instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContents* WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(RenderFrameHost* rfh) {
if (!rfh)
return nullptr;
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(rfh)->delegate()->GetAsWebContents();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct alien_cache **alloc_alien_cache(int node, int limit, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct alien_cache **alc_ptr;
size_t memsize = sizeof(void *) * nr_node_ids;
int i;
if (limit > 1)
limit = 12;
alc_ptr = kzalloc_node(memsize, gfp, node);
if (!alc_ptr)
return NULL;
for_each_node(i) {
if (i == node || !node_online(i))
continue;
alc_ptr[i] = __alloc_alien_cache(node, limit, 0xbaadf00d, gfp);
if (!alc_ptr[i]) {
for (i--; i >= 0; i--)
kfree(alc_ptr[i]);
kfree(alc_ptr);
return NULL;
}
}
return alc_ptr;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SynchronousCompositorImpl::UpdateNeedsBeginFrames() {
rwhva_->OnSetNeedsBeginFrames(is_active_ && renderer_needs_begin_frames_);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err dimC_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_DIMSSceneConfigBox *p = (GF_DIMSSceneConfigBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "DIMSSceneConfigBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "profile=\"%d\" level=\"%d\" pathComponents=\"%d\" useFullRequestHosts=\"%d\" streamType=\"%d\" containsRedundant=\"%d\" textEncoding=\"%s\" contentEncoding=\"%s\" >\n",
p->profile, p->level, p->pathComponents, p->fullRequestHost, p->streamType, p->containsRedundant, p->textEncoding, p->contentEncoding);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("DIMSSceneConfigBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 19,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AppCacheUpdateJob::MaybeLoadFromNewestCache(const GURL& url,
AppCacheEntry& entry) {
if (update_type_ != UPGRADE_ATTEMPT)
return false;
AppCache* newest = group_->newest_complete_cache();
AppCacheEntry* copy_me = newest->GetEntry(url);
if (!copy_me || !copy_me->has_response_id())
return false;
loading_responses_.insert(
LoadingResponses::value_type(copy_me->response_id(), url));
storage_->LoadResponseInfo(manifest_url_, group_->group_id(),
copy_me->response_id(),
this);
return true;
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void zend_hash_bucket_swap(Bucket *p, Bucket *q)
{
zval val;
zend_ulong h;
zend_string *key;
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&val, &p->val);
h = p->h;
key = p->key;
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&p->val, &q->val);
p->h = q->h;
p->key = q->key;
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&q->val, &val);
q->h = h;
q->key = key;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 3,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_dentry_open(struct file *f,
struct inode *inode,
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *),
const struct cred *cred)
{
static const struct file_operations empty_fops = {};
int error;
f->f_mode = OPEN_FMODE(f->f_flags) | FMODE_LSEEK |
FMODE_PREAD | FMODE_PWRITE;
path_get(&f->f_path);
f->f_inode = inode;
f->f_mapping = inode->i_mapping;
if (unlikely(f->f_flags & O_PATH)) {
f->f_mode = FMODE_PATH;
f->f_op = &empty_fops;
return 0;
}
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE && !special_file(inode->i_mode)) {
error = get_write_access(inode);
if (unlikely(error))
goto cleanup_file;
error = __mnt_want_write(f->f_path.mnt);
if (unlikely(error)) {
put_write_access(inode);
goto cleanup_file;
}
f->f_mode |= FMODE_WRITER;
}
/* POSIX.1-2008/SUSv4 Section XSI 2.9.7 */
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
f->f_mode |= FMODE_ATOMIC_POS;
f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
if (unlikely(WARN_ON(!f->f_op))) {
error = -ENODEV;
goto cleanup_all;
}
error = security_file_open(f, cred);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
error = break_lease(inode, f->f_flags);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
if (!open)
open = f->f_op->open;
if (open) {
error = open(inode, f);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
}
if ((f->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
i_readcount_inc(inode);
if ((f->f_mode & FMODE_READ) &&
likely(f->f_op->read || f->f_op->read_iter))
f->f_mode |= FMODE_CAN_READ;
if ((f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) &&
likely(f->f_op->write || f->f_op->write_iter))
f->f_mode |= FMODE_CAN_WRITE;
f->f_flags &= ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY | O_TRUNC);
file_ra_state_init(&f->f_ra, f->f_mapping->host->i_mapping);
return 0;
cleanup_all:
fops_put(f->f_op);
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITER) {
put_write_access(inode);
__mnt_drop_write(f->f_path.mnt);
}
cleanup_file:
path_put(&f->f_path);
f->f_path.mnt = NULL;
f->f_path.dentry = NULL;
f->f_inode = NULL;
return error;
}
Commit Message: vfs: add vfs_select_inode() helper
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 27,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::IsTransferredNavigation(
const GlobalRequestID& id) const {
ResourceLoader* loader = GetLoader(id);
return loader ? loader->is_transferring() : false;
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ScriptProcessorHandler::SetChannelCount(unsigned long channel_count,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
BaseAudioContext::GraphAutoLocker locker(Context());
if (channel_count != channel_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kNotSupportedError, "channelCount cannot be changed from " +
String::Number(channel_count_) + " to " +
String::Number(channel_count));
}
}
Commit Message: Keep ScriptProcessorHandler alive across threads
When posting a task from the ScriptProcessorHandler::Process to fire a
process event, we need to keep the handler alive in case the
ScriptProcessorNode goes away (because it has no onaudioprocess
handler) and removes the its handler.
Bug: 765495
Test:
Change-Id: Ib4fa39d7b112c7051897700a1eff9f59a4a7a054
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/677137
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503629}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 1,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DebuggerAttachFunction::RunAsync() {
std::unique_ptr<Attach::Params> params(Attach::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
CopyDebuggee(&debuggee_, params->target);
if (!InitAgentHost())
return false;
if (!DevToolsAgentHost::IsSupportedProtocolVersion(
params->required_version)) {
error_ = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kProtocolVersionNotSupportedError,
params->required_version);
return false;
}
if (FindClientHost()) {
FormatErrorMessage(keys::kAlreadyAttachedError);
return false;
}
new ExtensionDevToolsClientHost(GetProfile(), agent_host_.get(),
extension()->id(), extension()->name(),
debuggee_);
SendResponse(true);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 10,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void allocate_segment_by_default(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
int type, bool force)
{
struct curseg_info *curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, type);
if (force)
new_curseg(sbi, type, true);
else if (!is_set_ckpt_flags(sbi, CP_CRC_RECOVERY_FLAG) &&
type == CURSEG_WARM_NODE)
new_curseg(sbi, type, false);
else if (curseg->alloc_type == LFS && is_next_segment_free(sbi, type))
new_curseg(sbi, type, false);
else if (need_SSR(sbi) && get_ssr_segment(sbi, type))
change_curseg(sbi, type);
else
new_curseg(sbi, type, false);
stat_inc_seg_type(sbi, curseg);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void megasas_xfer_complete(SCSIRequest *req, uint32_t len)
{
MegasasCmd *cmd = req->hba_private;
uint8_t *buf;
uint32_t opcode;
trace_megasas_io_complete(cmd->index, len);
if (cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd != MFI_CMD_DCMD) {
scsi_req_continue(req);
return;
}
buf = scsi_req_get_buf(req);
opcode = le32_to_cpu(cmd->frame->dcmd.opcode);
if (opcode == MFI_DCMD_PD_GET_INFO && cmd->iov_buf) {
struct mfi_pd_info *info = cmd->iov_buf;
if (info->inquiry_data[0] == 0x7f) {
memset(info->inquiry_data, 0, sizeof(info->inquiry_data));
memcpy(info->inquiry_data, buf, len);
} else if (info->vpd_page83[0] == 0x7f) {
memset(info->vpd_page83, 0, sizeof(info->vpd_page83));
memcpy(info->vpd_page83, buf, len);
}
scsi_req_continue(req);
} else if (opcode == MFI_DCMD_LD_GET_INFO) {
struct mfi_ld_info *info = cmd->iov_buf;
if (cmd->iov_buf) {
memcpy(info->vpd_page83, buf, sizeof(info->vpd_page83));
scsi_req_continue(req);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 15,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Track::~Track() {
Info& info = const_cast<Info&>(m_info);
info.Clear();
ContentEncoding** i = content_encoding_entries_;
ContentEncoding** const j = content_encoding_entries_end_;
while (i != j) {
ContentEncoding* const encoding = *i++;
delete encoding;
}
delete[] content_encoding_entries_;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __imlib_AddUpdate(ImlibUpdate * u, int x, int y, int w, int h)
{
ImlibUpdate *nu;
if ((w < 1) || (h < 1) || ((x + w) < 1) || ((y + h) < 1))
return u;
nu = malloc(sizeof(ImlibUpdate));
nu->x = x;
nu->y = y;
nu->w = w;
nu->h = h;
nu->next = u;
return nu;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> GetDevToolsInitiator(
const WebString& initiator_str) {
if (initiator_str.IsNull())
return nullptr;
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> initiator =
base::DictionaryValue::From(base::JSONReader::Read(initiator_str.Utf8()));
if (!initiator)
return nullptr;
base::Value* parent = initiator->FindPath({"stack", "parent"});
if (parent && parent->is_dict())
parent->RemoveKey("parent");
return initiator;
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_mod_append_features(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value mod)
{
mrb_value klass;
mrb_check_type(mrb, mod, MRB_TT_MODULE);
mrb_get_args(mrb, "C", &klass);
mrb_include_module(mrb, mrb_class_ptr(klass), mrb_class_ptr(mod));
return mod;
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 8,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::requestStorageQuota(
WebFrame* frame,
WebStorageQuotaType type,
unsigned long long requested_size,
WebStorageQuotaCallbacks* callbacks) {
DCHECK(frame);
WebSecurityOrigin origin = frame->document().securityOrigin();
if (origin.isEmpty()) {
callbacks->didFail(WebKit::WebStorageQuotaErrorAbort);
return;
}
ChildThread::current()->quota_dispatcher()->RequestStorageQuota(
routing_id(), GURL(origin.toString()), type, requested_size, callbacks);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FolderHeaderView::ContentsChanged(views::Textfield* sender,
const base::string16& new_contents) {
if (!folder_item_)
return;
folder_item_->RemoveObserver(this);
std::string name = base::UTF16ToUTF8(folder_name_view_->text());
delegate_->SetItemName(folder_item_, name);
folder_item_->AddObserver(this);
Layout();
}
Commit Message: Enforce the maximum length of the folder name in UI.
BUG=355797
R=xiyuan@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/203863005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260156 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 3,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SocketStream::DoReadWrite(int result) {
if (result < OK) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return result;
}
if (!socket_.get() || !socket_->IsConnected()) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_CONNECTION_CLOSED;
}
if (closing_ && !current_write_buf_.get() && pending_write_bufs_.empty()) {
socket_->Disconnect();
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return OK;
}
next_state_ = STATE_READ_WRITE;
if (!server_closed_) {
if (!read_buf_.get()) {
read_buf_ = new IOBuffer(kReadBufferSize);
result = socket_->Read(
read_buf_.get(),
kReadBufferSize,
base::Bind(&SocketStream::OnReadCompleted, base::Unretained(this)));
if (result > 0) {
return DidReceiveData(result);
} else if (result == 0) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
server_closed_ = true;
return ERR_CONNECTION_CLOSED;
}
if (result != ERR_IO_PENDING) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
server_closed_ = true;
return result;
}
}
DCHECK(read_buf_.get());
}
if (waiting_for_write_completion_)
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
if (!current_write_buf_.get()) {
if (pending_write_bufs_.empty()) {
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
current_write_buf_ = new DrainableIOBuffer(
pending_write_bufs_.front().get(), pending_write_bufs_.front()->size());
pending_write_bufs_.pop_front();
}
result = socket_->Write(
current_write_buf_.get(),
current_write_buf_->BytesRemaining(),
base::Bind(&SocketStream::OnWriteCompleted, base::Unretained(this)));
if (result == ERR_IO_PENDING) {
waiting_for_write_completion_ = true;
} else if (result < 0) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
} else if (result > 0) {
DidSendData(result);
result = OK;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btrfs_unlink_inode(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root,
struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode,
const char *name, int name_len)
{
int ret;
ret = __btrfs_unlink_inode(trans, root, dir, inode, name, name_len);
if (!ret) {
drop_nlink(inode);
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 9,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void jmp_rel(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int rel)
{
register_address_increment(ctxt, &ctxt->_eip, rel);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DOS_FILE *get_owner(DOS_FS * fs, uint32_t cluster)
{
if (fs->cluster_owner == NULL)
return NULL;
else
return fs->cluster_owner[cluster];
}
Commit Message: set_fat(): Fix off-by-2 error leading to corruption in FAT12
In FAT12 two 12 bit entries are combined to a 24 bit value (three
bytes). Therefore, when an even numbered FAT entry is set in FAT12, it
must be be combined with the following entry. To prevent accessing
beyond the end of the FAT array, it must be checked that the cluster is
not the last one.
Previously, the check tested that the requested cluster was equal to
fs->clusters - 1. However, fs->clusters is the number of data clusters
not including the two reserved FAT entries at the start so the test
triggered two clusters early.
If the third to last entry was written on a FAT12 filesystem with an
odd number of clusters, the second to last entry would be corrupted.
This corruption may also lead to invalid memory accesses when the
corrupted entry becomes out of bounds and is used later.
Change the test to fs->clusters + 1 to fix.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <aeb@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 25,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void attrWithSetterExceptionAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::attrWithSetterExceptionAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fbOver (CARD32 x, CARD32 y)
{
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height);
CARD32
fbOver (CARD32 x, CARD32 y)
{
CARD16 a = ~x >> 24;
CARD16 t;
CARD32 m,n,o,p;
m = FbOverU(x,y,0,a,t);
n = FbOverU(x,y,8,a,t);
o = FbOverU(x,y,16,a,t);
p = FbOverU(x,y,24,a,t);
return m|n|o|p;
}
CARD32
fbOver24 (CARD32 x, CARD32 y)
{
CARD16 a = ~x >> 24;
CARD16 t;
CARD32 m,n,o;
m = FbOverU(x,y,0,a,t);
n = FbOverU(x,y,8,a,t);
o = FbOverU(x,y,16,a,t);
return m|n|o;
}
CARD32
fbIn (CARD32 x, CARD8 y)
{
CARD16 a = y;
CARD16 t;
CARD32 m,n,o,p;
m = FbInU(x,0,a,t);
n = FbInU(x,8,a,t);
o = FbInU(x,16,a,t);
p = FbInU(x,24,a,t);
return m|n|o|p;
}
#define genericCombine24(a,b,c,d) (((a)*(c)+(b)*(d)))
/*
* This macro does src IN mask OVER dst when src and dst are 0888.
* If src has alpha, this will not work
*/
#define inOver0888(alpha, source, destval, dest) { \
CARD32 dstrb=destval&0xFF00FF; CARD32 dstag=(destval>>8)&0xFF00FF; \
CARD32 drb=((source&0xFF00FF)-dstrb)*alpha; CARD32 dag=(((source>>8)&0xFF00FF)-dstag)*alpha; \
WRITE(dest, ((((drb>>8) + dstrb) & 0x00FF00FF) | ((((dag>>8) + dstag) << 8) & 0xFF00FF00))); \
}
/*
* This macro does src IN mask OVER dst when src and dst are 0565 and
* mask is a 5-bit alpha value. Again, if src has alpha, this will not
* work.
*/
#define inOver0565(alpha, source, destval, dest) { \
CARD16 dstrb = destval & 0xf81f; CARD16 dstg = destval & 0x7e0; \
CARD32 drb = ((source&0xf81f)-dstrb)*alpha; CARD32 dg=((source & 0x7e0)-dstg)*alpha; \
WRITE(dest, ((((drb>>5) + dstrb)&0xf81f) | (((dg>>5) + dstg) & 0x7e0))); \
}
#define inOver2x0565(alpha, source, destval, dest) { \
CARD32 dstrb = destval & 0x07e0f81f; CARD32 dstg = (destval & 0xf81f07e0)>>5; \
CARD32 drb = ((source&0x07e0f81f)-dstrb)*alpha; CARD32 dg=(((source & 0xf81f07e0)>>5)-dstg)*alpha; \
WRITE(dest, ((((drb>>5) + dstrb)&0x07e0f81f) | ((((dg>>5) + dstg)<<5) & 0xf81f07e0))); \
}
#if IMAGE_BYTE_ORDER == LSBFirst
#define setupPackedReader(count,temp,where,workingWhere,workingVal) count=(long)where; \
temp=count&3; \
where-=temp; \
workingWhere=(CARD32 *)where; \
workingVal=READ(workingWhere++); \
count=4-temp; \
workingVal>>=(8*temp)
#define readPacked(where,x,y,z) {if(!(x)) { (x)=4; y = READ(z++); } where=(y)&0xff; (y)>>=8; (x)--;}
#define readPackedSource(where) readPacked(where,ws,workingSource,wsrc)
#define readPackedDest(where) readPacked(where,wd,workingiDest,widst)
#define writePacked(what) workingoDest>>=8; workingoDest|=(what<<24); ww--; if(!ww) { ww=4; WRITE (wodst++, workingoDest); }
#else
#warning "I havn't tested fbCompositeTrans_0888xnx0888() on big endian yet!"
