instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct net_device *alloc_netdev_mqs(int sizeof_priv, const char *name,
void (*setup)(struct net_device *),
unsigned int txqs, unsigned int rxqs)
{
struct net_device *dev;
size_t alloc_size;
struct net_device *p;
BUG_ON(strlen(name) >= sizeof(dev->name));
if (txqs < 1) {
pr_err("alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate device "
"with zero queues.\n");
return NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
if (rxqs < 1) {
pr_err("alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate device "
"with zero RX queues.\n");
return NULL;
}
#endif
alloc_size = sizeof(struct net_device);
if (sizeof_priv) {
/* ensure 32-byte alignment of private area */
alloc_size = ALIGN(alloc_size, NETDEV_ALIGN);
alloc_size += sizeof_priv;
}
/* ensure 32-byte alignment of whole construct */
alloc_size += NETDEV_ALIGN - 1;
p = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p) {
printk(KERN_ERR "alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate device.\n");
return NULL;
}
dev = PTR_ALIGN(p, NETDEV_ALIGN);
dev->padded = (char *)dev - (char *)p;
dev->pcpu_refcnt = alloc_percpu(int);
if (!dev->pcpu_refcnt)
goto free_p;
if (dev_addr_init(dev))
goto free_pcpu;
dev_mc_init(dev);
dev_uc_init(dev);
dev_net_set(dev, &init_net);
dev->gso_max_size = GSO_MAX_SIZE;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->ethtool_ntuple_list.list);
dev->ethtool_ntuple_list.count = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->napi_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->unreg_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->link_watch_list);
dev->priv_flags = IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE;
setup(dev);
dev->num_tx_queues = txqs;
dev->real_num_tx_queues = txqs;
if (netif_alloc_netdev_queues(dev))
goto free_all;
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
dev->num_rx_queues = rxqs;
dev->real_num_rx_queues = rxqs;
if (netif_alloc_rx_queues(dev))
goto free_all;
#endif
strcpy(dev->name, name);
return dev;
free_all:
free_netdev(dev);
return NULL;
free_pcpu:
free_percpu(dev->pcpu_refcnt);
kfree(dev->_tx);
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
kfree(dev->_rx);
#endif
free_p:
kfree(p);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Icon* HTMLInputElement::icon() const
{
return m_inputType->icon();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ext4_ext_map_blocks(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map, int flags)
{
struct ext4_ext_path *path = NULL;
struct ext4_extent newex, *ex, *ex2;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
ext4_fsblk_t newblock = 0;
int free_on_err = 0, err = 0, depth, ret;
unsigned int allocated = 0, offset = 0;
unsigned int allocated_clusters = 0;
struct ext4_allocation_request ar;
ext4_lblk_t cluster_offset;
bool map_from_cluster = false;
ext_debug("blocks %u/%u requested for inode %lu\n",
map->m_lblk, map->m_len, inode->i_ino);
trace_ext4_ext_map_blocks_enter(inode, map->m_lblk, map->m_len, flags);
/* find extent for this block */
path = ext4_find_extent(inode, map->m_lblk, NULL, 0);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
err = PTR_ERR(path);
path = NULL;
goto out2;
}
depth = ext_depth(inode);
/*
* consistent leaf must not be empty;
* this situation is possible, though, _during_ tree modification;
* this is why assert can't be put in ext4_find_extent()
*/
if (unlikely(path[depth].p_ext == NULL && depth != 0)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "bad extent address "
"lblock: %lu, depth: %d pblock %lld",
(unsigned long) map->m_lblk, depth,
path[depth].p_block);
err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto out2;
}
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
if (ex) {
ext4_lblk_t ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ext4_fsblk_t ee_start = ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
unsigned short ee_len;
/*
* unwritten extents are treated as holes, except that
* we split out initialized portions during a write.
*/
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
trace_ext4_ext_show_extent(inode, ee_block, ee_start, ee_len);
/* if found extent covers block, simply return it */
if (in_range(map->m_lblk, ee_block, ee_len)) {
newblock = map->m_lblk - ee_block + ee_start;
/* number of remaining blocks in the extent */
allocated = ee_len - (map->m_lblk - ee_block);
ext_debug("%u fit into %u:%d -> %llu\n", map->m_lblk,
ee_block, ee_len, newblock);
/*
* If the extent is initialized check whether the
* caller wants to convert it to unwritten.
*/
if ((!ext4_ext_is_unwritten(ex)) &&
(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT_UNWRITTEN)) {
allocated = convert_initialized_extent(
handle, inode, map, &path,
allocated);
goto out2;
} else if (!ext4_ext_is_unwritten(ex))
goto out;
ret = ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents(
handle, inode, map, &path, flags,
allocated, newblock);
if (ret < 0)
err = ret;
else
allocated = ret;
goto out2;
}
}
/*
* requested block isn't allocated yet;
* we couldn't try to create block if create flag is zero
*/
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE) == 0) {
ext4_lblk_t hole_start, hole_len;
hole_start = map->m_lblk;
hole_len = ext4_ext_determine_hole(inode, path, &hole_start);
/*
* put just found gap into cache to speed up
* subsequent requests
*/
ext4_ext_put_gap_in_cache(inode, hole_start, hole_len);
/* Update hole_len to reflect hole size after map->m_lblk */
if (hole_start != map->m_lblk)
hole_len -= map->m_lblk - hole_start;
map->m_pblk = 0;
map->m_len = min_t(unsigned int, map->m_len, hole_len);
goto out2;
}
/*
* Okay, we need to do block allocation.
*/
newex.ee_block = cpu_to_le32(map->m_lblk);
cluster_offset = EXT4_LBLK_COFF(sbi, map->m_lblk);
/*
* If we are doing bigalloc, check to see if the extent returned
* by ext4_find_extent() implies a cluster we can use.
*/
if (cluster_offset && ex &&
get_implied_cluster_alloc(inode->i_sb, map, ex, path)) {
ar.len = allocated = map->m_len;
newblock = map->m_pblk;
map_from_cluster = true;
goto got_allocated_blocks;
}
/* find neighbour allocated blocks */
ar.lleft = map->m_lblk;
err = ext4_ext_search_left(inode, path, &ar.lleft, &ar.pleft);
if (err)
goto out2;
ar.lright = map->m_lblk;
ex2 = NULL;
err = ext4_ext_search_right(inode, path, &ar.lright, &ar.pright, &ex2);
if (err)
goto out2;
/* Check if the extent after searching to the right implies a
* cluster we can use. */
if ((sbi->s_cluster_ratio > 1) && ex2 &&
get_implied_cluster_alloc(inode->i_sb, map, ex2, path)) {
ar.len = allocated = map->m_len;
newblock = map->m_pblk;
map_from_cluster = true;
goto got_allocated_blocks;
}
/*
* See if request is beyond maximum number of blocks we can have in
* a single extent. For an initialized extent this limit is
* EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN and for an unwritten extent this limit is
* EXT_UNWRITTEN_MAX_LEN.
*/
if (map->m_len > EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN &&
!(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT))
map->m_len = EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN;
else if (map->m_len > EXT_UNWRITTEN_MAX_LEN &&
(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT))
map->m_len = EXT_UNWRITTEN_MAX_LEN;
/* Check if we can really insert (m_lblk)::(m_lblk + m_len) extent */
newex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(map->m_len);
err = ext4_ext_check_overlap(sbi, inode, &newex, path);
if (err)
allocated = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(&newex);
else
allocated = map->m_len;
/* allocate new block */
ar.inode = inode;
ar.goal = ext4_ext_find_goal(inode, path, map->m_lblk);
ar.logical = map->m_lblk;
/*
* We calculate the offset from the beginning of the cluster
* for the logical block number, since when we allocate a
* physical cluster, the physical block should start at the
* same offset from the beginning of the cluster. This is
* needed so that future calls to get_implied_cluster_alloc()
* work correctly.
*/
offset = EXT4_LBLK_COFF(sbi, map->m_lblk);
ar.len = EXT4_NUM_B2C(sbi, offset+allocated);
ar.goal -= offset;
ar.logical -= offset;
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
ar.flags = EXT4_MB_HINT_DATA;
else
/* disable in-core preallocation for non-regular files */
ar.flags = 0;
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_NO_NORMALIZE)
ar.flags |= EXT4_MB_HINT_NOPREALLOC;
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE)
ar.flags |= EXT4_MB_DELALLOC_RESERVED;
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_METADATA_NOFAIL)
ar.flags |= EXT4_MB_USE_RESERVED;
newblock = ext4_mb_new_blocks(handle, &ar, &err);
if (!newblock)
goto out2;
ext_debug("allocate new block: goal %llu, found %llu/%u\n",
ar.goal, newblock, allocated);
free_on_err = 1;
allocated_clusters = ar.len;
ar.len = EXT4_C2B(sbi, ar.len) - offset;
if (ar.len > allocated)
ar.len = allocated;
got_allocated_blocks:
/* try to insert new extent into found leaf and return */
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&newex, newblock + offset);
newex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ar.len);
/* Mark unwritten */
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT){
ext4_ext_mark_unwritten(&newex);
map->m_flags |= EXT4_MAP_UNWRITTEN;
}
err = 0;
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_KEEP_SIZE) == 0)
err = check_eofblocks_fl(handle, inode, map->m_lblk,
path, ar.len);
if (!err)
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, &path,
&newex, flags);
if (err && free_on_err) {
int fb_flags = flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE ?
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_NO_QUOT_UPDATE : 0;
/* free data blocks we just allocated */
/* not a good idea to call discard here directly,
* but otherwise we'd need to call it every free() */
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, NULL, newblock,
EXT4_C2B(sbi, allocated_clusters), fb_flags);
goto out2;
}
/* previous routine could use block we allocated */
newblock = ext4_ext_pblock(&newex);
allocated = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(&newex);
if (allocated > map->m_len)
allocated = map->m_len;
map->m_flags |= EXT4_MAP_NEW;
/*
* Reduce the reserved cluster count to reflect successful deferred
* allocation of delayed allocated clusters or direct allocation of
* clusters discovered to be delayed allocated. Once allocated, a
* cluster is not included in the reserved count.
*/
if (test_opt(inode->i_sb, DELALLOC) && !map_from_cluster) {
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE) {
/*
* When allocating delayed allocated clusters, simply
* reduce the reserved cluster count and claim quota
*/
ext4_da_update_reserve_space(inode, allocated_clusters,
1);
} else {
ext4_lblk_t lblk, len;
unsigned int n;
/*
* When allocating non-delayed allocated clusters
* (from fallocate, filemap, DIO, or clusters
* allocated when delalloc has been disabled by
* ext4_nonda_switch), reduce the reserved cluster
* count by the number of allocated clusters that
* have previously been delayed allocated. Quota
* has been claimed by ext4_mb_new_blocks() above,
* so release the quota reservations made for any
* previously delayed allocated clusters.
*/
lblk = EXT4_LBLK_CMASK(sbi, map->m_lblk);
len = allocated_clusters << sbi->s_cluster_bits;
n = ext4_es_delayed_clu(inode, lblk, len);
if (n > 0)
ext4_da_update_reserve_space(inode, (int) n, 0);
}
}
/*
* Cache the extent and update transaction to commit on fdatasync only
* when it is _not_ an unwritten extent.
*/
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT) == 0)
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
else
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 0);
out:
if (allocated > map->m_len)
allocated = map->m_len;
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
map->m_flags |= EXT4_MAP_MAPPED;
map->m_pblk = newblock;
map->m_len = allocated;
out2:
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
trace_ext4_ext_map_blocks_exit(inode, flags, map,
err ? err : allocated);
return err ? err : allocated;
}
Commit Message: ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <sriramr@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 28,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API RFlagItem *r_flag_set(RFlag *f, const char *name, ut64 off, ut32 size) {
RFlagItem *item = NULL;
RList *list;
/* contract fail */
if (!name || !*name) {
return NULL;
}
item = r_flag_get (f, name);
if (item) {
if (item->offset == off) {
item->size = size;
return item;
}
remove_offsetmap (f, item);
} else {
item = R_NEW0 (RFlagItem);
if (!item) {
return NULL;
}
if (!set_name (item, name)) {
eprintf ("Invalid flag name '%s'.\n", name);
r_flag_item_free (item);
return NULL;
}
ht_insert (f->ht_name, item->name, item);
r_list_append (f->flags, item);
}
item->space = f->space_idx;
item->offset = off + f->base;
item->size = size;
list = (RList *)r_flag_get_list (f, off);
if (!list) {
RFlagsAtOffset *flagsAtOffset = R_NEW (RFlagsAtOffset);
list = r_list_new ();
flagsAtOffset->flags = list;
flagsAtOffset->off = off;
r_skiplist_insert (f->by_off, flagsAtOffset);
}
r_list_append (list, item);
return item;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 29,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::DispatchDidStartProvisionalLoad(
DocumentLoader* loader,
ResourceRequest& request) {
if (web_frame_->Client()) {
WrappedResourceRequest wrapped_request(request);
web_frame_->Client()->DidStartProvisionalLoad(
WebDocumentLoaderImpl::FromDocumentLoader(loader), wrapped_request);
}
if (WebDevToolsAgentImpl* dev_tools = DevToolsAgent())
dev_tools->DidStartProvisionalLoad(web_frame_->GetFrame());
virtual_time_pauser_.PauseVirtualTime();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 6,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fuse_request_send_background_locked(struct fuse_conn *fc,
struct fuse_req *req)
{
req->isreply = 1;
fuse_request_send_nowait_locked(fc, req);
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_attach(void *opaque)
{
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
int32_t fid, afid, n_uname;
V9fsString uname, aname;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsQID qid;
ssize_t err;
Error *local_err = NULL;
v9fs_string_init(&uname);
v9fs_string_init(&aname);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "ddssd", &fid,
&afid, &uname, &aname, &n_uname);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_attach(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, afid, uname.data, aname.data);
fidp = alloc_fid(s, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp->uid = n_uname;
err = v9fs_co_name_to_path(pdu, NULL, "/", &fidp->path);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err = fid_to_qid(pdu, fidp, &qid);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
/*
* disable migration if we haven't done already.
