instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::dispatchChangeEvent() {
dispatchScopedEvent(Event::createBubble(EventTypeNames::change));
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021 | 0 | 3,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void methodWithOptionalArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "methodWithOptionalArg", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() <= 0)) {
imp->methodWithOptionalArg();
return;
}
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, opt, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->methodWithOptionalArg(opt);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ass_shaper_set_level(ASS_Shaper *shaper, ASS_ShapingLevel level)
{
shaper->shaping_level = level;
}
Commit Message: shaper: fix reallocation
Update the variable that tracks the allocated size. This potentially
improves performance and avoid some side effects, which lead to
undefined behavior in some cases.
Fixes fuzzer test case id:000051,sig:11,sync:fuzzer3,src:004221.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserPolicyConnector::Observe(int type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (type == chrome::NOTIFICATION_TOKEN_AVAILABLE) {
const TokenService* token_source =
Source<const TokenService>(source).ptr();
DCHECK_EQ(token_service_, token_source);
const TokenService::TokenAvailableDetails* token_details =
Details<const TokenService::TokenAvailableDetails>(details).ptr();
if (token_details->service() == GaiaConstants::kDeviceManagementService) {
if (user_data_store_.get()) {
user_data_store_->SetGaiaToken(token_details->token());
}
}
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void user_destroy(struct key *key)
{
struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data[0];
kzfree(upayload);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ax25_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied;
int err = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the
* queue for us! We do one quick check first though
*/
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
err = -ENOTCONN;
goto out;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
if (!sk_to_ax25(sk)->pidincl)
skb_pull(skb, 1); /* Remove PID */
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, 0, msg, copied);
if (msg->msg_name) {
ax25_digi digi;
ax25_address src;
const unsigned char *mac = skb_mac_header(skb);
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_ax25 *, sax, msg->msg_name);
memset(sax, 0, sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25));
ax25_addr_parse(mac + 1, skb->data - mac - 1, &src, NULL,
&digi, NULL, NULL);
sax->sax25_family = AF_AX25;
/* We set this correctly, even though we may not let the
application know the digi calls further down (because it
did NOT ask to know them). This could get political... **/
sax->sax25_ndigis = digi.ndigi;
sax->sax25_call = src;
if (sax->sax25_ndigis != 0) {
int ct;
struct full_sockaddr_ax25 *fsa = (struct full_sockaddr_ax25 *)sax;
for (ct = 0; ct < digi.ndigi; ct++)
fsa->fsa_digipeater[ct] = digi.calls[ct];
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25);
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
err = copied;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::verifyTrack(Track *track) {
const char *mime;
CHECK(track->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size;
if (!strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
if (!track->meta->findData(kKeyAVCC, &type, &data, &size)
|| type != kTypeAVCC) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_MPEG4)
|| !strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AAC)) {
if (!track->meta->findData(kKeyESDS, &type, &data, &size)
|| type != kTypeESDS) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
}
if (!track->sampleTable->isValid()) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix out-of-bounds write
Bug: 26365349
Change-Id: Ia363d9f8c231cf255dea852e0bbf5ca466c7990b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
{
struct kvmppc_ops *kvm_ops = NULL;
/*
* if we have both HV and PR enabled, default is HV
*/
if (type == 0) {
if (kvmppc_hv_ops)
kvm_ops = kvmppc_hv_ops;
else
kvm_ops = kvmppc_pr_ops;
if (!kvm_ops)
goto err_out;
} else if (type == KVM_VM_PPC_HV) {
if (!kvmppc_hv_ops)
goto err_out;
kvm_ops = kvmppc_hv_ops;
} else if (type == KVM_VM_PPC_PR) {
if (!kvmppc_pr_ops)
goto err_out;
kvm_ops = kvmppc_pr_ops;
} else
goto err_out;
if (kvm_ops->owner && !try_module_get(kvm_ops->owner))
return -ENOENT;
kvm->arch.kvm_ops = kvm_ops;
return kvmppc_core_init_vm(kvm);
err_out:
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 16,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int l_channel_close (lua_State *L) {
return channel_close(L, 0, 0);
}
Commit Message: Avoid a crash (double-free) when SSH connection fails
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 22,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteSelectSentence(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
return ExpandSelectionToGranularity(frame, TextGranularity::kSentence);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadItemImpl::SetTotalBytes(int64 total_bytes) {
total_bytes_ = total_bytes;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool IsValidElementNamePerHTMLParser(const CharType* characters,
unsigned length) {
CharType c = characters[0] | 0x20;
if (!('a' <= c && c < 'z'))
return false;
for (unsigned i = 1; i < length; ++i) {
c = characters[i];
if (c == '\t' || c == '\n' || c == '\f' || c == '\r' || c == ' ' ||
c == '/' || c == '>')
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 10,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_show_shade(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, fz_shade *shd)
{
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
fz_rect bbox;
softmask_save softmask = { NULL };
if (pr->super.hidden)
return;
fz_bound_shade(ctx, shd, &gstate->ctm, &bbox);
gstate = pdf_begin_group(ctx, pr, &bbox, &softmask);
/* FIXME: The gstate->ctm in the next line may be wrong; maybe
* it should be the parent gstates ctm? */
fz_fill_shade(ctx, pr->dev, shd, &gstate->ctm, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params);
pdf_end_group(ctx, pr, &softmask);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 28,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nl80211_send_new_peer_candidate(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
struct net_device *netdev,
const u8 *macaddr, const u8* ie, u8 ie_len,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct sk_buff *msg;
void *hdr;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, gfp);
if (!msg)
return;
hdr = nl80211hdr_put(msg, 0, 0, 0, NL80211_CMD_NEW_PEER_CANDIDATE);
if (!hdr) {
nlmsg_free(msg);
return;
}
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY, rdev->wiphy_idx);
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_IFINDEX, netdev->ifindex);
NLA_PUT(msg, NL80211_ATTR_MAC, ETH_ALEN, macaddr);
if (ie_len && ie)
NLA_PUT(msg, NL80211_ATTR_IE, ie_len , ie);
if (genlmsg_end(msg, hdr) < 0) {
nlmsg_free(msg);
return;
}
genlmsg_multicast_netns(wiphy_net(&rdev->wiphy), msg, 0,
nl80211_mlme_mcgrp.id, gfp);
return;
nla_put_failure:
genlmsg_cancel(msg, hdr);
nlmsg_free(msg);
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Element* Document::ElementFromPoint(int x, int y) const {
if (GetLayoutViewItem().IsNull())
return 0;
return TreeScope::ElementFromPoint(x, y);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 9,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: alloc_pa_data(krb5_preauthtype pa_type, size_t len, krb5_pa_data **out)
{
krb5_pa_data *pa;
uint8_t *buf = NULL;
*out = NULL;
if (len > 0) {
buf = malloc(len);
if (buf == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
pa = malloc(sizeof(*pa));
if (pa == NULL) {
free(buf);
return ENOMEM;
}
pa->magic = KV5M_PA_DATA;
pa->pa_type = pa_type;
pa->length = len;
pa->contents = buf;
*out = pa;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Ignore password attributes for S4U2Self requests
For consistency with Windows KDCs, allow protocol transition to work
even if the password has expired or needs changing.
Also, when looking up an enterprise principal with an AS request,
treat ERR_KEY_EXP as confirmation that the client is present in the
realm.
[ghudson@mit.edu: added comment in kdc_process_s4u2self_req(); edited
commit message]
ticket: 8763 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.17
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 12,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cifs_spnego_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
char *payload;
int ret;
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kmemdup(prep->data, prep->datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload)
goto error;
/* attach the data */
key->payload.data = payload;
ret = 0;
error:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 14,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ServiceWorkerContainer::~ServiceWorkerContainer()
{
ASSERT(!m_provider);
}
Commit Message: Check CSP before registering ServiceWorkers
Service Worker registrations should be subject to the same CSP checks as
other workers. The spec doesn't say this explicitly
(https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#directive-child-src-workers says "Worker or
SharedWorker constructors"), but it seems to be in the spirit of things,
and it matches Firefox's behavior.
BUG=579801
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1861253004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385775}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 6,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::BoundFramebufferHasDepthAttachment() {
Framebuffer* framebuffer =
GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT);
if (framebuffer) {
return framebuffer->HasDepthAttachment();
}
if (offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get()) {
return offscreen_target_depth_format_ != 0;
}
return back_buffer_has_depth_;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_open_recover(struct nfs4_opendata *opendata, struct nfs4_state *state)
{
struct nfs4_state *newstate;
int ret;
/* memory barrier prior to reading state->n_* */
clear_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags);
smp_rmb();
if (state->n_rdwr != 0) {
clear_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
ret = nfs4_open_recover_helper(opendata, FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE, &newstate);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
if (newstate != state)
return -ESTALE;
}
if (state->n_wronly != 0) {
clear_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
ret = nfs4_open_recover_helper(opendata, FMODE_WRITE, &newstate);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
if (newstate != state)
return -ESTALE;
}
if (state->n_rdonly != 0) {
clear_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
ret = nfs4_open_recover_helper(opendata, FMODE_READ, &newstate);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
if (newstate != state)
return -ESTALE;
}
/*
* We may have performed cached opens for all three recoveries.
* Check if we need to update the current stateid.
