instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int restart_read(struct edgeport_port *edge_port)
{
struct urb *urb;
int status = 0;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&edge_port->ep_lock, flags);
if (edge_port->ep_read_urb_state == EDGE_READ_URB_STOPPED) {
urb = edge_port->port->read_urb;
status = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
edge_port->ep_read_urb_state = EDGE_READ_URB_RUNNING;
edge_port->shadow_mcr |= MCR_RTS;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&edge_port->ep_lock, flags);
return status;
}
Commit Message: USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <wfpub@roembden.net>
Cc: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 33,359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vmload_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct vmcb *nested_vmcb;
struct page *page;
if (nested_svm_check_permissions(svm))
return 1;
nested_vmcb = nested_svm_map(svm, svm->vmcb->save.rax, &page);
if (!nested_vmcb)
return 1;
svm->next_rip = kvm_rip_read(&svm->vcpu) + 3;
skip_emulated_instruction(&svm->vcpu);
nested_svm_vmloadsave(nested_vmcb, svm->vmcb);
nested_svm_unmap(page);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 37,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::updatePlayState() {
bool isPlaying = webMediaPlayer() && !webMediaPlayer()->paused();
bool shouldBePlaying = potentiallyPlaying();
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "updatePlayState(" << (void*)this
<< ") - shouldBePlaying = " << boolString(shouldBePlaying)
<< ", isPlaying = " << boolString(isPlaying);
if (shouldBePlaying) {
setDisplayMode(Video);
if (!isPlaying) {
webMediaPlayer()->setRate(playbackRate());
webMediaPlayer()->setVolume(effectiveMediaVolume());
webMediaPlayer()->play();
}
startPlaybackProgressTimer();
m_playing = true;
} else { // Should not be playing right now
if (isPlaying) {
webMediaPlayer()->pause();
}
m_playbackProgressTimer.stop();
m_playing = false;
double time = currentTime();
if (time > m_lastSeekTime)
addPlayedRange(m_lastSeekTime, time);
}
if (layoutObject())
layoutObject()->updateFromElement();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int netif_rx(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct softnet_data *queue;
unsigned long flags;
/* if netpoll wants it, pretend we never saw it */
if (netpoll_rx(skb))
return NET_RX_DROP;
if (!skb->tstamp.tv64)
net_timestamp(skb);
/*
* The code is rearranged so that the path is the most
* short when CPU is congested, but is still operating.
*/
local_irq_save(flags);
queue = &__get_cpu_var(softnet_data);
__get_cpu_var(netdev_rx_stat).total++;
if (queue->input_pkt_queue.qlen <= netdev_max_backlog) {
if (queue->input_pkt_queue.qlen) {
enqueue:
__skb_queue_tail(&queue->input_pkt_queue, skb);
local_irq_restore(flags);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
napi_schedule(&queue->backlog);
goto enqueue;
}
__get_cpu_var(netdev_rx_stat).dropped++;
local_irq_restore(flags);
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_DROP;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_set_oid_output_format)
{
zend_long a1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "l", &a1) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
switch((int) a1) {
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_SUFFIX:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_MODULE:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_FULL:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_NUMERIC:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_UCD:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_NONE:
netsnmp_ds_set_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT, a1);
RETURN_TRUE;
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown SNMP output print format '%d'", (int) a1);
RETURN_FALSE;
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUseProgram(GLuint program) {
GLuint service_id = 0;
ProgramManager::ProgramInfo* info = NULL;
if (program) {
info = GetProgramInfoNotShader(program, "glUseProgram");
if (!info) {
return;
}
if (!info->IsValid()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glUseProgram", "program not linked");
return;
}
service_id = info->service_id();
}
if (current_program_) {
program_manager()->UnuseProgram(shader_manager(), current_program_);
}
current_program_ = info;
glUseProgram(service_id);
if (current_program_) {
program_manager()->UseProgram(current_program_);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 103,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void clear_page_mlock(struct page *page)
{
if (!TestClearPageMlocked(page))
return;
mod_zone_page_state(page_zone(page), NR_MLOCK,
-hpage_nr_pages(page));
count_vm_event(UNEVICTABLE_PGCLEARED);
if (!isolate_lru_page(page)) {
putback_lru_page(page);
} else {
/*
* We lost the race. the page already moved to evictable list.
*/
if (PageUnevictable(page))
count_vm_event(UNEVICTABLE_PGSTRANDED);
}
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 38,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int OutOfProcessInstance::GetDocumentPixelHeight() const {
return static_cast<int>(
ceil(document_size_.height() * zoom_ * device_scale_));
}
Commit Message: Prevent leaking PDF data cross-origin
BUG=520422
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1311973002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#345267}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 129,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: newSubscriber(const char * eventurl, const char * callback, int callbacklen)
{
struct subscriber * tmp;
if(!eventurl || !callback || !callbacklen)
return NULL;
tmp = calloc(1, sizeof(struct subscriber)+callbacklen+1);
if(!tmp)
return NULL;
if(strcmp(eventurl, WANCFG_EVENTURL)==0)
tmp->service = EWanCFG;
else if(strcmp(eventurl, WANIPC_EVENTURL)==0)
tmp->service = EWanIPC;
#ifdef ENABLE_L3F_SERVICE
else if(strcmp(eventurl, L3F_EVENTURL)==0)
tmp->service = EL3F;
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_6FC_SERVICE
else if(strcmp(eventurl, WANIP6FC_EVENTURL)==0)
tmp->service = E6FC;
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_DP_SERVICE
else if(strcmp(eventurl, DP_EVENTURL)==0)
tmp->service = EDP;
#endif
else {
free(tmp);
return NULL;
}
memcpy(tmp->callback, callback, callbacklen);
tmp->callback[callbacklen] = '\0';
#if defined(LIB_UUID)
{
uuid_t uuid;
uuid_generate(uuid);
memcpy(tmp->uuid, "uuid:", 5);
uuid_unparse(uuid, tmp->uuid + 5);
}
#elif defined(BSD_UUID)
{
uuid_t uuid;
uint32_t status;
uuid_create(&uuid, &status);
if(status != uuid_s_ok) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "uuid_create() failed (%u)", status);
} else {
char * uuid_str;
uuid_to_string(&uuid, &uuid_str, &status);
if(status != uuid_s_ok) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "uuid_to_string() failed (%u)", status);
} else {
if(strlen(uuid_str) != 36) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "uuid_to_string() returned %s", uuid_str);
status = (uint32_t)-1;
} else {
memcpy(tmp->uuid, "uuid:", 5);
memcpy(tmp->uuid + 5, uuid_str, 36);
tmp->uuid[sizeof(tmp->uuid)-1] = '\0';
}
free(uuid_str);
}
}
if(status != uuid_s_ok) {
/* make a dummy uuid */
strncpy(tmp->uuid, uuidvalue_igd, sizeof(tmp->uuid));
tmp->uuid[sizeof(tmp->uuid)-1] = '\0';
snprintf(tmp->uuid+sizeof(tmp->uuid)-5, 5, "%04lx", random() & 0xffff);
}
}
#else
/* make a dummy uuid */
strncpy(tmp->uuid, uuidvalue_igd, sizeof(tmp->uuid));
tmp->uuid[sizeof(tmp->uuid)-1] = '\0';
snprintf(tmp->uuid+sizeof(tmp->uuid)-5, 5, "%04lx", random() & 0xffff);
#endif
return tmp;
}
Commit Message: upnp_event_prepare(): check the return value of snprintf()
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 89,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string PlatformFontSkia::GetActualFontNameForTesting() const {
SkString family_name;
typeface_->getFamilyName(&family_name);
return family_name.c_str();
}
Commit Message: Take default system font size from PlatformFont
The default font returned by Skia should take the initial size from the
default value kDefaultBaseFontSize specified in PlatformFont.
R=robliao@chromium.org, asvitkine@chromium.org
CC=benck@google.com
Bug: 944227
Change-Id: I6b230b80c349abbe5968edb3cebdd6e89db4c4a6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1642738
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Etienne Bergeron <etienneb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#666299}
CWE ID: CWE-862
| 0
| 155,348
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int DetectEngineContentInspection(DetectEngineCtx *de_ctx, DetectEngineThreadCtx *det_ctx,
const Signature *s, const SigMatchData *smd,
Flow *f,
uint8_t *buffer, uint32_t buffer_len,
uint32_t stream_start_offset,
uint8_t inspection_mode, void *data)
{
SCEnter();
KEYWORD_PROFILING_START;
det_ctx->inspection_recursion_counter++;
if (det_ctx->inspection_recursion_counter == de_ctx->inspection_recursion_limit) {
det_ctx->discontinue_matching = 1;
KEYWORD_PROFILING_END(det_ctx, smd->type, 0);
SCReturnInt(0);
}
if (smd == NULL || buffer_len == 0) {
KEYWORD_PROFILING_END(det_ctx, smd->type, 0);
SCReturnInt(0);
}
/* \todo unify this which is phase 2 of payload inspection unification */
if (smd->type == DETECT_CONTENT) {
DetectContentData *cd = (DetectContentData *)smd->ctx;
SCLogDebug("inspecting content %"PRIu32" buffer_len %"PRIu32, cd->id, buffer_len);
/* we might have already have this content matched by the mpm.
* (if there is any other reason why we'd want to avoid checking
* it here, please fill it in) */
/* rule parsers should take care of this */
#ifdef DEBUG
BUG_ON(cd->depth != 0 && cd->depth <= cd->offset);
#endif
/* search for our pattern, checking the matches recursively.
* if we match we look for the next SigMatch as well */
uint8_t *found = NULL;
uint32_t offset = 0;
uint32_t depth = buffer_len;
uint32_t prev_offset = 0; /**< used in recursive searching */
uint32_t prev_buffer_offset = det_ctx->buffer_offset;
do {
if ((cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_DISTANCE) ||
(cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_WITHIN)) {
SCLogDebug("det_ctx->buffer_offset %"PRIu32, det_ctx->buffer_offset);
offset = prev_buffer_offset;
depth = buffer_len;
int distance = cd->distance;
if (cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_DISTANCE) {
if (cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_DISTANCE_BE) {
distance = det_ctx->bj_values[cd->distance];
}
if (distance < 0 && (uint32_t)(abs(distance)) > offset)
offset = 0;
else
offset += distance;
SCLogDebug("cd->distance %"PRIi32", offset %"PRIu32", depth %"PRIu32,
distance, offset, depth);
}
if (cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_WITHIN) {
if (cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_WITHIN_BE) {
if ((int32_t)depth > (int32_t)(prev_buffer_offset + det_ctx->bj_values[cd->within] + distance)) {
depth = prev_buffer_offset + det_ctx->bj_values[cd->within] + distance;
}
} else {
if ((int32_t)depth > (int32_t)(prev_buffer_offset + cd->within + distance)) {
depth = prev_buffer_offset + cd->within + distance;
}
SCLogDebug("cd->within %"PRIi32", det_ctx->buffer_offset %"PRIu32", depth %"PRIu32,
cd->within, prev_buffer_offset, depth);
}
if (stream_start_offset != 0 && prev_buffer_offset == 0) {
if (depth <= stream_start_offset) {
goto no_match;
} else if (depth >= (stream_start_offset + buffer_len)) {
;
} else {
depth = depth - stream_start_offset;
}
}
}
if (cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_DEPTH_BE) {
if ((det_ctx->bj_values[cd->depth] + prev_buffer_offset) < depth) {
depth = prev_buffer_offset + det_ctx->bj_values[cd->depth];
}
} else {
if (cd->depth != 0) {
if ((cd->depth + prev_buffer_offset) < depth) {
depth = prev_buffer_offset + cd->depth;
}
SCLogDebug("cd->depth %"PRIu32", depth %"PRIu32, cd->depth, depth);
}
}
if (cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_OFFSET_BE) {
if (det_ctx->bj_values[cd->offset] > offset)
offset = det_ctx->bj_values[cd->offset];
} else {
if (cd->offset > offset) {
offset = cd->offset;
SCLogDebug("setting offset %"PRIu32, offset);
}
}
} else { /* implied no relative matches */
/* set depth */
if (cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_DEPTH_BE) {
depth = det_ctx->bj_values[cd->depth];
} else {
if (cd->depth != 0) {
depth = cd->depth;
}
}
if (stream_start_offset != 0 && cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_DEPTH) {
if (depth <= stream_start_offset) {
goto no_match;
} else if (depth >= (stream_start_offset + buffer_len)) {
;
} else {
depth = depth - stream_start_offset;
}
}
/* set offset */
if (cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_OFFSET_BE)
offset = det_ctx->bj_values[cd->offset];
else
offset = cd->offset;
prev_buffer_offset = 0;
}
/* update offset with prev_offset if we're searching for
* matches after the first occurence. */
SCLogDebug("offset %"PRIu32", prev_offset %"PRIu32, offset, prev_offset);
if (prev_offset != 0)
offset = prev_offset;
SCLogDebug("offset %"PRIu32", depth %"PRIu32, offset, depth);
if (depth > buffer_len)
depth = buffer_len;
/* if offset is bigger than depth we can never match on a pattern.
