instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err gnrv_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_GenericVisualSampleEntryBox *ptr = (GF_GenericVisualSampleEntryBox *)s;
ptr->type = ptr->EntryType;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
ptr->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_GNRV;
gf_isom_video_sample_entry_write((GF_VisualSampleEntryBox *)ptr, bs);
gf_bs_write_data(bs, ptr->data, ptr->data_size);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 27,986 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void qeth_clear_outq_buffers(struct qeth_qdio_out_q *q, int free)
{
int j;
for (j = 0; j < QDIO_MAX_BUFFERS_PER_Q; ++j) {
if (!q->bufs[j])
continue;
qeth_cleanup_handled_pending(q, j, 1);
qeth_clear_output_buffer(q, q->bufs[j], QETH_QDIO_BUF_EMPTY);
if (free) {
kmem_cache_free(qeth_qdio_outbuf_cache, q->bufs[j]);
q->bufs[j] = NULL;
}
}
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: perf_reboot(struct notifier_block *notifier, unsigned long val, void *v)
{
int cpu;
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
perf_event_exit_cpu(cpu);
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void _WM_do_sysex_gm_reset(struct _mdi *mdi, struct _event_data *data) {
int i;
if (data != NULL) {
MIDI_EVENT_DEBUG(__FUNCTION__,data->channel, data->data.value);
} else {
MIDI_EVENT_DEBUG(__FUNCTION__,0, 0);
}
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
mdi->channel[i].bank = 0;
if (i != 9) {
mdi->channel[i].patch = _WM_get_patch_data(mdi, 0);
} else {
mdi->channel[i].patch = NULL;
}
mdi->channel[i].hold = 0;
mdi->channel[i].volume = 100;
mdi->channel[i].pressure = 127;
mdi->channel[i].expression = 127;
mdi->channel[i].balance = 64;
mdi->channel[i].pan = 64;
mdi->channel[i].pitch = 0;
mdi->channel[i].pitch_range = 200;
mdi->channel[i].reg_data = 0xFFFF;
mdi->channel[i].isdrum = 0;
}
/* I would not expect notes to be active when this event
triggers but we'll adjust active notes as well just in case */
_WM_AdjustChannelVolumes(mdi,16); // A setting > 15 adjusts all channels
mdi->channel[9].isdrum = 1;
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 25,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iasecc_sdo_get_data(struct sc_card *card, struct iasecc_sdo *sdo)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
int rv, sdo_tag;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sdo_tag = iasecc_sdo_tag_from_class(sdo->sdo_class);
rv = iasecc_sdo_get_tagged_data(card, sdo_tag, sdo);
/* When there is no public data 'GET DATA' returns error */
if (rv != SC_ERROR_INCORRECT_PARAMETERS)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "cannot parse ECC SDO data");
rv = iasecc_sdo_get_tagged_data(card, IASECC_DOCP_TAG, sdo);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "cannot parse ECC DOCP data");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 23,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Range* FindRangeOfStringAlgorithm(
Document& document,
const String& target,
const EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>& reference_range,
FindOptions options) {
if (target.IsEmpty())
return nullptr;
EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy> document_range =
EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>::RangeOfContents(document);
EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy> search_range(document_range);
bool forward = !(options & kBackwards);
bool start_in_reference_range = false;
if (reference_range.IsNotNull()) {
start_in_reference_range = options & kStartInSelection;
if (forward && start_in_reference_range)
search_range = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
reference_range.StartPosition(), document_range.EndPosition());
else if (forward)
search_range = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
reference_range.EndPosition(), document_range.EndPosition());
else if (start_in_reference_range)
search_range = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
document_range.StartPosition(), reference_range.EndPosition());
else
search_range = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
document_range.StartPosition(), reference_range.StartPosition());
}
Range* result_range =
FindStringBetweenPositions(target, search_range, options);
if (result_range && start_in_reference_range &&
NormalizeRange(EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(result_range)) ==
reference_range) {
if (forward)
search_range = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
FromPositionInDOMTree<Strategy>(result_range->EndPosition()),
search_range.EndPosition());
else
search_range = EphemeralRangeTemplate<Strategy>(
search_range.StartPosition(),
FromPositionInDOMTree<Strategy>(result_range->StartPosition()));
result_range = FindStringBetweenPositions(target, search_range, options);
}
if (!result_range && options & kWrapAround)
return FindStringBetweenPositions(target, document_range, options);
return result_range;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOLEAN BTM_GetSecurityFlags (BD_ADDR bd_addr, UINT8 * p_sec_flags)
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec;
if ((p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (bd_addr)) != NULL)
{
*p_sec_flags = (UINT8) p_dev_rec->sec_flags;
return(TRUE);
}
BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("BTM_GetSecurityFlags false");
return(FALSE);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 25,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void close_table_device(struct table_device *td, struct mapped_device *md)
{
if (!td->dm_dev.bdev)
return;
bd_unlink_disk_holder(td->dm_dev.bdev, dm_disk(md));
blkdev_put(td->dm_dev.bdev, td->dm_dev.mode | FMODE_EXCL);
put_dax(td->dm_dev.dax_dev);
td->dm_dev.bdev = NULL;
td->dm_dev.dax_dev = NULL;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 17,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int transport_write(rdpTransport* transport, wStream* s)
{
int length;
int status = -1;
WaitForSingleObject(transport->WriteMutex, INFINITE);
length = Stream_GetPosition(s);
Stream_SetPosition(s, 0);
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_TRANSPORT
if (length > 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Local > Remote\n");
winpr_HexDump(Stream_Buffer(s), length);
}
#endif
while (length > 0)
{
if (transport->layer == TRANSPORT_LAYER_TLS)
status = tls_write(transport->TlsOut, Stream_Pointer(s), length);
else if (transport->layer == TRANSPORT_LAYER_TCP)
status = tcp_write(transport->TcpOut, Stream_Pointer(s), length);
else if (transport->layer == TRANSPORT_LAYER_TSG)
status = tsg_write(transport->tsg, Stream_Pointer(s), length);
if (status < 0)
break; /* error occurred */
if (status == 0)
{
/* when sending is blocked in nonblocking mode, the receiving buffer should be checked */
if (!transport->blocking)
{
/* and in case we do have buffered some data, we set the event so next loop will get it */
if (transport_read_nonblocking(transport) > 0)
SetEvent(transport->ReceiveEvent);
}
if (transport->layer == TRANSPORT_LAYER_TLS)
tls_wait_write(transport->TlsOut);
else if (transport->layer == TRANSPORT_LAYER_TCP)
tcp_wait_write(transport->TcpOut);
else
USleep(transport->SleepInterval);
}
length -= status;
Stream_Seek(s, status);
}
if (status < 0)
{
/* A write error indicates that the peer has dropped the connection */
transport->layer = TRANSPORT_LAYER_CLOSED;
}
if (s->pool)
Stream_Release(s);
ReleaseMutex(transport->WriteMutex);
return status;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API zend_class_entry *zend_get_class_entry(const zval *zobject TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (Z_OBJ_HT_P(zobject)->get_class_entry) {
return Z_OBJ_HT_P(zobject)->get_class_entry(zobject TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "Class entry requested for an object without PHP class");
return NULL;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int update_time(struct inode *inode, struct timespec64 *time, int flags)
{
int (*update_time)(struct inode *, struct timespec64 *, int);
update_time = inode->i_op->update_time ? inode->i_op->update_time :
generic_update_time;
return update_time(inode, time, flags);
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 15,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gstd_release_context(void *ctx) {
OM_uint32 min;
gss_delete_sec_context(&min, (gss_ctx_id_t *)ctx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
}
Commit Message: knc: fix a couple of memory leaks.
One of these can be remotely triggered during the authentication
phase which leads to a remote DoS possibility.
Pointed out by: Imre Rad <radimre83@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 11,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VRDisplay::OnFocus() {
display_blurred_ = false;
ConnectVSyncProvider();
navigator_vr_->EnqueueVREvent(VRDisplayEvent::Create(
EventTypeNames::vrdisplayfocus, true, false, this, ""));
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID: | 1 | 18,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLSelectElement::remove(int optionIndex)
{
int listIndex = optionToListIndex(optionIndex);
if (listIndex < 0)
return;
listItems()[listIndex]->remove(IGNORE_EXCEPTION);
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 14,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Parcel::checkInterface(IBinder* binder) const
{
return enforceInterface(binder->getInterfaceDescriptor());
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuProcessHost::OnInitialized(bool result) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("GPU.GPUProcessInitialized", result);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Textfield::GetAccessibleNodeData(ui::AXNodeData* node_data) {
node_data->role = ax::mojom::Role::kTextField;
if (label_ax_id_) {
node_data->AddIntListAttribute(ax::mojom::IntListAttribute::kLabelledbyIds,
{label_ax_id_});
}
node_data->SetName(accessible_name_);
node_data->AddState(ax::mojom::State::kEditable);
if (enabled()) {
node_data->SetDefaultActionVerb(ax::mojom::DefaultActionVerb::kActivate);
if (read_only())
node_data->SetRestriction(ax::mojom::Restriction::kReadOnly);
}
if (text_input_type_ == ui::TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_PASSWORD) {
node_data->AddState(ax::mojom::State::kProtected);
node_data->SetValue(base::string16(
text().size(), gfx::RenderText::kPasswordReplacementChar));
} else {
node_data->SetValue(text());
}
node_data->AddStringAttribute(ax::mojom::StringAttribute::kPlaceholder,
base::UTF16ToUTF8(GetPlaceholderText()));
const gfx::Range range = GetSelectedRange();
node_data->AddIntAttribute(ax::mojom::IntAttribute::kTextSelStart,
range.start());
node_data->AddIntAttribute(ax::mojom::IntAttribute::kTextSelEnd, range.end());
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::Optional<base::TimeDelta> DataReductionProxyConfig::GetHttpRttEstimate()
const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return http_rtt_;
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void ModulateHCL(const double percent_hue,
const double percent_chroma,const double percent_luma,double *red,
double *green,double *blue)
{
double
hue,
luma,
chroma;
/*
Increase or decrease color luma, chroma, or hue.