* attach could get called multiple times for the same export.
*/
if (!s->migration_blocker) {
error_setg(&s->migration_blocker,
"Migration is disabled when VirtFS export path '%s' is mounted in the guest using mount_tag '%s'",
s->ctx.fs_root ? s->ctx.fs_root : "NULL", s->tag);
err = migrate_add_blocker(s->migration_blocker, &local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_free(local_err);
error_free(s->migration_blocker);
s->migration_blocker = NULL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
s->root_fid = fid;
}
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "Q", &qid);
if (err < 0) {
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err += offset;
memcpy(&s->root_qid, &qid, sizeof(qid));
trace_v9fs_attach_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id,
qid.type, qid.version, qid.path);
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&uname);
v9fs_string_free(&aname);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 7,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __init e820_add_kernel_range(void)
{
u64 start = __pa_symbol(_text);
u64 size = __pa_symbol(_end) - start;
/*
* Complain if .text .data and .bss are not marked as E820_RAM and
* attempt to fix it by adding the range. We may have a confused BIOS,
* or the user may have used memmap=exactmap or memmap=xxM$yyM to
* exclude kernel range. If we really are running on top non-RAM,
* we will crash later anyways.
*/
if (e820_all_mapped(start, start + size, E820_RAM))
return;
pr_warn(".text .data .bss are not marked as E820_RAM!\n");
e820_remove_range(start, size, E820_RAM, 0);
e820_add_region(start, size, E820_RAM);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::StringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_stringAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::StringAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Track::~Track()
{
Info& info = const_cast<Info&>(m_info);
info.Clear();
ContentEncoding** i = content_encoding_entries_;
ContentEncoding** const j = content_encoding_entries_end_;
while (i != j) {
ContentEncoding* const encoding = *i++;
delete encoding;
}
delete [] content_encoding_entries_;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 2,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QVariant QQuickWebView::inputMethodQuery(Qt::InputMethodQuery property) const
{
Q_D(const QQuickWebView);
const EditorState& state = d->webPageProxy->editorState();
switch(property) {
case Qt::ImCursorRectangle:
return QRectF(state.cursorRect);
case Qt::ImFont:
return QVariant();
case Qt::ImCursorPosition:
return QVariant(static_cast<int>(state.cursorPosition));
case Qt::ImAnchorPosition:
return QVariant(static_cast<int>(state.anchorPosition));
case Qt::ImSurroundingText:
return QString(state.surroundingText);
case Qt::ImCurrentSelection:
return QString(state.selectedText);
case Qt::ImMaximumTextLength:
return QVariant(); // No limit.
case Qt::ImHints:
return int(Qt::InputMethodHints(state.inputMethodHints));
default:
return QQuickFlickable::inputMethodQuery(property);
}
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __dn_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_dn *addr, int addrlen, long *timeo, int flags)
{
struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
struct dn_scp *scp = DN_SK(sk);
int err = -EISCONN;
struct flowidn fld;
struct dst_entry *dst;
if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTED)
goto out;
if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTING) {
err = 0;
if (scp->state == DN_RUN) {
sock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
goto out;
}
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
if (scp->state != DN_CI && scp->state != DN_CC) {
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
goto out;
}
return dn_wait_run(sk, timeo);
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (scp->state != DN_O)
goto out;
if (addr == NULL || addrlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_dn))
goto out;
if (addr->sdn_family != AF_DECnet)
goto out;
if (addr->sdn_flags & SDF_WILD)
goto out;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)) {
err = dn_auto_bind(sk->sk_socket);
if (err)
goto out;
}
memcpy(&scp->peer, addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_dn));
err = -EHOSTUNREACH;
memset(&fld, 0, sizeof(fld));
fld.flowidn_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fld.daddr = dn_saddr2dn(&scp->peer);
fld.saddr = dn_saddr2dn(&scp->addr);
dn_sk_ports_copy(&fld, scp);
fld.flowidn_proto = DNPROTO_NSP;
if (dn_route_output_sock(&sk->sk_dst_cache, &fld, sk, flags) < 0)
goto out;
dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
sk->sk_route_caps = dst->dev->features;
sock->state = SS_CONNECTING;
scp->state = DN_CI;
scp->segsize_loc = dst_metric_advmss(dst);
dn_nsp_send_conninit(sk, NSP_CI);
err = -EINPROGRESS;
if (*timeo) {
err = dn_wait_run(sk, timeo);
}
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_table_width(struct table *t, short *newwidth, int maxwidth)
{
int i, j, k, bcol, ecol;
struct table_cell *cell = &t->cell;
char *fixed;
int swidth, fwidth, width, nvar;
double s;
double *dwidth;
int try_again;
fixed = NewAtom_N(char, t->maxcol + 1);
bzero(fixed, t->maxcol + 1);
dwidth = NewAtom_N(double, t->maxcol + 1);
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i++) {
dwidth[i] = 0.0;
if (t->fixed_width[i] < 0) {
t->fixed_width[i] = -t->fixed_width[i] * maxwidth / 100;
}
if (t->fixed_width[i] > 0) {
newwidth[i] = t->fixed_width[i];
fixed[i] = 1;
}
else
newwidth[i] = 0;
if (newwidth[i] < t->minimum_width[i])
newwidth[i] = t->minimum_width[i];
}
for (k = 0; k <= cell->maxcell; k++) {
j = cell->indexarray[k];
bcol = cell->col[j];
ecol = bcol + cell->colspan[j];
if (cell->fixed_width[j] < 0)
cell->fixed_width[j] = -cell->fixed_width[j] * maxwidth / 100;
swidth = 0;
fwidth = 0;
nvar = 0;
for (i = bcol; i < ecol; i++) {
if (fixed[i]) {
fwidth += newwidth[i];
}
else {
swidth += newwidth[i];
nvar++;
}
}
width = max(cell->fixed_width[j], cell->minimum_width[j])
- (cell->colspan[j] - 1) * t->cellspacing;
if (nvar > 0 && width > fwidth + swidth) {
s = 0.;
for (i = bcol; i < ecol; i++) {
if (!fixed[i])
s += weight3(t->tabwidth[i]);
}
for (i = bcol; i < ecol; i++) {
if (!fixed[i])
dwidth[i] = (width - fwidth) * weight3(t->tabwidth[i]) / s;
else
dwidth[i] = (double)newwidth[i];
}
dv2sv(dwidth, newwidth, cell->colspan[j]);
if (cell->fixed_width[j] > 0) {
for (i = bcol; i < ecol; i++)
fixed[i] = 1;
}
}
}
do {
nvar = 0;
swidth = 0;
fwidth = 0;
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i++) {
if (fixed[i]) {
fwidth += newwidth[i];
}
else {
swidth += newwidth[i];
nvar++;
}
}
width = maxwidth - t->maxcol * t->cellspacing;
if (nvar == 0 || width <= fwidth + swidth)
break;
s = 0.;
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i++) {
if (!fixed[i])
s += weight3(t->tabwidth[i]);
}
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i++) {
if (!fixed[i])
dwidth[i] = (width - fwidth) * weight3(t->tabwidth[i]) / s;
else
dwidth[i] = (double)newwidth[i];
}
dv2sv(dwidth, newwidth, t->maxcol + 1);
try_again = 0;
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i++) {
if (!fixed[i]) {
if (newwidth[i] > t->tabwidth[i]) {
newwidth[i] = t->tabwidth[i];
fixed[i] = 1;
try_again = 1;
}
else if (newwidth[i] < t->minimum_width[i]) {
newwidth[i] = t->minimum_width[i];
fixed[i] = 1;
try_again = 1;
}
}
}
} while (try_again);
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool vmci_transport_is_trusted(struct vsock_sock *vsock, u32 peer_cid)
{
return vsock->trusted ||
vmci_is_context_owner(peer_cid, vsock->owner->uid);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 26,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FS_Dir_f( void ) {
char *path;
char *extension;
char **dirnames;
int ndirs;
int i;
if ( Cmd_Argc() < 2 || Cmd_Argc() > 3 ) {
Com_Printf( "usage: dir <directory> [extension]\n" );
return;
}
if ( Cmd_Argc() == 2 ) {
path = Cmd_Argv( 1 );
extension = "";
} else {
path = Cmd_Argv( 1 );
extension = Cmd_Argv( 2 );
}
Com_Printf( "Directory of %s %s\n", path, extension );
Com_Printf( "---------------\n" );
dirnames = FS_ListFiles( path, extension, &ndirs );
for ( i = 0; i < ndirs; i++ ) {
Com_Printf( "%s\n", dirnames[i] );
}
FS_FreeFileList( dirnames );
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 22,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::PrepareYUVATextureIndices(
const std::vector<ImageContext*>& contexts,
bool has_alpha,
SkYUVAIndex indices[4]) {
DCHECK((has_alpha && (contexts.size() == 3 || contexts.size() == 4)) ||
(!has_alpha && (contexts.size() == 2 || contexts.size() == 3)));
bool uv_interleaved = has_alpha ? contexts.size() == 3 : contexts.size() == 2;
indices[SkYUVAIndex::kY_Index].fIndex = 0;
indices[SkYUVAIndex::kY_Index].fChannel = SkColorChannel::kR;
if (uv_interleaved) {
indices[SkYUVAIndex::kU_Index].fIndex = 1;
indices[SkYUVAIndex::kU_Index].fChannel = SkColorChannel::kR;
indices[SkYUVAIndex::kV_Index].fIndex = 1;
indices[SkYUVAIndex::kV_Index].fChannel = SkColorChannel::kG;
indices[SkYUVAIndex::kA_Index].fIndex = has_alpha ? 2 : -1;
indices[SkYUVAIndex::kA_Index].fChannel = SkColorChannel::kR;
} else {
indices[SkYUVAIndex::kU_Index].fIndex = 1;
indices[SkYUVAIndex::kU_Index].fChannel = SkColorChannel::kR;
indices[SkYUVAIndex::kV_Index].fIndex = 2;
indices[SkYUVAIndex::kV_Index].fChannel = SkColorChannel::kR;
indices[SkYUVAIndex::kA_Index].fIndex = has_alpha ? 3 : -1;
indices[SkYUVAIndex::kA_Index].fChannel = SkColorChannel::kR;
}
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 11,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::vector<std::string> GetOutputNames(const std::vector<XID>& output_ids) {
std::vector<std::string> names;
Display* display = GetXDisplay();
Window root_window = DefaultRootWindow(display);
XRRScreenResources* screen_resources =
XRRGetScreenResources(display, root_window);
for (std::vector<XID>::const_iterator iter = output_ids.begin();
iter != output_ids.end(); ++iter) {
XRROutputInfo* output =
XRRGetOutputInfo(display, screen_resources, *iter);
names.push_back(std::string(output->name));
XRRFreeOutputInfo(output);
}
XRRFreeScreenResources(screen_resources);
return names;
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct urb *simple_alloc_urb(
struct usb_device *udev,
int pipe,
unsigned long bytes,
u8 bInterval)
{
return usbtest_alloc_urb(udev, pipe, bytes, URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP, 0,
bInterval, simple_callback);
}
Commit Message: usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 17,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: job_notify_hf_index(int field)
{
int result = -1;
switch(field) {
case JOB_NOTIFY_PRINTER_NAME:
result = hf_printername;
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_MACHINE_NAME:
result = hf_machinename;
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_PORT_NAME:
result = hf_portname;
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_USER_NAME:
result = hf_username;
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_NOTIFY_NAME:
result = hf_notifyname;
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_DATATYPE:
result = hf_datatype;
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_PRINT_PROCESSOR:
result = hf_printprocessor;
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_DRIVER_NAME:
result = hf_drivername;
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_DOCUMENT:
result = hf_documentname;
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_PRIORITY:
result = hf_job_priority;
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_POSITION:
result = hf_job_position;
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_TOTAL_PAGES:
result = hf_job_totalpages;
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_PAGES_PRINTED:
result = hf_job_pagesprinted;
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_TOTAL_BYTES:
result = hf_job_totalbytes;
break;
case JOB_NOTIFY_BYTES_PRINTED:
result = hf_job_bytesprinted;
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
int retval;
kgid_t kgid;
kgid = make_kgid(ns, gid);
if (!gid_valid(kgid))
return -EINVAL;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
old = current_cred();
retval = -EPERM;
if (nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid;
else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid))
new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid;
else
goto error;
return commit_creds(new);
error:
abort_creds(new);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-16 | 0 | 458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Attribute* UniqueElementData::attributeItem(unsigned index)
{
ASSERT_WITH_SECURITY_IMPLICATION(index < length());
return &m_attributeVector.at(index);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutoFillManager::DeterminePossibleFieldTypesForUpload(
FormStructure* submitted_form) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < submitted_form->field_count(); i++) {
const AutoFillField* field = submitted_form->field(i);
FieldTypeSet field_types;
personal_data_->GetPossibleFieldTypes(field->value(), &field_types);
DCHECK(!field_types.empty());
submitted_form->set_possible_types(i, field_types);
}
}
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mem_cgroup_reset_owner(struct page *newpage)
{
struct page_cgroup *pc;
if (mem_cgroup_disabled())
return;
pc = lookup_page_cgroup(newpage);
VM_BUG_ON(PageCgroupUsed(pc));
pc->mem_cgroup = root_mem_cgroup;
}
Commit Message: mm: memcg: Correct unregistring of events attached to the same eventfd
There is an issue when memcg unregisters events that were attached to
the same eventfd:
- On the first call mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() removes all
events attached to a given eventfd, and if there were no events left,
thresholds->primary would become NULL;
- Since there were several events registered, cgroups core will call
mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() again, but now kernel will oops,
as the function doesn't expect that threshold->primary may be NULL.
