instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void set_size_insets(const gfx::Size& size_insets) {
size_insets_ = size_insets;
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: server_httperror_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const struct http_error *ea = a;
const struct http_error *eb = b;
return (ea->error_code - eb->error_code);
}
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
CWE ID: CWE-770 | 0 | 29,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_value(SCPRContext *s, unsigned *cnt, unsigned maxc, unsigned step, unsigned *rval)
{
GetByteContext *gb = &s->gb;
RangeCoder *rc = &s->rc;
unsigned totfr = cnt[maxc];
unsigned value;
unsigned c = 0, cumfr = 0, cnt_c = 0;
int i, ret;
if ((ret = s->get_freq(rc, totfr, &value)) < 0)
return ret;
while (c < maxc) {
cnt_c = cnt[c];
if (value >= cumfr + cnt_c)
cumfr += cnt_c;
else
break;
c++;
}
if ((ret = s->decode(gb, rc, cumfr, cnt_c, totfr)) < 0)
return ret;
cnt[c] = cnt_c + step;
totfr += step;
if (totfr > BOT) {
totfr = 0;
for (i = 0; i < maxc; i++) {
unsigned nc = (cnt[i] >> 1) + 1;
cnt[i] = nc;
totfr += nc;
}
}
cnt[maxc] = totfr;
*rval = c;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/scpr: Check y in first line loop in decompress_i()
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1478/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5285486908145664
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void TabClosingAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContentsWrapper* contents,
int index) {
states_.push_back(new State(contents, index, CLOSE));
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void edge_bulk_in_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct edgeport_port *edge_port = urb->context;
struct device *dev = &edge_port->port->dev;
unsigned char *data = urb->transfer_buffer;
int retval = 0;
int port_number;
int status = urb->status;
switch (status) {
case 0:
/* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
/* this urb is terminated, clean up */
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - urb shutting down with status: %d\n", __func__, status);
return;
default:
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - nonzero read bulk status received: %d\n", __func__, status);
}
if (status == -EPIPE)
goto exit;
if (status) {
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - stopping read!\n", __func__);
return;
}
port_number = edge_port->port->port_number;
if (urb->actual_length > 0 && edge_port->lsr_event) {
edge_port->lsr_event = 0;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s ===== Port %u LSR Status = %02x, Data = %02x ======\n",
__func__, port_number, edge_port->lsr_mask, *data);
handle_new_lsr(edge_port, 1, edge_port->lsr_mask, *data);
/* Adjust buffer length/pointer */
--urb->actual_length;
++data;
}
if (urb->actual_length) {
usb_serial_debug_data(dev, __func__, urb->actual_length, data);
if (edge_port->close_pending)
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - close pending, dropping data on the floor\n",
__func__);
else
edge_tty_recv(edge_port->port, data,
urb->actual_length);
edge_port->port->icount.rx += urb->actual_length;
}
exit:
/* continue read unless stopped */
spin_lock(&edge_port->ep_lock);
if (edge_port->ep_read_urb_state == EDGE_READ_URB_RUNNING)
retval = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
else if (edge_port->ep_read_urb_state == EDGE_READ_URB_STOPPING)
edge_port->ep_read_urb_state = EDGE_READ_URB_STOPPED;
spin_unlock(&edge_port->ep_lock);
if (retval)
dev_err(dev, "%s - usb_submit_urb failed with result %d\n", __func__, retval);
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix div-by-zero in set_termios
Fix a division-by-zero in set_termios when debugging is enabled and a
high-enough speed has been requested so that the divisor value becomes
zero.
Instead of just fixing the offending debug statement, cap the baud rate
at the base as a zero divisor value also appears to crash the firmware.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.12
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 27,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nf_tables_dump_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
const struct nft_set *set;
struct nft_set_dump_args args;
struct nft_ctx ctx;
struct nlattr *nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_MAX + 1];
struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct nlattr *nest;
u32 portid, seq;
int event, err;
err = nlmsg_parse(cb->nlh, sizeof(struct nfgenmsg), nla,
NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_MAX, nft_set_elem_list_policy);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = nft_ctx_init_from_elemattr(&ctx, cb->skb, cb->nlh, (void *)nla,
false);
if (err < 0)
return err;
set = nf_tables_set_lookup(ctx.table, nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_SET]);
if (IS_ERR(set))
return PTR_ERR(set);
if (set->flags & NFT_SET_INACTIVE)
return -ENOENT;
event = NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM;
event |= NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES << 8;
portid = NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid;
seq = cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, sizeof(struct nfgenmsg),
NLM_F_MULTI);
if (nlh == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
nfmsg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
nfmsg->nfgen_family = ctx.afi->family;
nfmsg->version = NFNETLINK_V0;
nfmsg->res_id = htons(ctx.net->nft.base_seq & 0xffff);
if (nla_put_string(skb, NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_TABLE, ctx.table->name))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_string(skb, NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_SET, set->name))
goto nla_put_failure;
nest = nla_nest_start(skb, NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_ELEMENTS);
if (nest == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
args.cb = cb;
args.skb = skb;
args.iter.skip = cb->args[0];
args.iter.count = 0;
args.iter.err = 0;
args.iter.fn = nf_tables_dump_setelem;
set->ops->walk(&ctx, set, &args.iter);
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
if (args.iter.err && args.iter.err != -EMSGSIZE)
return args.iter.err;
if (args.iter.count == cb->args[0])
return 0;
cb->args[0] = args.iter.count;
return skb->len;
nla_put_failure:
return -ENOSPC;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 12,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spannable_string_t* InputHandler::selectedText(int32_t flags)
{
if (!isActiveTextEdit())
return 0;
return spannableTextInRange(selectionStart(), selectionEnd(), flags);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: epass2003_process_fci(struct sc_card *card, sc_file_t * file, const u8 * buf, size_t buflen)
{
sc_context_t *ctx = card->ctx;
size_t taglen, len = buflen;
const u8 *tag = NULL, *p = buf;
sc_log(ctx, "processing FCI bytes");
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(ctx, p, len, 0x83, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL && taglen == 2) {
file->id = (tag[0] << 8) | tag[1];
sc_log(ctx, " file identifier: 0x%02X%02X", tag[0], tag[1]);
}
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(ctx, p, len, 0x80, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL && taglen > 0 && taglen < 3) {
file->size = tag[0];
if (taglen == 2)
file->size = (file->size << 8) + tag[1];
sc_log(ctx, " bytes in file: %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
file->size);
}
if (tag == NULL) {
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(ctx, p, len, 0x81, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL && taglen >= 2) {
int bytes = (tag[0] << 8) + tag[1];
sc_log(ctx, " bytes in file: %d", bytes);
file->size = bytes;
}
}
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(ctx, p, len, 0x82, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL) {
if (taglen > 0) {
unsigned char byte = tag[0];
const char *type;
if (byte == 0x38) {
type = "DF";
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF;
}
else if (0x01 <= byte && byte <= 0x07) {
type = "working EF";
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF;
switch (byte) {
case 0x01:
file->ef_structure = SC_FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT;
break;
case 0x02:
file->ef_structure = SC_FILE_EF_LINEAR_FIXED;
break;
case 0x04:
file->ef_structure = SC_FILE_EF_LINEAR_FIXED;
break;
case 0x03:
case 0x05:
case 0x06:
case 0x07:
break;
default:
break;
}
}
else if (0x10 == byte) {
type = "BSO";
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_BSO;
}
else if (0x11 <= byte) {
type = "internal EF";
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF;
switch (byte) {
case 0x11:
break;
case 0x12:
break;
default:
break;
}
}
else {
type = "unknown";
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF;
}
sc_log(ctx, "type %s, EF structure %d", type, byte);
}
}
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(ctx, p, len, 0x84, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL && taglen > 0 && taglen <= 16) {
memcpy(file->name, tag, taglen);
file->namelen = taglen;
sc_log_hex(ctx, "File name", file->name, file->namelen);
if (!file->type)
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF;
}
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(ctx, p, len, 0x85, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL && taglen)
sc_file_set_prop_attr(file, tag, taglen);
else
file->prop_attr_len = 0;
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(ctx, p, len, 0xA5, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL && taglen)