#define setupPackedReader(count,temp,where,workingWhere,workingVal) count=(long)where; \
temp=count&3; \
where-=temp; \
workingWhere=(CARD32 *)where; \
workingVal=READ(workingWhere++); \
count=4-temp; \
workingVal<<=(8*temp)
#define readPacked(where,x,y,z) {if(!(x)) { (x)=4; y = READ(z++); } where=(y)>>24; (y)<<=8; (x)--;}
#define readPackedSource(where) readPacked(where,ws,workingSource,wsrc)
#define readPackedDest(where) readPacked(where,wd,workingiDest,widst)
#define writePacked(what) workingoDest<<=8; workingoDest|=what; ww--; if(!ww) { ww=4; WRITE(wodst++, workingoDest); }
#endif
/*
* Naming convention:
*
* opSRCxMASKxDST
*/
void
fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8x8888 (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD32 src, srca;
CARD32 *dstLine, *dst, d, dstMask;
CARD8 *maskLine, *mask, m;
FbStride dstStride, maskStride;
CARD16 w;
fbComposeGetSolid(pSrc, src, pDst->format);
dstMask = FbFullMask (pDst->pDrawable->depth);
srca = src >> 24;
if (src == 0)
return;
fbComposeGetStart (pDst, xDst, yDst, CARD32, dstStride, dstLine, 1);
fbComposeGetStart (pMask, xMask, yMask, CARD8, maskStride, maskLine, 1);
while (height--)
{
dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
mask = maskLine;
maskLine += maskStride;
w = width;
while (w--)
{
m = READ(mask++);
if (m == 0xff)
{
if (srca == 0xff)
WRITE(dst, src & dstMask);
else
WRITE(dst, fbOver (src, READ(dst)) & dstMask);
}
else if (m)
{
d = fbIn (src, m);
WRITE(dst, fbOver (d, READ(dst)) & dstMask);
}
dst++;
}
}
fbFinishAccess (pMask->pDrawable);
fbFinishAccess (pDst->pDrawable);
}
void
fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x8888C (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD32 src, srca;
CARD32 *dstLine, *dst, d, dstMask;
CARD32 *maskLine, *mask, ma;
FbStride dstStride, maskStride;
CARD16 w;
CARD32 m, n, o, p;
fbComposeGetSolid(pSrc, src, pDst->format);
dstMask = FbFullMask (pDst->pDrawable->depth);
srca = src >> 24;
if (src == 0)
return;
fbComposeGetStart (pDst, xDst, yDst, CARD32, dstStride, dstLine, 1);
fbComposeGetStart (pMask, xMask, yMask, CARD32, maskStride, maskLine, 1);
while (height--)
{
dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
mask = maskLine;
maskLine += maskStride;
w = width;
while (w--)
{
ma = READ(mask++);
if (ma == 0xffffffff)
{
if (srca == 0xff)
WRITE(dst, src & dstMask);
else
WRITE(dst, fbOver (src, READ(dst)) & dstMask);
}
else if (ma)
{
d = READ(dst);
#define FbInOverC(src,srca,msk,dst,i,result) { \
CARD16 __a = FbGet8(msk,i); \
CARD32 __t, __ta; \
CARD32 __i; \
__t = FbIntMult (FbGet8(src,i), __a,__i); \
__ta = (CARD8) ~FbIntMult (srca, __a,__i); \
__t = __t + FbIntMult(FbGet8(dst,i),__ta,__i); \
__t = (CARD32) (CARD8) (__t | (-(__t >> 8))); \
result = __t << (i); \
}
FbInOverC (src, srca, ma, d, 0, m);
FbInOverC (src, srca, ma, d, 8, n);
FbInOverC (src, srca, ma, d, 16, o);
FbInOverC (src, srca, ma, d, 24, p);
WRITE(dst, m|n|o|p);
}
dst++;
}
}
fbFinishAccess (pMask->pDrawable);
fbFinishAccess (pDst->pDrawable);
}
#define srcAlphaCombine24(a,b) genericCombine24(a,b,srca,srcia)
void
fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8x0888 (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD32 src, srca, srcia;
CARD8 *dstLine, *dst, *edst;
CARD8 *maskLine, *mask, m;
FbStride dstStride, maskStride;
CARD16 w;
CARD32 rs,gs,bs,rd,gd,bd;
fbComposeGetSolid(pSrc, src, pDst->format);
srca = src >> 24;
srcia = 255-srca;
if (src == 0)
return;
rs=src&0xff;
gs=(src>>8)&0xff;
bs=(src>>16)&0xff;
fbComposeGetStart (pDst, xDst, yDst, CARD8, dstStride, dstLine, 3);
fbComposeGetStart (pMask, xMask, yMask, CARD8, maskStride, maskLine, 1);
while (height--)
{
/* fixme: cleanup unused */
unsigned long wt, wd;
CARD32 workingiDest;
CARD32 *widst;
edst = dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
mask = maskLine;
maskLine += maskStride;
w = width;
#ifndef NO_MASKED_PACKED_READ
setupPackedReader(wd,wt,edst,widst,workingiDest);
#endif
while (w--)
{
#ifndef NO_MASKED_PACKED_READ
readPackedDest(rd);
readPackedDest(gd);
readPackedDest(bd);
#else
rd = READ(edst++);
gd = READ(edst++);
bd = READ(edst++);
#endif
m = READ(mask++);
if (m == 0xff)
{
if (srca == 0xff)
{
WRITE(dst++, rs);
WRITE(dst++, gs);
WRITE(dst++, bs);
}
else
{
WRITE(dst++, (srcAlphaCombine24(rs, rd)>>8));
WRITE(dst++, (srcAlphaCombine24(gs, gd)>>8));
WRITE(dst++, (srcAlphaCombine24(bs, bd)>>8));
}
}
else if (m)
{
int na=(srca*(int)m)>>8;
int nia=255-na;
WRITE(dst++, (genericCombine24(rs, rd, na, nia)>>8));
WRITE(dst++, (genericCombine24(gs, gd, na, nia)>>8));
WRITE(dst++, (genericCombine24(bs, bd, na, nia)>>8));
}
else
{
dst+=3;
}
}
}
fbFinishAccess (pMask->pDrawable);
fbFinishAccess (pDst->pDrawable);
}
void
fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8x0565 (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD32 src, srca8, srca5;
CARD16 *dstLine, *dst;
CARD16 d;
CARD32 t;
CARD8 *maskLine, *mask, m;
FbStride dstStride, maskStride;
CARD16 w,src16;
fbComposeGetSolid(pSrc, src, pDst->format);
if (src == 0)
return;
srca8 = (src >> 24);
srca5 = (srca8 >> 3);
src16 = cvt8888to0565(src);
fbComposeGetStart (pDst, xDst, yDst, CARD16, dstStride, dstLine, 1);
fbComposeGetStart (pMask, xMask, yMask, CARD8, maskStride, maskLine, 1);
while (height--)
{
dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
mask = maskLine;
maskLine += maskStride;
w = width;
while (w--)
{
m = READ(mask++);
if (m == 0)
dst++;
else if (srca5 == (0xff >> 3))
{
if (m == 0xff)
WRITE(dst++, src16);
else
{
d = READ(dst);
m >>= 3;
inOver0565 (m, src16, d, dst++);
}
}
else
{
d = READ(dst);
if (m == 0xff)
{
t = fbOver24 (src, cvt0565to0888 (d));
}
else
{
t = fbIn (src, m);
t = fbOver (t, cvt0565to0888 (d));
}
WRITE(dst++, cvt8888to0565 (t));
}
}
}
fbFinishAccess (pMask->pDrawable);
fbFinishAccess (pDst->pDrawable);
}
static void
fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x0565 (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD32 src, srca8, srca5;
CARD16 *dstLine, *dst;
CARD16 d;
CARD32 *maskLine, *mask;
CARD32 t;
CARD8 m;
FbStride dstStride, maskStride;
CARD16 w, src16;
fbComposeGetSolid(pSrc, src, pDst->format);
if (src == 0)
return;
srca8 = src >> 24;
srca5 = srca8 >> 3;
src16 = cvt8888to0565(src);
fbComposeGetStart (pDst, xDst, yDst, CARD16, dstStride, dstLine, 1);
fbComposeGetStart (pMask, xMask, yMask, CARD32, maskStride, maskLine, 1);
while (height--)
{
dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
mask = maskLine;
maskLine += maskStride;
w = width;
while (w--)
{
m = READ(mask++) >> 24;
if (m == 0)
dst++;
else if (srca5 == (0xff >> 3))
{
if (m == 0xff)
WRITE(dst++, src16);
else
{
d = READ(dst);
m >>= 3;
inOver0565 (m, src16, d, dst++);
}
}
else
{
if (m == 0xff)
{
d = READ(dst);
t = fbOver24 (src, cvt0565to0888 (d));
WRITE(dst++, cvt8888to0565 (t));
}
else
{
d = READ(dst);
t = fbIn (src, m);
t = fbOver (t, cvt0565to0888 (d));
WRITE(dst++, cvt8888to0565 (t));
}
}
}
}
}
void
fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x0565C (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD32 src, srca;
CARD16 src16;
CARD16 *dstLine, *dst;
CARD32 d;
CARD32 *maskLine, *mask, ma;
FbStride dstStride, maskStride;
CARD16 w;
CARD32 m, n, o;
fbComposeGetSolid(pSrc, src, pDst->format);
srca = src >> 24;
if (src == 0)
return;
src16 = cvt8888to0565(src);
fbComposeGetStart (pDst, xDst, yDst, CARD16, dstStride, dstLine, 1);
fbComposeGetStart (pMask, xMask, yMask, CARD32, maskStride, maskLine, 1);
while (height--)
{
dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
mask = maskLine;
maskLine += maskStride;
w = width;
while (w--)
{
ma = READ(mask++);
if (ma == 0xffffffff)
{
if (srca == 0xff)
{
WRITE(dst, src16);
}
else
{
d = READ(dst);
d = fbOver24 (src, cvt0565to0888(d));
WRITE(dst, cvt8888to0565(d));
}
}
else if (ma)
{
d = READ(dst);
d = cvt0565to0888(d);
FbInOverC (src, srca, ma, d, 0, m);
FbInOverC (src, srca, ma, d, 8, n);
FbInOverC (src, srca, ma, d, 16, o);
d = m|n|o;
WRITE(dst, cvt8888to0565(d));
}
dst++;
}
}
fbFinishAccess (pMask->pDrawable);
fbFinishAccess (pDst->pDrawable);
}
void
fbCompositeSrc_8888x8888 (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD32 *dstLine, *dst, dstMask;
CARD32 *srcLine, *src, s;
FbStride dstStride, srcStride;
CARD8 a;
CARD16 w;
fbComposeGetStart (pDst, xDst, yDst, CARD32, dstStride, dstLine, 1);
fbComposeGetStart (pSrc, xSrc, ySrc, CARD32, srcStride, srcLine, 1);
dstMask = FbFullMask (pDst->pDrawable->depth);
while (height--)
{
dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
src = srcLine;
srcLine += srcStride;
w = width;
while (w--)
{
s = READ(src++);
a = s >> 24;
if (a == 0xff)
WRITE(dst, s & dstMask);
else if (a)
WRITE(dst, fbOver (s, READ(dst)) & dstMask);
dst++;
}
}
fbFinishAccess (pSrc->pDrawable);
fbFinishAccess (pDst->pDrawable);
}
void
fbCompositeSrc_8888x0888 (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD8 *dstLine, *dst;
CARD32 d;
CARD32 *srcLine, *src, s;
CARD8 a;
FbStride dstStride, srcStride;
CARD16 w;
fbComposeGetStart (pDst, xDst, yDst, CARD8, dstStride, dstLine, 3);
fbComposeGetStart (pSrc, xSrc, ySrc, CARD32, srcStride, srcLine, 1);
while (height--)
{
dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
src = srcLine;
srcLine += srcStride;
w = width;
while (w--)
{
s = READ(src++);
a = s >> 24;
if (a)
{
if (a == 0xff)
d = s;
else
d = fbOver24 (s, Fetch24(dst));
Store24(dst,d);
}
dst += 3;
}
}
fbFinishAccess (pSrc->pDrawable);
fbFinishAccess (pDst->pDrawable);
}
void
fbCompositeSrc_8888x0565 (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD16 *dstLine, *dst;
CARD32 d;
CARD32 *srcLine, *src, s;
CARD8 a;
FbStride dstStride, srcStride;
CARD16 w;
fbComposeGetStart (pSrc, xSrc, ySrc, CARD32, srcStride, srcLine, 1);
fbComposeGetStart (pDst, xDst, yDst, CARD16, dstStride, dstLine, 1);
while (height--)
{
dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
src = srcLine;
srcLine += srcStride;
w = width;
while (w--)
{
s = READ(src++);
a = s >> 24;
if (a)
{
if (a == 0xff)
d = s;
else
{
d = READ(dst);
d = fbOver24 (s, cvt0565to0888(d));
}
WRITE(dst, cvt8888to0565(d));
}
dst++;
}
}
fbFinishAccess (pDst->pDrawable);
fbFinishAccess (pSrc->pDrawable);
}
void
fbCompositeSrcAdd_8000x8000 (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD8 *dstLine, *dst;
CARD8 *srcLine, *src;
FbStride dstStride, srcStride;
CARD16 w;
CARD8 s, d;
CARD16 t;
fbComposeGetStart (pSrc, xSrc, ySrc, CARD8, srcStride, srcLine, 1);
fbComposeGetStart (pDst, xDst, yDst, CARD8, dstStride, dstLine, 1);
while (height--)
{
dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
src = srcLine;
srcLine += srcStride;
w = width;
while (w--)
{
s = READ(src++);
if (s)
{
if (s != 0xff)
{
d = READ(dst);
t = d + s;
s = t | (0 - (t >> 8));
}
WRITE(dst, s);
}
dst++;
}
}
fbFinishAccess (pDst->pDrawable);
fbFinishAccess (pSrc->pDrawable);
}
void
fbCompositeSrcAdd_8888x8888 (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD32 *dstLine, *dst;
CARD32 *srcLine, *src;
FbStride dstStride, srcStride;
CARD16 w;
CARD32 s, d;
CARD16 t;
CARD32 m,n,o,p;
fbComposeGetStart (pSrc, xSrc, ySrc, CARD32, srcStride, srcLine, 1);
fbComposeGetStart (pDst, xDst, yDst, CARD32, dstStride, dstLine, 1);
while (height--)
{
dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
src = srcLine;
srcLine += srcStride;
w = width;
while (w--)
{
s = READ(src++);
if (s)
{
if (s != 0xffffffff)
{
d = READ(dst);
if (d)
{
m = FbAdd(s,d,0,t);
n = FbAdd(s,d,8,t);
o = FbAdd(s,d,16,t);
p = FbAdd(s,d,24,t);
s = m|n|o|p;
}
}
WRITE(dst, s);
}
dst++;
}
}
fbFinishAccess (pDst->pDrawable);
fbFinishAccess (pSrc->pDrawable);
}
static void
fbCompositeSrcAdd_8888x8x8 (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD8 *dstLine, *dst;
CARD8 *maskLine, *mask;
FbStride dstStride, maskStride;
CARD16 w;
CARD32 src;
CARD8 sa;
fbComposeGetStart (pDst, xDst, yDst, CARD8, dstStride, dstLine, 1);
fbComposeGetStart (pMask, xMask, yMask, CARD8, maskStride, maskLine, 1);
fbComposeGetSolid (pSrc, src, pDst->format);
sa = (src >> 24);
while (height--)
{
dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
mask = maskLine;
maskLine += maskStride;
w = width;
while (w--)
{
CARD16 tmp;
CARD16 a;
CARD32 m, d;
CARD32 r;
a = READ(mask++);
d = READ(dst);
m = FbInU (sa, 0, a, tmp);
r = FbAdd (m, d, 0, tmp);
WRITE(dst++, r);
}
}
fbFinishAccess(pDst->pDrawable);
fbFinishAccess(pMask->pDrawable);
}
void
fbCompositeSrcAdd_1000x1000 (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
FbBits *dstBits, *srcBits;
FbStride dstStride, srcStride;
int dstBpp, srcBpp;
int dstXoff, dstYoff;
int srcXoff, srcYoff;
fbGetDrawable(pSrc->pDrawable, srcBits, srcStride, srcBpp, srcXoff, srcYoff);
fbGetDrawable(pDst->pDrawable, dstBits, dstStride, dstBpp, dstXoff, dstYoff);
fbBlt (srcBits + srcStride * (ySrc + srcYoff),
srcStride,
xSrc + srcXoff,
dstBits + dstStride * (yDst + dstYoff),
dstStride,
xDst + dstXoff,
width,
height,
GXor,
