instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: loff_t ext4_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_mapping->host;
loff_t maxbytes;
if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)))
maxbytes = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_bitmap_maxbytes;
else
maxbytes = inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes;
switch (whence) {
case SEEK_SET:
case SEEK_CUR:
case SEEK_END:
return generic_file_llseek_size(file, offset, whence,
maxbytes, i_size_read(inode));
case SEEK_DATA:
return ext4_seek_data(file, offset, maxbytes);
case SEEK_HOLE:
return ext4_seek_hole(file, offset, maxbytes);
}
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TopSitesCache::GetPageThumbnail(
const GURL& url,
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedMemory>* bytes) const {
std::map<GURL, Images>::const_iterator found =
images_.find(GetCanonicalURL(url));
if (found != images_.end()) {
base::RefCountedMemory* data = found->second.thumbnail.get();
if (data) {
*bytes = data;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 1,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dirent *handle_readdir(FsContext *ctx, V9fsFidOpenState *fs)
{
return readdir(fs->dir.stream);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 15,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPICE_GNUC_VISIBLE int spice_server_set_image_compression(SpiceServer *s,
spice_image_compression_t comp)
{
spice_assert(reds == s);
set_image_compression(comp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int srpt_ch_list_empty(struct srpt_device *sdev)
{
int res;
spin_lock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
res = list_empty(&sdev->rch_list);
spin_unlock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
return res;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 19,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Box *tfdt_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_TFBaseMediaDecodeTimeBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TFDT);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 6,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::HasPendingActivity() const {
if (should_delay_load_event_)
return true;
if (network_state_ == kNetworkLoading)
return true;
{
AutoReset<bool> scope(&official_playback_position_needs_update_, false);
if (CouldPlayIfEnoughData())
return true;
}
if (seeking_)
return true;
if (media_source_)
return true;
if (async_event_queue_->HasPendingEvents())
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 5,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ComputeEndPoints(const DDSSingleColourLookup *lookup[],
const unsigned char *color, DDSVector3 *start, DDSVector3 *end,
unsigned char *index)
{
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
c,
maxError = SIZE_MAX;
for (i=0; i < 2; i++)
{
const DDSSourceBlock*
sources[3];
size_t
error = 0;
for (c=0; c < 3; c++)
{
sources[c] = &lookup[c][color[c]].sources[i];
error += ((size_t) sources[c]->error) * ((size_t) sources[c]->error);
}
if (error > maxError)
continue;
start->x = (float) sources[0]->start / 31.0f;
start->y = (float) sources[1]->start / 63.0f;
start->z = (float) sources[2]->start / 31.0f;
end->x = (float) sources[0]->end / 31.0f;
end->y = (float) sources[1]->end / 63.0f;
end->z = (float) sources[2]->end / 31.0f;
*index = (unsigned char) (2*i);
maxError = error;
}
}
Commit Message: Added check to prevent image being 0x0 (reported in #489).
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xenvif_get_sset_count(struct net_device *dev, int string_set)
{
switch (string_set) {
case ETH_SS_STATS:
return ARRAY_SIZE(xenvif_stats);
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: shutdown the ring if it contains garbage.
A buggy or malicious frontend should not be able to confuse netback.
If we spot anything which is not as it should be then shutdown the
device and don't try to continue with the ring in a potentially
hostile state. Well behaved and non-hostile frontends will not be
penalised.
As well as making the existing checks for such errors fatal also add a
new check that ensures that there isn't an insane number of requests
on the ring (i.e. more than would fit in the ring). If the ring
contains garbage then previously is was possible to loop over this
insane number, getting an error each time and therefore not generating
any more pending requests and therefore not exiting the loop in
xen_netbk_tx_build_gops for an externded period.
Also turn various netdev_dbg calls which no precipitate a fatal error
into netdev_err, they are rate limited because the device is shutdown
afterwards.
This fixes at least one known DoS/softlockup of the backend domain.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct posix_acl *gfs2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(inode);
struct gfs2_holder gh;
bool need_unlock = false;
struct posix_acl *acl;
if (!gfs2_glock_is_locked_by_me(ip->i_gl)) {
int ret = gfs2_glock_nq_init(ip->i_gl, LM_ST_SHARED,
LM_FLAG_ANY, &gh);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
need_unlock = true;
}
acl = __gfs2_get_acl(inode, type);
if (need_unlock)
gfs2_glock_dq_uninit(&gh);
return acl;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 13,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int php_stream_memory_seek(php_stream *stream, off_t offset, int whence, off_t *newoffs TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_memory_data *ms = (php_stream_memory_data*)stream->abstract;
assert(ms != NULL);
switch(whence) {
case SEEK_CUR:
if (offset < 0) {
if (ms->fpos < (size_t)(-offset)) {
ms->fpos = 0;
*newoffs = -1;
return -1;
} else {
ms->fpos = ms->fpos + offset;
*newoffs = ms->fpos;
stream->eof = 0;
return 0;
}
} else {
if (ms->fpos + (size_t)(offset) > ms->fsize) {
ms->fpos = ms->fsize;
*newoffs = -1;
return -1;
} else {
ms->fpos = ms->fpos + offset;
*newoffs = ms->fpos;
stream->eof = 0;
return 0;
}
}
case SEEK_SET:
if (ms->fsize < (size_t)(offset)) {
ms->fpos = ms->fsize;
*newoffs = -1;
return -1;
} else {
ms->fpos = offset;
*newoffs = ms->fpos;
stream->eof = 0;
return 0;
}
case SEEK_END:
if (offset > 0) {
ms->fpos = ms->fsize;
*newoffs = -1;
return -1;
} else if (ms->fsize < (size_t)(-offset)) {
ms->fpos = 0;
*newoffs = -1;
return -1;
} else {
ms->fpos = ms->fsize + offset;
*newoffs = ms->fpos;
stream->eof = 0;
return 0;
}
default:
*newoffs = ms->fpos;
return -1;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int len, r, ms_remain;
fd_set *setp;
char buf[8192];
struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
if (setp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/*
* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have
* been sent.
*/
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
for (;;) {
/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
if (r != 0)
break;
if (!compat20 && (
*typep == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS
|| *typep == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE
|| *typep == SSH_CMSG_EOF
|| *typep == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION))
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
break;
/* If we got a packet, return it. */
if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
break;
/*
* Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
* buffer, and try again.