sc_file_set_prop_attr(file, tag, taglen);
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(ctx, p, len, 0x86, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL && taglen)
sc_file_set_sec_attr(file, tag, taglen);
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(ctx, p, len, 0x8A, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL && taglen == 1) {
if (tag[0] == 0x01)
file->status = SC_FILE_STATUS_CREATION;
else if (tag[0] == 0x07 || tag[0] == 0x05)
file->status = SC_FILE_STATUS_ACTIVATED;
else if (tag[0] == 0x06 || tag[0] == 0x04)
file->status = SC_FILE_STATUS_INVALIDATED;
}
file->magic = SC_FILE_MAGIC;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 16,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void MaybeEncodeTextContent(const String& text_content,
const char* buffer_data,
size_t buffer_size,
String* result,
bool* base64_encoded) {
if (!text_content.IsNull() &&
!text_content.Utf8(WTF::kStrictUTF8Conversion).IsNull()) {
*result = text_content;
*base64_encoded = false;
} else if (buffer_data) {
*result = Base64Encode(buffer_data, buffer_size);
*base64_encoded = true;
} else if (text_content.IsNull()) {
*result = "";
*base64_encoded = false;
} else {
DCHECK(!text_content.Is8Bit());
*result = Base64Encode(text_content.Utf8(WTF::kLenientUTF8Conversion));
*base64_encoded = true;
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CastCastView::UpdateLabel() {
if (cast_config_delegate_ == nullptr ||
cast_config_delegate_->HasCastExtension() == false)
return;
cast_config_delegate_->GetReceiversAndActivities(
base::Bind(&CastCastView::UpdateLabelCallback, base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 22,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SendRoutedTouchTapSequence(content::WebContents* web_contents,
gfx::Point point) {
RenderWidgetHostViewAura* rwhva = static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewAura*>(
web_contents->GetRenderWidgetHostView());
ui::TouchEvent touch_start(
ui::ET_TOUCH_PRESSED, point, base::TimeTicks::Now(),
ui::PointerDetails(ui::EventPointerType::POINTER_TYPE_TOUCH, 0));
rwhva->OnTouchEvent(&touch_start);
ui::TouchEvent touch_end(
ui::ET_TOUCH_RELEASED, point, base::TimeTicks::Now(),
ui::PointerDetails(ui::EventPointerType::POINTER_TYPE_TOUCH, 0));
rwhva->OnTouchEvent(&touch_end);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::PinchGestureUpdate(float magnify_delta,
const gfx::Point& anchor) {
TRACE_EVENT0("cc", "LayerTreeHostImpl::PinchGestureUpdate");
if (!InnerViewportScrollLayer())
return;
viewport()->PinchUpdate(magnify_delta, anchor);
client_->SetNeedsCommitOnImplThread();
SetNeedsRedraw();
client_->RenewTreePriority();
UpdateRootLayerStateForSynchronousInputHandler();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 20,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClassicPendingScript::AdvanceReadyState(ReadyState new_ready_state) {
switch (ready_state_) {
case kWaitingForResource:
CHECK_EQ(new_ready_state, kWaitingForStreaming);
break;
case kWaitingForStreaming:
CHECK(new_ready_state == kReady || new_ready_state == kErrorOccurred);
break;
case kReady:
CHECK_EQ(new_ready_state, kReadyStreaming);
break;
case kReadyStreaming:
CHECK_EQ(new_ready_state, kReady);
break;
case kErrorOccurred:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
bool old_is_ready = IsReady();
ready_state_ = new_ready_state;
if (IsReady() && !old_is_ready && IsWatchingForLoad())
Client()->PendingScriptFinished(this);
if (IsCurrentlyStreaming()) {
if (ready_state_ == kReady || ready_state_ == kErrorOccurred) {
base::OnceClosure done = std::move(streamer_done_);
if (done)
std::move(done).Run();
is_currently_streaming_ = false;
}
}
if (IsCurrentlyStreaming()) {
DCHECK(streamer_);
DCHECK(!streamer_->IsFinished());
}
DCHECK_EQ(IsCurrentlyStreaming(), streamer_ && !streamer_->IsFinished());
DCHECK_EQ(IsCurrentlyStreaming(),
ready_state_ == kReadyStreaming ||
(streamer_ && (ready_state_ == kWaitingForResource ||
ready_state_ == kWaitingForStreaming)));
DCHECK(IsCurrentlyStreaming() || !streamer_done_);
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ZEXPORT inflateReset2(strm, windowBits)
z_streamp strm;
int windowBits;
{
int wrap;
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
/* get the state */
if (strm == Z_NULL || strm->state == Z_NULL) return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
state = (struct inflate_state FAR *)strm->state;
/* extract wrap request from windowBits parameter */
if (windowBits < 0) {
wrap = 0;
windowBits = -windowBits;
}
else {
wrap = (windowBits >> 4) + 1;
#ifdef GUNZIP
if (windowBits < 48)
windowBits &= 15;
#endif
}
/* set number of window bits, free window if different */
if (windowBits && (windowBits < 8 || windowBits > 15))
return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
if (state->window != Z_NULL && state->wbits != (unsigned)windowBits) {
ZFREE(strm, state->window);
state->window = Z_NULL;
}
/* update state and reset the rest of it */
state->wrap = wrap;
state->wbits = (unsigned)windowBits;
return inflateReset(strm);
}
Commit Message: Avoid shifts of negative values inflateMark().
The C standard says that bit shifts of negative integers is
undefined. This casts to unsigned values to assure a known
result.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 6,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t scsi_init_iovec(SCSIDiskReq *r)
{
r->iov.iov_len = MIN(r->sector_count * 512, SCSI_DMA_BUF_SIZE);
qemu_iovec_init_external(&r->qiov, &r->iov, 1);
return r->qiov.size / 512;
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 23,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PanoramiXRenderTriStrip(ClientPtr client)
{
PanoramiXRes *src, *dst;
int result = Success, j;
REQUEST(xRenderTriStripReq);
char *extra;
int extra_len;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE (xRenderTriStripReq);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE (src, stuff->src, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE (dst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
extra_len = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof (xRenderTriStripReq);
if (extra_len &&
(extra = (char *) malloc(extra_len))) {
memcpy (extra, stuff + 1, extra_len);
FOR_NSCREENS_FORWARD(j) {
if (j) memcpy (stuff + 1, extra, extra_len);
if (dst->u.pict.root) {
int x_off = screenInfo.screens[j]->x;
int y_off = screenInfo.screens[j]->y;
if(x_off || y_off) {
xPointFixed *fixed = (xPointFixed *) (stuff + 1);
int i = extra_len / sizeof (xPointFixed);
while (i--) {
fixed->x -= x_off;
fixed->y -= y_off;
fixed++;
}
}
}
stuff->src = src->info[j].id;
stuff->dst = dst->info[j].id;
result =
(*PanoramiXSaveRenderVector[X_RenderTriStrip]) (client);
if(result != Success) break;
}
free(extra);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jas_memdump(FILE *out, void *data, size_t len)
{
size_t i;
size_t j;
uchar *dp;
dp = data;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) {
fprintf(out, "%04zx:", i);
for (j = 0; j < 16; ++j) {
if (i + j < len) {
fprintf(out, " %02x", dp[i + j]);
}
}
fprintf(out, "\n");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 16,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameLoader::ModifyRequestForCSP(ResourceRequest& resource_request,
Document* origin_document) const {
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::EmbedderCSPEnforcementEnabled() &&
!RequiredCSP().IsEmpty()) {
DCHECK(
ContentSecurityPolicy::IsValidCSPAttr(RequiredCSP().GetString(), ""));
resource_request.SetHTTPHeaderField(HTTPNames::Sec_Required_CSP,
RequiredCSP());
}
if (resource_request.GetFrameType() !=
network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kNone) {
if (!resource_request.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Upgrade_Insecure_Requests)
.IsNull()) {
return;
}
resource_request.SetHTTPHeaderField(HTTPNames::Upgrade_Insecure_Requests,
"1");
}
UpgradeInsecureRequest(resource_request, origin_document);
}
Commit Message: Only allow downloading in response to real keyboard modifiers
BUG=848531
Change-Id: I97554c8d312243b55647f1376945aee32dbd95bf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1082216
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564051}
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct media_entity *find_entity(struct media_device *mdev, u32 id)
{
struct media_entity *entity;
int next = id & MEDIA_ENT_ID_FLAG_NEXT;
id &= ~MEDIA_ENT_ID_FLAG_NEXT;
spin_lock(&mdev->lock);
media_device_for_each_entity(entity, mdev) {
if ((entity->id == id && !next) ||
(entity->id > id && next)) {
spin_unlock(&mdev->lock);
return entity;
}
}
spin_unlock(&mdev->lock);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: [media] media-device: fix infoleak in ioctl media_enum_entities()
This fixes CVE-2014-1739.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Acked-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 25,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bittypmodin(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
ArrayType *ta = PG_GETARG_ARRAYTYPE_P(0);
PG_RETURN_INT32(anybit_typmodin(ta, "bit"));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 22,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::FilePath FindExeRelativeToSetupExe(const base::FilePath setup_exe_path,
const wchar_t* exe_file) {
if (!setup_exe_path.empty()) {
base::FilePath exe_path(
setup_exe_path.DirName().DirName().DirName().Append(exe_file));
if (file_util::PathExists(exe_path))
return exe_path;
exe_path = setup_exe_path.DirName().DirName().Append(exe_file);
if (file_util::PathExists(exe_path))
return exe_path;
