instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pixel_format_message (VncState *vs) {
char pad[3] = { 0, 0, 0 };
vs->client_pf = qemu_default_pixelformat(32);
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->client_pf.bits_per_pixel); /* bits-per-pixel */
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->client_pf.depth); /* depth */
#ifdef HOST_WORDS_BIGENDIAN
vnc_write_u8(vs, 1); /* big-endian-flag */
#else
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0); /* big-endian-flag */
#endif
vnc_write_u8(vs, 1); /* true-color-flag */
vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_pf.rmax); /* red-max */
vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_pf.gmax); /* green-max */
vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_pf.bmax); /* blue-max */
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->client_pf.rshift); /* red-shift */
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->client_pf.gshift); /* green-shift */
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->client_pf.bshift); /* blue-shift */
vnc_write(vs, pad, 3); /* padding */
vnc_hextile_set_pixel_conversion(vs, 0);
vs->write_pixels = vnc_write_pixels_copy;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ap_uevent (struct device *dev, struct kobj_uevent_env *env)
{
struct ap_device *ap_dev = to_ap_dev(dev);
int retval = 0;
if (!ap_dev)
return -ENODEV;
/* Set up DEV_TYPE environment variable. */
retval = add_uevent_var(env, "DEV_TYPE=%04X", ap_dev->device_type);
if (retval)
return retval;
/* Add MODALIAS= */
retval = add_uevent_var(env, "MODALIAS=ap:t%02X", ap_dev->device_type);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 16,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CNBL::CompleteMappedBuffers()
{
m_MappedBuffers.ForEachDetached([this](CNB *NB)
{
NBComplete();
CNB::Destroy(NB, m_Context->MiniportHandle);
});
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool CheckForMagicNumbers(const char* content, size_t size,
const MagicNumber* magic, size_t magic_len,
std::string* result) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < magic_len; ++i) {
if (MatchMagicNumber(content, size, magic[i], result))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol"
This reverts commit 3519e867dc606437f804561f889d7ed95b95876a.
Reason for revert: crbug.com/786150. Application compatibility for Android WebView applications means we need to allow sniffing on that platform.
Original change's description:
> Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol
>
> To reduce attack surface, Chrome should not MIME-sniff to text/html for
> any document delivered via the file protocol. This change only impacts
> the file protocol (documents served via HTTP/HTTPS/etc are unaffected).
>
> Bug: 777737
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
> Change-Id: I7086454356b8d2d092be9e1bca0f5ff6dd3b62c0
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/751402
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Achuith Bhandarkar <achuith@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Asanka Herath <asanka@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514372}
TBR=achuith@chromium.org,benwells@chromium.org,mmenke@chromium.org,sdefresne@chromium.org,asanka@chromium.org,elawrence@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 777737
Change-Id: I864ae060ce3277d41ea257ae75e0b80c51f3ea98
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/790790
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519347}
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_unpack_coeff8x8_8x8blk_cavlc(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
dec_mb_info_t * ps_cur_mb_info,
UWORD16 ui2_luma_csbp,
WORD16 *pi2_out_coeff_data)
{
UWORD8 *pu1_inv_scan;
UWORD8 u1_mb_field_decoding_flag = ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_field_decodingflag;
UWORD8 u1_field_coding_flag = ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_fld;
WORD32 dc_only_flag = 0;
PROFILE_DISABLE_UNPACK_LUMA()
if(ui2_luma_csbp & 0x33)
{
memset(pi2_out_coeff_data,0,64*sizeof(WORD16));
}
if(!u1_mb_field_decoding_flag)
{
pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_prog8x8_cavlc[0];
}
else
{
pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_int8x8_cavlc[0];
}
if(ui2_luma_csbp & 0x1)
{
dc_only_flag = ih264d_unpack_coeff4x4_4x4blk(ps_dec,
pi2_out_coeff_data,
pu1_inv_scan);
}
if(!u1_mb_field_decoding_flag)
{
pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_prog8x8_cavlc[1];
}
else
{
pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_int8x8_cavlc[1];
}
if(ui2_luma_csbp & 0x2)
{
dc_only_flag = 0;
ih264d_unpack_coeff4x4_4x4blk(ps_dec,
pi2_out_coeff_data,
pu1_inv_scan);
}
if(!u1_mb_field_decoding_flag)
{
pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_prog8x8_cavlc[2];
}
else
{
pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_int8x8_cavlc[2];
}
if(ui2_luma_csbp & 0x10)
{
dc_only_flag = 0;
ih264d_unpack_coeff4x4_4x4blk(ps_dec,
pi2_out_coeff_data,
pu1_inv_scan);
}
if(!u1_mb_field_decoding_flag)
{
pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_prog8x8_cavlc[3];
}
else
{
pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_int8x8_cavlc[3];
}
if(ui2_luma_csbp & 0x20)
{
dc_only_flag = 0;
ih264d_unpack_coeff4x4_4x4blk(ps_dec,
pi2_out_coeff_data,
pu1_inv_scan);
}
return dc_only_flag;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix for handling invalid intra mode
Bug: 28165659
Change-Id: I2291a287c27291695f4f3d6e753b6bbd7dfd9e42
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void SetupContext(URLRequestContext* context) {
context->set_ssl_config_service(
new TestSSLConfigService(true /* check for EV */,
true /* online revocation checking */));
}
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
TBR=droger@chromium.org,shalev@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 11,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetFloatv(GLenum pname,
GLfloat* params,
GLsizei params_size) {
DCHECK(params);
GLsizei num_written = 0;
if (state_.GetStateAsGLfloat(pname, params, &num_written)) {
DCHECK_EQ(num_written, params_size);
return;
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_ALIASED_POINT_SIZE_RANGE:
case GL_ALIASED_LINE_WIDTH_RANGE:
case GL_MAX_TEXTURE_MAX_ANISOTROPY_EXT:
DCHECK_EQ(params_size, util_.GLGetNumValuesReturned(pname));
pname = AdjustGetPname(pname);
api()->glGetFloatvFn(pname, params);
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<GLint[]> values(new GLint[params_size]);
memset(values.get(), 0, params_size * sizeof(GLint));
DoGetIntegerv(pname, values.get(), params_size);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < params_size; ++ii) {
params[ii] = static_cast<GLfloat>(values[ii]);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tg3_phy_stop(struct tg3 *tp)
{
if (!(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_CONNECTED))
return;
phy_stop(tp->mdio_bus->phy_map[TG3_PHY_MII_ADDR]);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t sc_right_trim(u8 *buf, size_t len) {
size_t i;
if (!buf)
return 0;
if (len > 0) {
for(i = len-1; i > 0; i--) {
if(!isprint(buf[i])) {
buf[i] = '\0';
len--;
continue;
}
break;
}
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 17,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct pstore *get_info(struct dm_exception_store *store)
{
return (struct pstore *) store->context;
}
Commit Message: dm snapshot: fix data corruption
This patch fixes a particular type of data corruption that has been
encountered when loading a snapshot's metadata from disk.
When we allocate a new chunk in persistent_prepare, we increment
ps->next_free and we make sure that it doesn't point to a metadata area
by further incrementing it if necessary.
When we load metadata from disk on device activation, ps->next_free is
positioned after the last used data chunk. However, if this last used
data chunk is followed by a metadata area, ps->next_free is positioned
erroneously to the metadata area. A newly-allocated chunk is placed at
the same location as the metadata area, resulting in data or metadata
corruption.
This patch changes the code so that ps->next_free skips the metadata
area when metadata are loaded in function read_exceptions.
The patch also moves a piece of code from persistent_prepare_exception
to a separate function skip_metadata to avoid code duplication.
CVE-2013-4299
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnReplaceMisspelling(const base::string16& text) {
if (!frame_->hasSelection())
return;
frame_->replaceMisspelledRange(text);
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dcbnl_getpfccfg(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct nlattr *data[DCB_PFC_UP_ATTR_MAX + 1], *nest;
u8 value;
int ret;
int i;
int getall = 0;
if (!tb[DCB_ATTR_PFC_CFG])
return -EINVAL;
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpfccfg)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ret = nla_parse_nested(data, DCB_PFC_UP_ATTR_MAX,
tb[DCB_ATTR_PFC_CFG],
dcbnl_pfc_up_nest);
if (ret)
return ret;
nest = nla_nest_start(skb, DCB_ATTR_PFC_CFG);
if (!nest)
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (data[DCB_PFC_UP_ATTR_ALL])
getall = 1;
for (i = DCB_PFC_UP_ATTR_0; i <= DCB_PFC_UP_ATTR_7; i++) {
if (!getall && !data[i])
continue;
netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpfccfg(netdev, i - DCB_PFC_UP_ATTR_0,
&value);
ret = nla_put_u8(skb, i, value);
if (ret) {
nla_nest_cancel(skb, nest);
return ret;
}
}
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 16,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int unicode_cp_is_allowed(unsigned uni_cp, int document_type)
{
/* XML 1.0 HTML 4.01 HTML 5
* 0x09..0x0A 0x09..0x0A 0x09..0x0A
* 0x0D 0x0D 0x0C..0x0D
* 0x0020..0xD7FF 0x20..0x7E 0x20..0x7E
* 0x00A0..0xD7FF 0x00A0..0xD7FF
* 0xE000..0xFFFD 0xE000..0x10FFFF 0xE000..0xFDCF
* 0x010000..0x10FFFF 0xFDF0..0x10FFFF (*)
*
* (*) exclude code points where ((code & 0xFFFF) >= 0xFFFE)
*
* References:
* XML 1.0: <http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml/#charsets>
* HTML 4.01: <http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/PR-html40-19990824/sgml/sgmldecl.html>
* HTML 5: <http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#preprocessing-the-input-stream>
*
* Not sure this is the relevant part for HTML 5, though. I opted to
* disallow the characters that would result in a parse error when
* preprocessing of the input stream. See also section 8.1.3.
*
* It's unclear if XHTML 1.0 allows C1 characters. I'll opt to apply to
* XHTML 1.0 the same rules as for XML 1.0.
* See <http://cmsmcq.com/2007/C1.xml>.