FB_ALLONES,
srcBpp,
FALSE,
FALSE);
fbFinishAccess(pDst->pDrawable);
fbFinishAccess(pSrc->pDrawable);
}
void
fbCompositeSolidMask_nx1xn (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
FbBits *dstBits;
FbStip *maskBits;
FbStride dstStride, maskStride;
int dstBpp, maskBpp;
int dstXoff, dstYoff;
int maskXoff, maskYoff;
FbBits src;
fbComposeGetSolid(pSrc, src, pDst->format);
fbGetStipDrawable (pMask->pDrawable, maskBits, maskStride, maskBpp, maskXoff, maskYoff);
fbGetDrawable (pDst->pDrawable, dstBits, dstStride, dstBpp, dstXoff, dstYoff);
switch (dstBpp) {
case 32:
break;
case 24:
break;
case 16:
src = cvt8888to0565(src);
break;
}
src = fbReplicatePixel (src, dstBpp);
fbBltOne (maskBits + maskStride * (yMask + maskYoff),
maskStride,
xMask + maskXoff,
dstBits + dstStride * (yDst + dstYoff),
dstStride,
(xDst + dstXoff) * dstBpp,
dstBpp,
width * dstBpp,
height,
0x0,
src,
FB_ALLONES,
0x0);
fbFinishAccess (pDst->pDrawable);
fbFinishAccess (pMask->pDrawable);
}
# define mod(a,b) ((b) == 1 ? 0 : (a) >= 0 ? (a) % (b) : (b) - (-a) % (b))
/*
* Apply a constant alpha value in an over computation
*/
static void
fbCompositeSrcSrc_nxn (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height);
static void
fbCompositeTrans_0565xnx0565(CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD16 *dstLine, *dst;
CARD16 *srcLine, *src;
FbStride dstStride, srcStride;
CARD16 w;
FbBits mask;
CARD8 maskAlpha;
CARD16 s_16, d_16;
CARD32 s_32, d_32;
fbComposeGetSolid (pMask, mask, pDst->format);
maskAlpha = mask >> 27;
if (!maskAlpha)
return;
if (maskAlpha == 0xff)
{
fbCompositeSrcSrc_nxn (PictOpSrc, pSrc, pMask, pDst,
xSrc, ySrc, xMask, yMask, xDst, yDst,
width, height);
return;
}
fbComposeGetStart (pSrc, xSrc, ySrc, CARD16, srcStride, srcLine, 1);
fbComposeGetStart (pDst, xDst, yDst, CARD16, dstStride, dstLine, 1);
while (height--)
{
CARD32 *isrc, *idst;
dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
src = srcLine;
srcLine += srcStride;
w = width;
if(((long)src&1)==1)
{
s_16 = READ(src++);
d_16 = READ(dst);
inOver0565(maskAlpha, s_16, d_16, dst++);
w--;
}
isrc=(CARD32 *)src;
if(((long)dst&1)==0)
{
idst=(CARD32 *)dst;
while (w>1)
{
s_32 = READ(isrc++);
d_32 = READ(idst);
inOver2x0565(maskAlpha, s_32, d_32, idst++);
w-=2;
}
dst=(CARD16 *)idst;
}
else
{
while (w > 1)
{
s_32 = READ(isrc++);
#if IMAGE_BYTE_ORDER == LSBFirst
s_16=s_32&0xffff;
#else
s_16=s_32>>16;
#endif
d_16 = READ(dst);
inOver0565 (maskAlpha, s_16, d_16, dst++);
#if IMAGE_BYTE_ORDER == LSBFirst
s_16=s_32>>16;
#else
s_16=s_32&0xffff;
#endif
d_16 = READ(dst);
inOver0565(maskAlpha, s_16, d_16, dst++);
w-=2;
}
}
src=(CARD16 *)isrc;
if(w!=0)
{
s_16 = READ(src);
d_16 = READ(dst);
inOver0565(maskAlpha, s_16, d_16, dst);
}
}
fbFinishAccess (pSrc->pDrawable);
fbFinishAccess (pDst->pDrawable);
}
/* macros for "i can't believe it's not fast" packed pixel handling */
#define alphamaskCombine24(a,b) genericCombine24(a,b,maskAlpha,maskiAlpha)
static void
fbCompositeTrans_0888xnx0888(CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD8 *dstLine, *dst,*idst;
CARD8 *srcLine, *src;
FbStride dstStride, srcStride;
CARD16 w;
FbBits mask;
CARD16 maskAlpha,maskiAlpha;
fbComposeGetSolid (pMask, mask, pDst->format);
maskAlpha = mask >> 24;
maskiAlpha= 255-maskAlpha;
if (!maskAlpha)
return;
/*
if (maskAlpha == 0xff)
{
fbCompositeSrc_0888x0888 (op, pSrc, pMask, pDst,
xSrc, ySrc, xMask, yMask, xDst, yDst,
width, height);
return;
}
*/
fbComposeGetStart (pSrc, xSrc, ySrc, CARD8, srcStride, srcLine, 3);
fbComposeGetStart (pDst, xDst, yDst, CARD8, dstStride, dstLine, 3);
{
unsigned long ws,wt;
CARD32 workingSource;
CARD32 *wsrc, *wdst, *widst;
CARD32 rs, rd, nd;
CARD8 *isrc;
/* are xSrc and xDst at the same alignment? if not, we need to be complicated :) */
/* if(0==0) */
if ((((xSrc * 3) & 3) != ((xDst * 3) & 3)) ||
((srcStride & 3) != (dstStride & 3)))
{
while (height--)
{
dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
isrc = src = srcLine;
srcLine += srcStride;
w = width*3;
setupPackedReader(ws,wt,isrc,wsrc,workingSource);
/* get to word aligned */
switch(~(long)dst&3)
{
case 1:
readPackedSource(rs);
/* *dst++=alphamaskCombine24(rs, *dst)>>8; */
rd = READ(dst); /* make gcc happy. hope it doens't cost us too much performance*/
WRITE(dst++, alphamaskCombine24(rs, rd) >> 8);
w--; if(w==0) break;
case 2:
readPackedSource(rs);
rd = READ(dst);
WRITE(dst++, alphamaskCombine24(rs, rd) >> 8);
w--; if(w==0) break;
case 3:
readPackedSource(rs);
rd = READ(dst);
WRITE(dst++,alphamaskCombine24(rs, rd) >> 8);
w--; if(w==0) break;
}
wdst=(CARD32 *)dst;
while (w>3)
{
rs=READ(wsrc++);
/* FIXME: write a special readPackedWord macro, which knows how to
* halfword combine
*/
#if IMAGE_BYTE_ORDER == LSBFirst
rd=READ(wdst);
readPackedSource(nd);
readPackedSource(rs);
nd|=rs<<8;
readPackedSource(rs);
nd|=rs<<16;
readPackedSource(rs);
nd|=rs<<24;
#else
readPackedSource(nd);
nd<<=24;
readPackedSource(rs);
nd|=rs<<16;
readPackedSource(rs);
nd|=rs<<8;
readPackedSource(rs);
nd|=rs;
#endif
inOver0888(maskAlpha, nd, rd, wdst++);
w-=4;
}
src=(CARD8 *)wdst;
switch(w)
{
case 3:
readPackedSource(rs);
rd=READ(dst);
WRITE(dst++,alphamaskCombine24(rs, rd)>>8);
case 2:
readPackedSource(rs);
rd = READ(dst);
WRITE(dst++, alphamaskCombine24(rs, rd)>>8);
case 1:
readPackedSource(rs);
rd = READ(dst);
WRITE(dst++, alphamaskCombine24(rs, rd)>>8);
}
}
}
else
{
while (height--)
{
idst=dst = dstLine;
dstLine += dstStride;
src = srcLine;
srcLine += srcStride;
w = width*3;
/* get to word aligned */
switch(~(long)src&3)
{
case 1:
rd=alphamaskCombine24(READ(src++), READ(dst))>>8;
WRITE(dst++, rd);
w--; if(w==0) break;
case 2:
rd=alphamaskCombine24(READ(src++), READ(dst))>>8;
WRITE(dst++, rd);
w--; if(w==0) break;
case 3:
rd=alphamaskCombine24(READ(src++), READ(dst))>>8;
WRITE(dst++, rd);
w--; if(w==0) break;
}
wsrc=(CARD32 *)src;
widst=(CARD32 *)dst;
while(w>3)
{
rs = READ(wsrc++);
rd = READ(widst);
inOver0888 (maskAlpha, rs, rd, widst++);
w-=4;
}
src=(CARD8 *)wsrc;
dst=(CARD8 *)widst;
switch(w)
{
case 3:
rd=alphamaskCombine24(READ(src++), READ(dst))>>8;
WRITE(dst++, rd);
case 2:
rd=alphamaskCombine24(READ(src++), READ(dst))>>8;
WRITE(dst++, rd);
case 1:
rd=alphamaskCombine24(READ(src++), READ(dst))>>8;
WRITE(dst++, rd);
}
}
}
}
}
/*
* Simple bitblt
*/
static void
fbCompositeSrcSrc_nxn (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
FbBits *dst;
FbBits *src;
FbStride dstStride, srcStride;
int srcXoff, srcYoff;
int dstXoff, dstYoff;
int srcBpp;
int dstBpp;
Bool reverse = FALSE;
Bool upsidedown = FALSE;
fbGetDrawable(pSrc->pDrawable,src,srcStride,srcBpp,srcXoff,srcYoff);
fbGetDrawable(pDst->pDrawable,dst,dstStride,dstBpp,dstXoff,dstYoff);
fbBlt (src + (ySrc + srcYoff) * srcStride,
srcStride,
(xSrc + srcXoff) * srcBpp,
dst + (yDst + dstYoff) * dstStride,
dstStride,
(xDst + dstXoff) * dstBpp,
(width) * dstBpp,
(height),
GXcopy,
FB_ALLONES,
dstBpp,
reverse,
upsidedown);
fbFinishAccess(pSrc->pDrawable);
fbFinishAccess(pDst->pDrawable);
}
/*
* Solid fill
void
fbCompositeSolidSrc_nxn (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
}
*/
#define SCANLINE_BUFFER_LENGTH 2048
static void
fbCompositeRectWrapper (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
CARD32 _scanline_buffer[SCANLINE_BUFFER_LENGTH * 3];
CARD32 *scanline_buffer = _scanline_buffer;
FbComposeData data;
data.op = op;
data.src = pSrc;
data.mask = pMask;
data.dest = pDst;
data.xSrc = xSrc;
data.ySrc = ySrc;
data.xMask = xMask;
}
void
fbComposite (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8x8888mmx;
else
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
RegionRec region;
int n;
BoxPtr pbox;
CompositeFunc func = NULL;
Bool srcRepeat = pSrc->pDrawable && pSrc->repeatType == RepeatNormal;
Bool maskRepeat = FALSE;
Bool srcTransform = pSrc->transform != 0;
break;
Bool srcAlphaMap = pSrc->alphaMap != 0;
Bool maskAlphaMap = FALSE;
Bool dstAlphaMap = pDst->alphaMap != 0;
int x_msk, y_msk, x_src, y_src, x_dst, y_dst;
int w, h, w_this, h_this;
#ifdef USE_MMX
static Bool mmx_setup = FALSE;
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x8888Cmmx;
else
#endif
}
#endif
xDst += pDst->pDrawable->x;
yDst += pDst->pDrawable->y;
if (pSrc->pDrawable) {
xSrc += pSrc->pDrawable->x;
ySrc += pSrc->pDrawable->y;
}
if (srcRepeat && srcTransform &&
pSrc->pDrawable->width == 1 &&
pSrc->pDrawable->height == 1)
else
if (pMask && pMask->pDrawable)
{
xMask += pMask->pDrawable->x;
yMask += pMask->pDrawable->y;
maskRepeat = pMask->repeatType == RepeatNormal;
if (pMask->filter == PictFilterConvolution)
}
else
{
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_r5g6b5:
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x0565;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
break;
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
if (pMask->componentAlpha) {
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x8888Cmmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x8888C;
break;
case PICT_b5g6r5:
#ifdef USE_MMX
if (fbHaveMMX())
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x0565Cmmx;
else
#endif
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x0565C;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
else
{
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_b5g6r5:
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx8888x0565;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
break;
case PICT_a1:
switch (pDst->format) {
case PICT_r5g6b5:
case PICT_b5g6r5:
case PICT_r8g8b8:
case PICT_b8g8r8:
case PICT_a8r8g8b8:
case PICT_x8r8g8b8:
case PICT_a8b8g8r8:
case PICT_x8b8g8r8:
{
FbBits src;
fbComposeGetSolid(pSrc, src, pDst->format);
if ((src & 0xff000000) == 0xff000000)
func = fbCompositeSolidMask_nx1xn;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 7,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Window::openMethodCustom(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args)
{
DOMWindow* impl = V8Window::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionState es(args.GetIsolate());
if (!BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame(impl->frame(), es)) {
es.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
String urlString = toWebCoreStringWithUndefinedOrNullCheck(args[0]);
AtomicString frameName = (args[1]->IsUndefined() || args[1]->IsNull()) ? "_blank" : toWebCoreAtomicString(args[1]);
String windowFeaturesString = toWebCoreStringWithUndefinedOrNullCheck(args[2]);
RefPtr<DOMWindow> openedWindow = impl->open(urlString, frameName, windowFeaturesString, activeDOMWindow(), firstDOMWindow());
if (!openedWindow)
return;
v8SetReturnValueFast(args, openedWindow.release(), impl);
}
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn)
{
struct perf_event_context *child_ctx, *clone_ctx = NULL;
struct perf_event *child_event, *next;
WARN_ON_ONCE(child != current);
child_ctx = perf_pin_task_context(child, ctxn);
if (!child_ctx)
return;
/*
* In order to reduce the amount of tricky in ctx tear-down, we hold
* ctx::mutex over the entire thing. This serializes against almost
* everything that wants to access the ctx.
*
* The exception is sys_perf_event_open() /
* perf_event_create_kernel_count() which does find_get_context()
* without ctx::mutex (it cannot because of the move_group double mutex
* lock thing). See the comments in perf_install_in_context().
*/
mutex_lock(&child_ctx->mutex);
/*
* In a single ctx::lock section, de-schedule the events and detach the
* context from the task such that we cannot ever get it scheduled back
* in.
*/
raw_spin_lock_irq(&child_ctx->lock);
task_ctx_sched_out(__get_cpu_context(child_ctx), child_ctx, EVENT_ALL);
/*
* Now that the context is inactive, destroy the task <-> ctx relation
* and mark the context dead.
*/
RCU_INIT_POINTER(child->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn], NULL);
put_ctx(child_ctx); /* cannot be last */
WRITE_ONCE(child_ctx->task, TASK_TOMBSTONE);
put_task_struct(current); /* cannot be last */
clone_ctx = unclone_ctx(child_ctx);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&child_ctx->lock);
if (clone_ctx)
put_ctx(clone_ctx);
/*
* Report the task dead after unscheduling the events so that we
* won't get any samples after PERF_RECORD_EXIT. We can however still
* get a few PERF_RECORD_READ events.
*/
perf_event_task(child, child_ctx, 0);
list_for_each_entry_safe(child_event, next, &child_ctx->event_list, event_entry)
perf_event_exit_event(child_event, child_ctx, child);
mutex_unlock(&child_ctx->mutex);
put_ctx(child_ctx);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix the perf_cpu_time_max_percent check
Use "proc_dointvec_minmax" instead of "proc_dointvec" to check the input
value from user-space.
If not, we can set a big value and some vars will overflow like
"sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate" which will cause a lot of unexpected
problems.