*/
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags) == 0 &&
memcmp(state->stateid.data, state->open_stateid.data, sizeof(state->stateid.data)) != 0) {
write_seqlock(&state->seqlock);
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags) == 0)
memcpy(state->stateid.data, state->open_stateid.data, sizeof(state->stateid.data));
write_sequnlock(&state->seqlock);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void check_stack_usage(void)
{
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(low_water_lock);
static int lowest_to_date = THREAD_SIZE;
unsigned long *n = end_of_stack(current);
unsigned long free;
while (*n == 0)
n++;
free = (unsigned long)n - (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current);
if (free >= lowest_to_date)
return;
spin_lock(&low_water_lock);
if (free < lowest_to_date) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s used greatest stack depth: %lu bytes "
"left\n",
current->comm, free);
lowest_to_date = free;
}
spin_unlock(&low_water_lock);
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorAccessibilityAgent::populateDOMNodeAncestors(
Node& inspectedDOMNode,
AXNode& nodeObject,
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Array<AXNode>>& nodes,
AXObjectCacheImpl& cache) const {
Node* parentNode = inspectedDOMNode.isShadowRoot()
? &toShadowRoot(inspectedDOMNode).host()
: FlatTreeTraversal::parent(inspectedDOMNode);
AXObject* parentAXObject = cache.getOrCreate(parentNode);
while (parentNode && !parentAXObject) {
parentNode = parentNode->isShadowRoot()
? &toShadowRoot(parentNode)->host()
: FlatTreeTraversal::parent(*parentNode);
parentAXObject = cache.getOrCreate(parentNode);
}
if (!parentAXObject)
return;
if (parentAXObject->accessibilityIsIgnored())
parentAXObject = parentAXObject->parentObjectUnignored();
if (!parentAXObject)
return;
std::unique_ptr<AXNode> parentNodeObject =
buildProtocolAXObject(*parentAXObject, nullptr, true, nodes, cache);
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Array<AXNodeId>> childIds =
protocol::Array<AXNodeId>::create();
childIds->addItem(String::number(kIDForInspectedNodeWithNoAXNode));
parentNodeObject->setChildIds(std::move(childIds));
nodes->addItem(std::move(parentNodeObject));
AXObject* grandparentAXObject = parentAXObject->parentObjectUnignored();
if (grandparentAXObject)
addAncestors(*grandparentAXObject, nullptr, nodes, cache);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 2,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
unsigned int len)
{
int i;
SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
|| (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
&& (s->s3->wpend_buf != buf))
|| (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
return (-1);
}
for (;;) {
clear_sys_error();
if (s->wbio != NULL) {
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
(char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
(unsigned int)wb->left);
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
i = -1;
}
if (i == wb->left) {
wb->left = 0;
wb->offset += i;
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
} else if (i <= 0) {
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
* using a datagram service
*/
wb->left = 0;
}
return i;
}
wb->offset += i;
wb->left -= i;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, convertToExecutable)
{
char *ext = NULL;
int is_data;
size_t ext_len = 0;
php_uint32 flags;
zend_object *ret;
/* a number that is not 0, 1 or 2 (Which is also Greg's birthday, so there) */
zend_long format = 9021976, method = 9021976;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|lls", &format, &method, &ext, &ext_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (PHAR_G(readonly)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"Cannot write out executable phar archive, phar is read-only");
return;
}
switch (format) {
case 9021976:
case PHAR_FORMAT_SAME: /* null is converted to 0 */
/* by default, use the existing format */
if (phar_obj->archive->is_tar) {
format = PHAR_FORMAT_TAR;
} else if (phar_obj->archive->is_zip) {
format = PHAR_FORMAT_ZIP;
} else {
format = PHAR_FORMAT_PHAR;
}
break;
case PHAR_FORMAT_PHAR:
case PHAR_FORMAT_TAR:
case PHAR_FORMAT_ZIP:
break;
default:
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0,
"Unknown file format specified, please pass one of Phar::PHAR, Phar::TAR or Phar::ZIP");
return;
}
switch (method) {
case 9021976:
flags = phar_obj->archive->flags & PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSION_MASK;
break;
case 0:
flags = PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_NONE;
break;
case PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_GZ:
if (format == PHAR_FORMAT_ZIP) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0,
"Cannot compress entire archive with gzip, zip archives do not support whole-archive compression");
return;
}
if (!PHAR_G(has_zlib)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0,
"Cannot compress entire archive with gzip, enable ext/zlib in php.ini");
return;
}
flags = PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_GZ;
break;
case PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_BZ2:
if (format == PHAR_FORMAT_ZIP) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0,
"Cannot compress entire archive with bz2, zip archives do not support whole-archive compression");
return;
}
if (!PHAR_G(has_bz2)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0,
"Cannot compress entire archive with bz2, enable ext/bz2 in php.ini");
return;
}
flags = PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_BZ2;
break;
default:
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0,
"Unknown compression specified, please pass one of Phar::GZ or Phar::BZ2");
return;
}
is_data = phar_obj->archive->is_data;
phar_obj->archive->is_data = 0;
ret = phar_convert_to_other(phar_obj->archive, format, ext, flags);
phar_obj->archive->is_data = is_data;
if (ret) {
ZVAL_OBJ(return_value, ret);
} else {
RETURN_NULL();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void decode_version(unsigned char *bcd, unsigned int *major, unsigned int *minor, unsigned int *fix)
{
*major = 0;
*minor = 0;
*fix = 0;
/* decode BCD to decimal */
if ((bcd[0]>>4) < 10 && ((bcd[0]&0xF) < 10) && ((bcd[1]>>4) < 10)) {
*major = (bcd[0]>>4)*100 + (bcd[0]&0xF)*10 + (bcd[1]>>4);
}
if (((bcd[1]&0xF) < 10) && ((bcd[2]>>4) < 10) && ((bcd[2]&0xF) < 10)) {
*minor = (bcd[1]&0xF)*100 + (bcd[2]>>4)*10 + (bcd[2]&0xF);
}
if ((bcd[3]>>4) < 10 && ((bcd[3]&0xF) < 10)
&& (bcd[4]>>4) < 10 && ((bcd[4]&0xF) < 10)) {
*fix = (bcd[3]>>4)*1000 + (bcd[3]&0xF)*100
+ (bcd[4]>>4)*10 + (bcd[4]&0xF);
}
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 26,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VerifyNewDownloadId(uint32_t expected_download_id, uint32_t download_id) {
ASSERT_EQ(expected_download_id, download_id);
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 14,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: daemon_AuthUserPwd(char *username, char *password, char *errbuf)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
/*
* Warning: the user which launches the process must have the
* SE_TCB_NAME right.
* This corresponds to have the "Act as part of the Operating System"
* turned on (administrative tools, local security settings, local
* policies, user right assignment)
* However, it seems to me that if you run it as a service, this
* right should be provided by default.
*
* XXX - hopefully, this returns errors such as ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE,
* which merely indicates that the user name or password is
* incorrect, not whether it's the user name or the password
* that's incorrect, so a client that's trying to brute-force
* accounts doesn't know whether it's the user name or the
* password that's incorrect, so it doesn't know whether to
* stop trying to log in with a given user name and move on
* to another user name.
*/
DWORD error;
HANDLE Token;
char errmsgbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for errors to log
if (LogonUser(username, ".", password, LOGON32_LOGON_NETWORK, LOGON32_PROVIDER_DEFAULT, &Token) == 0)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
error = GetLastError();
if (error != ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE)
{
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errmsgbuf,
PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, error, "LogonUser() failed");
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "%s", errmsgbuf);
}
return -1;
}
if (ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(Token) == 0)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
GetLastError(), "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser() failed");
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "%s", errmsgbuf);
CloseHandle(Token);
return -1;
}
CloseHandle(Token);
return 0;
#else
/*
* See
*
* http://www.unixpapa.com/incnote/passwd.html
*
* We use the Solaris/Linux shadow password authentication if
* we have getspnam(), otherwise we just do traditional
* authentication, which, on some platforms, might work, even
* with shadow passwords, if we're running as root. Traditional
* authenticaion won't work if we're not running as root, as
* I think these days all UN*Xes either won't return the password
* at all with getpwnam() or will only do so if you're root.
*
* XXX - perhaps what we *should* be using is PAM, if we have
* it. That might hide all the details of username/password
* authentication, whether it's done with a visible-to-root-
* only password database or some other authentication mechanism,
* behind its API.
*/
int error;
struct passwd *user;
char *user_password;
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
struct spwd *usersp;
#endif
char *crypt_password;
if ((user = getpwnam(username)) == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
return -1;
}
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
if ((usersp = getspnam(username)) == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
return -1;
}
user_password = usersp->sp_pwdp;
#else
/*
* XXX - what about other platforms?
* The unixpapa.com page claims this Just Works on *BSD if you're
* running as root - it's from 2000, so it doesn't indicate whether
* macOS (which didn't come out until 2001, under the name Mac OS
* X) behaves like the *BSDs or not, and might also work on AIX.
* HP-UX does something else.
*
* Again, hopefully PAM hides all that.
*/
user_password = user->pw_passwd;
#endif
errno = 0;
crypt_password = crypt(password, user_password);
if (crypt_password == NULL)
{
error = errno;
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
if (error == 0)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "crypt() failed");
}
else
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "crypt() failed: %s",
strerror(error));
}
return -1;
}
if (strcmp(user_password, crypt_password) != 0)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
return -1;
}
if (setuid(user->pw_uid))
{
error = errno;
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
error, "setuid");
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "setuid() failed: %s",
strerror(error));
return -1;
}
/* if (setgid(user->pw_gid))
{
error = errno;
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "setgid");
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "setgid() failed: %s",
strerror(error));
return -1;
}
*/
return 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message: In the open request, reject capture sources that are URLs.
You shouldn't be able to ask a server to open a remote device on some
*other* server; just open it yourself.
This addresses Include Security issue F13: [libpcap] Remote Packet
Capture Daemon Allows Opening Capture URLs.
CWE ID: CWE-918 | 0 | 12,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_set_vlan_vid(uint16_t vid, bool push_vlan_if_needed, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
if (vid & ~0xfff) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
} else {
struct ofpact_vlan_vid *vlan_vid = ofpact_put_SET_VLAN_VID(out);
vlan_vid->vlan_vid = vid;
vlan_vid->push_vlan_if_needed = push_vlan_if_needed;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AddHistogramFramesPerBuffer(int param) {
AudioFramesPerBuffer afpb = AsAudioFramesPerBuffer(param);
if (afpb != kUnexpectedAudioBufferSize) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebRTC.AudioOutputFramesPerBuffer",
afpb, kUnexpectedAudioBufferSize);
} else {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("WebRTC.AudioOutputFramesPerBufferUnexpected", param);
}
}
Commit Message: Avoids crash in WebRTC audio clients for 96kHz render rate on Mac OSX.