*/
memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
FD_SET(state->connection_in, setp);
if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
timeoutp = &timeout;
}
/* Wait for some data to arrive. */
for (;;) {
if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
}
if ((r = select(state->connection_in + 1, setp,
NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
break;
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
break;
if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
continue;
ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
if (ms_remain <= 0) {
r = 0;
break;
}
}
if (r == 0)
return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
/* Read data from the socket. */
len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
goto out;
}
if (len < 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* Append it to the buffer. */
if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
out:
free(setp);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 11,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sock_kfree_s(struct sock *sk, void *mem, int size)
{
kfree(mem);
atomic_sub(size, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void handle_rc_disconnect (tBTA_AV_RC_CLOSE *p_rc_close)
{
#if (AVRC_CTLR_INCLUDED == TRUE)
bt_bdaddr_t rc_addr;
tBTA_AV_FEAT features;
#endif
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: rc_handle: %d", __FUNCTION__, p_rc_close->rc_handle);
if ((p_rc_close->rc_handle != btif_rc_cb.rc_handle)
&& (bdcmp(btif_rc_cb.rc_addr, p_rc_close->peer_addr)))
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("Got disconnect of unknown device");
return;
}
btif_rc_cb.rc_handle = 0;
btif_rc_cb.rc_connected = FALSE;
memset(btif_rc_cb.rc_addr, 0, sizeof(BD_ADDR));
memset(btif_rc_cb.rc_notif, 0, sizeof(btif_rc_cb.rc_notif));
#if (AVRC_CTLR_INCLUDED == TRUE)
features = btif_rc_cb.rc_features;
#endif
btif_rc_cb.rc_features = 0;
btif_rc_cb.rc_vol_label=MAX_LABEL;
btif_rc_cb.rc_volume=MAX_VOLUME;
init_all_transactions();
close_uinput();
#if (AVRC_CTLR_INCLUDED == TRUE)
bdcpy(rc_addr.address, btif_rc_cb.rc_addr);
#endif
memset(btif_rc_cb.rc_addr, 0, sizeof(BD_ADDR));
#if (AVRC_CTLR_INCLUDED == TRUE)
/* report connection state if device is AVRCP target */
if (features & BTA_AV_FEAT_RCTG) {
if (bt_rc_ctrl_callbacks != NULL) {
HAL_CBACK(bt_rc_ctrl_callbacks, connection_state_cb, FALSE, &rc_addr);
}
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 4,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType IsITUFaxImage(const Image *image)
{
const StringInfo
*profile;
const unsigned char
*datum;
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"8bim");
if (profile == (const StringInfo *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
if (GetStringInfoLength(profile) < 5)
return(MagickFalse);
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
if ((datum[0] == 0x47) && (datum[1] == 0x33) && (datum[2] == 0x46) &&
(datum[3] == 0x41) && (datum[4] == 0x58))
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: slot_show(struct md_rdev *rdev, char *page)
{
if (rdev->raid_disk < 0)
return sprintf(page, "none\n");
else
return sprintf(page, "%d\n", rdev->raid_disk);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HB_Error Load_ValueRecord( HB_ValueRecord* vr,
HB_UShort format,
HB_UInt base_offset,
HB_Stream stream )
{
HB_Error error;
HB_UInt cur_offset, new_offset;
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_X_PLACEMENT )
{
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
return error;
vr->XPlacement = GET_Short();
FORGET_Frame();
}
else
vr->XPlacement = 0;
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_Y_PLACEMENT )
{
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
return error;
vr->YPlacement = GET_Short();
FORGET_Frame();
}
else
vr->YPlacement = 0;
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_X_ADVANCE )
{
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
return error;
vr->XAdvance = GET_Short();
FORGET_Frame();
}
else
vr->XAdvance = 0;
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_Y_ADVANCE )
{
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
return error;
vr->YAdvance = GET_Short();
FORGET_Frame();
}
else
vr->YAdvance = 0;
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_DEVICE_TABLES )
{
if ( ALLOC_ARRAY( vr->DeviceTables, 4, HB_Device ) )
return error;
vr->DeviceTables[VR_X_ADVANCE_DEVICE] = 0;
vr->DeviceTables[VR_Y_ADVANCE_DEVICE] = 0;
vr->DeviceTables[VR_X_PLACEMENT_DEVICE] = 0;
vr->DeviceTables[VR_Y_PLACEMENT_DEVICE] = 0;
}
else
{
vr->DeviceTables = 0;
}
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_X_PLACEMENT_DEVICE )
{
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
goto Fail4;
new_offset = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
if ( new_offset )
{
new_offset += base_offset;
cur_offset = FILE_Pos();
if ( FILE_Seek( new_offset ) ||
( error = _HB_OPEN_Load_Device( &vr->DeviceTables[VR_X_PLACEMENT_DEVICE],
stream ) ) != HB_Err_Ok )
goto Fail4;
(void)FILE_Seek( cur_offset );
}
}
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_Y_PLACEMENT_DEVICE )
{
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
goto Fail3;
new_offset = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
if ( new_offset )
{
new_offset += base_offset;
cur_offset = FILE_Pos();
if ( FILE_Seek( new_offset ) ||
( error = _HB_OPEN_Load_Device( &vr->DeviceTables[VR_Y_PLACEMENT_DEVICE],
stream ) ) != HB_Err_Ok )
goto Fail3;
(void)FILE_Seek( cur_offset );
}
}
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_X_ADVANCE_DEVICE )
{
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
goto Fail2;
new_offset = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
if ( new_offset )
{
new_offset += base_offset;
cur_offset = FILE_Pos();
if ( FILE_Seek( new_offset ) ||
( error = _HB_OPEN_Load_Device( &vr->DeviceTables[VR_X_ADVANCE_DEVICE],
stream ) ) != HB_Err_Ok )
goto Fail2;
(void)FILE_Seek( cur_offset );
}
}
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_Y_ADVANCE_DEVICE )
{
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
goto Fail1;
new_offset = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
if ( new_offset )
{
new_offset += base_offset;
cur_offset = FILE_Pos();
if ( FILE_Seek( new_offset ) ||
( error = _HB_OPEN_Load_Device( &vr->DeviceTables[VR_Y_ADVANCE_DEVICE],
stream ) ) != HB_Err_Ok )
goto Fail1;
(void)FILE_Seek( cur_offset );
}
}
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_X_ID_PLACEMENT )
{
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
goto Fail1;
#ifdef HB_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_MASTER
vr->XIdPlacement = GET_UShort();
#else
(void) GET_UShort();
#endif
FORGET_Frame();
}
#ifdef HB_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_MASTER
else
vr->XIdPlacement = 0;
#endif
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_Y_ID_PLACEMENT )
{
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
goto Fail1;
#ifdef HB_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_MASTER
vr->YIdPlacement = GET_UShort();
#else
(void) GET_UShort();
#endif
FORGET_Frame();
}
#ifdef HB_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_MASTER
else
vr->YIdPlacement = 0;
#endif
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_X_ID_ADVANCE )
{
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
goto Fail1;
#ifdef HB_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_MASTER
vr->XIdAdvance = GET_UShort();
#else
(void) GET_UShort();
#endif
FORGET_Frame();
}
#ifdef HB_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_MASTER
else
vr->XIdAdvance = 0;
#endif
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_Y_ID_ADVANCE )
{
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
goto Fail1;
#ifdef HB_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_MASTER
vr->YIdAdvance = GET_UShort();
#else
(void) GET_UShort();
#endif
FORGET_Frame();
}
#ifdef HB_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_MASTER
else
vr->YIdAdvance = 0;
#endif
return HB_Err_Ok;
Fail1:
if ( vr->DeviceTables )
_HB_OPEN_Free_Device( vr->DeviceTables[VR_Y_ADVANCE_DEVICE] );
Fail2:
if ( vr->DeviceTables )
_HB_OPEN_Free_Device( vr->DeviceTables[VR_X_ADVANCE_DEVICE] );
Fail3:
if ( vr->DeviceTables )
_HB_OPEN_Free_Device( vr->DeviceTables[VR_Y_PLACEMENT_DEVICE] );
Fail4:
FREE( vr->DeviceTables );
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TabsRemoveFunction::RemoveTab(int tab_id, std::string* error) {
Browser* browser = NULL;
WebContents* contents = NULL;
if (!GetTabById(tab_id, browser_context(), include_incognito_information(),
&browser, nullptr, &contents, nullptr, error)) {
return false;
}
if (!browser->window()->IsTabStripEditable()) {
*error = tabs_constants::kTabStripNotEditableError;
return false;
}
contents->Close();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~SelfDeletingDelegate() {}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 16,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentThreadableLoader::setSerializedCachedMetadata(Resource*, const char* data, size_t size)
{
if (!m_actualRequest.isNull())
return;
m_client->didReceiveCachedMetadata(data, size);
}
Commit Message: DocumentThreadableLoader: Add guards for sync notifyFinished() in setResource()
In loadRequest(), setResource() can call clear() synchronously:
DocumentThreadableLoader::clear()
DocumentThreadableLoader::handleError()
Resource::didAddClient()
RawResource::didAddClient()
and thus |m_client| can be null while resource() isn't null after setResource(),
causing crashes (Issue 595964).
This CL checks whether |*this| is destructed and
whether |m_client| is null after setResource().
BUG=595964
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1902683002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391001}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 5,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_get_valueretrieval)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_LONG(SNMP_G(valueretrieval));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 29,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BrowserContextDestroyer::BrowserContextDestroyer(
BrowserContext* context,
const std::set<content::RenderProcessHost*>& hosts)
: context_(context),
pending_hosts_(0) {
for (std::set<content::RenderProcessHost*>::iterator it = hosts.begin();
it != hosts.end(); ++it) {
(*it)->AddObserver(this);
++pending_hosts_;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 6,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline signed short ReadPropertySignedShort(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
union
{
unsigned short
unsigned_value;
signed short
signed_value;
} quantum;
unsigned short
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned short) buffer[1] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[0];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
value=(unsigned short) buffer[0] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[1];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 12,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int inet_rtx_syn_ack(const struct sock *parent, struct request_sock *req)
{
int err = req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(parent, req);
if (!err)
req->num_retrans++;
return err;
}
Commit Message: dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent
syzkaller found a way to trigger double frees from ip_mc_drop_socket()
It turns out that leave a copy of parent mc_list at accept() time,
which is very bad.
Very similar to commit 8b485ce69876 ("tcp: do not inherit
fastopen_req from parent")
Initial report from Pray3r, completed by Andrey one.
Thanks a lot to them !