*/
switch (document_type) {
case ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML401:
return (uni_cp >= 0x20 && uni_cp <= 0x7E) ||
(uni_cp == 0x0A || uni_cp == 0x09 || uni_cp == 0x0D) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xA0 && uni_cp <= 0xD7FF) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xE000 && uni_cp <= 0x10FFFF);
case ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML5:
return (uni_cp >= 0x20 && uni_cp <= 0x7E) ||
(uni_cp >= 0x09 && uni_cp <= 0x0D && uni_cp != 0x0B) || /* form feed U+0C allowed */
(uni_cp >= 0xA0 && uni_cp <= 0xD7FF) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xE000 && uni_cp <= 0x10FFFF &&
((uni_cp & 0xFFFF) < 0xFFFE) && /* last two of each plane (nonchars) disallowed */
(uni_cp < 0xFDD0 || uni_cp > 0xFDEF)); /* U+FDD0-U+FDEF (nonchars) disallowed */
case ENT_HTML_DOC_XHTML:
case ENT_HTML_DOC_XML1:
return (uni_cp >= 0x20 && uni_cp <= 0xD7FF) ||
(uni_cp == 0x0A || uni_cp == 0x09 || uni_cp == 0x0D) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xE000 && uni_cp <= 0x10FFFF && uni_cp != 0xFFFE && uni_cp != 0xFFFF);
default:
return 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 10,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool __init sparc64_has_md5_opcode(void)
{
unsigned long cfr;
if (!(sparc64_elf_hwcap & HWCAP_SPARC_CRYPTO))
return false;
__asm__ __volatile__("rd %%asr26, %0" : "=r" (cfr));
if (!(cfr & CFR_MD5))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 13,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool jsvIsBasicString(const JsVar *v) { return v && (v->flags&JSV_VARTYPEMASK)>=JSV_STRING_0 && (v->flags&JSV_VARTYPEMASK)<=JSV_STRING_MAX; } ///< Just a string (NOT a name)
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct commit *get_revision_1(struct rev_info *revs)
{
if (!revs->commits)
return NULL;
do {
struct commit_list *entry = revs->commits;
struct commit *commit = entry->item;
revs->commits = entry->next;
free(entry);
if (revs->reflog_info) {
save_parents(revs, commit);
fake_reflog_parent(revs->reflog_info, commit);
commit->object.flags &= ~(ADDED | SEEN | SHOWN);
}
/*
* If we haven't done the list limiting, we need to look at
* the parents here. We also need to do the date-based limiting
* that we'd otherwise have done in limit_list().
*/
if (!revs->limited) {
if (revs->max_age != -1 &&
(commit->date < revs->max_age))
continue;
if (add_parents_to_list(revs, commit, &revs->commits, NULL) < 0) {
if (!revs->ignore_missing_links)
die("Failed to traverse parents of commit %s",
sha1_to_hex(commit->object.sha1));
}
}
switch (simplify_commit(revs, commit)) {
case commit_ignore:
continue;
case commit_error:
die("Failed to simplify parents of commit %s",
sha1_to_hex(commit->object.sha1));
default:
if (revs->track_linear)
track_linear(revs, commit);
return commit;
}
} while (revs->commits);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gpc_unpc(Pixel *out, const Pixel *in, const Background *back)
{
(void)back;
if (in->a <= 128)
{
out->r = out->g = out->b = 255;
out->a = 0;
}
else
{
out->r = sRGB((double)in->r / in->a);
out->g = sRGB((double)in->g / in->a);
out->b = sRGB((double)in->b / in->a);
out->a = u8d(in->a / 257.);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpeg2000_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
ThreadFrame frame = { .f = data };
AVFrame *picture = data;
int tileno, ret;
s->avctx = avctx;
bytestream2_init(&s->g, avpkt->data, avpkt->size);
s->curtileno = -1;
memset(s->cdef, -1, sizeof(s->cdef));
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 2) {
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto end;
}
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) >= 12 &&
(bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g) == 12) &&
(bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g) == JP2_SIG_TYPE) &&
(bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g) == JP2_SIG_VALUE)) {
if (!jp2_find_codestream(s)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Could not find Jpeg2000 codestream atom.\n");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto end;
}
} else {
bytestream2_seek(&s->g, 0, SEEK_SET);
}
while (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) >= 3 && bytestream2_peek_be16(&s->g) != JPEG2000_SOC)
bytestream2_skip(&s->g, 1);
if (bytestream2_get_be16u(&s->g) != JPEG2000_SOC) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "SOC marker not present\n");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto end;
}
if (ret = jpeg2000_read_main_headers(s))
goto end;
/* get picture buffer */
if ((ret = ff_thread_get_buffer(avctx, &frame, 0)) < 0)
goto end;
picture->pict_type = AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;
picture->key_frame = 1;
if (ret = jpeg2000_read_bitstream_packets(s))
goto end;
for (tileno = 0; tileno < s->numXtiles * s->numYtiles; tileno++)
if (ret = jpeg2000_decode_tile(s, s->tile + tileno, picture))
goto end;
jpeg2000_dec_cleanup(s);
*got_frame = 1;
if (s->avctx->pix_fmt == AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8)
memcpy(picture->data[1], s->palette, 256 * sizeof(uint32_t));
return bytestream2_tell(&s->g);
end:
jpeg2000_dec_cleanup(s);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/jpeg2000dec: prevent out of array accesses in pixel addressing
Fixes Ticket2921
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BluetoothSocketSendFunction::~BluetoothSocketSendFunction() {}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 3,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t BaseArena::objectPayloadSizeForTesting() {
ASSERT(isConsistentForGC());
ASSERT(!m_firstUnsweptPage);
size_t objectPayloadSize = 0;
for (BasePage* page = m_firstPage; page; page = page->next())
objectPayloadSize += page->objectPayloadSizeForTesting();
return objectPayloadSize;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXObject* AXNodeObject::computeParentIfExists() const {
if (Node* parentNode = getParentNodeForComputeParent(getNode()))
return axObjectCache().get(parentNode);
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 26,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct rb_entry *__lookup_rb_tree_ret(struct rb_root *root,
struct rb_entry *cached_re,
unsigned int ofs,
struct rb_entry **prev_entry,
struct rb_entry **next_entry,
struct rb_node ***insert_p,
struct rb_node **insert_parent,
bool force)
{
struct rb_node **pnode = &root->rb_node;
struct rb_node *parent = NULL, *tmp_node;
struct rb_entry *re = cached_re;
*insert_p = NULL;
*insert_parent = NULL;
*prev_entry = NULL;
*next_entry = NULL;
if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(root))
return NULL;
if (re) {
if (re->ofs <= ofs && re->ofs + re->len > ofs)
goto lookup_neighbors;
}
while (*pnode) {
parent = *pnode;
re = rb_entry(*pnode, struct rb_entry, rb_node);
if (ofs < re->ofs)
pnode = &(*pnode)->rb_left;
else if (ofs >= re->ofs + re->len)
pnode = &(*pnode)->rb_right;
else
goto lookup_neighbors;
}
*insert_p = pnode;
*insert_parent = parent;
re = rb_entry(parent, struct rb_entry, rb_node);
tmp_node = parent;
if (parent && ofs > re->ofs)
tmp_node = rb_next(parent);
*next_entry = rb_entry_safe(tmp_node, struct rb_entry, rb_node);
tmp_node = parent;
if (parent && ofs < re->ofs)
tmp_node = rb_prev(parent);
*prev_entry = rb_entry_safe(tmp_node, struct rb_entry, rb_node);
return NULL;
lookup_neighbors:
if (ofs == re->ofs || force) {
/* lookup prev node for merging backward later */
tmp_node = rb_prev(&re->rb_node);
*prev_entry = rb_entry_safe(tmp_node, struct rb_entry, rb_node);
}
if (ofs == re->ofs + re->len - 1 || force) {
/* lookup next node for merging frontward later */
tmp_node = rb_next(&re->rb_node);
*next_entry = rb_entry_safe(tmp_node, struct rb_entry, rb_node);
}
return re;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a bug caused by NULL extent tree
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount
-sbi->mount_opt.opt = 0;
<--- -f2fs_iget
-do_read_inode
-f2fs_init_extent_tree
-F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree is NULL
-default_options && parse_options
-remount return
<--- -f2fs_map_blocks
-f2fs_lookup_extent_tree
-f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !et);
The same problem with f2fs_new_inode.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::AllowCertificateError(
SSLCertErrorHandler* handler,
bool overridable,
Callback2<SSLCertErrorHandler*, bool>::Type* callback) {
TabContents* tab = tab_util::GetTabContentsByID(
handler->render_process_host_id(),
handler->tab_contents_id());
if (!tab) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
prerender::PrerenderManager* prerender_manager =
tab->profile()->GetPrerenderManager();
if (prerender_manager && prerender_manager->IsTabContentsPrerendering(tab)) {
if (prerender_manager->prerender_tracker()->TryCancel(
handler->render_process_host_id(),
handler->tab_contents_id(),
prerender::FINAL_STATUS_SSL_ERROR)) {
handler->CancelRequest();
return;
}
}
SSLBlockingPage* blocking_page = new SSLBlockingPage(
handler, overridable, callback);
blocking_page->Show();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: openssl_dec(const EVP_CIPHER * cipher, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv,
const unsigned char *input, size_t length, unsigned char *output)
{
int r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx = NULL;
int outl = 0;
int outl_tmp = 0;
unsigned char iv_tmp[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH] = { 0 };
memcpy(iv_tmp, iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto out;
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv_tmp);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, output, &outl, input, length))
goto out;
if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, output + outl, &outl_tmp))
goto out;
r = SC_SUCCESS;
out:
if (ctx)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(strripos)
{
zval *zneedle;
zend_string *needle;
zend_string *haystack;
zend_long offset = 0;
char *p, *e;
char *found;
zend_string *needle_dup, *haystack_dup, *ord_needle = NULL;
ALLOCA_FLAG(use_heap);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "Sz|l", &haystack, &zneedle, &offset) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZSTR_ALLOCA_ALLOC(ord_needle, 1, use_heap);
if (Z_TYPE_P(zneedle) == IS_STRING) {
needle = Z_STR_P(zneedle);
} else {
if (php_needle_char(zneedle, ZSTR_VAL(ord_needle)) != SUCCESS) {
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZSTR_VAL(ord_needle)[1] = '\0';
needle = ord_needle;
}
if ((ZSTR_LEN(haystack) == 0) || (ZSTR_LEN(needle) == 0)) {
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (ZSTR_LEN(needle) == 1) {
/* Single character search can shortcut memcmps
Can also avoid tolower emallocs */
if (offset >= 0) {
if ((size_t)offset > ZSTR_LEN(haystack)) {
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Offset is greater than the length of haystack string");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
p = ZSTR_VAL(haystack) + (size_t)offset;
e = ZSTR_VAL(haystack) + ZSTR_LEN(haystack) - 1;
} else {
p = ZSTR_VAL(haystack);