*/
ConvertRGBToHCL(*red,*green,*blue,&hue,&chroma,&luma);
hue+=fmod((percent_hue-100.0),200.0)/200.0;
chroma*=0.01*percent_chroma;
luma*=0.01*percent_luma;
ConvertHCLToRGB(hue,chroma,luma,red,green,blue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/663
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/655
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cma_save_ip4_info(struct rdma_cm_id *id, struct rdma_cm_id *listen_id,
struct cma_hdr *hdr)
{
struct sockaddr_in *listen4, *ip4;
listen4 = (struct sockaddr_in *) &listen_id->route.addr.src_addr;
ip4 = (struct sockaddr_in *) &id->route.addr.src_addr;
ip4->sin_family = listen4->sin_family;
ip4->sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->dst_addr.ip4.addr;
ip4->sin_port = listen4->sin_port;
ip4 = (struct sockaddr_in *) &id->route.addr.dst_addr;
ip4->sin_family = listen4->sin_family;
ip4->sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->src_addr.ip4.addr;
ip4->sin_port = hdr->port;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int compat_update_counters(struct net *net, void __user *user,
unsigned int len)
{
struct compat_ebt_replace hlp;
if (copy_from_user(&hlp, user, sizeof(hlp)))
return -EFAULT;
/* try real handler in case userland supplied needed padding */
if (len != sizeof(hlp) + hlp.num_counters * sizeof(struct ebt_counter))
return update_counters(net, user, len);
return do_update_counters(net, hlp.name, compat_ptr(hlp.counters),
hlp.num_counters, user, len);
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void replaceChildrenWithFragment(ContainerNode* container, PassRefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
RefPtr<ContainerNode> containerNode(container);
#if ENABLE(MUTATION_OBSERVERS)
ChildListMutationScope mutation(containerNode.get());
#endif
if (!fragment->firstChild()) {
containerNode->removeChildren();
return;
}
if (hasOneTextChild(containerNode.get()) && hasOneTextChild(fragment.get())) {
toText(containerNode->firstChild())->setData(toText(fragment->firstChild())->data(), ec);
return;
}
if (hasOneChild(containerNode.get())) {
containerNode->replaceChild(fragment, containerNode->firstChild(), ec);
return;
}
containerNode->removeChildren();
containerNode->appendChild(fragment, ec);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_malloc_wrap(gs_memory_t **wrapped, gs_malloc_memory_t *contents)
{
# ifdef USE_RETRY_MEMORY_WRAPPER
/*
* This is deprecated since 'retry' for clist reversion/cycling
* will ONLY work for monochrome, simple PS or PCL, not for a
* color device and not for PDF or XPS with transparency
*/
{
gs_memory_retrying_t *rmem;
rmem = (gs_memory_retrying_t *)
gs_alloc_bytes_immovable((gs_memory_t *)lmem,
sizeof(gs_memory_retrying_t),
"gs_malloc_wrap(retrying)");
if (rmem == 0) {
gs_memory_locked_release(lmem);
gs_free_object(cmem, lmem, "gs_malloc_wrap(locked)");
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
}
code = gs_memory_retrying_init(rmem, (gs_memory_t *)lmem);
if (code < 0) {
gs_free_object((gs_memory_t *)lmem, rmem, "gs_malloc_wrap(retrying)");
gs_memory_locked_release(lmem);
gs_free_object(cmem, lmem, "gs_malloc_wrap(locked)");
return code;
}
*wrapped = (gs_memory_t *)rmem;
}
# endif /* retrying */
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 27,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FrameReference::FrameReference(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
Reset(frame);
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PositionWithAffinity RenderBlock::positionForPointWithInlineChildren(const LayoutPoint& pointInLogicalContents)
{
ASSERT(childrenInline());
if (!firstRootBox())
return createPositionWithAffinity(0, DOWNSTREAM);
bool linesAreFlipped = style()->isFlippedLinesWritingMode();
bool blocksAreFlipped = style()->isFlippedBlocksWritingMode();
InlineBox* closestBox = 0;
RootInlineBox* firstRootBoxWithChildren = 0;
RootInlineBox* lastRootBoxWithChildren = 0;
for (RootInlineBox* root = firstRootBox(); root; root = root->nextRootBox()) {
if (!root->firstLeafChild())
continue;
if (!firstRootBoxWithChildren)
firstRootBoxWithChildren = root;
if (!linesAreFlipped && root->isFirstAfterPageBreak() && (pointInLogicalContents.y() < root->lineTopWithLeading()
|| (blocksAreFlipped && pointInLogicalContents.y() == root->lineTopWithLeading())))
break;
lastRootBoxWithChildren = root;
if (pointInLogicalContents.y() < root->selectionBottom() || (blocksAreFlipped && pointInLogicalContents.y() == root->selectionBottom())) {
if (linesAreFlipped) {
RootInlineBox* nextRootBoxWithChildren = root->nextRootBox();
while (nextRootBoxWithChildren && !nextRootBoxWithChildren->firstLeafChild())
nextRootBoxWithChildren = nextRootBoxWithChildren->nextRootBox();
if (nextRootBoxWithChildren && nextRootBoxWithChildren->isFirstAfterPageBreak() && (pointInLogicalContents.y() > nextRootBoxWithChildren->lineTopWithLeading()
|| (!blocksAreFlipped && pointInLogicalContents.y() == nextRootBoxWithChildren->lineTopWithLeading())))
continue;
}
closestBox = root->closestLeafChildForLogicalLeftPosition(pointInLogicalContents.x());
if (closestBox)
break;
}
}
bool moveCaretToBoundary = document().frame()->editor().behavior().shouldMoveCaretToHorizontalBoundaryWhenPastTopOrBottom();
if (!moveCaretToBoundary && !closestBox && lastRootBoxWithChildren) {
closestBox = lastRootBoxWithChildren->closestLeafChildForLogicalLeftPosition(pointInLogicalContents.x());
}
if (closestBox) {
if (moveCaretToBoundary) {
LayoutUnit firstRootBoxWithChildrenTop = min<LayoutUnit>(firstRootBoxWithChildren->selectionTop(), firstRootBoxWithChildren->logicalTop());
if (pointInLogicalContents.y() < firstRootBoxWithChildrenTop
|| (blocksAreFlipped && pointInLogicalContents.y() == firstRootBoxWithChildrenTop)) {
InlineBox* box = firstRootBoxWithChildren->firstLeafChild();
if (box->isLineBreak()) {
if (InlineBox* newBox = box->nextLeafChildIgnoringLineBreak())
box = newBox;
}
return PositionWithAffinity(positionForBox(box, true), DOWNSTREAM);
}
}
LayoutPoint point(pointInLogicalContents.x(), closestBox->root().blockDirectionPointInLine());
if (!isHorizontalWritingMode())
point = point.transposedPoint();
if (closestBox->renderer().isReplaced())
return positionForPointRespectingEditingBoundaries(this, &toRenderBox(closestBox->renderer()), point);
return closestBox->renderer().positionForPoint(point);
}
if (lastRootBoxWithChildren) {
ASSERT(moveCaretToBoundary);
InlineBox* logicallyLastBox;
if (lastRootBoxWithChildren->getLogicalEndBoxWithNode(logicallyLastBox))
return PositionWithAffinity(positionForBox(logicallyLastBox, false), DOWNSTREAM);
}
return createPositionWithAffinity(0, DOWNSTREAM);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ims_pcu_destroy_bootloader_mode(struct ims_pcu *pcu)
{
/* Make sure our initial firmware request has completed */
wait_for_completion(&pcu->async_firmware_done);
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-pcu - sanity check against missing interfaces
A malicious device missing interface can make the driver oops.
Add sanity checking.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool IsHTMLQuote(UChar c) {
return (c == '"' || c == '\'');
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 4,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsTraceEventArgsWhitelisted(const char* category_group_name,
const char* event_name) {
base::CStringTokenizer category_group_tokens(
category_group_name, category_group_name + strlen(category_group_name),
",");
while (category_group_tokens.GetNext()) {
const std::string& category_group_token = category_group_tokens.token();
for (int i = 0; kEventArgsWhitelist[i][0] != NULL; ++i) {
DCHECK(kEventArgsWhitelist[i][1]);
if (base::MatchPattern(category_group_token.c_str(),
kEventArgsWhitelist[i][0]) &&
base::MatchPattern(event_name, kEventArgsWhitelist[i][1])) {
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 18,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int svm_is_rep(int prefixes)
{
return ((prefixes & (PREFIX_REPZ | PREFIX_REPNZ)) ? 8 : 0);
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 0 | 13,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::SiteInstanceGotProcess(
SiteInstance* site_instance) {
BrowserContext* context = site_instance->GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext();
ExtensionRegistry* registry = ExtensionRegistry::Get(context);
if (!registry)
return;
const Extension* extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
site_instance->GetSiteURL());
if (!extension)
return;
ProcessMap::Get(context)->Insert(extension->id(),
site_instance->GetProcess()->GetID(),
site_instance->GetId());
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&InfoMap::RegisterExtensionProcess,
ExtensionSystem::Get(context)->info_map(), extension->id(),
site_instance->GetProcess()->GetID(),
site_instance->GetId()));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem)
{
int r;
gfn_t base_gfn;
unsigned long npages;
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
struct kvm_memory_slot old, new;
struct kvm_memslots *slots = NULL, *old_memslots;
int as_id, id;
enum kvm_mr_change change;
r = check_memory_region_flags(mem);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
as_id = mem->slot >> 16;
id = (u16)mem->slot;
/* General sanity checks */
if (mem->memory_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
/* We can read the guest memory with __xxx_user() later on. */
if ((id < KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS) &&
((mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) ||
!access_ok((void __user *)(unsigned long)mem->userspace_addr,
mem->memory_size)))
goto out;
if (as_id >= KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM || id >= KVM_MEM_SLOTS_NUM)
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr + mem->memory_size < mem->guest_phys_addr)
goto out;
slot = id_to_memslot(__kvm_memslots(kvm, as_id), id);
base_gfn = mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (npages > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES)
goto out;
new = old = *slot;
new.id = id;
new.base_gfn = base_gfn;
new.npages = npages;
new.flags = mem->flags;
if (npages) {
if (!old.npages)
change = KVM_MR_CREATE;
else { /* Modify an existing slot. */
if ((mem->userspace_addr != old.userspace_addr) ||
(npages != old.npages) ||
((new.flags ^ old.flags) & KVM_MEM_READONLY))
goto out;
if (base_gfn != old.base_gfn)
change = KVM_MR_MOVE;
else if (new.flags != old.flags)
change = KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY;
else { /* Nothing to change. */
r = 0;
goto out;
}
}
} else {
if (!old.npages)
goto out;
change = KVM_MR_DELETE;
new.base_gfn = 0;
new.flags = 0;
}
if ((change == KVM_MR_CREATE) || (change == KVM_MR_MOVE)) {
/* Check for overlaps */
r = -EEXIST;
kvm_for_each_memslot(slot, __kvm_memslots(kvm, as_id)) {
if (slot->id == id)
continue;
if (!((base_gfn + npages <= slot->base_gfn) ||
(base_gfn >= slot->base_gfn + slot->npages)))
goto out;
}
}
/* Free page dirty bitmap if unneeded */
if (!(new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
r = -ENOMEM;
if (change == KVM_MR_CREATE) {
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
if (kvm_arch_create_memslot(kvm, &new, npages))
goto out_free;
}
/* Allocate page dirty bitmap if needed */
if ((new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES) && !new.dirty_bitmap) {
if (kvm_create_dirty_bitmap(&new) < 0)
goto out_free;
}
slots = kvzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_memslots), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
memcpy(slots, __kvm_memslots(kvm, as_id), sizeof(struct kvm_memslots));
if ((change == KVM_MR_DELETE) || (change == KVM_MR_MOVE)) {
slot = id_to_memslot(slots, id);
slot->flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID;
old_memslots = install_new_memslots(kvm, as_id, slots);
/* From this point no new shadow pages pointing to a deleted,
* or moved, memslot will be created.