* We can however, "match" on a negated pattern. */
if (offset > depth || depth == 0) {
if (cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_NEGATED) {
goto match;
} else {
goto no_match;
}
}
uint8_t *sbuffer = buffer + offset;
uint32_t sbuffer_len = depth - offset;
uint32_t match_offset = 0;
SCLogDebug("sbuffer_len %"PRIu32, sbuffer_len);
#ifdef DEBUG
BUG_ON(sbuffer_len > buffer_len);
#endif
/* \todo Add another optimization here. If cd->content_len is
* greater than sbuffer_len found is anyways NULL */
/* do the actual search */
found = SpmScan(cd->spm_ctx, det_ctx->spm_thread_ctx, sbuffer,
sbuffer_len);
/* next we evaluate the result in combination with the
* negation flag. */
SCLogDebug("found %p cd negated %s", found, cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_NEGATED ? "true" : "false");
if (found == NULL && !(cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_NEGATED)) {
goto no_match;
} else if (found == NULL && (cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_NEGATED)) {
goto match;
} else if (found != NULL && (cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_NEGATED)) {
SCLogDebug("content %"PRIu32" matched at offset %"PRIu32", but negated so no match", cd->id, match_offset);
/* don't bother carrying recursive matches now, for preceding
* relative keywords */
if (DETECT_CONTENT_IS_SINGLE(cd))
det_ctx->discontinue_matching = 1;
goto no_match;
} else {
match_offset = (uint32_t)((found - buffer) + cd->content_len);
SCLogDebug("content %"PRIu32" matched at offset %"PRIu32"", cd->id, match_offset);
det_ctx->buffer_offset = match_offset;
/* Match branch, add replace to the list if needed */
if (cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_REPLACE) {
if (inspection_mode == DETECT_ENGINE_CONTENT_INSPECTION_MODE_PAYLOAD) {
/* we will need to replace content if match is confirmed */
det_ctx->replist = DetectReplaceAddToList(det_ctx->replist, found, cd);
} else {
SCLogWarning(SC_ERR_INVALID_VALUE, "Can't modify payload without packet");
}
}
if (!(cd->flags & DETECT_CONTENT_RELATIVE_NEXT)) {
SCLogDebug("no relative match coming up, so this is a match");
goto match;
}
/* bail out if we have no next match. Technically this is an
* error, as the current cd has the DETECT_CONTENT_RELATIVE_NEXT
* flag set. */
if (smd->is_last) {
goto no_match;
}
SCLogDebug("content %"PRIu32, cd->id);
KEYWORD_PROFILING_END(det_ctx, smd->type, 1);
/* see if the next buffer keywords match. If not, we will
* search for another occurence of this content and see
* if the others match then until we run out of matches */
int r = DetectEngineContentInspection(de_ctx, det_ctx, s, smd+1,
f, buffer, buffer_len, stream_start_offset, inspection_mode, data);
if (r == 1) {
SCReturnInt(1);
}
if (det_ctx->discontinue_matching)
goto no_match;
/* set the previous match offset to the start of this match + 1 */
prev_offset = (match_offset - (cd->content_len - 1));
SCLogDebug("trying to see if there is another match after prev_offset %"PRIu32, prev_offset);
}
} while(1);
} else if (smd->type == DETECT_ISDATAAT) {
SCLogDebug("inspecting isdataat");
DetectIsdataatData *id = (DetectIsdataatData *)smd->ctx;
if (id->flags & ISDATAAT_RELATIVE) {
if (det_ctx->buffer_offset + id->dataat > buffer_len) {
SCLogDebug("det_ctx->buffer_offset + id->dataat %"PRIu32" > %"PRIu32, det_ctx->buffer_offset + id->dataat, buffer_len);
if (id->flags & ISDATAAT_NEGATED)
goto match;
goto no_match;
} else {
SCLogDebug("relative isdataat match");
if (id->flags & ISDATAAT_NEGATED)
goto no_match;
goto match;
}
} else {
if (id->dataat < buffer_len) {
SCLogDebug("absolute isdataat match");
if (id->flags & ISDATAAT_NEGATED)
goto no_match;
goto match;
} else {
SCLogDebug("absolute isdataat mismatch, id->isdataat %"PRIu32", buffer_len %"PRIu32"", id->dataat, buffer_len);
if (id->flags & ISDATAAT_NEGATED)
goto match;
goto no_match;
}
}
} else if (smd->type == DETECT_PCRE) {
SCLogDebug("inspecting pcre");
DetectPcreData *pe = (DetectPcreData *)smd->ctx;
uint32_t prev_buffer_offset = det_ctx->buffer_offset;
uint32_t prev_offset = 0;
int r = 0;
det_ctx->pcre_match_start_offset = 0;
do {
Packet *p = NULL;
if (inspection_mode == DETECT_ENGINE_CONTENT_INSPECTION_MODE_PAYLOAD)
p = (Packet *)data;
r = DetectPcrePayloadMatch(det_ctx, s, smd, p, f,
buffer, buffer_len);
if (r == 0) {
goto no_match;
}
if (!(pe->flags & DETECT_PCRE_RELATIVE_NEXT)) {
SCLogDebug("no relative match coming up, so this is a match");
goto match;
}
KEYWORD_PROFILING_END(det_ctx, smd->type, 1);
/* save it, in case we need to do a pcre match once again */
prev_offset = det_ctx->pcre_match_start_offset;
/* see if the next payload keywords match. If not, we will
* search for another occurence of this pcre and see
* if the others match, until we run out of matches */
r = DetectEngineContentInspection(de_ctx, det_ctx, s, smd+1,
f, buffer, buffer_len, stream_start_offset, inspection_mode, data);
if (r == 1) {
SCReturnInt(1);
}
if (det_ctx->discontinue_matching)
goto no_match;
det_ctx->buffer_offset = prev_buffer_offset;
det_ctx->pcre_match_start_offset = prev_offset;
} while (1);
} else if (smd->type == DETECT_BYTETEST) {
DetectBytetestData *btd = (DetectBytetestData *)smd->ctx;
uint8_t flags = btd->flags;
int32_t offset = btd->offset;
uint64_t value = btd->value;
if (flags & DETECT_BYTETEST_OFFSET_BE) {
offset = det_ctx->bj_values[offset];
}
if (flags & DETECT_BYTETEST_VALUE_BE) {
value = det_ctx->bj_values[value];
}
/* if we have dce enabled we will have to use the endianness
* specified by the dce header */
if (flags & DETECT_BYTETEST_DCE && data != NULL) {
DCERPCState *dcerpc_state = (DCERPCState *)data;
/* enable the endianness flag temporarily. once we are done
* processing we reset the flags to the original value*/
flags |= ((dcerpc_state->dcerpc.dcerpchdr.packed_drep[0] & 0x10) ?
DETECT_BYTETEST_LITTLE: 0);
}
if (DetectBytetestDoMatch(det_ctx, s, smd->ctx, buffer, buffer_len, flags,
offset, value) != 1) {
goto no_match;
}
goto match;
} else if (smd->type == DETECT_BYTEJUMP) {
DetectBytejumpData *bjd = (DetectBytejumpData *)smd->ctx;
uint8_t flags = bjd->flags;
int32_t offset = bjd->offset;
if (flags & DETECT_BYTEJUMP_OFFSET_BE) {
offset = det_ctx->bj_values[offset];
}
/* if we have dce enabled we will have to use the endianness
* specified by the dce header */
if (flags & DETECT_BYTEJUMP_DCE && data != NULL) {
DCERPCState *dcerpc_state = (DCERPCState *)data;
/* enable the endianness flag temporarily. once we are done
* processing we reset the flags to the original value*/
flags |= ((dcerpc_state->dcerpc.dcerpchdr.packed_drep[0] & 0x10) ?
DETECT_BYTEJUMP_LITTLE: 0);
}
if (DetectBytejumpDoMatch(det_ctx, s, smd->ctx, buffer, buffer_len,
flags, offset) != 1) {
goto no_match;
}
goto match;
} else if (smd->type == DETECT_BYTE_EXTRACT) {
DetectByteExtractData *bed = (DetectByteExtractData *)smd->ctx;
uint8_t endian = bed->endian;
/* if we have dce enabled we will have to use the endianness
* specified by the dce header */
if ((bed->flags & DETECT_BYTE_EXTRACT_FLAG_ENDIAN) &&
endian == DETECT_BYTE_EXTRACT_ENDIAN_DCE && data != NULL) {
DCERPCState *dcerpc_state = (DCERPCState *)data;
/* enable the endianness flag temporarily. once we are done
* processing we reset the flags to the original value*/
endian |= ((dcerpc_state->dcerpc.dcerpchdr.packed_drep[0] == 0x10) ?
DETECT_BYTE_EXTRACT_ENDIAN_LITTLE : DETECT_BYTE_EXTRACT_ENDIAN_BIG);
}
if (DetectByteExtractDoMatch(det_ctx, smd, s, buffer,
buffer_len,
&det_ctx->bj_values[bed->local_id],
endian) != 1) {
goto no_match;
}
goto match;
/* we should never get here, but bail out just in case */
} else if (smd->type == DETECT_AL_URILEN) {
SCLogDebug("inspecting uri len");
int r = 0;
DetectUrilenData *urilend = (DetectUrilenData *) smd->ctx;
switch (urilend->mode) {
case DETECT_URILEN_EQ:
if (buffer_len == urilend->urilen1)
r = 1;
break;
case DETECT_URILEN_LT:
if (buffer_len < urilend->urilen1)
r = 1;
break;
case DETECT_URILEN_GT:
if (buffer_len > urilend->urilen1)
r = 1;
break;
case DETECT_URILEN_RA:
if (buffer_len > urilend->urilen1 &&
buffer_len < urilend->urilen2) {
r = 1;
}
break;
}
if (r == 1) {
goto match;
}
det_ctx->discontinue_matching = 0;
goto no_match;
#ifdef HAVE_LUA
}
else if (smd->type == DETECT_LUA) {
SCLogDebug("lua starting");
if (DetectLuaMatchBuffer(det_ctx, s, smd, buffer, buffer_len,
det_ctx->buffer_offset, f) != 1)
{
SCLogDebug("lua no_match");
goto no_match;
}
SCLogDebug("lua match");
goto match;
#endif /* HAVE_LUA */
} else if (smd->type == DETECT_BASE64_DECODE) {
if (DetectBase64DecodeDoMatch(det_ctx, s, smd, buffer, buffer_len)) {
if (s->sm_arrays[DETECT_SM_LIST_BASE64_DATA] != NULL) {
KEYWORD_PROFILING_END(det_ctx, smd->type, 1);
if (DetectBase64DataDoMatch(de_ctx, det_ctx, s, f)) {
/* Base64 is a terminal list. */
goto final_match;
}
}
}
} else {
SCLogDebug("sm->type %u", smd->type);
#ifdef DEBUG
BUG_ON(1);
#endif
}
no_match:
KEYWORD_PROFILING_END(det_ctx, smd->type, 0);
SCReturnInt(0);
match:
/* this sigmatch matched, inspect the next one. If it was the last,
* the buffer portion of the signature matched. */
if (!smd->is_last) {
KEYWORD_PROFILING_END(det_ctx, smd->type, 1);
int r = DetectEngineContentInspection(de_ctx, det_ctx, s, smd+1,
f, buffer, buffer_len, stream_start_offset, inspection_mode, data);
SCReturnInt(r);
}
final_match:
KEYWORD_PROFILING_END(det_ctx, smd->type, 1);
SCReturnInt(1);
}
Commit Message: detect: avoid needless recursive scanning
Don't recursively inspect a detect list if the recursion
doesn't increase chance of success.