}
return base::FilePath();
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ProfileSyncService::ChangePreferredDataTypes(
syncable::ModelTypeSet preferred_types) {
DVLOG(1) << "ChangePreferredDataTypes invoked";
const syncable::ModelTypeSet registered_types = GetRegisteredDataTypes();
const syncable::ModelTypeSet registered_preferred_types =
Intersection(registered_types, preferred_types);
sync_prefs_.SetPreferredDataTypes(registered_types,
registered_preferred_types);
ReconfigureDatatypeManager();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 21,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssh_packet_backup_state(struct ssh *ssh,
struct ssh *backup_state)
{
struct ssh *tmp;
close(ssh->state->connection_in);
ssh->state->connection_in = -1;
close(ssh->state->connection_out);
ssh->state->connection_out = -1;
if (backup_state)
tmp = backup_state;
else
tmp = ssh_alloc_session_state();
backup_state = ssh;
ssh = tmp;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NotifyFormRemovedFromTree(const T& elements, Node& root) {
for (const auto& element : elements)
element->FormRemovedFromTree(root);
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 14,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool iscsi_allocationmap_is_allocated(IscsiLun *iscsilun,
int64_t sector_num, int nb_sectors)
{
unsigned long size;
if (iscsilun->allocationmap == NULL) {
return true;
}
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(sector_num + nb_sectors, iscsilun->cluster_sectors);
return !(find_next_bit(iscsilun->allocationmap, size,
sector_num / iscsilun->cluster_sectors) == size);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int devicenalternatespace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, ref **r, int *CIESubst)
{
ref altspace;
int code;
code = array_get(imemory, space, 2, &altspace);
if (code < 0)
return code;
ref_assign(*r, &altspace);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 7,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::SetAccessibilityFocus(int acc_obj_id) {
if (!host_)
return;
host_->AccessibilitySetFocus(acc_obj_id);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mpage_map_one_extent(handle_t *handle, struct mpage_da_data *mpd)
{
struct inode *inode = mpd->inode;
struct ext4_map_blocks *map = &mpd->map;
int get_blocks_flags;
int err, dioread_nolock;
trace_ext4_da_write_pages_extent(inode, map);
/*
* Call ext4_map_blocks() to allocate any delayed allocation blocks, or
* to convert an unwritten extent to be initialized (in the case
* where we have written into one or more preallocated blocks). It is
* possible that we're going to need more metadata blocks than
* previously reserved. However we must not fail because we're in
* writeback and there is nothing we can do about it so it might result
* in data loss. So use reserved blocks to allocate metadata if
* possible.
*
* We pass in the magic EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE if
* the blocks in question are delalloc blocks. This indicates
* that the blocks and quotas has already been checked when
* the data was copied into the page cache.
*/
get_blocks_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE |
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_METADATA_NOFAIL;
dioread_nolock = ext4_should_dioread_nolock(inode);
if (dioread_nolock)
get_blocks_flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_CREATE_EXT;
if (map->m_flags & (1 << BH_Delay))
get_blocks_flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE;
err = ext4_map_blocks(handle, inode, map, get_blocks_flags);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (dioread_nolock && (map->m_flags & EXT4_MAP_UNWRITTEN)) {
if (!mpd->io_submit.io_end->handle &&
ext4_handle_valid(handle)) {
mpd->io_submit.io_end->handle = handle->h_rsv_handle;
handle->h_rsv_handle = NULL;
}
ext4_set_io_unwritten_flag(inode, mpd->io_submit.io_end);
}
BUG_ON(map->m_len == 0);
if (map->m_flags & EXT4_MAP_NEW) {
struct block_device *bdev = inode->i_sb->s_bdev;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < map->m_len; i++)
unmap_underlying_metadata(bdev, map->m_pblk + i);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 7,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t TestURLLoader::OpenFileSystem(pp::FileSystem* file_system,
std::string* message) {
TestCompletionCallback callback(instance_->pp_instance(), callback_type());
callback.WaitForResult(file_system->Open(1024, callback.GetCallback()));
if (callback.failed()) {
message->assign(callback.errors());
return callback.result();
}
if (callback.result() != PP_OK) {
message->assign("FileSystem::Open");
return callback.result();
}
return callback.result();
}
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_pgsql_escape_internal(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int escape_literal) /* {{{ */ {
char *from = NULL;
zval *pgsql_link = NULL;
PGconn *pgsql;
size_t from_len;
int id = -1;
char *tmp;
switch (ZEND_NUM_ARGS()) {
case 1:
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &from, &from_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
pgsql_link = NULL;
id = FETCH_DEFAULT_LINK();
break;
default:
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "rs", &pgsql_link, &from, &from_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
break;
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING,"Cannot get default pgsql link");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (pgsql == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING,"Cannot get pgsql link");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (escape_literal) {
tmp = PGSQLescapeLiteral(pgsql, from, (size_t)from_len);
} else {
tmp = PGSQLescapeIdentifier(pgsql, from, (size_t)from_len);
}
if (!tmp) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING,"Failed to escape");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_STRING(tmp);
PGSQLfree(tmp);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_locku_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_unlockdata *calldata = data;
if (RPC_ASSASSINATED(task))
return;
switch (task->tk_status) {
case 0:
memcpy(calldata->lsp->ls_stateid.data,
calldata->res.stateid.data,
sizeof(calldata->lsp->ls_stateid.data));
renew_lease(calldata->server, calldata->timestamp);
break;
case -NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED:
break;
default:
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, calldata->server, NULL) == -EAGAIN)
rpc_restart_call(task);
}
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterHRZImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("HRZ");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void emmh32_final(emmh32_context *context, u8 digest[4])
{
int coeff_position, byte_position;
u32 val;
u64 sum, utmp;
s64 stmp;
coeff_position = context->position >> 2;
/* deal with partial 32-bit word left over from last update */
byte_position = context->position & 3;
if (byte_position) {
/* have a partial word in part to deal with */
val = ntohl(context->part.d32);
MIC_ACCUM(val & mask32[byte_position]); /* zero empty bytes */
}
/* reduce the accumulated u64 to a 32-bit MIC */
sum = context->accum;
stmp = (sum & 0xffffffffLL) - ((sum >> 32) * 15);
utmp = (stmp & 0xffffffffLL) - ((stmp >> 32) * 15);
sum = utmp & 0xffffffffLL;
if (utmp > 0x10000000fLL)
sum -= 15;
val = (u32)sum;
digest[0] = (val>>24) & 0xFF;
digest[1] = (val>>16) & 0xFF;
digest[2] = (val>>8) & 0xFF;
digest[3] = val & 0xFF;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _XcursorStdioFileWrite (XcursorFile *file, unsigned char *buf, int len)
{
FILE *f = file->closure;
return fwrite (buf, 1, len, f);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 17,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_vn_setattr(
struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *iattr)
{
int error;
if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
uint iolock;
xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_MMAPLOCK_EXCL);
iolock = XFS_IOLOCK_EXCL | XFS_MMAPLOCK_EXCL;
error = xfs_break_layouts(inode, &iolock, BREAK_UNMAP);
if (error) {
xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_MMAPLOCK_EXCL);
return error;
}
error = xfs_vn_setattr_size(dentry, iattr);
xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_MMAPLOCK_EXCL);
} else {
error = xfs_vn_setattr_nonsize(dentry, iattr);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix missing ILOCK unlock when xfs_setattr_nonsize fails due to EDQUOT
Benjamin Moody reported to Debian that XFS partially wedges when a chgrp
fails on account of being out of disk quota. I ran his reproducer
script:
# adduser dummy
# adduser dummy plugdev
# dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=100 of=test.img
# mkfs.xfs test.img
# mount -t xfs -o gquota test.img /mnt
# mkdir -p /mnt/dummy
# chown -c dummy /mnt/dummy
# xfs_quota -xc 'limit -g bsoft=100k bhard=100k plugdev' /mnt
(and then as user dummy)
$ dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1M count=50 of=/mnt/dummy/foo
$ chgrp plugdev /mnt/dummy/foo
and saw:
================================================
WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
5.3.0-rc5 #rc5 Tainted: G W
------------------------------------------------
chgrp/47006 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
1 lock held by chgrp/47006:
#0: 000000006664ea2d (&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}, at: xfs_ilock+0xd2/0x290 [xfs]
...which is clearly caused by xfs_setattr_nonsize failing to unlock the
ILOCK after the xfs_qm_vop_chown_reserve call fails. Add the missing
unlock.