*
* validation of sp->gfn happens in:
* - gfn_to_hva (kvm_read_guest, gfn_to_pfn)
* - kvm_is_visible_gfn (mmu_check_roots)
*/
kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(kvm, slot);
/*
* We can re-use the old_memslots from above, the only difference
* from the currently installed memslots is the invalid flag. This
* will get overwritten by update_memslots anyway.
*/
slots = old_memslots;
}
r = kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(kvm, &new, mem, change);
if (r)
goto out_slots;
/* actual memory is freed via old in kvm_free_memslot below */
if (change == KVM_MR_DELETE) {
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
memset(&new.arch, 0, sizeof(new.arch));
}
update_memslots(slots, &new, change);
old_memslots = install_new_memslots(kvm, as_id, slots);
kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(kvm, mem, &old, &new, change);
kvm_free_memslot(kvm, &old, &new);
kvfree(old_memslots);
return 0;
out_slots:
kvfree(slots);
out_free:
kvm_free_memslot(kvm, &new, &old);
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 13,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
{
SSL_CIPHER c;
const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
unsigned long id;
id=0x03000000L|((unsigned long)p[0]<<8L)|(unsigned long)p[1];
c.id=id;
cp = OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, ssl3_ciphers, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT_UNKNOWN_CIPHERSUITES
if (cp == NULL) fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher ID %x\n", (p[0] << 8) | p[1]);
#endif
if (cp == NULL || cp->valid == 0)
return NULL;
else
return cp;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 19,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShowExtensionInstalledBubble(
const Extension* extension,
Browser* browser,
const SkBitmap& icon,
Profile* profile) {
ExtensionInstalledBubble::Show(extension, browser, icon);
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebCore::IntRect InputHandler::boundingBoxForInputField()
{
if (!isActiveTextEdit())
return WebCore::IntRect();
if (!m_currentFocusElement->renderer())
return WebCore::IntRect();
if (HTMLInputElement* element = m_currentFocusElement->toInputElement())
if (element->isSearchField())
return element->innerBlockElement()->renderer()->absoluteBoundingBoxRect();
return m_currentFocusElement->renderer()->absoluteBoundingBoxRect();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::GetPagesSupportedByDownloads(
const MultipleOfflinePageItemCallback& callback) {
OfflinePageModelQueryBuilder builder;
builder.RequireSupportedByDownload(
OfflinePageModelQuery::Requirement::INCLUDE_MATCHING);
RunWhenLoaded(
base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::GetPagesMatchingQueryWhenLoadDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::Passed(builder.Build(GetPolicyController())), callback));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 26,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: box_overbelow(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
BOX *box1 = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(0);
BOX *box2 = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPle(box1->high.y, box2->high.y));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 13,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ForwardWheelEvent(
const WebMouseWheelEvent& wheel_event) {
ForwardWheelEventWithLatencyInfo(wheel_event,
ui::LatencyInfo(ui::SourceEventType::WHEEL));
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SwitchToFrench() {
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
std::string default_locale = g_browser_process->GetApplicationLocale();
EXPECT_NE("fr", default_locale);
g_browser_process->SetApplicationLocale("fr");
PrefService* prefs = g_browser_process->local_state();
prefs->SetString(prefs::kApplicationLocale, "fr");
std::string loaded_locale =
ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().ReloadLocaleResources("fr");
return loaded_locale == "fr";
}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_INSTCTRL( INS_ARG )
{
FT_Long K, L;
K = args[1];
L = args[0];
if ( K < 1 || K > 2 )
{
if ( CUR.pedantic_hinting )
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
if ( L != 0 )
L = K;
CUR.GS.instruct_control = FT_BOOL(
( (FT_Byte)CUR.GS.instruct_control & ~(FT_Byte)K ) | (FT_Byte)L );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(str_rot13)
{
zend_string *arg;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "S", &arg) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (ZSTR_LEN(arg) == 0) {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
} else {
RETURN_STR(php_strtr_ex(arg, rot13_from, rot13_to, 52));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 17,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ar6000_dset_open_req(
void *context,
u32 id,
u32 targHandle,
u32 targReplyFn,
u32 targReplyArg)
{
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int handle_take_screenshot_count() const {
return handle_take_screenshot_count_;
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterEMFImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("EMF");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINGDI32_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=ReadEMFImage;
#endif
entry->description=ConstantString(
"Windows Enhanced Meta File");
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsEMF;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->module=ConstantString("WMF");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("WMF");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINGDI32_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=ReadEMFImage;
#endif
entry->description=ConstantString("Windows Meta File");
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsWMF;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->module=ConstantString("WMF");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_partial(struct kmem_cache *s, struct kmem_cache_node *n)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct page *page, *h;
spin_lock_irqsave(&n->list_lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry_safe(page, h, &n->partial, lru) {
if (!page->inuse) {
list_del(&page->lru);
discard_slab(s, page);
n->nr_partial--;
} else {
list_slab_objects(s, page,
"Objects remaining on kmem_cache_close()");
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&n->list_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 3,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouter::SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouter(
content::BrowserContext* context)
: context_(context) {
event_router_ = EventRouter::Get(context_);
InitRealtimeReportingClient();
}
Commit Message: Add reporting for DLP deep scanning
For each triggered rule in the DLP response, we report the download as
violating that rule.
This also implements the UnsafeReportingEnabled enterprise policy, which
controls whether or not we do any reporting.
Bug: 980777
Change-Id: I48100cfb4dd5aa92ed80da1f34e64a6e393be2fa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1772381
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691371}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 14,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::zoomLevelChanged() {
bool remember = !webview()->mainFrame()->document().isPluginDocument();
Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidZoomURL(
routing_id_, webview()->zoomLevel(), remember,
GURL(webview()->mainFrame()->document().url())));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int ip6_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int mtu,unsigned int flags,
struct rt6_info *rt)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP large send offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL) {
struct frag_hdr fhdr;
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return err;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb,fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb->csum = 0;
/* Specify the length of each IPv6 datagram fragment.
* It has to be a multiple of 8.
*/
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = (mtu - fragheaderlen -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) & ~7;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
ipv6_select_ident(&fhdr, rt);
skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = fhdr.identification;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
}
return skb_append_datato_frags(sk, skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
}
Commit Message: ip6_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well
Now, if user application does:
sendto len<mtu flag MSG_MORE
sendto len>mtu flag 0
The skb is not treated as fragmented one because it is not initialized
that way. So move the initialization to fix this.
introduced by:
commit e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac "[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach"
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 25,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaPlayer::setAuxEffectSendLevel(float level)
{
ALOGV("MediaPlayer::setAuxEffectSendLevel(%f)", level);
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
mSendLevel = level;
if (mPlayer != 0) {
return mPlayer->setAuxEffectSendLevel(level);
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 4,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CastStreamingNativeHandler::CallErrorCallback(
int stream_id,
const std::string& message) const {
v8::Isolate* isolate = context()->isolate();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context()->v8_context());
v8::Local<v8::Array> event_args = v8::Array::New(isolate, 2);
event_args->Set(0, v8::Integer::New(isolate, stream_id));
event_args->Set(
1,
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate, message.data(), v8::String::kNormalString, message.size()));
context()->DispatchEvent("cast.streaming.rtpStream.onError", event_args);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t ZSTD_initCStream_advanced(ZSTD_CStream* zcs,
const void* dict, size_t dictSize,
ZSTD_parameters params, unsigned long long pledgedSrcSize)
{
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_initCStream_advanced: pledgedSrcSize=%u, flag=%u",
(U32)pledgedSrcSize, params.fParams.contentSizeFlag);
CHECK_F( ZSTD_checkCParams(params.cParams) );
if ((pledgedSrcSize==0) && (params.fParams.contentSizeFlag==0)) pledgedSrcSize = ZSTD_CONTENTSIZE_UNKNOWN; /* for compatibility with older programs relying on this behavior. Users should now specify ZSTD_CONTENTSIZE_UNKNOWN. This line will be removed in the future. */
zcs->requestedParams = ZSTD_assignParamsToCCtxParams(zcs->requestedParams, params);
return ZSTD_initCStream_internal(zcs, dict, dictSize, NULL /*cdict*/, zcs->requestedParams, pledgedSrcSize);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 3,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: megasas_return_cmd(struct megasas_instance *instance, struct megasas_cmd *cmd)
{
unsigned long flags;
u32 blk_tags;
struct megasas_cmd_fusion *cmd_fusion;
struct fusion_context *fusion = instance->ctrl_context;
/* This flag is used only for fusion adapter.