CWE ID:
| 1
| 167,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void gen_boot_verifier(nfs4_verifier *verifier, struct net *net)
{
__be32 verf[2];
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
/*
* This is opaque to client, so no need to byte-swap. Use
* __force to keep sparse happy
*/
verf[0] = (__force __be32)nn->nfssvc_boot.tv_sec;
verf[1] = (__force __be32)nn->nfssvc_boot.tv_usec;
memcpy(verifier->data, verf, sizeof(verifier->data));
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,308
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API void r_bin_java_annotation_free(void /*RBinJavaAnnotation*/ *a) {
RBinJavaAnnotation *annotation = a;
if (annotation) {
r_list_free (annotation->element_value_pairs);
free (annotation);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #10498 - Crash in fuzzed java file
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 79,675
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bc_svc_process(struct svc_serv *serv, struct rpc_rqst *req,
struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0];
struct rpc_task *task;
int proc_error;
int error;
dprintk("svc: %s(%p)\n", __func__, req);
/* Build the svc_rqst used by the common processing routine */
rqstp->rq_xprt = serv->sv_bc_xprt;
rqstp->rq_xid = req->rq_xid;
rqstp->rq_prot = req->rq_xprt->prot;
rqstp->rq_server = serv;
rqstp->rq_addrlen = sizeof(req->rq_xprt->addr);
memcpy(&rqstp->rq_addr, &req->rq_xprt->addr, rqstp->rq_addrlen);
memcpy(&rqstp->rq_arg, &req->rq_rcv_buf, sizeof(rqstp->rq_arg));
memcpy(&rqstp->rq_res, &req->rq_snd_buf, sizeof(rqstp->rq_res));
/* Adjust the argument buffer length */
rqstp->rq_arg.len = req->rq_private_buf.len;
if (rqstp->rq_arg.len <= rqstp->rq_arg.head[0].iov_len) {
rqstp->rq_arg.head[0].iov_len = rqstp->rq_arg.len;
rqstp->rq_arg.page_len = 0;
} else if (rqstp->rq_arg.len <= rqstp->rq_arg.head[0].iov_len +
rqstp->rq_arg.page_len)
rqstp->rq_arg.page_len = rqstp->rq_arg.len -
rqstp->rq_arg.head[0].iov_len;
else
rqstp->rq_arg.len = rqstp->rq_arg.head[0].iov_len +
rqstp->rq_arg.page_len;
/* reset result send buffer "put" position */
resv->iov_len = 0;
/*
* Skip the next two words because they've already been
* processed in the transport
*/
svc_getu32(argv); /* XID */
svc_getnl(argv); /* CALLDIR */
/* Parse and execute the bc call */
proc_error = svc_process_common(rqstp, argv, resv);
atomic_inc(&req->rq_xprt->bc_free_slots);
if (!proc_error) {
/* Processing error: drop the request */
xprt_free_bc_request(req);
return 0;
}
/* Finally, send the reply synchronously */
memcpy(&req->rq_snd_buf, &rqstp->rq_res, sizeof(req->rq_snd_buf));
task = rpc_run_bc_task(req);
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
error = PTR_ERR(task);
goto out;
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&task->tk_count) != 1);
error = task->tk_status;
rpc_put_task(task);
out:
dprintk("svc: %s(), error=%d\n", __func__, error);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __svc_clean_idle(fd_set *fds, int timeout, bool_t cleanblock)
{
int i, ncleaned;
SVCXPRT *xprt, *least_active;
struct timeval tv, tdiff, tmax;
struct cf_conn *cd;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
tmax.tv_sec = tmax.tv_usec = 0;
least_active = NULL;
rwlock_wrlock(&svc_fd_lock);
for (i = ncleaned = 0; i <= svc_maxfd; i++) {
if (FD_ISSET(i, fds)) {
xprt = __svc_xports[i];
if (xprt == NULL || xprt->xp_ops == NULL ||
xprt->xp_ops->xp_recv != svc_vc_recv)
continue;
cd = (struct cf_conn *)xprt->xp_p1;
if (!cleanblock && !cd->nonblock)
continue;
if (timeout == 0) {
timersub(&tv, &cd->last_recv_time, &tdiff);
if (timercmp(&tdiff, &tmax, >)) {
tmax = tdiff;
least_active = xprt;
}
continue;
}
if (tv.tv_sec - cd->last_recv_time.tv_sec > timeout) {
__xprt_unregister_unlocked(xprt);
__svc_vc_dodestroy(xprt);
ncleaned++;
}
}
}
if (timeout == 0 && least_active != NULL) {
__xprt_unregister_unlocked(least_active);
__svc_vc_dodestroy(least_active);
ncleaned++;
}
rwlock_unlock(&svc_fd_lock);
return ncleaned > 0 ? TRUE : FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-769
| 0
| 4,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rndis_get_response(USBNetState *s, uint8_t *buf)
{
int ret = 0;
struct rndis_response *r = s->rndis_resp.tqh_first;
if (!r)
return ret;
QTAILQ_REMOVE(&s->rndis_resp, r, entries);
ret = r->length;
memcpy(buf, r->buf, r->length);
g_free(r);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_bit_length(H264Context *h, const uint8_t *buf,
const uint8_t *ptr, int dst_length,
int i, int next_avc)
{
if ((h->workaround_bugs & FF_BUG_AUTODETECT) && i + 3 < next_avc &&
buf[i] == 0x00 && buf[i + 1] == 0x00 &&
buf[i + 2] == 0x01 && buf[i + 3] == 0xE0)
h->workaround_bugs |= FF_BUG_TRUNCATED;
if (!(h->workaround_bugs & FF_BUG_TRUNCATED))
while (dst_length > 0 && ptr[dst_length - 1] == 0)
dst_length--;
if (!dst_length)
return 0;
return 8 * dst_length - decode_rbsp_trailing(h, ptr + dst_length - 1);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: Clear delayed_pic on deallocation
Fixes use of freed memory
Fixes: case5_av_frame_copy_props.mp4
Found-by: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@coredump.cx>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 43,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: circle_box(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
BOX *box;
double delta;
box = (BOX *) palloc(sizeof(BOX));
delta = circle->radius / sqrt(2.0);
box->high.x = circle->center.x + delta;
box->low.x = circle->center.x - delta;
box->high.y = circle->center.y + delta;
box->low.y = circle->center.y - delta;
PG_RETURN_BOX_P(box);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int udp_ehashfn(struct net *net, const __be32 laddr,
const __u16 lport, const __be32 faddr,
const __be16 fport)
{
static u32 udp_ehash_secret __read_mostly;
net_get_random_once(&udp_ehash_secret, sizeof(udp_ehash_secret));
return __inet_ehashfn(laddr, lport, faddr, fport,
udp_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 40,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t chars_in_buffer(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
ssize_t n = 0;
if (!ldata->icanon)
n = read_cnt(ldata);
else
n = ldata->canon_head - ldata->read_tail;
return n;
}
Commit Message: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 39,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vhost_scsi_port_link(struct se_portal_group *se_tpg,
struct se_lun *lun)
{
struct vhost_scsi_tpg *tpg = container_of(se_tpg,
struct vhost_scsi_tpg, se_tpg);
mutex_lock(&vhost_scsi_mutex);
mutex_lock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
tpg->tv_tpg_port_count++;
mutex_unlock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
vhost_scsi_hotplug(tpg, lun);
mutex_unlock(&vhost_scsi_mutex);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodeTaskLegacy(
std::unique_ptr<JobRecord> job_record) {
DCHECK(encoder_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!job_record->output_shm.MapAt(job_record->output_offset,
job_record->output_shm.size())) {
VPLOGF(1) << "could not map I420 bitstream_buffer";
NotifyError(job_record->task_id, PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
if (job_record->exif_shm &&
!job_record->exif_shm->MapAt(job_record->exif_offset,
job_record->exif_shm->size())) {
VPLOGF(1) << "could not map exif bitstream_buffer";
NotifyError(job_record->task_id, PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
gfx::Size coded_size = job_record->input_frame->coded_size();
if (latest_input_buffer_coded_size_legacy_ != coded_size ||
latest_quality_legacy_ != job_record->quality) {
std::unique_ptr<EncodedInstance> encoded_device(new EncodedInstance(this));
VLOGF(1) << "Open Device for quality " << job_record->quality
<< ", width: " << coded_size.width()
<< ", height: " << coded_size.height();
if (!encoded_device->Initialize()) {
VLOGF(1) << "Failed to initialize device";
NotifyError(job_record->task_id, PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
if (!encoded_device->SetUpJpegParameters(job_record->quality, coded_size)) {
VLOGF(1) << "SetUpJpegParameters failed";
NotifyError(job_record->task_id, PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
if (!encoded_device->CreateBuffers(coded_size,
job_record->output_shm.size())) {
VLOGF(1) << "Create buffers failed.";
NotifyError(job_record->task_id, PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
latest_input_buffer_coded_size_legacy_ = coded_size;
latest_quality_legacy_ = job_record->quality;
encoded_instances_.push(std::move(encoded_device));
}
encoded_instances_.back()->input_job_queue_.push(std::move(job_record));
ServiceDeviceTaskLegacy();
}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,024
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::OnWindowClosing() {
if (!ShouldCloseWindow())
return;
bool should_quit_if_last_browser =
browser_shutdown::IsTryingToQuit() || !browser::WillKeepAlive();
if (should_quit_if_last_browser && BrowserList::size() == 1)
browser_shutdown::OnShutdownStarting(browser_shutdown::WINDOW_CLOSE);
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile());
if (session_service)
session_service->WindowClosing(session_id());
TabRestoreService* tab_restore_service =
TabRestoreServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile());
#if defined(USE_AURA)
if (tab_restore_service && is_app())
tab_restore_service->BrowserClosing(tab_restore_service_delegate());
#endif
if (tab_restore_service && is_type_tabbed() && tab_count())
tab_restore_service->BrowserClosing(tab_restore_service_delegate());
content::NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_CLOSING,
content::Source<Browser>(this),
content::NotificationService::NoDetails());
chrome::CloseAllTabs(this);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name);
/* setup the channel layer */
/* XXX - streamlocal? */
if (no_port_forwarding_flag ||
(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0)
channel_disable_adm_local_opens();
else
channel_permit_all_opens();
auth_debug_send();
if (compat20)
do_authenticated2(authctxt);
else
do_authenticated1(authctxt);
do_cleanup(authctxt);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ext4_write_inode(struct inode *inode, int wait)
{
int err;
if (current->flags & PF_MEMALLOC)
return 0;
if (EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal) {
if (ext4_journal_current_handle()) {
jbd_debug(1, "called recursively, non-PF_MEMALLOC!\n");
dump_stack();
return -EIO;
}
if (!wait)
return 0;
err = ext4_force_commit(inode->i_sb);
} else {
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
err = ext4_get_inode_loc(inode, &iloc);
if (err)
return err;
if (wait)
sync_dirty_buffer(iloc.bh);
if (buffer_req(iloc.bh) && !buffer_uptodate(iloc.bh)) {
ext4_error(inode->i_sb, "IO error syncing inode, "
"inode=%lu, block=%llu", inode->i_ino,
(unsigned long long)iloc.bh->b_blocknr);
err = -EIO;
}
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,545
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void prime_debug_regs(struct debug_reg *debug)
{
/*
* We could have inherited MSR_DE from userspace, since
* it doesn't get cleared on exception entry. Make sure
* MSR_DE is clear before we enable any debug events.
*/
mtmsr(mfmsr() & ~MSR_DE);
mtspr(SPRN_IAC1, debug->iac1);
mtspr(SPRN_IAC2, debug->iac2);
#if CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_IACS > 2
mtspr(SPRN_IAC3, debug->iac3);
mtspr(SPRN_IAC4, debug->iac4);
#endif
mtspr(SPRN_DAC1, debug->dac1);
mtspr(SPRN_DAC2, debug->dac2);
#if CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DVCS > 0
mtspr(SPRN_DVC1, debug->dvc1);
mtspr(SPRN_DVC2, debug->dvc2);
#endif
mtspr(SPRN_DBCR0, debug->dbcr0);
mtspr(SPRN_DBCR1, debug->dbcr1);
#ifdef CONFIG_BOOKE
mtspr(SPRN_DBCR2, debug->dbcr2);
#endif
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zisofs_extract_init(struct archive_write *a, struct zisofs_extract *zisofs,
const unsigned char *p, size_t bytes)
{
size_t avail = bytes;
size_t _ceil, xsize;
/* Allocate block pointers buffer. */
_ceil = (size_t)((zisofs->pz_uncompressed_size +
(((int64_t)1) << zisofs->pz_log2_bs) - 1)
>> zisofs->pz_log2_bs);
xsize = (_ceil + 1) * 4;
if (zisofs->block_pointers == NULL) {
size_t alloc = ((xsize >> 10) + 1) << 10;
zisofs->block_pointers = malloc(alloc);
if (zisofs->block_pointers == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"No memory for zisofs decompression");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
}
zisofs->block_pointers_size = xsize;
/* Allocate uncompressed data buffer. */
zisofs->uncompressed_buffer_size = (size_t)1UL << zisofs->pz_log2_bs;
/*
* Read the file header, and check the magic code of zisofs.