Reported-by: benjamin.moody@gmail.com
Fixes: 253f4911f297 ("xfs: better xfs_trans_alloc interface")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Status IndexedDBDatabase::PutOperation(
std::unique_ptr<PutOperationParams> params,
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction) {
IDB_TRACE2("IndexedDBDatabase::PutOperation", "txn.id", transaction->id(),
"size", params->value.SizeEstimate());
DCHECK_NE(transaction->mode(), blink::kWebIDBTransactionModeReadOnly);
bool key_was_generated = false;
Status s = Status::OK();
DCHECK(metadata_.object_stores.find(params->object_store_id) !=
metadata_.object_stores.end());
const IndexedDBObjectStoreMetadata& object_store =
metadata_.object_stores[params->object_store_id];
DCHECK(object_store.auto_increment || params->key->IsValid());
std::unique_ptr<IndexedDBKey> key;
if (params->put_mode != blink::kWebIDBPutModeCursorUpdate &&
object_store.auto_increment && !params->key->IsValid()) {
std::unique_ptr<IndexedDBKey> auto_inc_key = GenerateKey(
backing_store_.get(), transaction, id(), params->object_store_id);
key_was_generated = true;
if (!auto_inc_key->IsValid()) {
params->callbacks->OnError(
IndexedDBDatabaseError(blink::kWebIDBDatabaseExceptionConstraintError,
"Maximum key generator value reached."));
return s;
}
key = std::move(auto_inc_key);
} else {
key = std::move(params->key);
}
DCHECK(key->IsValid());
IndexedDBBackingStore::RecordIdentifier record_identifier;
if (params->put_mode == blink::kWebIDBPutModeAddOnly) {
bool found = false;
Status found_status = backing_store_->KeyExistsInObjectStore(
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(), id(), params->object_store_id,
*key, &record_identifier, &found);
if (!found_status.ok())
return found_status;
if (found) {
params->callbacks->OnError(
IndexedDBDatabaseError(blink::kWebIDBDatabaseExceptionConstraintError,
"Key already exists in the object store."));
return found_status;
}
}
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<IndexWriter>> index_writers;
base::string16 error_message;
bool obeys_constraints = false;
bool backing_store_success = MakeIndexWriters(transaction,
backing_store_.get(),
id(),
object_store,
*key,
key_was_generated,
params->index_keys,
&index_writers,
&error_message,
&obeys_constraints);
if (!backing_store_success) {
params->callbacks->OnError(IndexedDBDatabaseError(
blink::kWebIDBDatabaseExceptionUnknownError,
"Internal error: backing store error updating index keys."));
return s;
}
if (!obeys_constraints) {
params->callbacks->OnError(IndexedDBDatabaseError(
blink::kWebIDBDatabaseExceptionConstraintError, error_message));
return s;
}
s = backing_store_->PutRecord(transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(), id(),
params->object_store_id, *key, ¶ms->value,
¶ms->handles, &record_identifier);
if (!s.ok())
return s;
{
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBDatabase::PutOperation.UpdateIndexes", "txn.id",
transaction->id());
for (const auto& writer : index_writers) {
writer->WriteIndexKeys(record_identifier, backing_store_.get(),
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(), id(),
params->object_store_id);
}
}
if (object_store.auto_increment &&
params->put_mode != blink::kWebIDBPutModeCursorUpdate &&
key->type() == kWebIDBKeyTypeNumber) {
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBDatabase::PutOperation.AutoIncrement", "txn.id",
transaction->id());
s = UpdateKeyGenerator(backing_store_.get(), transaction, id(),
params->object_store_id, *key, !key_was_generated);
if (!s.ok())
return s;
}
{
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBDatabase::PutOperation.Callbacks", "txn.id",
transaction->id());
params->callbacks->OnSuccess(*key);
}
FilterObservation(transaction, params->object_store_id,
params->put_mode == blink::kWebIDBPutModeAddOnly
? blink::kWebIDBAdd
: blink::kWebIDBPut,
IndexedDBKeyRange(*key), ¶ms->value);
factory_->NotifyIndexedDBContentChanged(
origin(), metadata_.name,
metadata_.object_stores[params->object_store_id].name);
return s;
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFINE_TRACE(AXObjectCacheImpl) {
visitor->trace(m_document);
visitor->trace(m_nodeObjectMapping);
visitor->trace(m_objects);
visitor->trace(m_notificationsToPost);
AXObjectCache::trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 20,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::MarkContextChanged(
ContentChangeType change_type) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (framebuffer_binding_) {
framebuffer_binding_->SetContentsChanged(true);
return;
}
must_paint_to_canvas_ = true;
if (!GetDrawingBuffer()->MarkContentsChanged() && marked_canvas_dirty_) {
return;
}
if (Host()->IsOffscreenCanvas()) {
marked_canvas_dirty_ = true;
DidDraw();
return;
}
if (!canvas())
return;
if (!marked_canvas_dirty_) {
marked_canvas_dirty_ = true;
LayoutBox* layout_box = canvas()->GetLayoutBox();
if (layout_box && layout_box->HasAcceleratedCompositing()) {
layout_box->ContentChanged(change_type);
}
IntSize canvas_size = ClampedCanvasSize();
DidDraw(SkIRect::MakeXYWH(0, 0, canvas_size.Width(), canvas_size.Height()));
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 1,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string ChromeMetricsServiceClient::GetVersionString() {
return metrics::GetVersionString();
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 8,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *ipmr_mfc_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
{
struct ipmr_mfc_iter *it = seq->private;
struct net *net = seq_file_net(seq);
struct mr6_table *mrt;
mrt = ip6mr_get_table(net, RT6_TABLE_DFLT);
if (!mrt)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
it->mrt = mrt;
return *pos ? ipmr_mfc_seq_idx(net, seq->private, *pos - 1)
: SEQ_START_TOKEN;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SavePackage::OnReceivedSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage(
const std::vector<GURL>& resources_list,
const std::vector<Referrer>& referrers_list,
const std::vector<GURL>& frames_list) {
if (wait_state_ != RESOURCES_LIST)
return;
DCHECK(resources_list.size() == referrers_list.size());
all_save_items_count_ = static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()) +
static_cast<int>(frames_list.size());
if (download_ && download_->IsInProgress())
download_->SetTotalBytes(all_save_items_count_);
if (all_save_items_count_) {
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = resources_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveFileCreateInfo::SaveFileSource save_source = u.SchemeIsFile() ?