* Wait for Interrupt for Polled mode DCMD
*/
if (cmd->flags & DRV_DCMD_POLLED_MODE)
return;
spin_lock_irqsave(&instance->mfi_pool_lock, flags);
if (fusion) {
blk_tags = instance->max_scsi_cmds + cmd->index;
cmd_fusion = fusion->cmd_list[blk_tags];
megasas_return_cmd_fusion(instance, cmd_fusion);
}
cmd->scmd = NULL;
cmd->frame_count = 0;
cmd->flags = 0;
memset(cmd->frame, 0, instance->mfi_frame_size);
cmd->frame->io.context = cpu_to_le32(cmd->index);
if (!fusion && reset_devices)
cmd->frame->hdr.cmd = MFI_CMD_INVALID;
list_add(&cmd->list, (&instance->cmd_pool)->next);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&instance->mfi_pool_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 9,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Proxy::setDOMException(int ec, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
if (ec <= 0)
return;
ExceptionCodeDescription description(ec);
v8::Handle<v8::Value> exception;
switch (description.type) {
DOM_EXCEPTION_INTERFACES_FOR_EACH(TRY_TO_CREATE_EXCEPTION)
}
if (exception.IsEmpty())
return;
v8::Handle<v8::Value> error = v8::Exception::Error(v8String(description.description, isolate));
ASSERT(!error.IsEmpty());
ASSERT(exception->IsObject());
exception->ToObject()->SetAccessor(v8String("stack", isolate), DOMExceptionStackGetter, DOMExceptionStackSetter, error);
v8::ThrowException(exception);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int unix_may_send(struct sock *sk, struct sock *osk)
{
return unix_peer(osk) == NULL || unix_our_peer(sk, osk);
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 20,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebUIExtension::Install(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = blink::MainThreadIsolate();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = frame->MainWorldScriptContext();
if (context.IsEmpty())
return;
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context);
v8::Local<v8::Object> chrome = GetOrCreateChromeObject(isolate,
context->Global());
chrome->Set(gin::StringToSymbol(isolate, "send"),
gin::CreateFunctionTemplate(
isolate, base::Bind(&WebUIExtension::Send))->GetFunction());
chrome->Set(gin::StringToSymbol(isolate, "getVariableValue"),
gin::CreateFunctionTemplate(
isolate, base::Bind(&WebUIExtension::GetVariableValue))
->GetFunction());
}
Commit Message: Validate frame after conversion in chrome.send
BUG=797511
TEST=Manually, see https://crbug.com/797511#c1
Change-Id: Ib1a99db4d7648fb1325eb6d7af4ef111d6dda4cb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844076
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526197}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestingDomainReliabilityServiceFactoryUserData(
content::BrowserContext* context,
MockDomainReliabilityService* service)
: context(context),
service(service),
attached(false) {}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 6,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_permissions_task_done (GObject *source_object,
GAsyncResult *res,
gpointer user_data)
{
SetPermissionsJob *job;
job = user_data;
g_object_unref (job->file);
if (job->done_callback)
{
job->done_callback (!job_aborted ((CommonJob *) job),
job->done_callback_data);
}
finalize_common ((CommonJob *) job);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String Document::queryCommandValue(const String& commandName, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (!isHTMLDocument() && !isXHTMLDocument()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidStateError, "queryCommandValue is only supported on HTML documents.");
return "";
}
return command(this, commandName).value();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: encode_wcc_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct svc_fh *fhp)
{
struct dentry *dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
if (dentry && d_really_is_positive(dentry) && fhp->fh_post_saved) {
if (fhp->fh_pre_saved) {
*p++ = xdr_one;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, (u64) fhp->fh_pre_size);
p = encode_time3(p, &fhp->fh_pre_mtime);
p = encode_time3(p, &fhp->fh_pre_ctime);
} else {
*p++ = xdr_zero;
}
return encode_saved_post_attr(rqstp, p, fhp);
}
/* no pre- or post-attrs */
*p++ = xdr_zero;
return encode_post_op_attr(rqstp, p, fhp);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 20,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2Util::ComputeImagePaddedRowSize(int width,
int format,
int type,
int alignment,
uint32_t* padded_row_size) {
uint32_t bytes_per_group = ComputeImageGroupSize(format, type);
return ComputeImageRowSizeHelper(
width, bytes_per_group, alignment, nullptr, padded_row_size, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Validate glClearBuffer*v function |buffer| param on the client side
Otherwise we could read out-of-bounds even if an invalid |buffer| is passed
in and in theory we should not read the buffer at all.
BUG=908749
TEST=gl_tests in ASAN build
R=piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I94b69b56ce3358ff9bfc0e21f0618aec4371d1ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1354571
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#612023}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_u3v(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void* data)
{
gint offset = 0;
proto_tree *u3v_tree = NULL, *ccd_tree_flag, *u3v_telegram_tree = NULL, *ccd_tree = NULL;
gint data_length = 0;
gint req_id = 0;
gint command_id = -1;
gint status = 0;
guint prefix = 0;
proto_item *ti = NULL;
proto_item *item = NULL;
const char *command_string;
usb_conv_info_t *usb_conv_info;
gint stream_detected = FALSE;
gint control_detected = FALSE;
u3v_conv_info_t *u3v_conv_info = NULL;
gencp_transaction_t *gencp_trans = NULL;
usb_conv_info = (usb_conv_info_t *)data;
/* decide if this packet belongs to U3V protocol */
u3v_conv_info = (u3v_conv_info_t *)usb_conv_info->class_data;
if (!u3v_conv_info) {
u3v_conv_info = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), u3v_conv_info_t);
usb_conv_info->class_data = u3v_conv_info;
}
prefix = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, 0);
if ((tvb_reported_length(tvb) >= 4) && ( ( U3V_CONTROL_PREFIX == prefix ) || ( U3V_EVENT_PREFIX == prefix ) ) ) {
control_detected = TRUE;
}
if (((tvb_reported_length(tvb) >= 4) && (( U3V_STREAM_LEADER_PREFIX == prefix ) || ( U3V_STREAM_TRAILER_PREFIX == prefix )))
|| (usb_conv_info->endpoint == u3v_conv_info->ep_stream)) {
stream_detected = TRUE;
}
/* initialize interface class/subclass in case no descriptors have been dissected yet */
if ( control_detected || stream_detected){
if ( usb_conv_info->interfaceClass == IF_CLASS_UNKNOWN &&
usb_conv_info->interfaceSubclass == IF_SUBCLASS_UNKNOWN){
usb_conv_info->interfaceClass = IF_CLASS_MISCELLANEOUS;
usb_conv_info->interfaceSubclass = IF_SUBCLASS_MISC_U3V;
}
}
if ( control_detected ) {
/* Set the protocol column */
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "U3V");
/* Clear out stuff in the info column */
col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);
/* Adds "USB3Vision" heading to protocol tree */
/* We will add fields to this using the u3v_tree pointer */
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_u3v, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
u3v_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_u3v);
prefix = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
command_id = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset+6);
/* decode CCD ( DCI/DCE command data layout) */
if ((prefix == U3V_CONTROL_PREFIX || prefix == U3V_EVENT_PREFIX) && ((command_id % 2) == 0)) {
command_string = val_to_str(command_id,command_names,"Unknown Command (0x%x)");
item = proto_tree_add_item(u3v_tree, hf_u3v_ccd_cmd, tvb, offset, 8, ENC_NA);
proto_item_append_text(item, ": %s", command_string);
ccd_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_u3v_cmd);
/* Add the prefix code: */
proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree, hf_u3v_gencp_prefix, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* Add the flags */
item = proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree, hf_u3v_flag, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ccd_tree_flag = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_u3v_flags);
proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree_flag, hf_u3v_acknowledge_required_flag, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "> %s ", command_string);
} else if (prefix == U3V_CONTROL_PREFIX && ((command_id % 2) == 1)) {
command_string = val_to_str(command_id,command_names,"Unknown Acknowledge (0x%x)");
item = proto_tree_add_item(u3v_tree, hf_u3v_ccd_ack, tvb, offset, 8, ENC_NA);
proto_item_append_text(item, ": %s", command_string);
ccd_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_u3v_ack);
/* Add the prefix code: */
proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree, hf_u3v_gencp_prefix, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* Add the status: */
proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree, hf_u3v_status, tvb, offset, 2,ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
status = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
offset += 2;
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "< %s %s",
command_string,
val_to_str(status, status_names_short, "Unknown status (0x%04X)"));
} else {
return 0;
}
/* Add the command id*/
proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree, hf_u3v_command_id, tvb, offset, 2,ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
/* Parse the second part of both the command and the acknowledge header:
0 15 16 31
-------- -------- -------- --------
| status | acknowledge |
-------- -------- -------- --------
| length | req_id |
-------- -------- -------- --------
Add the data length
Number of valid data bytes in this message, not including this header. This
represents the number of bytes of payload appended after this header */
proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree, hf_u3v_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
data_length = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
offset += 2;
/* Add the request ID */
proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree, hf_u3v_request_id, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
req_id = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
offset += 2;
/* Add telegram subtree */
u3v_telegram_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(u3v_tree, ett_u3v);
if (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) {
if ((command_id % 2) == 0) {
/* This is a command */
gencp_trans = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), gencp_transaction_t);
gencp_trans->cmd_frame = pinfo->fd->num;
gencp_trans->ack_frame = 0;
gencp_trans->cmd_time = pinfo->fd->abs_ts;
/* add reference to current packet */
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_u3v, req_id, gencp_trans);
/* add reference to current */
u3v_conv_info->trans_info = gencp_trans;
} else {
gencp_trans = u3v_conv_info->trans_info;
if (gencp_trans) {
gencp_trans->ack_frame = pinfo->fd->num;
/* add reference to current packet */
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_u3v, req_id, gencp_trans);
}
}
} else {
gencp_trans = (gencp_transaction_t*)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(),pinfo, proto_u3v, req_id);
}
if (!gencp_trans) {
/* create a "fake" gencp_trans structure */
gencp_trans = wmem_new(wmem_packet_scope(), gencp_transaction_t);
gencp_trans->cmd_frame = 0;
gencp_trans->ack_frame = 0;
gencp_trans->cmd_time = pinfo->fd->abs_ts;
}
/* dissect depending on command? */
switch (command_id) {
case U3V_READMEM_CMD:
dissect_u3v_read_mem_cmd(u3v_telegram_tree, tvb, pinfo, offset, data_length,u3v_conv_info,gencp_trans);
break;
case U3V_WRITEMEM_CMD:
dissect_u3v_write_mem_cmd(u3v_telegram_tree, tvb, pinfo, offset, data_length,u3v_conv_info,gencp_trans);
break;
case U3V_EVENT_CMD:
dissect_u3v_event_cmd(u3v_telegram_tree, tvb, pinfo, offset, data_length);
break;
case U3V_READMEM_ACK:
if ( U3V_STATUS_GENCP_SUCCESS == status ) {
dissect_u3v_read_mem_ack(u3v_telegram_tree, tvb, pinfo, offset, data_length,u3v_conv_info,gencp_trans);
}
break;
case U3V_WRITEMEM_ACK:
dissect_u3v_write_mem_ack(u3v_telegram_tree, tvb, pinfo, offset, data_length, u3v_conv_info,gencp_trans);
break;
case U3V_PENDING_ACK:
