != NULL) b.get_refs()->decWeak(who);
return;
}
case BINDER_TYPE_FD: {
if (obj.cookie != 0) { // owned
if (outAshmemSize != NULL) {
struct stat st;
int ret = fstat(obj.handle, &st);
if (!ret && S_ISCHR(st.st_mode) && (st.st_rdev == ashmem_rdev())) {
int size = ashmem_get_size_region(obj.handle);
if (size > 0) {
*outAshmemSize -= size;
}
}
}
close(obj.handle);
}
return;
}
}
ALOGE("Invalid object type 0x%08x", obj.type);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: logerror(Image *image, const char *a1, const char *a2, const char *a3)
{
fflush(stdout);
if (image->image.warning_or_error)
fprintf(stderr, "%s%s%s: %s\n", a1, a2, a3, image->image.message);
else
fprintf(stderr, "%s%s%s\n", a1, a2, a3);
if (image->image.opaque != NULL)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: image opaque pointer non-NULL on error\n",
image->file_name);
png_image_free(&image->image);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: INT_PTR CALLBACK SelectionDynCallback(HWND hwndDlg, UINT message, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
{
int r = -1;
switch (message) {
case WM_INITDIALOG:
return (INT_PTR)TRUE;
case WM_COMMAND:
switch (LOWORD(wParam)) {
case IDOK:
r = 0;
case IDCANCEL:
EndDialog(hwndDlg, r);
return (INT_PTR)TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
CWE ID: CWE-494
| 0
| 62,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AwContents::IsVisible(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) {
return browser_view_renderer_.IsClientVisible();
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t cr2,
bool write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable,
int emulation_type)
{
gpa_t gpa = cr2;
pfn_t pfn;
if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_NO_REEXECUTE)
return false;
if (!vcpu->arch.mmu.direct_map) {
/*
* Write permission should be allowed since only
* write access need to be emulated.
*/
gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(vcpu, cr2, NULL);
/*
* If the mapping is invalid in guest, let cpu retry
* it to generate fault.
*/
if (gpa == UNMAPPED_GVA)
return true;
}
/*
* Do not retry the unhandleable instruction if it faults on the
* readonly host memory, otherwise it will goto a infinite loop:
* retry instruction -> write #PF -> emulation fail -> retry
* instruction -> ...
*/
pfn = gfn_to_pfn(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
/*
* If the instruction failed on the error pfn, it can not be fixed,
* report the error to userspace.
*/
if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn))
return false;
kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
/* The instructions are well-emulated on direct mmu. */
if (vcpu->arch.mmu.direct_map) {
unsigned int indirect_shadow_pages;
spin_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
indirect_shadow_pages = vcpu->kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages;
spin_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
if (indirect_shadow_pages)
kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
return true;
}
/*
* if emulation was due to access to shadowed page table
* and it failed try to unshadow page and re-enter the
* guest to let CPU execute the instruction.
*/
kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
/*
* If the access faults on its page table, it can not
* be fixed by unprotecting shadow page and it should
* be reported to userspace.
*/
return !write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,920
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DiceResponseHandlerFactory()
: BrowserContextKeyedServiceFactory(
"DiceResponseHandler",
BrowserContextDependencyManager::GetInstance()) {
DependsOn(AboutSigninInternalsFactory::GetInstance());
DependsOn(AccountReconcilorFactory::GetInstance());
DependsOn(AccountTrackerServiceFactory::GetInstance());
DependsOn(ChromeSigninClientFactory::GetInstance());
DependsOn(ProfileOAuth2TokenServiceFactory::GetInstance());
DependsOn(SigninManagerFactory::GetInstance());
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetPreferencesFromJson(Profile* profile, const std::string& json) {
base::DictionaryValue* dict = nullptr;
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> parsed = base::JSONReader::Read(json);
if (!parsed || !parsed->GetAsDictionary(&dict))
return;
DictionaryPrefUpdate update(profile->GetPrefs(), prefs::kDevToolsPreferences);
for (base::DictionaryValue::Iterator it(*dict); !it.IsAtEnd(); it.Advance()) {
if (!it.value().IsType(base::Value::Type::STRING))
continue;
update.Get()->SetWithoutPathExpansion(
it.key(), it.value().CreateDeepCopy());
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 138,433
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Element* ContainerNode::lastElementChild() const
{
Node* n = lastChild();
while (n && !n->isElementNode())
n = n->previousSibling();
return toElement(n);
}
Commit Message: Notify nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event
This patch changes notifying nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event. In willRemoveChildren(), like willRemoveChild(); r115686 did same change, although it didn't change willRemoveChildren().
The issue 295010, use-after-free, is caused by setting removed node to Selection in mutation event handler.