TBR=xians
BUG=166523
TEST=Misc set of WebRTC audio clients on Mac.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11773017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@175323 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExternalProtocolDialog::Cancel() {
ExternalProtocolHandler::RecordHandleStateMetrics(
false /* checkbox_selected */, ExternalProtocolHandler::BLOCK);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Set Cancel as the default button for the external protocol dialog.
This ensures that users holding down the Enter or Space key cannot
accidentally trigger an external protocol launch.
BUG=865202
Change-Id: I2cec7b3c216b80641200c97dec2517a66b4e0b24
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142705
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Trent Apted <tapted@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576340}
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool link_dump_filtered(struct net_device *dev,
int master_idx,
const struct rtnl_link_ops *kind_ops)
{
if (link_master_filtered(dev, master_idx) ||
link_kind_filtered(dev, kind_ops))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 1,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Compositor::DidGenerateLocalSurfaceIdAllocation(
const viz::LocalSurfaceIdAllocation& allocation) {
for (auto& observer : observer_list_)
observer.DidGenerateLocalSurfaceIdAllocation(this, allocation);
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 18,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: is_octal(const char *p, size_t len)
{
while (len-- > 0) {
if (*p < '0' || *p > '7')
return (0);
++p;
}
return (1);
}
Commit Message: Reject cpio symlinks that exceed 1MB
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutofillManager::AutofillManager(
AutofillDriver* driver,
AutofillClient* client,
PersonalDataManager* personal_data,
const std::string app_locale,
AutofillDownloadManagerState enable_download_manager)
: AutofillHandler(driver),
client_(client),
payments_client_(std::make_unique<payments::PaymentsClient>(
driver->GetURLLoaderFactory(),
client->GetPrefs(),
client->GetIdentityManager(),
/*unmask_delegate=*/this,
/*save_delegate=*/nullptr,
driver->IsIncognito())),
app_locale_(app_locale),
personal_data_(personal_data),
form_data_importer_(
std::make_unique<FormDataImporter>(client,
payments_client_.get(),
personal_data,
app_locale_)),
field_filler_(app_locale, client->GetAddressNormalizer()),
autocomplete_history_manager_(
std::make_unique<AutocompleteHistoryManager>(driver, client)),
form_interactions_ukm_logger_(
std::make_unique<AutofillMetrics::FormInteractionsUkmLogger>(
client->GetUkmRecorder())),
address_form_event_logger_(
std::make_unique<AutofillMetrics::FormEventLogger>(
/*is_for_credit_card=*/false,
form_interactions_ukm_logger_.get())),
credit_card_form_event_logger_(
std::make_unique<AutofillMetrics::FormEventLogger>(
/*is_for_credit_card=*/true,
form_interactions_ukm_logger_.get())),
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
autofill_assistant_(this),
#endif
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(driver);
DCHECK(client_);
if (enable_download_manager == ENABLE_AUTOFILL_DOWNLOAD_MANAGER) {
download_manager_.reset(new AutofillDownloadManager(driver, this));
}
CountryNames::SetLocaleString(app_locale_);
if (personal_data_ && client_)
personal_data_->OnSyncServiceInitialized(client_->GetSyncService());
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ping_proc_unregister(struct net *net, struct ping_seq_afinfo *afinfo)
{
remove_proc_entry(afinfo->name, net->proc_net);
}
Commit Message: ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name
A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const net::HttpRequestHeaders& request_headers() const {
return request_headers_;
}
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652}
CWE ID: | 1 | 25,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct tevent_req *smb2cli_req_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct tevent_context *ev,
struct smbXcli_conn *conn,
uint16_t cmd,
uint32_t additional_flags,
uint32_t clear_flags,
uint32_t timeout_msec,
struct smbXcli_tcon *tcon,
struct smbXcli_session *session,
const uint8_t *fixed,
uint16_t fixed_len,
const uint8_t *dyn,
uint32_t dyn_len,
uint32_t max_dyn_len)
{
struct tevent_req *req;
NTSTATUS status;
req = smb2cli_req_create(mem_ctx, ev, conn, cmd,
additional_flags, clear_flags,
timeout_msec,
tcon, session,
fixed, fixed_len,
dyn, dyn_len,
max_dyn_len);
if (req == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (!tevent_req_is_in_progress(req)) {
return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
}
status = smb2cli_req_compound_submit(&req, 1);
if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
}
return req;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 GlobalConfirmInfoBar::DelegateProxy::GetMessageText() const {
return global_info_bar_ ? global_info_bar_->delegate_->GetMessageText()
: base::string16();
}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 28,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jas_image_t *jas_image_decode(jas_stream_t *in, int fmt, char *optstr)
{
jas_image_fmtinfo_t *fmtinfo;
jas_image_t *image;
image = 0;
/* If possible, try to determine the format of the input data. */
if (fmt < 0) {
if ((fmt = jas_image_getfmt(in)) < 0)
goto error;
}
/* Is it possible to decode an image represented in this format? */
if (!(fmtinfo = jas_image_lookupfmtbyid(fmt)))
goto error;
if (!fmtinfo->ops.decode)
goto error;
/* Decode the image. */
if (!(image = (*fmtinfo->ops.decode)(in, optstr)))
goto error;
/* Create a color profile if needed. */
if (!jas_clrspc_isunknown(image->clrspc_) &&
!jas_clrspc_isgeneric(image->clrspc_) && !image->cmprof_) {
if (!(image->cmprof_ =
jas_cmprof_createfromclrspc(jas_image_clrspc(image))))
goto error;
}
return image;
error:
if (image)
jas_image_destroy(image);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 25,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xenvif_get_sset_count(struct net_device *dev, int string_set)
{
switch (string_set) {
case ETH_SS_STATS:
return ARRAY_SIZE(xenvif_stats);
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: shutdown the ring if it contains garbage.
A buggy or malicious frontend should not be able to confuse netback.
If we spot anything which is not as it should be then shutdown the
device and don't try to continue with the ring in a potentially
hostile state. Well behaved and non-hostile frontends will not be
penalised.
As well as making the existing checks for such errors fatal also add a
new check that ensures that there isn't an insane number of requests
on the ring (i.e. more than would fit in the ring). If the ring
contains garbage then previously is was possible to loop over this
insane number, getting an error each time and therefore not generating
any more pending requests and therefore not exiting the loop in
xen_netbk_tx_build_gops for an externded period.
Also turn various netdev_dbg calls which no precipitate a fatal error
into netdev_err, they are rate limited because the device is shutdown
afterwards.
This fixes at least one known DoS/softlockup of the backend domain.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pvscsi_on_cmd_config(PVSCSIState *s)
{
trace_pvscsi_on_cmd_noimpl("PVSCSI_CMD_CONFIG");
return PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_FAILED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PP_DeviceType_Dev PepperMediaDeviceManager::FromMediaStreamType(
MediaStreamType type) {
switch (type) {
case MEDIA_NO_SERVICE:
return PP_DEVICETYPE_DEV_INVALID;
case MEDIA_DEVICE_AUDIO_CAPTURE:
return PP_DEVICETYPE_DEV_AUDIOCAPTURE;
case MEDIA_DEVICE_VIDEO_CAPTURE:
return PP_DEVICETYPE_DEV_VIDEOCAPTURE;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return PP_DEVICETYPE_DEV_INVALID;
}
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothAdapter::SetPowered(bool powered,
const base::Closure& callback,
const ErrorCallback& error_callback) {
if (set_powered_callbacks_) {
ui_task_runner_->PostTask(FROM_HERE, error_callback);
return;
}
if (powered == IsPowered()) {
ui_task_runner_->PostTask(FROM_HERE, callback);
return;
}
if (!SetPoweredImpl(powered)) {
ui_task_runner_->PostTask(FROM_HERE, error_callback);
return;
}
set_powered_callbacks_ = std::make_unique<SetPoweredCallbacks>();
set_powered_callbacks_->powered = powered;
set_powered_callbacks_->callback = callback;
set_powered_callbacks_->error_callback = error_callback;
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sctp_assoc_set_primary(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_transport *transport)
{
int changeover = 0;
/* it's a changeover only if we already have a primary path
* that we are changing
*/
if (asoc->peer.primary_path != NULL &&
asoc->peer.primary_path != transport)
changeover = 1 ;
asoc->peer.primary_path = transport;
/* Set a default msg_name for events. */
memcpy(&asoc->peer.primary_addr, &transport->ipaddr,
sizeof(union sctp_addr));
/* If the primary path is changing, assume that the
* user wants to use this new path.
*/
if ((transport->state == SCTP_ACTIVE) ||
(transport->state == SCTP_UNKNOWN))
asoc->peer.active_path = transport;
/*
* SFR-CACC algorithm:
* Upon the receipt of a request to change the primary
* destination address, on the data structure for the new
* primary destination, the sender MUST do the following:
*
* 1) If CHANGEOVER_ACTIVE is set, then there was a switch
* to this destination address earlier. The sender MUST set
* CYCLING_CHANGEOVER to indicate that this switch is a
* double switch to the same destination address.
*
* Really, only bother is we have data queued or outstanding on
* the association.
*/
if (!asoc->outqueue.outstanding_bytes && !asoc->outqueue.out_qlen)
return;
if (transport->cacc.changeover_active)
transport->cacc.cycling_changeover = changeover;
/* 2) The sender MUST set CHANGEOVER_ACTIVE to indicate that
* a changeover has occurred.
*/
transport->cacc.changeover_active = changeover;
/* 3) The sender MUST store the next TSN to be sent in
* next_tsn_at_change.