Signed-off-by: Tan Xiaojun <tanxiaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1487829879-56237-1-git-send-email-tanxiaojun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 17,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FPDF_DOCUMENT PDFiumEngine::CreateSinglePageRasterPdf(
double source_page_width,
double source_page_height,
const PP_PrintSettings_Dev& print_settings,
PDFiumPage* page_to_print) {
FPDF_DOCUMENT temp_doc = FPDF_CreateNewDocument();
if (!temp_doc)
return temp_doc;
const pp::Size& bitmap_size(page_to_print->rect().size());
pp::ImageData image =
pp::ImageData(client_->GetPluginInstance(),
PP_IMAGEDATAFORMAT_BGRA_PREMUL, bitmap_size, false);
FPDF_BITMAP bitmap =
FPDFBitmap_CreateEx(bitmap_size.width(), bitmap_size.height(),
FPDFBitmap_BGRx, image.data(), image.stride());
FPDFBitmap_FillRect(bitmap, 0, 0, bitmap_size.width(), bitmap_size.height(),
0xFFFFFFFF);
pp::Rect page_rect = page_to_print->rect();
FPDF_RenderPageBitmap(bitmap, page_to_print->GetPrintPage(), page_rect.x(),
page_rect.y(), page_rect.width(), page_rect.height(),
print_settings.orientation,
FPDF_ANNOT | FPDF_PRINTING | FPDF_NO_CATCH);
unsigned char* bitmap_data =
static_cast<unsigned char*>(FPDFBitmap_GetBuffer(bitmap));
double ratio_x = ConvertUnitDouble(bitmap_size.width(), print_settings.dpi,
kPointsPerInch);
double ratio_y = ConvertUnitDouble(bitmap_size.height(), print_settings.dpi,
kPointsPerInch);
FPDF_PAGEOBJECT temp_img = FPDFPageObj_NewImageObj(temp_doc);
bool encoded = false;
std::vector<uint8_t> compressed_bitmap_data;
if (!(print_settings.format & PP_PRINTOUTPUTFORMAT_PDF)) {
const int kQuality = 40;
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::Make(
FPDFBitmap_GetWidth(bitmap), FPDFBitmap_GetHeight(bitmap),
kBGRA_8888_SkColorType, kOpaque_SkAlphaType);
SkPixmap src(info, bitmap_data, FPDFBitmap_GetStride(bitmap));
encoded = gfx::JPEGCodec::Encode(src, kQuality, &compressed_bitmap_data);
}
{
std::unique_ptr<void, FPDFPageDeleter> temp_page_holder(
FPDFPage_New(temp_doc, 0, source_page_width, source_page_height));
FPDF_PAGE temp_page = temp_page_holder.get();
if (encoded) {
FPDF_FILEACCESS file_access = {};
file_access.m_FileLen =
static_cast<unsigned long>(compressed_bitmap_data.size());
file_access.m_GetBlock = &GetBlockForJpeg;
file_access.m_Param = &compressed_bitmap_data;
FPDFImageObj_LoadJpegFileInline(&temp_page, 1, temp_img, &file_access);
} else {
FPDFImageObj_SetBitmap(&temp_page, 1, temp_img, bitmap);
}
FPDFImageObj_SetMatrix(temp_img, ratio_x, 0, 0, ratio_y, 0, 0);
FPDFPage_InsertObject(temp_page, temp_img);
FPDFPage_GenerateContent(temp_page);
}
page_to_print->ClosePrintPage();
FPDFBitmap_Destroy(bitmap);
return temp_doc;
}
Commit Message: Copy visible_pages_ when iterating over it.
On this case, a call inside the loop may cause visible_pages_ to
change.
Bug: 822091
Change-Id: I41b0715faa6fe3e39203cd9142cf5ea38e59aefb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964592
Reviewed-by: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <hnakashima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543494}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: alloc_strvec_quoted_escaped(char *src)
{
char *token;
vector_t *strvec;
char cur_quote = 0;
char *ofs_op;
char *op_buf;
char *ofs, *ofs1;
char op_char;
if (!src) {
if (!buf_extern)
return NULL;
src = buf_extern;
}
/* Create a vector and alloc each command piece */
strvec = vector_alloc();
op_buf = MALLOC(MAXBUF);
ofs = src;
while (*ofs) {
/* Find the next 'word' */
ofs += strspn(ofs, WHITE_SPACE);
if (!*ofs)
break;
ofs_op = op_buf;
while (*ofs) {
ofs1 = strpbrk(ofs, cur_quote == '"' ? "\"\\" : cur_quote == '\'' ? "'\\" : WHITE_SPACE_STR "'\"\\");
if (!ofs1) {
size_t len;
if (cur_quote) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_UNMATCHED_QUOTE, "String '%s': missing terminating %c", src, cur_quote);
goto err_exit;
}
strcpy(ofs_op, ofs);
len = strlen(ofs);
ofs += len;
ofs_op += len;
break;
}
/* Save the wanted text */
strncpy(ofs_op, ofs, ofs1 - ofs);
ofs_op += ofs1 - ofs;
ofs = ofs1;
if (*ofs == '\\') {
/* It is a '\' */
ofs++;
if (!*ofs) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Missing escape char at end: '%s'", src);
goto err_exit;
}
if (*ofs == 'x' && isxdigit(ofs[1])) {
op_char = 0;
ofs++;
while (isxdigit(*ofs)) {
op_char <<= 4;
op_char |= isdigit(*ofs) ? *ofs - '0' : (10 + *ofs - (isupper(*ofs) ? 'A' : 'a'));
ofs++;
}
}
else if (*ofs == 'c' && ofs[1]) {
op_char = *++ofs & 0x1f; /* Convert to control character */
ofs++;
}
else if (*ofs >= '0' && *ofs <= '7') {
op_char = *ofs++ - '0';
if (*ofs >= '0' && *ofs <= '7') {
op_char <<= 3;
op_char += *ofs++ - '0';
}
if (*ofs >= '0' && *ofs <= '7') {
op_char <<= 3;
op_char += *ofs++ - '0';
}
}
else {
switch (*ofs) {
case 'a':
op_char = '\a';
break;
case 'b':
op_char = '\b';
break;
case 'E':
op_char = 0x1b;
break;
case 'f':
op_char = '\f';
break;
case 'n':
op_char = '\n';
break;
case 'r':
op_char = '\r';
break;
case 't':
op_char = '\t';
break;
case 'v':
op_char = '\v';
break;
default: /* \"' */
op_char = *ofs;
break;
}
ofs++;
}
*ofs_op++ = op_char;
continue;
}
if (cur_quote) {
/* It's the close quote */
ofs++;
cur_quote = 0;
continue;
}
if (*ofs == '"' || *ofs == '\'') {
cur_quote = *ofs++;
continue;
}
break;
}
token = MALLOC(ofs_op - op_buf + 1);
memcpy(token, op_buf, ofs_op - op_buf);
token[ofs_op - op_buf] = '\0';
/* Alloc & set the slot */
vector_alloc_slot(strvec);
vector_set_slot(strvec, token);
}
FREE(op_buf);
if (!vector_size(strvec)) {
free_strvec(strvec);
return NULL;
}
return strvec;
err_exit:
free_strvec(strvec);
FREE(op_buf);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 4,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostQt::renderNextFrame()
{
m_waitingForUIProcess = false;
scheduleLayerFlush();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 15,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: begin_softmask(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, softmask_save *save)
{
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
pdf_xobject *softmask = gstate->softmask;
fz_rect mask_bbox;
fz_matrix tos_save[2], save_ctm;
fz_matrix mask_matrix;
fz_colorspace *mask_colorspace;
save->softmask = softmask;
if (softmask == NULL)
return gstate;
save->page_resources = gstate->softmask_resources;
save->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
save_ctm = gstate->ctm;
pdf_xobject_bbox(ctx, softmask, &mask_bbox);
pdf_xobject_matrix(ctx, softmask, &mask_matrix);
pdf_tos_save(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
if (gstate->luminosity)
mask_bbox = fz_infinite_rect;
else
{
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &mask_matrix);
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &gstate->softmask_ctm);
}
gstate->softmask = NULL;
gstate->softmask_resources = NULL;
gstate->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
mask_colorspace = pdf_xobject_colorspace(ctx, softmask);
if (gstate->luminosity && !mask_colorspace)
mask_colorspace = fz_keep_colorspace(ctx, fz_device_gray(ctx));
fz_try(ctx)
{
fz_begin_mask(ctx, pr->dev, &mask_bbox, gstate->luminosity, mask_colorspace, gstate->softmask_bc, &gstate->fill.color_params);
pdf_run_xobject(ctx, pr, softmask, save->page_resources, &fz_identity, 1);
}
fz_always(ctx)
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, mask_colorspace);
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow_if(ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER);
/* FIXME: Ignore error - nasty, but if we throw from
* here the clip stack would be messed up. */
/* TODO: pass cookie here to increase the cookie error count */
}
fz_end_mask(ctx, pr->dev);
pdf_tos_restore(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
gstate->ctm = save_ctm;
return gstate;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *proto_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
return seq_list_next(v, &proto_list, pos);
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoIsRenderbuffer(GLuint renderbuffer,
uint32_t* result) {
*result = api()->glIsRenderbufferEXTFn(
GetRenderbufferServiceID(api(), renderbuffer, resources_, false));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int calc_stack(const char *str, int *parens, int *preds, int *err)
{
bool is_pred = false;
int nr_preds = 0;
int open = 1; /* Count the expression as "(E)" */
int last_quote = 0;
int max_open = 1;
int quote = 0;
int i;
*err = 0;
for (i = 0; str[i]; i++) {
if (isspace(str[i]))
continue;
if (quote) {
if (str[i] == quote)
quote = 0;
continue;
}
switch (str[i]) {
case '\'':
case '"':
quote = str[i];
last_quote = i;
break;
case '|':
case '&':
if (str[i+1] != str[i])
break;
is_pred = false;
continue;
case '(':
is_pred = false;
open++;
if (open > max_open)
max_open = open;
continue;
case ')':
is_pred = false;
if (open == 1) {
*err = i;
return TOO_MANY_CLOSE;
}
open--;
continue;
}
if (!is_pred) {
nr_preds++;
is_pred = true;
}
}
if (quote) {
*err = last_quote;
return MISSING_QUOTE;
}
if (open != 1) {
int level = open;
/* find the bad open */
for (i--; i; i--) {
if (quote) {
if (str[i] == quote)
quote = 0;
continue;
}
switch (str[i]) {
case '(':
if (level == open) {
*err = i;
return TOO_MANY_OPEN;
}
level--;
break;
case ')':
level++;
break;
case '\'':
case '"':
quote = str[i];
break;
}
}
/* First character is the '(' with missing ')' */
*err = 0;
return TOO_MANY_OPEN;
}
/* Set the size of the required stacks */
*parens = max_open;
*preds = nr_preds;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CMSExceptionHandler(cmsContext context,cmsUInt32Number severity,
const char *message)
{
CMSExceptionInfo
*cms_exception;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
Image
*image;
cms_exception=(CMSExceptionInfo *) context;
image=cms_exception->image;
exception=cms_exception->exception;
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),ImageWarning,
"UnableToTransformColorspace","`%s'","unknown context");
return;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TransformEvent,GetMagickModule(),"lcms: #%u, %s",
severity,message != (char *) NULL ? message : "no message");
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),ImageWarning,
"UnableToTransformColorspace","`%s'",image->filename);
}
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 10,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType DecodeImage(Image *image,const ssize_t opacity,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
c;
LZWInfo
*lzw_info;
size_t
pass;
ssize_t
index,
offset,
y;
unsigned char
data_size;
/*
Allocate decoder tables.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
data_size=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (data_size > MaximumLZWBits)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
lzw_info=AcquireLZWInfo(image,data_size);
if (lzw_info == (LZWInfo *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
pass=0;
offset=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; )
{
c=ReadBlobLZWByte(lzw_info);
if (c < 0)
break;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) c,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+index,q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,index == opacity ? TransparentAlpha : OpaqueAlpha,q);
x++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
break;
if (image->interlace == NoInterlace)
offset++;
else
{
switch (pass)
{
case 0:
default:
{
offset+=8;
break;
}
case 1:
{
offset+=8;
break;
}
case 2:
{
offset+=4;
break;
}
case 3:
{
offset+=2;
break;
}
}
if ((pass == 0) && (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
pass++;
offset=4;
}
if ((pass == 1) && (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
pass++;
offset=2;
}
if ((pass == 2) && (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
pass++;
offset=1;
}
}
}
lzw_info=RelinquishLZWInfo(lzw_info);
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/592
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 24,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::DevicesEnumerated(
bool requested_audio_input,
bool requested_video_input,
const std::string& label,
const MediaDeviceEnumeration& enumeration) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DeviceRequest* request = FindRequest(label);
if (!request)
return;
bool requested[] = {requested_audio_input, requested_video_input};
MediaStreamType stream_types[] = {MEDIA_DEVICE_AUDIO_CAPTURE,
MEDIA_DEVICE_VIDEO_CAPTURE};
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(requested); ++i) {
if (!requested[i])
continue;
DCHECK(request->audio_type() == stream_types[i] ||
request->video_type() == stream_types[i]);
if (request->state(stream_types[i]) == MEDIA_REQUEST_STATE_REQUESTED) {
request->SetState(stream_types[i], MEDIA_REQUEST_STATE_PENDING_APPROVAL);
}
}
if (!SetUpDeviceCaptureRequest(request, enumeration))
FinalizeRequestFailed(label, request, MEDIA_DEVICE_NO_HARDWARE);
else
ReadOutputParamsAndPostRequestToUI(label, request, enumeration);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 27,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf14_grayspot_get_color_comp_index(gx_device * dev, const char * pname,
int name_size, int component_type)
{
return pdf14_spot_get_color_comp_index(dev, pname, name_size, component_type, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: create_spnego_ctx(void)
{
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx = NULL;
spnego_ctx = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)
malloc(sizeof (spnego_gss_ctx_id_rec));
if (spnego_ctx == NULL) {
return (NULL);
}
spnego_ctx->magic_num = SPNEGO_MAGIC_ID;
spnego_ctx->ctx_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
spnego_ctx->mech_set = NULL;
spnego_ctx->internal_mech = NULL;
spnego_ctx->optionStr = NULL;
spnego_ctx->DER_mechTypes.length = 0;
spnego_ctx->DER_mechTypes.value = NULL;
spnego_ctx->default_cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
spnego_ctx->mic_reqd = 0;
spnego_ctx->mic_sent = 0;
spnego_ctx->mic_rcvd = 0;
spnego_ctx->mech_complete = 0;
spnego_ctx->nego_done = 0;
spnego_ctx->internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
spnego_ctx->actual_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
check_spnego_options(spnego_ctx);
return (spnego_ctx);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_bufinfo_ioctl(struct comedi_device *dev,
struct comedi_bufinfo __user *arg, void *file)
{
struct comedi_bufinfo bi;
struct comedi_subdevice *s;
struct comedi_async *async;
if (copy_from_user(&bi, arg, sizeof(struct comedi_bufinfo)))
return -EFAULT;
if (bi.subdevice >= dev->n_subdevices || bi.subdevice < 0)
return -EINVAL;
s = dev->subdevices + bi.subdevice;
if (s->lock && s->lock != file)
return -EACCES;
async = s->async;
if (!async) {
DPRINTK("subdevice does not have async capability\n");
bi.buf_write_ptr = 0;
bi.buf_read_ptr = 0;
bi.buf_write_count = 0;
bi.buf_read_count = 0;
bi.bytes_read = 0;
bi.bytes_written = 0;
goto copyback;
}
if (!s->busy) {
bi.bytes_read = 0;
bi.bytes_written = 0;
goto copyback_position;
}
if (s->busy != file)
return -EACCES;
if (bi.bytes_read && (s->subdev_flags & SDF_CMD_READ)) {
bi.bytes_read = comedi_buf_read_alloc(async, bi.bytes_read);
comedi_buf_read_free(async, bi.bytes_read);
if (!(comedi_get_subdevice_runflags(s) & (SRF_ERROR |
SRF_RUNNING))
&& async->buf_write_count == async->buf_read_count) {
do_become_nonbusy(dev, s);
}
}
if (bi.bytes_written && (s->subdev_flags & SDF_CMD_WRITE)) {
bi.bytes_written =
comedi_buf_write_alloc(async, bi.bytes_written);
comedi_buf_write_free(async, bi.bytes_written);
}
copyback_position:
bi.buf_write_count = async->buf_write_count;
bi.buf_write_ptr = async->buf_write_ptr;
bi.buf_read_count = async->buf_read_count;
bi.buf_read_ptr = async->buf_read_ptr;
copyback:
if (copy_to_user(arg, &bi, sizeof(struct comedi_bufinfo)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: staging: comedi: fix infoleak to userspace
driver_name and board_name are pointers to strings, not buffers of size
COMEDI_NAMELEN. Copying COMEDI_NAMELEN bytes of a string containing
less than COMEDI_NAMELEN-1 bytes would leak some unrelated bytes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 15,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltNewExtModule(xsltExtInitFunction initFunc,
xsltExtShutdownFunction shutdownFunc,
xsltStyleExtInitFunction styleInitFunc,
xsltStyleExtShutdownFunction styleShutdownFunc)
{
xsltExtModulePtr cur;
cur = (xsltExtModulePtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xsltExtModule));
if (cur == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltNewExtModule : malloc failed\n");
return (NULL);
}
cur->initFunc = initFunc;
cur->shutdownFunc = shutdownFunc;
cur->styleInitFunc = styleInitFunc;
cur->styleShutdownFunc = styleShutdownFunc;
return (cur);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WaitUntilStable() {
uint32_t current_frame_number = view_->RendererFrameNumber();
uint32_t previous_frame_number;
do {
base::RunLoop run_loop;
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE, run_loop.QuitClosure(), delta_);
run_loop.Run();
previous_frame_number = current_frame_number;
current_frame_number = view_->RendererFrameNumber();
} while (current_frame_number != previous_frame_number);
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 1,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~BufferMeta() {
delete[] mBackup;
}
Commit Message: IOMX: allow configuration after going to loaded state
This was disallowed recently but we still use it as MediaCodcec.stop
only goes to loaded state, and does not free component.