*/
if (!zisofs->header_passed) {
int err = 0;
if (avail < 16) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Illegal zisofs file body");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (memcmp(p, zisofs_magic, sizeof(zisofs_magic)) != 0)
err = 1;
else if (archive_le32dec(p + 8) != zisofs->pz_uncompressed_size)
err = 1;
else if (p[12] != 4 || p[13] != zisofs->pz_log2_bs)
err = 1;
if (err) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Illegal zisofs file body");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
avail -= 16;
p += 16;
zisofs->header_passed = 1;
}
/*
* Read block pointers.
*/
if (zisofs->header_passed &&
zisofs->block_pointers_avail < zisofs->block_pointers_size) {
xsize = zisofs->block_pointers_size
- zisofs->block_pointers_avail;
if (avail < xsize)
xsize = avail;
memcpy(zisofs->block_pointers
+ zisofs->block_pointers_avail, p, xsize);
zisofs->block_pointers_avail += xsize;
avail -= xsize;
if (zisofs->block_pointers_avail
== zisofs->block_pointers_size) {
/* We've got all block pointers and initialize
* related variables. */
zisofs->block_off = 0;
zisofs->block_avail = 0;
/* Complete a initialization */
zisofs->initialized = 1;
}
}
return ((ssize_t)avail);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 50,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sha224_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *hash)
{
u8 D[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
sha256_final(desc, D);
memcpy(hash, D, SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE);
memzero_explicit(D, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static CURLcode create_conn_helper_init_proxy(struct connectdata *conn)
{
char *proxy = NULL;
char *socksproxy = NULL;
char *no_proxy = NULL;
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
/*************************************************************
* Extract the user and password from the authentication string
*************************************************************/
if(conn->bits.proxy_user_passwd) {
result = parse_proxy_auth(data, conn);
if(result)
goto out;
}
/*************************************************************
* Detect what (if any) proxy to use
*************************************************************/
if(data->set.str[STRING_PROXY]) {
proxy = strdup(data->set.str[STRING_PROXY]);
/* if global proxy is set, this is it */
if(NULL == proxy) {
failf(data, "memory shortage");
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
}
if(data->set.str[STRING_PRE_PROXY]) {
socksproxy = strdup(data->set.str[STRING_PRE_PROXY]);
/* if global socks proxy is set, this is it */
if(NULL == socksproxy) {
failf(data, "memory shortage");
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
}
if(!data->set.str[STRING_NOPROXY]) {
const char *p = "no_proxy";
no_proxy = curl_getenv(p);
if(!no_proxy) {
p = "NO_PROXY";
no_proxy = curl_getenv(p);
}
if(no_proxy) {
infof(conn->data, "Uses proxy env variable %s == '%s'\n", p, no_proxy);
}
}
if(check_noproxy(conn->host.name, data->set.str[STRING_NOPROXY] ?
data->set.str[STRING_NOPROXY] : no_proxy)) {
Curl_safefree(proxy);
Curl_safefree(socksproxy);
}
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP
else if(!proxy && !socksproxy)
/* if the host is not in the noproxy list, detect proxy. */
proxy = detect_proxy(conn);
#endif /* CURL_DISABLE_HTTP */
Curl_safefree(no_proxy);
#ifdef USE_UNIX_SOCKETS
/* For the time being do not mix proxy and unix domain sockets. See #1274 */
if(proxy && conn->unix_domain_socket) {
free(proxy);
proxy = NULL;
}
#endif
if(proxy && (!*proxy || (conn->handler->flags & PROTOPT_NONETWORK))) {
free(proxy); /* Don't bother with an empty proxy string or if the
protocol doesn't work with network */
proxy = NULL;
}
if(socksproxy && (!*socksproxy ||
(conn->handler->flags & PROTOPT_NONETWORK))) {
free(socksproxy); /* Don't bother with an empty socks proxy string or if
the protocol doesn't work with network */
socksproxy = NULL;
}
/***********************************************************************
* If this is supposed to use a proxy, we need to figure out the proxy host
* name, proxy type and port number, so that we can re-use an existing
* connection that may exist registered to the same proxy host.
***********************************************************************/
if(proxy || socksproxy) {
if(proxy) {
result = parse_proxy(data, conn, proxy, conn->http_proxy.proxytype);
Curl_safefree(proxy); /* parse_proxy copies the proxy string */
if(result)
goto out;
}
if(socksproxy) {
result = parse_proxy(data, conn, socksproxy,
conn->socks_proxy.proxytype);
/* parse_proxy copies the socks proxy string */
Curl_safefree(socksproxy);
if(result)
goto out;
}
if(conn->http_proxy.host.rawalloc) {
#ifdef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP
/* asking for a HTTP proxy is a bit funny when HTTP is disabled... */
result = CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
goto out;
#else
/* force this connection's protocol to become HTTP if compatible */
if(!(conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP)) {
if((conn->handler->flags & PROTOPT_PROXY_AS_HTTP) &&
!conn->bits.tunnel_proxy)
conn->handler = &Curl_handler_http;
else
/* if not converting to HTTP over the proxy, enforce tunneling */
conn->bits.tunnel_proxy = TRUE;
}
conn->bits.httpproxy = TRUE;
#endif
}
else {
conn->bits.httpproxy = FALSE; /* not a HTTP proxy */
conn->bits.tunnel_proxy = FALSE; /* no tunneling if not HTTP */
}
if(conn->socks_proxy.host.rawalloc) {
if(!conn->http_proxy.host.rawalloc) {
/* once a socks proxy */
if(!conn->socks_proxy.user) {
conn->socks_proxy.user = conn->http_proxy.user;
conn->http_proxy.user = NULL;
Curl_safefree(conn->socks_proxy.passwd);
conn->socks_proxy.passwd = conn->http_proxy.passwd;
conn->http_proxy.passwd = NULL;
}
}
conn->bits.socksproxy = TRUE;
}
else
conn->bits.socksproxy = FALSE; /* not a socks proxy */
}
else {
conn->bits.socksproxy = FALSE;
conn->bits.httpproxy = FALSE;
}
conn->bits.proxy = conn->bits.httpproxy || conn->bits.socksproxy;
if(!conn->bits.proxy) {
/* we aren't using the proxy after all... */
conn->bits.proxy = FALSE;
conn->bits.httpproxy = FALSE;
conn->bits.socksproxy = FALSE;
conn->bits.proxy_user_passwd = FALSE;
conn->bits.tunnel_proxy = FALSE;
}
out:
free(socksproxy);
free(proxy);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 77,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Read(net::URLRequest* request,
int* bytes_read) {
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(request);
DCHECK(!info->is_paused());
net::IOBuffer* buf;
int buf_size;
if (!info->resource_handler()->OnWillRead(info->GetRequestID(),
&buf, &buf_size, -1)) {
return false;
}
DCHECK(buf);
DCHECK(buf_size > 0);
info->set_has_started_reading(true);
return request->Read(buf, buf_size, bytes_read);
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __be32 check_backchannel_attrs(struct nfsd4_channel_attrs *ca)
{
ca->headerpadsz = 0;
if (ca->maxreq_sz < NFSD_CB_MAX_REQ_SZ)
return nfserr_toosmall;
if (ca->maxresp_sz < NFSD_CB_MAX_RESP_SZ)
return nfserr_toosmall;
ca->maxresp_cached = 0;
if (ca->maxops < 2)
return nfserr_toosmall;
return nfs_ok;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,415
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __sys_getsockopt(int fd, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
int err, fput_needed;
struct socket *sock;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (sock != NULL) {
err = security_socket_getsockopt(sock, level, optname);
if (err)
goto out_put;
if (level == SOL_SOCKET)
err =
sock_getsockopt(sock, level, optname, optval,
optlen);
else
err =
sock->ops->getsockopt(sock, level, optname, optval,
optlen);
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 82,239
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void brcmf_configure_wowl(struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg,
struct brcmf_if *ifp,
struct cfg80211_wowlan *wowl)
{
u32 wowl_config;
u32 i;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Suspend, wowl config.\n");
if (!brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_WOWL_ARP_ND))
brcmf_configure_arp_nd_offload(ifp, false);
brcmf_fil_cmd_int_get(ifp, BRCMF_C_GET_PM, &cfg->wowl.pre_pmmode);
brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_PM, PM_MAX);
wowl_config = 0;
if (wowl->disconnect)
wowl_config = BRCMF_WOWL_DIS | BRCMF_WOWL_BCN | BRCMF_WOWL_RETR;
if (wowl->magic_pkt)
wowl_config |= BRCMF_WOWL_MAGIC;
if ((wowl->patterns) && (wowl->n_patterns)) {
wowl_config |= BRCMF_WOWL_NET;
for (i = 0; i < wowl->n_patterns; i++) {
brcmf_config_wowl_pattern(ifp, "add",
(u8 *)wowl->patterns[i].pattern,
wowl->patterns[i].pattern_len,
(u8 *)wowl->patterns[i].mask,
wowl->patterns[i].pkt_offset);
}
}
if (wowl->nd_config) {
brcmf_cfg80211_sched_scan_start(cfg->wiphy, ifp->ndev,
wowl->nd_config);
wowl_config |= BRCMF_WOWL_PFN_FOUND;
cfg->wowl.nd_data_completed = false;
cfg->wowl.nd_enabled = true;
/* Now reroute the event for PFN to the wowl function. */
brcmf_fweh_unregister(cfg->pub, BRCMF_E_PFN_NET_FOUND);
brcmf_fweh_register(cfg->pub, BRCMF_E_PFN_NET_FOUND,
brcmf_wowl_nd_results);
}
if (wowl->gtk_rekey_failure)
wowl_config |= BRCMF_WOWL_GTK_FAILURE;
if (!test_bit(BRCMF_VIF_STATUS_CONNECTED, &ifp->vif->sme_state))
wowl_config |= BRCMF_WOWL_UNASSOC;
brcmf_fil_iovar_data_set(ifp, "wowl_wakeind", "clear",
sizeof(struct brcmf_wowl_wakeind_le));
brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "wowl", wowl_config);
brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "wowl_activate", 1);
brcmf_bus_wowl_config(cfg->pub->bus_if, true);
cfg->wowl.active = true;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,055
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntSize WebPagePrivate::viewportSize() const
{
return mapFromTransformed(transformedViewportSize());
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,472
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _poppler_page_new (PopplerDocument *document, Page *page, int index)
{
PopplerPage *poppler_page;
g_return_val_if_fail (POPPLER_IS_DOCUMENT (document), NULL);
poppler_page = (PopplerPage *) g_object_new (POPPLER_TYPE_PAGE, NULL, NULL);
poppler_page->document = (PopplerDocument *) g_object_ref (document);
poppler_page->page = page;
poppler_page->index = index;
return poppler_page;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 748
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: acpi_object_type acpi_ns_get_type(struct acpi_namespace_node * node)
{
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE(ns_get_type);
if (!node) {
ACPI_WARNING((AE_INFO, "Null Node parameter"));
return_UINT8(ACPI_TYPE_ANY);
}
return_UINT8(node->type);
}
Commit Message: ACPICA: Namespace: fix operand cache leak
ACPICA commit a23325b2e583556eae88ed3f764e457786bf4df6
I found some ACPI operand cache leaks in ACPI early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.174332] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.175504] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.176010] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.177032] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.178284] ACPI: SCI (IRQ16705) allocation failed
>[ 0.179352] ACPI Exception: AE_NOT_ACQUIRED, Unable to install
System Control Interrupt handler (20160930/evevent-131)
>[ 0.180008] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.181125] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler
(20160930/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.184068] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has
objects
>[ 0.185358] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3 #2
>[ 0.186820] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS
virtual_box 12/01/2006
>[ 0.188000] Call Trace:
>[ 0.188000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x7d
>[ 0.188000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x224/0x230
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x22/0x22
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0xd
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_terminate+0x5/0xf
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_init+0x288/0x32e
>[ 0.188000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? video_setup+0x7a/0x7a
>[ 0.188000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1b0
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x194/0x21a
>[ 0.188000] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.188000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling acpi_terminate() function. The function calls
acpi_ns_terminate() function to delete namespace data and ACPI operand cache
(acpi_gbl_module_code_list).