dissect_u3v_pending_ack(u3v_telegram_tree, tvb, pinfo, offset, data_length, u3v_conv_info,gencp_trans);
break;
default:
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_payloaddata, tvb, offset, data_length, ENC_NA);
break;
}
return data_length + 12;
} else if ( stream_detected ) {
/* this is streaming data */
/* init this stream configuration */
u3v_conv_info = (u3v_conv_info_t *)usb_conv_info->class_data;
u3v_conv_info->ep_stream = usb_conv_info->endpoint;
/* Set the protocol column */
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "U3V");
/* Clear out stuff in the info column */
col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);
/* Adds "USB3Vision" heading to protocol tree */
/* We will add fields to this using the u3v_tree pointer */
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_u3v, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
u3v_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_u3v);
if(tvb_captured_length(tvb) >=4) {
prefix = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
switch (prefix) {
case U3V_STREAM_LEADER_PREFIX:
dissect_u3v_stream_leader(u3v_tree, tvb, pinfo, usb_conv_info);
break;
case U3V_STREAM_TRAILER_PREFIX:
dissect_u3v_stream_trailer(u3v_tree, tvb, pinfo, usb_conv_info);
break;
default:
dissect_u3v_stream_payload(u3v_tree, tvb, pinfo, usb_conv_info);
break;
}
}
return tvb_captured_length(tvb);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 16,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_set_phy_oem_bits(E1000ECore *core, int index, uint16_t val)
{
core->phy[0][PHY_OEM_BITS] = val & ~BIT(10);
if (val & BIT(10)) {
e1000x_restart_autoneg(core->mac, core->phy[0], core->autoneg_timer);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 9,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::DeactivateContext(
WebGLRenderingContextBase* context) {
ActiveContexts().erase(context);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ServiceWorkerProviderHost* ServiceWorkerContextCore::GetProviderHost(
int provider_id) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
auto found = providers_->find(provider_id);
if (found == providers_->end())
return nullptr;
return found->second.get();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_write_attribute_ns)
{
zval *pind;
xmlwriter_object *intern;
xmlTextWriterPtr ptr;
char *name, *prefix, *uri, *content;
int name_len, prefix_len, uri_len, content_len, retval;
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval *this = getThis();
if (this) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "sss!s",
&prefix, &prefix_len, &name, &name_len, &uri, &uri_len, &content, &content_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
XMLWRITER_FROM_OBJECT(intern, this);
} else
#endif
{
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rsss!s", &pind,
&prefix, &prefix_len, &name, &name_len, &uri, &uri_len, &content, &content_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(intern,xmlwriter_object *, &pind, -1, "XMLWriter", le_xmlwriter);
}
XMLW_NAME_CHK("Invalid Attribute Name");
ptr = intern->ptr;
if (ptr) {
retval = xmlTextWriterWriteAttributeNS(ptr, (xmlChar *)prefix, (xmlChar *)name, (xmlChar *)uri, (xmlChar *)content);
if (retval != -1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 12,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tipc_sk_reinit(struct net *net)
{
struct tipc_net *tn = net_generic(net, tipc_net_id);
const struct bucket_table *tbl;
struct rhash_head *pos;
struct tipc_sock *tsk;
struct tipc_msg *msg;
int i;
rcu_read_lock();
tbl = rht_dereference_rcu((&tn->sk_rht)->tbl, &tn->sk_rht);
for (i = 0; i < tbl->size; i++) {
rht_for_each_entry_rcu(tsk, pos, tbl, i, node) {
spin_lock_bh(&tsk->sk.sk_lock.slock);
msg = &tsk->phdr;
msg_set_prevnode(msg, tn->own_addr);
msg_set_orignode(msg, tn->own_addr);
spin_unlock_bh(&tsk->sk.sk_lock.slock);
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DatabaseImpl::DeleteRange(
int64_t transaction_id,
int64_t object_store_id,
const IndexedDBKeyRange& key_range,
::indexed_db::mojom::CallbacksAssociatedPtrInfo callbacks_info) {
scoped_refptr<IndexedDBCallbacks> callbacks(
new IndexedDBCallbacks(dispatcher_host_->AsWeakPtr(), origin_,
std::move(callbacks_info), idb_runner_));
idb_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&IDBThreadHelper::DeleteRange, base::Unretained(helper_),
transaction_id, object_store_id, key_range,
base::Passed(&callbacks)));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 12,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CURLcode smtp_disconnect(struct connectdata *conn, bool dead_connection)
{
struct smtp_conn *smtpc = &conn->proto.smtpc;
/* We cannot send quit unconditionally. If this connection is stale or
bad in any way, sending quit and waiting around here will make the
disconnect wait in vain and cause more problems than we need to. */
/* The SMTP session may or may not have been allocated/setup at this
point! */
if(!dead_connection && smtpc->pp.conn && smtpc->pp.conn->bits.protoconnstart)
if(!smtp_perform_quit(conn))
(void)smtp_block_statemach(conn); /* ignore errors on QUIT */
/* Disconnect from the server */
Curl_pp_disconnect(&smtpc->pp);
/* Cleanup the SASL module */
Curl_sasl_cleanup(conn, smtpc->sasl.authused);
/* Cleanup our connection based variables */
Curl_safefree(smtpc->domain);
return CURLE_OK;
}
Commit Message: smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ahci_write_fis_pio(AHCIDevice *ad, uint16_t len)
{
AHCIPortRegs *pr = &ad->port_regs;
uint8_t *pio_fis, *cmd_fis;
uint64_t tbl_addr;
dma_addr_t cmd_len = 0x80;
IDEState *s = &ad->port.ifs[0];
if (!ad->res_fis || !(pr->cmd & PORT_CMD_FIS_RX)) {
return;
}
/* map cmd_fis */
tbl_addr = le64_to_cpu(ad->cur_cmd->tbl_addr);
cmd_fis = dma_memory_map(ad->hba->as, tbl_addr, &cmd_len,
DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE);
if (cmd_fis == NULL) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "dma_memory_map failed in ahci_write_fis_pio");
ahci_trigger_irq(ad->hba, ad, PORT_IRQ_HBUS_ERR);
return;
}
if (cmd_len != 0x80) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no,
"dma_memory_map mapped too few bytes in ahci_write_fis_pio");
dma_memory_unmap(ad->hba->as, cmd_fis, cmd_len,
DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE, cmd_len);
ahci_trigger_irq(ad->hba, ad, PORT_IRQ_HBUS_ERR);
return;
}
pio_fis = &ad->res_fis[RES_FIS_PSFIS];
pio_fis[0] = 0x5f;
pio_fis[1] = (ad->hba->control_regs.irqstatus ? (1 << 6) : 0);
pio_fis[2] = s->status;
pio_fis[3] = s->error;
pio_fis[4] = s->sector;
pio_fis[5] = s->lcyl;
pio_fis[6] = s->hcyl;
pio_fis[7] = s->select;
pio_fis[8] = s->hob_sector;
pio_fis[9] = s->hob_lcyl;
pio_fis[10] = s->hob_hcyl;
pio_fis[11] = 0;
pio_fis[12] = cmd_fis[12];
pio_fis[13] = cmd_fis[13];
pio_fis[14] = 0;
pio_fis[15] = s->status;
pio_fis[16] = len & 255;
pio_fis[17] = len >> 8;
pio_fis[18] = 0;
pio_fis[19] = 0;
/* Update shadow registers: */
pr->tfdata = (ad->port.ifs[0].error << 8) |
ad->port.ifs[0].status;
if (pio_fis[2] & ERR_STAT) {
ahci_trigger_irq(ad->hba, ad, PORT_IRQ_TF_ERR);
}
ahci_trigger_irq(ad->hba, ad, PORT_IRQ_PIOS_FIS);
dma_memory_unmap(ad->hba->as, cmd_fis, cmd_len,
DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE, cmd_len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 24,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: omx_video::omx_video():
c2d_opened(false),
psource_frame(NULL),
pdest_frame(NULL),
secure_session(false),
mEmptyEosBuffer(NULL),
m_pipe_in(-1),
m_pipe_out(-1),
m_pInput_pmem(NULL),
m_pOutput_pmem(NULL),
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pInput_ion(NULL),
m_pOutput_ion(NULL),
#endif
m_error_propogated(false),
m_state(OMX_StateInvalid),
m_app_data(NULL),
m_use_input_pmem(OMX_FALSE),
m_use_output_pmem(OMX_FALSE),
m_input_msg_id(OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB),
m_inp_mem_ptr(NULL),
m_out_mem_ptr(NULL),
input_flush_progress (false),
output_flush_progress (false),
input_use_buffer (false),
output_use_buffer (false),
pending_input_buffers(0),
pending_output_buffers(0),
m_out_bm_count(0),
m_inp_bm_count(0),
m_flags(0),
m_etb_count(0),
m_fbd_count(0),
m_event_port_settings_sent(false),
hw_overload(false)
{
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("omx_video(): Inside Constructor()");
memset(&m_cmp,0,sizeof(m_cmp));
memset(&m_pCallbacks,0,sizeof(m_pCallbacks));
async_thread_created = false;
msg_thread_created = false;
mUsesColorConversion = false;
pthread_mutex_init(&m_lock, NULL);
sem_init(&m_cmd_lock,0,0);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("meta_buffer_hdr = %p", meta_buffer_hdr);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *DecompressBlock(Image *orig, MagickOffsetType Size, ImageInfo *clone_info, ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image2;
void *CacheBlock, *DecompressBlock;
z_stream zip_info;
FILE *mat_file;
size_t magick_size;
size_t extent;
int file;
int status;
int zip_status;
if(clone_info==NULL) return NULL;
if(clone_info->file) /* Close file opened from previous transaction. */
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
CacheBlock = AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)((Size<16384)?Size:16384),sizeof(unsigned char *));
if(CacheBlock==NULL) return NULL;
DecompressBlock = AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)(4096),sizeof(unsigned char *));
if(DecompressBlock==NULL)
{
RelinquishMagickMemory(CacheBlock);
return NULL;
}
mat_file=0;
file = AcquireUniqueFileResource(clone_info->filename);
if (file != -1)
mat_file = fdopen(file,"w");
if(!mat_file)
{
RelinquishMagickMemory(CacheBlock);
RelinquishMagickMemory(DecompressBlock);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Cannot create file stream for decompressed image");
return NULL;
}
zip_info.zalloc=AcquireZIPMemory;
zip_info.zfree=RelinquishZIPMemory;
zip_info.opaque = (voidpf) NULL;
zip_status = inflateInit(&zip_info);
if (zip_status != Z_OK)
{
RelinquishMagickMemory(CacheBlock);
RelinquishMagickMemory(DecompressBlock);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"UnableToUncompressImage","`%s'",clone_info->filename);
(void) fclose(mat_file);
RelinquishUniqueFileResource(clone_info->filename);
return NULL;
}
/* zip_info.next_out = 8*4;*/
zip_info.avail_in = 0;
zip_info.total_out = 0;
while(Size>0 && !EOFBlob(orig))
{
magick_size = ReadBlob(orig, (Size<16384)?Size:16384, (unsigned char *) CacheBlock);
zip_info.next_in = (Bytef *) CacheBlock;
zip_info.avail_in = (uInt) magick_size;
while(zip_info.avail_in>0)
{
zip_info.avail_out = 4096;
zip_info.next_out = (Bytef *) DecompressBlock;
zip_status = inflate(&zip_info,Z_NO_FLUSH);
if ((zip_status != Z_OK) && (zip_status != Z_STREAM_END))
break;
extent=fwrite(DecompressBlock, 4096-zip_info.avail_out, 1, mat_file);
(void) extent;
if(zip_status == Z_STREAM_END) goto DblBreak;
}
if ((zip_status != Z_OK) && (zip_status != Z_STREAM_END))
break;
Size -= magick_size;
}
DblBreak:
inflateEnd(&zip_info);
(void)fclose(mat_file);
RelinquishMagickMemory(CacheBlock);
RelinquishMagickMemory(DecompressBlock);
if((clone_info->file=fopen(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL) goto UnlinkFile;
if( (image2 = AcquireImage(clone_info))==NULL ) goto EraseFile;
status = OpenBlob(clone_info,image2,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
EraseFile:
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
UnlinkFile:
RelinquishUniqueFileResource(clone_info->filename);
return NULL;
}
return image2;
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 18,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *get_netscape_format(const struct Cookie *co)
{
return aprintf(
"%s" /* httponly preamble */
"%s%s\t" /* domain */
"%s\t" /* tailmatch */
"%s\t" /* path */
"%s\t" /* secure */
"%" FORMAT_OFF_T "\t" /* expires */
"%s\t" /* name */
"%s", /* value */
co->httponly?"#HttpOnly_":"",
/* Make sure all domains are prefixed with a dot if they allow
tailmatching. This is Mozilla-style. */
(co->tailmatch && co->domain && co->domain[0] != '.')? ".":"",
co->domain?co->domain:"unknown",
co->tailmatch?"TRUE":"FALSE",
co->path?co->path:"/",
co->secure?"TRUE":"FALSE",
co->expires,
co->name,
co->value?co->value:"");
}
Commit Message: cookie: fix tailmatching to prevent cross-domain leakage
Cookies set for 'example.com' could accidentaly also be sent by libcurl
to the 'bexample.com' (ie with a prefix to the first domain name).