*/
transport->cacc.next_tsn_at_change = asoc->next_tsn;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UrlFetcher::Core::Core(const GURL& url, Method method)
: url_(url),
method_(method),
delegate_message_loop_(base::MessageLoopProxy::current()),
buffer_(new net::IOBuffer(kBufferSize)) {
CHECK(url_.is_valid());
}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int build_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c)
{
struct xfrm_user_expire *ue;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
int err;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, c->pid, 0, XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE, sizeof(*ue), 0);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
ue = nlmsg_data(nlh);
copy_to_user_state(x, &ue->state);
ue->hard = (c->data.hard != 0) ? 1 : 0;
err = xfrm_mark_put(skb, &x->mark);
if (err)
return err;
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mp_put_char(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned char ch)
{
struct sb_uart_state *state = tty->driver_data;
return __mp_put_char(state->port, &state->info->xmit, ch);
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoFramebufferRenderbuffer(
GLenum target, GLenum attachment, GLenum renderbuffertarget,
GLuint client_renderbuffer_id) {
FramebufferManager::FramebufferInfo* framebuffer_info =
GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(target);
if (!framebuffer_info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glFramebufferRenderbuffer: no framebuffer bound");
return;
}
GLuint service_id = 0;
RenderbufferManager::RenderbufferInfo* info = NULL;
if (client_renderbuffer_id) {
info = GetRenderbufferInfo(client_renderbuffer_id);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glFramebufferRenderbuffer: unknown renderbuffer");
return;
}
service_id = info->service_id();
}
CopyRealGLErrorsToWrapper();
glFramebufferRenderbufferEXT(
target, attachment, renderbuffertarget, service_id);
GLenum error = PeekGLError();
if (error == GL_NO_ERROR) {
framebuffer_info->AttachRenderbuffer(attachment, info);
if (service_id == 0 ||
glCheckFramebufferStatusEXT(target) == GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
if (info) {
ClearUnclearedRenderbuffers(target, framebuffer_info);
}
}
}
if (framebuffer_info == bound_draw_framebuffer_) {
state_dirty_ = true;
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
{
const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
int k;
/* Can't do anything on client side */
if (s->server == 0)
return -1;
if (nmatch == -2)
{
if (tls1_suiteb(s))
{
/* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
* already know these are acceptable due to previous
* checks.
*/
unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
/* Should never happen */
return NID_undef;
}
/* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
nmatch = 0;
}
tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
&supp, &supplen);
tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
&pref, &preflen);
preflen /= 2;
supplen /= 2;
k = 0;
for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
{
const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
{
if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
{
if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
continue;
if (nmatch == k)
{
int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
}
k++;
}
}
}
if (nmatch == -1)
return k;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init ksm_slab_init(void)
{
rmap_item_cache = KSM_KMEM_CACHE(rmap_item, 0);
if (!rmap_item_cache)
goto out;
stable_node_cache = KSM_KMEM_CACHE(stable_node, 0);
if (!stable_node_cache)
goto out_free1;
mm_slot_cache = KSM_KMEM_CACHE(mm_slot, 0);
if (!mm_slot_cache)
goto out_free2;
return 0;
out_free2:
kmem_cache_destroy(stable_node_cache);
out_free1:
kmem_cache_destroy(rmap_item_cache);
out:
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: ksm: fix NULL pointer dereference in scan_get_next_rmap_item()
Andrea Righi reported a case where an exiting task can race against
ksmd::scan_get_next_rmap_item (http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/6/1/742) easily
triggering a NULL pointer dereference in ksmd.
ksm_scan.mm_slot == &ksm_mm_head with only one registered mm
CPU 1 (__ksm_exit) CPU 2 (scan_get_next_rmap_item)
list_empty() is false
lock slot == &ksm_mm_head
list_del(slot->mm_list)
(list now empty)
unlock
lock
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next)
(list is empty, so slot is still ksm_mm_head)
unlock
slot->mm == NULL ... Oops
Close this race by revalidating that the new slot is not simply the list
head again.
Andrea's test case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define BUFSIZE getpagesize()
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
void *ptr;
if (posix_memalign(&ptr, getpagesize(), BUFSIZE) < 0) {
perror("posix_memalign");
exit(1);
}
if (madvise(ptr, BUFSIZE, MADV_MERGEABLE) < 0) {
perror("madvise");
exit(1);
}
*(char *)NULL = 0;
return 0;
}
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 3,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::AttachInterstitialPage(
InterstitialPageImpl* interstitial_page) {
DCHECK(interstitial_page);
GetRenderManager()->set_interstitial_page(interstitial_page);
CancelActiveAndPendingDialogs();
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidAttachInterstitialPage();
if (frame_tree_.IsLoading())
LoadingStateChanged(true, true, nullptr);
if (node_.OuterContentsFrameTreeNode()) {
if (GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate()) {
DCHECK(
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(interstitial_page->GetView())
->IsRenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame());
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame* view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame*>(
interstitial_page->GetView());
GetRenderManager()->SetRWHViewForInnerContents(view);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 5,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mget(struct magic_set *ms, const unsigned char *s, struct magic *m,
size_t nbytes, size_t o, unsigned int cont_level, int mode, int text,
int flip, int recursion_level, int *printed_something,
int *need_separator, int *returnval)
{
uint32_t soffset, offset = ms->offset;
uint32_t lhs;
int rv, oneed_separator, in_type;
char *sbuf, *rbuf;
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
struct mlist ml;
if (recursion_level >= 20) {
file_error(ms, 0, "recursion nesting exceeded");
return -1;
}
if (mcopy(ms, p, m->type, m->flag & INDIR, s, (uint32_t)(offset + o),
(uint32_t)nbytes, m) == -1)
return -1;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "mget(type=%d, flag=%x, offset=%u, o=%"
SIZE_T_FORMAT "u, " "nbytes=%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u)\n",
m->type, m->flag, offset, o, nbytes);
mdebug(offset, (char *)(void *)p, sizeof(union VALUETYPE));
#ifndef COMPILE_ONLY
file_mdump(m);
#endif
}
if (m->flag & INDIR) {
int off = m->in_offset;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINDIRECT) {
const union VALUETYPE *q = CAST(const union VALUETYPE *,
((const void *)(s + offset + off)));
switch (cvt_flip(m->in_type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
off = q->b;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
off = q->h;
break;
case FILE_BESHORT:
off = (short)((q->hs[0]<<8)|(q->hs[1]));
break;
case FILE_LESHORT:
off = (short)((q->hs[1]<<8)|(q->hs[0]));
break;
case FILE_LONG:
off = q->l;
break;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEID3:
off = (int32_t)((q->hl[0]<<24)|(q->hl[1]<<16)|
(q->hl[2]<<8)|(q->hl[3]));
break;
case FILE_LEID3:
case FILE_LELONG:
off = (int32_t)((q->hl[3]<<24)|(q->hl[2]<<16)|
(q->hl[1]<<8)|(q->hl[0]));
break;
case FILE_MELONG:
off = (int32_t)((q->hl[1]<<24)|(q->hl[0]<<16)|
(q->hl[3]<<8)|(q->hl[2]));
break;
}
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "indirect offs=%u\n", off);
}
switch (in_type = cvt_flip(m->in_type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 1))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = p->b & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = p->b | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = p->b ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = p->b + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = p->b - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = p->b * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = p->b / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = p->b % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = p->b;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_BESHORT:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 2))
return 0;
lhs = (p->hs[0] << 8) | p->hs[1];
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = lhs & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = lhs | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = lhs ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = lhs + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = lhs - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = lhs * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = lhs / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = lhs % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = lhs;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_LESHORT:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 2))
return 0;
lhs = (p->hs[1] << 8) | p->hs[0];
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = lhs & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = lhs | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = lhs ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = lhs + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = lhs - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = lhs * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = lhs / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = lhs % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = lhs;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 2))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = p->h & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = p->h | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = p->h ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = p->h + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = p->h - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = p->h * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = p->h / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = p->h % off;
break;
}
}
else
offset = p->h;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEID3:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 4))
return 0;
lhs = (p->hl[0] << 24) | (p->hl[1] << 16) |
(p->hl[2] << 8) | p->hl[3];
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = lhs & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = lhs | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = lhs ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = lhs + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = lhs - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = lhs * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = lhs / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = lhs % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = lhs;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_LEID3:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 4))
return 0;
lhs = (p->hl[3] << 24) | (p->hl[2] << 16) |
(p->hl[1] << 8) | p->hl[0];
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = lhs & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = lhs | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = lhs ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = lhs + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = lhs - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = lhs * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = lhs / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = lhs % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = lhs;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_MELONG:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 4))
return 0;
lhs = (p->hl[1] << 24) | (p->hl[0] << 16) |
(p->hl[3] << 8) | p->hl[2];
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = lhs & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = lhs | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = lhs ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = lhs + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = lhs - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = lhs * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = lhs / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = lhs % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = lhs;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_LONG:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 4))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = p->l & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = p->l | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = p->l ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = p->l + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = p->l - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = p->l * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = p->l / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = p->l % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = p->l;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
default:
break;
}
switch (in_type) {
case FILE_LEID3:
case FILE_BEID3:
offset = ((((offset >> 0) & 0x7f) << 0) |
(((offset >> 8) & 0x7f) << 7) |
(((offset >> 16) & 0x7f) << 14) |
(((offset >> 24) & 0x7f) << 21)) + 10;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (m->flag & INDIROFFADD) {
offset += ms->c.li[cont_level-1].off;
if (offset == 0) {
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr,
"indirect *zero* offset\n");
return 0;
}
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "indirect +offs=%u\n", offset);
}
if (mcopy(ms, p, m->type, 0, s, offset, nbytes, m) == -1)
return -1;
ms->offset = offset;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0) {
mdebug(offset, (char *)(void *)p,
sizeof(union VALUETYPE));
#ifndef COMPILE_ONLY
file_mdump(m);
#endif
}
}
/* Verify we have enough data to match magic type */
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BYTE:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 1))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 2))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
case FILE_FLOAT:
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 4))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 8))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
case FILE_SEARCH:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, m->vallen))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_REGEX:
if (nbytes < offset)
return 0;
break;
case FILE_INDIRECT:
if (offset == 0)
return 0;
if (nbytes < offset)
return 0;
sbuf = ms->o.buf;
soffset = ms->offset;
ms->o.buf = NULL;
ms->offset = 0;
rv = file_softmagic(ms, s + offset, nbytes - offset,
recursion_level, BINTEST, text);
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "indirect @offs=%u[%d]\n", offset, rv);
rbuf = ms->o.buf;
ms->o.buf = sbuf;
ms->offset = soffset;
if (rv == 1) {
if ((ms->flags & (MAGIC_MIME|MAGIC_APPLE)) == 0 &&
file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%u"), offset) == -1) {
free(rbuf);
return -1;
}
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", rbuf) == -1) {
free(rbuf);
return -1;
}
}
free(rbuf);
return rv;
case FILE_USE:
if (nbytes < offset)
return 0;
sbuf = m->value.s;
if (*sbuf == '^') {
sbuf++;
flip = !flip;
}
if (file_magicfind(ms, sbuf, &ml) == -1) {
file_error(ms, 0, "cannot find entry `%s'", sbuf);
return -1;
}
oneed_separator = *need_separator;
if (m->flag & NOSPACE)
*need_separator = 0;
rv = match(ms, ml.magic, ml.nmagic, s, nbytes, offset + o,
mode, text, flip, recursion_level, printed_something,
need_separator, returnval);
if (rv != 1)
*need_separator = oneed_separator;
return rv;
case FILE_NAME:
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", m->desc) == -1)
return -1;
return 1;
case FILE_DEFAULT: /* nothing to check */
case FILE_CLEAR:
default:
break;
}
if (!mconvert(ms, m, flip))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: PR/398: Correctly truncate pascal strings (fixes out of bounds read of 1, 2,
or 4 bytes).