That's a good question whether mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event()
should actually remove all events in one go, but nowadays it can't
do any better as cftype->unregister_event callback doesn't pass
any private event-associated cookie. So, let's fix the issue by
simply checking for threshold->primary.
FWIW, w/o the patch the following oops may be observed:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
IP: [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
Pid: 574, comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.3.0-rc4+ #9 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810be32c>] [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88001d0b9d60 EFLAGS: 00010246
Process kworker/0:2 (pid: 574, threadinfo ffff88001d0b8000, task ffff88001de91cc0)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8107092b>] cgroup_event_remove+0x2b/0x60
[<ffffffff8103db94>] process_one_work+0x174/0x450
[<ffffffff8103e413>] worker_thread+0x123/0x2d0
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anton Vorontsov <anton.vorontsov@linaro.org>
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_SHZ( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
TT_GlyphZoneRec zp;
FT_UShort refp;
FT_F26Dot6 dx,
dy;
FT_UShort limit, i;
if ( BOUNDS( args[0], 2 ) )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
return;
}
if ( Compute_Point_Displacement( exc, &dx, &dy, &zp, &refp ) )
return;
/* XXX: UNDOCUMENTED! SHZ doesn't move the phantom points. */
/* Twilight zone has no real contours, so use `n_points'. */
/* Normal zone's `n_points' includes phantoms, so must */
/* use end of last contour. */
if ( exc->GS.gep2 == 0 )
limit = (FT_UShort)exc->zp2.n_points;
else if ( exc->GS.gep2 == 1 && exc->zp2.n_contours > 0 )
limit = (FT_UShort)( exc->zp2.contours[exc->zp2.n_contours - 1] + 1 );
else
limit = 0;
/* XXX: UNDOCUMENTED! SHZ doesn't touch the points */
for ( i = 0; i < limit; i++ )
{
if ( zp.cur != exc->zp2.cur || refp != i )
Move_Zp2_Point( exc, i, dx, dy, FALSE );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 26,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TextureManager::Restore(TextureInfo* info,
TextureDefinition* definition) {
DCHECK(info->owned_);
scoped_ptr<TextureDefinition> scoped_definition(definition);
if (info->IsAttachedToFramebuffer())
return false;
if (info->IsImmutable())
return false;
if (info->target() != definition->target())
return false;
if (info->level_infos_.size() != definition->level_infos().size())
return false;
if (info->level_infos_[0].size() != definition->level_infos()[0].size())
return false;
for (size_t face = 0; face < info->level_infos_.size(); ++face) {
GLenum target = info->target() == GL_TEXTURE_2D ?
GL_TEXTURE_2D : FaceIndexToGLTarget(face);
for (size_t level = 0; level < info->level_infos_[face].size(); ++level) {
const TextureDefinition::LevelInfo& level_info =
definition->level_infos()[face][level];
SetLevelInfo(info,
target,
level,
level_info.internal_format,
level_info.width,
level_info.height,
level_info.depth,
level_info.border,
level_info.format,
level_info.type,
level_info.cleared);
}
}
GLuint old_service_id = info->service_id();
glDeleteTextures(1, &old_service_id);
info->SetServiceId(definition->ReleaseServiceId());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 25,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, contains)
{
zval *obj;
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = Z_SPLOBJSTORAGE_P(getThis());
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "o", &obj) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(spl_object_storage_contains(intern, getThis(), obj));
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int SplObjectStorage::count()
Commit Message: Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void trap_errors(void)
{
trapped_error_code = 0;
old_error_handler = XSetErrorHandler(error_handler);
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 12,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Verify_FindNoMainResponse() {
EXPECT_EQ(kEntryUrl, delegate()->found_url_);
EXPECT_TRUE(delegate()->found_manifest_url_.is_empty());
EXPECT_EQ(blink::mojom::kAppCacheNoCacheId, delegate()->found_cache_id_);
EXPECT_EQ(blink::mojom::kAppCacheNoResponseId,
delegate()->found_entry_.response_id());
EXPECT_EQ(blink::mojom::kAppCacheNoResponseId,
delegate()->found_fallback_entry_.response_id());
EXPECT_TRUE(delegate()->found_namespace_entry_url_.is_empty());
EXPECT_EQ(0, delegate()->found_entry_.types());
EXPECT_EQ(0, delegate()->found_fallback_entry_.types());
TestFinished();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iperf_send(struct iperf_test *test, fd_set *write_setP)
{
register int multisend, r, streams_active;
register struct iperf_stream *sp;
struct timeval now;
/* Can we do multisend mode? */
if (test->settings->burst != 0)
multisend = test->settings->burst;
else if (test->settings->rate == 0)
multisend = test->multisend;
else
multisend = 1; /* nope */
for (; multisend > 0; --multisend) {
if (test->settings->rate != 0 && test->settings->burst == 0)
gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
streams_active = 0;
SLIST_FOREACH(sp, &test->streams, streams) {
if (sp->green_light &&
(write_setP == NULL || FD_ISSET(sp->socket, write_setP))) {
if ((r = sp->snd(sp)) < 0) {
if (r == NET_SOFTERROR)
break;
i_errno = IESTREAMWRITE;
return r;
}
streams_active = 1;
test->bytes_sent += r;
++test->blocks_sent;
if (test->settings->rate != 0 && test->settings->burst == 0)
iperf_check_throttle(sp, &now);
if (multisend > 1 && test->settings->bytes != 0 && test->bytes_sent >= test->settings->bytes)
break;
if (multisend > 1 && test->settings->blocks != 0 && test->blocks_sent >= test->settings->blocks)
break;
}
}
if (!streams_active)
break;
}
if (test->settings->burst != 0) {
gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
SLIST_FOREACH(sp, &test->streams, streams)
iperf_check_throttle(sp, &now);
}
if (write_setP != NULL)
SLIST_FOREACH(sp, &test->streams, streams)
if (FD_ISSET(sp->socket, write_setP))
FD_CLR(sp->socket, write_setP);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TextTrack::IsVisualKind() const {
return kind() == SubtitlesKeyword() || kind() == CaptionsKeyword();
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool venc_dev::venc_loaded_start()
{
return true;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 12,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlSAXParseDTD(xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax, const xmlChar *ExternalID,
const xmlChar *SystemID) {
xmlDtdPtr ret = NULL;
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
xmlParserInputPtr input = NULL;
xmlCharEncoding enc;
xmlChar* systemIdCanonic;
if ((ExternalID == NULL) && (SystemID == NULL)) return(NULL);
ctxt = xmlNewParserCtxt();
if (ctxt == NULL) {
return(NULL);
}
/* We are loading a DTD */
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD;
/*
* Set-up the SAX context
*/
if (sax != NULL) {
if (ctxt->sax != NULL)
xmlFree(ctxt->sax);
ctxt->sax = sax;
ctxt->userData = ctxt;
}
/*
* Canonicalise the system ID
*/
systemIdCanonic = xmlCanonicPath(SystemID);
if ((SystemID != NULL) && (systemIdCanonic == NULL)) {
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* Ask the Entity resolver to load the damn thing
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->resolveEntity != NULL))
input = ctxt->sax->resolveEntity(ctxt->userData, ExternalID,
systemIdCanonic);
if (input == NULL) {
if (sax != NULL) ctxt->sax = NULL;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
if (systemIdCanonic != NULL)
xmlFree(systemIdCanonic);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* plug some encoding conversion routines here.
*/
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0) {
if (sax != NULL) ctxt->sax = NULL;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
if (systemIdCanonic != NULL)
xmlFree(systemIdCanonic);
return(NULL);
}
if ((ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur) >= 4) {
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding(ctxt->input->cur, 4);
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
}
if (input->filename == NULL)
input->filename = (char *) systemIdCanonic;
else
xmlFree(systemIdCanonic);
input->line = 1;
input->col = 1;
input->base = ctxt->input->cur;
input->cur = ctxt->input->cur;
input->free = NULL;
/*
* let's parse that entity knowing it's an external subset.
*/
ctxt->inSubset = 2;
ctxt->myDoc = xmlNewDoc(BAD_CAST "1.0");
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "New Doc failed");
if (sax != NULL) ctxt->sax = NULL;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(NULL);
}
ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
ctxt->myDoc->extSubset = xmlNewDtd(ctxt->myDoc, BAD_CAST "none",
ExternalID, SystemID);
xmlParseExternalSubset(ctxt, ExternalID, SystemID);
if (ctxt->myDoc != NULL) {
if (ctxt->wellFormed) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc->extSubset;
ctxt->myDoc->extSubset = NULL;
if (ret != NULL) {
xmlNodePtr tmp;
ret->doc = NULL;
tmp = ret->children;
while (tmp != NULL) {
tmp->doc = NULL;
tmp = tmp->next;
}
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
}
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
if (sax != NULL) ctxt->sax = NULL;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 6,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void get_descriptor_table_ptr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 selector, struct desc_ptr *dt)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
u32 base3 = 0;
if (selector & 1 << 2) {
struct desc_struct desc;
u16 sel;
memset (dt, 0, sizeof *dt);
if (!ops->get_segment(ctxt, &sel, &desc, &base3,
VCPU_SREG_LDTR))
return;
dt->size = desc_limit_scaled(&desc); /* what if limit > 65535? */
dt->address = get_desc_base(&desc) | ((u64)base3 << 32);
} else
ops->get_gdt(ctxt, dt);
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DictionaryValue* CommitResponseToValue(const sync_pb::CommitResponse& proto) {
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue();
SET_REP(entryresponse, EntryResponseToValue);
return value;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 8,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoRequestExtensionCHROMIUM(
const char* extension) {
api()->glRequestExtensionANGLEFn(extension);
FlushErrors();
context_->ReinitializeDynamicBindings();
feature_info_->Initialize(
feature_info_->context_type(), true /* is_passthrough_cmd_decoder */,
feature_info_->disallowed_features(), true /* force_reinitialize */);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 6,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rsvg_acquire_file_data (const char *filename,
const char *base_uri,
char **out_mime_type,
gsize *out_len,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GError **error)
{
gchar *path, *data;
gsize len;
char *content_type;
rsvg_return_val_if_fail (filename != NULL, NULL, error);
g_assert (out_len != NULL);
path = _rsvg_io_get_file_path (filename, base_uri);
if (path == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!g_file_get_contents (path, &data, &len, error)) {
g_free (path);
return NULL;
}
if (out_mime_type &&
(content_type = g_content_type_guess (path, (guchar *) data, len, NULL))) {
*out_mime_type = g_content_type_get_mime_type (content_type);
g_free (content_type);
}
g_free (path);
*out_len = len;
return data;
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible credentials leaking reported by Alex Birsan.