This is a security vulnerabilty, CVE-2013-1944.
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130412.html
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 20,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CrostiniUpgrader::RemoveObserver(CrostiniUpgraderUIObserver* observer) {
upgrader_observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Creates a WebUI-based Crostini Upgrader"
This reverts commit 29c8bb394dd8b8c03e006efb39ec77fc42f96900.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 717476 as the
culprit for failures in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/waterfall/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyRAsSDVdmU3VzcGVjdGVkQ0wiMWNocm9taXVtLzI5YzhiYjM5NGRkOGI4YzAzZTAwNmVmYjM5ZWM3N2ZjNDJmOTY5MDAM
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/b/8896211200981346592
Sample Failed Step: compile
Original change's description:
> Creates a WebUI-based Crostini Upgrader
>
> The UI is behind the new crostini-webui-upgrader flag
> (currently disabled by default)
>
> The main areas for review are
>
> calamity@:
> html/js - chrome/browser/chromeos/crostini_upgrader/
> mojo and webui glue classes - chrome/browser/ui/webui/crostini_upgrader/
>
> davidmunro@
> crostini business logic - chrome/browser/chromeos/crostini/
>
> In this CL, the optional container backup stage is stubbed, and will be
> in a subsequent CL.
>
> A suite of unit/browser tests are also currently lacking. I intend them for
> follow-up CLs.
>
>
> Bug: 930901
> Change-Id: Ic52c5242e6c57232ffa6be5d6af65aaff5e8f4ff
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1900520
> Commit-Queue: Nicholas Verne <nverne@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: calamity <calamity@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#717476}
Change-Id: I704f549216a7d1dc21942fbf6cf4ab9a1d600380
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 930901
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1928159
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#717481}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ask(char *ret, const char *replies, const char *text, ...) {
bool on_tty;
assert(ret);
assert(replies);
assert(text);
on_tty = isatty(STDOUT_FILENO);
for (;;) {
va_list ap;
char c;
int r;
bool need_nl = true;
if (on_tty)
fputs(ANSI_HIGHLIGHT_ON, stdout);
va_start(ap, text);
vprintf(text, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (on_tty)
fputs(ANSI_HIGHLIGHT_OFF, stdout);
fflush(stdout);
r = read_one_char(stdin, &c, (usec_t) -1, &need_nl);
if (r < 0) {
if (r == -EBADMSG) {
puts("Bad input, please try again.");
continue;
}
putchar('\n');
return r;
}
if (need_nl)
putchar('\n');
if (strchr(replies, c)) {
*ret = c;
return 0;
}
puts("Read unexpected character, please try again.");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidSendScreenRects(RenderWidgetHostImpl* rwh) {
if (browser_plugin_embedder_)
browser_plugin_embedder_->DidSendScreenRects();
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int utf8s_to_utf16s(const u8 *s, int len, wchar_t *pwcs)
{
u16 *op;
int size;
unicode_t u;
op = pwcs;
while (*s && len > 0) {
if (*s & 0x80) {
size = utf8_to_utf32(s, len, &u);
if (size < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (u >= PLANE_SIZE) {
u -= PLANE_SIZE;
*op++ = (wchar_t) (SURROGATE_PAIR |
((u >> 10) & SURROGATE_BITS));
*op++ = (wchar_t) (SURROGATE_PAIR |
SURROGATE_LOW |
(u & SURROGATE_BITS));
} else {
*op++ = (wchar_t) u;
}
s += size;
len -= size;
} else {
*op++ = *s++;
len--;
}
}
return op - pwcs;
}
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 16,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CreateIpcChannel(
const std::string& channel_name,
const std::string& pipe_security_descriptor,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> io_task_runner,
IPC::Listener* delegate,
scoped_ptr<IPC::ChannelProxy>* channel_out) {
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes;
security_attributes.nLength = sizeof(security_attributes);
security_attributes.bInheritHandle = FALSE;
ULONG security_descriptor_length = 0;
if (!ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptor(
UTF8ToUTF16(pipe_security_descriptor).c_str(),
SDDL_REVISION_1,
reinterpret_cast<PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR*>(
&security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor),
&security_descriptor_length)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) <<
"Failed to create a security descriptor for the Chromoting IPC channel";
return false;
}
std::string pipe_name(kChromePipeNamePrefix);
pipe_name.append(channel_name);
base::win::ScopedHandle pipe;
pipe.Set(CreateNamedPipe(
UTF8ToUTF16(pipe_name).c_str(),
PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX | FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED | FILE_FLAG_FIRST_PIPE_INSTANCE,
PIPE_TYPE_BYTE | PIPE_READMODE_BYTE,
1,
IPC::Channel::kReadBufferSize,
IPC::Channel::kReadBufferSize,
5000,
&security_attributes));
if (!pipe.IsValid()) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) <<
"Failed to create the server end of the Chromoting IPC channel";
LocalFree(security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor);
return false;
}
LocalFree(security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor);
channel_out->reset(new IPC::ChannelProxy(
IPC::ChannelHandle(pipe),
IPC::Channel::MODE_SERVER,
delegate,
io_task_runner));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 10,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SubmitCompositorFrame(
const viz::LocalSurfaceId& local_surface_id,
viz::CompositorFrame frame,
base::Optional<viz::HitTestRegionList> hit_test_region_list,
uint64_t submit_time) {
if (frame.HasCopyOutputRequests()) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(GetProcess(),
bad_message::RWH_COPY_REQUEST_ATTEMPT);
return;
}
auto new_surface_properties =
RenderWidgetSurfaceProperties::FromCompositorFrame(frame);
if (local_surface_id == last_local_surface_id_ &&
new_surface_properties != last_surface_properties_) {
std::string error = base::StringPrintf(
"[OOPIF? %d] %s\n", view_ && view_->IsRenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame(),
new_surface_properties.ToDiffString(last_surface_properties_).c_str());
LOG(ERROR) << "Surface invariants violation: " << error;
static int invariants_violation_count = 0;
++invariants_violation_count;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_1000("Compositing.SurfaceInvariantsViolations",
invariants_violation_count);
if (features::IsSurfaceInvariantsViolationLoggingEnabled()) {
static auto* crash_key = base::debug::AllocateCrashKeyString(
"surface-invariants-violation", base::debug::CrashKeySize::Size256);
base::debug::ScopedCrashKeyString key_value(crash_key, error);
base::debug::DumpWithoutCrashing();
}
if (view_) {
frame.metadata.begin_frame_ack.has_damage = false;
view_->OnDidNotProduceFrame(frame.metadata.begin_frame_ack);
}
std::vector<viz::ReturnedResource> resources =
viz::TransferableResource::ReturnResources(frame.resource_list);
renderer_compositor_frame_sink_->DidReceiveCompositorFrameAck(resources);
return;
}
last_local_surface_id_ = local_surface_id;
last_surface_properties_ = new_surface_properties;
last_received_content_source_id_ = frame.metadata.content_source_id;
frame.metadata.begin_frame_ack.has_damage = true;
last_frame_metadata_ = frame.metadata.Clone();
if (enable_surface_synchronization_) {
if (view_) {
view_->SubmitCompositorFrame(local_surface_id, std::move(frame),
std::move(hit_test_region_list));
view_->DidReceiveRendererFrame();
} else {
std::vector<viz::ReturnedResource> resources =
viz::TransferableResource::ReturnResources(frame.resource_list);
renderer_compositor_frame_sink_->DidReceiveCompositorFrameAck(resources);
}
} else {
if (view_ &&
frame.metadata.content_source_id >= current_content_source_id_) {
view_->SubmitCompositorFrame(local_surface_id, std::move(frame),
std::move(hit_test_region_list));
view_->DidReceiveRendererFrame();
} else {
if (view_) {
frame.metadata.begin_frame_ack.has_damage = false;
view_->OnDidNotProduceFrame(frame.metadata.begin_frame_ack);
}
std::vector<viz::ReturnedResource> resources =
viz::TransferableResource::ReturnResources(frame.resource_list);
renderer_compositor_frame_sink_->DidReceiveCompositorFrameAck(resources);
}
if (last_received_content_source_id_ >= current_content_source_id_) {
did_receive_first_frame_after_navigation_ = true;
if (new_content_rendering_timeout_ &&
new_content_rendering_timeout_->IsRunning()) {
new_content_rendering_timeout_->Stop();
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint8_t compute_meta_length_after_function(int function,
msg_type_t msg_type)
{
int length;
if (msg_type == MSG_INDICATION) {
if (function <= MODBUS_FC_WRITE_SINGLE_REGISTER) {
length = 4;
} else if (function == MODBUS_FC_WRITE_MULTIPLE_COILS ||
function == MODBUS_FC_WRITE_MULTIPLE_REGISTERS) {
length = 5;
} else if (function == MODBUS_FC_MASK_WRITE_REGISTER) {
length = 6;
} else if (function == MODBUS_FC_WRITE_AND_READ_REGISTERS) {
length = 9;
} else {
/* MODBUS_FC_READ_EXCEPTION_STATUS, MODBUS_FC_REPORT_SLAVE_ID */
length = 0;
}
} else {
/* MSG_CONFIRMATION */
switch (function) {
case MODBUS_FC_WRITE_SINGLE_COIL:
case MODBUS_FC_WRITE_SINGLE_REGISTER:
case MODBUS_FC_WRITE_MULTIPLE_COILS:
case MODBUS_FC_WRITE_MULTIPLE_REGISTERS:
length = 4;
break;
case MODBUS_FC_MASK_WRITE_REGISTER:
length = 6;
break;
default:
length = 1;
}
}
return length;
}
Commit Message: Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsDownloadManagerDelegate::GenerateFilename(
const GURL& url,
const std::string& content_disposition,
const std::string& suggested_filename,
const std::string& mime_type,
const base::FilePath& suggested_directory,
const FilenameDeterminedCallback& callback) {
base::AssertBlockingAllowed();
base::FilePath generated_name =
net::GenerateFileName(url, content_disposition, std::string(),
suggested_filename, mime_type, "download");
if (!base::PathExists(suggested_directory))
base::CreateDirectory(suggested_directory);
base::FilePath suggested_path(suggested_directory.Append(generated_name));
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(content::BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(callback, suggested_path));
}
Commit Message: Always mark content downloaded by devtools delegate as potentially dangerous
Bug: 805445
Change-Id: I7051f519205e178db57e23320ab979f8fa9ce38b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894782
Commit-Queue: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533215}
CWE ID: | 0 | 862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::UpdateCursor(const WebCursor& cursor) {
current_cursor_ = cursor;
const display::Display display =
display::Screen::GetScreen()->GetDisplayNearestWindow(window_);
current_cursor_.SetDisplayInfo(display);
UpdateCursorIfOverSelf();
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 25,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::NativeView OmniboxViewWin::GetNativeView() const {
return m_hWnd;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip6_dst_hoplimit(struct dst_entry *dst)
{
int hoplimit = dst_metric_raw(dst, RTAX_HOPLIMIT);
if (hoplimit == 0) {
struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;
struct inet6_dev *idev;
rcu_read_lock();
idev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
if (idev)
hoplimit = idev->cnf.hop_limit;
else
hoplimit = dev_net(dev)->ipv6.devconf_all->hop_limit;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
return hoplimit;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options
The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller
program. The reproducer is basically:
int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP);
send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE);
send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0);
The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to
NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero
byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path.
The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order
to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points
to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header
can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data