if (offset < -INT_MAX || (size_t)(-offset) > ZSTR_LEN(haystack)) {
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Offset is greater than the length of haystack string");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
e = ZSTR_VAL(haystack) + ZSTR_LEN(haystack) + (size_t)offset;
}
/* Borrow that ord_needle buffer to avoid repeatedly tolower()ing needle */
*ZSTR_VAL(ord_needle) = tolower(*ZSTR_VAL(needle));
while (e >= p) {
if (tolower(*e) == *ZSTR_VAL(ord_needle)) {
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
RETURN_LONG(e - p + (offset > 0 ? offset : 0));
}
e--;
}
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
haystack_dup = php_string_tolower(haystack);
if (offset >= 0) {
if ((size_t)offset > ZSTR_LEN(haystack)) {
zend_string_release(haystack_dup);
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Offset is greater than the length of haystack string");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
p = ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup) + offset;
e = ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup) + ZSTR_LEN(haystack);
} else {
if (offset < -INT_MAX || (size_t)(-offset) > ZSTR_LEN(haystack)) {
zend_string_release(haystack_dup);
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Offset is greater than the length of haystack string");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
p = ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup);
if (-offset < ZSTR_LEN(needle)) {
e = ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup) + ZSTR_LEN(haystack);
} else {
e = ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup) + ZSTR_LEN(haystack) + offset + ZSTR_LEN(needle);
}
}
needle_dup = php_string_tolower(needle);
if ((found = (char *)zend_memnrstr(p, ZSTR_VAL(needle_dup), ZSTR_LEN(needle_dup), e))) {
RETVAL_LONG(found - ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup));
zend_string_release(needle_dup);
zend_string_release(haystack_dup);
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
} else {
zend_string_release(needle_dup);
zend_string_release(haystack_dup);
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 26,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poly_above(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
POLYGON *polya = PG_GETARG_POLYGON_P(0);
POLYGON *polyb = PG_GETARG_POLYGON_P(1);
bool result;
result = polya->boundbox.low.y > polyb->boundbox.high.y;
/*
* Avoid leaking memory for toasted inputs ... needed for rtree indexes
*/
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(polya, 0);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(polyb, 1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 12,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleVertexAttribPointer(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::VertexAttribPointer& c) {
if (!bound_array_buffer_ || bound_array_buffer_->IsDeleted()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glVertexAttribPointer: no array buffer bound");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint indx = c.indx;
GLint size = c.size;
GLenum type = c.type;
GLboolean normalized = c.normalized;
GLsizei stride = c.stride;
GLsizei offset = c.offset;
const void* ptr = reinterpret_cast<const void*>(offset);
if (!validators_->vertex_attrib_type.IsValid(type)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM,
"glVertexAttribPointer: type GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->vertex_attrib_size.IsValid(size)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glVertexAttribPointer: size GL_INVALID_VALUE");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (indx >= group_->max_vertex_attribs()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glVertexAttribPointer: index out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (stride < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glVertexAttribPointer: stride < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (stride > 255) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glVertexAttribPointer: stride > 255");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (offset < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glVertexAttribPointer: offset < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLsizei component_size =
GLES2Util::GetGLTypeSizeForTexturesAndBuffers(type);
if (offset % component_size > 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glVertexAttribPointer: offset not valid for type");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (stride % component_size > 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glVertexAttribPointer: stride not valid for type");
return error::kNoError;
}
vertex_attrib_manager_->SetAttribInfo(
indx,
bound_array_buffer_,
size,
type,
normalized,
stride,
stride != 0 ? stride : component_size * size,
offset);
if (type != GL_FIXED) {
glVertexAttribPointer(indx, size, type, normalized, stride, ptr);
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
return;
if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis()) {
/*
* Tracking the NMI-blocked state in software is built upon
* finding the next open IRQ window. This, in turn, depends on
* well-behaving guests: They have to keep IRQs disabled at
* least as long as the NMI handler runs. Otherwise we may
* cause NMI nesting, maybe breaking the guest. But as this is
* highly unlikely, we can live with the residual risk.
*/
vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked = 1;
vmx->vnmi_blocked_time = 0;
}
++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
vmx->nmi_known_unmasked = false;
if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
if (kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, NMI_VECTOR, 0) != EMULATE_DONE)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
return;
}
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD,
INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | NMI_VECTOR);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NaClProcessHost::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
if (!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValuePath(
switches::kNaClGdb).empty()) {
base::ProcessHandle process;
DCHECK(process_->GetData().handle == base::kNullProcessHandle);
if (base::OpenProcessHandleWithAccess(
peer_pid,
base::kProcessAccessDuplicateHandle |
base::kProcessAccessQueryInformation |
base::kProcessAccessWaitForTermination,
&process)) {
process_->SetHandle(process);
if (!StartWithLaunchedProcess()) {
delete this;
return;
}
} else {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get process handle";
}
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::processReferrerPolicy(const String& policy)
{
ASSERT(!policy.isNull());
m_referrerPolicy = ReferrerPolicyDefault;
if (equalIgnoringCase(policy, "never"))
m_referrerPolicy = ReferrerPolicyNever;
else if (equalIgnoringCase(policy, "always"))
m_referrerPolicy = ReferrerPolicyAlways;
else if (equalIgnoringCase(policy, "origin"))
m_referrerPolicy = ReferrerPolicyOrigin;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: display_cache_file(struct display *dp, const char *filename)
/* Does the initial cache of the file. */
{
FILE *fp;
int ret;
dp->filename = filename;
if (filename != NULL)
{
fp = fopen(filename, "rb");
if (fp == NULL)
display_log(dp, USER_ERROR, "open failed: %s", strerror(errno));
}
else
fp = stdin;
ret = buffer_from_file(&dp->original_file, fp);
fclose(fp);
if (ret != 0)
display_log(dp, APP_ERROR, "read failed: %s", strerror(ret));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int req_ssl_is_https_field(request_rec *r)
{
return ap_lua_ssl_is_https(r->connection);
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void drain_stock(struct memcg_stock_pcp *stock)
{
struct mem_cgroup *old = stock->cached;
if (stock->nr_pages) {
unsigned long bytes = stock->nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
res_counter_uncharge(&old->res, bytes);
if (do_swap_account)
res_counter_uncharge(&old->memsw, bytes);
stock->nr_pages = 0;
}
stock->cached = NULL;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 19,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_io_set_close_on_exec(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
#if defined(F_GETFD) && defined(F_SETFD) && defined(FD_CLOEXEC)
struct mrb_io *fptr;
int flag, ret;
mrb_bool b;
fptr = io_get_open_fptr(mrb, self);
mrb_get_args(mrb, "b", &b);
flag = b ? FD_CLOEXEC : 0;
if (fptr->fd2 >= 0) {
if ((ret = fcntl(fptr->fd2, F_GETFD)) == -1) mrb_sys_fail(mrb, "F_GETFD failed");
if ((ret & FD_CLOEXEC) != flag) {
ret = (ret & ~FD_CLOEXEC) | flag;
ret = fcntl(fptr->fd2, F_SETFD, ret);
if (ret == -1) mrb_sys_fail(mrb, "F_SETFD failed");
}
}
if ((ret = fcntl(fptr->fd, F_GETFD)) == -1) mrb_sys_fail(mrb, "F_GETFD failed");
if ((ret & FD_CLOEXEC) != flag) {
ret = (ret & ~FD_CLOEXEC) | flag;
ret = fcntl(fptr->fd, F_SETFD, ret);
if (ret == -1) mrb_sys_fail(mrb, "F_SETFD failed");
}
return mrb_bool_value(b);
#else
mrb_raise(mrb, E_NOTIMP_ERROR, "IO#close_on_exec= is not supported on the platform");
return mrb_nil_value();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix `use after free in File#initilialize_copy`; fix #4001
The bug and the fix were reported by https://hackerone.com/pnoltof
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayerListIterator<Layer> LayerTreeHost::begin() const {
return LayerListIterator<Layer>(root_layer_.get());
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 5,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SSLPolicyTestCommittedInterstitials() {}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct cgroup_meta_data *lxc_cgroup_load_meta()
{
const char *cgroup_use = NULL;
char **cgroup_use_list = NULL;
struct cgroup_meta_data *md = NULL;
int saved_errno;
errno = 0;
cgroup_use = lxc_global_config_value("lxc.cgroup.use");
if (!cgroup_use && errno != 0)
return NULL;
if (cgroup_use) {
cgroup_use_list = lxc_string_split_and_trim(cgroup_use, ',');
if (!cgroup_use_list)
return NULL;
}
md = lxc_cgroup_load_meta2((const char **)cgroup_use_list);
saved_errno = errno;
lxc_free_array((void **)cgroup_use_list, free);
errno = saved_errno;
return md;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 26,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void disable_net_traffic(pegasus_t *pegasus)
{
__le16 tmp = cpu_to_le16(0);
set_registers(pegasus, EthCtrl0, sizeof(tmp), &tmp);
}
Commit Message: pegasus: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
References: https://bugs.debian.org/852556
Reported-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Tested-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void clear_empty_dir(struct ctl_dir *dir)
{
dir->header.ctl_table[0].child = NULL;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __archive_write_close_filter(struct archive_write_filter *f)
{
if (f->close != NULL)
return (f->close)(f);
if (f->next_filter != NULL)
return (__archive_write_close_filter(f->next_filter));
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Limit write requests to at most INT_MAX.