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_print_exec (struct t_gui_buffer *buffer, struct t_gui_line *line)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook, *next_hook;
char *prefix_no_color, *message_no_color;
int tags_match, tag_found, i, j;
if (!line->data->message || !line->data->message[0])
return;
prefix_no_color = (line->data->prefix) ?
gui_color_decode (line->data->prefix, NULL) : NULL;
message_no_color = gui_color_decode (line->data->message, NULL);
if (!message_no_color)
{
if (prefix_no_color)
free (prefix_no_color);
return;
}
hook_exec_start ();
ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_PRINT];
while (ptr_hook)
{
next_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook;
if (!ptr_hook->deleted
&& !ptr_hook->running
&& (!HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, buffer)
|| (buffer == HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, buffer)))
&& (!HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, message)
|| !HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, message)[0]
|| string_strcasestr (prefix_no_color, HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, message))
|| string_strcasestr (message_no_color, HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, message))))
{
/* check if tags match */
if (HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, tags_array))
{
/* if there are tags in message printed */
if (line->data->tags_array)
{
tags_match = 1;
for (i = 0; i < HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, tags_count); i++)
{
/* search for tag in message */
tag_found = 0;
for (j = 0; j < line->data->tags_count; j++)
{
if (string_strcasecmp (HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, tags_array)[i],
line->data->tags_array[j]) == 0)
{
tag_found = 1;
break;
}
}
/* tag was asked by hook but not found in message? */
if (!tag_found)
{
tags_match = 0;
break;
}
}
}
else
tags_match = 0;
}
else
tags_match = 1;
/* run callback */
if (tags_match)
{
ptr_hook->running = 1;
(void) (HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, callback))
(ptr_hook->callback_data, buffer, line->data->date,
line->data->tags_count,
(const char **)line->data->tags_array,
(int)line->data->displayed, (int)line->data->highlight,
(HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, strip_colors)) ? prefix_no_color : line->data->prefix,
(HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, strip_colors)) ? message_no_color : line->data->message);
ptr_hook->running = 0;
}
}
ptr_hook = next_hook;
}
if (prefix_no_color)
free (prefix_no_color);
if (message_no_color)
free (message_no_color);
hook_exec_end ();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct page *alloc_huge_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr, int avoid_reserve)
{
struct hugepage_subpool *spool = subpool_vma(vma);
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
struct page *page;
long chg;
/*
* Processes that did not create the mapping will have no
* reserves and will not have accounted against subpool
* limit. Check that the subpool limit can be made before
* satisfying the allocation MAP_NORESERVE mappings may also
* need pages and subpool limit allocated allocated if no reserve
* mapping overlaps.
*/
chg = vma_needs_reservation(h, vma, addr);
if (chg < 0)
return ERR_PTR(-VM_FAULT_OOM);
if (chg)
if (hugepage_subpool_get_pages(spool, chg))
return ERR_PTR(-VM_FAULT_SIGBUS);
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
page = dequeue_huge_page_vma(h, vma, addr, avoid_reserve);
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (!page) {
page = alloc_buddy_huge_page(h, NUMA_NO_NODE);
if (!page) {
hugepage_subpool_put_pages(spool, chg);
return ERR_PTR(-VM_FAULT_SIGBUS);
}
}
set_page_private(page, (unsigned long)spool);
vma_commit_reservation(h, vma, addr);
return page;
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::CancelPendingIfNecessary(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host) {
if (render_frame_host == pending_render_frame_host_.get())
CancelPending();
else if (render_frame_host == speculative_render_frame_host_.get()) {
if (frame_tree_node_->navigation_request() &&
frame_tree_node_->navigation_request()->navigation_handle()) {
frame_tree_node_->navigation_request()
->navigation_handle()
->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_ABORTED);
}
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_proc_set_acl(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(inode),
__nfs4_proc_set_acl(inode, buf, buflen),
&exception);
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 15,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int isofs_get_last_session(struct super_block *sb, s32 session)
{
struct cdrom_multisession ms_info;
unsigned int vol_desc_start;
struct block_device *bdev = sb->s_bdev;
int i;
vol_desc_start=0;
ms_info.addr_format=CDROM_LBA;
if(session >= 0 && session <= 99) {
struct cdrom_tocentry Te;
Te.cdte_track=session;
Te.cdte_format=CDROM_LBA;
i = ioctl_by_bdev(bdev, CDROMREADTOCENTRY, (unsigned long) &Te);
if (!i) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "ISOFS: Session %d start %d type %d\n",
session, Te.cdte_addr.lba,
Te.cdte_ctrl&CDROM_DATA_TRACK);
if ((Te.cdte_ctrl&CDROM_DATA_TRACK) == 4)
return Te.cdte_addr.lba;
}
printk(KERN_ERR "ISOFS: Invalid session number or type of track\n");
}
i = ioctl_by_bdev(bdev, CDROMMULTISESSION, (unsigned long) &ms_info);
if (session > 0)
printk(KERN_ERR "ISOFS: Invalid session number\n");
#if 0
printk(KERN_DEBUG "isofs.inode: CDROMMULTISESSION: rc=%d\n",i);
if (i==0) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "isofs.inode: XA disk: %s\n",ms_info.xa_flag?"yes":"no");
printk(KERN_DEBUG "isofs.inode: vol_desc_start = %d\n", ms_info.addr.lba);
}
#endif
if (i==0)
#if WE_OBEY_THE_WRITTEN_STANDARDS
if (ms_info.xa_flag) /* necessary for a valid ms_info.addr */
#endif
vol_desc_start=ms_info.addr.lba;
return vol_desc_start;
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix unbounded recursion when processing relocated directories
We did not check relocated directory in any way when processing Rock
Ridge 'CL' tag. Thus a corrupted isofs image can possibly have a CL
entry pointing to another CL entry leading to possibly unbounded
recursion in kernel code and thus stack overflow or deadlocks (if there
is a loop created from CL entries).
Fix the problem by not allowing CL entry to point to a directory entry
with CL entry (such use makes no good sense anyway) and by checking
whether CL entry doesn't point to itself.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chris Evans <cevans@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(krb5_context context,
krb5_data *secret,
krb5_data *alg_oid,
krb5_const_principal party_u_info,
krb5_const_principal party_v_info,
krb5_enctype enctype,
krb5_data *as_req,
krb5_data *pk_as_rep,
krb5_keyblock *key_block)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
unsigned int reps = 0;
uint32_t counter = 1; /* Does this type work on Windows? */
size_t offset = 0;
size_t hash_len = 0;
size_t rand_len = 0;
size_t key_len = 0;
krb5_data random_data;
krb5_sp80056a_other_info other_info_fields;
krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info supp_pub_info_fields;
krb5_data *other_info = NULL;
krb5_data *supp_pub_info = NULL;
krb5_algorithm_identifier alg_id;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
const EVP_MD *(*EVP_func)(void);
/* initialize random_data here to make clean-up safe */
random_data.length = 0;
random_data.data = NULL;
/* allocate and initialize the key block */
key_block->magic = 0;
key_block->enctype = enctype;
if (0 != (retval = krb5_c_keylengths(context, enctype, &rand_len,
&key_len)))
goto cleanup;
random_data.length = rand_len;
key_block->length = key_len;
if (NULL == (key_block->contents = malloc(key_block->length))) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memset (key_block->contents, 0, key_block->length);
/* If this is anonymous pkinit, use the anonymous principle for party_u_info */
if (party_u_info && krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(context, party_u_info,
krb5_anonymous_principal()))
party_u_info = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
if (0 != (retval = pkinit_alg_values(context, alg_oid, &hash_len, &EVP_func)))
goto cleanup;
/* 1. reps = keydatalen (K) / hash length (H) */
reps = key_block->length/hash_len;
/* ... and round up, if necessary */
if (key_block->length > (reps * hash_len))
reps++;
/* Allocate enough space in the random data buffer to hash directly into
* it, even if the last hash will make it bigger than the key length. */
if (NULL == (random_data.data = malloc(reps * hash_len))) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Encode the ASN.1 octet string for "SuppPubInfo" */
supp_pub_info_fields.enctype = enctype;
supp_pub_info_fields.as_req = *as_req;
supp_pub_info_fields.pk_as_rep = *pk_as_rep;
if (0 != ((retval = encode_krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info(&supp_pub_info_fields,
&supp_pub_info))))
goto cleanup;
/* Now encode the ASN.1 octet string for "OtherInfo" */
memset(&alg_id, 0, sizeof alg_id);
alg_id.algorithm = *alg_oid; /*alias*/
other_info_fields.algorithm_identifier = alg_id;
other_info_fields.party_u_info = (krb5_principal) party_u_info;
other_info_fields.party_v_info = (krb5_principal) party_v_info;
other_info_fields.supp_pub_info = *supp_pub_info;
if (0 != (retval = encode_krb5_sp80056a_other_info(&other_info_fields, &other_info)))
goto cleanup;
/* 2. Initialize a 32-bit, big-endian bit string counter as 1.
* 3. For i = 1 to reps by 1, do the following:
* - Compute Hashi = H(counter || Z || OtherInfo).
* - Increment counter (modulo 2^32)
*/
for (counter = 1; counter <= reps; counter++) {
uint s = 0;
uint32_t be_counter = htonl(counter);
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* - Compute Hashi = H(counter || Z || OtherInfo). */
if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_func())) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
"Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestInit() returned an error.");
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &be_counter, 4) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, secret->data, secret->length) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, other_info->data, other_info->length)) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
"Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestUpdate() returned an error.");
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* 4. Set key = Hash1 || Hash2 || ... so that length of key is K bytes. */
if (!EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, (uint8_t *)random_data.data + offset, &s)) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
"Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestUpdate() returned an error.");
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
offset += s;
assert(s == hash_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
}
retval = krb5_c_random_to_key(context, enctype, &random_data,
key_block);
cleanup:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
/* If this has been an error, free the allocated key_block, if any */
if (retval) {
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, key_block);
}
/* free other allocated resources, either way */
if (random_data.data)
free(random_data.data);
krb5_free_data(context, other_info);
krb5_free_data(context, supp_pub_info);
return retval;
} /*pkinit_alg_agility_kdf() */
Commit Message: Fix PKINIT cert matching data construction
Rewrite X509_NAME_oneline_ex() and its call sites to use dynamic
allocation and to perform proper error checking.
ticket: 8617
target_version: 1.16
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool DetectRunTxInspectRule(ThreadVars *tv,
DetectEngineCtx *de_ctx,
DetectEngineThreadCtx *det_ctx,
Packet *p,
Flow *f,
const uint8_t in_flow_flags, // direction, EOF, etc
void *alstate,
DetectTransaction *tx,
const Signature *s,
uint32_t *stored_flags,
RuleMatchCandidateTx *can,
DetectRunScratchpad *scratch)
{
uint8_t flow_flags = in_flow_flags;
const int direction = (flow_flags & STREAM_TOSERVER) ? 0 : 1;
uint32_t inspect_flags = stored_flags ? *stored_flags : 0;
int total_matches = 0;
int file_no_match = 0;
bool retval = false;
bool mpm_before_progress = false; // is mpm engine before progress?
bool mpm_in_progress = false; // is mpm engine in a buffer we will revisit?