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
*olen = 0;
/* We're always including an TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV in the
* initial ClientHello, in which case also adding the renegotiation
* info extension is NOT RECOMMENDED as per RFC 5746 Section 3.4. */
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
return;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" ) );
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 5 + ssl->verify_data_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
/*
* Secure renegotiation
*/
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = ( ssl->verify_data_len + 1 ) & 0xFF;
*p++ = ssl->verify_data_len & 0xFF;
memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len );
*olen = 5 + ssl->verify_data_len;
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check before length read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 23,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int netlbl_cipsov4_listall(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct netlbl_cipsov4_doiwalk_arg cb_arg;
int doi_skip = cb->args[0];
cb_arg.nl_cb = cb;
cb_arg.skb = skb;
cb_arg.seq = cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq;
cipso_v4_doi_walk(&doi_skip, netlbl_cipsov4_listall_cb, &cb_arg);
cb->args[0] = doi_skip;
return skb->len;
}
Commit Message: NetLabel: correct CIPSO tag handling when adding new DOI definitions
The current netlbl_cipsov4_add_common() function has two problems which are
fixed with this patch. The first is an off-by-one bug where it is possibile to
overflow the doi_def->tags[] array. The second is a bug where the same
doi_def->tags[] array was not always fully initialized, which caused sporadic
failures.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void inv_predict_13(uint8_t *p, const uint8_t *p_l, const uint8_t *p_tl,
const uint8_t *p_t, const uint8_t *p_tr)
{
p[0] = clamp_add_subtract_half(p_l[0], p_t[0], p_tl[0]);
p[1] = clamp_add_subtract_half(p_l[1], p_t[1], p_tl[1]);
p[2] = clamp_add_subtract_half(p_l[2], p_t[2], p_tl[2]);
p[3] = clamp_add_subtract_half(p_l[3], p_t[3], p_tl[3]);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage void __sched schedule(void)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
sched_submit_work(tsk);
__schedule();
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 23,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_indirect(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
struct iovec iov[], unsigned int iov_size,
unsigned int *out_num, unsigned int *in_num,
struct vhost_log *log, unsigned int *log_num,
struct vring_desc *indirect)
{
struct vring_desc desc;
unsigned int i = 0, count, found = 0;
u32 len = vhost32_to_cpu(vq, indirect->len);
struct iov_iter from;
int ret;
/* Sanity check */
if (unlikely(len % sizeof desc)) {
vq_err(vq, "Invalid length in indirect descriptor: "
"len 0x%llx not multiple of 0x%zx\n",
(unsigned long long)len,
sizeof desc);
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = translate_desc(vq, vhost64_to_cpu(vq, indirect->addr), len, vq->indirect,
UIO_MAXIOV);
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
vq_err(vq, "Translation failure %d in indirect.\n", ret);
return ret;
}
iov_iter_init(&from, READ, vq->indirect, ret, len);
/* We will use the result as an address to read from, so most
* architectures only need a compiler barrier here. */
read_barrier_depends();
count = len / sizeof desc;
/* Buffers are chained via a 16 bit next field, so
* we can have at most 2^16 of these. */
if (unlikely(count > USHRT_MAX + 1)) {
vq_err(vq, "Indirect buffer length too big: %d\n",
indirect->len);
return -E2BIG;
}
do {
unsigned iov_count = *in_num + *out_num;
if (unlikely(++found > count)) {
vq_err(vq, "Loop detected: last one at %u "
"indirect size %u\n",
i, count);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (unlikely(copy_from_iter(&desc, sizeof(desc), &from) !=
sizeof(desc))) {
vq_err(vq, "Failed indirect descriptor: idx %d, %zx\n",
i, (size_t)vhost64_to_cpu(vq, indirect->addr) + i * sizeof desc);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (unlikely(desc.flags & cpu_to_vhost16(vq, VRING_DESC_F_INDIRECT))) {
vq_err(vq, "Nested indirect descriptor: idx %d, %zx\n",
i, (size_t)vhost64_to_cpu(vq, indirect->addr) + i * sizeof desc);
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = translate_desc(vq, vhost64_to_cpu(vq, desc.addr),
vhost32_to_cpu(vq, desc.len), iov + iov_count,
iov_size - iov_count);
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
vq_err(vq, "Translation failure %d indirect idx %d\n",
ret, i);
return ret;
}
/* If this is an input descriptor, increment that count. */
if (desc.flags & cpu_to_vhost16(vq, VRING_DESC_F_WRITE)) {
*in_num += ret;
if (unlikely(log)) {
log[*log_num].addr = vhost64_to_cpu(vq, desc.addr);
log[*log_num].len = vhost32_to_cpu(vq, desc.len);
++*log_num;
}
} else {
/* If it's an output descriptor, they're all supposed
* to come before any input descriptors. */
if (unlikely(*in_num)) {
vq_err(vq, "Indirect descriptor "
"has out after in: idx %d\n", i);
return -EINVAL;
}
*out_num += ret;
}
} while ((i = next_desc(vq, &desc)) != -1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint::DidStopLoading() {
DCHECK(!on_ready_.is_null());
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint::CallOnReady,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 15,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *register_lua_codecache(cmd_parms *cmd,
void *_cfg,
const char *arg)
{
ap_lua_dir_cfg *cfg = (ap_lua_dir_cfg *) _cfg;
if (strcasecmp("never", arg) == 0) {
cfg->codecache = AP_LUA_CACHE_NEVER;
}
else if (strcasecmp("stat", arg) == 0) {
cfg->codecache = AP_LUA_CACHE_STAT;
}
else if (strcasecmp("forever", arg) == 0) {
cfg->codecache = AP_LUA_CACHE_FOREVER;
}
else {
return apr_psprintf(cmd->pool,
"LuaCodeCache type of '%s' not recognized, valid "
"options are 'never', 'stat', and 'forever'",
arg);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 5,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String AudioHandler::NodeTypeName() const {
switch (node_type_) {
case kNodeTypeDestination:
return "AudioDestinationNode";
case kNodeTypeOscillator:
return "OscillatorNode";
case kNodeTypeAudioBufferSource:
return "AudioBufferSourceNode";
case kNodeTypeMediaElementAudioSource:
return "MediaElementAudioSourceNode";
case kNodeTypeMediaStreamAudioDestination:
return "MediaStreamAudioDestinationNode";
case kNodeTypeMediaStreamAudioSource:
return "MediaStreamAudioSourceNode";
case kNodeTypeScriptProcessor:
return "ScriptProcessorNode";
case kNodeTypeBiquadFilter:
return "BiquadFilterNode";
case kNodeTypePanner:
return "PannerNode";
case kNodeTypeStereoPanner:
return "StereoPannerNode";
case kNodeTypeConvolver:
return "ConvolverNode";
case kNodeTypeDelay:
return "DelayNode";
case kNodeTypeGain:
return "GainNode";
case kNodeTypeChannelSplitter:
return "ChannelSplitterNode";
case kNodeTypeChannelMerger:
return "ChannelMergerNode";
case kNodeTypeAnalyser:
return "AnalyserNode";
case kNodeTypeDynamicsCompressor:
return "DynamicsCompressorNode";
case kNodeTypeWaveShaper:
return "WaveShaperNode";
case kNodeTypeUnknown:
case kNodeTypeEnd:
default:
NOTREACHED();
return "UnknownNode";
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
TBR=rtoy@chromium.org,hongchan@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 8,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetMimeTypeMatch(const std::string& mime_type_string,
std::map<std::string, int> mime_type_map) {
for (const auto& entry : mime_type_map) {
if (entry.first == mime_type_string) {
return entry.second;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Add .desktop file to download_file_types.asciipb
.desktop files act as shortcuts on Linux, allowing arbitrary code
execution. We should send pings for these files.