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Pray3r <pray3r.z@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 21,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::IsBuiltinComponent(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
const url::Origin& origin) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
return ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::IsBuiltinComponent(
browser_context, origin);
#else
return false;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sp<InputWindowHandle> InputDispatcher::findTouchedWindowAtLocked(int32_t displayId,
int32_t x, int32_t y) {
size_t numWindows = mWindowHandles.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < numWindows; i++) {
sp<InputWindowHandle> windowHandle = mWindowHandles.itemAt(i);
const InputWindowInfo* windowInfo = windowHandle->getInfo();
if (windowInfo->displayId == displayId) {
int32_t flags = windowInfo->layoutParamsFlags;
if (windowInfo->visible) {
if (!(flags & InputWindowInfo::FLAG_NOT_TOUCHABLE)) {
bool isTouchModal = (flags & (InputWindowInfo::FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE
| InputWindowInfo::FLAG_NOT_TOUCH_MODAL)) == 0;
if (isTouchModal || windowInfo->touchableRegionContainsPoint(x, y)) {
return windowHandle;
}
}
}
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 6,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_get_pCAL(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
png_charp *purpose, png_int_32 *X0, png_int_32 *X1, int *type, int *nparams,
png_charp *units, png_charpp *params)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s retrieval function", "pCAL");
if (png_ptr != NULL && info_ptr != NULL && (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_pCAL)
&& purpose != NULL && X0 != NULL && X1 != NULL && type != NULL &&
nparams != NULL && units != NULL && params != NULL)
{
*purpose = info_ptr->pcal_purpose;
*X0 = info_ptr->pcal_X0;
*X1 = info_ptr->pcal_X1;
*type = (int)info_ptr->pcal_type;
*nparams = (int)info_ptr->pcal_nparams;
*units = info_ptr->pcal_units;
*params = info_ptr->pcal_params;
return (PNG_INFO_pCAL);
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_read_format_zip_seekable_bid(struct archive_read *a, int best_bid)
{
struct zip *zip = (struct zip *)a->format->data;
int64_t file_size, current_offset;
const char *p;
int i, tail;
/* If someone has already bid more than 32, then avoid
trashing the look-ahead buffers with a seek. */
if (best_bid > 32)
return (-1);
file_size = __archive_read_seek(a, 0, SEEK_END);
if (file_size <= 0)
return 0;
/* Search last 16k of file for end-of-central-directory
* record (which starts with PK\005\006) */
tail = (int)zipmin(1024 * 16, file_size);
current_offset = __archive_read_seek(a, -tail, SEEK_END);
if (current_offset < 0)
return 0;
if ((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, (size_t)tail, NULL)) == NULL)
return 0;
/* Boyer-Moore search backwards from the end, since we want
* to match the last EOCD in the file (there can be more than
* one if there is an uncompressed Zip archive as a member
* within this Zip archive). */
for (i = tail - 22; i > 0;) {
switch (p[i]) {
case 'P':
if (memcmp(p + i, "PK\005\006", 4) == 0) {
int ret = read_eocd(zip, p + i,
current_offset + i);
if (ret > 0) {
/* Zip64 EOCD locator precedes
* regular EOCD if present. */
if (i >= 20
&& memcmp(p + i - 20, "PK\006\007", 4) == 0) {
read_zip64_eocd(a, zip, p + i - 20);
}
return (ret);
}
}
i -= 4;
break;
case 'K': i -= 1; break;
case 005: i -= 2; break;
case 006: i -= 3; break;
default: i -= 4; break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Issue #656: Fix CVE-2016-1541, VU#862384
When reading OS X metadata entries in Zip archives that were stored
without compression, libarchive would use the uncompressed entry size
to allocate a buffer but would use the compressed entry size to limit
the amount of data copied into that buffer. Since the compressed
and uncompressed sizes are provided by data in the archive itself,
an attacker could manipulate these values to write data beyond
the end of the allocated buffer.
This fix provides three new checks to guard against such
manipulation and to make libarchive generally more robust when
handling this type of entry:
1. If an OS X metadata entry is stored without compression,
abort the entire archive if the compressed and uncompressed
data sizes do not match.
2. When sanity-checking the size of an OS X metadata entry,
abort this entry if either the compressed or uncompressed
size is larger than 4MB.
3. When copying data into the allocated buffer, check the copy
size against both the compressed entry size and uncompressed
entry size.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcXFixesShowCursor(ClientPtr client)
{
WindowPtr pWin;
CursorHideCountPtr pChc;
int rc;
REQUEST(xXFixesShowCursorReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXFixesShowCursorReq);
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pWin, stuff->window, RT_WINDOW,
client, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success) {
client->errorValue = stuff->window;
return rc;
}
/*
* Has client hidden the cursor on this screen?
* If not, generate an error.
*/
pChc = findCursorHideCount(client, pWin->drawable.pScreen);
if (pChc == NULL) {
return BadMatch;
}
rc = XaceHook(XACE_SCREEN_ACCESS, client, pWin->drawable.pScreen,
DixShowAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
pChc->hideCount--;
if (pChc->hideCount <= 0) {
FreeResource(pChc->resource, 0);
}
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct key *old;
might_sleep();
/* create an empty session keyring */
if (!keyring) {
flags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN;
if (cred->session_keyring)
flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid, cred,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
flags, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
} else {
__key_get(keyring);
}
/* install the keyring */
old = cred->session_keyring;
rcu_assign_pointer(cred->session_keyring, keyring);
if (old)
key_put(old);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AudioHandler::AudioHandler(NodeType node_type,
AudioNode& node,
float sample_rate)
: is_initialized_(false),
node_type_(kNodeTypeUnknown),
node_(&node),
context_(node.context()),
last_processing_time_(-1),
last_non_silent_time_(-1),
connection_ref_count_(0),
is_disabled_(false),
channel_count_(2) {
SetNodeType(node_type);
SetInternalChannelCountMode(kMax);
SetInternalChannelInterpretation(AudioBus::kSpeakers);
#if DEBUG_AUDIONODE_REFERENCES
if (!is_node_count_initialized_) {
is_node_count_initialized_ = true;
atexit(AudioHandler::PrintNodeCounts);
}
#endif
InstanceCounters::IncrementCounter(InstanceCounters::kAudioHandlerCounter);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
TBR=rtoy@chromium.org,hongchan@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 20,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlobURLRequestJob::DidStart() {
if (request()->method() != "GET") {
NotifyFailure(net::ERR_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return;
}
if (!blob_data_) {
NotifyFailure(net::ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND);
return;
}
CountSize();
}
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 10,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool is_exception(u32 intr_info)
{
return (intr_info & (INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK))
== (INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 1 | 13,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t vmsvga_index_read(void *opaque, uint32_t address)
{
struct vmsvga_state_s *s = opaque;
return s->index;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 7,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int shift_arg_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long shift)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
unsigned long old_start = vma->vm_start;
unsigned long old_end = vma->vm_end;
unsigned long length = old_end - old_start;
unsigned long new_start = old_start - shift;
unsigned long new_end = old_end - shift;
struct mmu_gather tlb;
BUG_ON(new_start > new_end);
/*
* ensure there are no vmas between where we want to go
* and where we are
*/
if (vma != find_vma(mm, new_start))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* cover the whole range: [new_start, old_end)
*/
if (vma_adjust(vma, new_start, old_end, vma->vm_pgoff, NULL))
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* move the page tables downwards, on failure we rely on
* process cleanup to remove whatever mess we made.
*/
if (length != move_page_tables(vma, old_start,
vma, new_start, length, false))
return -ENOMEM;
lru_add_drain();
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0);
if (new_end > old_start) {
/*
* when the old and new regions overlap clear from new_end.
*/
free_pgd_range(&tlb, new_end, old_end, new_end,
vma->vm_next ? vma->vm_next->vm_start : 0);
} else {
/*
* otherwise, clean from old_start; this is done to not touch
* the address space in [new_end, old_start) some architectures
* have constraints on va-space that make this illegal (IA64) -
* for the others its just a little faster.
*/
free_pgd_range(&tlb, old_start, old_end, new_end,
vma->vm_next ? vma->vm_next->vm_start : 0);
}
tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, new_end, old_end);
/*
* Shrink the vma to just the new range. Always succeeds.
*/
vma_adjust(vma, new_start, new_end, vma->vm_pgoff, NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack
If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.
Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.
After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.
This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.