/* see if we want to pass on the FLUSH flag */
if ((s->flags & SIG_FLAG_FLUSH) == 0)
flow_flags &=~ STREAM_FLUSH;
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "starting %s", direction ? "toclient" : "toserver");
/* for a new inspection we inspect pkt header and packet matches */
if (likely(stored_flags == NULL)) {
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "first inspect, run packet matches");
if (DetectRunInspectRuleHeader(p, f, s, s->flags, s->proto.flags) == 0) {
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "DetectRunInspectRuleHeader() no match");
return false;
}
if (DetectRunInspectRulePacketMatches(tv, det_ctx, p, f, s) == 0) {
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "DetectRunInspectRulePacketMatches no match");
return false;
}
/* stream mpm and negated mpm sigs can end up here with wrong proto */
if (!(f->alproto == s->alproto || s->alproto == ALPROTO_UNKNOWN)) {
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "alproto mismatch");
return false;
}
}
const DetectEngineAppInspectionEngine *engine = s->app_inspect;
while (engine != NULL) { // TODO could be do {} while as s->app_inspect cannot be null
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "engine %p inspect_flags %x", engine, inspect_flags);
if (!(inspect_flags & BIT_U32(engine->id)) &&
direction == engine->dir)
{
const bool skip_engine = (engine->alproto != 0 && engine->alproto != f->alproto);
/* special case: file_data on 'alert tcp' will have engines
* in the list that are not for us. */
if (unlikely(skip_engine)) {
engine = engine->next;
continue;
}
/* engines are sorted per progress, except that the one with
* mpm/prefilter enabled is first */
if (tx->tx_progress < engine->progress) {
SCLogDebug("tx progress %d < engine progress %d",
tx->tx_progress, engine->progress);
break;
}
if (engine->mpm) {
if (tx->tx_progress > engine->progress) {
mpm_before_progress = true;
} else if (tx->tx_progress == engine->progress) {
mpm_in_progress = true;
}
}
/* run callback: but bypass stream callback if we can */
int match;
if (unlikely(engine->stream && can->stream_stored)) {
match = can->stream_result;
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "stream skipped, stored result %d used instead", match);
} else {
KEYWORD_PROFILING_SET_LIST(det_ctx, engine->sm_list);
if (engine->Callback) {
match = engine->Callback(tv, de_ctx, det_ctx,
s, engine->smd, f, flow_flags, alstate, tx->tx_ptr, tx->tx_id);
} else {
BUG_ON(engine->v2.Callback == NULL);
match = engine->v2.Callback(de_ctx, det_ctx, engine,
s, f, flow_flags, alstate, tx->tx_ptr, tx->tx_id);
}
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "engine %p match %d", engine, match);
if (engine->stream) {
can->stream_stored = true;
can->stream_result = match;
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "stream ran, store result %d for next tx (if any)", match);
}
}
if (match == DETECT_ENGINE_INSPECT_SIG_MATCH) {
inspect_flags |= BIT_U32(engine->id);
engine = engine->next;
total_matches++;
continue;
} else if (match == DETECT_ENGINE_INSPECT_SIG_MATCH_MORE_FILES) {
/* if the file engine matched, but indicated more
* files are still in progress, we don't set inspect
* flags as these would end inspection for this tx */
engine = engine->next;
total_matches++;
continue;
} else if (match == DETECT_ENGINE_INSPECT_SIG_CANT_MATCH) {
inspect_flags |= DE_STATE_FLAG_SIG_CANT_MATCH;
inspect_flags |= BIT_U32(engine->id);
} else if (match == DETECT_ENGINE_INSPECT_SIG_CANT_MATCH_FILESTORE) {
inspect_flags |= DE_STATE_FLAG_SIG_CANT_MATCH;
inspect_flags |= BIT_U32(engine->id);
file_no_match = 1;
}
/* implied DETECT_ENGINE_INSPECT_SIG_NO_MATCH */
if (engine->mpm && mpm_before_progress) {
inspect_flags |= DE_STATE_FLAG_SIG_CANT_MATCH;
inspect_flags |= BIT_U32(engine->id);
}
break;
}
engine = engine->next;
}
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "inspect_flags %x, total_matches %u, engine %p",
inspect_flags, total_matches, engine);
if (engine == NULL && total_matches) {
inspect_flags |= DE_STATE_FLAG_FULL_INSPECT;
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "MATCH");
retval = true;
}
if (stored_flags) {
*stored_flags = inspect_flags;
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "continue inspect flags %08x", inspect_flags);
} else {
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "start inspect flags %08x", inspect_flags);
if (inspect_flags & DE_STATE_FLAG_SIG_CANT_MATCH) {
if (file_no_match) {
/* if we have a mismatch on a file sig, we need to keep state.
* We may get another file on the same tx (for http and smtp
* at least), so for a new file we need to re-eval the sig.
* Thoughts / TODO:
* - not for some protos that have 1 file per tx (e.g. nfs)
* - maybe we only need this for file sigs that mix with
* other matches? E.g. 'POST + filename', is different than
* just 'filename'.
*/
DetectRunStoreStateTx(scratch->sgh, f, tx->tx_ptr, tx->tx_id, s,
inspect_flags, flow_flags, file_no_match);
}
} else if ((inspect_flags & DE_STATE_FLAG_FULL_INSPECT) && mpm_before_progress) {
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "no need to store match sig, "
"mpm won't trigger for it anymore");
if (inspect_flags & DE_STATE_FLAG_FILE_INSPECT) {
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "except that for new files, "
"we may have to revisit anyway");
DetectRunStoreStateTx(scratch->sgh, f, tx->tx_ptr, tx->tx_id, s,
inspect_flags, flow_flags, file_no_match);
}
} else if ((inspect_flags & DE_STATE_FLAG_FULL_INSPECT) == 0 && mpm_in_progress) {
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "no need to store no-match sig, "
"mpm will revisit it");
} else {
TRACE_SID_TXS(s->id, tx, "storing state: flags %08x", inspect_flags);
DetectRunStoreStateTx(scratch->sgh, f, tx->tx_ptr, tx->tx_id, s,
inspect_flags, flow_flags, file_no_match);
}
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: stream: fix false negative on bad RST
If a bad RST was received the stream inspection would not happen
for that packet, but it would still move the 'raw progress' tracker
forward. Following good packets would then fail to detect anything
before the 'raw progress' position.
Bug #2770
Reported-by: Alexey Vishnyakov
CWE ID: CWE-347 | 0 | 20,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Value* CreateChoiceData(const Experiment& experiment,
const std::set<std::string>& enabled_experiments) {
DCHECK_EQ(Experiment::MULTI_VALUE, experiment.type);
ListValue* result = new ListValue;
for (int i = 0; i < experiment.num_choices; ++i) {
const Experiment::Choice& choice = experiment.choices[i];
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue;
std::string name = NameForChoice(experiment, i);
value->SetString("description",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(choice.description_id));
value->SetString("internal_name", name);
value->SetBoolean("selected", enabled_experiments.count(name) > 0);
result->Append(value);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 8,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rt_fill_info(struct net *net, __be32 dst, __be32 src,
struct flowi4 *fl4, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid,
u32 seq, int event, int nowait, unsigned int flags)
{
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb);
struct rtmsg *r;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
unsigned long expires = 0;
u32 error;
u32 metrics[RTAX_MAX];
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, sizeof(*r), flags);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
r = nlmsg_data(nlh);
r->rtm_family = AF_INET;
r->rtm_dst_len = 32;
r->rtm_src_len = 0;
r->rtm_tos = fl4->flowi4_tos;
r->rtm_table = RT_TABLE_MAIN;
if (nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_TABLE, RT_TABLE_MAIN))
goto nla_put_failure;
r->rtm_type = rt->rt_type;
r->rtm_scope = RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE;
r->rtm_protocol = RTPROT_UNSPEC;
r->rtm_flags = (rt->rt_flags & ~0xFFFF) | RTM_F_CLONED;
if (rt->rt_flags & RTCF_NOTIFY)
r->rtm_flags |= RTM_F_NOTIFY;
if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_DOREDIRECT)
r->rtm_flags |= RTCF_DOREDIRECT;
if (nla_put_be32(skb, RTA_DST, dst))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (src) {
r->rtm_src_len = 32;
if (nla_put_be32(skb, RTA_SRC, src))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (rt->dst.dev &&
nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_OIF, rt->dst.dev->ifindex))
goto nla_put_failure;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
if (rt->dst.tclassid &&
nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_FLOW, rt->dst.tclassid))
goto nla_put_failure;
#endif
if (!rt_is_input_route(rt) &&
fl4->saddr != src) {
if (nla_put_be32(skb, RTA_PREFSRC, fl4->saddr))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (rt->rt_uses_gateway &&
nla_put_be32(skb, RTA_GATEWAY, rt->rt_gateway))
goto nla_put_failure;
expires = rt->dst.expires;
if (expires) {
unsigned long now = jiffies;
if (time_before(now, expires))
expires -= now;
else
expires = 0;
}
memcpy(metrics, dst_metrics_ptr(&rt->dst), sizeof(metrics));
if (rt->rt_pmtu && expires)
metrics[RTAX_MTU - 1] = rt->rt_pmtu;
if (rtnetlink_put_metrics(skb, metrics) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (fl4->flowi4_mark &&
nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_MARK, fl4->flowi4_mark))
goto nla_put_failure;
error = rt->dst.error;
if (rt_is_input_route(rt)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
if (ipv4_is_multicast(dst) && !ipv4_is_local_multicast(dst) &&
IPV4_DEVCONF_ALL(net, MC_FORWARDING)) {
int err = ipmr_get_route(net, skb,
fl4->saddr, fl4->daddr,
r, nowait, portid);
if (err <= 0) {
if (!nowait) {
if (err == 0)
return 0;
goto nla_put_failure;
} else {
if (err == -EMSGSIZE)
goto nla_put_failure;
error = err;
}
}
} else
#endif
if (nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_IIF, skb->dev->ifindex))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (rtnl_put_cacheinfo(skb, &rt->dst, 0, expires, error) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: inet: update the IP ID generation algorithm to higher standards.
Commit 355b98553789 ("netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()")
makes net_hash_mix() return a true 32 bits of entropy. When used in the
IP ID generation algorithm, this has the effect of extending the IP ID
generation key from 32 bits to 64 bits.
However, net_hash_mix() is only used for IP ID generation starting with
kernel version 4.1. Therefore, earlier kernels remain with 32-bit key
no matter what the net_hash_mix() return value is.
This change addresses the issue by explicitly extending the key to 64
bits for kernels older than 4.1.
Signed-off-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t cifs_user_readv(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, loff_t pos)
{
ssize_t read;
read = cifs_iovec_read(iocb->ki_filp, iov, nr_segs, &pos);
if (read > 0)
iocb->ki_pos = pos;
return read;
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int spl_filesystem_dir_it_valid(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object((spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter);
return object->u.dir.entry.d_name[0] != '\0' ? SUCCESS : FAILURE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 4,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int copy_sighand(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct sighand_struct *sig;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND) {
atomic_inc(¤t->sighand->count);
return 0;
}
sig = kmem_cache_alloc(sighand_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
rcu_assign_pointer(tsk->sighand, sig);
if (!sig)
return -ENOMEM;
atomic_set(&sig->count, 1);
memcpy(sig->action, current->sighand->action, sizeof(sig->action));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int packet_mc_add(struct sock *sk, struct packet_mreq_max *mreq)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_mclist *ml, *i;
struct net_device *dev;
int err;
rtnl_lock();
err = -ENODEV;
dev = __dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), mreq->mr_ifindex);
if (!dev)
goto done;
err = -EINVAL;
if (mreq->mr_alen > dev->addr_len)
goto done;
err = -ENOBUFS;
i = kmalloc(sizeof(*i), GFP_KERNEL);
if (i == NULL)
goto done;
err = 0;
for (ml = po->mclist; ml; ml = ml->next) {
if (ml->ifindex == mreq->mr_ifindex &&
ml->type == mreq->mr_type &&
ml->alen == mreq->mr_alen &&
memcmp(ml->addr, mreq->mr_address, ml->alen) == 0) {
ml->count++;
/* Free the new element ... */
kfree(i);
goto done;
}
}
i->type = mreq->mr_type;
i->ifindex = mreq->mr_ifindex;
i->alen = mreq->mr_alen;
memcpy(i->addr, mreq->mr_address, i->alen);
i->count = 1;
i->next = po->mclist;
po->mclist = i;
err = packet_dev_mc(dev, i, 1);
if (err) {
po->mclist = i->next;
kfree(i);
}
done:
rtnl_unlock();
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_packet: prevent information leak
In 2.6.27, commit 393e52e33c6c2 (packet: deliver VLAN TCI to userspace)
added a small information leak.
Add padding field and make sure its zeroed before copy to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_put_ofp13_table_stats(const struct ofputil_table_stats *stats,
struct ofpbuf *buf)
{
struct ofp13_table_stats *out;
out = ofpbuf_put_zeros(buf, sizeof *out);
out->table_id = stats->table_id;
out->active_count = htonl(stats->active_count);
out->lookup_count = htonll(stats->lookup_count);
out->matched_count = htonll(stats->matched_count);
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 26,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromotingInstance::PauseVideo(bool pause) {
if (!IsConnected()) {
return;
}
protocol::VideoControl video_control;
video_control.set_enable(!pause);
host_connection_->host_stub()->ControlVideo(video_control);
}
Commit Message: Restrict the Chromoting client plugin to use by extensions & apps.