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_FILE :
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_NET;
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(u, referrers_list[i],
this, save_source);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(frames_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = frames_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(
u, Referrer(), this, SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_DOM);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
wait_state_ = NET_FILES;
DoSavingProcess();
} else {
Cancel(true);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 922 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pg_parse_json(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem)
{
JsonTokenType tok;
/* get the initial token */
json_lex(lex);
tok = lex_peek(lex);
/* parse by recursive descent */
switch (tok)
{
case JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_START:
parse_object(lex, sem);
break;
case JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_START:
parse_array(lex, sem);
break;
default:
parse_scalar(lex, sem); /* json can be a bare scalar */
}
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_END, lex, JSON_TOKEN_END);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ikev1_vid_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_VID)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_VID)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 3,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nullableLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::nullableLongAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLElement::setInnerHTML(const String& html, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
RefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment = createFragmentFromSource(html, this, ec);
if (fragment)
replaceChildrenWithFragment(this, fragment.release(), ec);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 6,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iasecc_sdo_get_data(struct sc_card *card, struct iasecc_sdo *sdo)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
int rv, sdo_tag;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sdo_tag = iasecc_sdo_tag_from_class(sdo->sdo_class);
rv = iasecc_sdo_get_tagged_data(card, sdo_tag, sdo);
/* When there is no public data 'GET DATA' returns error */
if (rv != SC_ERROR_INCORRECT_PARAMETERS)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "cannot parse ECC SDO data");
rv = iasecc_sdo_get_tagged_data(card, IASECC_DOCP_TAG, sdo);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "cannot parse ECC DOCP data");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 18,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int decode_splitmvs(VP8Context *s, VP56RangeCoder *c, VP8Macroblock *mb,
int layout, int is_vp7)
{
int part_idx;
int n, num;
VP8Macroblock *top_mb;
VP8Macroblock *left_mb = &mb[-1];
const uint8_t *mbsplits_left = vp8_mbsplits[left_mb->partitioning];
const uint8_t *mbsplits_top, *mbsplits_cur, *firstidx;
VP56mv *top_mv;
VP56mv *left_mv = left_mb->bmv;
VP56mv *cur_mv = mb->bmv;
if (!layout) // layout is inlined, s->mb_layout is not
top_mb = &mb[2];
else
top_mb = &mb[-s->mb_width - 1];
mbsplits_top = vp8_mbsplits[top_mb->partitioning];
top_mv = top_mb->bmv;
if (vp56_rac_get_prob_branchy(c, vp8_mbsplit_prob[0])) {
if (vp56_rac_get_prob_branchy(c, vp8_mbsplit_prob[1]))
part_idx = VP8_SPLITMVMODE_16x8 + vp56_rac_get_prob(c, vp8_mbsplit_prob[2]);
else
part_idx = VP8_SPLITMVMODE_8x8;
} else {
part_idx = VP8_SPLITMVMODE_4x4;
}
num = vp8_mbsplit_count[part_idx];
mbsplits_cur = vp8_mbsplits[part_idx],
firstidx = vp8_mbfirstidx[part_idx];
mb->partitioning = part_idx;
for (n = 0; n < num; n++) {
int k = firstidx[n];
uint32_t left, above;
const uint8_t *submv_prob;
if (!(k & 3))
left = AV_RN32A(&left_mv[mbsplits_left[k + 3]]);
else
left = AV_RN32A(&cur_mv[mbsplits_cur[k - 1]]);
if (k <= 3)
above = AV_RN32A(&top_mv[mbsplits_top[k + 12]]);
else
above = AV_RN32A(&cur_mv[mbsplits_cur[k - 4]]);
submv_prob = get_submv_prob(left, above, is_vp7);
if (vp56_rac_get_prob_branchy(c, submv_prob[0])) {
if (vp56_rac_get_prob_branchy(c, submv_prob[1])) {
if (vp56_rac_get_prob_branchy(c, submv_prob[2])) {
mb->bmv[n].y = mb->mv.y +
read_mv_component(c, s->prob->mvc[0], is_vp7);
mb->bmv[n].x = mb->mv.x +
read_mv_component(c, s->prob->mvc[1], is_vp7);
} else {
AV_ZERO32(&mb->bmv[n]);
}
} else {
AV_WN32A(&mb->bmv[n], above);
}
} else {
AV_WN32A(&mb->bmv[n], left);
}
}
return num;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DevToolsAgentHostClient::MayAttachToRenderer(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
bool is_webui) {
return true;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameFetchContext::DispatchWillSendRequest(
unsigned long identifier,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
Resource::Type resource_type,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
if (IsDetached())
return;
if (redirect_response.IsNull()) {
GetFrame()->Loader().Progress().WillStartLoading(identifier,
request.Priority());
}
probe::willSendRequest(GetFrame()->GetDocument(), identifier,
MasterDocumentLoader(), request, redirect_response,
initiator_info, resource_type);
if (IdlenessDetector* idleness_detector = GetFrame()->GetIdlenessDetector())
idleness_detector->OnWillSendRequest(MasterDocumentLoader()->Fetcher());
if (document_) {
InteractiveDetector* interactive_detector(
InteractiveDetector::From(*document_));
if (interactive_detector) {
interactive_detector->OnResourceLoadBegin(base::nullopt);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 18,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcp_v4_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
tcp_init_sock(sk);
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &ipv4_specific;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
tcp_sk(sk)->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv4_specific;
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 1,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::NotifyExtensions(
DownloadItem* download,
const base::FilePath& virtual_path,
const NotifyExtensionsCallback& callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(!download->IsTransient());
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
extensions::ExtensionDownloadsEventRouter* router =
DownloadCoreServiceFactory::GetForBrowserContext(profile_)
->GetExtensionEventRouter();
if (router) {
base::Closure original_path_callback =
base::Bind(callback, base::FilePath(),
DownloadPathReservationTracker::UNIQUIFY);
router->OnDeterminingFilename(download, virtual_path.BaseName(),
original_path_callback,
callback);
return;
}
#endif
callback.Run(base::FilePath(), DownloadPathReservationTracker::UNIQUIFY);
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int zend_declare_property_ex(zend_class_entry *ce, const char *name, int name_length, zval *property, int access_type, const char *doc_comment, int doc_comment_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zend_property_info property_info, *property_info_ptr;
const char *interned_name;
ulong h = zend_get_hash_value(name, name_length+1);
if (!(access_type & ZEND_ACC_PPP_MASK)) {
access_type |= ZEND_ACC_PUBLIC;
}
if (access_type & ZEND_ACC_STATIC) {
if (zend_hash_quick_find(&ce->properties_info, name, name_length + 1, h, (void**)&property_info_ptr) == SUCCESS &&
(property_info_ptr->flags & ZEND_ACC_STATIC) != 0) {
property_info.offset = property_info_ptr->offset;
zval_ptr_dtor(&ce->default_static_members_table[property_info.offset]);
zend_hash_quick_del(&ce->properties_info, name, name_length + 1, h);
} else {
property_info.offset = ce->default_static_members_count++;
ce->default_static_members_table = perealloc(ce->default_static_members_table, sizeof(zval*) * ce->default_static_members_count, ce->type == ZEND_INTERNAL_CLASS);
}
ce->default_static_members_table[property_info.offset] = property;
if (ce->type == ZEND_USER_CLASS) {
ce->static_members_table = ce->default_static_members_table;
}
} else {
if (zend_hash_quick_find(&ce->properties_info, name, name_length + 1, h, (void**)&property_info_ptr) == SUCCESS &&
(property_info_ptr->flags & ZEND_ACC_STATIC) == 0) {
property_info.offset = property_info_ptr->offset;
zval_ptr_dtor(&ce->default_properties_table[property_info.offset]);
zend_hash_quick_del(&ce->properties_info, name, name_length + 1, h);
} else {
property_info.offset = ce->default_properties_count++;
ce->default_properties_table = perealloc(ce->default_properties_table, sizeof(zval*) * ce->default_properties_count, ce->type == ZEND_INTERNAL_CLASS);
}
ce->default_properties_table[property_info.offset] = property;
}
if (ce->type & ZEND_INTERNAL_CLASS) {
switch(Z_TYPE_P(property)) {
case IS_ARRAY:
case IS_OBJECT:
case IS_RESOURCE:
zend_error(E_CORE_ERROR, "Internal zval's can't be arrays, objects or resources");
break;
default:
break;
}
}
switch (access_type & ZEND_ACC_PPP_MASK) {
case ZEND_ACC_PRIVATE: {
char *priv_name;
int priv_name_length;