Bug: 904182
Change-Id: Ibc26141fb180e843e1ffaf3f78717a9109d2fa9a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1344552
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#611272}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mark_reg_unknown_value(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
{
BUG_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG);
__mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno);
}
Commit Message: bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
The patch fixes two things at once:
1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
struct mnt_namespace *new_ns;
struct ucounts *ucounts;
int ret;
ucounts = inc_mnt_namespaces(user_ns);
if (!ucounts)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC);
new_ns = kmalloc(sizeof(struct mnt_namespace), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_ns) {
dec_mnt_namespaces(ucounts);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
ret = ns_alloc_inum(&new_ns->ns);
if (ret) {
kfree(new_ns);
dec_mnt_namespaces(ucounts);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
new_ns->ns.ops = &mntns_operations;
new_ns->seq = atomic64_add_return(1, &mnt_ns_seq);
atomic_set(&new_ns->count, 1);
new_ns->root = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_ns->list);
init_waitqueue_head(&new_ns->poll);
new_ns->event = 0;
new_ns->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
new_ns->ucounts = ucounts;
return new_ns;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 1 | 27,922 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void emitline(JF, js_Ast *node)
{
if (F->lastline != node->line) {
F->lastline = node->line;
emit(J, F, OP_LINE);
emitraw(J, F, node->line);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 16,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LICENSE_BLOB* license_new_binary_blob(UINT16 type)
{
LICENSE_BLOB* blob;
blob = (LICENSE_BLOB*) malloc(sizeof(LICENSE_BLOB));
blob->type = type;
blob->length = 0;
blob->data = NULL;
return blob;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible integer overflow in license_read_scope_list()
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nonpaging_sync_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
return 1;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterBMPImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("BMP");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadBMPImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteBMPImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsBMP;
entry->description=ConstantString("Microsoft Windows bitmap image");
entry->module=ConstantString("BMP");
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("BMP2");
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteBMPImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsBMP;
entry->description=ConstantString("Microsoft Windows bitmap image (V2)");
entry->module=ConstantString("BMP");
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("BMP3");
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteBMPImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsBMP;
entry->description=ConstantString("Microsoft Windows bitmap image (V3)");
entry->module=ConstantString("BMP");
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bin_info(RCore *r, int mode) {
int i, j, v;
char str[R_FLAG_NAME_SIZE];
RBinInfo *info = r_bin_get_info (r->bin);
RBinFile *binfile = r_core_bin_cur (r);
RBinObject *obj = r_bin_cur_object (r->bin);
const char *compiled = NULL;
bool havecode;
if (!binfile || !info || !obj) {
if (mode & R_CORE_BIN_JSON) {
r_cons_printf ("{}");
}
return false;
}
havecode = is_executable (obj) | (obj->entries != NULL);
compiled = get_compile_time (binfile->sdb);
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
r_config_set (r->config, "file.type", info->rclass);
r_config_set (r->config, "cfg.bigendian",
info->big_endian ? "true" : "false");
if (info->rclass && !strcmp (info->rclass, "fs")) {
} else {
if (info->lang) {
r_config_set (r->config, "bin.lang", info->lang);
}
r_config_set (r->config, "asm.os", info->os);
if (info->rclass && !strcmp (info->rclass, "pe")) {
r_config_set (r->config, "anal.cpp.abi", "msvc");
} else {
r_config_set (r->config, "anal.cpp.abi", "itanium");
}
r_config_set (r->config, "asm.arch", info->arch);
if (info->cpu && *info->cpu) {
r_config_set (r->config, "asm.cpu", info->cpu);
}
r_config_set (r->config, "anal.arch", info->arch);
snprintf (str, R_FLAG_NAME_SIZE, "%i", info->bits);
r_config_set (r->config, "asm.bits", str);
r_config_set (r->config, "asm.dwarf",
(R_BIN_DBG_STRIPPED & info->dbg_info) ? "false" : "true");
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_ALIGN);
if (v != -1) r_config_set_i (r->config, "asm.pcalign", v);
}
} else if (IS_MODE_SIMPLE (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("arch %s\n", info->arch);
if (info->cpu && *info->cpu) {
r_cons_printf ("cpu %s\n", info->cpu);
}
r_cons_printf ("bits %d\n", info->bits);
r_cons_printf ("os %s\n", info->os);
r_cons_printf ("endian %s\n", info->big_endian? "big": "little");
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_MIN_OP_SIZE);
if (v != -1) {
r_cons_printf ("minopsz %d\n", v);
}
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_MAX_OP_SIZE);
if (v != -1) {
r_cons_printf ("maxopsz %d\n", v);
}
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_ALIGN);
if (v != -1) {
r_cons_printf ("pcalign %d\n", v);
}
} else if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
if (info->type && !strcmp (info->type, "fs")) {
r_cons_printf ("e file.type=fs\n");
r_cons_printf ("m /root %s 0\n", info->arch);
} else {
r_cons_printf ("e cfg.bigendian=%s\n"
"e asm.bits=%i\n"
"e asm.dwarf=%s\n",
r_str_bool (info->big_endian),
info->bits,
r_str_bool (R_BIN_DBG_STRIPPED &info->dbg_info));
if (info->lang && *info->lang) {
r_cons_printf ("e bin.lang=%s\n", info->lang);
}
if (info->rclass && *info->rclass) {
r_cons_printf ("e file.type=%s\n",
info->rclass);
}
if (info->os) {
r_cons_printf ("e asm.os=%s\n", info->os);
}
if (info->arch) {
r_cons_printf ("e asm.arch=%s\n", info->arch);
}
if (info->cpu && *info->cpu) {
r_cons_printf ("e asm.cpu=%s\n", info->cpu);
}
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_ALIGN);
if (v != -1) r_cons_printf ("e asm.pcalign=%d\n", v);
}
} else {
char *tmp_buf;
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("{");
}
pair_str ("arch", info->arch, mode, false);
if (info->cpu && *info->cpu) {
pair_str ("cpu", info->cpu, mode, false);
}
pair_ut64 ("binsz", r_bin_get_size (r->bin), mode, false);
pair_str ("bintype", info->rclass, mode, false);
pair_int ("bits", info->bits, mode, false);
pair_bool ("canary", info->has_canary, mode, false);
pair_str ("class", info->bclass, mode, false);
if (info->actual_checksum) {
/* computed checksum */
pair_str ("cmp.csum", info->actual_checksum, mode, false);
}
pair_str ("compiled", compiled, mode, false);
pair_bool ("crypto", info->has_crypto, mode, false);
pair_str ("dbg_file", info->debug_file_name, mode, false);
pair_str ("endian", info->big_endian ? "big" : "little", mode, false);
if (info->rclass && !strcmp (info->rclass, "mdmp")) {
tmp_buf = sdb_get (binfile->sdb, "mdmp.flags", 0);
if (tmp_buf) {
pair_str ("flags", tmp_buf, mode, false);
free (tmp_buf);
}
}
pair_bool ("havecode", havecode, mode, false);
if (info->claimed_checksum) {
/* checksum specified in header */
pair_str ("hdr.csum", info->claimed_checksum, mode, false);
}
pair_str ("guid", info->guid, mode, false);
pair_str ("intrp", info->intrp, mode, false);
pair_str ("lang", info->lang, mode, false);
pair_bool ("linenum", R_BIN_DBG_LINENUMS & info->dbg_info, mode, false);
pair_bool ("lsyms", R_BIN_DBG_SYMS & info->dbg_info, mode, false);
pair_str ("machine", info->machine, mode, false);
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_MAX_OP_SIZE);
if (v != -1) {
pair_int ("maxopsz", v, mode, false);
}
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_MIN_OP_SIZE);
if (v != -1) {
pair_int ("minopsz", v, mode, false);
}
pair_bool ("nx", info->has_nx, mode, false);
pair_str ("os", info->os, mode, false);
if (info->rclass && !strcmp (info->rclass, "pe")) {
pair_bool ("overlay", info->pe_overlay, mode, false);
}
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_ALIGN);
if (v != -1) {
pair_int ("pcalign", v, mode, false);
}
pair_bool ("pic", info->has_pi, mode, false);
pair_bool ("relocs", R_BIN_DBG_RELOCS & info->dbg_info, mode, false);
tmp_buf = sdb_get (obj->kv, "elf.relro", 0);
if (tmp_buf) {
pair_str ("relro", tmp_buf, mode, false);
free (tmp_buf);
}
pair_str ("rpath", info->rpath, mode, false);
if (info->rclass && !strcmp (info->rclass, "pe")) {
pair_bool ("signed", info->signature, mode, false);
}
pair_bool ("static", r_bin_is_static (r->bin), mode, false);
if (info->rclass && !strcmp (info->rclass, "mdmp")) {
v = sdb_num_get (binfile->sdb, "mdmp.streams", 0);
if (v != -1) {
pair_int ("streams", v, mode, false);
}
}
pair_bool ("stripped", R_BIN_DBG_STRIPPED & info->dbg_info, mode, false);
pair_str ("subsys", info->subsystem, mode, false);
pair_bool ("va", info->has_va, mode, true);
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf (",\"checksums\":{");
for (i = 0; info->sum[i].type; i++) {
RBinHash *h = &info->sum[i];
ut64 hash = r_hash_name_to_bits (h->type);
RHash *rh = r_hash_new (true, hash);
int len = r_hash_calculate (rh, hash, (const ut8*)
binfile->buf->buf+h->from, h->to);
if (len < 1) {
eprintf ("Invaild checksum length\n");
}
r_hash_free (rh);
r_cons_printf ("%s\"%s\":{\"hex\":\"", i?",": "", h->type);
for (j = 0; j < h->len; j++) {
r_cons_printf ("%02x", h->buf[j]);
}
r_cons_printf ("\"}");
}
r_cons_printf ("}");
} else {
for (i = 0; info->sum[i].type; i++) {
RBinHash *h = &info->sum[i];
ut64 hash = r_hash_name_to_bits (h->type);
RHash *rh = r_hash_new (true, hash);
int len = r_hash_calculate (rh, hash, (const ut8*)
binfile->buf->buf+h->from, h->to);
if (len < 1) {
eprintf ("Invaild wtf\n");
}
r_hash_free (rh);
r_cons_printf ("%s %d-%dc ", h->type, h->from, h->to+h->from);
for (j = 0; j < h->len; j++) {
r_cons_printf ("%02x", h->buf[j]);
}
r_cons_newline ();
}
}
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) r_cons_printf ("}");
}
r_core_anal_type_init (r);
r_core_anal_cc_init (r);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CredentialManagerImpl::~CredentialManagerImpl() {}
Commit Message: Fix Credential Management API Store() for existing Credentials
This changes fixes the Credential Management API to correctly handle
storing of already existing credentials. In the previous version
`preferred_match()` was updated, which is not necessarily the credential
selected by the user.