BUG=160456
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11365276
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::UpdatePreferredSize(const gfx::Size& pref_size) {
const gfx::Size old_size = GetPreferredSize();
preferred_size_ = pref_size;
OnPreferredSizeChanged(old_size);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hashTableIterInit(HASH_TABLE_ITER *iter, const HASH_TABLE *table)
{
iter->p = table->v;
iter->end = iter->p + table->size;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 11,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: encode_MULTIPATH(const struct ofpact_multipath *mp,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
struct nx_action_multipath *nam = put_NXAST_MULTIPATH(out);
nam->fields = htons(mp->fields);
nam->basis = htons(mp->basis);
nam->algorithm = htons(mp->algorithm);
nam->max_link = htons(mp->max_link);
nam->arg = htonl(mp->arg);
nam->ofs_nbits = nxm_encode_ofs_nbits(mp->dst.ofs, mp->dst.n_bits);
nam->dst = htonl(nxm_header_from_mff(mp->dst.field));
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioFlinger::EffectChain::process_l()
{
sp<ThreadBase> thread = mThread.promote();
if (thread == 0) {
ALOGW("process_l(): cannot promote mixer thread");
return;
}
bool isGlobalSession = (mSessionId == AUDIO_SESSION_OUTPUT_MIX) ||
(mSessionId == AUDIO_SESSION_OUTPUT_STAGE);
bool doProcess = (thread->type() != ThreadBase::OFFLOAD);
if (!isGlobalSession) {
bool tracksOnSession = (trackCnt() != 0);
if (!tracksOnSession && mTailBufferCount == 0) {
doProcess = false;
}
if (activeTrackCnt() == 0) {
if (tracksOnSession || mTailBufferCount > 0) {
clearInputBuffer_l(thread);
if (mTailBufferCount > 0) {
mTailBufferCount--;
}
}
}
}
size_t size = mEffects.size();
if (doProcess) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
mEffects[i]->process();
}
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
mEffects[i]->updateState();
}
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnUpdateViewportIntersection(const gfx::Rect& viewport_intersection,
const gfx::Rect& compositing_rect) {
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(
content::BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&UpdateViewportIntersectionMessageFilter::
OnUpdateViewportIntersectionPostOnIO,
this, viewport_intersection, compositing_rect));
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 4,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void assign_proto_idx(struct proto *prot)
{
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationRequest::OnRedirectChecksComplete(
NavigationThrottle::ThrottleCheckResult result) {
DCHECK(result.action() != NavigationThrottle::DEFER);
DCHECK(result.action() != NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_RESPONSE);
if (result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL_AND_IGNORE ||
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL) {
DCHECK(result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL ||
result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_ABORTED);
OnRequestFailedInternal(false, result.net_error_code(), base::nullopt, true,
result.error_page_content());
return;
}
if (result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST ||
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST_AND_COLLAPSE) {
DCHECK(result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CLIENT ||
result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_ADMINISTRATOR);
OnRequestFailedInternal(false, result.net_error_code(), base::nullopt, true,
result.error_page_content());
return;
}
RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::OnNavigationRequestWillBeSent(*this);
loader_->FollowRedirect();
}
Commit Message: Check ancestors when setting an <iframe> navigation's "site for cookies".
Currently, we're setting the "site for cookies" only by looking at the
top-level document. We ought to be verifying that the ancestor frames
are same-site before doing so. We do this correctly in Blink (see
`Document::SiteForCookies`), but didn't do so when navigating in the
browser.
This patch addresses the majority of the problem by walking the ancestor
chain when processing a NavigationRequest. If all the ancestors are
same-site, we set the "site for cookies" to the top-level document's URL.
If they aren't all same-site, we set it to an empty URL to ensure that
we don't send SameSite cookies.
Bug: 833847
Change-Id: Icd77f31fa618fa9f8b59fc3b15e1bed6ee05aabd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1025772
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553942}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnZoom(PageZoom zoom) {
if (!webview()) // Not sure if this can happen, but no harm in being safe.
return;
webview()->hidePopups();
double old_zoom_level = webview()->zoomLevel();
double zoom_level;
if (zoom == PAGE_ZOOM_RESET) {
zoom_level = 0;
} else if (static_cast<int>(old_zoom_level) == old_zoom_level) {
zoom_level = old_zoom_level + zoom;
} else {
if ((old_zoom_level > 1 && zoom > 0) ||
(old_zoom_level < 1 && zoom < 0)) {
zoom_level = static_cast<int>(old_zoom_level + zoom);
} else {
zoom_level = static_cast<int>(old_zoom_level);
}
}
webview()->setZoomLevel(false, zoom_level);
zoomLevelChanged();
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 3,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init sha1_powerpc_mod_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnSetName(const std::string& name) {
if (!webview())
return;
webview()->mainFrame()->setName(WebString::fromUTF8(name));
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: server_file_request(struct httpd *env, struct client *clt, char *path,
struct stat *st)
{
struct server_config *srv_conf = clt->clt_srv_conf;
struct media_type *media;
const char *errstr = NULL;
int fd = -1, ret, code = 500;
if ((ret = server_file_method(clt)) != 0) {
code = ret;
goto abort;
}
if ((ret = server_file_modified_since(clt->clt_descreq, st)) != -1)
return (ret);
/* Now open the file, should be readable or we have another problem */
if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
goto abort;
media = media_find_config(env, srv_conf, path);
ret = server_response_http(clt, 200, media, st->st_size,
MINIMUM(time(NULL), st->st_mtim.tv_sec));
switch (ret) {
case -1:
goto fail;
case 0:
/* Connection is already finished */
close(fd);
goto done;
default:
break;
}
clt->clt_fd = fd;
if (clt->clt_srvbev != NULL)
bufferevent_free(clt->clt_srvbev);
clt->clt_srvbev_throttled = 0;
clt->clt_srvbev = bufferevent_new(clt->clt_fd, server_read,
server_write, server_file_error, clt);
if (clt->clt_srvbev == NULL) {
errstr = "failed to allocate file buffer event";
goto fail;
}
/* Adjust read watermark to the socket output buffer size */
bufferevent_setwatermark(clt->clt_srvbev, EV_READ, 0,
clt->clt_sndbufsiz);
bufferevent_settimeout(clt->clt_srvbev,
srv_conf->timeout.tv_sec, srv_conf->timeout.tv_sec);
bufferevent_enable(clt->clt_srvbev, EV_READ);
bufferevent_disable(clt->clt_bev, EV_READ);
done:
server_reset_http(clt);
return (0);
fail:
bufferevent_disable(clt->clt_bev, EV_READ|EV_WRITE);
bufferevent_free(clt->clt_bev);
clt->clt_bev = NULL;
abort:
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
if (errstr == NULL)
errstr = strerror(errno);
server_abort_http(clt, code, errstr);
return (-1);
}
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
CWE ID: CWE-770 | 0 | 22,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pva_probe(AVProbeData * pd) {
const unsigned char *buf = pd->buf;
int len = pva_check(buf);
if (len < 0)
return 0;
if (pd->buf_size >= len + 8 &&
pva_check(buf + len) >= 0)
return AVPROBE_SCORE_EXTENSION;
return AVPROBE_SCORE_MAX / 4;
}
Commit Message: avformat/pva: Check for EOF before retrying in read_part_of_packet()
Fixes: Infinite loop
Fixes: pva-4b1835dbc2027bf3c567005dcc78e85199240d06
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 9,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AffineTransform SVGLayoutSupport::deprecatedCalculateTransformToLayer(const LayoutObject* layoutObject)
{
AffineTransform transform;
while (layoutObject) {
transform = layoutObject->localToSVGParentTransform() * transform;
if (layoutObject->isSVGRoot())
break;
layoutObject = layoutObject->parent();
}
PaintLayer* layer = layoutObject ? layoutObject->enclosingLayer() : 0;
while (layer && layer->isAllowedToQueryCompositingState()) {
if (layer->compositingState() != NotComposited)
break;
if (TransformationMatrix* layerTransform = layer->transform())
transform = layerTransform->toAffineTransform() * transform;
layer = layer->parent();
}
return transform;
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,202 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PanoramiXConsolidate(void)
{
int i;
PanoramiXRes *root, *defmap, *saver;
ScreenPtr pScreen = screenInfo.screens[0];
DepthPtr pDepth = pScreen->allowedDepths;
VisualPtr pVisual = pScreen->visuals;
PanoramiXNumDepths = 0;
PanoramiXNumVisuals = 0;
for (i = 0; i < pScreen->numDepths; i++)
PanoramiXMaybeAddDepth(pDepth++);
for (i = 0; i < pScreen->numVisuals; i++)
PanoramiXMaybeAddVisual(pVisual++);
root = malloc(sizeof(PanoramiXRes));
root->type = XRT_WINDOW;
defmap = malloc(sizeof(PanoramiXRes));
defmap->type = XRT_COLORMAP;
saver = malloc(sizeof(PanoramiXRes));
saver->type = XRT_WINDOW;
FOR_NSCREENS(i) {
ScreenPtr scr = screenInfo.screens[i];
root->info[i].id = scr->root->drawable.id;
root->u.win.class = InputOutput;
root->u.win.root = TRUE;
saver->info[i].id = scr->screensaver.wid;
saver->u.win.class = InputOutput;
saver->u.win.root = TRUE;
defmap->info[i].id = scr->defColormap;
}
AddResource(root->info[0].id, XRT_WINDOW, root);
AddResource(saver->info[0].id, XRT_WINDOW, saver);
AddResource(defmap->info[0].id, XRT_COLORMAP, defmap);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void expand_func(int16_t *rp, int16_t *rn,
int16_t p1, int16_t z0, int16_t n1)
{
/*
*rp = (5 * p1 + 10 * z0 + 1 * n1 + 8) >> 4;
*rn = (1 * p1 + 10 * z0 + 5 * n1 + 8) >> 4;
*/
uint16_t r = (uint16_t)(((uint16_t)(p1 + n1) >> 1) + z0) >> 1;
*rp = (uint16_t)(((uint16_t)(r + p1) >> 1) + z0 + 1) >> 1;
*rn = (uint16_t)(((uint16_t)(r + n1) >> 1) + z0 + 1) >> 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix blur coefficient calculation buffer overflow
Found by fuzzer test case id:000082,sig:11,src:002579,op:havoc,rep:8.
Correctness should be checked, but this fixes the overflow for good.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::resetLinkColor()
{
m_linkColor = Color(0, 0, 238);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_SFVTCA( INS_ARG )
{
DO_SFVTCA
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lib_file_open_search_with_no_combine(gs_file_path_ptr lib_path, const gs_memory_t *mem, i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p,
const char *fname, uint flen, char *buffer, int blen, uint *pclen, ref *pfile,
gx_io_device *iodev, bool starting_arg_file, char *fmode)
{
stream *s;
uint blen1 = blen;
struct stat fstat;
if (gp_file_name_reduce(fname, flen, buffer, &blen1) != gp_combine_success)
goto skip;
if (starting_arg_file || check_file_permissions_aux(i_ctx_p, buffer, blen1) >= 0) {
if (iodev_os_open_file(iodev, (const char *)buffer, blen1,
(const char *)fmode, &s, (gs_memory_t *)mem) == 0) {
*pclen = blen1;
make_stream_file(pfile, s, "r");
return 0;
}
}
else {
/* If we are not allowed to open the file by check_file_permissions_aux()
* and if the file exists, throw an error.......
* Otherwise, keep searching.