Bug: 31450460
Change-Id: I72e092e4e55c9f23b1baee3e950d76e84a5ef28d
(cherry picked from commit e03b22839d78c841ce0a1a0a1ee1960932188b0b)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 14,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
pid_t pid;
int status;
while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
(pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
;
signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
errno = save_errno;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: channel_close_fd(int *fdp)
{
int ret = 0, fd = *fdp;
if (fd != -1) {
ret = close(fd);
*fdp = -1;
if (fd == channel_max_fd)
channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd();
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *New_FFMPEG_Demux()
{
GF_InputService *ffd;
FFDemux *priv;
GF_SAFEALLOC(ffd, GF_InputService);
if (!ffd) return NULL;
GF_SAFEALLOC(priv, FFDemux);
if (!priv) {
gf_free(ffd);
return NULL;
}
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_INFO, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[FFMPEG Demuxer] Registering all ffmpeg plugins...\n") );
/* register all codecs, demux and protocols */
av_register_all();
avformat_network_init();
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_DEBUG, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[FFMPEG Demuxer] Registering all ffmpeg plugins DONE.\n") );
ffd->RegisterMimeTypes = FFD_RegisterMimeTypes;
ffd->CanHandleURL = FFD_CanHandleURL;
ffd->CloseService = FFD_CloseService;
ffd->ConnectChannel = FFD_ConnectChannel;
ffd->ConnectService = FFD_ConnectService;
ffd->DisconnectChannel = FFD_DisconnectChannel;
ffd->GetServiceDescriptor = FFD_GetServiceDesc;
ffd->ServiceCommand = FFD_ServiceCommand;
ffd->CanHandleURLInService = FFD_CanHandleURLInService;
priv->thread = gf_th_new("FFMPEG Demux");
priv->mx = gf_mx_new("FFMPEG Demux");
if (!priv->thread || !priv->mx) {
if (priv->thread) gf_th_del(priv->thread);
if (priv->mx) gf_mx_del(priv->mx);
gf_free(priv);
return NULL;
}
GF_REGISTER_MODULE_INTERFACE(ffd, GF_NET_CLIENT_INTERFACE, "FFMPEG Demuxer", "gpac distribution");
ffd->priv = priv;
return ffd;
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,202 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ndo_dflt_fdb_add(struct ndmsg *ndm,
struct nlattr *tb[],
struct net_device *dev,
const unsigned char *addr, u16 vid,
u16 flags)
{
int err = -EINVAL;
/* If aging addresses are supported device will need to
* implement its own handler for this.
*/
if (ndm->ndm_state && !(ndm->ndm_state & NUD_PERMANENT)) {
pr_info("%s: FDB only supports static addresses\n", dev->name);
return err;
}
if (vid) {
pr_info("%s: vlans aren't supported yet for dev_uc|mc_add()\n", dev->name);
return err;
}
if (is_unicast_ether_addr(addr) || is_link_local_ether_addr(addr))
err = dev_uc_add_excl(dev, addr);
else if (is_multicast_ether_addr(addr))
err = dev_mc_add_excl(dev, addr);
/* Only return duplicate errors if NLM_F_EXCL is set */
if (err == -EEXIST && !(flags & NLM_F_EXCL))
err = 0;
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_dx_csum_verify(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_dir_entry *dirent)
{
struct dx_countlimit *c;
struct dx_tail *t;
int count_offset, limit, count;
if (!EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM))
return 1;
c = get_dx_countlimit(inode, dirent, &count_offset);
if (!c) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "dir seems corrupt? Run e2fsck -D.");
return 1;
}
limit = le16_to_cpu(c->limit);
count = le16_to_cpu(c->count);
if (count_offset + (limit * sizeof(struct dx_entry)) >
EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb) - sizeof(struct dx_tail)) {
warn_no_space_for_csum(inode);
return 1;
}
t = (struct dx_tail *)(((struct dx_entry *)c) + limit);
if (t->dt_checksum != ext4_dx_csum(inode, dirent, count_offset,
count, t))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 24,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: test_sync_sh (void) {
parse_cmd_line("sync_sh 'echo Test echo.'", NULL);
g_assert_cmpstr("Test echo.\n", ==, uzbl.comm.sync_stdout);
/* clean up after ourselves */
uzbl.comm.sync_stdout = strfree(uzbl.comm.sync_stdout);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RTCPeerConnectionHandler::CreateNativeSessionDescription(
const std::string& sdp, const std::string& type,
webrtc::SdpParseError* error) {
webrtc::SessionDescriptionInterface* native_desc =
dependency_factory_->CreateSessionDescription(type, sdp, error);
LOG_IF(ERROR, !native_desc) << "Failed to create native session description."
<< " Type: " << type << " SDP: " << sdp;
return native_desc;
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct net_device *__dev_get_by_index(struct net *net, int ifindex)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct hlist_head *head = dev_index_hash(net, ifindex);
hlist_for_each_entry(dev, head, index_hlist)
if (dev->ifindex == ifindex)
return dev;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 18,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethod(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
JSC::JSValue result = jsNumber(impl->intMethod());
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned char *get_params(unsigned char *p, int *param, int *len)
{
int n;
*len = 0;
while (*p != '\0') {
while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') {
p++;
}
if (isdigit((int) ((unsigned char) *p))) {
for (n = 0; isdigit((int) ((unsigned char) *p)); p++) {
n = (int) ((ssize_t) n * 10 + (*p - '0'));
}
if (*len < 10) {
param[(*len)++] = n;
}
while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') {
p++;
}
if (*p == ';') {
p++;
}
} else if (*p == ';') {
if (*len < 10) {
param[(*len)++] = 0;
}
p++;
} else
break;
}
return p;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1452
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool login_via_cert(PgSocket *client)
{
struct tls *tls = client->sbuf.tls;
struct tls_cert *cert;
struct tls_cert_dname *subj;
if (!tls) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "TLS connection required");
return false;
}
if (tls_get_peer_cert(client->sbuf.tls, &cert, NULL) < 0 || !cert) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "TLS client certificate required");
return false;
}
subj = &cert->subject;
log_debug("TLS cert login: CN=%s/C=%s/L=%s/ST=%s/O=%s/OU=%s",
subj->common_name ? subj->common_name : "(null)",
subj->country_name ? subj->country_name : "(null)",
subj->locality_name ? subj->locality_name : "(null)",
subj->state_or_province_name ? subj->state_or_province_name : "(null)",
subj->organization_name ? subj->organization_name : "(null)",
subj->organizational_unit_name ? subj->organizational_unit_name : "(null)");
if (!subj->common_name) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "Invalid TLS certificate");
goto fail;
}
if (strcmp(subj->common_name, client->auth_user->name) != 0) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "TLS certificate name mismatch");
goto fail;
}
tls_cert_free(cert);
/* login successful */
return finish_client_login(client);
fail:
tls_cert_free(cert);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove too early set of auth_user
When query returns 0 rows (user not found),
this user stays as login user...
Should fix #69.
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 16,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: qcms_transform* colorTransform() const { return m_transform; }
Commit Message: Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
R=pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int decode_asi(unsigned int insn, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (insn & 0x800000) {
if (insn & 0x2000)
return (unsigned char)(regs->tstate >> 24); /* %asi */
else
return (unsigned char)(insn >> 5); /* imm_asi */
} else
return ASI_P;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Element* Document::ScrollingElementNoLayout() {
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::ScrollTopLeftInteropEnabled()) {
if (InQuirksMode()) {
DCHECK(lifecycle_.GetState() >= DocumentLifecycle::kStyleClean);
HTMLBodyElement* body = FirstBodyElement();
if (body && body->GetLayoutObject() &&
body->GetLayoutObject()->HasOverflowClip())
return nullptr;
return body;
}
return documentElement();
}
return body();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void t_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
{
mutex_unlock(&ftrace_lock);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int instantiate_none(struct lxc_handler *handler, struct lxc_netdev *netdev)
{
netdev->ifindex = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 24,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static vm_fault_t hugetlb_no_page(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t idx,
unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep, unsigned int flags)
{
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
vm_fault_t ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
int anon_rmap = 0;
unsigned long size;
struct page *page;
pte_t new_pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
unsigned long haddr = address & huge_page_mask(h);
bool new_page = false;
/*
* Currently, we are forced to kill the process in the event the
* original mapper has unmapped pages from the child due to a failed
* COW. Warn that such a situation has occurred as it may not be obvious
*/
if (is_vma_resv_set(vma, HPAGE_RESV_UNMAPPED)) {
pr_warn_ratelimited("PID %d killed due to inadequate hugepage pool\n",
current->pid);
return ret;
}
/*
* Use page lock to guard against racing truncation
* before we get page_table_lock.
*/
retry:
page = find_lock_page(mapping, idx);
if (!page) {
size = i_size_read(mapping->host) >> huge_page_shift(h);
if (idx >= size)
goto out;
/*
* Check for page in userfault range
*/
if (userfaultfd_missing(vma)) {
u32 hash;
struct vm_fault vmf = {
.vma = vma,
.address = haddr,
.flags = flags,
/*
* Hard to debug if it ends up being
* used by a callee that assumes
* something about the other
* uninitialized fields... same as in
* memory.c
*/
};
/*
* hugetlb_fault_mutex must be dropped before
* handling userfault. Reacquire after handling
* fault to make calling code simpler.
*/
hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(h, mm, vma, mapping,
idx, haddr);
mutex_unlock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
ret = handle_userfault(&vmf, VM_UFFD_MISSING);
mutex_lock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
goto out;
}
page = alloc_huge_page(vma, haddr, 0);
if (IS_ERR(page)) {
ret = vmf_error(PTR_ERR(page));
goto out;
}
clear_huge_page(page, address, pages_per_huge_page(h));
__SetPageUptodate(page);
new_page = true;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE) {
int err = huge_add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, idx);
if (err) {
put_page(page);
if (err == -EEXIST)
goto retry;
goto out;
}
} else {
lock_page(page);
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma))) {
ret = VM_FAULT_OOM;
goto backout_unlocked;
}
anon_rmap = 1;
}
} else {
/*
* If memory error occurs between mmap() and fault, some process
* don't have hwpoisoned swap entry for errored virtual address.
* So we need to block hugepage fault by PG_hwpoison bit check.
*/
if (unlikely(PageHWPoison(page))) {
ret = VM_FAULT_HWPOISON |
VM_FAULT_SET_HINDEX(hstate_index(h));
goto backout_unlocked;
}
}
/*
* If we are going to COW a private mapping later, we examine the
* pending reservations for this page now. This will ensure that
* any allocations necessary to record that reservation occur outside
* the spinlock.
*/
if ((flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
if (vma_needs_reservation(h, vma, haddr) < 0) {
ret = VM_FAULT_OOM;
goto backout_unlocked;
}
/* Just decrements count, does not deallocate */
vma_end_reservation(h, vma, haddr);
}
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, ptep);
size = i_size_read(mapping->host) >> huge_page_shift(h);
if (idx >= size)
goto backout;
ret = 0;
if (!huge_pte_none(huge_ptep_get(ptep)))
goto backout;
if (anon_rmap) {
ClearPagePrivate(page);
hugepage_add_new_anon_rmap(page, vma, haddr);
} else
page_dup_rmap(page, true);
new_pte = make_huge_pte(vma, page, ((vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
&& (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)));
set_huge_pte_at(mm, haddr, ptep, new_pte);
hugetlb_count_add(pages_per_huge_page(h), mm);
if ((flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
/* Optimization, do the COW without a second fault */
ret = hugetlb_cow(mm, vma, address, ptep, page, ptl);
}
spin_unlock(ptl);
/*
* Only make newly allocated pages active. Existing pages found
* in the pagecache could be !page_huge_active() if they have been
* isolated for migration.
*/
if (new_page)
set_page_huge_active(page);
unlock_page(page);
out:
return ret;
backout:
spin_unlock(ptl);
backout_unlocked:
unlock_page(page);
restore_reserve_on_error(h, vma, haddr, page);
put_page(page);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vrend_free_sync_thread(void)
{
if (!vrend_state.sync_thread)
return;
pipe_mutex_lock(vrend_state.fence_mutex);
vrend_state.stop_sync_thread = true;
pipe_mutex_unlock(vrend_state.fence_mutex);
pipe_condvar_signal(vrend_state.fence_cond);
pipe_thread_wait(vrend_state.sync_thread);
vrend_state.sync_thread = 0;
pipe_condvar_destroy(vrend_state.fence_cond);
pipe_mutex_destroy(vrend_state.fence_mutex);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 29,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftMPEG4::updatePortDefinitions(bool updateCrop, bool updateInputSize) {
SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::updatePortDefinitions(updateCrop, updateInputSize);
/* We have to align our width and height - this should affect stride! */
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *def = &editPortInfo(kOutputPortIndex)->mDef;
def->format.video.nStride = align(def->format.video.nStride, 16);
def->format.video.nSliceHeight = align(def->format.video.nSliceHeight, 16);
def->nBufferSize = (def->format.video.nStride * def->format.video.nSliceHeight * 3) / 2;
}
Commit Message: SoftMPEG4: Check the buffer size before writing the reference frame.
Also prevent overflow in SoftMPEG4 and division by zero in SoftMPEG4Encoder.
Bug: 30033990
Change-Id: I7701f5fc54c2670587d122330e5dc851f64ed3c2
(cherry picked from commit 695123195034402ca76169b195069c28c30342d3)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType RenderType(Image *image,const DrawInfo *draw_info,
const PointInfo *offset,TypeMetric *metrics,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const TypeInfo
*type_info;
DrawInfo
*annotate_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
type_info=(const TypeInfo *) NULL;
if (draw_info->font != (char *) NULL)
{
if (*draw_info->font == '@')
{
status=RenderFreetype(image,draw_info,draw_info->encoding,offset,
metrics,exception);
return(status);
}
if (*draw_info->font == '-')
return(RenderX11(image,draw_info,offset,metrics,exception));
if (*draw_info->font == '^')
return(RenderPostscript(image,draw_info,offset,metrics,exception));
if (IsPathAccessible(draw_info->font) != MagickFalse)
{
status=RenderFreetype(image,draw_info,draw_info->encoding,offset,
metrics,exception);
return(status);
}
type_info=GetTypeInfo(draw_info->font,exception);
if (type_info == (const TypeInfo *) NULL)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),TypeWarning,
"UnableToReadFont","`%s'",draw_info->font);
}
if ((type_info == (const TypeInfo *) NULL) &&
(draw_info->family != (const char *) NULL))
{
type_info=GetTypeInfoByFamily(draw_info->family,draw_info->style,
draw_info->stretch,draw_info->weight,exception);
if (type_info == (const TypeInfo *) NULL)
{
char
**family;
int
number_families;
register ssize_t
i;
/*
Parse font family list.