This prevents a certain common programming error (passing -1 to write)
from leading to other problems deeper in the library.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 8,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsIT8SetDataFormat(cmsHANDLE h, int n, const char *Sample)
{
cmsIT8* it8 = (cmsIT8*)h;
return SetDataFormat(it8, n, Sample);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 28,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: select_client_key(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *client,
krb5_enctype *req_enctypes, int n_req_enctypes,
krb5_keyblock *kb_out, krb5_key_data **kd_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_key_data *kd;
krb5_enctype etype;
int i;
memset(kb_out, 0, sizeof(*kb_out));
*kd_out = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < n_req_enctypes; i++) {
etype = req_enctypes[i];
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype))
continue;
if (krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, client, etype, -1, 0, &kd) == 0) {
/* Decrypt the client key data and set its enctype to the request
* enctype (which may differ from the key data enctype for DES). */
ret = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, kd, kb_out, NULL);
if (ret)
return ret;
kb_out->enctype = etype;
*kd_out = kd;
return 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 1,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int edge_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct edgeport_port *edge_port = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
struct edgeport_serial *edge_serial;
struct usb_device *dev;
struct urb *urb;
int port_number;
int status;
u16 open_settings;
u8 transaction_timeout;
if (edge_port == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
port_number = port->port_number;
dev = port->serial->dev;
/* turn off loopback */
status = ti_do_config(edge_port, UMPC_SET_CLR_LOOPBACK, 0);
if (status) {
dev_err(&port->dev,
"%s - cannot send clear loopback command, %d\n",
__func__, status);
return status;
}
/* set up the port settings */
if (tty)
edge_set_termios(tty, port, &tty->termios);
/* open up the port */
/* milliseconds to timeout for DMA transfer */
transaction_timeout = 2;
edge_port->ump_read_timeout =
max(20, ((transaction_timeout * 3) / 2));
/* milliseconds to timeout for DMA transfer */
open_settings = (u8)(UMP_DMA_MODE_CONTINOUS |
UMP_PIPE_TRANS_TIMEOUT_ENA |
(transaction_timeout << 2));
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - Sending UMPC_OPEN_PORT\n", __func__);
/* Tell TI to open and start the port */
status = send_cmd(dev, UMPC_OPEN_PORT,
(u8)(UMPM_UART1_PORT + port_number), open_settings, NULL, 0);
if (status) {
dev_err(&port->dev, "%s - cannot send open command, %d\n",
__func__, status);
return status;
}
/* Start the DMA? */
status = send_cmd(dev, UMPC_START_PORT,
(u8)(UMPM_UART1_PORT + port_number), 0, NULL, 0);
if (status) {
dev_err(&port->dev, "%s - cannot send start DMA command, %d\n",
__func__, status);
return status;
}
/* Clear TX and RX buffers in UMP */
status = purge_port(port, UMP_PORT_DIR_OUT | UMP_PORT_DIR_IN);
if (status) {
dev_err(&port->dev,
"%s - cannot send clear buffers command, %d\n",
__func__, status);
return status;
}
/* Read Initial MSR */
status = ti_vread_sync(dev, UMPC_READ_MSR, 0,
(__u16)(UMPM_UART1_PORT + port_number),
&edge_port->shadow_msr, 1);
if (status) {
dev_err(&port->dev, "%s - cannot send read MSR command, %d\n",
__func__, status);
return status;
}
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "ShadowMSR 0x%X\n", edge_port->shadow_msr);
/* Set Initial MCR */
edge_port->shadow_mcr = MCR_RTS | MCR_DTR;
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "ShadowMCR 0x%X\n", edge_port->shadow_mcr);
edge_serial = edge_port->edge_serial;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&edge_serial->es_lock))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (edge_serial->num_ports_open == 0) {
/* we are the first port to open, post the interrupt urb */
urb = edge_serial->serial->port[0]->interrupt_in_urb;
if (!urb) {
dev_err(&port->dev,
"%s - no interrupt urb present, exiting\n",
__func__);
status = -EINVAL;
goto release_es_lock;
}
urb->context = edge_serial;
status = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_KERNEL);
if (status) {
dev_err(&port->dev,
"%s - usb_submit_urb failed with value %d\n",
__func__, status);
goto release_es_lock;
}
}
/*
* reset the data toggle on the bulk endpoints to work around bug in
* host controllers where things get out of sync some times
*/
usb_clear_halt(dev, port->write_urb->pipe);
usb_clear_halt(dev, port->read_urb->pipe);
/* start up our bulk read urb */
urb = port->read_urb;
if (!urb) {
dev_err(&port->dev, "%s - no read urb present, exiting\n",
__func__);
status = -EINVAL;
goto unlink_int_urb;
}
edge_port->ep_read_urb_state = EDGE_READ_URB_RUNNING;
urb->context = edge_port;
status = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_KERNEL);
if (status) {
dev_err(&port->dev,
"%s - read bulk usb_submit_urb failed with value %d\n",
__func__, status);
goto unlink_int_urb;
}
++edge_serial->num_ports_open;
goto release_es_lock;
unlink_int_urb:
if (edge_port->edge_serial->num_ports_open == 0)
usb_kill_urb(port->serial->port[0]->interrupt_in_urb);
release_es_lock:
mutex_unlock(&edge_serial->es_lock);
return status;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191 | 0 | 26,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebGLRenderingContextBase::GetStaticBitmapImage(
std::unique_ptr<viz::SingleReleaseCallback>* out_release_callback) {
if (!GetDrawingBuffer())
return nullptr;
if (CreationAttributes().preserve_drawing_buffer)
return GetImage();
return GetDrawingBuffer()->TransferToStaticBitmapImage(out_release_callback);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_set_oFFs(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
png_int_32 offset_x, png_int_32 offset_y, int unit_type)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "oFFs");
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL)
return;
info_ptr->x_offset = offset_x;
info_ptr->y_offset = offset_y;
info_ptr->offset_unit_type = (png_byte)unit_type;
info_ptr->valid |= PNG_INFO_oFFs;
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BookmarkManagerView::WindowClosing() {
g_browser_process->local_state()->SetInteger(
prefs::kBookmarkManagerSplitLocation, split_view_->divider_x());
}
Commit Message: Relands cl 16982 as it wasn't the cause of the build breakage. Here's
the description for that cl:
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/115505 for bug
http://crbug.com/4030 for tyoshino.
BUG=http://crbug.com/4030
TEST=make sure control-w dismisses bookmark manager.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/113902
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@16987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(icu::UnicodeString("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
transliterator_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d; ӏ > l; [кĸκ] > k; п > n;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Block dotless-i / j + a combining mark
U+0131 (doltess i) and U+0237 (dotless j) are blocked from being
followed by a combining mark in U+0300 block.
Bug: 774842
Test: See the bug
Change-Id: I92aac0e97233184864d060fd0f137a90b042c679
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/767888
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517605}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform1iv(
GLint fake_location, GLsizei count, const GLint *value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniform1iv",
Program::kUniform1i,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
if (type == GL_SAMPLER_2D || type == GL_SAMPLER_2D_RECT_ARB ||
type == GL_SAMPLER_CUBE || type == GL_SAMPLER_EXTERNAL_OES) {
if (!state_.current_program->SetSamplers(
state_.texture_units.size(), fake_location, count, value)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glUniform1iv", "texture unit out of range");
return;
}
}
glUniform1iv(real_location, count, value);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~OwnedTexture() {
ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance()->RemoveObserver(this);
DeleteTexture();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hrtick_start_fair(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p)
{
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 29,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iperf_get_test_server_port(struct iperf_test *ipt)
{
return ipt->server_port;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int HttpStreamParser::ReadResponseHeaders(const CompletionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(io_state_ == STATE_REQUEST_SENT || io_state_ == STATE_DONE);
DCHECK(callback_.is_null());
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
if (io_state_ == STATE_DONE)
return ERR_CONNECTION_CLOSED;
int result = OK;
io_state_ = STATE_READ_HEADERS;
if (read_buf_->offset() > 0) {
result = read_buf_->offset() - read_buf_unused_offset_;
read_buf_->set_offset(read_buf_unused_offset_);
}
if (result > 0)
io_state_ = STATE_READ_HEADERS_COMPLETE;
result = DoLoop(result);
if (result == ERR_IO_PENDING)
callback_ = callback;
return result > 0 ? OK : result;
}
Commit Message: net: don't process truncated headers on HTTPS connections.
This change causes us to not process any headers unless they are correctly
terminated with a \r\n\r\n sequence.
BUG=244260
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15688012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202927 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::shouldSendViolationReport(
const String& report) const {
return !m_violationReportsSent.contains(report.impl()->hash());
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ext4_insert_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
handle_t *handle;
struct ext4_ext_path *path;
struct ext4_extent *extent;
ext4_lblk_t offset_lblk, len_lblk, ee_start_lblk = 0;
unsigned int credits, ee_len;
int ret = 0, depth, split_flag = 0;
loff_t ioffset;
/*
* We need to test this early because xfstests assumes that an
* insert range of (0, 1) will return EOPNOTSUPP if the file
* system does not support insert range.
*/
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Insert range works only on fs block size aligned offsets. */
if (offset & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1) ||
len & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
trace_ext4_insert_range(inode, offset, len);
offset_lblk = offset >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
len_lblk = len >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
/* Call ext4_force_commit to flush all data in case of data=journal */
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = ext4_force_commit(inode->i_sb);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
inode_lock(inode);
/* Currently just for extent based files */
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Check for wrap through zero */
if (inode->i_size + len > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) {
ret = -EFBIG;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Offset should be less than i_size */
if (offset >= i_size_read(inode)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Wait for existing dio to complete */
inode_dio_wait(inode);
/*
* Prevent page faults from reinstantiating pages we have released from
* page cache.
*/
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
ret = ext4_break_layouts(inode);
if (ret)
goto out_mmap;
/*
* Need to round down to align start offset to page size boundary
* for page size > block size.