*/
if ((*iodev->procs.file_status)(iodev, buffer, &fstat) >= 0) {
return_error(gs_error_invalidfileaccess);
}
}
skip:
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 5,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ssl3_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len)
{
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*(p++) = htype;
l2n3(len, p);
s->init_num = (int)len + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_off = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 8,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_return_incompatible_delegation(struct inode *inode, fmode_t fmode)
{
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(NFS_I(inode)->delegation);
if (delegation == NULL || (delegation->type & fmode) == fmode) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
nfs_inode_return_delegation(inode);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 8,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NuPlayer::GenericSource::schedulePollBuffering() {
sp<AMessage> msg = new AMessage(kWhatPollBuffering, this);
msg->setInt32("generation", mPollBufferingGeneration);
msg->post(1000000ll);
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripModel::InsertTabContentsAt(int index,
TabContentsWrapper* contents,
int add_types) {
bool active = add_types & ADD_ACTIVE;
bool pin =
contents->extension_tab_helper()->is_app() || add_types & ADD_PINNED;
index = ConstrainInsertionIndex(index, pin);
closing_all_ = false;
TabContentsWrapper* selected_contents = GetSelectedTabContents();
TabContentsData* data = new TabContentsData(contents);
data->pinned = pin;
if ((add_types & ADD_INHERIT_GROUP) && selected_contents) {
if (active) {
ForgetAllOpeners();
}
data->SetGroup(&selected_contents->controller());
} else if ((add_types & ADD_INHERIT_OPENER) && selected_contents) {
if (active) {
ForgetAllOpeners();
}
data->opener = &selected_contents->controller();
}
contents_data_.insert(contents_data_.begin() + index, data);
selection_model_.IncrementFrom(index);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabInsertedAt(contents, index, active));
if (active) {
selection_model_.SetSelectedIndex(index);
NotifyTabSelectedIfChanged(selected_contents, index, false);
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputHandler::setInputModeEnabled(bool active)
{
FocusLog(LogLevelInfo, "InputHandler::setInputModeEnabled '%s', override is '%s'"
, active ? "true" : "false"
, m_webPage->m_dumpRenderTree || Platform::Settings::instance()->alwaysShowKeyboardOnFocus() ? "true" : "false");
m_inputModeEnabled = active;
if (isInputModeEnabled() && isActiveTextEdit() && !m_currentFocusElement->document()->frame()->selection()->isFocused())
m_currentFocusElement->document()->frame()->selection()->setFocused(true);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ipxitf_rcv(struct ipx_interface *intrfc, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ipxhdr *ipx = ipx_hdr(skb);
int rc = 0;
ipxitf_hold(intrfc);
/* See if we should update our network number */
if (!intrfc->if_netnum) /* net number of intrfc not known yet */
ipxitf_discover_netnum(intrfc, skb);
IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->last_hop.index = -1;
if (ipx->ipx_type == IPX_TYPE_PPROP) {
rc = ipxitf_pprop(intrfc, skb);
if (rc)
goto out_free_skb;
}
/* local processing follows */
if (!IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_dest_net)
IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_dest_net = intrfc->if_netnum;
if (!IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_source_net)
IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_source_net = intrfc->if_netnum;
/* it doesn't make sense to route a pprop packet, there's no meaning
* in the ipx_dest_net for such packets */
if (ipx->ipx_type != IPX_TYPE_PPROP &&
intrfc->if_netnum != IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_dest_net) {
/* We only route point-to-point packets. */
if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_HOST) {
skb = skb_unshare(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb)
rc = ipxrtr_route_skb(skb);
goto out_intrfc;
}
goto out_free_skb;
}
/* see if we should keep it */
if (!memcmp(ipx_broadcast_node, ipx->ipx_dest.node, IPX_NODE_LEN) ||
!memcmp(intrfc->if_node, ipx->ipx_dest.node, IPX_NODE_LEN)) {
rc = ipxitf_demux_socket(intrfc, skb, 0);
goto out_intrfc;
}
/* we couldn't pawn it off so unload it */
out_free_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
out_intrfc:
ipxitf_put(intrfc);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BlobLoader(PassRefPtr<BlobDataHandle> blobDataHandle,
PresentationConnection* PresentationConnection)
: m_PresentationConnection(PresentationConnection),
m_loader(FileReaderLoader::create(FileReaderLoader::ReadAsArrayBuffer,
this)) {
m_loader->start(m_PresentationConnection->getExecutionContext(),
std::move(blobDataHandle));
}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,971 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(checkdate)
{
long m, d, y;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "lll", &m, &d, &y) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (y < 1 || y > 32767 || !timelib_valid_date(y, m, d)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE; /* True : This month, day, year arguments are valid */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ct_build_clabel(const struct nf_conntrack *ct, struct nethdr *n)
{
const struct nfct_bitmask *b;
uint32_t *words;
unsigned int wordcount, i, maxbit;
if (!nfct_attr_is_set(ct, ATTR_CONNLABELS))
return;
b = nfct_get_attr(ct, ATTR_CONNLABELS);
maxbit = nfct_bitmask_maxbit(b);
for (i=0; i <= maxbit; i++) {
if (nfct_bitmask_test_bit(b, i))
break;
}
if (i > maxbit)
return;
wordcount = (nfct_bitmask_maxbit(b) / 32) + 1;
words = put_header(n, NTA_LABELS, wordcount * sizeof(*words));
for (i=0; i < wordcount; i++) {
int bit = 31;
uint32_t tmp = 0;
do {
if (nfct_bitmask_test_bit(b, (32 * i) + bit))
tmp |= (1 << bit);
} while (--bit >= 0);
words[i] = htonl(tmp);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 15,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_frame_common(AVCodecContext *avctx, PNGDecContext *s,
AVFrame *p, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
AVDictionary *metadata = NULL;
uint32_t tag, length;
int decode_next_dat = 0;
int ret;
for (;;) {
length = bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->gb);
if (length <= 0) {
if (avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_PNG &&
avctx->skip_frame == AVDISCARD_ALL) {
av_frame_set_metadata(p, metadata);
return 0;
}
if (CONFIG_APNG_DECODER && avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_APNG && length == 0) {
if (!(s->state & PNG_IDAT))
return 0;
else
goto exit_loop;
}
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "%d bytes left\n", length);
if ( s->state & PNG_ALLIMAGE
&& avctx->strict_std_compliance <= FF_COMPLIANCE_NORMAL)
goto exit_loop;
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail;
}
length = bytestream2_get_be32(&s->gb);
if (length > 0x7fffffff || length > bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->gb)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "chunk too big\n");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail;
}
tag = bytestream2_get_le32(&s->gb);
if (avctx->debug & FF_DEBUG_STARTCODE)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "png: tag=%c%c%c%c length=%u\n",
(tag & 0xff),
((tag >> 8) & 0xff),
((tag >> 16) & 0xff),
((tag >> 24) & 0xff), length);
if (avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_PNG &&
avctx->skip_frame == AVDISCARD_ALL) {
switch(tag) {
case MKTAG('I', 'H', 'D', 'R'):
case MKTAG('p', 'H', 'Y', 's'):
case MKTAG('t', 'E', 'X', 't'):
case MKTAG('I', 'D', 'A', 'T'):
case MKTAG('t', 'R', 'N', 'S'):
break;
default:
goto skip_tag;
}
}
switch (tag) {
case MKTAG('I', 'H', 'D', 'R'):
if ((ret = decode_ihdr_chunk(avctx, s, length)) < 0)
goto fail;
break;
case MKTAG('p', 'H', 'Y', 's'):
if ((ret = decode_phys_chunk(avctx, s)) < 0)
goto fail;
break;
case MKTAG('f', 'c', 'T', 'L'):
if (!CONFIG_APNG_DECODER || avctx->codec_id != AV_CODEC_ID_APNG)
goto skip_tag;
if ((ret = decode_fctl_chunk(avctx, s, length)) < 0)
goto fail;
decode_next_dat = 1;
break;
case MKTAG('f', 'd', 'A', 'T'):
if (!CONFIG_APNG_DECODER || avctx->codec_id != AV_CODEC_ID_APNG)
goto skip_tag;
if (!decode_next_dat) {
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail;
}
bytestream2_get_be32(&s->gb);
length -= 4;
/* fallthrough */
case MKTAG('I', 'D', 'A', 'T'):
if (CONFIG_APNG_DECODER && avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_APNG && !decode_next_dat)
goto skip_tag;
if ((ret = decode_idat_chunk(avctx, s, length, p)) < 0)
goto fail;
break;
case MKTAG('P', 'L', 'T', 'E'):
if (decode_plte_chunk(avctx, s, length) < 0)
goto skip_tag;
break;
case MKTAG('t', 'R', 'N', 'S'):
if (decode_trns_chunk(avctx, s, length) < 0)
goto skip_tag;
break;
case MKTAG('t', 'E', 'X', 't'):
if (decode_text_chunk(s, length, 0, &metadata) < 0)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Broken tEXt chunk\n");
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, length + 4);
break;
case MKTAG('z', 'T', 'X', 't'):
if (decode_text_chunk(s, length, 1, &metadata) < 0)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Broken zTXt chunk\n");
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, length + 4);
break;
case MKTAG('s', 'T', 'E', 'R'): {
int mode = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->gb);
AVStereo3D *stereo3d = av_stereo3d_create_side_data(p);
if (!stereo3d)
goto fail;
if (mode == 0 || mode == 1) {
stereo3d->type = AV_STEREO3D_SIDEBYSIDE;
stereo3d->flags = mode ? 0 : AV_STEREO3D_FLAG_INVERT;
} else {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Unknown value in sTER chunk (%d)\n", mode);
}
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, 4); /* crc */
break;
}
case MKTAG('I', 'E', 'N', 'D'):
if (!(s->state & PNG_ALLIMAGE))
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "IEND without all image\n");
if (!(s->state & (PNG_ALLIMAGE|PNG_IDAT))) {
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail;
}
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, 4); /* crc */
goto exit_loop;
default:
/* skip tag */
skip_tag:
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, length + 4);
break;
}
}
exit_loop:
if (avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_PNG &&
avctx->skip_frame == AVDISCARD_ALL) {
av_frame_set_metadata(p, metadata);
return 0;
}
if (s->bits_per_pixel <= 4)
handle_small_bpp(s, p);
/* apply transparency if needed */
if (s->has_trns && s->color_type != PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) {
size_t byte_depth = s->bit_depth > 8 ? 2 : 1;
size_t raw_bpp = s->bpp - byte_depth;
unsigned x, y;
for (y = 0; y < s->height; ++y) {
uint8_t *row = &s->image_buf[s->image_linesize * y];
/* since we're updating in-place, we have to go from right to left */
for (x = s->width; x > 0; --x) {
uint8_t *pixel = &row[s->bpp * (x - 1)];
memmove(pixel, &row[raw_bpp * (x - 1)], raw_bpp);
if (!memcmp(pixel, s->transparent_color_be, raw_bpp)) {
memset(&pixel[raw_bpp], 0, byte_depth);
} else {
memset(&pixel[raw_bpp], 0xff, byte_depth);
}
}
}
}
/* handle P-frames only if a predecessor frame is available */
if (s->last_picture.f->data[0]) {
if ( !(avpkt->flags & AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY) && avctx->codec_tag != AV_RL32("MPNG")
&& s->last_picture.f->width == p->width
&& s->last_picture.f->height== p->height
&& s->last_picture.f->format== p->format
) {
if (CONFIG_PNG_DECODER && avctx->codec_id != AV_CODEC_ID_APNG)
handle_p_frame_png(s, p);
else if (CONFIG_APNG_DECODER &&
avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_APNG &&
(ret = handle_p_frame_apng(avctx, s, p)) < 0)
goto fail;
}
}
ff_thread_report_progress(&s->picture, INT_MAX, 0);
ff_thread_report_progress(&s->previous_picture, INT_MAX, 0);
av_frame_set_metadata(p, metadata);
metadata = NULL;
return 0;
fail:
av_dict_free(&metadata);
ff_thread_report_progress(&s->picture, INT_MAX, 0);
ff_thread_report_progress(&s->previous_picture, INT_MAX, 0);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/pngdec: Fix off by 1 size in decode_zbuf()
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 444/fuzz-2-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_PNG_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 7,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<MakeCredentialTask> CreateMakeCredentialTask(
FidoDevice* device) {
PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity rp(test_data::kRelyingPartyId);
PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity user(
fido_parsing_utils::Materialize(test_data::kUserId));
return std::make_unique<MakeCredentialTask>(
device,
CtapMakeCredentialRequest(
test_data::kClientDataHash, std::move(rp), std::move(user),
PublicKeyCredentialParams(
std::vector<PublicKeyCredentialParams::CredentialInfo>(1))),
callback_receiver_.callback());
}
Commit Message: [base] Make dynamic container to static span conversion explicit
This change disallows implicit conversions from dynamic containers to
static spans. This conversion can cause CHECK failures, and thus should
be done carefully. Requiring explicit construction makes it more obvious
when this happens. To aid usability, appropriate base::make_span<size_t>
overloads are added.