Bug: 795878
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I269f465861f44cdd784f0ce077e755191d3bd7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/843022
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Kolosovskiy <kolos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526313}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 24,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool acceptsEditingFocus(Element* element)
{
ASSERT(element);
ASSERT(element->rendererIsEditable());
return element->document().frame() && element->rootEditableElement();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mcryptd_free_ahash(struct mcryptd_ahash *tfm)
{
crypto_free_ahash(&tfm->base);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 9,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CorePageLoadMetricsObserver::OnLoadEventStart(
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadTiming& timing,
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadExtraInfo& info) {
if (WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(timing.load_event_start,
info)) {
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(internal::kHistogramLoadImmediate,
timing.load_event_start.value());
} else {
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(internal::kBackgroundHistogramLoadImmediate,
timing.load_event_start.value());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove clock resolution page load histograms.
These were temporary metrics intended to understand whether high/low
resolution clocks adversely impact page load metrics. After collecting a few
months of data it was determined that clock resolution doesn't adversely
impact our metrics, and it that these histograms were no longer needed.
BUG=394757
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2155143003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#406143}
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint8_t *scsi_get_buf(SCSIRequest *req)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
return (uint8_t *)r->iov.iov_base;
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::PoweredChanged(bool powered) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(BluetoothAdapter::Observer, observers_,
AdapterPoweredChanged(this, powered));
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_proc_confirm(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = (uint8_t*)p_data;
uint8_t reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
if (p != NULL) {
/* save the SConfirm for comparison later */
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->rconfirm, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
}
p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_CMD_CONFIRM;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix OOB read before buffer length check
Bug: 111936834
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ib98528fb62db0d724ebd9112d071e367f78e369d
(cherry picked from commit 4548f34c90803c6544f6bed03399f2eabeab2a8e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 2,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DevToolsAgentHostImpl::DetachClient(DevToolsAgentHostClient* client) {
if (!SessionByClient(client))
return false;
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHostImpl> protect(this);
InnerDetachClient(client);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContentsImpl* WebContentsImpl::CreateWithOpener(
const WebContents::CreateParams& params,
FrameTreeNode* opener) {
TRACE_EVENT0("browser", "WebContentsImpl::CreateWithOpener");
WebContentsImpl* new_contents = new WebContentsImpl(params.browser_context);
new_contents->SetOpenerForNewContents(opener, params.opener_suppressed);
FrameTreeNode* new_root = new_contents->GetFrameTree()->root();
if (opener) {
blink::WebSandboxFlags opener_flags = opener->effective_sandbox_flags();
const blink::WebSandboxFlags inherit_flag =
blink::WebSandboxFlags::kPropagatesToAuxiliaryBrowsingContexts;
if ((opener_flags & inherit_flag) == inherit_flag) {
new_root->SetPendingSandboxFlags(opener_flags);
new_root->CommitPendingFramePolicy();
}
}
if (params.created_with_opener)
new_contents->created_with_opener_ = true;
if (params.guest_delegate) {
BrowserPluginGuest::Create(new_contents, params.guest_delegate);
new_contents->is_subframe_ = true;
}
new_contents->Init(params);
return new_contents;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FrameLoader::allAncestorsAreComplete() const
{
for (Frame* ancestor = m_frame; ancestor; ancestor = ancestor->tree()->parent()) {
if (!ancestor->document()->loadEventFinished())
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CLASS border_interpolate (int border)
{
int row, col, y, x, f, c, sum[8];
for (row=0; row < height; row++)
for (col=0; col < width; col++) {
if (col==border && row >= border && row < height-border)
col = width-border;
memset (sum, 0, sizeof sum);
for (y=row-1; y != row+2; y++)
for (x=col-1; x != col+2; x++)
if (y >= 0 && y < height && x >= 0 && x < width) {
f = fc(y,x);
sum[f] += image[y*width+x][f];
sum[f+4]++;
}
f = fc(row,col);
FORCC if (c != f && sum[c+4])
image[row*width+col][c] = sum[c] / sum[c+4];
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::PostponeIdleNotification() {
idle_notifications_to_skip_ = 2;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dnslabel_table_get_pos(const struct dnslabel_table *table, const char *label)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < table->n_labels; ++i) {
if (!strcmp(label, table->labels[i].v))
return table->labels[i].pos;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cipso_v4_parsetag_enum(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const unsigned char *tag,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
int ret_val;
u8 tag_len = tag[1];
u32 level;
ret_val = cipso_v4_map_lvl_ntoh(doi_def, tag[3], &level);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
secattr->attr.mls.lvl = level;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
if (tag_len > 4) {
secattr->attr.mls.cat =
netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
if (secattr->attr.mls.cat == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
ret_val = cipso_v4_map_cat_enum_ntoh(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4,
secattr);
if (ret_val != 0) {
netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(secattr->attr.mls.cat);
return ret_val;
}
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 6,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Console::groupCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ConsoleHelper(info).reportCallWithDefaultArgument(ConsoleAPIType::kStartGroup, String16("console.group"));
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 7,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_rw_iunlock(
struct xfs_inode *ip,
int type)
{
xfs_iunlock(ip, type);
if (type & XFS_IOLOCK_EXCL)
mutex_unlock(&VFS_I(ip)->i_mutex);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(str_split)
{
zend_string *str;
zend_long split_length = 1;
char *p;
size_t n_reg_segments;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "S|l", &str, &split_length) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (split_length <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "The length of each segment must be greater than zero");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (0 == ZSTR_LEN(str) || (size_t)split_length >= ZSTR_LEN(str)) {
array_init_size(return_value, 1);
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, ZSTR_VAL(str), ZSTR_LEN(str));
return;
}
array_init_size(return_value, (uint32_t)(((ZSTR_LEN(str) - 1) / split_length) + 1));
n_reg_segments = ZSTR_LEN(str) / split_length;
p = ZSTR_VAL(str);
while (n_reg_segments-- > 0) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, p, split_length);
p += split_length;
}
if (p != (ZSTR_VAL(str) + ZSTR_LEN(str))) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, p, (ZSTR_VAL(str) + ZSTR_LEN(str) - p));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 23,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int save_fsave_header(struct task_struct *tsk, void __user *buf)
{
if (use_fxsr()) {
struct xregs_state *xsave = &tsk->thread.fpu.state.xsave;
struct user_i387_ia32_struct env;
struct _fpstate_32 __user *fp = buf;
convert_from_fxsr(&env, tsk);
if (__copy_to_user(buf, &env, sizeof(env)) ||
__put_user(xsave->i387.swd, &fp->status) ||
__put_user(X86_FXSR_MAGIC, &fp->magic))
return -1;
} else {
struct fregs_state __user *fp = buf;
u32 swd;
if (__get_user(swd, &fp->swd) || __put_user(swd, &fp->status))
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to
set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers. ptrace() can
set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with
NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task.
In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel
assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the
CPU can restore it.
However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate
format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable),
it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the
xstate_header to an arbitrary value. However, all bits in that field
are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with
nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault. This
caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit. In
addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from
the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked.
Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in
the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise.
The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it
with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly)
provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted
format.
Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state.
This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be
better to return an error before changing anything. But it seems the
"clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to
do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full
userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user().
This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned
WARN_ON_FPU():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000
RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0
RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40
FS: 00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff <0f> ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f
Here is a C reproducer. The expected behavior is that the program spin
forever with no output. However, on a buggy kernel running on a
processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature
(e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two
the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not
restored correctly. With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above
kernel warning.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();
uint64_t xstate[512];
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) };
if (pid == 0) {
bool tracee = true;
for (int i = 0; i < sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) && tracee; i++)
tracee = (fork() != 0);
uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF };
asm volatile(" movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n"
" mov %0, %%rbx\n"
"1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n"
" mov %0, %%rax\n"
" cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n"
" je 1b\n"
: "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0");
printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted! tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n",
tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]);
} else {
usleep(100000);
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
xstate[65] = -1;
ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call.
The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but
only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the
kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR
directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking).