*/
ioffset = round_down(offset, PAGE_SIZE);
/* Write out all dirty pages */
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(inode->i_mapping, ioffset,
LLONG_MAX);
if (ret)
goto out_mmap;
truncate_pagecache(inode, ioffset);
credits = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_TRUNCATE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out_mmap;
}
/* Expand file to avoid data loss if there is error while shifting */
inode->i_size += len;
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize += len;
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
ret = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
if (ret)
goto out_stop;
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
path = ext4_find_extent(inode, offset_lblk, NULL, 0);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
depth = ext_depth(inode);
extent = path[depth].p_ext;
if (extent) {
ee_start_lblk = le32_to_cpu(extent->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(extent);
/*
* If offset_lblk is not the starting block of extent, split
* the extent @offset_lblk
*/
if ((offset_lblk > ee_start_lblk) &&
(offset_lblk < (ee_start_lblk + ee_len))) {
if (ext4_ext_is_unwritten(extent))
split_flag = EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT1 |
EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2;
ret = ext4_split_extent_at(handle, inode, &path,
offset_lblk, split_flag,
EXT4_EX_NOCACHE |
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO |
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_METADATA_NOFAIL);
}
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
if (ret < 0) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
} else {
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
}
ret = ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, offset_lblk,
EXT_MAX_BLOCKS - offset_lblk);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
/*
* if offset_lblk lies in a hole which is at start of file, use
* ee_start_lblk to shift extents
*/
ret = ext4_ext_shift_extents(inode, handle,
ee_start_lblk > offset_lblk ? ee_start_lblk : offset_lblk,
len_lblk, SHIFT_RIGHT);
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
if (ret >= 0)
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
out_stop:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_mmap:
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
out_mutex:
inode_unlock(inode);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <sriramr@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 21,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kernel_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page, int offset,
size_t size, int flags)
{
if (sock->ops->sendpage)
return sock->ops->sendpage(sock, page, offset, size, flags);
return sock_no_sendpage(sock, page, offset, size, flags);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UrlmonUrlRequestManager::OnResponseStarted(int request_id,
const char* mime_type, const char* headers, int size,
base::Time last_modified, const std::string& redirect_url,
int redirect_status, const net::HostPortPair& socket_address) {
DCHECK_NE(request_id, -1);
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__;
DCHECK(LookupRequest(request_id) != NULL);
++calling_delegate_;
delegate_->OnResponseStarted(request_id, mime_type, headers, size,
last_modified, redirect_url, redirect_status, socket_address);
--calling_delegate_;
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InterstitialPageImpl::Proceed() {
if (!render_view_host_)
return;
if (action_taken_ != NO_ACTION) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
Disable();
action_taken_ = PROCEED_ACTION;
pause_throbber_ = false;
controller_->delegate()->DidProceedOnInterstitial();
if (new_navigation_)
TakeActionOnResourceDispatcher(CANCEL);
else
TakeActionOnResourceDispatcher(RESUME);
if (!new_navigation_) {
Hide();
delegate_->OnProceed();
return;
}
delegate_->OnProceed();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void skip_to_key(AVFormatContext *s)
{
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) {
int j = asf->asfid2avid[i];
ASFStream *asf_st = &asf->streams[i];
if (j < 0 || s->streams[j]->codecpar->codec_type != AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO)
continue;
asf_st->skip_to_key = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UrlFetcherDownloader::UrlFetcherDownloader(
std::unique_ptr<CrxDownloader> successor,
scoped_refptr<NetworkFetcherFactory> network_fetcher_factory)
: CrxDownloader(std::move(successor)),
network_fetcher_factory_(network_fetcher_factory) {}
Commit Message: Fix error handling in the request sender and url fetcher downloader.
That means handling the network errors by primarily looking at net_error.
Bug: 1028369
Change-Id: I8181bced25f8b56144ea336a03883d0dceea5108
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1935428
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sorin Jianu <sorin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#719199}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void http_av_log(void *ptr, int level, const char *fmt, va_list vargs)
{
static int print_prefix = 1;
AVClass *avc = ptr ? *(AVClass**)ptr : NULL;
if (level > av_log_get_level())
return;
if (print_prefix && avc)
http_log("[%s @ %p]", avc->item_name(ptr), ptr);
print_prefix = strstr(fmt, "\n") != NULL;
http_vlog(fmt, vargs);
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PathIsWritable(const FilePath& path) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
return access(path.value().c_str(), W_OK) == 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 25,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fuse_setup(struct fuse* fuse, gid_t gid, mode_t mask) {
char opts[256];
fuse->fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR);
if (fuse->fd == -1) {
ERROR("failed to open fuse device: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
umount2(fuse->dest_path, MNT_DETACH);
snprintf(opts, sizeof(opts),
"fd=%i,rootmode=40000,default_permissions,allow_other,user_id=%d,group_id=%d",
fuse->fd, fuse->global->uid, fuse->global->gid);
if (mount("/dev/fuse", fuse->dest_path, "fuse", MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC |
MS_NOATIME, opts) != 0) {
ERROR("failed to mount fuse filesystem: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
fuse->gid = gid;
fuse->mask = mask;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix overflow in path building
An incorrect size was causing an unsigned value
to wrap, causing it to write past the end of
the buffer.
Bug: 28085658
Change-Id: Ie9625c729cca024d514ba2880ff97209d435a165
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 12,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~CacheQueryResult() {}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dell_poweredge_bt_xaction_handler(struct notifier_block *self,
unsigned long unused,
void *in)
{
struct smi_info *smi_info = in;
unsigned char *data = smi_info->curr_msg->data;
unsigned int size = smi_info->curr_msg->data_size;
if (size >= 8 &&
(data[0]>>2) == STORAGE_NETFN &&
data[1] == STORAGE_CMD_GET_SDR &&
data[7] == 0x3A) {
return_hosed_msg_badsize(smi_info);
return NOTIFY_STOP;
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 26,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pmcraid_identify_hrrq(struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd)
{
struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance = cmd->drv_inst;
struct pmcraid_ioarcb *ioarcb = &cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb;
int index = cmd->hrrq_index;
__be64 hrrq_addr = cpu_to_be64(pinstance->hrrq_start_bus_addr[index]);
u32 hrrq_size = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(u32) * PMCRAID_MAX_CMD);
void (*done_function)(struct pmcraid_cmd *);
pmcraid_reinit_cmdblk(cmd);
cmd->hrrq_index = index + 1;
if (cmd->hrrq_index < pinstance->num_hrrq) {
done_function = pmcraid_identify_hrrq;
} else {
cmd->hrrq_index = 0;
done_function = pmcraid_get_fwversion;
}
/* Initialize ioarcb */
ioarcb->request_type = REQ_TYPE_IOACMD;
ioarcb->resource_handle = cpu_to_le32(PMCRAID_IOA_RES_HANDLE);
/* initialize the hrrq number where IOA will respond to this command */
ioarcb->hrrq_id = index;
ioarcb->cdb[0] = PMCRAID_IDENTIFY_HRRQ;
ioarcb->cdb[1] = index;
/* IOA expects 64-bit pci address to be written in B.E format
* (i.e cdb[2]=MSByte..cdb[9]=LSB.
*/
pmcraid_info("HRRQ_IDENTIFY with hrrq:ioarcb:index => %llx:%llx:%x\n",
hrrq_addr, ioarcb->ioarcb_bus_addr, index);
memcpy(&(ioarcb->cdb[2]), &hrrq_addr, sizeof(hrrq_addr));
memcpy(&(ioarcb->cdb[10]), &hrrq_size, sizeof(hrrq_size));
/* Subsequent commands require HRRQ identification to be successful.
* Note that this gets called even during reset from SCSI mid-layer
* or tasklet
*/
pmcraid_send_cmd(cmd, done_function,
PMCRAID_INTERNAL_TIMEOUT,
pmcraid_timeout_handler);
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit LayoutBlockFlow::adjustLogicalLeftOffsetForLine(LayoutUnit offsetFromFloats, bool applyTextIndent) const
{
LayoutUnit left = offsetFromFloats;
if (applyTextIndent && style()->isLeftToRightDirection())
left += textIndentOffset();
return left;
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 23,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UpdateProviderPolicy(const PolicyMap& policy) {
PolicyMap policy_with_defaults;
policy_with_defaults.CopyFrom(policy);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
SetEnterpriseUsersDefaults(&policy_with_defaults);
#endif
provider_.UpdateChromePolicy(policy_with_defaults);
DCHECK(base::MessageLoopCurrent::Get());
base::RunLoop loop;
loop.RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::SetCompositor(ui::Compositor* compositor) {
DCHECK(!compositor_);
if (!compositor)
return;
compositor_ = compositor;
compositor_->AddObserver(this);
DCHECK(!vsync_manager_.get());
vsync_manager_ = compositor_->vsync_manager();
vsync_manager_->AddObserver(this);
compositor_->AddFrameSink(frame_sink_id_);
}
Commit Message: mac: Make RWHVMac::ClearCompositorFrame clear locks
Ensure that the BrowserCompositorMac not hold on to a compositor lock
when requested to clear its compositor frame. This lock may be held
indefinitely (if the renderer hangs) and so the frame will never be
cleared.
Bug: 739621
Change-Id: I15d0e82bdf632f3379a48e959f198afb8a4ac218
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/608239
Commit-Queue: ccameron chromium <ccameron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#493563}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPluginDelegateProxy::OnResolveProxy(const GURL& url,
bool* result,
std::string* proxy_list) {
*result = false;
RenderThreadImpl::current()->Send(
new ViewHostMsg_ResolveProxy(url, result, proxy_list));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: btrfs_search_dir_index_item(struct btrfs_root *root,
struct btrfs_path *path, u64 dirid,
const char *name, int name_len)
{
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
struct btrfs_dir_item *di;
struct btrfs_key key;
u32 nritems;
int ret;
key.objectid = dirid;
key.type = BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY;
key.offset = 0;
ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root, &key, path, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
leaf = path->nodes[0];
nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(leaf);
while (1) {
if (path->slots[0] >= nritems) {
ret = btrfs_next_leaf(root, path);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
if (ret > 0)
break;
leaf = path->nodes[0];
nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(leaf);
continue;
}
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, path->slots[0]);
if (key.objectid != dirid || key.type != BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY)
break;
di = btrfs_match_dir_item_name(root, path, name, name_len);
if (di)
return di;
path->slots[0]++;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 21,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsValidStateForWindowsCreateFunction(
const windows::Create::Params::CreateData* create_data) {
if (!create_data)
return true;
bool has_bound = create_data->left || create_data->top ||
create_data->width || create_data->height;
bool is_panel = create_data->type == windows::CreateType::CREATE_TYPE_PANEL;
switch (create_data->state) {
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_MINIMIZED:
return !(create_data->focused && *create_data->focused) && !has_bound &&
!is_panel;
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_MAXIMIZED:
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_FULLSCREEN:
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_LOCKED_FULLSCREEN:
return !(create_data->focused && !*create_data->focused) && !has_bound &&
!is_panel;
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_NORMAL:
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_DOCKED:
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_NONE:
return true;
}
NOTREACHED();
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int PostScript_MetaHandler::FindPostScriptHint()
{
bool found = false;
IOBuffer ioBuf;
XMP_Uns8 ch;
XMP_IO* fileRef = this->parent->ioRef;
XMP_AbortProc abortProc = this->parent->abortProc;
void * abortArg = this->parent->abortArg;
const bool checkAbort = (abortProc != 0);
fileRef->Rewind();
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 4 ) ) return false;
XMP_Uns32 fileheader = GetUns32BE ( ioBuf.ptr );
if ( fileheader == 0xC5D0D3C6 ) {
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 30 ) ) return false;
XMP_Uns32 psOffset = GetUns32LE ( ioBuf.ptr+4 ); // PostScript offset.
XMP_Uns32 psLength = GetUns32LE ( ioBuf.ptr+8 ); // PostScript length.