For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:
http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LocalFrame* Document::GetFrameOfMasterDocument() const {
if (frame_)
return frame_;
if (imports_controller_)
return imports_controller_->Master()->GetFrame();
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 10,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, valid)
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = Z_SPLOBJSTORAGE_P(getThis());
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(zend_hash_has_more_elements_ex(&intern->storage, &intern->pos) == SUCCESS);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed SplObjectStorage::key()
Commit Message: Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AuthenticatorBlePowerOnManualSheetModel::OnBluetoothPoweredStateChanged() {
dialog_model()->OnSheetModelDidChange();
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int arcmsr_build_ccb(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb,
struct CommandControlBlock *ccb, struct scsi_cmnd *pcmd)
{
struct ARCMSR_CDB *arcmsr_cdb = (struct ARCMSR_CDB *)&ccb->arcmsr_cdb;
int8_t *psge = (int8_t *)&arcmsr_cdb->u;
__le32 address_lo, address_hi;
int arccdbsize = 0x30;
__le32 length = 0;
int i;
struct scatterlist *sg;
int nseg;
ccb->pcmd = pcmd;
memset(arcmsr_cdb, 0, sizeof(struct ARCMSR_CDB));
arcmsr_cdb->TargetID = pcmd->device->id;
arcmsr_cdb->LUN = pcmd->device->lun;
arcmsr_cdb->Function = 1;
arcmsr_cdb->msgContext = 0;
memcpy(arcmsr_cdb->Cdb, pcmd->cmnd, pcmd->cmd_len);
nseg = scsi_dma_map(pcmd);
if (unlikely(nseg > acb->host->sg_tablesize || nseg < 0))
return FAILED;
scsi_for_each_sg(pcmd, sg, nseg, i) {
/* Get the physical address of the current data pointer */
length = cpu_to_le32(sg_dma_len(sg));
address_lo = cpu_to_le32(dma_addr_lo32(sg_dma_address(sg)));
address_hi = cpu_to_le32(dma_addr_hi32(sg_dma_address(sg)));
if (address_hi == 0) {
struct SG32ENTRY *pdma_sg = (struct SG32ENTRY *)psge;
pdma_sg->address = address_lo;
pdma_sg->length = length;
psge += sizeof (struct SG32ENTRY);
arccdbsize += sizeof (struct SG32ENTRY);
} else {
struct SG64ENTRY *pdma_sg = (struct SG64ENTRY *)psge;
pdma_sg->addresshigh = address_hi;
pdma_sg->address = address_lo;
pdma_sg->length = length|cpu_to_le32(IS_SG64_ADDR);
psge += sizeof (struct SG64ENTRY);
arccdbsize += sizeof (struct SG64ENTRY);
}
}
arcmsr_cdb->sgcount = (uint8_t)nseg;
arcmsr_cdb->DataLength = scsi_bufflen(pcmd);
arcmsr_cdb->msgPages = arccdbsize/0x100 + (arccdbsize % 0x100 ? 1 : 0);
if ( arccdbsize > 256)
arcmsr_cdb->Flags |= ARCMSR_CDB_FLAG_SGL_BSIZE;
if (pcmd->sc_data_direction == DMA_TO_DEVICE)
arcmsr_cdb->Flags |= ARCMSR_CDB_FLAG_WRITE;
ccb->arc_cdb_size = arccdbsize;
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntRect Element::boundsInRootViewSpace()
{
document()->updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
FrameView* view = document()->view();
if (!view)
return IntRect();
Vector<FloatQuad> quads;
if (isSVGElement() && renderer()) {
SVGElement* svgElement = toSVGElement(this);
FloatRect localRect;
if (svgElement->getBoundingBox(localRect))
quads.append(renderer()->localToAbsoluteQuad(localRect));
} else {
if (renderBoxModelObject())
renderBoxModelObject()->absoluteQuads(quads);
}
if (quads.isEmpty())
return IntRect();
IntRect result = quads[0].enclosingBoundingBox();
for (size_t i = 1; i < quads.size(); ++i)
result.unite(quads[i].enclosingBoundingBox());
result = view->contentsToRootView(result);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 23,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVCEncoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1 ||
bitRate->eControlRate != OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitrate = bitRate->nTargetBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *avcType =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *)params;
if (avcType->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (avcType->eProfile != OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileBaseline ||
avcType->nRefFrames != 1 ||
avcType->nBFrames != 0 ||
avcType->bUseHadamard != OMX_TRUE ||
(avcType->nAllowedPictureTypes & OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeB) != 0 ||
avcType->nRefIdx10ActiveMinus1 != 0 ||
avcType->nRefIdx11ActiveMinus1 != 0 ||
avcType->bWeightedPPrediction != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bEntropyCodingCABAC != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bconstIpred != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bDirect8x8Inference != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bDirectSpatialTemporal != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->nCabacInitIdc != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (OK != ConvertOmxAvcLevelToAvcSpecLevel(avcType->eLevel, &mAVCEncLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 17,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: adjust_exit_policy_from_exitpolicy_failure(origin_circuit_t *circ,
entry_connection_t *conn,
node_t *node,
const tor_addr_t *addr)
{
int make_reject_all = 0;
const sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(addr);
if (node) {
tor_addr_t tmp;
int asked_for_family = tor_addr_parse(&tmp, conn->socks_request->address);
if (family == AF_UNSPEC) {
make_reject_all = 1;
} else if (node_exit_policy_is_exact(node, family) &&
asked_for_family != -1 && !conn->chosen_exit_name) {
make_reject_all = 1;
}
if (make_reject_all) {
log_info(LD_APP,
"Exitrouter %s seems to be more restrictive than its exit "
"policy. Not using this router as exit for now.",
node_describe(node));
policies_set_node_exitpolicy_to_reject_all(node);
}
}
if (family != AF_UNSPEC)
addr_policy_append_reject_addr(&circ->prepend_policy, addr);
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 8,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int generic_pipe_buf_nosteal(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 3,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iasecc_card_ctl(struct sc_card *card, unsigned long cmd, void *ptr)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct iasecc_sdo *sdo = (struct iasecc_sdo *) ptr;
switch (cmd) {
case SC_CARDCTL_GET_SERIALNR:
return iasecc_get_serialnr(card, (struct sc_serial_number *)ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_IASECC_SDO_CREATE:
sc_log(ctx, "CMD SC_CARDCTL_IASECC_SDO_CREATE: sdo_class %X", sdo->sdo_class);
return iasecc_sdo_create(card, (struct iasecc_sdo *) ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_IASECC_SDO_DELETE:
sc_log(ctx, "CMD SC_CARDCTL_IASECC_SDO_DELETE: sdo_class %X", sdo->sdo_class);
return iasecc_sdo_delete(card, (struct iasecc_sdo *) ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_IASECC_SDO_PUT_DATA:
sc_log(ctx, "CMD SC_CARDCTL_IASECC_SDO_PUT_DATA: sdo_class %X", sdo->sdo_class);
return iasecc_sdo_put_data(card, (struct iasecc_sdo_update *) ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_IASECC_SDO_KEY_RSA_PUT_DATA:
sc_log(ctx, "CMD SC_CARDCTL_IASECC_SDO_KEY_RSA_PUT_DATA");
return iasecc_sdo_key_rsa_put_data(card, (struct iasecc_sdo_rsa_update *) ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_IASECC_SDO_GET_DATA:
sc_log(ctx, "CMD SC_CARDCTL_IASECC_SDO_GET_DATA: sdo_class %X", sdo->sdo_class);
return iasecc_sdo_get_data(card, (struct iasecc_sdo *) ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_IASECC_SDO_GENERATE:
sc_log(ctx, "CMD SC_CARDCTL_IASECC_SDO_GET_DATA: sdo_class %X", sdo->sdo_class);
return iasecc_sdo_generate(card, (struct iasecc_sdo *) ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_GET_SE_INFO:
sc_log(ctx, "CMD SC_CARDCTL_GET_SE_INFO: sdo_class %X", sdo->sdo_class);
return iasecc_se_get_info(card, (struct iasecc_se_info *) ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_GET_CHV_REFERENCE_IN_SE:
sc_log(ctx, "CMD SC_CARDCTL_GET_CHV_REFERENCE_IN_SE");
return iasecc_get_chv_reference_from_se(card, (int *)ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_IASECC_GET_FREE_KEY_REFERENCE:
sc_log(ctx, "CMD SC_CARDCTL_IASECC_GET_FREE_KEY_REFERENCE");
return iasecc_get_free_reference(card, (struct iasecc_ctl_get_free_reference *)ptr);
}
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 4,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MiniTabAnimation(TabStripGtk* tabstrip, int index)
: TabAnimation(tabstrip, MINI),
index_(index) {
int tab_count = tabstrip->GetTabCount();
int start_mini_count = tabstrip->GetMiniTabCount();
int end_mini_count = start_mini_count;
if (tabstrip->GetTabAt(index)->mini())
start_mini_count--;
else
start_mini_count++;
tabstrip_->GetTabAt(index)->set_animating_mini_change(true);
GenerateStartAndEndWidths(tab_count, tab_count, start_mini_count,
end_mini_count);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gpgsm_reset (void *engine)
{
engine_gpgsm_t gpgsm = engine;
/* IF we have an active connection we must send a reset because we
need to reset the list of signers. Note that RESET does not
reset OPTION commands. */
return (gpgsm->assuan_ctx
? gpgsm_assuan_simple_command (gpgsm->assuan_ctx, "RESET",
NULL, NULL)
: 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IDNSpoofChecker::SetAllowedUnicodeSet(UErrorCode* status) {
if (U_FAILURE(*status))
return;
const icu::UnicodeSet* recommended_set =
uspoof_getRecommendedUnicodeSet(status);
icu::UnicodeSet allowed_set;
allowed_set.addAll(*recommended_set);
const icu::UnicodeSet* inclusion_set = uspoof_getInclusionUnicodeSet(status);
allowed_set.addAll(*inclusion_set);
allowed_set.remove(0x338u);
allowed_set.remove(0x58au); // Armenian Hyphen
allowed_set.remove(0x2010u);
allowed_set.remove(0x2019u); // Right Single Quotation Mark
allowed_set.remove(0x2027u);
allowed_set.remove(0x30a0u); // Katakana-Hiragana Double Hyphen
allowed_set.remove(0x2bbu); // Modifier Letter Turned Comma
allowed_set.remove(0x2bcu); // Modifier Letter Apostrophe
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
allowed_set.remove(0x0620u);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Cu);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Du);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Eu);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Fu);
#endif
allowed_set.remove(0x01CDu, 0x01DCu); // Latin Ext B; Pinyin
allowed_set.remove(0x1C80u, 0x1C8Fu); // Cyrillic Extended-C
allowed_set.remove(0x1E00u, 0x1E9Bu); // Latin Extended Additional
allowed_set.remove(0x1F00u, 0x1FFFu); // Greek Extended
allowed_set.remove(0xA640u, 0xA69Fu); // Cyrillic Extended-B
allowed_set.remove(0xA720u, 0xA7FFu); // Latin Extended-D
uspoof_setAllowedUnicodeSet(checker_, &allowed_set, status);
}
Commit Message: Block modifier-letter-voicing character from domain names
This character (ˬ) is easy to miss between other characters. It's one of the three characters from Spacing-Modifier-Letters block that ICU lists in its recommended set in uspoof.cpp. Two of these characters (modifier-letter-turned-comma and modifier-letter-apostrophe) are already blocked in crbug/678812.