But the deletion code in acpi_ns_terminate() function is wrapped in
ACPI_EXEC_APP definition, therefore the code is only executed when the
definition exists. If the define doesn't exist, ACPI operand cache
(acpi_gbl_module_code_list) is leaked, and stack dump is shown in kernel log.
This causes a security threat because the old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory
locations of kernel functions in stack dump, therefore kernel ASLR can be
neutralized.
To fix ACPI operand leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which
removes the ACPI_EXEC_APP define in acpi_ns_terminate() function for
executing the deletion code unconditionally.
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/a23325b2
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-755
| 0
| 63,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void xt_source_destroy(void)
{
if (--xt_source_count < 1 && xt_source) {
g_source_destroy(xt_source);
xt_source = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean lxterminal_socket_accept_client(GIOChannel * source, GIOCondition condition, LXTermWindow * lxtermwin)
{
if (condition & G_IO_IN)
{
/* Accept the new connection. */
int fd = accept(g_io_channel_unix_get_fd(source), NULL, NULL);
if (fd < 0)
g_warning("Accept failed: %s\n", g_strerror(errno));
/* Add O_NONBLOCK to the flags. */
fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0) | O_NONBLOCK);
/* Create a glib I/O channel. */
GIOChannel * gio = g_io_channel_unix_new(fd);
if (gio == NULL)
g_warning("Cannot create new GIOChannel\n");
else
{
/* Set up the glib I/O channel and add it to the event loop. */
g_io_channel_set_encoding(gio, NULL, NULL);
g_io_add_watch(gio, G_IO_IN | G_IO_HUP, (GIOFunc) lxterminal_socket_read_channel, lxtermwin);
g_io_channel_unref(gio);
}
}
/* Our listening socket hung up - we are dead. */
if (condition & G_IO_HUP)
g_error("Server listening socket closed unexpectedly\n");
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 13,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> V8TestObject::FindInstanceInPrototypeChain(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, v8::Isolate* isolate) {
return V8PerIsolateData::From(isolate)->FindInstanceInPrototypeChain(
V8TestObject::GetWrapperTypeInfo(), v8_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,713
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: poly_contain(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
POLYGON *polya = PG_GETARG_POLYGON_P(0);
POLYGON *polyb = PG_GETARG_POLYGON_P(1);
bool result;
/*
* Quick check to see if bounding box is contained.
*/
if (polya->npts > 0 && polyb->npts > 0 &&
DatumGetBool(DirectFunctionCall2(box_contain,
BoxPGetDatum(&polya->boundbox),
BoxPGetDatum(&polyb->boundbox))))
{
int i;
LSEG s;
s.p[0] = polyb->p[polyb->npts - 1];
result = true;
for (i = 0; i < polyb->npts && result; i++)
{
s.p[1] = polyb->p[i];
result = lseg_inside_poly(s.p, s.p + 1, polya, 0);
s.p[0] = s.p[1];
}
}
else
{
result = false;
}
/*
* Avoid leaking memory for toasted inputs ... needed for rtree indexes
*/
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(polya, 0);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(polyb, 1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void intel_pebs_aliases_snb(struct perf_event *event)
{
if ((event->hw.config & X86_RAW_EVENT_MASK) == 0x003c) {
/*
* Use an alternative encoding for CPU_CLK_UNHALTED.THREAD_P
* (0x003c) so that we can use it with PEBS.
*
* The regular CPU_CLK_UNHALTED.THREAD_P event (0x003c) isn't
* PEBS capable. However we can use UOPS_RETIRED.ALL
* (0x01c2), which is a PEBS capable event, to get the same
* count.
*
* UOPS_RETIRED.ALL counts the number of cycles that retires
* CNTMASK micro-ops. By setting CNTMASK to a value (16)
* larger than the maximum number of micro-ops that can be
* retired per cycle (4) and then inverting the condition, we
* count all cycles that retire 16 or less micro-ops, which
* is every cycle.
*
* Thereby we gain a PEBS capable cycle counter.
*/
u64 alt_config = X86_CONFIG(.event=0xc2, .umask=0x01, .inv=1, .cmask=16);
alt_config |= (event->hw.config & ~X86_RAW_EVENT_MASK);
event->hw.config = alt_config;
}
}
Commit Message: perf/x86: Fix offcore_rsp valid mask for SNB/IVB
The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.
This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.
A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.
This version of the patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jolsa@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 31,671
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long snd_seq_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct snd_seq_client *client = file->private_data;
/* To use kernel stack for ioctl data. */
union {
int pversion;
int client_id;
struct snd_seq_system_info system_info;
struct snd_seq_running_info running_info;
struct snd_seq_client_info client_info;
struct snd_seq_port_info port_info;
struct snd_seq_port_subscribe port_subscribe;
struct snd_seq_queue_info queue_info;
struct snd_seq_queue_status queue_status;
struct snd_seq_queue_tempo tempo;
struct snd_seq_queue_timer queue_timer;
struct snd_seq_queue_client queue_client;
struct snd_seq_client_pool client_pool;
struct snd_seq_remove_events remove_events;
struct snd_seq_query_subs query_subs;
} buf;
const struct ioctl_handler *handler;
unsigned long size;
int err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!client))
return -ENXIO;
for (handler = ioctl_handlers; handler->cmd > 0; ++handler) {
if (handler->cmd == cmd)
break;
}
if (handler->cmd == 0)
return -ENOTTY;
memset(&buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
/*
* All of ioctl commands for ALSA sequencer get an argument of size
* within 13 bits. We can safely pick up the size from the command.
*/
size = _IOC_SIZE(handler->cmd);
if (handler->cmd & IOC_IN) {
if (copy_from_user(&buf, (const void __user *)arg, size))
return -EFAULT;
}
err = handler->func(client, &buf);
if (err >= 0) {
/* Some commands includes a bug in 'dir' field. */
if (handler->cmd == SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SET_QUEUE_CLIENT ||
handler->cmd == SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SET_CLIENT_POOL ||
(handler->cmd & IOC_OUT))
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &buf, size))
return -EFAULT;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 60,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionService::ReportExtensionLoadError(
const FilePath& extension_path,
const std::string &error,
NotificationType type,
bool be_noisy) {
NotificationService* service = NotificationService::current();
service->Notify(type,
Source<Profile>(profile_),
Details<const std::string>(&error));
std::string path_str = UTF16ToUTF8(extension_path.LossyDisplayName());
std::string message = base::StringPrintf(
"Could not load extension from '%s'. %s",
path_str.c_str(), error.c_str());
ExtensionErrorReporter::GetInstance()->ReportError(message, be_noisy);
}
Commit Message: Unrevert: Show the install dialog for the initial load of an unpacked extension
with plugins.
First landing broke some browser tests.
BUG=83273
TEST=in the extensions managmenet page, with developer mode enabled, Load an unpacked extension on an extension with NPAPI plugins. You should get an install dialog.
TBR=mihaip
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87738 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: extract_substr(uschar *subject, int value1, int value2, int *len)
{
int sublen = Ustrlen(subject);
if (value1 < 0) /* count from right */
{
value1 += sublen;
/* If the position is before the start, skip to the start, and adjust the
length. If the length ends up negative, the substring is null because nothing
can precede. This falls out naturally when the length is unset, meaning "all
to the left". */
if (value1 < 0)
{
value2 += value1;
if (value2 < 0) value2 = 0;
value1 = 0;
}
/* Otherwise an unset length => characters before value1 */
else if (value2 < 0)
{
value2 = value1;
value1 = 0;
}
}
/* For a non-negative offset, if the starting position is past the end of the
string, the result will be the null string. Otherwise, an unset length means
"rest"; just set it to the maximum - it will be cut down below if necessary. */
else
{
if (value1 > sublen)
{
value1 = sublen;
value2 = 0;
}
else if (value2 < 0) value2 = sublen;
}
/* Cut the length down to the maximum possible for the offset value, and get
the required characters. */
if (value1 + value2 > sublen) value2 = sublen - value1;
*len = value2;
return subject + value1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: build_qfs_info_req(struct kvec *iov, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, int level,
int outbuf_len, u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid)
{
int rc;
struct smb2_query_info_req *req;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Query FSInfo level %d\n", level);
if ((tcon->ses == NULL) || (tcon->ses->server == NULL))
return -EIO;
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_QUERY_INFO, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc)
return rc;
req->InfoType = SMB2_O_INFO_FILESYSTEM;
req->FileInfoClass = level;
req->PersistentFileId = persistent_fid;
req->VolatileFileId = volatile_fid;
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field and 1 for pad */
req->InputBufferOffset =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct smb2_query_info_req) - 1 - 4);
req->OutputBufferLength = cpu_to_le32(
outbuf_len + sizeof(struct smb2_query_info_rsp) - 1 - 4);
iov->iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field */
iov->iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int iucv_below_msglim(struct sock *sk)
{
struct iucv_sock *iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != IUCV_CONNECTED)
return 1;
if (iucv->transport == AF_IUCV_TRANS_IUCV)
return (skb_queue_len(&iucv->send_skb_q) < iucv->path->msglim);
else
return ((atomic_read(&iucv->msg_sent) < iucv->msglimit_peer) &&
(atomic_read(&iucv->pendings) <= 0));
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,596
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void convertToWithoutRowidTable(Parse *pParse, Table *pTab){
Index *pIdx;
Index *pPk;
int nPk;
int i, j;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
Vdbe *v = pParse->pVdbe;
/* Mark every PRIMARY KEY column as NOT NULL (except for imposter tables)
*/
if( !db->init.imposterTable ){
for(i=0; i<pTab->nCol; i++){
if( (pTab->aCol[i].colFlags & COLFLAG_PRIMKEY)!=0 ){
pTab->aCol[i].notNull = OE_Abort;
}
}
}
/* Convert the P3 operand of the OP_CreateBtree opcode from BTREE_INTKEY
** into BTREE_BLOBKEY.
*/
if( pParse->addrCrTab ){
assert( v );
sqlite3VdbeChangeP3(v, pParse->addrCrTab, BTREE_BLOBKEY);
}
/* Locate the PRIMARY KEY index. Or, if this table was originally
** an INTEGER PRIMARY KEY table, create a new PRIMARY KEY index.
*/
if( pTab->iPKey>=0 ){
ExprList *pList;
Token ipkToken;
sqlite3TokenInit(&ipkToken, pTab->aCol[pTab->iPKey].zName);
pList = sqlite3ExprListAppend(pParse, 0,
sqlite3ExprAlloc(db, TK_ID, &ipkToken, 0));
if( pList==0 ) return;
pList->a[0].sortOrder = pParse->iPkSortOrder;
assert( pParse->pNewTable==pTab );
sqlite3CreateIndex(pParse, 0, 0, 0, pList, pTab->keyConf, 0, 0, 0, 0,
SQLITE_IDXTYPE_PRIMARYKEY);
if( db->mallocFailed || pParse->nErr ) return;
pPk = sqlite3PrimaryKeyIndex(pTab);
pTab->iPKey = -1;
}else{
pPk = sqlite3PrimaryKeyIndex(pTab);
/*
** Remove all redundant columns from the PRIMARY KEY. For example, change
** "PRIMARY KEY(a,b,a,b,c,b,c,d)" into just "PRIMARY KEY(a,b,c,d)". Later
** code assumes the PRIMARY KEY contains no repeated columns.
*/
for(i=j=1; i<pPk->nKeyCol; i++){
if( hasColumn(pPk->aiColumn, j, pPk->aiColumn[i]) ){
pPk->nColumn--;
}else{
pPk->aiColumn[j++] = pPk->aiColumn[i];
}
}
pPk->nKeyCol = j;
}
assert( pPk!=0 );
pPk->isCovering = 1;
if( !db->init.imposterTable ) pPk->uniqNotNull = 1;
nPk = pPk->nKeyCol;
/* Bypass the creation of the PRIMARY KEY btree and the sqlite_master
** table entry. This is only required if currently generating VDBE
** code for a CREATE TABLE (not when parsing one as part of reading
** a database schema). */
if( v && pPk->tnum>0 ){
assert( db->init.busy==0 );
sqlite3VdbeChangeOpcode(v, pPk->tnum, OP_Goto);
}
/* The root page of the PRIMARY KEY is the table root page */
pPk->tnum = pTab->tnum;