MoveToOffset ( fileRef, psOffset, &ioBuf );
}
while ( true ) {
if ( checkAbort && abortProc(abortArg) ) {
XMP_Throw ( "PostScript_MetaHandler::FindPostScriptHint - User abort", kXMPErr_UserAbort );
}
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, kPSContainsXMPString.length() ) ) return kPSHint_NoMarker;
if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr(kPSEndCommentString.c_str()), kPSEndCommentString.length() ) ) {
return kPSHint_NoMarker;
} else if ( ! CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr(kPSContainsXMPString.c_str()), kPSContainsXMPString.length() ) ) {
do {
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMarker;
ch = *ioBuf.ptr;
++ioBuf.ptr;
} while ( ! IsNewline ( ch ) );
} else {
ioBuf.ptr += kPSContainsXMPString.length();
int xmpHint = kPSHint_NoMain; // ! From here on, a failure means "no main", not "no marker".
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
if ( ! IsSpaceOrTab ( *ioBuf.ptr ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
while ( true ) {
while ( true ) { // Skip leading spaces and tabs.
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
if ( ! IsSpaceOrTab ( *ioBuf.ptr ) ) break;
++ioBuf.ptr;
}
if ( IsNewline ( *ioBuf.ptr ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain; // Reached the end of the ContainsXMP comment.
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 6 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("NoMain"), 6 ) ) {
ioBuf.ptr += 6;
xmpHint = kPSHint_NoMain;
break;
} else if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("MainFi"), 6 ) ) {
ioBuf.ptr += 6;
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 3 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("rst"), 3 ) ) {
ioBuf.ptr += 3;
xmpHint = kPSHint_MainFirst;
}
break;
} else if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("MainLa"), 6 ) ) {
ioBuf.ptr += 6;
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 2 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("st"), 2 ) ) {
ioBuf.ptr += 2;
xmpHint = kPSHint_MainLast;
}
break;
} else {
while ( true ) { // Skip until whitespace.
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
if ( IsWhitespace ( *ioBuf.ptr ) ) break;
++ioBuf.ptr;
}
}
} // Look for the main packet location option.
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
if ( ! IsWhitespace ( *ioBuf.ptr ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
return xmpHint;
} // Found "%ADO_ContainsXMP:".
} // Outer marker loop.
return kPSHint_NoMarker; // Should never reach here.
} // PostScript_MetaHandler::FindPostScriptHint
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *M_fs_path_join(const char *p1, const char *p2, M_fs_system_t sys_type)
{
M_buf_t *buf;
char sep;
sys_type = M_fs_path_get_system_type(sys_type);
/* If p2 is an absolute path we can't properly join it to another path... */
if (M_fs_path_isabs(p2, sys_type))
return M_strdup(p2);
buf = M_buf_create();
sep = M_fs_path_get_system_sep(sys_type);
/* Don't add nothing if we have nothing. */
if (p1 != NULL && *p1 != '\0')
M_buf_add_str(buf, p1);
/* Only put a sep if we have two parts and we really need the sep (p1 doesn't end with a sep). */
if (p1 != NULL && *p1 != '\0' && p2 != NULL && *p2 != '\0' && p1[M_str_len(p1)-1] != sep)
M_buf_add_byte(buf, (unsigned char)sep);
/* Don't add nothing if we have nothing. */
if (p2 != NULL && *p2 != '\0')
M_buf_add_str(buf, p2);
return M_buf_finish_str(buf, NULL);
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 10,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnDatabaseClosed(const string16& origin_identifier,
const string16& database_name) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
if (!database_connections_.IsDatabaseOpened(
origin_identifier, database_name)) {
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BadMessageTerminate_DBMF"));
BadMessageReceived();
return;
}
database_connections_.RemoveConnection(origin_identifier, database_name);
db_tracker_->DatabaseClosed(origin_identifier, database_name);
}
Commit Message: WebDatabase: check path traversal in origin_identifier
BUG=172264
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12212091
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@183141 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 13,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltScanLiteral(xsltParserContextPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *q, *cur;
xmlChar *ret = NULL;
int val, len;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR == '"') {
NEXT;
cur = q = CUR_PTR;
val = xmlStringCurrentChar(NULL, cur, &len);
while ((IS_CHAR(val)) && (val != '"')) {
cur += len;
val = xmlStringCurrentChar(NULL, cur, &len);
}
if (!IS_CHAR(val)) {
ctxt->error = 1;
return(NULL);
} else {
ret = xmlStrndup(q, cur - q);
}
cur += len;
CUR_PTR = cur;
} else if (CUR == '\'') {
NEXT;
cur = q = CUR_PTR;
val = xmlStringCurrentChar(NULL, cur, &len);
while ((IS_CHAR(val)) && (val != '\'')) {
cur += len;
val = xmlStringCurrentChar(NULL, cur, &len);
}
if (!IS_CHAR(val)) {
ctxt->error = 1;
return(NULL);
} else {
ret = xmlStrndup(q, cur - q);
}
cur += len;
CUR_PTR = cur;
} else {
/* XP_ERROR(XPATH_START_LITERAL_ERROR); */
ctxt->error = 1;
return(NULL);
}
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Handle a bad XSLT expression better.
BUG=138672
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10830177
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@150123 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init ipv6_packet_init(void)
{
dev_add_pack(&ipv6_packet_type);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderThreadImpl::CreateExternalBeginFrameSource(int routing_id) {
return std::make_unique<CompositorExternalBeginFrameSource>(
compositor_message_filter_.get(), sync_message_filter(), routing_id);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 6,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Textfield::DeleteRange(const gfx::Range& range) {
if (!ImeEditingAllowed() || range.is_empty())
return false;
OnBeforeUserAction();
model_->SelectRange(range);
if (model_->HasSelection()) {
model_->DeleteSelection();
UpdateAfterChange(true, true);
}
OnAfterUserAction();
return true;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int oz_usb_submit_elt(struct oz_elt_buf *eb, struct oz_elt_info *ei,
struct oz_usb_ctx *usb_ctx, u8 strid, u8 isoc)
{
int ret;
struct oz_elt *elt = (struct oz_elt *)ei->data;
struct oz_app_hdr *app_hdr = (struct oz_app_hdr *)(elt+1);
elt->type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA;
ei->app_id = OZ_APPID_USB;
ei->length = elt->length + sizeof(struct oz_elt);
app_hdr->app_id = OZ_APPID_USB;
spin_lock_bh(&eb->lock);
if (isoc == 0) {
app_hdr->elt_seq_num = usb_ctx->tx_seq_num++;
if (usb_ctx->tx_seq_num == 0)
usb_ctx->tx_seq_num = 1;
}
ret = oz_queue_elt_info(eb, isoc, strid, ei);
if (ret)
oz_elt_info_free(eb, ei);
spin_unlock_bh(&eb->lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: divide-by-zero leading to panic
A network supplied parameter was not checked before division, leading to
a divide-by-zero. Since this happens in the softirq path, it leads to a
crash. A PoC follows below, which requires the ozprotocol.h file from
this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
struct oz_elt oz_elt2;
struct oz_multiple_fixed oz_multiple_fixed;
} __packed packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 0,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
},
.oz_elt2 = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed)
},
.oz_multiple_fixed = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DATA,
.endpoint = 0,
.format = OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED,
.unit_size = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &packet, sizeof(packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 25,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
/* update guest state fields: */
vmcs12->guest_cr0 = vmcs12_guest_cr0(vcpu, vmcs12);
vmcs12->guest_cr4 = vmcs12_guest_cr4(vcpu, vmcs12);
kvm_get_dr(vcpu, 7, (unsigned long *)&vmcs12->guest_dr7);
vmcs12->guest_rsp = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP);
vmcs12->guest_rip = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RIP);
vmcs12->guest_rflags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
vmcs12->guest_es_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_ES_SELECTOR);
vmcs12->guest_cs_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR);
vmcs12->guest_ss_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_SS_SELECTOR);
vmcs12->guest_ds_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_DS_SELECTOR);
vmcs12->guest_fs_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_FS_SELECTOR);
vmcs12->guest_gs_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_GS_SELECTOR);
vmcs12->guest_ldtr_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR);
vmcs12->guest_tr_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_TR_SELECTOR);
vmcs12->guest_es_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_ES_LIMIT);
vmcs12->guest_cs_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_CS_LIMIT);
vmcs12->guest_ss_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SS_LIMIT);
vmcs12->guest_ds_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_DS_LIMIT);
vmcs12->guest_fs_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_FS_LIMIT);
vmcs12->guest_gs_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_GS_LIMIT);
vmcs12->guest_ldtr_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT);
vmcs12->guest_tr_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT);
vmcs12->guest_gdtr_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT);
vmcs12->guest_idtr_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
vmcs12->guest_es_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES);
vmcs12->guest_cs_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_CS_AR_BYTES);
vmcs12->guest_ss_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SS_AR_BYTES);
vmcs12->guest_ds_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_DS_AR_BYTES);
vmcs12->guest_fs_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_FS_AR_BYTES);
vmcs12->guest_gs_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_GS_AR_BYTES);
vmcs12->guest_ldtr_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES);
vmcs12->guest_tr_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES);
vmcs12->guest_es_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_ES_BASE);
vmcs12->guest_cs_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CS_BASE);
vmcs12->guest_ss_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SS_BASE);
vmcs12->guest_ds_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DS_BASE);
vmcs12->guest_fs_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_FS_BASE);
vmcs12->guest_gs_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GS_BASE);
vmcs12->guest_ldtr_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_LDTR_BASE);
vmcs12->guest_tr_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_TR_BASE);
vmcs12->guest_gdtr_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GDTR_BASE);
vmcs12->guest_idtr_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_IDTR_BASE);
vmcs12->guest_interruptibility_info =
vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);
vmcs12->guest_pending_dbg_exceptions =
vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS);
/*
* In some cases (usually, nested EPT), L2 is allowed to change its
* own CR3 without exiting. If it has changed it, we must keep it.
* Of course, if L0 is using shadow page tables, GUEST_CR3 was defined
* by L0, not L1 or L2, so we mustn't unconditionally copy it to vmcs12.
*
* Additionally, restore L2's PDPTR to vmcs12.
*/
if (enable_ept) {
vmcs12->guest_cr3 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_CR3);
vmcs12->guest_pdptr0 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0);
vmcs12->guest_pdptr1 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1);
vmcs12->guest_pdptr2 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2);
vmcs12->guest_pdptr3 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3);
}
vmcs12->vm_entry_controls =
(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & ~VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) |
(vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS) & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
/* TODO: These cannot have changed unless we have MSR bitmaps and
* the relevant bit asks not to trap the change */
vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL);
if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT)
vmcs12->guest_ia32_pat = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_PAT);
vmcs12->guest_sysenter_cs = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
vmcs12->guest_sysenter_esp = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP);
vmcs12->guest_sysenter_eip = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP);
/* update exit information fields: */
vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason;
vmcs12->exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
if ((vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info &
(INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)) ==
(INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK))
vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code =
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field = 0;
vmcs12->vm_exit_instruction_len = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
vmcs12->vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
if (!(vmcs12->vm_exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY)) {
/* vm_entry_intr_info_field is cleared on exit. Emulate this
* instead of reading the real value. */
vmcs12->vm_entry_intr_info_field &= ~INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
/*
* Transfer the event that L0 or L1 may wanted to inject into
* L2 to IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD.