zend_mangle_property_name(&priv_name, &priv_name_length, ce->name, ce->name_length, name, name_length, ce->type & ZEND_INTERNAL_CLASS);
property_info.name = priv_name;
property_info.name_length = priv_name_length;
}
break;
case ZEND_ACC_PROTECTED: {
char *prot_name;
int prot_name_length;
zend_mangle_property_name(&prot_name, &prot_name_length, "*", 1, name, name_length, ce->type & ZEND_INTERNAL_CLASS);
property_info.name = prot_name;
property_info.name_length = prot_name_length;
}
break;
case ZEND_ACC_PUBLIC:
if (IS_INTERNED(name)) {
property_info.name = (char*)name;
} else {
property_info.name = ce->type & ZEND_INTERNAL_CLASS ? zend_strndup(name, name_length) : estrndup(name, name_length);
}
property_info.name_length = name_length;
break;
}
interned_name = zend_new_interned_string(property_info.name, property_info.name_length+1, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (interned_name != property_info.name) {
if (ce->type == ZEND_USER_CLASS) {
efree((char*)property_info.name);
} else {
free((char*)property_info.name);
}
property_info.name = interned_name;
}
property_info.flags = access_type;
property_info.h = (access_type & ZEND_ACC_PUBLIC) ? h : zend_get_hash_value(property_info.name, property_info.name_length+1);
property_info.doc_comment = doc_comment;
property_info.doc_comment_len = doc_comment_len;
property_info.ce = ce;
zend_hash_quick_update(&ce->properties_info, name, name_length+1, h, &property_info, sizeof(zend_property_info), NULL);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 22,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: quic::QuicStreamId stream_id() const { return stream_id_; }
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 21,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void svm_set_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
BUG_ON(!(gif_set(svm)));
trace_kvm_inj_virq(vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr);
++vcpu->stat.irq_injections;
svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr |
SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_INTR;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 11,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnWheelEventAck(
const MouseWheelEventWithLatencyInfo& wheel_event,
InputEventAckSource ack_source,
InputEventAckState ack_result) {
latency_tracker_.OnInputEventAck(wheel_event.event, &wheel_event.latency,
ack_result);
for (auto& input_event_observer : input_event_observers_)
input_event_observer.OnInputEventAck(ack_source, ack_result,
wheel_event.event);
if (!is_hidden() && view_) {
if (ack_result != INPUT_EVENT_ACK_STATE_CONSUMED &&
delegate_ && delegate_->HandleWheelEvent(wheel_event.event)) {
ack_result = INPUT_EVENT_ACK_STATE_CONSUMED;
}
view_->WheelEventAck(wheel_event.event, ack_result);
}
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,410 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void enforce_filters(void) {
arg_nonewprivs = 1;
force_nonewprivs = 1;
fmessage("\n** Warning: dropping all Linux capabilities **\n");
arg_caps_drop_all = 1;
arg_nogroups = 1;
}
Commit Message: mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 11,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cm_format_sidr_rep_event(struct cm_work *work)
{
struct cm_sidr_rep_msg *sidr_rep_msg;
struct ib_cm_sidr_rep_event_param *param;
sidr_rep_msg = (struct cm_sidr_rep_msg *)
work->mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.mad;
param = &work->cm_event.param.sidr_rep_rcvd;
param->status = sidr_rep_msg->status;
param->qkey = be32_to_cpu(sidr_rep_msg->qkey);
param->qpn = be32_to_cpu(cm_sidr_rep_get_qpn(sidr_rep_msg));
param->info = &sidr_rep_msg->info;
param->info_len = sidr_rep_msg->info_length;
work->cm_event.private_data = &sidr_rep_msg->private_data;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const gfx::VectorIcon& AuthenticatorBleVerifyingSheetModel::GetStepIllustration(
ImageColorScheme color_scheme) const {
return color_scheme == ImageColorScheme::kDark ? kWebauthnBleDarkIcon
: kWebauthnBleIcon;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_xattr_acl_get(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
void *value, size_t size, int type)
{
struct posix_acl *acl;
int error;
acl = xfs_get_acl(dentry->d_inode, type);
if (IS_ERR(acl))
return PTR_ERR(acl);
if (acl == NULL)
return -ENODATA;
error = posix_acl_to_xattr(acl, value, size);
posix_acl_release(acl);
return error;
}
Commit Message: xfs: validate acl count
This prevents in-memory corruption and possible panics if the on-disk
ACL is badly corrupted.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::UpdateLegacyWin() {
if (legacy_window_destroyed_ || !GetHostWindowHWND())
return;
if (!legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_) {
legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_ =
LegacyRenderWidgetHostHWND::Create(GetHostWindowHWND());
}
if (legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_) {
legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_->set_host(this);
legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_->UpdateParent(GetHostWindowHWND());
legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_->SetBounds(
window_->GetBoundsInRootWindow());
if (!host_->is_hidden())
legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_->Show();
}
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 28,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bta_hl_co_get_echo_data (UINT8 app_id, tBTA_HL_MCL_HANDLE mcl_handle,
UINT16 buf_size, UINT8 *p_buf, UINT16 evt)
{
tBTA_HL_STATUS status = BTA_HL_STATUS_FAIL;
UNUSED(app_id);
UNUSED(buf_size);
UNUSED(p_buf);
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s not supported",__FUNCTION__);
bta_hl_ci_get_echo_data(mcl_handle, status, evt);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 4,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Magick_ColorType_from_PNG_ColorType(const int ping_colortype)
{
switch (ping_colortype)
{
case 0:
return "Grayscale";
case 2:
return "Truecolor";
case 3:
return "Indexed";
case 4:
return "GrayAlpha";
case 6:
return "RGBA";
default:
return "UndefinedColorType";
}
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 19,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint8_t arcmsr_hbaC_wait_msgint_ready(struct AdapterControlBlock *pACB)
{
struct MessageUnit_C __iomem *phbcmu = pACB->pmuC;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 2000; i++) {
if (readl(&phbcmu->outbound_doorbell)
& ARCMSR_HBCMU_IOP2DRV_MESSAGE_CMD_DONE) {
writel(ARCMSR_HBCMU_IOP2DRV_MESSAGE_CMD_DONE_DOORBELL_CLEAR,
&phbcmu->outbound_doorbell_clear); /*clear interrupt*/
return true;
}
msleep(10);
} /* max 20 seconds */
return false;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sysctl_head_get(struct ctl_table_header *head)
{
spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
head->count++;
spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long do_sigpending(void __user *set, unsigned long sigsetsize)
{
long error = -EINVAL;
sigset_t pending;
if (sigsetsize > sizeof(sigset_t))
goto out;
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
sigorsets(&pending, ¤t->pending.signal,
¤t->signal->shared_pending.signal);
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
/* Outside the lock because only this thread touches it. */
sigandsets(&pending, ¤t->blocked, &pending);
error = -EFAULT;
if (!copy_to_user(set, &pending, sigsetsize))
error = 0;
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: createLppTransposer (HANDLE_SBR_LPP_TRANS hs, /*!< Handle of low power transposer */
TRANSPOSER_SETTINGS *pSettings, /*!< Pointer to settings */
const int highBandStartSb, /*!< ? */
UCHAR *v_k_master, /*!< Master table */
const int numMaster, /*!< Valid entries in master table */
const int usb, /*!< Highband area stop subband */
const int timeSlots, /*!< Number of time slots */
const int nCols, /*!< Number of colums (codec qmf bank) */
UCHAR *noiseBandTable, /*!< Mapping of SBR noise bands to QMF bands */
const int noNoiseBands, /*!< Number of noise bands */
UINT fs, /*!< Sample Frequency */
const int chan, /*!< Channel number */
const int overlap
)
{
/* FB inverse filtering settings */
hs->pSettings = pSettings;
pSettings->nCols = nCols;
pSettings->overlap = overlap;
switch (timeSlots) {
case 15:
case 16:
break;
default:
return SBRDEC_UNSUPPORTED_CONFIG; /* Unimplemented */
}
if (chan==0) {
/* Init common data only once */
hs->pSettings->nCols = nCols;
return resetLppTransposer (hs,
highBandStartSb,
v_k_master,
numMaster,
noiseBandTable,
noNoiseBands,
usb,
fs);
}
return SBRDEC_OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bound memory access in lppTransposer
In TRANSPOSER_SETTINGS, initialize the whole bwBorders array to a
reasonable value to guarantee correct termination in while loop
in lppTransposer function. This fixes the reported bug.
For completeness:
- clear the whole bwIndex array instead of noOfPatches entries only.
- abort criterion in while loop to prevent potential
infinite loop, and limit bwIndex[patch] to a valid range.