/* Update the in-memory representation of all UNIQUE indices by converting
** the final rowid column into one or more columns of the PRIMARY KEY.
*/
for(pIdx=pTab->pIndex; pIdx; pIdx=pIdx->pNext){
int n;
if( IsPrimaryKeyIndex(pIdx) ) continue;
for(i=n=0; i<nPk; i++){
if( !hasColumn(pIdx->aiColumn, pIdx->nKeyCol, pPk->aiColumn[i]) ) n++;
}
if( n==0 ){
/* This index is a superset of the primary key */
pIdx->nColumn = pIdx->nKeyCol;
continue;
}
if( resizeIndexObject(db, pIdx, pIdx->nKeyCol+n) ) return;
for(i=0, j=pIdx->nKeyCol; i<nPk; i++){
if( !hasColumn(pIdx->aiColumn, pIdx->nKeyCol, pPk->aiColumn[i]) ){
pIdx->aiColumn[j] = pPk->aiColumn[i];
pIdx->azColl[j] = pPk->azColl[i];
j++;
}
}
assert( pIdx->nColumn>=pIdx->nKeyCol+n );
assert( pIdx->nColumn>=j );
}
/* Add all table columns to the PRIMARY KEY index
*/
if( nPk<pTab->nCol ){
if( resizeIndexObject(db, pPk, pTab->nCol) ) return;
for(i=0, j=nPk; i<pTab->nCol; i++){
if( !hasColumn(pPk->aiColumn, j, i) ){
assert( j<pPk->nColumn );
pPk->aiColumn[j] = i;
pPk->azColl[j] = sqlite3StrBINARY;
j++;
}
}
assert( pPk->nColumn==j );
assert( pTab->nCol==j );
}else{
pPk->nColumn = pTab->nCol;
}
recomputeColumnsNotIndexed(pPk);
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 151,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CSSStyleSheet::ClearOwnerNode() {
DidMutate();
if (owner_node_)
contents_->UnregisterClient(this);
owner_node_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Disallow access to opaque CSS responses.
Bug: 848786
Change-Id: Ie53fbf644afdd76d7c65649a05c939c63d89b4ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1088335
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565537}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 153,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SetAsDefaultProtocolClientUsingIntentPicker(const std::string& protocol) {
base::ScopedBlockingCall scoped_blocking_call(base::BlockingType::MAY_BLOCK);
base::FilePath chrome_exe;
if (!base::PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &chrome_exe)) {
NOTREACHED() << "Error getting app exe path";
return false;
}
base::string16 wprotocol(base::UTF8ToUTF16(protocol));
if (!ShellUtil::ShowMakeChromeDefaultProtocolClientSystemUI(chrome_exe,
wprotocol)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch the set-default-client Windows UI.";
return false;
}
VLOG(1) << "Set-default-client Windows UI completed.";
return true;
}
Commit Message: Validate external protocols before launching on Windows
Bug: 889459
Change-Id: Id33ca6444bff1e6dd71b6000823cf6fec09746ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1256208
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597611}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: double WebMediaPlayerImpl::MediaTimeForTimeValue(double timeValue) const {
return base::TimeDelta::FromSecondsD(timeValue).InSecondsF();
}
Commit Message: Fix HasSingleSecurityOrigin for HLS
HLS manifests can request segments from a different origin than the
original manifest's origin. We do not inspect HLS manifests within
Chromium, and instead delegate to Android's MediaPlayer. This means we
need to be conservative, and always assume segments might come from a
different origin. HasSingleSecurityOrigin should always return false
when decoding HLS.
Bug: 864283
Change-Id: Ie16849ac6f29ae7eaa9caf342ad0509a226228ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142691
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Thomas Guilbert <tguilbert@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576378}
CWE ID: CWE-346
| 0
| 154,433
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void spl_ptr_llist_zval_ctor(spl_ptr_llist_element *elem) { /* {{{ */
if (Z_REFCOUNTED(elem->data)) {
Z_ADDREF(elem->data);
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 54,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Tab* tab() { return tab_; }
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nautilus_file_operations_delete (GList *files,
GtkWindow *parent_window,
NautilusDeleteCallback done_callback,
gpointer done_callback_data)
{
trash_or_delete_internal (files, parent_window,
FALSE,
done_callback, done_callback_data);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline bool doFancyUpsampling() { return true; }
Commit Message: Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
R=pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sess_auth_ntlm(struct sess_data *sess_data)
{
int rc = 0;
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB;
char *bcc_ptr;
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
__u32 capabilities;
__u16 bytes_remaining;
/* old style NTLM sessionsetup */
/* wct = 13 */
rc = sess_alloc_buffer(sess_data, 13);
if (rc)
goto out;
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
bcc_ptr = sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, pSMB);
pSMB->req_no_secext.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
/* calculate ntlm response and session key */
rc = setup_ntlm_response(ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLM authentication\n",
rc);
goto out;
}
/* copy ntlm response */
memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
} else {
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength = 0;
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength = 0;
}
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
/* unicode strings must be word aligned */
if (sess_data->iov[0].iov_len % 2) {
*bcc_ptr = 0;
bcc_ptr++;
}
unicode_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
} else {
ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
}
sess_data->iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr -
(long) sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
rc = sess_sendreceive(sess_data);
if (rc)
goto out;
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
if (smb_buf->WordCount != 3) {
rc = -EIO;
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad word count %d\n", smb_buf->WordCount);
goto out;
}
if (le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.Action) & GUEST_LOGIN)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Guest login\n"); /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */
ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid; /* UID left in wire format (le) */
cifs_dbg(FYI, "UID = %llu\n", ses->Suid);
bytes_remaining = get_bcc(smb_buf);
bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf);
/* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */
if (bytes_remaining == 0) {
/* no string area to decode, do nothing */
} else if (smb_buf->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) {
/* unicode string area must be word-aligned */
if (((unsigned long) bcc_ptr - (unsigned long) smb_buf) % 2) {
++bcc_ptr;
--bytes_remaining;
}
decode_unicode_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
sess_data->nls_cp);
} else {
decode_ascii_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
sess_data->nls_cp);
}
rc = sess_establish_session(sess_data);
out:
sess_data->result = rc;
sess_data->func = NULL;
sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 84,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa)
{
return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), fp, rsa);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 94,655
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static BROTLI_INLINE uint32_t Log2Floor(uint32_t x) {
uint32_t result = 0;
while (x) {
x >>= 1;
++result;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fill_zero(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index,
loff_t start, loff_t len)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct page *page;
if (!len)
return;
f2fs_balance_fs(sbi);
f2fs_lock_op(sbi);
page = get_new_data_page(inode, NULL, index, false);
f2fs_unlock_op(sbi);
if (!IS_ERR(page)) {
f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback(page, DATA);
zero_user(page, start, len);
set_page_dirty(page);
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
}
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void copy_vmcs12_to_shadow(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
const unsigned long *fields[] = {
shadow_read_write_fields,
shadow_read_only_fields
};
const int max_fields[] = {
max_shadow_read_write_fields,
max_shadow_read_only_fields
};
int i, q;
unsigned long field;
u64 field_value = 0;
struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs = vmx->nested.current_shadow_vmcs;
vmcs_load(shadow_vmcs);
for (q = 0; q < ARRAY_SIZE(fields); q++) {
for (i = 0; i < max_fields[q]; i++) {
field = fields[q][i];
vmcs12_read_any(&vmx->vcpu, field, &field_value);
switch (vmcs_field_type(field)) {
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_U16:
vmcs_write16(field, (u16)field_value);
break;
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_U32:
vmcs_write32(field, (u32)field_value);
break;
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_U64:
vmcs_write64(field, (u64)field_value);
break;
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_NATURAL_WIDTH:
vmcs_writel(field, (long)field_value);
break;
}
}
}
vmcs_clear(shadow_vmcs);
vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 36,995
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool disable_si_irq(struct smi_info *smi_info)
{
if ((smi_info->io.irq) && (!smi_info->interrupt_disabled)) {
smi_info->interrupt_disabled = true;
start_check_enables(smi_info);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 90,216
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tlv_get(const unsigned char *msg, int len, unsigned char tag,
unsigned char *ret, int *ret_len)
{
int cur = 0;
while (cur < len) {
if (*(msg+cur)==tag) {
int ii, ln = *(msg+cur+1);
if (ln > *ret_len)
return SC_ERROR_WRONG_LENGTH;
for (ii=0; ii<ln; ii++)
*(ret + ii) = *(msg+cur+2+ii);
*ret_len = ln;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
cur += 2 + *(msg+cur+1);
}
return SC_ERROR_INCORRECT_PARAMETERS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,569
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer,
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos,
unsigned long convmul,
unsigned long convdiv)
{
return __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(table->data, table, write,
buffer, lenp, ppos, convmul, convdiv);
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void edge_heartbeat_schedule(struct edgeport_serial *edge_serial)
{
if (!edge_serial->use_heartbeat)
return;
schedule_delayed_work(&edge_serial->heartbeat_work,
FW_HEARTBEAT_SECS * HZ);
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191
| 0
| 66,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
ASN1_BOOLEAN *tbool = NULL;
ASN1_STRING *strtmp;
ASN1_OBJECT *otmp;
int utype;
const unsigned char *cont;
unsigned char c;
int len;
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
pf = it->funcs;
if (pf && pf->prim_i2c)
return pf->prim_i2c(pval, cout, putype, it);
/* Should type be omitted? */
if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE)
|| (it->utype != V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) {
if (!*pval)
return -1;
}
if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) {
/* If MSTRING type set the underlying type */
strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
utype = strtmp->type;
*putype = utype;
} else if (it->utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
/* If ANY set type and pointer to value */
ASN1_TYPE *typ;
typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval;
utype = typ->type;
*putype = utype;
pval = &typ->value.asn1_value;
} else
utype = *putype;
switch (utype) {
case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
otmp = (ASN1_OBJECT *)*pval;
cont = otmp->data;
len = otmp->length;
break;
case V_ASN1_NULL:
cont = NULL;
len = 0;
break;
case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
tbool = (ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval;
if (*tbool == -1)
return -1;
if (it->utype != V_ASN1_ANY) {
/*
* Default handling if value == size field then omit
*/
if (*tbool && (it->size > 0))
return -1;
if (!*tbool && !it->size)
return -1;
}
c = (unsigned char)*tbool;
cont = &c;
len = 1;
break;
case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
return i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING((ASN1_BIT_STRING *)*pval,
cout ? &cout : NULL);
break;
case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
/*
* These are all have the same content format as ASN1_INTEGER