*/
vmcs12_save_pending_event(vcpu, vmcs12);
}
/*
* Drop what we picked up for L2 via vmx_complete_interrupts. It is
* preserved above and would only end up incorrectly in L1.
*/
vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PolygonInfo **DestroyPolygonThreadSet(PolygonInfo **polygon_info)
{
register ssize_t
i;
assert(polygon_info != (PolygonInfo **) NULL);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource); i++)
if (polygon_info[i] != (PolygonInfo *) NULL)
polygon_info[i]=DestroyPolygonInfo(polygon_info[i]);
polygon_info=(PolygonInfo **) RelinquishMagickMemory(polygon_info);
return(polygon_info);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mxf_get_sorted_table_segments(MXFContext *mxf, int *nb_sorted_segments, MXFIndexTableSegment ***sorted_segments)
{
int i, j, nb_segments = 0;
MXFIndexTableSegment **unsorted_segments;
int last_body_sid = -1, last_index_sid = -1, last_index_start = -1;
/* count number of segments, allocate arrays and copy unsorted segments */
for (i = 0; i < mxf->metadata_sets_count; i++)
if (mxf->metadata_sets[i]->type == IndexTableSegment)
nb_segments++;
if (!nb_segments)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!(unsorted_segments = av_calloc(nb_segments, sizeof(*unsorted_segments))) ||
!(*sorted_segments = av_calloc(nb_segments, sizeof(**sorted_segments)))) {
av_freep(sorted_segments);
av_free(unsorted_segments);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = j = 0; i < mxf->metadata_sets_count; i++)
if (mxf->metadata_sets[i]->type == IndexTableSegment)
unsorted_segments[j++] = (MXFIndexTableSegment*)mxf->metadata_sets[i];
*nb_sorted_segments = 0;
/* sort segments by {BodySID, IndexSID, IndexStartPosition}, remove duplicates while we're at it */
for (i = 0; i < nb_segments; i++) {
int best = -1, best_body_sid = -1, best_index_sid = -1, best_index_start = -1;
uint64_t best_index_duration = 0;
for (j = 0; j < nb_segments; j++) {
MXFIndexTableSegment *s = unsorted_segments[j];
/* Require larger BosySID, IndexSID or IndexStartPosition then the previous entry. This removes duplicates.
* We want the smallest values for the keys than what we currently have, unless this is the first such entry this time around.
* If we come across an entry with the same IndexStartPosition but larger IndexDuration, then we'll prefer it over the one we currently have.
*/
if ((i == 0 || s->body_sid > last_body_sid || s->index_sid > last_index_sid || s->index_start_position > last_index_start) &&
(best == -1 || s->body_sid < best_body_sid || s->index_sid < best_index_sid || s->index_start_position < best_index_start ||
(s->index_start_position == best_index_start && s->index_duration > best_index_duration))) {
best = j;
best_body_sid = s->body_sid;
best_index_sid = s->index_sid;
best_index_start = s->index_start_position;
best_index_duration = s->index_duration;
}
}
/* no suitable entry found -> we're done */
if (best == -1)
break;
(*sorted_segments)[(*nb_sorted_segments)++] = unsorted_segments[best];
last_body_sid = best_body_sid;
last_index_sid = best_index_sid;
last_index_start = best_index_start;
}
av_free(unsorted_segments);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 28,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl_handshake_step( ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
#if defined(POLARSSL_SSL_CLI_C)
if( ssl->endpoint == SSL_IS_CLIENT )
ret = ssl_handshake_client_step( ssl );
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_C)
if( ssl->endpoint == SSL_IS_SERVER )
ret = ssl_handshake_server_step( ssl );
#endif
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Performance::ActivateObserver(PerformanceObserver& observer) {
if (active_observers_.IsEmpty())
deliver_observations_timer_.StartOneShot(TimeDelta(), FROM_HERE);
active_observers_.insert(&observer);
}
Commit Message: Fix timing allow check algorithm for service workers
This CL uses the OriginalURLViaServiceWorker() in the timing allow check
algorithm if the response WasFetchedViaServiceWorker(). This way, if a
service worker changes a same origin request to become cross origin,
then the timing allow check algorithm will still fail.
resource-timing-worker.js is changed so it avoids an empty Response,
which is an odd case in terms of same origin checks.
Bug: 837275
Change-Id: I7e497a6fcc2ee14244121b915ca5f5cceded417a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1038229
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Reviewed-by: Timothy Dresser <tdresser@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555476}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 1,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteInsertImage(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String& value) {
DCHECK(frame.GetDocument());
HTMLImageElement* image = HTMLImageElement::Create(*frame.GetDocument());
if (!value.IsEmpty())
image->SetSrc(value);
return ExecuteInsertElement(frame, image);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofproto_port_get_stp_status(struct ofproto *ofproto, ofp_port_t ofp_port,
struct ofproto_port_stp_status *s)
{
struct ofport *ofport = ofproto_get_port(ofproto, ofp_port);
if (!ofport) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "%s: cannot get STP status on nonexistent "
"port %"PRIu32, ofproto->name, ofp_port);
return ENODEV;
}
return (ofproto->ofproto_class->get_stp_port_status
? ofproto->ofproto_class->get_stp_port_status(ofport, s)
: EOPNOTSUPP);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 5,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int read_one_char(FILE *f, char *ret, usec_t t, bool *need_nl) {
_cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
struct termios old_termios;
int r;
assert(f);
assert(ret);
/* If this is a terminal, then switch canonical mode off, so that we can read a single character */
if (tcgetattr(fileno(f), &old_termios) >= 0) {
struct termios new_termios = old_termios;
new_termios.c_lflag &= ~ICANON;
new_termios.c_cc[VMIN] = 1;
new_termios.c_cc[VTIME] = 0;
if (tcsetattr(fileno(f), TCSADRAIN, &new_termios) >= 0) {
char c;
if (t != USEC_INFINITY) {
if (fd_wait_for_event(fileno(f), POLLIN, t) <= 0) {
(void) tcsetattr(fileno(f), TCSADRAIN, &old_termios);
return -ETIMEDOUT;
}
}
r = safe_fgetc(f, &c);
(void) tcsetattr(fileno(f), TCSADRAIN, &old_termios);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return -EIO;
if (need_nl)
*need_nl = c != '\n';
*ret = c;
return 0;
}
}
if (t != USEC_INFINITY) {
if (fd_wait_for_event(fileno(f), POLLIN, t) <= 0)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
}
/* If this is not a terminal, then read a full line instead */
r = read_line(f, 16, &line); /* longer than necessary, to eat up UTF-8 chars/vt100 key sequences */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return -EIO;
if (strlen(line) != 1)
return -EBADMSG;
if (need_nl)
*need_nl = false;
*ret = line[0];
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | 0 | 20,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *ubifs_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct ubifs_inode *ui = ubifs_inode(dentry->d_inode);
nd_set_link(nd, ui->data);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dev_cpu_dead(unsigned int oldcpu)
{
struct sk_buff **list_skb;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int cpu;
struct softnet_data *sd, *oldsd, *remsd = NULL;
local_irq_disable();
cpu = smp_processor_id();
sd = &per_cpu(softnet_data, cpu);
oldsd = &per_cpu(softnet_data, oldcpu);
/* Find end of our completion_queue. */
list_skb = &sd->completion_queue;
while (*list_skb)
list_skb = &(*list_skb)->next;
/* Append completion queue from offline CPU. */
*list_skb = oldsd->completion_queue;
oldsd->completion_queue = NULL;
/* Append output queue from offline CPU. */
if (oldsd->output_queue) {
*sd->output_queue_tailp = oldsd->output_queue;
sd->output_queue_tailp = oldsd->output_queue_tailp;
oldsd->output_queue = NULL;
oldsd->output_queue_tailp = &oldsd->output_queue;
}
/* Append NAPI poll list from offline CPU, with one exception :
* process_backlog() must be called by cpu owning percpu backlog.
* We properly handle process_queue & input_pkt_queue later.
*/
while (!list_empty(&oldsd->poll_list)) {
struct napi_struct *napi = list_first_entry(&oldsd->poll_list,
struct napi_struct,
poll_list);
list_del_init(&napi->poll_list);
if (napi->poll == process_backlog)
napi->state = 0;
else
____napi_schedule(sd, napi);
}
raise_softirq_irqoff(NET_TX_SOFTIRQ);
local_irq_enable();
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
remsd = oldsd->rps_ipi_list;
oldsd->rps_ipi_list = NULL;
#endif
/* send out pending IPI's on offline CPU */
net_rps_send_ipi(remsd);
/* Process offline CPU's input_pkt_queue */
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&oldsd->process_queue))) {
netif_rx_ni(skb);
input_queue_head_incr(oldsd);
}
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&oldsd->input_pkt_queue))) {
netif_rx_ni(skb);
input_queue_head_incr(oldsd);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 26,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t WebMediaPlayerImpl::VideoDecodedByteCount() const {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
return GetPipelineStatistics().video_bytes_decoded;
}
Commit Message: Fix HasSingleSecurityOrigin for HLS
HLS manifests can request segments from a different origin than the
original manifest's origin. We do not inspect HLS manifests within
Chromium, and instead delegate to Android's MediaPlayer. This means we
need to be conservative, and always assume segments might come from a
different origin. HasSingleSecurityOrigin should always return false
when decoding HLS.