Bug: 877931
Change-Id: Id9f526bc57bfd30a52d14df827b0445ca087381d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1189985
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586657}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 22,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void range_start_decoding(APEContext *ctx)
{
ctx->rc.buffer = bytestream_get_byte(&ctx->ptr);
ctx->rc.low = ctx->rc.buffer >> (8 - EXTRA_BITS);
ctx->rc.range = (uint32_t) 1 << EXTRA_BITS;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 7,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SWriteQueryImageAttributesReply(ClientPtr client,
xvQueryImageAttributesReply * rep)
{
swaps(&rep->sequenceNumber);
swapl(&rep->length);
swapl(&rep->num_planes);
swapl(&rep->data_size);
swaps(&rep->width);
swaps(&rep->height);
WriteToClient(client, sz_xvQueryImageAttributesReply, rep);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void append_stats(const char *key, const uint16_t klen,
const char *val, const uint32_t vlen,
const void *cookie)
{
/* value without a key is invalid */
if (klen == 0 && vlen > 0) {
return ;
}
conn *c = (conn*)cookie;
if (c->protocol == binary_prot) {
size_t needed = vlen + klen + sizeof(protocol_binary_response_header);
if (!grow_stats_buf(c, needed)) {
return ;
}
append_bin_stats(key, klen, val, vlen, c);
} else {
size_t needed = vlen + klen + 10; // 10 == "STAT = \r\n"
if (!grow_stats_buf(c, needed)) {
return ;
}
append_ascii_stats(key, klen, val, vlen, c);
}
assert(c->stats.offset <= c->stats.size);
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ide_data_writel(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val)
{
IDEBus *bus = opaque;
IDEState *s = idebus_active_if(bus);
uint8_t *p;
/* PIO data access allowed only when DRQ bit is set. The result of a write
* during PIO out is indeterminate, just ignore it. */
if (!(s->status & DRQ_STAT) || ide_is_pio_out(s)) {
return;
}
p = s->data_ptr;
*(uint32_t *)p = le32_to_cpu(val);
p += 4;
s->data_ptr = p;
if (p >= s->data_end)
s->end_transfer_func(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rt_fill_info(struct net *net,
struct sk_buff *skb, u32 pid, u32 seq, int event,
int nowait, unsigned int flags)
{
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb);
struct rtmsg *r;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
long expires = 0;
const struct inet_peer *peer = rt->peer;
u32 id = 0, ts = 0, tsage = 0, error;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, event, sizeof(*r), flags);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
r = nlmsg_data(nlh);
r->rtm_family = AF_INET;
r->rtm_dst_len = 32;
r->rtm_src_len = 0;
r->rtm_tos = rt->rt_key_tos;
r->rtm_table = RT_TABLE_MAIN;
NLA_PUT_U32(skb, RTA_TABLE, RT_TABLE_MAIN);
r->rtm_type = rt->rt_type;
r->rtm_scope = RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE;
r->rtm_protocol = RTPROT_UNSPEC;
r->rtm_flags = (rt->rt_flags & ~0xFFFF) | RTM_F_CLONED;
if (rt->rt_flags & RTCF_NOTIFY)
r->rtm_flags |= RTM_F_NOTIFY;
NLA_PUT_BE32(skb, RTA_DST, rt->rt_dst);
if (rt->rt_key_src) {
r->rtm_src_len = 32;
NLA_PUT_BE32(skb, RTA_SRC, rt->rt_key_src);
}
if (rt->dst.dev)
NLA_PUT_U32(skb, RTA_OIF, rt->dst.dev->ifindex);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
if (rt->dst.tclassid)
NLA_PUT_U32(skb, RTA_FLOW, rt->dst.tclassid);
#endif
if (rt_is_input_route(rt))
NLA_PUT_BE32(skb, RTA_PREFSRC, rt->rt_spec_dst);
else if (rt->rt_src != rt->rt_key_src)
NLA_PUT_BE32(skb, RTA_PREFSRC, rt->rt_src);
if (rt->rt_dst != rt->rt_gateway)
NLA_PUT_BE32(skb, RTA_GATEWAY, rt->rt_gateway);
if (rtnetlink_put_metrics(skb, dst_metrics_ptr(&rt->dst)) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (rt->rt_mark)
NLA_PUT_BE32(skb, RTA_MARK, rt->rt_mark);
error = rt->dst.error;
if (peer) {
inet_peer_refcheck(rt->peer);
id = atomic_read(&peer->ip_id_count) & 0xffff;
if (peer->tcp_ts_stamp) {
ts = peer->tcp_ts;
tsage = get_seconds() - peer->tcp_ts_stamp;
}
expires = ACCESS_ONCE(peer->pmtu_expires);
if (expires)
expires -= jiffies;
}
if (rt_is_input_route(rt)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
__be32 dst = rt->rt_dst;
if (ipv4_is_multicast(dst) && !ipv4_is_local_multicast(dst) &&
IPV4_DEVCONF_ALL(net, MC_FORWARDING)) {
int err = ipmr_get_route(net, skb,
rt->rt_src, rt->rt_dst,
r, nowait);
if (err <= 0) {
if (!nowait) {
if (err == 0)
return 0;
goto nla_put_failure;
} else {
if (err == -EMSGSIZE)
goto nla_put_failure;
error = err;
}
}
} else
#endif
NLA_PUT_U32(skb, RTA_IIF, rt->rt_iif);
}
if (rtnl_put_cacheinfo(skb, &rt->dst, id, ts, tsage,
expires, error) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t hpet_time_after64(uint64_t a, uint64_t b)
{
return ((int64_t)(b) - (int64_t)(a) < 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_object_name(struct fsck_options *options, struct object *obj,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
char *existing;
if (!options->object_names)
return;
existing = lookup_decoration(options->object_names, obj);
if (existing)
return;
va_start(ap, fmt);
strbuf_vaddf(&buf, fmt, ap);
add_decoration(options->object_names, obj, strbuf_detach(&buf, NULL));
va_end(ap);
}
Commit Message: fsck: detect submodule urls starting with dash
Urls with leading dashes can cause mischief on older
versions of Git. We should detect them so that they can be
rejected by receive.fsckObjects, preventing modern versions
of git from being a vector by which attacks can spread.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CommandBuffer::State CommandBufferProxyImpl::GetLastState() {
base::AutoLock lock(last_state_lock_);
TryUpdateState();
return last_state_;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 28,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mf_bitmap_from_of11(ovs_be32 wc11_)
{
struct mf_bitmap fields = MF_BITMAP_INITIALIZER;
const struct ofp11_wc_map *p;
uint32_t wc11 = ntohl(wc11_);
for (p = ofp11_wc_map; p < &ofp11_wc_map[ARRAY_SIZE(ofp11_wc_map)]; p++) {
if (wc11 & p->wc11) {
bitmap_set1(fields.bm, p->mf);
}
}
return fields;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 25,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_eligible_guards(const or_options_t *options,
guard_selection_t *gs,
int *n_guards_out)
{
/* Construct eligible_guards as GUARDS - SAMPLED_GUARDS */
smartlist_t *eligible_guards = smartlist_new();
int n_guards = 0; // total size of "GUARDS"
if (gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE) {
const smartlist_t *bridges = bridge_list_get();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridges, bridge_info_t *, bridge) {
++n_guards;
if (NULL != get_sampled_guard_for_bridge(gs, bridge)) {
continue;
}
smartlist_add(eligible_guards, bridge);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge);
} else {
const smartlist_t *nodes = nodelist_get_list();
const int n_sampled = smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards);
/* Build a bloom filter of our current guards: let's keep this O(N). */
digestset_t *sampled_guard_ids = digestset_new(n_sampled);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, const entry_guard_t *,
guard) {
digestset_add(sampled_guard_ids, guard->identity);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(nodes, const node_t *, node) {
if (! node_is_possible_guard(node))
continue;
if (gs->type == GS_TYPE_RESTRICTED) {
/* In restricted mode, we apply the filter BEFORE sampling, so
* that we are sampling from the nodes that we might actually
* select. If we sampled first, we might wind up with a sample
* that didn't include any EntryNodes at all. */
if (! node_passes_guard_filter(options, node))
continue;
}
++n_guards;
if (digestset_contains(sampled_guard_ids, node->identity))
continue;
smartlist_add(eligible_guards, (node_t*)node);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
/* Now we can free that bloom filter. */
digestset_free(sampled_guard_ids);
}
*n_guards_out = n_guards;
return eligible_guards;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(clock_nanosleep, const clockid_t, which_clock, int, flags,
const struct __kernel_timespec __user *, rqtp,
struct __kernel_timespec __user *, rmtp)
{
const struct k_clock *kc = clockid_to_kclock(which_clock);
struct timespec64 t;
if (!kc)
return -EINVAL;
if (!kc->nsleep)
return -ENANOSLEEP_NOTSUP;
if (get_timespec64(&t, rqtp))
return -EFAULT;
if (!timespec64_valid(&t))
return -EINVAL;
if (flags & TIMER_ABSTIME)
rmtp = NULL;
current->restart_block.nanosleep.type = rmtp ? TT_NATIVE : TT_NONE;
current->restart_block.nanosleep.rmtp = rmtp;
return kc->nsleep(which_clock, flags, &t);
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 10,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ExtractPostscript(Image *image,const ImageInfo *image_info,
MagickOffsetType PS_Offset,ssize_t PS_Size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
postscript_file[MaxTextExtent];
const MagicInfo
*magic_info;
FILE
*ps_file;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
Image
*image2;
unsigned char
magick[2*MaxTextExtent];
if ((clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info)) == NULL)
return(image);
clone_info->blob=(void *) NULL;
clone_info->length=0;
/* Obtain temporary file */
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(postscript_file);
ps_file=fopen_utf8(postscript_file,"wb");
if (ps_file == (FILE *) NULL)
goto FINISH;
/* Copy postscript to temporary file */
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
(void) ReadBlob(image, 2*MaxTextExtent, magick);
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
while(PS_Size-- > 0)
{
(void) fputc(ReadBlobByte(image),ps_file);
}
(void) fclose(ps_file);
/* Detect file format - Check magic.mgk configuration file. */
magic_info=GetMagicInfo(magick,2*MaxTextExtent,exception);
if(magic_info == (const MagicInfo *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
/* printf("Detected:%s \n",magic_info->name); */
if(exception->severity != UndefinedException) goto FINISH_UNL;
if(magic_info->name == (char *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
(void) strncpy(clone_info->magick,magic_info->name,MaxTextExtent);
/* Read nested image */
/*FormatString(clone_info->filename,"%s:%s",magic_info->name,postscript_file);*/
FormatLocaleString(clone_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",postscript_file);
image2=ReadImage(clone_info,exception);
if (!image2)
goto FINISH_UNL;
/*
Replace current image with new image while copying base image
attributes.
*/
(void) CopyMagickMemory(image2->filename,image->filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(image2->magick_filename,image->magick_filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(image2->magick,image->magick,MaxTextExtent);
image2->depth=image->depth;
DestroyBlob(image2);
image2->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
if ((image->rows == 0) || (image->columns == 0))
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,image2);
FINISH_UNL:
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(postscript_file);
FINISH:
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
return(image);
}
Commit Message: Fixed out-of-bounds write reported in: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/102
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 13,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int red_channel_no_item_being_sent(RedChannel *channel)
{
RingItem *link;
RedChannelClient *rcc;
RING_FOREACH(link, &channel->clients) {
rcc = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link);
if (!red_channel_client_no_item_being_sent(rcc)) {
return FALSE;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnMessageReceivedOnRenderThread(const IPC::Message& message) {
if (owner_)
owner_->OnMessageReceived(message);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntPoint WebPagePrivate::frameOffset(const Frame* frame) const
{
ASSERT(frame);
if (!mainFrame())
return IntPoint();
return mainFrame()->view()->windowToContents(frame->view()->contentsToWindow(IntPoint::zero()));
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::didRemoveTrackElement(HTMLTrackElement* trackElement) {
KURL url = trackElement->getNonEmptyURLAttribute(srcAttr);
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "didRemoveTrackElement(" << (void*)this << ") - 'src' is "
<< urlForLoggingMedia(url);
TextTrack* textTrack = trackElement->track();
if (!textTrack)
return;
textTrack->setHasBeenConfigured(false);
if (!m_textTracks)
return;
m_textTracks->remove(textTrack);
size_t index = m_textTracksWhenResourceSelectionBegan.find(textTrack);
if (index != kNotFound)
m_textTracksWhenResourceSelectionBegan.remove(index);
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: prefix_components (char *filename, bool checkdirs)
{
int count = 0;
struct stat stat_buf;
int stat_result;
char *f = filename + FILE_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (filename);
if (*f)
while (*++f)
if (ISSLASH (f[0]) && ! ISSLASH (f[-1]))
{
if (checkdirs)
{
*f = '\0';
stat_result = safe_stat (filename, &stat_buf);
*f = '/';
if (! (stat_result == 0 && S_ISDIR (stat_buf.st_mode)))
break;
}
count++;
}
return count;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 21,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillManager::DisambiguatePhoneUploadTypes(FormStructure* form,
size_t current_index) {
ServerFieldTypeSet matching_types;
matching_types.insert(PHONE_HOME_CITY_AND_NUMBER);
AutofillField* field = form->field(current_index);
field->set_possible_types(matching_types);
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int llc_ui_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
int val = 0, len = 0, rc = -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(level != SOL_LLC))
goto out;
rc = get_user(len, optlen);
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (len != sizeof(int))
goto out;
switch (optname) {
case LLC_OPT_RETRY:
val = llc->n2; break;
case LLC_OPT_SIZE:
val = llc->n1; break;
case LLC_OPT_ACK_TMR_EXP:
val = llc->ack_timer.expire / HZ; break;
case LLC_OPT_P_TMR_EXP:
val = llc->pf_cycle_timer.expire / HZ; break;
case LLC_OPT_REJ_TMR_EXP:
val = llc->rej_sent_timer.expire / HZ; break;
case LLC_OPT_BUSY_TMR_EXP:
val = llc->busy_state_timer.expire / HZ; break;
case LLC_OPT_TX_WIN:
val = llc->k; break;
case LLC_OPT_RX_WIN:
val = llc->rw; break;
case LLC_OPT_PKTINFO:
val = (llc->cmsg_flags & LLC_CMSG_PKTINFO) != 0;
break;
default:
rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
goto out;
}
rc = 0;
if (put_user(len, optlen) || copy_to_user(optval, &val, len))
rc = -EFAULT;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: llc: Fix missing msg_namelen update in llc_ui_recvmsg()
For stream sockets the code misses to update the msg_namelen member
to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized
sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack
memory. The msg_namelen update is also missing for datagram sockets
in case the socket is shutting down during receive.
Fix both issues by setting msg_namelen to 0 early. It will be
updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 9,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DeviceTokenFetcher::DeviceTokenFetcher(
DeviceManagementService* service,
CloudPolicyCacheBase* cache,
CloudPolicyDataStore* data_store,
PolicyNotifier* notifier,
DelayedWorkScheduler* scheduler) {
Initialize(service, cache, data_store, notifier, scheduler);
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,322 |
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