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.17+]
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Fixes: 0b29643a5843 ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-25-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HasPasswordField(const WebLocalFrame& frame) {
static base::NoDestructor<WebString> kPassword("password");
const WebElementCollection elements = frame.GetDocument().All();
for (WebElement element = elements.FirstItem(); !element.IsNull();
element = elements.NextItem()) {
if (element.IsFormControlElement()) {
const WebFormControlElement& control =
element.To<WebFormControlElement>();
if (control.FormControlTypeForAutofill() == *kPassword)
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 20,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main( int /*argc*/, char ** argv)
{
InitializeMagick(*argv);
int failures=0;
try {
string srcdir("");
if(getenv("SRCDIR") != 0)
srcdir = getenv("SRCDIR");
list<Image> imageList;
readImages( &imageList, srcdir + "test_image_anim.miff" );
Image appended;
appendImages( &appended, imageList.begin(), imageList.end() );
if (( appended.signature() != "3a90bb0bb8f69f6788ab99e9e25598a0d6c5cdbbb797f77ad68011e0a8b1689d" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "c15fcd1e739b73638dc4e36837bdb53f7087359544664caf7b1763928129f3c7" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "229ff72f812e5f536245dc3b4502a0bc2ab2363f67c545863a85ab91ebfbfb83" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "b98c42c55fc4e661cb3684154256809c03c0c6b53da2738b6ce8066e1b6ddef0" ))
{
++failures;
cout << "Line: " << __LINE__
<< " Horizontal append failed, signature = "
<< appended.signature() << endl;
appended.write("appendImages_horizontal_out.miff");
}
appendImages( &appended, imageList.begin(), imageList.end(), true );
if (( appended.signature() != "d73d25ccd6011936d08b6d0d89183b7a61790544c2195269aff4db2f782ffc08" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "0909f7ffa7c6ea410fb2ebfdbcb19d61b19c4bd271851ce3bd51662519dc2b58" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "11b97ba6ac1664aa1c2faed4c86195472ae9cce2ed75402d975bb4ffcf1de751" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "cae4815eeb3cb689e73b94d897a9957d3414d1d4f513e8b5e52579b05d164bfe" ))
{
++failures;
cout << "Line: " << __LINE__
<< " Vertical append failed, signature = "
<< appended.signature() << endl;
appended.write("appendImages_vertical_out.miff");
}
}
catch( Exception &error_ )
{
cout << "Caught exception: " << error_.what() << endl;
return 1;
}
catch( exception &error_ )
{
cout << "Caught exception: " << error_.what() << endl;
return 1;
}
if ( failures )
{
cout << failures << " failures" << endl;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix signature mismatch
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 1 | 1,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hns_nic_dev_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct net_device *ndev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(ndev);
if (ndev->reg_state != NETREG_UNINITIALIZED)
unregister_netdev(ndev);
if (priv->ring_data)
hns_nic_uninit_ring_data(priv);
priv->ring_data = NULL;
if (ndev->phydev)
phy_disconnect(ndev->phydev);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(priv->ae_handle))
hnae_put_handle(priv->ae_handle);
priv->ae_handle = NULL;
if (priv->notifier_block.notifier_call)
hnae_unregister_notifier(&priv->notifier_block);
priv->notifier_block.notifier_call = NULL;
set_bit(NIC_STATE_REMOVING, &priv->state);
(void)cancel_work_sync(&priv->service_task);
free_netdev(ndev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelRaw(Image *image,const size_t channels,
const ssize_t type,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
row_size;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is RAW");
row_size=GetPSDRowSize(image);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_size,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
status=MagickTrue;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
status=MagickFalse;
count=ReadBlob(image,row_size,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) row_size)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
status=ReadPSDChannelPixels(image,channels,y,type,pixels,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UNCURL_EXPORT int32_t uncurl_new_tls_ctx(struct uncurl_tls_ctx **uc_tls_in)
{
int32_t e;
struct uncurl_tls_ctx *uc_tls = *uc_tls_in = calloc(1, sizeof(struct uncurl_tls_ctx));
e = tlss_alloc(&uc_tls->tlss);
if (e == UNCURL_OK) return e;
uncurl_free_tls_ctx(uc_tls);
*uc_tls_in = NULL;
return e;
}
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
CWE ID: CWE-352 | 0 | 12,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __net_init fib4_rules_init(struct net *net)
{
struct fib_table *local_table, *main_table;
main_table = fib_trie_table(RT_TABLE_MAIN, NULL);
if (!main_table)
return -ENOMEM;
local_table = fib_trie_table(RT_TABLE_LOCAL, main_table);
if (!local_table)
goto fail;
hlist_add_head_rcu(&local_table->tb_hlist,
&net->ipv4.fib_table_hash[TABLE_LOCAL_INDEX]);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&main_table->tb_hlist,
&net->ipv4.fib_table_hash[TABLE_MAIN_INDEX]);
return 0;
fail:
fib_free_table(main_table);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_show_char(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, int cid)
{
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
pdf_font_desc *fontdesc = gstate->text.font;
fz_matrix trm;
int gid;
int ucsbuf[8];
int ucslen;
int i;
int render_direct;
gid = pdf_tos_make_trm(ctx, &pr->tos, &gstate->text, fontdesc, cid, &trm);
/* If we are a type3 font within a type 3 font, or are otherwise
* uncachable, then render direct. */
render_direct = (!fz_font_ft_face(ctx, fontdesc->font) && pr->nested_depth > 0) || !fz_glyph_cacheable(ctx, fontdesc->font, gid);
/* flush buffered text if rendermode has changed */
if (!pr->tos.text || gstate->text.render != pr->tos.text_mode || render_direct)
{
gstate = pdf_flush_text(ctx, pr);
pdf_tos_reset(ctx, &pr->tos, gstate->text.render);
}
if (render_direct)
{
/* Render the glyph stream direct here (only happens for
* type3 glyphs that seem to inherit current graphics
* attributes, or type 3 glyphs within type3 glyphs). */
fz_matrix composed;
fz_concat(&composed, &trm, &gstate->ctm);
fz_render_t3_glyph_direct(ctx, pr->dev, fontdesc->font, gid, &composed, gstate, pr->nested_depth, pr->default_cs);
/* Render text invisibly so that it can still be extracted. */
pr->tos.text_mode = 3;
}
ucslen = 0;
if (fontdesc->to_unicode)
ucslen = pdf_lookup_cmap_full(fontdesc->to_unicode, cid, ucsbuf);
if (ucslen == 0 && (size_t)cid < fontdesc->cid_to_ucs_len)
{
ucsbuf[0] = fontdesc->cid_to_ucs[cid];
ucslen = 1;
}
if (ucslen == 0 || (ucslen == 1 && ucsbuf[0] == 0))
{
ucsbuf[0] = FZ_REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
ucslen = 1;
}
/* add glyph to textobject */
fz_show_glyph(ctx, pr->tos.text, fontdesc->font, &trm, gid, ucsbuf[0], fontdesc->wmode, 0, FZ_BIDI_NEUTRAL, FZ_LANG_UNSET);
/* add filler glyphs for one-to-many unicode mapping */
for (i = 1; i < ucslen; i++)
fz_show_glyph(ctx, pr->tos.text, fontdesc->font, &trm, -1, ucsbuf[i], fontdesc->wmode, 0, FZ_BIDI_NEUTRAL, FZ_LANG_UNSET);
pdf_tos_move_after_char(ctx, &pr->tos);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 24,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::ChromeContentBrowserClient(
ChromeFeatureListCreator* chrome_feature_list_creator)
: chrome_feature_list_creator_(chrome_feature_list_creator),
weak_factory_(this) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(kPredefinedAllowedDevChannelOrigins); ++i)
allowed_dev_channel_origins_.insert(kPredefinedAllowedDevChannelOrigins[i]);
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(kPredefinedAllowedFileHandleOrigins); ++i)
allowed_file_handle_origins_.insert(kPredefinedAllowedFileHandleOrigins[i]);
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(kPredefinedAllowedSocketOrigins); ++i)
allowed_socket_origins_.insert(kPredefinedAllowedSocketOrigins[i]);
extra_parts_.push_back(new ChromeContentBrowserClientPluginsPart);
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
extra_parts_.push_back(new ChromeContentBrowserClientChromeOsPart);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
extra_parts_.push_back(new ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart);
#endif
gpu_binder_registry_.AddInterface(
base::Bind(&metrics::CallStackProfileCollector::Create));
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 23,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static _Bool check_notify_received (const notification_t *n) /* {{{ */
{
notification_meta_t *ptr;
for (ptr = n->meta; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->next)
if ((strcmp ("network:received", ptr->name) == 0)
&& (ptr->type == NM_TYPE_BOOLEAN))
return ((_Bool) ptr->nm_value.nm_boolean);
return (0);
} /* }}} _Bool check_notify_received */
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tree_mod_log_insert_key(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
struct extent_buffer *eb, int slot,
enum mod_log_op op, gfp_t flags)
{
struct tree_mod_elem *tm;
int ret;
if (!tree_mod_need_log(fs_info, eb))
return 0;
tm = alloc_tree_mod_elem(eb, slot, op, flags);
if (!tm)
return -ENOMEM;
if (tree_mod_dont_log(fs_info, eb)) {
kfree(tm);
return 0;
}
ret = __tree_mod_log_insert(fs_info, tm);
tree_mod_log_write_unlock(fs_info);
if (ret)
kfree(tm);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 20,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
{
int i, idx;
const EVP_MD *md;
CERT *c = s->cert;
/* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
return 1;
/* Should never happen */
if (!c)
return 0;
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
{
unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
switch(sig_alg)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
break;
#endif
default:
continue;
}
if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
{
md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
if (md)
{
c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
}
}
}
/* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
* supported it stays as NULL.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
{
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_METHOD(exception, __construct)
{
char *message = NULL;
long code = 0;
zval *object, *previous = NULL;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), message_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, argc TSRMLS_CC, "|slO!", &message, &message_len, &code, &previous, default_exception_ce) == FAILURE) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "Wrong parameters for Exception([string $exception [, long $code [, Exception $previous = NULL]]])");
}
object = getThis();
if (message) {
zend_update_property_stringl(default_exception_ce, object, "message", sizeof("message")-1, message, message_len TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (code) {
zend_update_property_long(default_exception_ce, object, "code", sizeof("code")-1, code TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (previous) {
zend_update_property(default_exception_ce, object, "previous", sizeof("previous")-1, previous TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,340 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::NotifyNavigationEntryCommitted(
LoadCommittedDetails* details) {
details->entry = GetActiveEntry();
ssl_manager_.DidCommitProvisionalLoad(*details);
web_contents_->NotifyNavigationStateChanged(kInvalidateAll);
web_contents_->NotifyNavigationEntryCommitted(*details);
NotificationDetails notification_details =
Details<LoadCommittedDetails>(details);
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_NAV_ENTRY_COMMITTED,
Source<NavigationController>(this),
notification_details);
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mem_cgroup_can_attach(struct cgroup_subsys *ss,
struct cgroup *cgroup,
struct cgroup_taskset *tset)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,394 |
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