Bug: 864283
Change-Id: Ie16849ac6f29ae7eaa9caf342ad0509a226228ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142691
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Thomas Guilbert <tguilbert@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576378}
CWE ID: CWE-346 | 0 | 13,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SparseHistogram::~SparseHistogram() {}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 6,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string ChromeMetricsServiceClient::GetApplicationLocale() {
return g_browser_process->GetApplicationLocale();
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 26,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int prepend_path(const struct path *path,
const struct path *root,
char **buffer, int *buflen)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
struct vfsmount *vfsmnt;
struct mount *mnt;
int error = 0;
unsigned seq, m_seq = 0;
char *bptr;
int blen;
rcu_read_lock();
restart_mnt:
read_seqbegin_or_lock(&mount_lock, &m_seq);
seq = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
restart:
bptr = *buffer;
blen = *buflen;
error = 0;
dentry = path->dentry;
vfsmnt = path->mnt;
mnt = real_mount(vfsmnt);
read_seqbegin_or_lock(&rename_lock, &seq);
while (dentry != root->dentry || vfsmnt != root->mnt) {
struct dentry * parent;
if (dentry == vfsmnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
struct mount *parent = ACCESS_ONCE(mnt->mnt_parent);
/* Escaped? */
if (dentry != vfsmnt->mnt_root) {
bptr = *buffer;
blen = *buflen;
error = 3;
break;
}
/* Global root? */
if (mnt != parent) {
dentry = ACCESS_ONCE(mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
mnt = parent;
vfsmnt = &mnt->mnt;
continue;
}
if (!error)
error = is_mounted(vfsmnt) ? 1 : 2;
break;
}
parent = dentry->d_parent;
prefetch(parent);
error = prepend_name(&bptr, &blen, &dentry->d_name);
if (error)
break;
dentry = parent;
}
if (!(seq & 1))
rcu_read_unlock();
if (need_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq)) {
seq = 1;
goto restart;
}
done_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq);
if (!(m_seq & 1))
rcu_read_unlock();
if (need_seqretry(&mount_lock, m_seq)) {
m_seq = 1;
goto restart_mnt;
}
done_seqretry(&mount_lock, m_seq);
if (error >= 0 && bptr == *buffer) {
if (--blen < 0)
error = -ENAMETOOLONG;
else
*--bptr = '/';
}
*buffer = bptr;
*buflen = blen;
return error;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 8,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetImageAlpha(Image *image,const Quantum alpha,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
MagickBooleanType
status;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
status=MagickTrue;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (GetPixelReadMask(image,q) != 0)
SetPixelAlpha(image,alpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleRegisterSharedIdsCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::RegisterSharedIdsCHROMIUM& c) {
GLuint namespace_id = static_cast<GLuint>(c.namespace_id);
GLsizei n = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.n);
uint32 data_size;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(n, sizeof(GLuint), &data_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
GLuint* ids = GetSharedMemoryAs<GLuint*>(
c.ids_shm_id, c.ids_shm_offset, data_size);
if (n < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "RegisterSharedIdsCHROMIUM: n < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (ids == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
DoRegisterSharedIdsCHROMIUM(namespace_id, n, ids);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: garp_group_garp_interval_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
garp_delay_t *delay = LIST_TAIL_DATA(garp_delay);
double val;
if (!read_double_strvec(strvec, 1, &val, 0, INT_MAX / 1000000, true)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "garp_group garp_interval '%s' invalid", FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
return;
}
delay->garp_interval.tv_sec = (time_t)val;
delay->garp_interval.tv_usec = (suseconds_t)((val - delay->garp_interval.tv_sec) * 1000000);
delay->have_garp_interval = true;
if (delay->garp_interval.tv_sec >= 1)
log_message(LOG_INFO, "The garp_interval is very large - %s seconds", FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec,1));
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 4,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_init_class(mrb_state *mrb)
{
struct RClass *bob; /* BasicObject */
struct RClass *obj; /* Object */
struct RClass *mod; /* Module */
struct RClass *cls; /* Class */
/* boot class hierarchy */
bob = boot_defclass(mrb, 0);
obj = boot_defclass(mrb, bob); mrb->object_class = obj;
mod = boot_defclass(mrb, obj); mrb->module_class = mod;/* obj -> mod */
cls = boot_defclass(mrb, mod); mrb->class_class = cls; /* obj -> cls */
/* fix-up loose ends */
bob->c = obj->c = mod->c = cls->c = cls;
make_metaclass(mrb, bob);
make_metaclass(mrb, obj);
make_metaclass(mrb, mod);
make_metaclass(mrb, cls);
/* name basic classes */
mrb_define_const(mrb, bob, "BasicObject", mrb_obj_value(bob));
mrb_define_const(mrb, obj, "BasicObject", mrb_obj_value(bob));
mrb_define_const(mrb, obj, "Object", mrb_obj_value(obj));
mrb_define_const(mrb, obj, "Module", mrb_obj_value(mod));
mrb_define_const(mrb, obj, "Class", mrb_obj_value(cls));
/* name each classes */
mrb_class_name_class(mrb, NULL, bob, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "BasicObject"));
mrb_class_name_class(mrb, NULL, obj, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "Object")); /* 15.2.1 */
mrb_class_name_class(mrb, NULL, mod, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "Module")); /* 15.2.2 */
mrb_class_name_class(mrb, NULL, cls, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "Class")); /* 15.2.3 */
mrb->proc_class = mrb_define_class(mrb, "Proc", mrb->object_class); /* 15.2.17 */
MRB_SET_INSTANCE_TT(mrb->proc_class, MRB_TT_PROC);
MRB_SET_INSTANCE_TT(cls, MRB_TT_CLASS);
mrb_define_method(mrb, bob, "initialize", mrb_bob_init, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, bob, "!", mrb_bob_not, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, bob, "==", mrb_obj_equal_m, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.1 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, bob, "!=", mrb_obj_not_equal_m, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, bob, "__id__", mrb_obj_id_m, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.3.3 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, bob, "__send__", mrb_f_send, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.3.1.3.4 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, bob, "instance_eval", mrb_obj_instance_eval, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.3.1.3.18 */
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, cls, "new", mrb_class_new_class, MRB_ARGS_OPT(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, cls, "superclass", mrb_class_superclass, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.2.3.3.4 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, cls, "new", mrb_instance_new, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.3.3.3 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, cls, "initialize", mrb_class_initialize, MRB_ARGS_OPT(1)); /* 15.2.3.3.1 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, cls, "inherited", mrb_bob_init, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
MRB_SET_INSTANCE_TT(mod, MRB_TT_MODULE);
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "class_variable_defined?", mrb_mod_cvar_defined, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.16 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "class_variable_get", mrb_mod_cvar_get, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.17 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "class_variable_set", mrb_mod_cvar_set, MRB_ARGS_REQ(2)); /* 15.2.2.4.18 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "extend_object", mrb_mod_extend_object, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.25 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "extended", mrb_bob_init, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.26 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "prepended", mrb_bob_init, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "prepend_features", mrb_mod_prepend_features, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "include?", mrb_mod_include_p, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.28 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "append_features", mrb_mod_append_features, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.10 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "class_eval", mrb_mod_module_eval, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.15 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "included", mrb_bob_init, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.29 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "included_modules", mrb_mod_included_modules, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.2.2.4.30 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "initialize", mrb_mod_initialize, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.2.2.4.31 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "instance_methods", mrb_mod_instance_methods, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.33 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "method_defined?", mrb_mod_method_defined, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.34 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "module_eval", mrb_mod_module_eval, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.35 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "module_function", mrb_mod_module_function, MRB_ARGS_ANY());
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "private", mrb_mod_dummy_visibility, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.36 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "protected", mrb_mod_dummy_visibility, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.37 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "public", mrb_mod_dummy_visibility, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.38 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "remove_class_variable", mrb_mod_remove_cvar, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.39 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "remove_method", mrb_mod_remove_method, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.41 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "method_removed", mrb_bob_init, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "attr_reader", mrb_mod_attr_reader, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.13 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "attr_writer", mrb_mod_attr_writer, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.14 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "to_s", mrb_mod_to_s, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "inspect", mrb_mod_to_s, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "alias_method", mrb_mod_alias, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.8 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "ancestors", mrb_mod_ancestors, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.2.2.4.9 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "undef_method", mrb_mod_undef, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.41 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "const_defined?", mrb_mod_const_defined, MRB_ARGS_ARG(1,1)); /* 15.2.2.4.20 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "const_get", mrb_mod_const_get, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.21 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "const_set", mrb_mod_const_set, MRB_ARGS_REQ(2)); /* 15.2.2.4.23 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "constants", mrb_mod_constants, MRB_ARGS_OPT(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.24 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "remove_const", mrb_mod_remove_const, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.40 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "const_missing", mrb_mod_const_missing, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "define_method", mod_define_method, MRB_ARGS_ARG(1,1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "class_variables", mrb_mod_class_variables, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.2.2.4.19 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "===", mrb_mod_eqq, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, mod, "constants", mrb_mod_s_constants, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.3.1 */
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, mod, "nesting", mrb_mod_s_nesting, MRB_ARGS_REQ(0)); /* 15.2.2.3.2 */
mrb_undef_method(mrb, cls, "append_features");
mrb_undef_method(mrb, cls, "extend_object");
mrb->top_self = (struct RObject*)mrb_obj_alloc(mrb, MRB_TT_OBJECT, mrb->object_class);
mrb_define_singleton_method(mrb, mrb->top_self, "inspect", inspect_main, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_singleton_method(mrb, mrb->top_self, "to_s", inspect_main, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_singleton_method(mrb, mrb->top_self, "define_method", top_define_method, MRB_ARGS_ARG(1,1));
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 16,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rotate_backups(const char *fname)
{
#ifdef __VMS
# define SEP "_"
# define AVS ";*" /* All-version suffix. */
# define AVSL (sizeof (AVS) - 1)
#else
# define SEP "."
# define AVSL 0
#endif
int maxlen = strlen (fname) + sizeof (SEP) + numdigit (opt.backups) + AVSL;
char *from = (char *)alloca (maxlen);
char *to = (char *)alloca (maxlen);
struct_stat sb;
int i;
if (stat (fname, &sb) == 0)
if (S_ISREG (sb.st_mode) == 0)
return;
for (i = opt.backups; i > 1; i--)
{
#ifdef VMS
/* Delete (all versions of) any existing max-suffix file, to avoid
* creating multiple versions of it. (On VMS, rename() will
* create a new version of an existing destination file, not
* destroy/overwrite it.)
*/
if (i == opt.backups)
{
sprintf (to, "%s%s%d%s", fname, SEP, i, AVS);
delete (to);
}
#endif
sprintf (to, "%s%s%d", fname, SEP, i);
sprintf (from, "%s%s%d", fname, SEP, i - 1);
rename (from, to);
}
sprintf (to, "%s%s%d", fname, SEP, 1);
rename(fname, to);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 5,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int call_netdevice_notifiers(unsigned long val, struct net_device *dev)
{
return raw_notifier_call_chain(&netdev_chain, val, dev);
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::Undo() {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->GetFrameInputHandler()->Undo();
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Undo"));
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,335 |
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