Bug: 896717
Change-Id: I24b2b591de8cc7822cd55aa005b15676be91175e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303037
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604128}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 22,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jp2_putuint8(jas_stream_t *out, uint_fast8_t val)
{
if (jas_stream_putc(out, val & 0xff) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 29,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_white(int c)
{
return c == '\x00' || c == '\x09' || c == '\x0a' || c == '\x0c' || c == '\x0d' || c == '\x20';
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gboolean BrowserWindowGtk::OnMainWindowDeleteEvent(GtkWidget* widget,
GdkEvent* event) {
Close();
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nfc_llcp_exit(void)
{
nfc_llcp_sock_exit();
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadItemImpl::NotifyRemoved() {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.OnDownloadRemoved(this);
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,410 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsPipeline* BlackPreservingKOnlyIntents(cmsContext ContextID,
cmsUInt32Number nProfiles,
cmsUInt32Number TheIntents[],
cmsHPROFILE hProfiles[],
cmsBool BPC[],
cmsFloat64Number AdaptationStates[],
cmsUInt32Number dwFlags)
{
GrayOnlyParams bp;
cmsPipeline* Result;
cmsUInt32Number ICCIntents[256];
cmsStage* CLUT;
cmsUInt32Number i, nGridPoints;
if (nProfiles < 1 || nProfiles > 255) return NULL;
for (i=0; i < nProfiles; i++)
ICCIntents[i] = TranslateNonICCIntents(TheIntents[i]);
if (cmsGetColorSpace(hProfiles[0]) != cmsSigCmykData ||
cmsGetColorSpace(hProfiles[nProfiles-1]) != cmsSigCmykData)
return DefaultICCintents(ContextID, nProfiles, ICCIntents, hProfiles, BPC, AdaptationStates, dwFlags);
memset(&bp, 0, sizeof(bp));
Result = cmsPipelineAlloc(ContextID, 4, 4);
if (Result == NULL) return NULL;
bp.cmyk2cmyk = DefaultICCintents(ContextID,
nProfiles,
ICCIntents,
hProfiles,
BPC,
AdaptationStates,
dwFlags);
if (bp.cmyk2cmyk == NULL) goto Error;
bp.KTone = _cmsBuildKToneCurve(ContextID,
4096,
nProfiles,
ICCIntents,
hProfiles,
BPC,
AdaptationStates,
dwFlags);
if (bp.KTone == NULL) goto Error;
nGridPoints = _cmsReasonableGridpointsByColorspace(cmsSigCmykData, dwFlags);
CLUT = cmsStageAllocCLut16bit(ContextID, nGridPoints, 4, 4, NULL);
if (CLUT == NULL) goto Error;
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Result, cmsAT_BEGIN, CLUT))
goto Error;
if (!cmsStageSampleCLut16bit(CLUT, BlackPreservingGrayOnlySampler, (void*) &bp, 0))
goto Error;
cmsPipelineFree(bp.cmyk2cmyk);
cmsFreeToneCurve(bp.KTone);
return Result;
Error:
if (bp.cmyk2cmyk != NULL) cmsPipelineFree(bp.cmyk2cmyk);
if (bp.KTone != NULL) cmsFreeToneCurve(bp.KTone);
if (Result != NULL) cmsPipelineFree(Result);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix a double free on error recovering
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cma_query_handler(int status, struct ib_sa_path_rec *path_rec,
void *context)
{
struct cma_work *work = context;
struct rdma_route *route;
route = &work->id->id.route;
if (!status) {
route->num_paths = 1;
*route->path_rec = *path_rec;
} else {
work->old_state = RDMA_CM_ROUTE_QUERY;
work->new_state = RDMA_CM_ADDR_RESOLVED;
work->event.event = RDMA_CM_EVENT_ROUTE_ERROR;
work->event.status = status;
}
queue_work(cma_wq, &work->work);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void LocationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueFast(info, WTF::GetPtr(impl->locationWithPerWorldBindings()), impl);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void addReplyStatusLength(client *c, const char *s, size_t len) {
addReplyString(c,"+",1);
addReplyString(c,s,len);
addReplyString(c,"\r\n",2);
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 7,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void XMLHttpRequest::send(const String& body, ExceptionState& es)
{
if (!initSend(es))
return;
if (!body.isNull() && areMethodAndURLValidForSend()) {
String contentType = getRequestHeader("Content-Type");
if (contentType.isEmpty()) {
setRequestHeaderInternal("Content-Type", "text/plain;charset=UTF-8");
} else {
replaceCharsetInMediaType(contentType, "UTF-8");
m_requestHeaders.set("Content-Type", contentType);
}
m_requestEntityBody = FormData::create(UTF8Encoding().encode(body, WTF::EntitiesForUnencodables));
if (m_upload)
m_requestEntityBody->setAlwaysStream(true);
}
createRequest(es);
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nl80211_dump_station(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct station_info sinfo;
struct cfg80211_registered_device *dev;
struct net_device *netdev;
u8 mac_addr[ETH_ALEN];
int sta_idx = cb->args[1];
int err;
err = nl80211_prepare_netdev_dump(skb, cb, &dev, &netdev);
if (err)
return err;
if (!dev->ops->dump_station) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_err;
}
while (1) {
err = dev->ops->dump_station(&dev->wiphy, netdev, sta_idx,
mac_addr, &sinfo);
if (err == -ENOENT)
break;
if (err)
goto out_err;
if (nl80211_send_station(skb,
NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).pid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, NLM_F_MULTI,
netdev, mac_addr,
&sinfo) < 0)
goto out;
sta_idx++;
}
out:
cb->args[1] = sta_idx;
err = skb->len;
out_err:
nl80211_finish_netdev_dump(dev);
return err;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::OverrideRequestContextForURL(
const GURL& url, content::ResourceContext* context) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
if (url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme)) {
ProfileIOData* io_data = ProfileIOData::FromResourceContext(context);
return io_data->extensions_request_context();
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct request *blk_peek_request(struct request_queue *q)
{
struct request *rq;
int ret;
lockdep_assert_held(q->queue_lock);
WARN_ON_ONCE(q->mq_ops);
while ((rq = elv_next_request(q)) != NULL) {
if (!(rq->rq_flags & RQF_STARTED)) {
/*
* This is the first time the device driver
* sees this request (possibly after
* requeueing). Notify IO scheduler.
*/
if (rq->rq_flags & RQF_SORTED)
elv_activate_rq(q, rq);
/*
* just mark as started even if we don't start
* it, a request that has been delayed should
* not be passed by new incoming requests
*/
rq->rq_flags |= RQF_STARTED;
trace_block_rq_issue(q, rq);
}
if (!q->boundary_rq || q->boundary_rq == rq) {
q->end_sector = rq_end_sector(rq);
q->boundary_rq = NULL;
}
if (rq->rq_flags & RQF_DONTPREP)
break;
if (q->dma_drain_size && blk_rq_bytes(rq)) {
/*
* make sure space for the drain appears we
* know we can do this because max_hw_segments
* has been adjusted to be one fewer than the
* device can handle
*/
rq->nr_phys_segments++;
}
if (!q->prep_rq_fn)
break;
ret = q->prep_rq_fn(q, rq);
if (ret == BLKPREP_OK) {
break;
} else if (ret == BLKPREP_DEFER) {
/*
* the request may have been (partially) prepped.
* we need to keep this request in the front to
* avoid resource deadlock. RQF_STARTED will
* prevent other fs requests from passing this one.
*/
if (q->dma_drain_size && blk_rq_bytes(rq) &&
!(rq->rq_flags & RQF_DONTPREP)) {
/*
* remove the space for the drain we added
* so that we don't add it again
*/
--rq->nr_phys_segments;
}
rq = NULL;
break;
} else if (ret == BLKPREP_KILL || ret == BLKPREP_INVALID) {
rq->rq_flags |= RQF_QUIET;
/*
* Mark this request as started so we don't trigger
* any debug logic in the end I/O path.
*/
blk_start_request(rq);
__blk_end_request_all(rq, ret == BLKPREP_INVALID ?
BLK_STS_TARGET : BLK_STS_IOERR);
} else {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: bad return=%d\n", __func__, ret);
break;
}
}
return rq;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 3,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: freeBindings(XML_Parser parser, BINDING *bindings) {
while (bindings) {
BINDING *b = bindings;
/* m_startNamespaceDeclHandler will have been called for this
* binding in addBindings(), so call the end handler now.