*/
family=StringToArgv(draw_info->family,&number_families);
for (i=1; i < (ssize_t) number_families; i++)
{
type_info=GetTypeInfoByFamily(family[i],draw_info->style,
draw_info->stretch,draw_info->weight,exception);
if (type_info != (const TypeInfo *) NULL)
break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_families; i++)
family[i]=DestroyString(family[i]);
family=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(family);
if (type_info == (const TypeInfo *) NULL)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),TypeWarning,
"UnableToReadFont","`%s'",draw_info->family);
}
}
if (type_info == (const TypeInfo *) NULL)
type_info=GetTypeInfoByFamily("Arial",draw_info->style,
draw_info->stretch,draw_info->weight,exception);
if (type_info == (const TypeInfo *) NULL)
type_info=GetTypeInfoByFamily("Helvetica",draw_info->style,
draw_info->stretch,draw_info->weight,exception);
if (type_info == (const TypeInfo *) NULL)
type_info=GetTypeInfoByFamily("Century Schoolbook",draw_info->style,
draw_info->stretch,draw_info->weight,exception);
if (type_info == (const TypeInfo *) NULL)
type_info=GetTypeInfoByFamily("Sans",draw_info->style,
draw_info->stretch,draw_info->weight,exception);
if (type_info == (const TypeInfo *) NULL)
type_info=GetTypeInfoByFamily((const char *) NULL,draw_info->style,
draw_info->stretch,draw_info->weight,exception);
if (type_info == (const TypeInfo *) NULL)
type_info=GetTypeInfo("*",exception);
if (type_info == (const TypeInfo *) NULL)
{
status=RenderFreetype(image,draw_info,draw_info->encoding,offset,metrics,
exception);
return(status);
}
annotate_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
annotate_info->face=type_info->face;
if (type_info->metrics != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&annotate_info->metrics,type_info->metrics);
if (type_info->glyphs != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&annotate_info->font,type_info->glyphs);
status=RenderFreetype(image,annotate_info,type_info->encoding,offset,metrics,
exception);
annotate_info=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate_info);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1589
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ax25_free_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
ax25_cb_put(sk_to_ax25(sk));
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnMediaPlayerActionAt(
const gfx::PointF& location,
const blink::WebMediaPlayerAction& action) {
blink::WebFloatRect viewport_position(location.x(), location.y(), 0, 0);
GetRenderWidget()->ConvertWindowToViewport(&viewport_position);
frame_->PerformMediaPlayerAction(
WebPoint(viewport_position.x, viewport_position.y), action);
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 14,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::OnDescriptorWriteValueSuccess(
RemoteDescriptorWriteValueCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
std::move(callback).Run(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sha1_neon_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
struct sha1_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int partial = sctx->count % SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE;
int res;
/* Handle the fast case right here */
if (partial + len < SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE) {
sctx->count += len;
memcpy(sctx->buffer + partial, data, len);
return 0;
}
if (!may_use_simd()) {
res = sha1_update_arm(desc, data, len);
} else {
kernel_neon_begin();
res = __sha1_neon_update(desc, data, len, partial);
kernel_neon_end();
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 0 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockRenderProcess::~MockRenderProcess() {
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asf_read_generic_value(AVIOContext *pb, int type, uint64_t *value)
{
switch (type) {
case ASF_BOOL:
*value = avio_rl16(pb);
break;
case ASF_DWORD:
*value = avio_rl32(pb);
break;
case ASF_QWORD:
*value = avio_rl64(pb);
break;
case ASF_WORD:
*value = avio_rl16(pb);
break;
default:
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutoInstallCurrentThreadPlatformMock()
{
m_oldPlatform = Platform::current();
Platform::initialize(&m_mockPlatform);
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 11,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptValue Document::registerElement(ScriptState* script_state,
const AtomicString& name,
const ElementRegistrationOptions* options,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (!RegistrationContext()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"No element registration context is available.");
return ScriptValue();
}
if (name == "dom-module")
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kPolymerV1Detected);
V0CustomElementConstructorBuilder constructor_builder(script_state, options);
RegistrationContext()->RegisterElement(this, &constructor_builder, name,
exception_state);
return constructor_builder.BindingsReturnValue();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 5,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsWindow::AddDevToolsExtensionsToClient() {
content::WebContents* inspected_web_contents = GetInspectedWebContents();
if (inspected_web_contents) {
SessionTabHelper* session_tab_helper =
SessionTabHelper::FromWebContents(inspected_web_contents);
if (session_tab_helper) {
base::FundamentalValue tabId(session_tab_helper->session_id().id());
CallClientFunction("WebInspector.setInspectedTabId", &tabId, NULL, NULL);
}
}
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents_->GetBrowserContext());
const ExtensionService* extension_service = extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(
profile->GetOriginalProfile())->extension_service();
if (!extension_service)
return;
const ExtensionSet* extensions = extension_service->extensions();
ListValue results;
for (ExtensionSet::const_iterator extension(extensions->begin());
extension != extensions->end(); ++extension) {
if (extensions::ManifestURL::GetDevToolsPage(extension->get()).is_empty())
continue;
DictionaryValue* extension_info = new DictionaryValue();
extension_info->Set(
"startPage",
new StringValue(
extensions::ManifestURL::GetDevToolsPage(extension->get()).spec()));
extension_info->Set("name", new StringValue((*extension)->name()));
extension_info->Set(
"exposeExperimentalAPIs",
new base::FundamentalValue((*extension)->HasAPIPermission(
extensions::APIPermission::kExperimental)));
results.Append(extension_info);
}
CallClientFunction("WebInspector.addExtensions", &results, NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err mfro_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
s->size += 4;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 15,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned php_ifd_get32u(void *value, int motorola_intel)
{
return (unsigned)php_ifd_get32s(value, motorola_intel) & 0xffffffff;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_get_invariants(struct tg3 *tp, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
{
u32 misc_ctrl_reg;
u32 pci_state_reg, grc_misc_cfg;
u32 val;
u16 pci_cmd;
int err;
/* Force memory write invalidate off. If we leave it on,
* then on 5700_BX chips we have to enable a workaround.
* The workaround is to set the TG3PCI_DMA_RW_CTRL boundary
* to match the cacheline size. The Broadcom driver have this
* workaround but turns MWI off all the times so never uses
* it. This seems to suggest that the workaround is insufficient.
*/
pci_read_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, &pci_cmd);
pci_cmd &= ~PCI_COMMAND_INVALIDATE;
pci_write_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, pci_cmd);
/* Important! -- Make sure register accesses are byteswapped
* correctly. Also, for those chips that require it, make
* sure that indirect register accesses are enabled before
* the first operation.
*/
pci_read_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_MISC_HOST_CTRL,
&misc_ctrl_reg);
tp->misc_host_ctrl |= (misc_ctrl_reg &
MISC_HOST_CTRL_CHIPREV);
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_MISC_HOST_CTRL,
tp->misc_host_ctrl);
tg3_detect_asic_rev(tp, misc_ctrl_reg);
/* If we have 5702/03 A1 or A2 on certain ICH chipsets,
* we need to disable memory and use config. cycles
* only to access all registers. The 5702/03 chips
* can mistakenly decode the special cycles from the
* ICH chipsets as memory write cycles, causing corruption
* of register and memory space. Only certain ICH bridges
* will drive special cycles with non-zero data during the
* address phase which can fall within the 5703's address
* range. This is not an ICH bug as the PCI spec allows
* non-zero address during special cycles. However, only
* these ICH bridges are known to drive non-zero addresses
* during special cycles.
*
* Since special cycles do not cross PCI bridges, we only
* enable this workaround if the 5703 is on the secondary
* bus of these ICH bridges.
*/
if ((tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5703_A1) ||
(tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5703_A2)) {
static struct tg3_dev_id {
u32 vendor;
u32 device;
u32 rev;
} ich_chipsets[] = {
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82801AA_8,
PCI_ANY_ID },
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82801AB_8,
PCI_ANY_ID },
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82801BA_11,
0xa },
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82801BA_6,
PCI_ANY_ID },
{ },
};
struct tg3_dev_id *pci_id = &ich_chipsets[0];
struct pci_dev *bridge = NULL;
while (pci_id->vendor != 0) {
bridge = pci_get_device(pci_id->vendor, pci_id->device,
bridge);
if (!bridge) {
pci_id++;
continue;
}
if (pci_id->rev != PCI_ANY_ID) {
if (bridge->revision > pci_id->rev)
continue;
}
if (bridge->subordinate &&
(bridge->subordinate->number ==
tp->pdev->bus->number)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, ICH_WORKAROUND);
pci_dev_put(bridge);
break;
}
}
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5701) {
static struct tg3_dev_id {
u32 vendor;
u32 device;
} bridge_chipsets[] = {
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_PXH_0 },
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_PXH_1 },
{ },
};
struct tg3_dev_id *pci_id = &bridge_chipsets[0];
struct pci_dev *bridge = NULL;
while (pci_id->vendor != 0) {
bridge = pci_get_device(pci_id->vendor,
pci_id->device,
bridge);
if (!bridge) {
pci_id++;
continue;
}
if (bridge->subordinate &&
(bridge->subordinate->number <=
tp->pdev->bus->number) &&
(bridge->subordinate->busn_res.end >=
tp->pdev->bus->number)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, 5701_DMA_BUG);
pci_dev_put(bridge);
break;
}
}
}
/* The EPB bridge inside 5714, 5715, and 5780 cannot support
* DMA addresses > 40-bit. This bridge may have other additional
* 57xx devices behind it in some 4-port NIC designs for example.
* Any tg3 device found behind the bridge will also need the 40-bit
* DMA workaround.
*/
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5780_CLASS)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, 40BIT_DMA_BUG);
tp->msi_cap = pci_find_capability(tp->pdev, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI);
} else {
struct pci_dev *bridge = NULL;
do {
bridge = pci_get_device(PCI_VENDOR_ID_SERVERWORKS,
PCI_DEVICE_ID_SERVERWORKS_EPB,
bridge);
if (bridge && bridge->subordinate &&
(bridge->subordinate->number <=
tp->pdev->bus->number) &&
(bridge->subordinate->busn_res.end >=
tp->pdev->bus->number)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, 40BIT_DMA_BUG);
pci_dev_put(bridge);
break;
}
} while (bridge);
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5704 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5714)
tp->pdev_peer = tg3_find_peer(tp);
/* Determine TSO capabilities */
if (tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5719_A0)
; /* Do nothing. HW bug. */
else if (tg3_flag(tp, 57765_PLUS))
tg3_flag_set(tp, HW_TSO_3);
else if (tg3_flag(tp, 5755_PLUS) ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5906)
tg3_flag_set(tp, HW_TSO_2);
else if (tg3_flag(tp, 5750_PLUS)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, HW_TSO_1);
tg3_flag_set(tp, TSO_BUG);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5750 &&
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) >= CHIPREV_ID_5750_C2)
tg3_flag_clear(tp, TSO_BUG);
} else if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) != ASIC_REV_5700 &&
tg3_asic_rev(tp) != ASIC_REV_5701 &&
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) != CHIPREV_ID_5705_A0) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, TSO_BUG);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5705)
tp->fw_needed = FIRMWARE_TG3TSO5;
else
tp->fw_needed = FIRMWARE_TG3TSO;
}
/* Selectively allow TSO based on operating conditions */
if (tg3_flag(tp, HW_TSO_1) ||
tg3_flag(tp, HW_TSO_2) ||
tg3_flag(tp, HW_TSO_3) ||
tp->fw_needed) {
/* For firmware TSO, assume ASF is disabled.
* We'll disable TSO later if we discover ASF
* is enabled in tg3_get_eeprom_hw_cfg().
*/
tg3_flag_set(tp, TSO_CAPABLE);
} else {
tg3_flag_clear(tp, TSO_CAPABLE);
tg3_flag_clear(tp, TSO_BUG);
tp->fw_needed = NULL;
}
if (tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_A0)
tp->fw_needed = FIRMWARE_TG3;
tp->irq_max = 1;
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5750_PLUS)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, SUPPORT_MSI);
if (tg3_chip_rev(tp) == CHIPREV_5750_AX ||
tg3_chip_rev(tp) == CHIPREV_5750_BX ||
(tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5714 &&
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) <= CHIPREV_ID_5714_A2 &&
tp->pdev_peer == tp->pdev))
tg3_flag_clear(tp, SUPPORT_MSI);
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5755_PLUS) ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5906) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, 1SHOT_MSI);
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, 57765_PLUS)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, SUPPORT_MSIX);
tp->irq_max = TG3_IRQ_MAX_VECS;
}
}
tp->txq_max = 1;
tp->rxq_max = 1;
if (tp->irq_max > 1) {
tp->rxq_max = TG3_RSS_MAX_NUM_QS;
tg3_rss_init_dflt_indir_tbl(tp, TG3_RSS_MAX_NUM_QS);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5719 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5720)
tp->txq_max = tp->irq_max - 1;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5755_PLUS) ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5906)
tg3_flag_set(tp, SHORT_DMA_BUG);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5719)
tp->dma_limit = TG3_TX_BD_DMA_MAX_4K;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5717 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5719 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5720 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5762)
tg3_flag_set(tp, LRG_PROD_RING_CAP);
if (tg3_flag(tp, 57765_PLUS) &&
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) != CHIPREV_ID_5719_A0)
tg3_flag_set(tp, USE_JUMBO_BDFLAG);
if (!tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS) ||
tg3_flag(tp, 5780_CLASS) ||
tg3_flag(tp, USE_JUMBO_BDFLAG))
tg3_flag_set(tp, JUMBO_CAPABLE);
pci_read_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_PCISTATE,
&pci_state_reg);
if (pci_is_pcie(tp->pdev)) {
u16 lnkctl;
tg3_flag_set(tp, PCI_EXPRESS);
pcie_capability_read_word(tp->pdev, PCI_EXP_LNKCTL, &lnkctl);
if (lnkctl & PCI_EXP_LNKCTL_CLKREQ_EN) {
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5906) {
tg3_flag_clear(tp, HW_TSO_2);
tg3_flag_clear(tp, TSO_CAPABLE);
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5784 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5761 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_57780_A0 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_57780_A1)
tg3_flag_set(tp, CLKREQ_BUG);
} else if (tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5717_A0) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, L1PLLPD_EN);
}
} else if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5785) {
/* BCM5785 devices are effectively PCIe devices, and should
* follow PCIe codepaths, but do not have a PCIe capabilities
* section.
*/
tg3_flag_set(tp, PCI_EXPRESS);
} else if (!tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS) ||
tg3_flag(tp, 5780_CLASS)) {
tp->pcix_cap = pci_find_capability(tp->pdev, PCI_CAP_ID_PCIX);
if (!tp->pcix_cap) {
dev_err(&tp->pdev->dev,
"Cannot find PCI-X capability, aborting\n");
return -EIO;
}
if (!(pci_state_reg & PCISTATE_CONV_PCI_MODE))
tg3_flag_set(tp, PCIX_MODE);
}
/* If we have an AMD 762 or VIA K8T800 chipset, write
* reordering to the mailbox registers done by the host
* controller can cause major troubles. We read back from
* every mailbox register write to force the writes to be
* posted to the chip in order.
*/
if (pci_dev_present(tg3_write_reorder_chipsets) &&
!tg3_flag(tp, PCI_EXPRESS))
tg3_flag_set(tp, MBOX_WRITE_REORDER);
pci_read_config_byte(tp->pdev, PCI_CACHE_LINE_SIZE,
&tp->pci_cacheline_sz);
pci_read_config_byte(tp->pdev, PCI_LATENCY_TIMER,
&tp->pci_lat_timer);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5703 &&
tp->pci_lat_timer < 64) {
tp->pci_lat_timer = 64;
pci_write_config_byte(tp->pdev, PCI_LATENCY_TIMER,
tp->pci_lat_timer);
}
/* Important! -- It is critical that the PCI-X hw workaround
* situation is decided before the first MMIO register access.
*/
if (tg3_chip_rev(tp) == CHIPREV_5700_BX) {
/* 5700 BX chips need to have their TX producer index
* mailboxes written twice to workaround a bug.
*/
tg3_flag_set(tp, TXD_MBOX_HWBUG);
/* If we are in PCI-X mode, enable register write workaround.
*
* The workaround is to use indirect register accesses
* for all chip writes not to mailbox registers.
*/
if (tg3_flag(tp, PCIX_MODE)) {
u32 pm_reg;
tg3_flag_set(tp, PCIX_TARGET_HWBUG);
/* The chip can have it's power management PCI config
* space registers clobbered due to this bug.
* So explicitly force the chip into D0 here.