Test: see bug for malicious content, decoded with "stagefright -s -a"
Bug: 65280786
Change-Id: I16ed2e1c0f1601926239a652ca20a91284151843
(cherry picked from commit 6d3dd40e204bf550abcfa589bd9615df8778e118)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 20,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlockFlow::setMaxMarginBeforeValues(LayoutUnit pos, LayoutUnit neg)
{
if (!m_rareData) {
if (pos == RenderBlockFlowRareData::positiveMarginBeforeDefault(this) && neg == RenderBlockFlowRareData::negativeMarginBeforeDefault(this))
return;
m_rareData = adoptPtr(new RenderBlockFlowRareData(this));
}
m_rareData->m_margins.setPositiveMarginBefore(pos);
m_rareData->m_margins.setNegativeMarginBefore(neg);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_insert_lt_node(dpb_manager_t *ps_dpb_mgr,
struct dpb_info_t *ps_mov_node,
UWORD32 u4_lt_idx,
UWORD8 u1_fld_pic_flag)
{
UWORD8 u1_mark_top_field_long_term = 0;
UWORD8 u1_mark_bot_field_long_term = 0;
{
if(u1_fld_pic_flag)
{
/* Assign corresponding field (top or bottom) long_term_frame_idx */
if((ps_mov_node->s_top_field.u1_reference_info == IS_LONG_TERM)
&& (ps_mov_node->s_bot_field.u1_reference_info
== IS_LONG_TERM))
{
if(ps_mov_node->u1_lt_idx == u4_lt_idx)
u1_mark_bot_field_long_term = 1;
else
{
UWORD32 i4_error_code;
i4_error_code = ERROR_DBP_MANAGER_T;
return i4_error_code;
}
}
else if(ps_mov_node->s_top_field.u1_reference_info == IS_LONG_TERM)
{
u1_mark_top_field_long_term = 1;
}
if(!(u1_mark_top_field_long_term || u1_mark_bot_field_long_term))
{
UWORD32 i4_error_code;
i4_error_code = ERROR_DBP_MANAGER_T;
return i4_error_code;
}
}
else
{
ps_mov_node->s_top_field.u1_reference_info = IS_LONG_TERM;
ps_mov_node->s_bot_field.u1_reference_info = IS_LONG_TERM;
ps_mov_node->s_top_field.u1_long_term_frame_idx = u4_lt_idx;
ps_mov_node->s_bot_field.u1_long_term_frame_idx = u4_lt_idx;
}
ps_mov_node->u1_lt_idx = u4_lt_idx; //Assign the LT index to the node
ps_mov_node->ps_pic_buf->u1_long_term_frm_idx = u4_lt_idx;
ps_mov_node->u1_used_as_ref = IS_LONG_TERM;
/* Insert the new long term in the LT list with u4_lt_idx */
/* in ascending order. */
if(ps_dpb_mgr->u1_num_lt_ref_bufs > 0)
{
struct dpb_info_t *ps_next_dpb = ps_dpb_mgr->ps_dpb_ht_head;
if(u4_lt_idx < ps_next_dpb->u1_lt_idx)
{
ps_mov_node->ps_prev_long = ps_next_dpb;
ps_dpb_mgr->ps_dpb_ht_head = ps_mov_node;
}
else
{
WORD32 i;
struct dpb_info_t *ps_nxtDPB = ps_next_dpb;
ps_next_dpb = ps_next_dpb->ps_prev_long;
for(i = 1; i < ps_dpb_mgr->u1_num_lt_ref_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_next_dpb->u1_lt_idx > u4_lt_idx)
break;
ps_nxtDPB = ps_next_dpb;
ps_next_dpb = ps_next_dpb->ps_prev_long;
}
ps_nxtDPB->ps_prev_long = ps_mov_node;
ps_mov_node->ps_prev_long = ps_next_dpb;
}
}
else
{
ps_dpb_mgr->ps_dpb_ht_head = ps_mov_node;
ps_mov_node->ps_prev_long = NULL;
}
/* Identify the picture buffer as a long term picture buffer */
ps_mov_node->ps_pic_buf->u1_is_short = 0;
/* Increment LT buf count only if new LT node inserted */
/* If Increment during top_field is done, don't increment */
/* for bottom field, as both them are part of same pic. */
if(!u1_mark_bot_field_long_term)
ps_dpb_mgr->u1_num_lt_ref_bufs++;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Return error when there are more mmco params than allocated size
Bug: 25818142
Change-Id: I5c1b23985eeca5192b42703c627ca3d060e4e13d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void addCornerArc(SkPath* path, const SkRect& rect, const IntSize& size, int startAngle)
{
SkIRect ir;
int rx = SkMin32(SkScalarRound(rect.width()), size.width());
int ry = SkMin32(SkScalarRound(rect.height()), size.height());
ir.set(-rx, -ry, rx, ry);
switch (startAngle) {
case 0:
ir.offset(rect.fRight - ir.fRight, rect.fBottom - ir.fBottom);
break;
case 90:
ir.offset(rect.fLeft - ir.fLeft, rect.fBottom - ir.fBottom);
break;
case 180:
ir.offset(rect.fLeft - ir.fLeft, rect.fTop - ir.fTop);
break;
case 270:
ir.offset(rect.fRight - ir.fRight, rect.fTop - ir.fTop);
break;
default:
ASSERT(0);
}
SkRect r;
r.set(ir);
path->arcTo(r, SkIntToScalar(startAngle), SkIntToScalar(90), false);
}
Commit Message: [skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 11,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FcDirCacheDisposeUnlocked (FcCache *cache)
{
FcCacheRemoveUnlocked (cache);
switch (cache->magic) {
case FC_CACHE_MAGIC_ALLOC:
free (cache);
break;
case FC_CACHE_MAGIC_MMAP:
#if defined(HAVE_MMAP) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
munmap (cache, cache->size);
#elif defined(_WIN32)
UnmapViewOfFile (cache);
#endif
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 8,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void account_numa_enqueue(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p)
{
rq->nr_numa_running += (p->numa_preferred_nid != -1);
rq->nr_preferred_running += (p->numa_preferred_nid == task_node(p));
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 15,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void svc_rdma_send_error(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt, struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
int status)
{
struct ib_send_wr err_wr;
struct page *p;
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
enum rpcrdma_errcode err;
__be32 *va;
int length;
int ret;
ret = svc_rdma_repost_recv(xprt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret)
return;
p = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
return;
va = page_address(p);
/* XDR encode an error reply */
err = ERR_CHUNK;
if (status == -EPROTONOSUPPORT)
err = ERR_VERS;
length = svc_rdma_xdr_encode_error(xprt, rmsgp, err, va);
ctxt = svc_rdma_get_context(xprt);
ctxt->direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
ctxt->count = 1;
ctxt->pages[0] = p;
/* Prepare SGE for local address */
ctxt->sge[0].lkey = xprt->sc_pd->local_dma_lkey;
ctxt->sge[0].length = length;
ctxt->sge[0].addr = ib_dma_map_page(xprt->sc_cm_id->device,
p, 0, length, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (ib_dma_mapping_error(xprt->sc_cm_id->device, ctxt->sge[0].addr)) {
dprintk("svcrdma: Error mapping buffer for protocol error\n");
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
return;
}
svc_rdma_count_mappings(xprt, ctxt);
/* Prepare SEND WR */
memset(&err_wr, 0, sizeof(err_wr));
ctxt->cqe.done = svc_rdma_wc_send;
err_wr.wr_cqe = &ctxt->cqe;
err_wr.sg_list = ctxt->sge;
err_wr.num_sge = 1;
err_wr.opcode = IB_WR_SEND;
err_wr.send_flags = IB_SEND_SIGNALED;
/* Post It */
ret = svc_rdma_send(xprt, &err_wr);
if (ret) {
dprintk("svcrdma: Error %d posting send for protocol error\n",
ret);
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 1 | 7,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pdf_run_j(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, int linejoin)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_gstate *gstate = pdf_flush_text(ctx, pr);
pr->dev->flags &= ~FZ_DEVFLAG_LINEJOIN_UNDEFINED;
gstate->stroke_state = fz_unshare_stroke_state(ctx, gstate->stroke_state);
gstate->stroke_state->linejoin = linejoin;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::DidNavigateMainFramePostCommit(WebContents* web_contents) {
if (web_contents == tab_strip_model_->GetActiveWebContents())
UpdateBookmarkBarState(BOOKMARK_BAR_STATE_CHANGE_TAB_STATE);
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebMediaPlayerImpl::DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker() const {
if (data_source_)
return data_source_->DidGetOpaqueResponseViaServiceWorker();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 1 | 5,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit LayoutBlockFlow::logicalLeftFloatOffsetForLine(LayoutUnit logicalTop, LayoutUnit fixedOffset, LayoutUnit logicalHeight) const
{
if (m_floatingObjects && m_floatingObjects->hasLeftObjects())
return m_floatingObjects->logicalLeftOffset(fixedOffset, logicalTop, logicalHeight);
return fixedOffset;
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 5,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ahci_reg_init(AHCIState *s)
{
int i;
s->control_regs.cap = (s->ports - 1) |
(AHCI_NUM_COMMAND_SLOTS << 8) |
(AHCI_SUPPORTED_SPEED_GEN1 << AHCI_SUPPORTED_SPEED) |
HOST_CAP_NCQ | HOST_CAP_AHCI;
s->control_regs.impl = (1 << s->ports) - 1;
s->control_regs.version = AHCI_VERSION_1_0;
for (i = 0; i < s->ports; i++) {
s->dev[i].port_state = STATE_RUN;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 4,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: create_trace_option_core_file(struct trace_array *tr,
const char *option, long index)
{
struct dentry *t_options;
t_options = trace_options_init_dentry(tr);
if (!t_options)
return NULL;
return trace_create_file(option, 0644, t_options,
(void *)&tr->trace_flags_index[index],
&trace_options_core_fops);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 25,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::requestPointerUnlock()
{
return m_webView->requestPointerUnlock();
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nl80211_parse_mcast_rate(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
int mcast_rate[IEEE80211_NUM_BANDS],
int rateval)
{
struct wiphy *wiphy = &rdev->wiphy;
bool found = false;
int band, i;
for (band = 0; band < IEEE80211_NUM_BANDS; band++) {
struct ieee80211_supported_band *sband;
sband = wiphy->bands[band];
if (!sband)
continue;
for (i = 0; i < sband->n_bitrates; i++) {
if (sband->bitrates[i].bitrate == rateval) {
mcast_rate[band] = i + 1;
found = true;
break;
}
}
}
return found;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __vma_link(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct vm_area_struct *prev, struct rb_node **rb_link,
struct rb_node *rb_parent)
{
__vma_link_list(mm, vma, prev, rb_parent);
__vma_link_rb(mm, vma, rb_link, rb_parent);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 23,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int emulate_clts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
kvm_x86_ops->set_cr0(vcpu, kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, ~X86_CR0_TS));
kvm_x86_ops->fpu_activate(vcpu);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 16,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aspath_gettoken (const char *buf, enum as_token *token, u_long *asno)
{
const char *p = buf;
/* Skip seperators (space for sequences, ',' for sets). */
while (isspace ((int) *p) || *p == ',')
p++;
/* Check the end of the string and type specify characters
(e.g. {}()). */
switch (*p)
{
case '\0':
return NULL;
case '{':
*token = as_token_set_start;
p++;
return p;
case '}':
*token = as_token_set_end;
p++;
return p;
case '(':
*token = as_token_confed_seq_start;
p++;
return p;
case ')':
*token = as_token_confed_seq_end;
p++;
return p;
case '[':
*token = as_token_confed_set_start;
p++;
return p;
case ']':
*token = as_token_confed_set_end;
p++;
return p;
}
/* Check actual AS value. */
if (isdigit ((int) *p))
{
as_t asval;
*token = as_token_asval;
asval = (*p - '0');
p++;
while (isdigit ((int) *p))
{
asval *= 10;
asval += (*p - '0');
p++;
}
*asno = asval;
return p;
}
/* There is no match then return unknown token. */
*token = as_token_unknown;
return p++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::CloneNonAttributePropertiesFrom(const Element& other,
CloneChildrenFlag flag) {
HTMLElement::CloneNonAttributePropertiesFrom(other, flag);
if (FastHasAttribute(mutedAttr))
muted_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 9,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct kvm_memslots *install_new_memslots(struct kvm *kvm,
int as_id, struct kvm_memslots *slots)
{
struct kvm_memslots *old_memslots = __kvm_memslots(kvm, as_id);
/*
* Set the low bit in the generation, which disables SPTE caching
* until the end of synchronize_srcu_expedited.