*/
if (parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler)
parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, b->prefix->name);
bindings = bindings->nextTagBinding;
b->nextTagBinding = parser->m_freeBindingList;
parser->m_freeBindingList = b;
b->prefix->binding = b->prevPrefixBinding;
}
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 26,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long Track::GetNumber() const { return m_info.number; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutoResetServer (int sig)
{
int olderrno = errno;
dispatchException |= DE_RESET;
isItTimeToYield = TRUE;
errno = olderrno;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 3,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NaClProcessHost::Launch(
ChromeRenderMessageFilter* chrome_render_message_filter,
int socket_count,
IPC::Message* reply_msg,
scoped_refptr<ExtensionInfoMap> extension_info_map) {
chrome_render_message_filter_ = chrome_render_message_filter;
reply_msg_ = reply_msg;
extension_info_map_ = extension_info_map;
if (socket_count > 8) {
delete this;
return;
}
NaClBrowser* nacl_browser = NaClBrowser::GetInstance();
nacl_browser->EnsureAllResourcesAvailable();
if (!nacl_browser->IsOk()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Cannot launch NaCl process";
delete this;
return;
}
for (int i = 0; i < socket_count; i++) {
nacl::Handle pair[2];
if (nacl::SocketPair(pair) == -1) {
delete this;
return;
}
internal_->sockets_for_renderer.push_back(pair[0]);
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.push_back(pair[1]);
SetCloseOnExec(pair[0]);
SetCloseOnExec(pair[1]);
}
if (!LaunchSelLdr()) {
delete this;
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct snd_rawmidi_substream *snd_usbmidi_find_substream(struct snd_usb_midi *umidi,
int stream,
int number)
{
struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream;
list_for_each_entry(substream, &umidi->rmidi->streams[stream].substreams,
list) {
if (substream->number == number)
return substream;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_findkey(struct ipc_ids *ids, key_t key)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc;
int next_id;
int total;
for (total = 0, next_id = 0; total < ids->in_use; next_id++) {
ipc = idr_find(&ids->ipcs_idr, next_id);
if (ipc == NULL)
continue;
if (ipc->key != key) {
total++;
continue;
}
rcu_read_lock();
ipc_lock_object(ipc);
return ipc;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 10,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops,
const struct tcp_request_sock_ops *af_ops,
struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie foc = { .len = -1 };
__u32 isn = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn;
struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sock *fastopen_sk = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
struct request_sock *req;
bool want_cookie = false;
struct flowi fl;
/* TW buckets are converted to open requests without
* limitations, they conserve resources and peer is
* evidently real one.
*/
if ((net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies == 2 ||
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_is_full(sk)) && !isn) {
want_cookie = tcp_syn_flood_action(sk, skb, rsk_ops->slab_name);
if (!want_cookie)
goto drop;
}
/* Accept backlog is full. If we have already queued enough
* of warm entries in syn queue, drop request. It is better than
* clogging syn queue with openreqs with exponentially increasing
* timeout.
*/
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk) && inet_csk_reqsk_queue_young(sk) > 1) {
NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
goto drop;
}
req = inet_reqsk_alloc(rsk_ops, sk, !want_cookie);
if (!req)
goto drop;
tcp_rsk(req)->af_specific = af_ops;
tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt);
tmp_opt.mss_clamp = af_ops->mss_clamp;
tmp_opt.user_mss = tp->rx_opt.user_mss;
tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, 0, want_cookie ? NULL : &foc);
if (want_cookie && !tmp_opt.saw_tstamp)
tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt);
tmp_opt.tstamp_ok = tmp_opt.saw_tstamp;
tcp_openreq_init(req, &tmp_opt, skb, sk);
/* Note: tcp_v6_init_req() might override ir_iif for link locals */
inet_rsk(req)->ir_iif = inet_request_bound_dev_if(sk, skb);
af_ops->init_req(req, sk, skb);
if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req))
goto drop_and_free;
if (!want_cookie && !isn) {
/* VJ's idea. We save last timestamp seen
* from the destination in peer table, when entering
* state TIME-WAIT, and check against it before
* accepting new connection request.
*
* If "isn" is not zero, this request hit alive
* timewait bucket, so that all the necessary checks
* are made in the function processing timewait state.
*/
if (tcp_death_row.sysctl_tw_recycle) {
bool strict;
dst = af_ops->route_req(sk, &fl, req, &strict);
if (dst && strict &&
!tcp_peer_is_proven(req, dst, true,
tmp_opt.saw_tstamp)) {
NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_PAWSPASSIVEREJECTED);
goto drop_and_release;
}
}
/* Kill the following clause, if you dislike this way. */
else if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies &&
(sysctl_max_syn_backlog - inet_csk_reqsk_queue_len(sk) <
(sysctl_max_syn_backlog >> 2)) &&
!tcp_peer_is_proven(req, dst, false,
tmp_opt.saw_tstamp)) {
/* Without syncookies last quarter of
* backlog is filled with destinations,
* proven to be alive.
* It means that we continue to communicate
* to destinations, already remembered
* to the moment of synflood.
*/
pr_drop_req(req, ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->source),
rsk_ops->family);
goto drop_and_release;
}
isn = af_ops->init_seq(skb);
}
if (!dst) {
dst = af_ops->route_req(sk, &fl, req, NULL);
if (!dst)
goto drop_and_free;
}
tcp_ecn_create_request(req, skb, sk, dst);
if (want_cookie) {
isn = cookie_init_sequence(af_ops, sk, skb, &req->mss);
req->cookie_ts = tmp_opt.tstamp_ok;
if (!tmp_opt.tstamp_ok)
inet_rsk(req)->ecn_ok = 0;
}
tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn = isn;
tcp_rsk(req)->txhash = net_tx_rndhash();
tcp_openreq_init_rwin(req, sk, dst);
if (!want_cookie) {
tcp_reqsk_record_syn(sk, req, skb);
fastopen_sk = tcp_try_fastopen(sk, skb, req, &foc, dst);
}
if (fastopen_sk) {
af_ops->send_synack(fastopen_sk, dst, &fl, req,
&foc, TCP_SYNACK_FASTOPEN);
/* Add the child socket directly into the accept queue */
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk, req, fastopen_sk);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
bh_unlock_sock(fastopen_sk);
sock_put(fastopen_sk);
} else {
tcp_rsk(req)->tfo_listener = false;
if (!want_cookie)
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(sk, req, TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
af_ops->send_synack(sk, dst, &fl, req, &foc,
!want_cookie ? TCP_SYNACK_NORMAL :
TCP_SYNACK_COOKIE);
if (want_cookie) {
reqsk_free(req);
return 0;
}
}
reqsk_put(req);
return 0;
drop_and_release:
dst_release(dst);
drop_and_free:
reqsk_free(req);
drop:
tcp_listendrop(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const gfx::FontList& Textfield::GetDefaultFontList() {
ui::ResourceBundle& rb = ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
return rb.GetFontListWithDelta(ui::kLabelFontSizeDelta);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t ZSTD_CCtx_refPrefix(ZSTD_CCtx* cctx, const void* prefix, size_t prefixSize)
{
return ZSTD_CCtx_refPrefix_advanced(cctx, prefix, prefixSize, ZSTD_dct_rawContent);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 21,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asf_read_simple_index(AVFormatContext *s, const GUIDParseTable *g)
{
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
AVStream *st = NULL;
uint64_t interval; // index entry time interval in 100 ns units, usually it's 1s
uint32_t pkt_num, nb_entries;
int32_t prev_pkt_num = -1;
int i;
int64_t offset;
uint64_t size = avio_rl64(pb);
for (i = 0; i < asf->nb_streams; i++) {
if ((asf->asf_st[i]->type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO) && !asf->asf_st[i]->indexed) {
asf->asf_st[i]->indexed = 1;
st = s->streams[asf->asf_st[i]->index];
break;
}
}
if (!st) {
avio_skip(pb, size - 24); // if there's no video stream, skip index object
return 0;
}
avio_skip(pb, 16); // skip File ID
interval = avio_rl64(pb);
avio_skip(pb, 4);
nb_entries = avio_rl32(pb);
for (i = 0; i < nb_entries; i++) {
pkt_num = avio_rl32(pb);
offset = avio_skip(pb, 2);
if (offset < 0) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Skipping failed in asf_read_simple_index.\n");
return offset;
}
if (prev_pkt_num != pkt_num) {
av_add_index_entry(st, asf->first_packet_offset + asf->packet_size *
pkt_num, av_rescale(interval, i, 10000),
asf->packet_size, 0, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
prev_pkt_num = pkt_num;
}
}
asf->is_simple_index = 1;
align_position(pb, asf->offset, size);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::OnMultipleClick(int click_count,
int page_index,
int char_index) {
DCHECK_GE(click_count, 2);
bool is_double_click = click_count == 2;
int start_index = char_index;
do {
base::char16 cur = pages_[page_index]->GetCharAtIndex(start_index);
if (FindMultipleClickBoundary(is_double_click, cur))
break;
} while (--start_index >= 0);
if (start_index)
start_index++;
int end_index = char_index;
int total = pages_[page_index]->GetCharCount();
while (end_index++ <= total) {
base::char16 cur = pages_[page_index]->GetCharAtIndex(end_index);
if (FindMultipleClickBoundary(is_double_click, cur))
break;
}
selection_.push_back(PDFiumRange(pages_[page_index].get(), start_index,
end_index - start_index));