*/
pci_read_config_dword(tp->pdev,
tp->pm_cap + PCI_PM_CTRL,
&pm_reg);
pm_reg &= ~PCI_PM_CTRL_STATE_MASK;
pm_reg |= PCI_PM_CTRL_PME_ENABLE | 0 /* D0 */;
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev,
tp->pm_cap + PCI_PM_CTRL,
pm_reg);
/* Also, force SERR#/PERR# in PCI command. */
pci_read_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, &pci_cmd);
pci_cmd |= PCI_COMMAND_PARITY | PCI_COMMAND_SERR;
pci_write_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, pci_cmd);
}
}
if ((pci_state_reg & PCISTATE_BUS_SPEED_HIGH) != 0)
tg3_flag_set(tp, PCI_HIGH_SPEED);
if ((pci_state_reg & PCISTATE_BUS_32BIT) != 0)
tg3_flag_set(tp, PCI_32BIT);
/* Chip-specific fixup from Broadcom driver */
if ((tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5704_A0) &&
(!(pci_state_reg & PCISTATE_RETRY_SAME_DMA))) {
pci_state_reg |= PCISTATE_RETRY_SAME_DMA;
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_PCISTATE, pci_state_reg);
}
/* Default fast path register access methods */
tp->read32 = tg3_read32;
tp->write32 = tg3_write32;
tp->read32_mbox = tg3_read32;
tp->write32_mbox = tg3_write32;
tp->write32_tx_mbox = tg3_write32;
tp->write32_rx_mbox = tg3_write32;
/* Various workaround register access methods */
if (tg3_flag(tp, PCIX_TARGET_HWBUG))
tp->write32 = tg3_write_indirect_reg32;
else if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5701 ||
(tg3_flag(tp, PCI_EXPRESS) &&
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5750_A0)) {
/*
* Back to back register writes can cause problems on these
* chips, the workaround is to read back all reg writes
* except those to mailbox regs.
*
* See tg3_write_indirect_reg32().
*/
tp->write32 = tg3_write_flush_reg32;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, TXD_MBOX_HWBUG) || tg3_flag(tp, MBOX_WRITE_REORDER)) {
tp->write32_tx_mbox = tg3_write32_tx_mbox;
if (tg3_flag(tp, MBOX_WRITE_REORDER))
tp->write32_rx_mbox = tg3_write_flush_reg32;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, ICH_WORKAROUND)) {
tp->read32 = tg3_read_indirect_reg32;
tp->write32 = tg3_write_indirect_reg32;
tp->read32_mbox = tg3_read_indirect_mbox;
tp->write32_mbox = tg3_write_indirect_mbox;
tp->write32_tx_mbox = tg3_write_indirect_mbox;
tp->write32_rx_mbox = tg3_write_indirect_mbox;
iounmap(tp->regs);
tp->regs = NULL;
pci_read_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, &pci_cmd);
pci_cmd &= ~PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY;
pci_write_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, pci_cmd);
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5906) {
tp->read32_mbox = tg3_read32_mbox_5906;
tp->write32_mbox = tg3_write32_mbox_5906;
tp->write32_tx_mbox = tg3_write32_mbox_5906;
tp->write32_rx_mbox = tg3_write32_mbox_5906;
}
if (tp->write32 == tg3_write_indirect_reg32 ||
(tg3_flag(tp, PCIX_MODE) &&
(tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5700 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5701)))
tg3_flag_set(tp, SRAM_USE_CONFIG);
/* The memory arbiter has to be enabled in order for SRAM accesses
* to succeed. Normally on powerup the tg3 chip firmware will make
* sure it is enabled, but other entities such as system netboot
* code might disable it.
*/
val = tr32(MEMARB_MODE);
tw32(MEMARB_MODE, val | MEMARB_MODE_ENABLE);
tp->pci_fn = PCI_FUNC(tp->pdev->devfn) & 3;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5704 ||
tg3_flag(tp, 5780_CLASS)) {
if (tg3_flag(tp, PCIX_MODE)) {
pci_read_config_dword(tp->pdev,
tp->pcix_cap + PCI_X_STATUS,
&val);
tp->pci_fn = val & 0x7;
}
} else if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5717 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5719 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5720) {
tg3_read_mem(tp, NIC_SRAM_CPMU_STATUS, &val);
if ((val & NIC_SRAM_CPMUSTAT_SIG_MSK) != NIC_SRAM_CPMUSTAT_SIG)
val = tr32(TG3_CPMU_STATUS);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5717)
tp->pci_fn = (val & TG3_CPMU_STATUS_FMSK_5717) ? 1 : 0;
else
tp->pci_fn = (val & TG3_CPMU_STATUS_FMSK_5719) >>
TG3_CPMU_STATUS_FSHFT_5719;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, FLUSH_POSTED_WRITES)) {
tp->write32_tx_mbox = tg3_write_flush_reg32;
tp->write32_rx_mbox = tg3_write_flush_reg32;
}
/* Get eeprom hw config before calling tg3_set_power_state().
* In particular, the TG3_FLAG_IS_NIC flag must be
* determined before calling tg3_set_power_state() so that
* we know whether or not to switch out of Vaux power.
* When the flag is set, it means that GPIO1 is used for eeprom
* write protect and also implies that it is a LOM where GPIOs
* are not used to switch power.
*/
tg3_get_eeprom_hw_cfg(tp);
if (tp->fw_needed && tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_ASF)) {
tg3_flag_clear(tp, TSO_CAPABLE);
tg3_flag_clear(tp, TSO_BUG);
tp->fw_needed = NULL;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_APE)) {
/* Allow reads and writes to the
* APE register and memory space.
*/
pci_state_reg |= PCISTATE_ALLOW_APE_CTLSPC_WR |
PCISTATE_ALLOW_APE_SHMEM_WR |
PCISTATE_ALLOW_APE_PSPACE_WR;
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_PCISTATE,
pci_state_reg);
tg3_ape_lock_init(tp);
}
/* Set up tp->grc_local_ctrl before calling
* tg3_pwrsrc_switch_to_vmain(). GPIO1 driven high
* will bring 5700's external PHY out of reset.
* It is also used as eeprom write protect on LOMs.
*/
tp->grc_local_ctrl = GRC_LCLCTRL_INT_ON_ATTN | GRC_LCLCTRL_AUTO_SEEPROM;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5700 ||
tg3_flag(tp, EEPROM_WRITE_PROT))
tp->grc_local_ctrl |= (GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_OE1 |
GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_OUTPUT1);
/* Unused GPIO3 must be driven as output on 5752 because there
* are no pull-up resistors on unused GPIO pins.
*/
else if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5752)
tp->grc_local_ctrl |= GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_OE3;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5755 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_57780 ||
tg3_flag(tp, 57765_CLASS))
tp->grc_local_ctrl |= GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_UART_SEL;
if (tp->pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_TIGON3_5761 ||
tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_5761S) {
/* Turn off the debug UART. */
tp->grc_local_ctrl |= GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_UART_SEL;
if (tg3_flag(tp, IS_NIC))
/* Keep VMain power. */
tp->grc_local_ctrl |= GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_OE0 |
GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_OUTPUT0;
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5762)
tp->grc_local_ctrl |=
tr32(GRC_LOCAL_CTRL) & GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_UART_SEL;
/* Switch out of Vaux if it is a NIC */
tg3_pwrsrc_switch_to_vmain(tp);
/* Derive initial jumbo mode from MTU assigned in
* ether_setup() via the alloc_etherdev() call
*/
if (tp->dev->mtu > ETH_DATA_LEN && !tg3_flag(tp, 5780_CLASS))
tg3_flag_set(tp, JUMBO_RING_ENABLE);
/* Determine WakeOnLan speed to use. */
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5700 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_A0 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_B0 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_B2) {
tg3_flag_clear(tp, WOL_SPEED_100MB);
} else {
tg3_flag_set(tp, WOL_SPEED_100MB);
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5906)
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_IS_FET;
/* A few boards don't want Ethernet@WireSpeed phy feature */
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5700 ||
(tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5705 &&
(tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) != CHIPREV_ID_5705_A0) &&
(tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) != CHIPREV_ID_5705_A1)) ||
(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_FET) ||
(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_ANY_SERDES))
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_NO_ETH_WIRE_SPEED;
if (tg3_chip_rev(tp) == CHIPREV_5703_AX ||
tg3_chip_rev(tp) == CHIPREV_5704_AX)
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_ADC_BUG;
if (tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5704_A0)
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_5704_A0_BUG;
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS) &&
!(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_FET) &&
tg3_asic_rev(tp) != ASIC_REV_5785 &&
tg3_asic_rev(tp) != ASIC_REV_57780 &&
!tg3_flag(tp, 57765_PLUS)) {
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5755 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5787 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5784 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5761) {
if (tp->pdev->device != PCI_DEVICE_ID_TIGON3_5756 &&
tp->pdev->device != PCI_DEVICE_ID_TIGON3_5722)
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_JITTER_BUG;
if (tp->pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_TIGON3_5755M)
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_ADJUST_TRIM;
} else
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_BER_BUG;
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5784 &&
tg3_chip_rev(tp) != CHIPREV_5784_AX) {
tp->phy_otp = tg3_read_otp_phycfg(tp);
if (tp->phy_otp == 0)
tp->phy_otp = TG3_OTP_DEFAULT;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, CPMU_PRESENT))
tp->mi_mode = MAC_MI_MODE_500KHZ_CONST;
else
tp->mi_mode = MAC_MI_MODE_BASE;
tp->coalesce_mode = 0;
if (tg3_chip_rev(tp) != CHIPREV_5700_AX &&
tg3_chip_rev(tp) != CHIPREV_5700_BX)
tp->coalesce_mode |= HOSTCC_MODE_32BYTE;
/* Set these bits to enable statistics workaround. */
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5717 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5719_A0 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5720_A0) {
tp->coalesce_mode |= HOSTCC_MODE_ATTN;
tp->grc_mode |= GRC_MODE_IRQ_ON_FLOW_ATTN;
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5785 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_57780)
tg3_flag_set(tp, USE_PHYLIB);
err = tg3_mdio_init(tp);
if (err)
return err;
/* Initialize data/descriptor byte/word swapping. */
val = tr32(GRC_MODE);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5720 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5762)
val &= (GRC_MODE_BYTE_SWAP_B2HRX_DATA |
GRC_MODE_WORD_SWAP_B2HRX_DATA |
GRC_MODE_B2HRX_ENABLE |
GRC_MODE_HTX2B_ENABLE |
GRC_MODE_HOST_STACKUP);
else
val &= GRC_MODE_HOST_STACKUP;
tw32(GRC_MODE, val | tp->grc_mode);
tg3_switch_clocks(tp);
/* Clear this out for sanity. */
tw32(TG3PCI_MEM_WIN_BASE_ADDR, 0);
pci_read_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_PCISTATE,
&pci_state_reg);
if ((pci_state_reg & PCISTATE_CONV_PCI_MODE) == 0 &&
!tg3_flag(tp, PCIX_TARGET_HWBUG)) {
if (tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_A0 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_B0 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_B2 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_B5) {
void __iomem *sram_base;
/* Write some dummy words into the SRAM status block
* area, see if it reads back correctly. If the return
* value is bad, force enable the PCIX workaround.
*/
sram_base = tp->regs + NIC_SRAM_WIN_BASE + NIC_SRAM_STATS_BLK;
writel(0x00000000, sram_base);
writel(0x00000000, sram_base + 4);
writel(0xffffffff, sram_base + 4);
if (readl(sram_base) != 0x00000000)
tg3_flag_set(tp, PCIX_TARGET_HWBUG);
}
}
udelay(50);
tg3_nvram_init(tp);
grc_misc_cfg = tr32(GRC_MISC_CFG);
grc_misc_cfg &= GRC_MISC_CFG_BOARD_ID_MASK;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5705 &&
(grc_misc_cfg == GRC_MISC_CFG_BOARD_ID_5788 ||
grc_misc_cfg == GRC_MISC_CFG_BOARD_ID_5788M))
tg3_flag_set(tp, IS_5788);
if (!tg3_flag(tp, IS_5788) &&
tg3_asic_rev(tp) != ASIC_REV_5700)
tg3_flag_set(tp, TAGGED_STATUS);
if (tg3_flag(tp, TAGGED_STATUS)) {
tp->coalesce_mode |= (HOSTCC_MODE_CLRTICK_RXBD |
HOSTCC_MODE_CLRTICK_TXBD);
tp->misc_host_ctrl |= MISC_HOST_CTRL_TAGGED_STATUS;
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_MISC_HOST_CTRL,
tp->misc_host_ctrl);
}
/* Preserve the APE MAC_MODE bits */
if (tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_APE))
tp->mac_mode = MAC_MODE_APE_TX_EN | MAC_MODE_APE_RX_EN;
else
tp->mac_mode = 0;
if (tg3_10_100_only_device(tp, ent))
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_10_100_ONLY;
err = tg3_phy_probe(tp);
if (err) {
dev_err(&tp->pdev->dev, "phy probe failed, err %d\n", err);
/* ... but do not return immediately ... */
tg3_mdio_fini(tp);
}
tg3_read_vpd(tp);
tg3_read_fw_ver(tp);
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_PHY_SERDES) {
tp->phy_flags &= ~TG3_PHYFLG_USE_MI_INTERRUPT;
} else {
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5700)
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_USE_MI_INTERRUPT;
else
tp->phy_flags &= ~TG3_PHYFLG_USE_MI_INTERRUPT;
}
/* 5700 {AX,BX} chips have a broken status block link
* change bit implementation, so we must use the
* status register in those cases.
*/
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5700)
tg3_flag_set(tp, USE_LINKCHG_REG);
else
tg3_flag_clear(tp, USE_LINKCHG_REG);
/* The led_ctrl is set during tg3_phy_probe, here we might
* have to force the link status polling mechanism based
* upon subsystem IDs.
*/
if (tp->pdev->subsystem_vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_DELL &&
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5701 &&
!(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_PHY_SERDES)) {
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_USE_MI_INTERRUPT;
tg3_flag_set(tp, USE_LINKCHG_REG);
}
/* For all SERDES we poll the MAC status register. */
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_PHY_SERDES)
tg3_flag_set(tp, POLL_SERDES);
else
tg3_flag_clear(tp, POLL_SERDES);
tp->rx_offset = NET_SKB_PAD + NET_IP_ALIGN;
tp->rx_copy_thresh = TG3_RX_COPY_THRESHOLD;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5701 &&
tg3_flag(tp, PCIX_MODE)) {
tp->rx_offset = NET_SKB_PAD;
#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
tp->rx_copy_thresh = ~(u16)0;
#endif
}
tp->rx_std_ring_mask = TG3_RX_STD_RING_SIZE(tp) - 1;
tp->rx_jmb_ring_mask = TG3_RX_JMB_RING_SIZE(tp) - 1;
tp->rx_ret_ring_mask = tg3_rx_ret_ring_size(tp) - 1;
tp->rx_std_max_post = tp->rx_std_ring_mask + 1;
/* Increment the rx prod index on the rx std ring by at most
* 8 for these chips to workaround hw errata.
*/
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5750 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5752 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5755)
tp->rx_std_max_post = 8;
if (tg3_flag(tp, ASPM_WORKAROUND))
tp->pwrmgmt_thresh = tr32(PCIE_PWR_MGMT_THRESH) &
PCIE_PWR_MGMT_L1_THRESH_MSK;
return err;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PrintPreviewDialogController::PrintPreviewDialogController()
: waiting_for_new_preview_page_(false),
is_creating_print_preview_dialog_(false) {
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 19,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::RenderbufferStorageImpl(
GLenum target,
GLsizei samples,
GLenum internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
const char* function_name) {
DCHECK(!samples); // |samples| > 0 is only valid in WebGL2's
DCHECK(!IsWebGL2OrHigher()); // Make sure this is overridden in WebGL 2.
switch (internalformat) {
case GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT16:
case GL_RGBA4:
case GL_RGB5_A1:
case GL_RGB565:
case GL_STENCIL_INDEX8:
ContextGL()->RenderbufferStorage(target, internalformat, width, height);
renderbuffer_binding_->SetInternalFormat(internalformat);
renderbuffer_binding_->SetSize(width, height);
break;
case GL_SRGB8_ALPHA8_EXT:
if (!ExtensionEnabled(kEXTsRGBName)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name, "sRGB not enabled");
break;
}
ContextGL()->RenderbufferStorage(target, internalformat, width, height);
renderbuffer_binding_->SetInternalFormat(internalformat);
renderbuffer_binding_->SetSize(width, height);
break;
case GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_OES:
DCHECK(IsDepthStencilSupported());
ContextGL()->RenderbufferStorage(target, GL_DEPTH24_STENCIL8_OES, width,
height);
renderbuffer_binding_->SetSize(width, height);
renderbuffer_binding_->SetInternalFormat(internalformat);
break;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name,
"invalid internalformat");
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: test_bson_copy (void)
{
bson_t b;
bson_t *c;
bson_init (&b);
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_int32 (&b, "foobar", -1, 1234));
c = bson_copy (&b);
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL (&b, c);
bson_destroy (c);
bson_destroy (&b);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 48 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int g_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
unsigned long *ptr = v;
if (!ptr)
return 0;
if (ptr == (unsigned long *)1) {
seq_printf(m, "#### all functions enabled ####\n");
return 0;
}
seq_printf(m, "%ps\n", (void *)*ptr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_rdtsc(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u64 cr4 = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4);
if (cr4 & X86_CR4_TSD && ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt))
return emulate_ud(ctxt);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zsettransfer(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
int code;
check_proc(*op);
check_ostack(zcolor_remap_one_ostack - 1);
check_estack(1 + zcolor_remap_one_estack);
istate->transfer_procs.red =
istate->transfer_procs.green =
istate->transfer_procs.blue =
istate->transfer_procs.gray = *op;
if ((code = gs_settransfer_remap(igs, gs_mapped_transfer, false)) < 0)
return code;
push_op_estack(zcolor_reset_transfer);
pop(1);
return zcolor_remap_one( i_ctx_p,
&istate->transfer_procs.gray,
igs->set_transfer.gray,
igs,
zcolor_remap_one_finish );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 20,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int aio_set_page_dirty(struct page *page)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: aio: fix kernel memory disclosure in io_getevents() introduced in v3.10
A kernel memory disclosure was introduced in aio_read_events_ring() in v3.10
by commit a31ad380bed817aa25f8830ad23e1a0480fef797. The changes made to
aio_read_events_ring() failed to correctly limit the index into
ctx->ring_pages[], allowing an attacked to cause the subsequent kmap() of
an arbitrary page with a copy_to_user() to copy the contents into userspace.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2014-0206. Thanks to Mateusz and
Petr for disclosing this issue.