*/
WARN_ON(old_memslots->generation & 1);
slots->generation = old_memslots->generation + 1;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots[as_id], slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
/*
* Increment the new memslot generation a second time. This prevents
* vm exits that race with memslot updates from caching a memslot
* generation that will (potentially) be valid forever.
*/
slots->generation++;
kvm_arch_memslots_updated(kvm, slots);
return old_memslots;
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 29,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MSG_WriteDeltaKey( msg_t *msg, int key, int oldV, int newV, int bits ) {
if ( oldV == newV ) {
MSG_WriteBits( msg, 0, 1 );
return;
}
MSG_WriteBits( msg, 1, 1 );
MSG_WriteBits( msg, newV ^ key, bits );
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::BooleanOrDOMStringOrUnrestrictedDoubleMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_booleanOrDOMStringOrUnrestrictedDoubleMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::BooleanOrDOMStringOrUnrestrictedDoubleMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_ODD( INS_ARG )
{
DO_ODD
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EglRenderingVDAClient::NotifyError(VideoDecodeAccelerator::Error error) {
SetState(CS_ERROR);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RootWindow::ScheduleFullDraw() {
compositor_->ScheduleFullDraw();
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_device_index(RD_NTHANDLE handle)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < RDPDR_MAX_DEVICES; i++)
{
if (g_rdpdr_device[i].handle == handle)
return i;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: efx_alloc_channel(struct efx_nic *efx, int i, struct efx_channel *old_channel)
{
struct efx_channel *channel;
struct efx_rx_queue *rx_queue;
struct efx_tx_queue *tx_queue;
int j;
if (old_channel) {
channel = kmalloc(sizeof(*channel), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!channel)
return NULL;
*channel = *old_channel;
channel->napi_dev = NULL;
memset(&channel->eventq, 0, sizeof(channel->eventq));
rx_queue = &channel->rx_queue;
rx_queue->buffer = NULL;
memset(&rx_queue->rxd, 0, sizeof(rx_queue->rxd));
for (j = 0; j < EFX_TXQ_TYPES; j++) {
tx_queue = &channel->tx_queue[j];
if (tx_queue->channel)
tx_queue->channel = channel;
tx_queue->buffer = NULL;
memset(&tx_queue->txd, 0, sizeof(tx_queue->txd));
}
} else {
channel = kzalloc(sizeof(*channel), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!channel)
return NULL;
channel->efx = efx;
channel->channel = i;
for (j = 0; j < EFX_TXQ_TYPES; j++) {
tx_queue = &channel->tx_queue[j];
tx_queue->efx = efx;
tx_queue->queue = i * EFX_TXQ_TYPES + j;
tx_queue->channel = channel;
}
}
rx_queue = &channel->rx_queue;
rx_queue->efx = efx;
setup_timer(&rx_queue->slow_fill, efx_rx_slow_fill,
(unsigned long)rx_queue);
return channel;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 22,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DidStopFlinging() {
if (view_)
view_->DidStopFlinging();
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BrowserSideNavigationBrowserTest() {}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::isImageButton() const
{
return m_inputType->isImageButton();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int MSG_LookaheadByte( msg_t *msg ) {
const int bloc = Huff_getBloc();
const int readcount = msg->readcount;
const int bit = msg->bit;
int c = MSG_ReadByte(msg);
Huff_setBloc(bloc);
msg->readcount = readcount;
msg->bit = bit;
return c;
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VideoCaptureManager::VideoCaptureManager(
std::unique_ptr<VideoCaptureProvider> video_capture_provider,
base::RepeatingCallback<void(const std::string&)> emit_log_message_cb,
ScreenlockMonitor* monitor)
: new_capture_session_id_(1),
video_capture_provider_(std::move(video_capture_provider)),
emit_log_message_cb_(std::move(emit_log_message_cb)),
screenlock_monitor_(monitor) {
if (screenlock_monitor_) {
screenlock_monitor_->AddObserver(this);
}
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 27,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncManager::SyncInternal::StoreState(
const std::string& state) {
if (!directory()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not write notification state";
return;
}
if (VLOG_IS_ON(1)) {
std::string encoded_state;
base::Base64Encode(state, &encoded_state);
DVLOG(1) << "Writing notification state: " << encoded_state;
}
directory()->SetNotificationState(state);
directory()->SaveChanges();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int cdc_ncm_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb_in)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct cdc_ncm_ctx *ctx = (struct cdc_ncm_ctx *)dev->data[0];
int len;
int nframes;
int x;
int offset;
struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 *ndp16;
struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16 *dpe16;
int ndpoffset;
int loopcount = 50; /* arbitrary max preventing infinite loop */
u32 payload = 0;
ndpoffset = cdc_ncm_rx_verify_nth16(ctx, skb_in);
if (ndpoffset < 0)
goto error;
next_ndp:
nframes = cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16(skb_in, ndpoffset);
if (nframes < 0)
goto error;
ndp16 = (struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 *)(skb_in->data + ndpoffset);
if (ndp16->dwSignature != cpu_to_le32(USB_CDC_NCM_NDP16_NOCRC_SIGN)) {
netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net,
"invalid DPT16 signature <%#010x>\n",
le32_to_cpu(ndp16->dwSignature));
goto err_ndp;
}
dpe16 = ndp16->dpe16;
for (x = 0; x < nframes; x++, dpe16++) {
offset = le16_to_cpu(dpe16->wDatagramIndex);
len = le16_to_cpu(dpe16->wDatagramLength);
/*
* CDC NCM ch. 3.7
* All entries after first NULL entry are to be ignored
*/
if ((offset == 0) || (len == 0)) {
if (!x)
goto err_ndp; /* empty NTB */
break;
}
/* sanity checking */
if (((offset + len) > skb_in->len) ||
(len > ctx->rx_max) || (len < ETH_HLEN)) {
netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net,
"invalid frame detected (ignored) offset[%u]=%u, length=%u, skb=%p\n",
x, offset, len, skb_in);
if (!x)
goto err_ndp;
break;
} else {
/* create a fresh copy to reduce truesize */
skb = netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align(dev->net, len);
if (!skb)
goto error;
memcpy(skb_put(skb, len), skb_in->data + offset, len);
usbnet_skb_return(dev, skb);
payload += len; /* count payload bytes in this NTB */
}
}
err_ndp:
/* are there more NDPs to process? */
ndpoffset = le16_to_cpu(ndp16->wNextNdpIndex);
if (ndpoffset && loopcount--)
goto next_ndp;
/* update stats */
ctx->rx_overhead += skb_in->len - payload;
ctx->rx_ntbs++;
return 1;
error:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void efx_port_dummy_op_void(struct efx_nic *efx) {}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 21,041 |
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