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 10,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static OMX_ERRORTYPE subscribe_to_events(int fd)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
struct v4l2_event_subscription sub;
int array_sz = sizeof(event_type)/sizeof(int);
int i,rc;
memset(&sub, 0, sizeof(sub));
if (fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid input: %d", fd);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
for (i = 0; i < array_sz; ++i) {
memset(&sub, 0, sizeof(sub));
sub.type = event_type[i];
rc = ioctl(fd, VIDIOC_SUBSCRIBE_EVENT, &sub);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to subscribe event: 0x%x", sub.type);
break;
}
}
if (i < array_sz) {
for (--i; i >=0 ; i--) {
memset(&sub, 0, sizeof(sub));
sub.type = event_type[i];
rc = ioctl(fd, VIDIOC_UNSUBSCRIBE_EVENT, &sub);
if (rc)
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to unsubscribe event: 0x%x", sub.type);
}
eRet = OMX_ErrorNotImplemented;
}
return eRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 17,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *register_access_checker_hook(cmd_parms *cmd, void *_cfg,
const char *file,
const char *function,
const char *when)
{
int apr_hook_when = APR_HOOK_MIDDLE;
if (when) {
if (!strcasecmp(when, "early")) {
apr_hook_when = AP_LUA_HOOK_FIRST;
}
else if (!strcasecmp(when, "late")) {
apr_hook_when = AP_LUA_HOOK_LAST;
}
else {
return "Third argument must be 'early' or 'late'";
}
}
return register_named_file_function_hook("access_checker", cmd, _cfg,
file, function, apr_hook_when);
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ParaNdis_ReviewIPPacket(PVOID buffer, ULONG size, LPCSTR caller)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = QualifyIpPacket((IPHeader *) buffer, size);
PrintOutParsingResult(res, 1, caller);
return res;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::SetManagedMemoryPolicy(
const ManagedMemoryPolicy& policy) {
if (cached_managed_memory_policy_ == policy)
return;
ManagedMemoryPolicy old_policy = ActualManagedMemoryPolicy();
cached_managed_memory_policy_ = policy;
ManagedMemoryPolicy actual_policy = ActualManagedMemoryPolicy();
if (old_policy == actual_policy)
return;
UpdateTileManagerMemoryPolicy(actual_policy);
bool needs_commit = true;
if (visible() &&
actual_policy.bytes_limit_when_visible >= max_memory_needed_bytes_ &&
old_policy.bytes_limit_when_visible >= max_memory_needed_bytes_ &&
actual_policy.priority_cutoff_when_visible ==
old_policy.priority_cutoff_when_visible) {
needs_commit = false;
}
if (needs_commit)
client_->SetNeedsCommitOnImplThread();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 14,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_acl_text_want_type(struct archive_acl *acl, int flags)
{
int want_type;
/* Check if ACL is NFSv4 */
if ((acl->acl_types & ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_NFS4) != 0) {
/* NFSv4 should never mix with POSIX.1e */
if ((acl->acl_types & ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_POSIX1E) != 0)
return (0);
else
return (ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_NFS4);
}
/* Now deal with POSIX.1e ACLs */
want_type = 0;
if ((flags & ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) != 0)
want_type |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS;
if ((flags & ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) != 0)
want_type |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT;
/* By default we want both access and default ACLs */
if (want_type == 0)
return (ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_POSIX1E);
return (want_type);
}
Commit Message: Skip 0-length ACL fields
Currently, it is possible to create an archive that crashes bsdtar
with a malformed ACL:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
archive_acl_from_text_l (acl=<optimised out>, text=0x7e2e92 "", want_type=<optimised out>, sc=<optimised out>) at libarchive/archive_acl.c:1726
1726 switch (*s) {
(gdb) p n
$1 = 1
(gdb) p field[n]
$2 = {start = 0x0, end = 0x0}
Stop this by checking that the length is not zero before beginning
the switch statement.
I am pretty sure this is the bug mentioned in the qsym paper [1],
and I was able to replicate it with a qsym + AFL + afl-rb setup.
[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yun
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 6,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackTexture::Create() {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor("BackTexture::Create",
state_->GetErrorState());
Destroy();
glGenTextures(1, &id_);
ScopedTextureBinder binder(state_, id_, GL_TEXTURE_2D);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_MAG_FILTER, GL_NEAREST);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_MIN_FILTER, GL_NEAREST);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_S, GL_CLAMP_TO_EDGE);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_T, GL_CLAMP_TO_EDGE);
glTexImage2D(
GL_TEXTURE_2D, 0, GL_RGBA, 16, 16, 0, GL_RGBA, GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, NULL);
bytes_allocated_ = 16u * 16u * 4u;
memory_tracker_.TrackMemAlloc(bytes_allocated_);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool is_page_fault(u32 intr_info)
{
return is_exception_n(intr_info, PF_VECTOR);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 14,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __init __weak arch_early_irq_init(void)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 15,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nested_vmx_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 indicator)
{
/* TODO: not to reset guest simply here. */
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
pr_warn("kvm: nested vmx abort, indicator %d\n", indicator);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ShaderManager::ShaderInfo* GetShaderInfo(GLuint client_id) {
return shader_manager()->GetShaderInfo(client_id);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RList* MACH0_(mach_fields)(RBinFile *arch) {
struct MACH0_(mach_header) *mh = MACH0_(get_hdr_from_bytes)(arch->buf);
if (!mh) {
return NULL;
}
RList *ret = r_list_new ();
if (!ret) {
return NULL;
}
ret->free = free;
ut64 addr = 0;
#define ROW(nam,siz,val,fmt) \
r_list_append (ret, r_bin_field_new (addr, addr, siz, nam, sdb_fmt (0, "0x%08x", val), fmt)); \
addr += 4;
ROW("hdr.magic", 4, mh->magic, "x");
ROW("hdr.cputype", 4, mh->cputype, NULL);
ROW("hdr.cpusubtype", 4, mh->cpusubtype, NULL);
ROW("hdr.filetype", 4, mh->filetype, NULL);
ROW("hdr.ncmds", 4, mh->ncmds, NULL);
ROW("hdr.sizeofcmds", 4, mh->sizeofcmds, NULL);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(libxml)
{
zend_class_entry ce;
php_libxml_initialize();
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_VERSION", LIBXML_VERSION, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DOTTED_VERSION", LIBXML_DOTTED_VERSION, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("LIBXML_LOADED_VERSION", (char *)xmlParserVersion, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* For use with loading xml */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOENT", XML_PARSE_NOENT, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DTDLOAD", XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DTDATTR", XML_PARSE_DTDATTR, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_DTDVALID", XML_PARSE_DTDVALID, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOERROR", XML_PARSE_NOERROR, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOWARNING", XML_PARSE_NOWARNING, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOBLANKS", XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_XINCLUDE", XML_PARSE_XINCLUDE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NSCLEAN", XML_PARSE_NSCLEAN, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOCDATA", XML_PARSE_NOCDATA, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NONET", XML_PARSE_NONET, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_PEDANTIC", XML_PARSE_PEDANTIC, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20621
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_COMPACT", XML_PARSE_COMPACT, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOXMLDECL", XML_SAVE_NO_DECL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20703
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_PARSEHUGE", XML_PARSE_HUGE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_NOEMPTYTAG", LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* Schema validation options */
#if defined(LIBXML_SCHEMAS_ENABLED) && LIBXML_VERSION >= 20614
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_SCHEMA_CREATE", XML_SCHEMA_VAL_VC_I_CREATE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
/* Additional constants for use with loading html */
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20707
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_HTML_NOIMPLIED", HTML_PARSE_NOIMPLIED, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20708
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_HTML_NODEFDTD", HTML_PARSE_NODEFDTD, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
/* Error levels */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_NONE", XML_ERR_NONE, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_WARNING", XML_ERR_WARNING, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_ERROR", XML_ERR_ERROR, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("LIBXML_ERR_FATAL", XML_ERR_FATAL, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
INIT_CLASS_ENTRY(ce, "LibXMLError", NULL);
libxmlerror_class_entry = zend_register_internal_class(&ce TSRMLS_CC);
if (sapi_module.name) {
static const char * const supported_sapis[] = {
"cgi-fcgi",
"fpm-fcgi",
"litespeed",
NULL
};
const char * const *sapi_name;
for (sapi_name = supported_sapis; *sapi_name; sapi_name++) {