is read outside of it.
This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects
running out-of-bounds.
[ 42.361487] ==================================================================
[ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789
[ 42.366469]
[ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41
[ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 42.368824] Call Trace:
[ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
[ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290
[ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370
[ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50
[ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110
[ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0
[ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30
[ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990
[ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690
[ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990
[ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730
[ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160
[ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330
[ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0
[ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0
[ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0
[ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0
[ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930
[ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120
[ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290
[ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930
[ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540
[ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380
[ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310
[ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0
[ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0
[ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20
[ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0
[ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260
[ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
[ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50
[ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383
[ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383
[ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018
[ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad
[ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00
[ 42.397257]
[ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789:
[ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380
[ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0
[ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580
[ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0
[ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0
[ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0
[ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0
[ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930
[ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190
[ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.403718]
[ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794:
[ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0
[ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0
[ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0
[ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60
[ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0
[ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0
[ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40
[ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110
[ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580
[ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190
[ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.409513]
[ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780
[ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
[ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980)
[ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
[ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c
[ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000
[ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 42.415604]
[ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 42.418273] ^
[ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419882] ==================================================================
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 6,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void git_index__set_ignore_case(git_index *index, bool ignore_case)
{
index->ignore_case = ignore_case;
if (ignore_case) {
index->entries_cmp_path = git__strcasecmp_cb;
index->entries_search = git_index_entry_isrch;
index->entries_search_path = index_entry_isrch_path;
index->reuc_search = reuc_isrch;
} else {
index->entries_cmp_path = git__strcmp_cb;
index->entries_search = git_index_entry_srch;
index->entries_search_path = index_entry_srch_path;
index->reuc_search = reuc_srch;
}
git_vector_set_cmp(&index->entries,
ignore_case ? git_index_entry_icmp : git_index_entry_cmp);
git_vector_sort(&index->entries);
git_vector_set_cmp(&index->reuc, ignore_case ? reuc_icmp : reuc_cmp);
git_vector_sort(&index->reuc);
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 11,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void gf_isom_check_sample_desc(GF_TrackBox *trak)
{
GF_BitStream *bs;
GF_UnknownBox *a;
u32 i;
if (!trak->Media || !trak->Media->information) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Track with no media box !\n" ));
return;
}
if (!trak->Media->information->sampleTable) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Track with no sample table !\n" ));
trak->Media->information->sampleTable = (GF_SampleTableBox *) gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STBL);
}
if (!trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Track with no sample description box !\n" ));
trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription = (GF_SampleDescriptionBox *) gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSD);
return;
}
i=0;
while ((a = (GF_UnknownBox*)gf_list_enum(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->other_boxes, &i))) {
switch (a->type) {
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_MP4S:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_ENCS:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_MP4A:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_ENCA:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_MP4V:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_ENCV:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_RESV:
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_3GP_AMR:
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_3GP_AMR_WB:
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_3GP_EVRC:
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_3GP_QCELP:
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_3GP_SMV:
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_3GP_H263:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_GHNT:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_RTP_STSD:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SRTP_STSD:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_FDP_STSD:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_RRTP_STSD:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_RTCP_STSD:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_METX:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_METT:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STXT:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_AVC1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_AVC2:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_AVC3:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_AVC4:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SVC1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_MVC1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HVC1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HEV1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HVC2:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HEV2:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HVT1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_LHV1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_LHE1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TX3G:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TEXT:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_ENCT:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_DIMS:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_AC3:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_EC3:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_LSR1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_WVTT:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STPP:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SBTT:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_MP3:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_JPEG:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_PNG:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_JP2K:
continue;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_UNKNOWN:
break;
default:
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Unexpected box %s in stsd!\n", gf_4cc_to_str(a->type)));
continue;
}
assert(a->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
if (!a->data || (a->dataSize<8) ) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Sample description %s does not have at least 8 bytes!\n", gf_4cc_to_str(a->original_4cc) ));
continue;
}
else if (a->dataSize > a->size) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Sample description %s has wrong data size %d!\n", gf_4cc_to_str(a->original_4cc), a->dataSize));
continue;
}
/*only process visual or audio*/
switch (trak->Media->handler->handlerType) {
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_VISUAL:
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_AUXV:
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_PICT:
{
GF_GenericVisualSampleEntryBox *genv;
/*remove entry*/
gf_list_rem(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->other_boxes, i-1);
genv = (GF_GenericVisualSampleEntryBox *) gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_GNRV);
bs = gf_bs_new(a->data, a->dataSize, GF_BITSTREAM_READ);
genv->size = a->size-8;
gf_isom_video_sample_entry_read((GF_VisualSampleEntryBox *) genv, bs);
if (gf_bs_available(bs)) {
u64 pos = gf_bs_get_position(bs);
GF_Err e = gf_isom_box_array_read((GF_Box *) genv, bs, gf_isom_box_add_default);
if (e) {
gf_bs_seek(bs, pos);
genv->data_size = (u32) gf_bs_available(bs);
if (genv->data_size) {
genv->data = a->data;
a->data = NULL;
memmove(genv->data, genv->data + pos, genv->data_size);
}
} else {
genv->data_size = 0;
}
}
gf_bs_del(bs);
if (!genv->data_size && genv->data) {
gf_free(genv->data);
genv->data = NULL;
}
genv->size = 0;
genv->EntryType = a->original_4cc;
gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)a);
gf_list_insert(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->other_boxes, genv, i-1);
}
break;
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_AUDIO:
{
GF_GenericAudioSampleEntryBox *gena;
/*remove entry*/
gf_list_rem(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->other_boxes, i-1);
gena = (GF_GenericAudioSampleEntryBox *) gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_GNRA);
gena->size = a->size-8;
bs = gf_bs_new(a->data, a->dataSize, GF_BITSTREAM_READ);
gf_isom_audio_sample_entry_read((GF_AudioSampleEntryBox *) gena, bs);
if (gf_bs_available(bs)) {
u64 pos = gf_bs_get_position(bs);
GF_Err e = gf_isom_box_array_read((GF_Box *) gena, bs, gf_isom_box_add_default);
if (e) {
gf_bs_seek(bs, pos);
gena->data_size = (u32) gf_bs_available(bs);
if (gena->data_size) {
gena->data = a->data;
a->data = NULL;
memmove(gena->data, gena->data + pos, gena->data_size);
}
} else {
gena->data_size = 0;
}
}
gf_bs_del(bs);
if (!gena->data_size && gena->data) {
gf_free(gena->data);
gena->data = NULL;
}
gena->size = 0;
gena->EntryType = a->original_4cc;
gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)a);
gf_list_insert(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->other_boxes, gena, i-1);