BUG=295010
TEST=LayoutTests/fast/dom/Range/range-created-during-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-mutation-event-by-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-blur-event-by-remove-children.html
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25389004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebURLLoaderImpl::Context::OnReceivedRedirect(
const GURL& new_url,
const ResourceResponseInfo& info,
bool* has_new_first_party_for_cookies,
GURL* new_first_party_for_cookies) {
if (!client_)
return false;
WebURLResponse response;
response.initialize();
PopulateURLResponse(request_.url(), info, &response);
WebURLRequest new_request(new_url);
new_request.setFirstPartyForCookies(request_.firstPartyForCookies());
new_request.setDownloadToFile(request_.downloadToFile());
WebString referrer_string = WebString::fromUTF8("Referer");
WebString referrer = WebSecurityPolicy::generateReferrerHeader(
referrer_policy_,
new_url,
request_.httpHeaderField(referrer_string));
if (!referrer.isEmpty())
new_request.setHTTPHeaderField(referrer_string, referrer);
if (response.httpStatusCode() == 307)
new_request.setHTTPMethod(request_.httpMethod());
client_->willSendRequest(loader_, new_request, response);
request_ = new_request;
*has_new_first_party_for_cookies = true;
*new_first_party_for_cookies = request_.firstPartyForCookies();
if (new_url == GURL(new_request.url()))
return true;
DCHECK(!new_request.url().isValid());
return false;
}
Commit Message: Protect WebURLLoaderImpl::Context while receiving responses.
A client's didReceiveResponse can cancel a request; by protecting the
Context we avoid a use after free in this case.
Interestingly, we really had very good warning about this problem, see
https://codereview.chromium.org/11900002/ back in January.
R=darin
BUG=241139
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15738007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AutofillPopupFooterView* AutofillPopupFooterView::Create(
AutofillPopupViewNativeViews* popup_view,
int line_number,
int frontend_id) {
AutofillPopupFooterView* result =
new AutofillPopupFooterView(popup_view, line_number, frontend_id);
result->Init();
return result;
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 130,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ObjectBackedNativeHandler::Router(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = args.GetIsolate();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> data = args.Data().As<v8::Object>();
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = isolate->GetCurrentContext();
v8::Local<v8::Value> handler_function_value;
v8::Local<v8::Value> feature_name_value;
if (!GetPrivate(context, data, kHandlerFunction, &handler_function_value) ||
handler_function_value->IsUndefined() ||
!GetPrivate(context, data, kFeatureName, &feature_name_value) ||
!feature_name_value->IsString()) {
ScriptContext* script_context =
ScriptContextSet::GetContextByV8Context(context);
console::Error(script_context ? script_context->GetRenderFrame() : nullptr,
"Extension view no longer exists");
return;
}
if (content::WorkerThread::GetCurrentId() == 0) {
ScriptContext* script_context =
ScriptContextSet::GetContextByV8Context(context);
v8::Local<v8::String> feature_name_string =
feature_name_value->ToString(context).ToLocalChecked();
std::string feature_name = *v8::String::Utf8Value(feature_name_string);
if (script_context &&
!feature_name.empty() &&
!script_context->GetAvailability(feature_name).is_available()) {
return;
}
}
CHECK(handler_function_value->IsExternal());
static_cast<HandlerFunction*>(
handler_function_value.As<v8::External>()->Value())->Run(args);
v8::ReturnValue<v8::Value> ret = args.GetReturnValue();
v8::Local<v8::Value> ret_value = ret.Get();
if (ret_value->IsObject() && !ret_value->IsNull() &&
!ContextCanAccessObject(context, v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(ret_value),
true)) {
NOTREACHED() << "Insecure return value";
ret.SetUndefined();
}
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 172,251
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InputHandler::setPopupListIndex(int index)
{
if (index == -2) // Abandon
return clearCurrentFocusElement();
if (!isActiveSelectPopup())
return clearCurrentFocusElement();
RenderObject* renderer = m_currentFocusElement->renderer();
if (renderer && renderer->isMenuList()) {
RenderMenuList* renderMenu = toRenderMenuList(renderer);
renderMenu->hidePopup();
}
HTMLSelectElement* selectElement = static_cast<HTMLSelectElement*>(m_currentFocusElement.get());
int optionIndex = selectElement->listToOptionIndex(index);
selectElement->optionSelectedByUser(optionIndex, true /* deselect = true */, true /* fireOnChangeNow = false */);
clearCurrentFocusElement();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,569
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jpc_qcx_putcompparms(jpc_qcxcp_t *compparms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *out)
{
int i;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
jpc_putuint8(out, ((compparms->numguard & 7) << 5) | compparms->qntsty);
for (i = 0; i < compparms->numstepsizes; ++i) {
if (compparms->qntsty == JPC_QCX_NOQNT) {
if (jpc_putuint8(out, JPC_QCX_GETEXPN(
compparms->stepsizes[i]) << 3)) {
return -1;
}
} else {
if (jpc_putuint16(out, compparms->stepsizes[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,884
|
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