*/
* These are all have the same content format as ASN1_INTEGER
*/
return i2c_ASN1_INTEGER((ASN1_INTEGER *)*pval, cout ? &cout : NULL);
break;
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
case V_ASN1_SET:
default:
/* All based on ASN1_STRING and handled the same */
strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
/* Special handling for NDEF */
if ((it->size == ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
&& (strtmp->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
if (cout) {
strtmp->data = cout;
strtmp->length = 0;
}
/* Special return code */
return -2;
}
cont = strtmp->data;
len = strtmp->length;
break;
}
if (cout && len)
memcpy(cout, cont, len);
return len;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 165,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void setPositiveMarginIfLarger(LayoutUnit p)
{
ASSERT(!m_discardMargin);
if (p > m_positiveMargin)
m_positiveMargin = p;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void rt_bind_peer(struct rtable *rt, __be32 daddr, int create)
{
struct inet_peer *peer;
peer = inet_getpeer_v4(daddr, create);
if (peer && cmpxchg(&rt->peer, NULL, peer) != NULL)
inet_putpeer(peer);
else
rt->rt_peer_genid = rt_peer_genid();
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct cgroup_meta_data *lxc_cgroup_put_meta(struct cgroup_meta_data *meta_data)
{
size_t i;
if (!meta_data)
return NULL;
if (--meta_data->ref > 0)
return meta_data;
lxc_free_array((void **)meta_data->mount_points, (lxc_free_fn)lxc_cgroup_mount_point_free);
if (meta_data->hierarchies) {
for (i = 0; i <= meta_data->maximum_hierarchy; i++)
lxc_cgroup_hierarchy_free(meta_data->hierarchies[i]);
}
free(meta_data->hierarchies);
free(meta_data);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,504
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::DidCancelPopupMenu() {
Send(new FrameMsg_SelectPopupMenuItem(routing_id_, -1));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void deprecatedMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
UseCounter::countDeprecation(callingExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate()), UseCounter::Method);
TestObjectV8Internal::deprecatedMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(curl_escape)
{
char *str = NULL, *res = NULL;
size_t str_len = 0;
zval *zid;
php_curl *ch;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "rs", &zid, &str, &str_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(ch, php_curl *, zid, -1, le_curl_name, le_curl);
if ((res = curl_easy_escape(ch->cp, str, str_len))) {
RETVAL_STRING(res);
curl_free(res);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err moov_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_MovieBox *ptr = (GF_MovieBox *)s;
if (ptr->mvhd) {
e = gf_isom_box_size((GF_Box *) ptr->mvhd);
if (e) return e;
ptr->size += ptr->mvhd->size;
}
if (ptr->iods) {
e = gf_isom_box_size((GF_Box *) ptr->iods);
if (e) return e;
ptr->size += ptr->iods->size;
}
if (ptr->udta) {
e = gf_isom_box_size((GF_Box *) ptr->udta);
if (e) return e;
ptr->size += ptr->udta->size;
}
if (ptr->meta) {
e = gf_isom_box_size((GF_Box *) ptr->meta);
if (e) return e;
ptr->size += ptr->meta->size;
}
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_ISOM_FRAGMENTS
if (ptr->mvex) {
e = gf_isom_box_size((GF_Box *) ptr->mvex);
if (e) return e;
ptr->size += ptr->mvex->size;
}
#endif
return gf_isom_box_array_size(s, ptr->trackList);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: smp_fetch_capture_res_ver(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
struct http_txn *txn = smp->strm->txn;
if (!txn || txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_HDR_FIRST)
return 0;
if (txn->rsp.flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11)
smp->data.u.str.str = "HTTP/1.1";
else
smp->data.u.str.str = "HTTP/1.0";
smp->data.u.str.len = 8;
smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR;
smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 6,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void skcipher_wait(struct sock *sk)
{
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
int ctr = 0;
while (atomic_read(&ctx->inflight) && ctr++ < 100)
msleep(100);
}
Commit Message: crypto: algif_skcipher - Require setkey before accept(2)
Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them
without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that
the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been
done on the socket yet.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 55,973
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: getStringBuffer(int length) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < stringBufferPool->size; i++) {
if (!stringBufferPool->inUse[i]) {
stringBufferPool->buffers[i] = stringBufferPool->alloc(i, length);
stringBufferPool->inUse[i] = 1;
return i;
}
}
_lou_outOfMemory();
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow
Fixes #635
Thanks to HongxuChen for reporting it
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 76,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct ifsock *find_outbound(struct sockaddr *sa)
{
in_addr_t cand;
struct ifsock *ifs;
struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
cand = addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
LIST_FOREACH(ifs, &il, link) {
in_addr_t a, m;
a = ifs->addr.sin_addr.s_addr;
m = ifs->mask.sin_addr.s_addr;
if (a == htonl(INADDR_ANY) || m == htonl(INADDR_ANY))
continue;
if ((a & m) == (cand & m))
return ifs;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 88,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __sha1_update(struct sha1_state *sctx, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, unsigned int partial)
{
unsigned int done = 0;
sctx->count += len;
if (partial) {
done = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE - partial;
memcpy(sctx->buffer + partial, data, done);
sha1_block_data_order(sctx->state, sctx->buffer, 1);
}
if (len - done >= SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE) {
const unsigned int rounds = (len - done) / SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE;
sha1_block_data_order(sctx->state, data + done, rounds);
done += rounds * SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
memcpy(sctx->buffer, data + done, len - done);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PrefService* DataReductionProxySettings::GetOriginalProfilePrefs() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return prefs_;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 172,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseEntityDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name = NULL;
xmlChar *value = NULL;
xmlChar *URI = NULL, *literal = NULL;
const xmlChar *ndata = NULL;
int isParameter = 0;
xmlChar *orig = NULL;
/* GROW; done in the caller */
if (CMP8(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', 'E', 'N', 'T', 'I', 'T', 'Y')) {
int inputid = ctxt->input->id;
SHRINK;
SKIP(8);
if (SKIP_BLANKS == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after '<!ENTITY'\n");
}
if (RAW == '%') {
NEXT;
if (SKIP_BLANKS == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after '%%'\n");
}
isParameter = 1;
}
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseEntityDecl: no name\n");
return;
}
if (xmlStrchr(name, ':') != NULL) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_COLON,
"colons are forbidden from entities names '%s'\n",
name, NULL, NULL);
}
if (SKIP_BLANKS == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after the entity name\n");
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ENTITY_DECL;
/*
* handle the various case of definitions...
*/
if (isParameter) {
if ((RAW == '"') || (RAW == '\'')) {
value = xmlParseEntityValue(ctxt, &orig);
if (value) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX) && (ctxt->sax->entityDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->entityDecl(ctxt->userData, name,
XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY,
NULL, NULL, value);
}
} else {
URI = xmlParseExternalID(ctxt, &literal, 1);
if ((URI == NULL) && (literal == NULL)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_VALUE_REQUIRED, NULL);
}
if (URI) {
xmlURIPtr uri;
uri = xmlParseURI((const char *) URI);
if (uri == NULL) {
xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_URI,
"Invalid URI: %s\n", URI);
/*
* This really ought to be a well formedness error
* but the XML Core WG decided otherwise c.f. issue
* E26 of the XML erratas.
*/
} else {
if (uri->fragment != NULL) {
/*
* Okay this is foolish to block those but not
* invalid URIs.
*/
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_URI_FRAGMENT, NULL);
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->entityDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->entityDecl(ctxt->userData, name,
XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY,
literal, URI, NULL);
}
xmlFreeURI(uri);
}
}
}
} else {
if ((RAW == '"') || (RAW == '\'')) {
value = xmlParseEntityValue(ctxt, &orig);
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX) && (ctxt->sax->entityDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->entityDecl(ctxt->userData, name,
XML_INTERNAL_GENERAL_ENTITY,
NULL, NULL, value);
/*
* For expat compatibility in SAX mode.
*/
if ((ctxt->myDoc == NULL) ||
(xmlStrEqual(ctxt->myDoc->version, SAX_COMPAT_MODE))) {
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
ctxt->myDoc = xmlNewDoc(SAX_COMPAT_MODE);
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "New Doc failed");
return;
}
ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
}
if (ctxt->myDoc->intSubset == NULL)
ctxt->myDoc->intSubset = xmlNewDtd(ctxt->myDoc,
BAD_CAST "fake", NULL, NULL);
xmlSAX2EntityDecl(ctxt, name, XML_INTERNAL_GENERAL_ENTITY,
NULL, NULL, value);
}
} else {
URI = xmlParseExternalID(ctxt, &literal, 1);
if ((URI == NULL) && (literal == NULL)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_VALUE_REQUIRED, NULL);
}
if (URI) {
xmlURIPtr uri;
uri = xmlParseURI((const char *)URI);
if (uri == NULL) {
xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_URI,
"Invalid URI: %s\n", URI);
/*
* This really ought to be a well formedness error
* but the XML Core WG decided otherwise c.f. issue
* E26 of the XML erratas.
*/
} else {
if (uri->fragment != NULL) {
/*
* Okay this is foolish to block those but not
* invalid URIs.
*/
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_URI_FRAGMENT, NULL);
}
xmlFreeURI(uri);
}
}
if ((RAW != '>') && (SKIP_BLANKS == 0)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required before 'NDATA'\n");
}
if (CMP5(CUR_PTR, 'N', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A')) {
SKIP(5);
if (SKIP_BLANKS == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after 'NDATA'\n");
}
ndata = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->unparsedEntityDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->unparsedEntityDecl(ctxt->userData, name,
literal, URI, ndata);
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX) && (ctxt->sax->entityDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->entityDecl(ctxt->userData, name,
XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY,
literal, URI, NULL);
/*
* For expat compatibility in SAX mode.
* assuming the entity repalcement was asked for
*/
if ((ctxt->replaceEntities != 0) &&
((ctxt->myDoc == NULL) ||
(xmlStrEqual(ctxt->myDoc->version, SAX_COMPAT_MODE)))) {
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
ctxt->myDoc = xmlNewDoc(SAX_COMPAT_MODE);
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "New Doc failed");
return;
}
ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
}
if (ctxt->myDoc->intSubset == NULL)
ctxt->myDoc->intSubset = xmlNewDtd(ctxt->myDoc,
BAD_CAST "fake", NULL, NULL);
xmlSAX2EntityDecl(ctxt, name,
XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY,
literal, URI, NULL);
}
}
}
}
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
goto done;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (RAW != '>') {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_NOT_FINISHED,
"xmlParseEntityDecl: entity %s not terminated\n", name);
xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
} else {
if (inputid != ctxt->input->id) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Entity declaration doesn't start and stop in"
" the same entity\n");
}
NEXT;
}
if (orig != NULL) {
/*
* Ugly mechanism to save the raw entity value.