}
break;
default:
{
GF_Err e;
GF_GenericSampleEntryBox *genm;
/*remove entry*/
gf_list_rem(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->other_boxes, i-1);
genm = (GF_GenericSampleEntryBox *) gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_GNRM);
genm->size = a->size-8;
bs = gf_bs_new(a->data, a->dataSize, GF_BITSTREAM_READ);
e = gf_isom_base_sample_entry_read((GF_SampleEntryBox *)genm, bs);
if (e) return;
genm->size -= 8;
if (gf_bs_available(bs)) {
u64 pos = gf_bs_get_position(bs);
GF_Err e = gf_isom_box_array_read((GF_Box *) genm, bs, gf_isom_box_add_default);
if (e) {
gf_bs_seek(bs, pos);
genm->data_size = (u32) gf_bs_available(bs);
if (genm->data_size) {
genm->data = a->data;
a->data = NULL;
memmove(genm->data, genm->data + pos, genm->data_size);
}
} else {
genm->data_size = 0;
}
}
gf_bs_del(bs);
if (!genm->data_size && genm->data) {
gf_free(genm->data);
genm->data = NULL;
}
genm->size = 0;
genm->EntryType = a->original_4cc;
gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)a);
gf_list_insert(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->other_boxes, genm, i-1);
}
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 3,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CJSON_PUBLIC(cJSON *) cJSON_CreateStringArray(const char **strings, int count)
{
size_t i = 0;
cJSON *n = NULL;
cJSON *p = NULL;
cJSON *a = NULL;
if ((count < 0) || (strings == NULL))
{
return NULL;
}
a = cJSON_CreateArray();
for (i = 0; a && (i < (size_t)count); i++)
{
n = cJSON_CreateString(strings[i]);
if(!n)
{
cJSON_Delete(a);
return NULL;
}
if(!i)
{
a->child = n;
}
else
{
suffix_object(p,n);
}
p = n;
}
return a;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 9,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool decode_search_options_request(void *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB in, void *_out)
{
void **out = (void **)_out;
struct asn1_data *data = asn1_init(mem_ctx);
struct ldb_search_options_control *lsoc;
if (!data) return false;
if (!asn1_load(data, in)) {
return false;
}
lsoc = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_search_options_control);
if (!lsoc) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, (int *) &(lsoc->search_options))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
*out = lsoc;
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_LIBXML_API void php_libxml_ctx_error(void *ctx, const char *msg, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, msg);
php_libxml_internal_error_handler(PHP_LIBXML_CTX_ERROR, ctx, &msg, args);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaPlayer::setVolume(float leftVolume, float rightVolume)
{
ALOGV("MediaPlayer::setVolume(%f, %f)", leftVolume, rightVolume);
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
mLeftVolume = leftVolume;
mRightVolume = rightVolume;
if (mPlayer != 0) {
return mPlayer->setVolume(leftVolume, rightVolume);
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 27,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionApiTest::RunComponentExtensionTest(
const std::string& extension_name) {
return RunExtensionTestImpl(extension_name,
std::string(),
NULL,
kFlagEnableFileAccess | kFlagLoadAsComponent);
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 23,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::CheckDecoderDxvaSupport() {
base::win::ScopedComPtr<IMFAttributes> attributes;
HRESULT hr = decoder_->GetAttributes(attributes.Receive());
RETURN_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to get decoder attributes", false);
UINT32 dxva = 0;
hr = attributes->GetUINT32(MF_SA_D3D_AWARE, &dxva);
RETURN_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to check if decoder supports DXVA", false);
hr = attributes->SetUINT32(CODECAPI_AVDecVideoAcceleration_H264, TRUE);
RETURN_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to enable DXVA H/W decoding", false);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct btrfs_dir_item *btrfs_lookup_xattr(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root,
struct btrfs_path *path, u64 dir,
const char *name, u16 name_len,
int mod)
{
int ret;
struct btrfs_key key;
int ins_len = mod < 0 ? -1 : 0;
int cow = mod != 0;
key.objectid = dir;
btrfs_set_key_type(&key, BTRFS_XATTR_ITEM_KEY);
key.offset = btrfs_name_hash(name, name_len);
ret = btrfs_search_slot(trans, root, &key, path, ins_len, cow);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
if (ret > 0)
return NULL;
return btrfs_match_dir_item_name(root, path, name, name_len);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 19,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: float Document::DevicePixelRatio() const {
return frame_ ? frame_->DevicePixelRatio() : 1.0;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int compat_getdrvprm(int drive,
struct compat_floppy_drive_params __user *arg)
{
struct compat_floppy_drive_params v;
memset(&v, 0, sizeof(struct compat_floppy_drive_params));
mutex_lock(&floppy_mutex);
v.cmos = UDP->cmos;
v.max_dtr = UDP->max_dtr;
v.hlt = UDP->hlt;
v.hut = UDP->hut;
v.srt = UDP->srt;
v.spinup = UDP->spinup;
v.spindown = UDP->spindown;
v.spindown_offset = UDP->spindown_offset;
v.select_delay = UDP->select_delay;
v.rps = UDP->rps;
v.tracks = UDP->tracks;
v.timeout = UDP->timeout;
v.interleave_sect = UDP->interleave_sect;
v.max_errors = UDP->max_errors;
v.flags = UDP->flags;
v.read_track = UDP->read_track;
memcpy(v.autodetect, UDP->autodetect, sizeof(v.autodetect));
v.checkfreq = UDP->checkfreq;
v.native_format = UDP->native_format;
mutex_unlock(&floppy_mutex);
if (copy_from_user(arg, &v, sizeof(struct compat_floppy_drive_params)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: floppy: fix div-by-zero in setup_format_params
This fixes a divide by zero error in the setup_format_params function of
the floppy driver.
Two consecutive ioctls can trigger the bug: The first one should set the
drive geometry with such .sect and .rate values for the F_SECT_PER_TRACK
to become zero. Next, the floppy format operation should be called.
A floppy disk is not required to be inserted. An unprivileged user
could trigger the bug if the device is accessible.
The patch checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK for a non-zero value in the
set_geometry function. The proper check should involve a reasonable
upper limit for the .sect and .rate fields, but it could change the
UAPI.
The patch also checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK in the setup_format_params, and
cancels the formatting operation in case of zero.
The bug was found by syzkaller.
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 7,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RebuildState(const std::vector<flags_ui::FeatureEntry>& entries) {
flags_state_ = std::make_unique<flags_ui::FlagsState>(entries, this);
}
Commit Message: Add feature and flag to enable incognito Chrome Custom Tabs
kCCTIncognito feature and flag are added to enable/disable incognito
Chrome Custom Tabs. The default is set to disabled.
Bug: 1023759
Change-Id: If32d256e3e9eaa94bcc09f7538c85e2dab53c589
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1911201
Reviewed-by: Peter Conn <peconn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714849}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 32 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void skb_abort_seq_read(struct skb_seq_state *st)
{
if (st->frag_data)
kunmap_atomic(st->frag_data);
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 25,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ext4_map_blocks_es_recheck(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_map_blocks *es_map,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
int flags)
{
int retval;
map->m_flags = 0;
/*
* There is a race window that the result is not the same.
* e.g. xfstests #223 when dioread_nolock enables. The reason
* is that we lookup a block mapping in extent status tree with
* out taking i_data_sem. So at the time the unwritten extent
* could be converted.
*/
down_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) {
retval = ext4_ext_map_blocks(handle, inode, map, flags &
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_KEEP_SIZE);
} else {
retval = ext4_ind_map_blocks(handle, inode, map, flags &
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_KEEP_SIZE);
}
up_read((&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem));
/*
* We don't check m_len because extent will be collpased in status
* tree. So the m_len might not equal.
*/
if (es_map->m_lblk != map->m_lblk ||
es_map->m_flags != map->m_flags ||
es_map->m_pblk != map->m_pblk) {
printk("ES cache assertion failed for inode: %lu "
"es_cached ex [%d/%d/%llu/%x] != "
"found ex [%d/%d/%llu/%x] retval %d flags %x\n",
inode->i_ino, es_map->m_lblk, es_map->m_len,
es_map->m_pblk, es_map->m_flags, map->m_lblk,
map->m_len, map->m_pblk, map->m_flags,
retval, flags);
}
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix data exposure after a crash
Huang has reported that in his powerfail testing he is seeing stale
block contents in some of recently allocated blocks although he mounts
ext4 in data=ordered mode. After some investigation I have found out
that indeed when delayed allocation is used, we don't add inode to
transaction's list of inodes needing flushing before commit. Originally
we were doing that but commit f3b59291a69d removed the logic with a
flawed argument that it is not needed.
The problem is that although for delayed allocated blocks we write their
contents immediately after allocating them, there is no guarantee that
the IO scheduler or device doesn't reorder things and thus transaction
allocating blocks and attaching them to inode can reach stable storage
before actual block contents. Actually whenever we attach freshly
allocated blocks to inode using a written extent, we should add inode to
transaction's ordered inode list to make sure we properly wait for block
contents to be written before committing the transaction. So that is
what we do in this patch. This also handles other cases where stale data
exposure was possible - like filling hole via mmap in
data=ordered,nodelalloc mode.
The only exception to the above rule are extending direct IO writes where
blkdev_direct_IO() waits for IO to complete before increasing i_size and
thus stale data exposure is not possible. For now we don't complicate
the code with optimizing this special case since the overhead is pretty
low. In case this is observed to be a performance problem we can always
handle it using a special flag to ext4_map_blocks().
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f3b59291a69d0b734be1fc8be489fef2dd846d3d
Reported-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Tested-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 8,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_memory_gc_status(const gs_ref_memory_t * mem, gs_memory_gc_status_t * pstat)
{
*pstat = mem->gc_status;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 10,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfrm6_tunnel_spi_init(void)
{
int i;
xfrm6_tunnel_spi = 0;
xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem = kmem_cache_create("xfrm6_tunnel_spi",
sizeof(struct xfrm6_tunnel_spi),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN,
NULL, NULL);
if (!xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < XFRM6_TUNNEL_SPI_BYADDR_HSIZE; i++)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&xfrm6_tunnel_spi_byaddr[i]);
for (i = 0; i < XFRM6_TUNNEL_SPI_BYSPI_HSIZE; i++)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&xfrm6_tunnel_spi_byspi[i]);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [IPV6]: Fix slab corruption running ip6sic
From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CURLcode smtp_continue_auth(struct connectdata *conn, const char *resp)
{
struct smtp_conn *smtpc = &conn->proto.smtpc;
return Curl_pp_sendf(&smtpc->pp, "%s", resp);
}
Commit Message: smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void bmap_unlock(struct gfs2_inode *ip, int create)
{
if (create)
up_write(&ip->i_rw_mutex);
else
up_read(&ip->i_rw_mutex);
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,496 |
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