if (strcmp(sapi_module.name, *sapi_name) == 0) {
_php_libxml_per_request_initialization = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (!_php_libxml_per_request_initialization) {
/* report errors via handler rather than stderr */
xmlSetGenericErrorFunc(NULL, php_libxml_error_handler);
xmlParserInputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_input_buffer_create_filename);
xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_output_buffer_create_filename);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RemoveTexture(GLuint client_id) {
texture_manager()->RemoveTexture(client_id);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GaiaCookieManagerService::Init() {
cookie_changed_subscription_ = signin_client_->AddCookieChangedCallback(
GaiaUrls::GetInstance()->google_url(), kGaiaCookieName,
base::Bind(&GaiaCookieManagerService::OnCookieChanged,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 12,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int php_stream_temp_flush(php_stream *stream TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
assert(ts != NULL);
return ts->innerstream ? php_stream_flush(ts->innerstream) : -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcXvSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xvSelectVideoNotifyReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvSelectVideoNotifyReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->drawable);
return XvProcVector[xv_SelectVideoNotify] (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::BindVertexArrayOESHelper(GLuint array) {
bool changed = false;
if (vertex_array_object_manager_->BindVertexArray(array, &changed)) {
if (changed) {
helper_->BindVertexArrayOES(array);
}
} else {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glBindVertexArrayOES",
"id was not generated with glGenVertexArrayOES");
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 28,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rb_init_page(struct buffer_data_page *bpage)
{
local_set(&bpage->commit, 0);
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 9,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_set_display_frame(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl,
void *pv_api_ip,
void *pv_api_op)
{
ivd_set_display_frame_ip_t *dec_disp_ip;
ivd_set_display_frame_op_t *dec_disp_op;
UWORD32 i;
dec_struct_t * ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)(dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle);
dec_disp_ip = (ivd_set_display_frame_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
dec_disp_op = (ivd_set_display_frame_op_t *)pv_api_op;
dec_disp_op->u4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_disp_bufs = 0;
if(ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
UWORD32 u4_num_bufs = dec_disp_ip->num_disp_bufs;
u4_num_bufs = MIN(u4_num_bufs, MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW);
ps_dec->u4_num_disp_bufs = u4_num_bufs;
for(i = 0; i < u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
ps_dec->disp_bufs[i].u4_num_bufs =
dec_disp_ip->s_disp_buffer[i].u4_num_bufs;
ps_dec->disp_bufs[i].buf[0] =
dec_disp_ip->s_disp_buffer[i].pu1_bufs[0];
ps_dec->disp_bufs[i].buf[1] =
dec_disp_ip->s_disp_buffer[i].pu1_bufs[1];
ps_dec->disp_bufs[i].buf[2] =
dec_disp_ip->s_disp_buffer[i].pu1_bufs[2];
ps_dec->disp_bufs[i].u4_bufsize[0] =
dec_disp_ip->s_disp_buffer[i].u4_min_out_buf_size[0];
ps_dec->disp_bufs[i].u4_bufsize[1] =
dec_disp_ip->s_disp_buffer[i].u4_min_out_buf_size[1];
ps_dec->disp_bufs[i].u4_bufsize[2] =
dec_disp_ip->s_disp_buffer[i].u4_min_out_buf_size[2];
}
}
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fixed error concealment when no MBs are decoded in the current pic
Bug: 29493002
Change-Id: I3fae547ddb0616b4e6579580985232bd3d65881e
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Gfx::opSetFillColorN(Object args[], int numArgs) {
GfxColor color;
GfxPattern *pattern;
int i;
if (state->getFillColorSpace()->getMode() == csPattern) {
if (numArgs > 1) {
if (!((GfxPatternColorSpace *)state->getFillColorSpace())->getUnder() ||
numArgs - 1 != ((GfxPatternColorSpace *)state->getFillColorSpace())
->getUnder()->getNComps()) {
error(getPos(), "Incorrect number of arguments in 'scn' command");
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < numArgs - 1 && i < gfxColorMaxComps; ++i) {
if (args[i].isNum()) {
color.c[i] = dblToCol(args[i].getNum());
}
}
state->setFillColor(&color);
out->updateFillColor(state);
}
if (args[numArgs-1].isName() &&
(pattern = res->lookupPattern(args[numArgs-1].getName(), this))) {
state->setFillPattern(pattern);
}
} else {
if (numArgs != state->getFillColorSpace()->getNComps()) {
error(getPos(), "Incorrect number of arguments in 'scn' command");
return;
}
state->setFillPattern(NULL);
for (i = 0; i < numArgs && i < gfxColorMaxComps; ++i) {
if (args[i].isNum()) {
color.c[i] = dblToCol(args[i].getNum());
}
}
state->setFillColor(&color);
out->updateFillColor(state);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Part::registerJob(KJob* job)
{
if (!m_jobTracker) {
m_jobTracker = new JobTracker(widget());
m_statusBarExtension->addStatusBarItem(m_jobTracker->widget(0), 0, true);
m_jobTracker->widget(job)->show();
}
m_jobTracker->registerJob(job);
emit busy();
connect(job, &KJob::result, this, &Part::ready);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 6,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: COMPS_HSList * comps_mrtree_get(COMPS_MRTree * rt, const char * key) {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem * it = NULL;
COMPS_MRTreeData * rtdata;
unsigned int offset, len, x;
char found, ended;
len = strlen(key);
offset = 0;
subnodes = rt->subnodes;
while (offset != len) {
found = 0;
for (it = subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
if (((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key[0] == key[offset]) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
return NULL;
rtdata = (COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data;
for (x=1; ;x++) {
ended=0;
if (rtdata->key[x] == 0) ended += 1;
if (x == len - offset) ended += 2;
if (ended != 0) break;
if (key[offset+x] != rtdata->key[x]) break;
}
if (ended == 3) return rtdata->data;
else if (ended == 1) offset+=x;
else return NULL;
subnodes = ((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
}
if (it)
return ((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->data;
else return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void webkitWebViewBaseSizeAllocate(GtkWidget* widget, GtkAllocation* allocation)
{
GTK_WIDGET_CLASS(webkit_web_view_base_parent_class)->size_allocate(widget, allocation);
WebKitWebViewBase* webViewBase = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_BASE(widget);
if (!gtk_widget_get_mapped(GTK_WIDGET(webViewBase)) && !webViewBase->priv->pageProxy->drawingArea()->size().isEmpty()) {
webViewBase->priv->needsResizeOnMap = true;
return;
}
resizeWebKitWebViewBaseFromAllocation(webViewBase, allocation);
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 15,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ikev1_hash_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_HASH)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
/* Print the entire payload in hex */
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_HASH)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14469/ISAKMP: Add a missing bounds check
In ikev1_n_print() check bounds before trying to fetch the replay detection
status.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OVS_REQUIRES(ofproto_mutex)
{
struct ofputil_group_stats ogs;
const struct ofproto *ofproto = group->ofproto;
long long int now = time_msec();
int error;
ogs.bucket_stats = xmalloc(group->n_buckets * sizeof *ogs.bucket_stats);
/* Provider sets the packet and byte counts, we do the rest. */
ogs.ref_count = rule_collection_n(&group->rules);
ogs.n_buckets = group->n_buckets;
error = (ofproto->ofproto_class->group_get_stats
? ofproto->ofproto_class->group_get_stats(group, &ogs)
: EOPNOTSUPP);
if (error) {
ogs.packet_count = UINT64_MAX;
ogs.byte_count = UINT64_MAX;
memset(ogs.bucket_stats, 0xff,
ogs.n_buckets * sizeof *ogs.bucket_stats);
}
ogs.group_id = group->group_id;
calc_duration(group->created, now, &ogs.duration_sec, &ogs.duration_nsec);
ofputil_append_group_stats(replies, &ogs);
free(ogs.bucket_stats);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 21,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static spl_ptr_heap_element spl_ptr_heap_top(spl_ptr_heap *heap) { /* {{{ */
if (heap->count == 0) {
return NULL;
}
return heap->elements[0];
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcGetProperty(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xGetPropertyReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGetPropertyReq);
swapl(&stuff->window);
swapl(&stuff->property);
swapl(&stuff->type);
swapl(&stuff->longOffset);
swapl(&stuff->longLength);
return ((*ProcVector[X_GetProperty]) (client));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaPlayer::prepareAsync_l()
{
if ( (mPlayer != 0) && ( mCurrentState & (MEDIA_PLAYER_INITIALIZED | MEDIA_PLAYER_STOPPED) ) ) {
if (mAudioAttributesParcel != NULL) {
mPlayer->setParameter(KEY_PARAMETER_AUDIO_ATTRIBUTES, *mAudioAttributesParcel);
} else {
mPlayer->setAudioStreamType(mStreamType);
}
mCurrentState = MEDIA_PLAYER_PREPARING;
return mPlayer->prepareAsync();
}
ALOGE("prepareAsync called in state %d", mCurrentState);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void returnDataCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
info.GetReturnValue().Set(info.Data());
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 27,112 |
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