*/
xmlEntityPtr cur = NULL;
if (isParameter) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity != NULL))
cur = ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->getEntity != NULL))
cur = ctxt->sax->getEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if ((cur == NULL) && (ctxt->userData==ctxt)) {
cur = xmlSAX2GetEntity(ctxt, name);
}
}
if ((cur != NULL) && (cur->orig == NULL)) {
cur->orig = orig;
orig = NULL;
}
}
done:
if (value != NULL) xmlFree(value);
if (URI != NULL) xmlFree(URI);
if (literal != NULL) xmlFree(literal);
if (orig != NULL) xmlFree(orig);
}
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 59,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err metx_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 size, i;
GF_Err e;
char *str;
GF_MetaDataSampleEntryBox *ptr = (GF_MetaDataSampleEntryBox*)s;
e = gf_isom_base_sample_entry_read((GF_SampleEntryBox *)ptr, bs);
if (e) return e;
size = (u32) ptr->size - 8;
str = gf_malloc(sizeof(char)*size);
i=0;
while (size) {
str[i] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
size--;
if (!str[i])
break;
i++;
}
if (i) {
if (ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STPP) {
ptr->xml_namespace = gf_strdup(str);
} else {
ptr->content_encoding = gf_strdup(str);
}
}
i=0;
while (size) {
str[i] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
size--;
if (!str[i])
break;
i++;
}
if ((ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_METX) || (ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STPP)) {
if (i) {
if (ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STPP) {
ptr->xml_schema_loc = gf_strdup(str);
} else {
ptr->xml_namespace = gf_strdup(str);
}
}
i=0;
while (size) {
str[i] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
size--;
if (!str[i])
break;
i++;
}
if (i) {
if (ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STPP) {
ptr->mime_type = gf_strdup(str);
} else {
ptr->xml_schema_loc = gf_strdup(str);
}
}
}
else {
if (i) ptr->mime_type = gf_strdup(str);
}
ptr->size = size;
gf_free(str);
return gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, metx_AddBox);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __glXDrawableRelease(__GLXdrawable *drawable)
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::OnDidResetContentSecurityPolicy() {
for (const auto& pair : proxy_hosts_) {
pair.second->Send(
new FrameMsg_ResetContentSecurityPolicy(pair.second->GetRoutingID()));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PDFiumEngine::OnRightMouseDown(const pp::MouseInputEvent& event) {
DCHECK_EQ(PP_INPUTEVENT_MOUSEBUTTON_RIGHT, event.GetButton());
pp::Point point = event.GetPosition();
int page_index = -1;
int char_index = -1;
int form_type = FPDF_FORMFIELD_UNKNOWN;
PDFiumPage::LinkTarget target;
PDFiumPage::Area area =
GetCharIndex(point, &page_index, &char_index, &form_type, &target);
DCHECK_GE(form_type, FPDF_FORMFIELD_UNKNOWN);
bool is_form_text_area = IsFormTextArea(area, form_type);
bool is_editable_form_text_area = false;
double page_x = -1;
double page_y = -1;
FPDF_PAGE page = nullptr;
if (is_form_text_area) {
DCHECK_NE(page_index, -1);
DeviceToPage(page_index, point.x(), point.y(), &page_x, &page_y);
page = pages_[page_index]->GetPage();
is_editable_form_text_area =
IsPointInEditableFormTextArea(page, page_x, page_y, form_type);
}
if (in_form_text_area_) {
if (is_form_text_area) {
FORM_OnFocus(form_, page, 0, page_x, page_y);
} else {
FORM_ForceToKillFocus(form_);
SetInFormTextArea(false);
}
return true;
}
if (is_form_text_area) {
{
SelectionChangeInvalidator selection_invalidator(this);
selection_.clear();
}
SetInFormTextArea(true);
editable_form_text_area_ = is_editable_form_text_area;
FORM_OnFocus(form_, page, 0, page_x, page_y);
return true;
}
if (selection_.empty())
return false;
std::vector<pp::Rect> selection_rect_vector;
GetAllScreenRectsUnion(&selection_, GetVisibleRect().point(),
&selection_rect_vector);
for (const auto& rect : selection_rect_vector) {
if (rect.Contains(point.x(), point.y()))
return false;
}
SelectionChangeInvalidator selection_invalidator(this);
selection_.clear();
return true;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 146,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AuthenticatorBlePinEntrySheetModel::IsAcceptButtonVisible() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,953
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FLACParser::metadata_callback(
const FLAC__StreamDecoder * /* decoder */,
const FLAC__StreamMetadata *metadata, void *client_data)
{
((FLACParser *) client_data)->metadataCallback(metadata);
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 162,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static zval *phar_rename_archive(phar_archive_data *phar, char *ext, zend_bool compress TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
const char *oldname = NULL;
char *oldpath = NULL;
char *basename = NULL, *basepath = NULL;
char *newname = NULL, *newpath = NULL;
zval *ret, arg1;
zend_class_entry *ce;
char *error;
const char *pcr_error;
int ext_len = ext ? strlen(ext) : 0;
int oldname_len;
phar_archive_data **pphar = NULL;
php_stream_statbuf ssb;
if (!ext) {
if (phar->is_zip) {
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "zip";
} else {
ext = "phar.zip";
}
} else if (phar->is_tar) {
switch (phar->flags) {
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_GZ:
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "tar.gz";
} else {
ext = "phar.tar.gz";
}
break;
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_BZ2:
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "tar.bz2";
} else {
ext = "phar.tar.bz2";
}
break;
default:
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "tar";
} else {
ext = "phar.tar";
}
}
} else {
switch (phar->flags) {
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_GZ:
ext = "phar.gz";
break;
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_BZ2:
ext = "phar.bz2";
break;
default:
ext = "phar";
}
}
} else if (phar_path_check(&ext, &ext_len, &pcr_error) > pcr_is_ok) {
if (phar->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "data phar converted from \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar converted from \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
}
return NULL;
}
if (ext[0] == '.') {
++ext;
}
oldpath = estrndup(phar->fname, phar->fname_len);
oldname = zend_memrchr(phar->fname, '/', phar->fname_len);
++oldname;
oldname_len = strlen(oldname);
basename = estrndup(oldname, oldname_len);
spprintf(&newname, 0, "%s.%s", strtok(basename, "."), ext);
efree(basename);
basepath = estrndup(oldpath, (strlen(oldpath) - oldname_len));
phar->fname_len = spprintf(&newpath, 0, "%s%s", basepath, newname);
phar->fname = newpath;
phar->ext = newpath + phar->fname_len - strlen(ext) - 1;
efree(basepath);
efree(newname);
if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&cached_phars, newpath, phar->fname_len, (void **) &pphar)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to add newly converted phar \"%s\" to the list of phars, new phar name is in phar.cache_list", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), newpath, phar->fname_len, (void **) &pphar)) {
if ((*pphar)->fname_len == phar->fname_len && !memcmp((*pphar)->fname, phar->fname, phar->fname_len)) {
if (!zend_hash_num_elements(&phar->manifest)) {
(*pphar)->is_tar = phar->is_tar;
(*pphar)->is_zip = phar->is_zip;
(*pphar)->is_data = phar->is_data;
(*pphar)->flags = phar->flags;
(*pphar)->fp = phar->fp;
phar->fp = NULL;
phar_destroy_phar_data(phar TSRMLS_CC);
phar = *pphar;
phar->refcount++;
newpath = oldpath;
goto its_ok;
}
}
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to add newly converted phar \"%s\" to the list of phars, a phar with that name already exists", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
its_ok:
if (SUCCESS == php_stream_stat_path(newpath, &ssb)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" exists and must be unlinked prior to conversion", newpath);
return NULL;
}
if (!phar->is_data) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(newpath, phar->fname_len, (const char **) &(phar->ext), &(phar->ext_len), 1, 1, 1 TSRMLS_CC)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
return NULL;
}
if (phar->alias) {
if (phar->is_temporary_alias) {
phar->alias = NULL;
phar->alias_len = 0;
} else {
phar->alias = estrndup(newpath, strlen(newpath));
phar->alias_len = strlen(newpath);
phar->is_temporary_alias = 1;
zend_hash_update(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), newpath, phar->fname_len, (void*)&phar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL);
}
}
} else {
if (SUCCESS != phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(newpath, phar->fname_len, (const char **) &(phar->ext), &(phar->ext_len), 0, 1, 1 TSRMLS_CC)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "data phar \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
return NULL;
}
phar->alias = NULL;
phar->alias_len = 0;
}
if ((!pphar || phar == *pphar) && SUCCESS != zend_hash_update(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), newpath, phar->fname_len, (void*)&phar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to add newly converted phar \"%s\" to the list of phars", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
phar_flush(phar, 0, 0, 1, &error TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
efree(oldpath);
return NULL;
}
efree(oldpath);
if (phar->is_data) {
ce = phar_ce_data;
} else {
ce = phar_ce_archive;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ret);
if (SUCCESS != object_init_ex(ret, ce)) {
zval_dtor(ret);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to instantiate phar object when converting archive \"%s\"", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
INIT_PZVAL(&arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&arg1, phar->fname, phar->fname_len, 0);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&ret, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, &arg1);
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 1
| 164,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u64 ovl_dentry_version_get(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct ovl_entry *oe = dentry->d_fsdata;
WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex));
return oe->version;
}
Commit Message: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 74,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LiveSyncTest::WaitForTestServerToStart(int time_ms, int intervals) {
for (int i = 0; i < intervals; ++i) {
if (IsTestServerRunning())
return true;
base::PlatformThread::Sleep(time_ms / intervals);
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cache_init_objs_debug(struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct page *page)
{
#if DEBUG
int i;
for (i = 0; i < cachep->num; i++) {
void *objp = index_to_obj(cachep, page, i);
if (cachep->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
*dbg_userword(cachep, objp) = NULL;
if (cachep->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
*dbg_redzone1(cachep, objp) = RED_INACTIVE;
*dbg_redzone2(cachep, objp) = RED_INACTIVE;
}
/*
* Constructors are not allowed to allocate memory from the same
* cache which they are a constructor for. Otherwise, deadlock.
* They must also be threaded.
*/
if (cachep->ctor && !(cachep->flags & SLAB_POISON)) {
kasan_unpoison_object_data(cachep,
objp + obj_offset(cachep));
cachep->ctor(objp + obj_offset(cachep));
kasan_poison_object_data(
cachep, objp + obj_offset(cachep));
}
if (cachep->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
if (*dbg_redzone2(cachep, objp) != RED_INACTIVE)
slab_error(cachep, "constructor overwrote the end of an object");
if (*dbg_redzone1(cachep, objp) != RED_INACTIVE)
slab_error(cachep, "constructor overwrote the start of an object");
}
/* need to poison the objs? */
if (cachep->flags & SLAB_POISON) {
poison_obj(cachep, objp, POISON_FREE);
slab_kernel_map(cachep, objp, 0, 0);
}
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 68,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handlePoll(zloop_t __attribute__((unused)) * loop, zmq_pollitem_t *poller, void* pd) {
smsg_t* pMsg;
poller_data* pollerData = (poller_data*)pd;
char* buf = zstr_recv(poller->socket);
if (msgConstruct(&pMsg) == RS_RET_OK) {
MsgSetRawMsg(pMsg, buf, strlen(buf));
MsgSetInputName(pMsg, s_namep);
MsgSetHOSTNAME(pMsg, glbl.GetLocalHostName(), ustrlen(glbl.GetLocalHostName()));
MsgSetRcvFrom(pMsg, glbl.GetLocalHostNameProp());
MsgSetRcvFromIP(pMsg, glbl.GetLocalHostIP());
MsgSetMSGoffs(pMsg, 0);
MsgSetFlowControlType(pMsg, eFLOWCTL_NO_DELAY);
MsgSetRuleset(pMsg, pollerData->ruleset);
pMsg->msgFlags = NEEDS_PARSING | PARSE_HOSTNAME;
submitMsg2(pMsg);
}
/* gotta free the string returned from zstr_recv() */
free(buf);
if( pollerData->thread->bShallStop == TRUE) {
/* a handler that returns -1 will terminate the
czmq reactor loop
*/
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1565 from Whissi/fix-format-security-issue-in-zmq-modules
Fix format security issue in zmq3 modules
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 62,755
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ftrace_function_set_filter(struct perf_event *event,
struct event_filter *filter)
{
return -ENODEV;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void setJSTestObjImmutablePoint(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setImmutablePoint(toSVGPoint(value));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,334
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int atl2_set_mac(struct net_device *netdev, void *p)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
struct sockaddr *addr = p;
if (!is_valid_ether_addr(addr->sa_data))
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (netif_running(netdev))
return -EBUSY;
memcpy(netdev->dev_addr, addr->sa_data, netdev->addr_len);
memcpy(adapter->hw.mac_addr, addr->sa_data, netdev->addr_len);
atl2_set_mac_addr(&adapter->hw);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool send_app_scn(rfc_slot_t *slot) {
if(slot->scn_notified == true) {
return true;
}
slot->scn_notified = true;
return sock_send_all(slot->fd, (const uint8_t*)&slot->scn, sizeof(slot->scn)) == sizeof(slot->scn);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __always_inline unsigned long vmcs_readl(unsigned long field)
{
unsigned long value;
asm volatile (__ex_clear(ASM_VMX_VMREAD_RDX_RAX, "%0")
: "=a"(value) : "d"(field) : "cc");
return value;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int setup_partitions(VP8Context *s, const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
const uint8_t *sizes = buf;
int i;
int ret;
s->num_coeff_partitions = 1 << vp8_rac_get_uint(&s->c, 2);
buf += 3 * (s->num_coeff_partitions - 1);
buf_size -= 3 * (s->num_coeff_partitions - 1);
if (buf_size < 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < s->num_coeff_partitions - 1; i++) {
int size = AV_RL24(sizes + 3 * i);
if (buf_size - size < 0)
return -1;
ret = ff_vp56_init_range_decoder(&s->coeff_partition[i], buf, size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
buf += size;
buf_size -= size;
}
return ff_vp56_init_range_decoder(&s->coeff_partition[i], buf, buf_size);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *pasp_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_PixelAspectRatioBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_PASP);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,312
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_entries(struct net *net, struct ipt_get_entries __user *uptr,
const int *len)
{
int ret;
struct ipt_get_entries get;
struct xt_table *t;
if (*len < sizeof(get)) {
duprintf("get_entries: %u < %zu\n", *len, sizeof(get));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_from_user(&get, uptr, sizeof(get)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
if (*len != sizeof(struct ipt_get_entries) + get.size) {
duprintf("get_entries: %u != %zu\n",
*len, sizeof(get) + get.size);
return -EINVAL;
}
get.name[sizeof(get.name) - 1] = '\0';
t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET, get.name);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) {
const struct xt_table_info *private = t->private;
duprintf("t->private->number = %u\n", private->number);
if (get.size == private->size)
ret = copy_entries_to_user(private->size,
t, uptr->entrytable);
else {
duprintf("get_entries: I've got %u not %u!\n",
private->size, get.size);
ret = -EAGAIN;
}
module_put(t->me);
xt_table_unlock(t);
} else
ret = t ? PTR_ERR(t) : -ENOENT;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u32 gf_sys_clock()
{
return OS_GetSysClock();
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 90,835
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cbc_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm));
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int err;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
kernel_fpu_begin();
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
aesni_cbc_enc(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK, walk.iv);
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
kernel_fpu_end();
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: find_openstateowner_str(unsigned int hashval, struct nfsd4_open *open,
struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
struct nfs4_openowner *oo;
spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock);
oo = find_openstateowner_str_locked(hashval, open, clp);
spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
return oo;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,454
|
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