This patch applies to v3.12+. A separate backport is needed for 3.10/3.11.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct MACH0_(obj_t)* MACH0_(mach0_new)(const char* file, bool verbose) {
ut8 *buf;
struct MACH0_(obj_t) *bin;
if (!(bin = malloc (sizeof (struct MACH0_(obj_t))))) {
return NULL;
}
memset (bin, 0, sizeof (struct MACH0_(obj_t)));
bin->verbose = verbose;
bin->file = file;
if (!(buf = (ut8*)r_file_slurp(file, &bin->size)))
return MACH0_(mach0_free)(bin);
bin->b = r_buf_new ();
if (!r_buf_set_bytes(bin->b, buf, bin->size)) {
free (buf);
return MACH0_(mach0_free)(bin);
}
free (buf);
bin->dyld_info = NULL;
if (!init(bin)) {
return MACH0_(mach0_free)(bin);
}
bin->imports_by_ord_size = 0;
bin->imports_by_ord = NULL;
return bin;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 10,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static USBEndpoint *xhci_epid_to_usbep(XHCIEPContext *epctx)
{
USBPort *uport;
uint32_t token;
if (!epctx) {
return NULL;
}
uport = epctx->xhci->slots[epctx->slotid - 1].uport;
token = (epctx->epid & 1) ? USB_TOKEN_IN : USB_TOKEN_OUT;
if (!uport) {
return NULL;
}
return usb_ep_get(uport->dev, token, epctx->epid >> 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 27,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PassRefPtr<CSSValue> createLineBoxContainValue(unsigned lineBoxContain)
{
if (!lineBoxContain)
return cssValuePool().createIdentifierValue(CSSValueNone);
return CSSLineBoxContainValue::create(lineBoxContain);
}
Commit Message: Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void intel_fixup_er(struct perf_event *event, int idx)
{
event->hw.extra_reg.idx = idx;
if (idx == EXTRA_REG_RSP_0) {
event->hw.config &= ~INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK;
event->hw.config |= 0x01b7;
event->hw.extra_reg.reg = MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_0;
} else if (idx == EXTRA_REG_RSP_1) {
event->hw.config &= ~INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK;
event->hw.config |= 0x01bb;
event->hw.extra_reg.reg = MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_1;
}
}
Commit Message: perf/x86: Fix offcore_rsp valid mask for SNB/IVB
The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.
This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.
A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.
This version of the patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jolsa@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int llc_ui_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int addrlen, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_llc *addr = (struct sockaddr_llc *)uaddr;
int rc = -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(addrlen != sizeof(*addr)))
goto out;
rc = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (unlikely(addr->sllc_family != AF_LLC))
goto out;
if (unlikely(sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM))
goto out;
rc = -EALREADY;
if (unlikely(sock->state == SS_CONNECTING))
goto out;
/* bind connection to sap if user hasn't done it. */
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)) {
/* bind to sap with null dev, exclusive */
rc = llc_ui_autobind(sock, addr);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
llc->daddr.lsap = addr->sllc_sap;
memcpy(llc->daddr.mac, addr->sllc_mac, IFHWADDRLEN);
sock->state = SS_CONNECTING;
sk->sk_state = TCP_SYN_SENT;
llc->link = llc_ui_next_link_no(llc->sap->laddr.lsap);
rc = llc_establish_connection(sk, llc->dev->dev_addr,
addr->sllc_mac, addr->sllc_sap);
if (rc) {
dprintk("%s: llc_ui_send_conn failed :-(\n", __func__);
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
goto out;
}
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_SENT) {
const long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & O_NONBLOCK);
if (!timeo || !llc_ui_wait_for_conn(sk, timeo))
goto out;
rc = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
if (signal_pending(current))
goto out;
}
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE)
goto sock_error;
sock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
rc = 0;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return rc;
sock_error:
rc = sock_error(sk) ? : -ECONNABORTED;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: llc: Fix missing msg_namelen update in llc_ui_recvmsg()
For stream sockets the code misses to update the msg_namelen member
to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized
sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack
memory. The msg_namelen update is also missing for datagram sockets
in case the socket is shutting down during receive.
Fix both issues by setting msg_namelen to 0 early. It will be
updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 8,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::TabDetachedAt(WebContents* contents, int index, bool was_active) {
if (!tab_strip_model_->closing_all()) {
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfileIfExisting(profile_);
if (session_service) {
session_service->SetSelectedTabInWindow(session_id(),
tab_strip_model_->active_index());
}
}
TabDetachedAtImpl(contents, was_active, DETACH_TYPE_DETACH);
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int reuc_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const git_index_reuc_entry *info_a = a;
const git_index_reuc_entry *info_b = b;
return strcmp(info_a->path, info_b->path);
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 17,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Texture::AllocateStorage(const gfx::Size& size, GLenum format) {
DCHECK_NE(id_, 0u);
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(decoder_);
ScopedTexture2DBinder binder(decoder_, id_);
glTexImage2D(GL_TEXTURE_2D,
0, // mip level
format,
size.width(),
size.height(),
0, // border
format,
GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE,
NULL);
size_ = size;
return glGetError() == GL_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AuthenticatorBleEnterPairingModeSheetModel::GetStepIllustration(
ImageColorScheme color_scheme) const {
return color_scheme == ImageColorScheme::kDark ? kWebauthnBleDarkIcon
: kWebauthnBleIcon;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int keyring_restrict(key_ref_t keyring_ref, const char *type,
const char *restriction)
{
struct key *keyring;
struct key_type *restrict_type = NULL;
struct key_restriction *restrict_link;
int ret = 0;
keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
key_check(keyring);
if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
return -ENOTDIR;
if (!type) {
restrict_link = keyring_restriction_alloc(restrict_link_reject);
} else {
restrict_type = key_type_lookup(type);
if (IS_ERR(restrict_type))
return PTR_ERR(restrict_type);
if (!restrict_type->lookup_restriction) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto error;
}
restrict_link = restrict_type->lookup_restriction(restriction);
}
if (IS_ERR(restrict_link)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(restrict_link);
goto error;
}
down_write(&keyring->sem);
down_write(&keyring_serialise_restrict_sem);
if (keyring->restrict_link)
ret = -EEXIST;
else if (keyring_detect_restriction_cycle(keyring, restrict_link))
ret = -EDEADLK;
else
keyring->restrict_link = restrict_link;
up_write(&keyring_serialise_restrict_sem);
up_write(&keyring->sem);
if (ret < 0) {
key_put(restrict_link->key);
kfree(restrict_link);
}
error:
if (restrict_type)
key_type_put(restrict_type);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XMLHttpRequest::State XMLHttpRequest::readyState() const
{
return m_state;
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int write_exit_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
void *val, int bytes)
{
struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[0];
memcpy(vcpu->run->mmio.data, frag->data, min(8u, frag->len));
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int airo_get_nick(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
struct iw_point *dwrq,
char *extra)
{
struct airo_info *local = dev->ml_priv;
readConfigRid(local, 1);
strncpy(extra, local->config.nodeName, 16);
extra[16] = '\0';
dwrq->length = strlen(extra);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::forwardInputEvent(const blink::WebInputEvent* event) {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_ForwardInputEvent(routing_id_, event));
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_always_inline void backup_mb_border(H264Context *h, uint8_t *src_y,
uint8_t *src_cb, uint8_t *src_cr,
int linesize, int uvlinesize,
int simple)
{
uint8_t *top_border;
int top_idx = 1;
const int pixel_shift = h->pixel_shift;
int chroma444 = CHROMA444(h);
int chroma422 = CHROMA422(h);
src_y -= linesize;
src_cb -= uvlinesize;
src_cr -= uvlinesize;
if (!simple && FRAME_MBAFF(h)) {
if (h->mb_y & 1) {
if (!MB_MBAFF(h)) {
top_border = h->top_borders[0][h->mb_x];
AV_COPY128(top_border, src_y + 15 * linesize);
if (pixel_shift)
AV_COPY128(top_border + 16, src_y + 15 * linesize + 16);
if (simple || !CONFIG_GRAY || !(h->flags & CODEC_FLAG_GRAY)) {
if (chroma444) {
if (pixel_shift) {
AV_COPY128(top_border + 32, src_cb + 15 * uvlinesize);
AV_COPY128(top_border + 48, src_cb + 15 * uvlinesize + 16);
AV_COPY128(top_border + 64, src_cr + 15 * uvlinesize);
AV_COPY128(top_border + 80, src_cr + 15 * uvlinesize + 16);
} else {
AV_COPY128(top_border + 16, src_cb + 15 * uvlinesize);
AV_COPY128(top_border + 32, src_cr + 15 * uvlinesize);
}
} else if (chroma422) {
if (pixel_shift) {
AV_COPY128(top_border + 32, src_cb + 15 * uvlinesize);
AV_COPY128(top_border + 48, src_cr + 15 * uvlinesize);
} else {
AV_COPY64(top_border + 16, src_cb + 15 * uvlinesize);
AV_COPY64(top_border + 24, src_cr + 15 * uvlinesize);
}
} else {
if (pixel_shift) {
AV_COPY128(top_border + 32, src_cb + 7 * uvlinesize);
AV_COPY128(top_border + 48, src_cr + 7 * uvlinesize);
} else {
AV_COPY64(top_border + 16, src_cb + 7 * uvlinesize);
AV_COPY64(top_border + 24, src_cr + 7 * uvlinesize);
}
}
}
}
} else if (MB_MBAFF(h)) {
top_idx = 0;
} else
return;
}
top_border = h->top_borders[top_idx][h->mb_x];
/* There are two lines saved, the line above the top macroblock
* of a pair, and the line above the bottom macroblock. */
AV_COPY128(top_border, src_y + 16 * linesize);
if (pixel_shift)
AV_COPY128(top_border + 16, src_y + 16 * linesize + 16);
if (simple || !CONFIG_GRAY || !(h->flags & CODEC_FLAG_GRAY)) {
if (chroma444) {
if (pixel_shift) {
AV_COPY128(top_border + 32, src_cb + 16 * linesize);
AV_COPY128(top_border + 48, src_cb + 16 * linesize + 16);
AV_COPY128(top_border + 64, src_cr + 16 * linesize);
AV_COPY128(top_border + 80, src_cr + 16 * linesize + 16);
} else {
AV_COPY128(top_border + 16, src_cb + 16 * linesize);
AV_COPY128(top_border + 32, src_cr + 16 * linesize);
}
} else if (chroma422) {
if (pixel_shift) {
AV_COPY128(top_border + 32, src_cb + 16 * uvlinesize);
AV_COPY128(top_border + 48, src_cr + 16 * uvlinesize);
} else {
AV_COPY64(top_border + 16, src_cb + 16 * uvlinesize);
AV_COPY64(top_border + 24, src_cr + 16 * uvlinesize);
}
} else {
if (pixel_shift) {
AV_COPY128(top_border + 32, src_cb + 8 * uvlinesize);
AV_COPY128(top_border + 48, src_cr + 8 * uvlinesize);
} else {
AV_COPY64(top_border + 16, src_cb + 8 * uvlinesize);
AV_COPY64(top_border + 24, src_cr + 8 * uvlinesize);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void get_counters(const struct ebt_counter *oldcounters,
struct ebt_counter *counters, unsigned int nentries)
{
int i, cpu;
struct ebt_counter *counter_base;
/* counters of cpu 0 */
memcpy(counters, oldcounters,
sizeof(struct ebt_counter) * nentries);
/* add other counters to those of cpu 0 */
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
if (cpu == 0)
continue;
counter_base = COUNTER_BASE(oldcounters, nentries, cpu);
for (i = 0; i < nentries; i++) {
counters[i].pcnt += counter_base[i].pcnt;
counters[i].bcnt += counter_base[i].bcnt;
}
}
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets
We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.
The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.
Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.
Reported-by: <syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 6,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rdpUpdate* update_new(rdpRdp* rdp)
{
const wObject cb = { NULL, NULL, NULL, update_free_queued_message, NULL };
rdpUpdate* update;
OFFSCREEN_DELETE_LIST* deleteList;
update = (rdpUpdate*) calloc(1, sizeof(rdpUpdate));
if (!update)
return NULL;
update->log = WLog_Get("com.freerdp.core.update");
update->pointer = (rdpPointerUpdate*) calloc(1, sizeof(rdpPointerUpdate));
if (!update->pointer)
goto fail;
update->primary = (rdpPrimaryUpdate*) calloc(1, sizeof(rdpPrimaryUpdate));
if (!update->primary)
goto fail;
update->secondary = (rdpSecondaryUpdate*) calloc(1, sizeof(rdpSecondaryUpdate));
if (!update->secondary)
goto fail;
update->altsec = (rdpAltSecUpdate*) calloc(1, sizeof(rdpAltSecUpdate));
if (!update->altsec)
goto fail;
update->window = (rdpWindowUpdate*) calloc(1, sizeof(rdpWindowUpdate));
if (!update->window)
goto fail;
deleteList = &(update->altsec->create_offscreen_bitmap.deleteList);
deleteList->sIndices = 64;
deleteList->indices = calloc(deleteList->sIndices, 2);
if (!deleteList->indices)
goto fail;
deleteList->cIndices = 0;
update->SuppressOutput = update_send_suppress_output;
update->initialState = TRUE;
update->queue = MessageQueue_New(&cb);
if (!update->queue)
goto fail;
return update;
fail:
update_free(update);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_dops_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
avio_wb32(pb, 0);
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "dOps");
avio_w8(pb, 0); /* Version */
if (track->par->extradata_size < 19) {
av_log(pb, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid extradata size\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* extradata contains an Ogg OpusHead, other than byte-ordering and
OpusHead's preceeding magic/version, OpusSpecificBox is currently
identical. */
avio_w8(pb, AV_RB8(track->par->extradata + 9)); /* OuputChannelCount */
avio_wb16(pb, AV_RL16(track->par->extradata + 10)); /* PreSkip */
avio_wb32(pb, AV_RL32(track->par->extradata + 12)); /* InputSampleRate */
avio_wb16(pb, AV_RL16(track->par->extradata + 16)); /* OutputGain */
/* Write the rest of the header out without byte-swapping. */
avio_write(pb, track->par->extradata + 18, track->par->extradata_size - 18);
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 12,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::processArguments(const String& features, void* data, ArgumentsCallback callback)
{
int keyBegin, keyEnd;
int valueBegin, valueEnd;
int i = 0;
int length = features.length();
String buffer = features.lower();
while (i < length) {
while (isSeparator(buffer[i])) {
if (i >= length)
break;
i++;
}
keyBegin = i;
while (!isSeparator(buffer[i]))
i++;
keyEnd = i;
while (buffer[i] != '=') {
if (buffer[i] == ',' || i >= length)
break;
i++;
}
while (isSeparator(buffer[i])) {
if (buffer[i] == ',' || i >= length)
break;
i++;
}
valueBegin = i;
while (!isSeparator(buffer[i]))
i++;
valueEnd = i;
ASSERT_WITH_SECURITY_IMPLICATION(i <= length);
String keyString = buffer.substring(keyBegin, keyEnd - keyBegin);
String valueString = buffer.substring(valueBegin, valueEnd - valueBegin);
callback(keyString, valueString, this, data);
}
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 24,043 |
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